

INTERNATIONAL
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1973

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INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS ON PALESTINE, 1973

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PREFACE

This is the seventh annual volume of *International Documents on Palestine* which is published jointly by the Institute for Palestine Studies and the University of Kuwait. The purpose of the series is to put on record the attitudes and policies relating to the Palestine question and the Arab-Israeli conflict of the states and organizations directly and indirectly involved. The collection is divided into three sections: United Nations, International (including Israel) and Arab World.

The United Nations section contains the reports or parts of reports relevant to the Middle East as well as resolutions adopted by the United Nations and its specialized agencies. It should be noted that United Nations annual reports in this volume cover a period from the middle of 1972 to the middle of 1973; the parts relevant to the October war will consequently appear in the 1974 volume of this series. While the practice is to include speeches by delegates to the United Nations in the International and Arab World sections, an exception has been made for the debates regarding the October war; a selection of these has been included in the United Nations section.

The documents contained in the International and Arab World sections have been selected from material, written or oral, originating from governments or groupings of states and their officials and, to a minor extent, from private individuals and institutions which represent significant groups of opinion or which are actually or potentially involved in matters relating to the Palestine question. Such material includes treaties, joint communiqués, policy statements, speeches, parliamentary proceedings, interviews and resolutions adopted by conferences and congresses.

In considering items for selection the editors have evaluated their significance in terms of general policy towards the area or as an indirect record of the events of the year. The October war and its aftermath naturally dominate but the selection also deals with the gradual stagnation of international moves to start negotiations, developments in Arab and Palestinian policy and attitudes regarding the confrontation with Israel, Israeli policy regarding the occupied territories in the light of the coming general election, and Israel's growing international isolation, in particular in Africa. Developments in the oil crisis have only been considered insofar as they are directly relevant to the war and to US and European policy towards the Middle East.

In selection no attempt has been made to achieve full geographical representation. The distribution of documents among countries in both the International and Arab World sections reflects the editors' perceptions of those countries' involvement in and influence on events and developments during the year. A large number of countries are represented only indirectly through resolutions and statements of regional organizations such as the OAU.

The majority of documents in the Arab World Section have been selected from the comprehensive documentary collection published in Arabic by the Institute for Palestine Studies, *Arab Documents on Palestine 1973*.

When documents have been reproduced only in part this is indicated in the wording of the title and footnote or, in some cases, by the word *excerpt(s)* after the title of the document.

In the case of documents issued originally in a language other than English the editors have, as far as was possible, used English translations published by journals or agencies of the country of origin. In such instances the footnote simply states "English text" with no reference to the original language. In cases where unofficial English translations have been used they have, when possible, been checked with the original. Other material has been translated especially for this volume. It should be noted that translations from Hebrew have, for technical reasons, been made through Arabic rather than directly into English.

The spelling of names of persons and places is left unchanged in texts appearing in their original versions. In documents translated for this volume familiar Arabic names appear in the form common in the English language press; others are written in a form which, while avoiding diacritical marks, reflects the Arabic spelling as closely as possible.

Within the International and Arab World sections documents are arranged chronologically. When a specific date could not be ascertained, the formula of "early", "mid" or "late" added to the month has been used and the document placed in the approximate chronological sequence. For the period October 6 to October 26 the time (gmt) of issue or publication of a document has been included in the footnote whenever possible. Place is normally designated by city if it is indicated on the document, reliably reported or can safely be assumed; only UN documents carry no indication of place. Within the United Nations section documents are arranged with reference to the organization's internal structure and only within subsections are documents arranged chronologically.

Abbreviations (e.g., PLO for Palestine Liberation Organization) in the text will be found in the index with a cross reference to the full name.

The Institute for Palestine Studies expresses its gratitude to the University of Kuwait, and particularly to its President and its Secretary-General, for invaluable aid towards the publication of this volume.

The Institute also extends its thanks to the staffs of the libraries of the American University of Beirut, the Palestine Research Centre, the UN Information Centre and UNESCO in Beirut for their cooperation.

Translations from French and Italian are by Rosanna Salbashian and from German and Norwegian by Jorgen Nielsen. Janet Habal and Mona Hakim assisted in typing the manuscript and Helena Rashed in the proof-reading. The index was prepared by Helena Rashed.

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Below is a list of the parliamentary records, documentary series, annual reports, radio monitoring services, newspapers and periodicals consulted in the compilation of this book, with their place of publication and frequency:

<i>AAUG Newsletter</i>	Washington, D.C.	irregular
<i>Action</i>	New York	weekly
<i>Africa Diary</i>	New Delhi	weekly
<i>al-Ahram</i>	Cairo	daily
<i>al-Akhbar</i>	Beirut	weekly
<i>al-Amal</i>	Beirut	daily
<i>Al-Hamishmar</i>	Tel Aviv	daily
<i>American Jewish Alternatives to Zionism</i>	New York	irregular
<i>American Journal of International Law</i>	Washington, D.C.	quarterly
<i>al-Anba'</i>	Beirut	weekly
<i>al-Anba'</i>	Rabat	daily
<i>al-Anwar</i>	Beirut	daily
<i>Arab Palestinian Resistance</i>	Damascus	monthly
<i>Arab Report and Record</i>	London	twice a month
<i>L'Arche</i>	Paris	monthly
<i>Asian Recorder</i>	New Delhi	weekly
<i>Australian Foreign Affairs Record</i>	Canberra	monthly
<i>al-Baath</i>	Damascus	daily
<i>BBC Summary of World Broadcasts</i>	London	daily
<i>Bemahane</i>	Tel Aviv	weekly
<i>al-Bilad</i>	Jidda	daily
<i>Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamts der Bundesregierung</i>	Bonn	irregular
<i>Bulletin of the Institute for Palestine Studies</i>	Beirut	twice a month
<i>Canada: Statements and Speeches</i>	Ottawa	irregular
<i>Christian Attitudes on Jews and Judaism</i>	London	twice a month
<i>The Church and the Jewish People Newsletter</i>	Geneva	quarterly
<i>Congressional Record</i>	Washington, D.C.	daily
<i>Corriere della Sera</i>	Milan	daily
<i>Current Digest of the Soviet Press</i>	Columbus, Ohio	weekly

<i>Davar</i>	Tel Aviv	daily
<i>Department of State Bulletin</i>	Washington, D.C.	weekly
<i>Dis Politika—Foreign Policy</i>	Ankara	quarterly
<i>al-Dustur</i>	Amman	daily
<i>Europa Archiv</i>	Bonn	twice a month
<i>al-Fajr al-Jadid</i>	Tripoli, Libya	daily
<i>Filastin al-Thawra</i>	Beirut	weekly
<i>Foreign Affairs</i>	New York	quarterly
<i>Foreign Affairs Bulletin</i>	East Berlin	3 times a month
<i>Foreign Affairs Reports</i>	New Delhi	monthly
<i>Free Palestine</i>	London	monthly
<i>The Guardian Weekly</i>	Manchester	weekly
<i>Haaretz</i>	Tel Aviv	daily
<i>al-Hadaf</i>	Beirut	weekly
<i>Hamburger Morgenpost</i>	Hamburg	daily
<i>Hansard's Parliamentary Debates</i>	London	daily
<i>Haolam Hazeh</i>	Tel Aviv	weekly
<i>al-Hawadith</i>	Beirut	weekly
<i>Hatzofeh</i>	Tel Aviv	daily
<i>L'Humanité</i>	Paris	daily
<i>al-Hurriya</i>	Beirut	weekly
<i>Ila al-Amam</i>	Beirut	weekly
<i>India News</i>	Beirut	irregular
<i>Information Bulletin (RAKAH)</i>	Haifa	monthly
<i>International Affairs</i>	Moscow	monthly
<i>International Herald Tribune</i>	Paris	daily
<i>International Perspectives</i>	Ottawa	6 times a year
<i>Israel at Peace</i>	Tel Aviv	monthly
<i>Israel Digest</i>	Jerusalem	twice a month
<i>Israel Magazine</i>	Tel Aviv	monthly
<i>al-Ittihad</i>	Haifa	twice a week
<i>The Jerusalem Post</i>	Jerusalem	daily
<i>Jeune Afrique</i>	Paris	weekly
<i>Jewish Affairs</i>	New York	6 times a year
<i>Jewish Chronicle</i>	London	weekly
<i>Jewish Frontier</i>	New York	monthly
<i>Jewish Observer and Middle East Review</i>	London	weekly

<i>Journal of Palestine Studies</i>	Beirut	quarterly
<i>al-Jumhuriya</i>	Baghdad	daily
<i>Keesing's Contemporary Archives</i>	Bristol	weekly
<i>Kurier</i>	Vienna	daily
<i>Maariv</i>	Tel Aviv	daily
<i>MAPAM Bulletin</i>	Tel Aviv	quarterly
<i>Middle East Economic Survey</i>	Beirut	weekly
<i>Middle East International</i>	London	monthly
<i>Middle East Journal</i>	Washington, D.C.	quarterly
<i>Le Monde</i>	Paris	daily
<i>al-Montada</i>	Beirut	irregular
<i>Moscow News</i>	Moscow	weekly
<i>al-Muharrir</i>	Beirut	daily
<i>al-Nahar</i>	Beirut	daily
<i>National Jewish Monthly</i>	Washington, D.C.	monthly
<i>National News Agency Bulletin</i>	Beirut	daily
<i>Near East Report</i>	Washington, D.C.	weekly
<i>New Outlook</i>	Tel Aviv	monthly
<i>New Times</i>	Moscow	weekly
<i>New York Times</i>	New York	daily
<i>New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review</i>	Wellington	monthly
<i>Newsweek</i>	New York	weekly
<i>al-Nida'</i>	Beirut	daily
<i>Le Nouvel Observateur</i>	Paris	weekly
<i>Orient</i>	Hamburg	quarterly
<i>L'Orient-Le Jour</i>	Beirut	daily
<i>Pakistan Horizon</i>	Karachi	quarterly
<i>Palestine Digest</i>	Washington, D.C.	monthly
<i>Peking Review</i>	Peking	weekly
<i>La Politique étrangère de la France :</i> <i>Textes et documents</i>	Paris	twice a year
<i>The Pope Speaks</i>	Washington, D.C.	monthly
<i>Relazioni Internazionali</i>	Milan	weekly
<i>Review of International Affairs</i>	Belgrade	twice a month
<i>Revista de Politica Internacional</i>	Madrid	6 times a year
<i>Revue romaine d'études internationales</i>	Bucharest	quarterly
<i>al-Riyad</i>	Riyad	daily

<i>al-Shaab</i>	Algiers	daily
<i>al-Siyasa</i>	Kuwait	daily
<i>Soviet News</i>	London	weekly
<i>Der Spiegel</i>	Hamburg	weekly
<i>Survey of Current Affairs</i>	London	monthly
<i>Survival</i>	London	6 times a year
<i>al-Tala'i</i>	Damascus	twice a month
<i>al-Thawra</i>	Baghdad	daily
<i>al-Thawra</i>	Damascus	daily
<i>Time</i>	New York	weekly
<i>The Times</i>	London	daily
<i>Tricontinental</i>	Havana	monthly
<i>UD-informasjon</i>	Oslo	irregular
<i>UN Documents Index</i>	New York	monthly
<i>UN Monthly Chronicle</i>	New York	monthly
<i>U.S. News and World Report</i>	Washington, D.C.	weekly
<i>USSR and Third World</i>	London	8 times a year
<i>Wafa</i>	Beirut	daily
<i>Die Welt</i>	Hamburg	daily
<i>World Marxist Review Information Bulletin</i>	Toronto	twice a month
<i>Yediot Aharonot</i>	Tel Aviv	daily
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United Nations

Annual Reports Submitted to the General Assembly

1

Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization: the Situation in the Middle East¹

August 4, 1973

A. Search for a settlement

In accordance with his mandate under Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, the Secretary-General continued to report on the activities of Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, his Special Representative to the Middle East. In a report of 15 September 1972 (A/8815-S/10792),² the Secretary-General recalled General Assembly resolution 2799 (XXVI) of 13 December 1971, in which he was requested, *inter alia*, to reactivate the mission of his Special Representative and to report thereon as appropriate to the Security Council and the General Assembly, and stated that Ambassador Jarring had held meetings with the parties concerned at Headquarters as well as in the capitals of their respective countries. The Secretary-General concluded that, in spite of continued efforts, it had not been possible to make substantial progress and an agreed basis for discussions under Ambassador Jarring's auspices did not seem to exist.

CONSIDERATION BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY³

The General Assembly, at its twenty-seventh session, discussed the situation in the Middle East between 29 November and 8 December 1972. In

resolution 2949 (XXVII) of 8 December 1972,⁴ the Assembly reaffirmed that the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East should include the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict and the termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and its right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. It declared that changes carried out by Israel in the occupied Arab territories in contravention of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949⁵ were null and void, and called upon Israel to rescind forthwith all such measures and to desist from all policies and practices affecting the physical character or demographic composition of the occupied Arab territories. The Assembly recognized that respect for the rights of the Palestinians was an indispensable element in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. It also requested the Security Council, in consultation with the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, to take all appropriate steps for the full and speedy implementation of Council resolution 242 (1967).

CONSIDERATION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN APRIL 1973

In the course of the discussion on a Lebanese complaint against Israel (see sect. B.1 below), the representative of Egypt requested the Council to review the entire situation in the Middle East (S/10911 and S/10913).⁶ For that purpose, he submitted a draft resolution (S/10918), under which the Council would request the Secretary-General to submit to the Council a comprehensive

¹ Part One, Chapter I of *Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 16 June 1972–15 June 1973, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 1* (U.N. doc. A/9001), pp. 3–7.

² Printed as doc. 9 in *International Documents on Palestine 1972* [ed. note].

³ For relevant documents, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-seventh Session, Annexes*, agenda item 21. [This and following footnotes are part of the document except where indicated.]

⁴ Printed as doc. 10 in *International Documents on Palestine 1972* [ed. note].

⁵ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75, Nos. 970–973.

⁶ For the printed text, see *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-eighth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1973*.

report on the efforts of the United Nations pertaining to the situation in the Middle East since June 1967, and would decide to meet following the submission of that report to examine the situation in the Middle East. The draft resolution was adopted by the Council on 20 April as resolution 331 (1973).⁷

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Secretary-General submitted a report under Security Council resolution 331 (1973) on 18 May 1973 (S/10929)⁸ giving a full account of the efforts undertaken by the United Nations concerning the situation in the Middle East since June 1967. The first part of the report covered the efforts to deal with particular aspects of the Middle East situation, namely, the status of the cease-fire, the situation in the occupied territories, the question of Jerusalem and the Palestine refugee problem. The second part, which was based largely on previous comprehensive reports, gave details of the efforts of Ambassador Jarring to promote a peaceful settlement between the parties. The Secretary-General concluded that the basic deadlock between the parties remained and observed that a settlement was long overdue. The tensions and conflicts of the Middle East were a heavy burden not only on the countries of the area, but also on the international community itself. It was his earnest hope that in embarking on this new effort, all those concerned would find it possible to look to the future and take advantage of the international instrumentalities at their disposal and of the general and fervent desire of the international community to open a new and more harmonious chapter in the history of the Middle East.

CONSIDERATION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN JUNE 1973

On 6 June 1973 the Security Council began its examination of the situation in the Middle East on the basis of its resolution 331 (1973) and of the report of the Secretary-General. The Council met from 6 to 14 June.⁹ At the last meeting, on 14 June, the President announced that the exchange of views

with the members of the Council had indicated a common view that a suspension of the Council meetings would be useful for further unofficial consultations among the members in regard to the Council's next step. It was therefore agreed that the Council should suspend its discussion on the understanding that it would reconvene in the middle of July.

Details on the consideration of this question by the Security Council will be found in its report to the General Assembly.¹⁰

B. *Status of the cease-fire*

1. ISRAEL-LEBANON AND ISRAEL-SYRIA SECTORS

The United Nations cease-fire observation operations continued in both sectors during the period under review. Acting upon a request from the Lebanese Government and after having been informed by the President of the Security Council that the Council had no objection to the proposed action, the Secretary-General established two additional observation posts in the Israel-Lebanon sector and increased by four the number of observers assigned to UNTSO (S/10818, S/10819 and S/10907).¹¹

The reports submitted by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO and transmitted by the Secretary-General to the Security Council almost on a daily basis (S/7930 and addenda) show that frequent incidents took place in the two sectors during the period under review. In the Israel-Lebanon sector, Israeli forces personnel continued to occupy, during daylight hours, three posts in Lebanese territory near the armistice demarcation line. There were many cases of small-arms or machine-gun firing in the Israel-Syria sector and occasional overflights by Israeli military aircraft in both sectors. In addition to those occurrences, several more serious incidents involving mainly ground and air attacks by Israeli forces were reported by United Nations observers.

The more serious incidents were generally also brought to the attention of the Security Council by

¹⁰ See doc. 2 below [ed. note].

⁷ Printed as doc. 31 below [ed. note].

⁸ Printed as doc. 8 below [ed. note].

⁹ *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-eighth Year*, 1717th to 1726th meetings.

¹¹ For the printed text, see *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-seventh Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1972*, documents S/10818 and S/10819; and *ibid.*, *Twenty-eighth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1973*, document S/10907.

the parties themselves and, in some cases, were considered by the Council at their request. Those incidents and their consideration by the Council are outlined below.

CONSIDERATION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN JUNE AND JULY 1972

On 20 June 1972, Israel complained that terrorists based in Lebanon had attacked civilians in Israeli territory (S/10706).¹² Subsequently, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic charged that Israeli forces had launched large-scale attacks against Lebanon on 21, 22 and 23 June and had abducted a number of Lebanese and Syrian military and security personnel from Lebanese territory during an attack on 21 June. On 23 June, Lebanon submitted a request, with which the Syrian Arab Republic associated itself, for an urgent meeting of the Security Council to discuss this matter (S/10715).¹² Israel also requested a meeting to consider the continuous armed attacks and other acts of terror against Israel from Lebanese territory (S/10716).¹²

The Council considered the above complaints at three meetings held between 23 and 26 June.¹³ As a result of this consideration, the Council adopted resolution 316 (1972)¹⁴ on 26 June by which it condemned, while deploring all acts of violence, Israel's repeated attacks on Lebanese territory and population and expressed the strong desire that appropriate steps would lead to the release of all Syrian and Lebanese military and security personnel abducted by Israeli forces on 21 June.

On 5 July, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic complained that Israel had not abided by Security Council resolution 316 (1972) and requested an urgent meeting of the Council (S/10730 and S/10731).¹⁵ Israel also requested an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the mutual release of all prisoners of war in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1949 (S/10739).¹⁵

The Security Council considered these complaints from 18 to 21 July.¹⁶ At the outset of the debate, the Council was informed of the efforts made by the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General regarding the implementation of Council resolution 316 (1972). On 21 July, the Council adopted resolution 317 (1972), in which it reaffirmed its resolution 316 (1972) and called on Israel to return without delay all Syrian and Lebanese military and security personnel abducted by Israeli armed forces on 21 June. The Council also requested the President of the Council and the Secretary-General to make renewed efforts to secure the implementation of the resolution.

In this connexion, it may be noted that, in his report of 18 May 1973, the Secretary-General referred to the efforts he had made in close co-operation with the President of the Security Council for the release of the Syrian and Lebanese abducted personnel and indicated that so far those efforts had not proved successful (S/10929, para. 9). Subsequently, the Secretary-General was informed that the abducted personnel, together with a number of prisoners of war detained in Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic, had been released and repatriated on 3 June in operations carried out under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

CONSIDERATION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN SEPTEMBER 1972

On 8 September, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic complained that Israeli military aircraft had attacked various localities that day in their territories causing many casualties among the civilian population (S/10780 and A/8785-S/10781).¹⁷ They subsequently requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider this matter (S/10782 and S/10783).¹⁷

The Security Council held two meetings on 10 September¹⁸ to consider those complaints. A draft resolution whereby the Council would call on the parties concerned to cease immediately all military

¹² For the printed text, see *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-seventh Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1972*.

¹³ *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-seventh Year*, 1648th to 1650th meetings.

¹⁴ Printed as doc. 16 in *International Documents on Palestine 1972* [ed. note].

¹⁵ For the printed text, see *ibid.*, *Twenty-seventh Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1972*.

¹⁶ *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-seventh Year*, 1651st to 1653rd meetings.

¹⁷ For the printed text, see *ibid.*, *Twenty-seventh Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1972*.

¹⁸ *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-seventh Year*, 1661st and 1662nd meetings.

operations and to exercise the greatest restraint in the interest of international peace and security received 13 votes in favour and 1 against, with 1 abstention. It was not adopted because of the negative vote of a permanent member of the Council.

INCIDENTS BETWEEN SEPTEMBER 1972 AND APRIL 1973

On 16 September, Lebanon charged that Israeli armed forces had launched a massive land and air attack that day against southern Lebanon (S/10795 and S/10799).¹⁹ On 17 September, Israel stated that the action undertaken by the Israeli forces was part of Israel's consistent defence effort against terrorist organizations operating against it from Lebanese territory (S/10796 and S/10801).¹⁹

On 21 November, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO reported that a number of Israeli military aircraft had attacked targets that day in the Syrian Arab Republic. There were also exchanges of artillery and tank fire between Israeli and Syrian forces in the cease-fire sector (S/7930/Add.1809 and 1810).¹⁹

On 21 February 1973, Lebanon complained that Israeli armed units had landed that day in northern Lebanon and had attacked two Palestinian refugee camps in the area causing many casualties (S/10885).²⁰ Israel replied that its action had been directed against centres used by terrorist organizations for action against Israel (S/10887).²⁰

CONSIDERATION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN APRIL 1973

On 11 April 1973, Lebanon complained that in the early hours of 10 April, units belonging to the Israeli armed forces had landed south of Beirut and had attacked several objectives in the city (S/10911).²¹ A total of 14 persons had been killed, including three Palestinian leaders, and 29 wounded. Israel replied that its action in Beirut had been directed against terrorist headquarters and bases (S/10912).²¹ Subsequently, Lebanon re-

quested an emergency meeting of the Security Council to consider this matter (S/10913).²¹

The Security Council considered the Lebanese complaint at seven meetings held between 12 and 21 April.²² The Council also heard the representative of Egypt, who requested the Council to review the entire situation in the Middle East (see sect. A above).

In connexion with the Lebanese complaint, the Security Council, on 21 April, adopted resolution 332 (1973),²³ in which it condemned all acts of violence which endangered or took innocent human lives and the repeated military attacks by Israel against Lebanon and called upon Israel to desist forthwith from all military attacks on Lebanon.

2. SUEZ CANAL AND ISRAEL-JORDAN SECTORS

During the period under review, there were no complaints from the parties concerning cease-fire violations in the Suez Canal and Israel-Jordan sectors. The United Nations cease-fire observation operation in the Suez Canal sector continued its activities. According to the reports submitted by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, the situation in that sector was quiet and there were no violations of the cease-fire with the exception of a few incidents involving isolated small-arms firings or overflights (S/7930/Add.1677, 1738, 1743, 1758, 1760, 1770, 1772, 1773, 1826, 1830, and 1951).²⁴

C. *Treatment of civilian populations in Israeli-occupied territories*

During the period under review, the Security Council received a number of communications relating to the treatment of civilian populations in Israeli-occupied territories and to general conditions there. Egypt, Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic charged that Israel was following a policy of mass deportation of civilians, mass destruction of houses, as well as expropriation of property in order to consolidate its occupation of

¹⁹ For the printed text, see *ibid.*, *Twenty-seventh Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1972*.

²⁰ For the printed text, see *ibid.*, *Twenty-eighth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1973*.

²¹ For the printed text, see *ibid.*, *Supplement for April, May and June 1973*.

²² Printed as doc. 32 below [ed. note].

²³ For the printed text, see *ibid.*, *Twenty-seventh Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1972*, document S/7930/Add.1677; *ibid.*, *Supplement for October, November and December 1972*, documents S/7930/Add.1772, 1773 and 1826; and *ibid.*, *Supplement for January, February and March 1973*, document S/7930/Add.1951.

Arab territories and to settle its own immigrants there. Israel's reply to those charges was that the policy followed by Arab States was to keep those regions in constant terror and turmoil, and that Israel had taken measures to prevent violence and terror fomented by Arab States (A/8735-S/10717, S/10724, A/8736-S/10725, A/8737-S/10726, A/8738-S/10727, A/8998-S/10857 and A/9035-S/10862).²⁵

On 7 April Egypt, Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic charged that Israel was reportedly considering a proposal for the authorization of Israeli individuals to purchase land and property in the occupied territories and demanded that action be taken to make Israel desist forthwith from any such action (A/9055-S/10909).²⁶ A letter from Israel dated 12 April indicated that there was no change in the procedure regarding the transfer of land in the occupied territories (A/9058-S/10914).²⁶

The question of the violation of human rights in the occupied territories is dealt with in the chapter on human rights [not reproduced here—ed.].

D. *The situation in and around Jerusalem and its Holy Places*

The situation with regard to Jerusalem and the Holy Places was the subject of several communications by Jordan and Israel. In August and October 1972, Jordan complained of Israeli designs to complete the Judaization of the Old City of Jerusalem through expropriation of property, evacuation of its inhabitants and construction and requested a halt to Israel's measures in the Old City (A/8755-S/10760²⁷ and A/8858-S/10814²⁸). Israel replied that construction had been undertaken in the Jewish Quarter of East Jerusalem which, in 19 years of Jordanian occupation, had been systematically destroyed and its entire Jewish population uprooted and exiled (A/8766-S/10765).²⁷ Egypt transmitted a resolu-

tion adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO on 17 November calling for the preservation of cultural properties of the Old City of Jerusalem (A/8932-S/10845).²⁸

In a letter dated 14 February 1973, Jordan complained that work undertaken by Israel, under the pretext of "archaeological excavations", below the southern and western walls of the Al-Aqsa Mosque might, if continued, cause the destruction of one of the holiest places in Islam (A/9045-S/10882).²⁹ Israel replied that the work done in the area of the Al-Aqsa Mosque was being executed under the direction of the Moslem Council in charge of the Mosque and that it was in no way connected with any archaeological activities which were being conducted outside the area of the Mosque (A/9046-S/10883).²⁹

On 23 April, Jordan called attention to the fact that, in defiance of Security Council resolutions, in particular resolutions 250 (1968) of 27 April 1968 and 251 (1968) of 2 May 1968, Israel was planning to hold a large military parade on 7 May to celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of its establishment, and that the parade would extend to the Arab sector of Jerusalem (A/9059-S/10919).³⁰ On 27 April, the President of the Security Council, after consultations with all the members of the Council, drew the attention of the Permanent Representative of Israel to the provisions of Council resolution 250 (1968) calling on Israel to refrain from holding a military parade in Jerusalem on 2 May 1968, and to resolution 251 (1968), by which the Security Council unanimously deplored the holding of the parade.³¹ In a second letter, dated 8 May, Jordan said that Israel had held a military parade in Jerusalem despite the statement of the President of the Security Council on 27 April. It asserted that in so doing Israel was continuing its repeated violations of successive General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on Jerusalem and on other aspects of the Middle East conflict (A/9064-S/10924).³⁰

²⁵ For the printed text, see *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-seventh Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1972*, documents S/10717, S/10724, S/10725 and S/10726; *ibid.*, *Supplement for July, August and September 1972*, document S/10727; and *ibid.*, *Twenty-eighth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1973*, documents S/10857 and S/10862.

²⁶ For the printed text, see *ibid.*, *Twenty-eighth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1973*.

²⁷ For the printed text, see *ibid.*, *Twenty-seventh Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1972*.

²⁸ For the printed text, see *ibid.*, *Supplement for October, November and December 1972*.

²⁹ For the printed text, see *ibid.*, *Twenty-eighth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1973*.

³⁰ For the printed text, see *ibid.*, *Supplement for April, May and June 1973*.

³¹ See doc. 23 below [ed. note].

E. General statements and other matters brought to the attention of the Security Council in connexion with the situation in the Middle East

During the period under review, the Security Council and the Secretary-General received several communications concerning various other matters relating to the situation in the Middle East. The Lod incident, which had taken place in May 1972, was the subject of further communications between Israel and the Libyan Arab Republic (A/8696-S/10701, S/10702, A/8732-S/10707 and A/8734-S/10713).³² There were also a few communications regarding hijacking and airline incidents. Israel drew attention to the detention on 23 October by the Netherlands authorities at the Amsterdam airport of a man who tried to smuggle letter bombs and arms for use by Arab terror organizations, and to the hijacking on 29 October of a Lufthansa aircraft by Arab terrorists (S/10816 and S/10817).³³

During the month of March 1973, the Security Council received a number of communications with regard to a Libyan civil aircraft incident, which resulted in the death of 106 civilians (S/10893, S/10895, S/10902 and S/10904).³⁴ Egypt charged that Israeli aircraft had attacked the Libyan aircraft with cannon fire and missiles. That aircraft, which was on a flight from Benghazi to Cairo, had deviated from its original course, owing to navigational difficulties and bad weather, and accidentally overflew the occupied Egyptian territory of Sinai. Israel said that its Prime Minister had expressed deep sorrow at the loss of human life and claimed that the incident had resulted from a series of errors which had led the Israeli defence system to assume that the plane had penetrated into occupied territory on a hostile mission. She hoped that a channel of communications could be set up with Arab countries in the event of future emergencies. Egypt replied that the responsibility for the incident lay with Israel, as was evident from the Israeli pilot's statement that he had shot at the wings, which meant that it was done with the intention of blowing up

the aircraft in midair. Egypt also transmitted the text of a resolution, adopted on 28 February 1973 by the Assembly of ICAO at its nineteenth extraordinary session, condemning the Israeli action (S/10893, annex I).³⁵ In connexion with this incident, the representatives of non-aligned countries at the United Nations issued a statement on 21 February expressing sympathy for the loss of innocent civilian lives and condemning unwarranted acts of aggression which aggravated the tension in the Middle East (A/9049-S/10889).

Other communications were related to the prisoners of war in Egypt, Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic, conditions in the occupied territories, the situation in the Middle East in general and terrorism in the area (A/8737-S/10725³⁶ and A/8738-S/10727).³⁷ Israel invoked the Geneva Convention of 1949 relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War and expressed its desire for a general release and repatriation of all prisoners of war held by the parties (S/10732).³⁷

With regard to terrorism, Israel called attention to the campaign of terror carried out with the support of Arab States by Arab terrorist organizations which had culminated in the killing of Israeli athletes in Munich on 5 September 1972 (A/8784-S/10779).³⁷ Egypt replied that it was Israel that had introduced terrorism to the Middle East and was carrying out official terror in the occupied territories (A/8806-S/10788).³⁷

2

Report of the Security Council: the Situation in the Middle East³⁸

November, 1973

A. Communications, reports of the Secretary-General and discussion by the Council concerning the status of the cease-fire

³² For the printed text, see *ibid.*, *Twenty-seventh Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1972*.

³³ For the printed text, see *ibid.*, *Supplement for October, November and December 1972*.

³⁴ For the printed text, see *ibid.*, *Twenty-eighth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1973*.

³⁵ Printed as doc. 45 below [ed. note].

³⁶ For the printed text, see *ibid.*, *Twenty-seventh Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1972*.

³⁷ For the printed text, see *ibid.*, *Supplement for July, August and September 1972*.

³⁸ Part One, Chapter 1 of *Report of the Security Council, 16 June 1972-15 June 1973, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 2* (U.N. doc. A/9002), pp. 2-40.

1. COMPLAINTS BY ISRAEL AND JORDAN

5. During the period covered by this report, no complaints were received from Israel or Jordan concerning violations of the cease-fire in the Israel-Jordan sector, and no meetings of the Security Council were held in that connexion.

2. REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THE SUEZ CANAL SECTOR

6. With regard to the situation in the Suez Canal sector, no complaints were submitted directly to the Security Council by Egypt or Israel regarding cease-fire violations. The Secretary-General continued to circulate supplemental information on the basis of reports received regularly from the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) that occasionally included complaints of cease-fire violations (S/7930/Add.1657, 1673, 1677, 1738, 1743, 1758, 1762, 1770, 1772, 1773, 1826 and 1830).

7. In a report dated 20 July 1972 (S/7930/Add.1673), the Chief of Staff indicated that Israeli jet aircraft had been seen crossing the Suez Canal from east to west and then recrossing soon thereafter. In reports dated 24 July and 10 October (S/7930/Add.1677 and 1762), he indicated that Egyptian surface-to-air missiles had been fired at Israeli aircraft. Israel complained, and United Nations military observers confirmed, that on those occasions Egyptian missiles had been fired at its aircraft while on routine flight over the east bank of the Suez Canal.

8. In other reports dated 16 and 17 September, 5, 15, 16 and 17 October, and 3 and 11 December (S/7930/Add.1738, 1743, 1758, 1762, 1770, 1772, 1773, 1826 and 1830), it was indicated that Israel had complained of rifle and machine-gun fire by Egyptian forces against Israeli positions on the east bank of the Canal but that the incidents referred to in Israel's complaints had not been confirmed by the United Nations observers.

3. COMPLAINTS BY ISRAEL AND THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC

9. In a letter dated 22 June 1972 (S/10710), the Syrian Arab Republic complained that Israeli forces had ambushed and abducted from inside Lebanese territory five Syrian officers who had been on a visit to the Lebanese Army and requested

that the Security Council initiate steps for their immediate release (see section 4 (a) below).

10. Between 16 June and early September, the Secretary-General continued to circulate supplemental information based on reports received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO on the situation in the Israel-Syria sector. The reports related to firing incidents, crossing of the cease-fire line and overflights by the Israeli and Syrian aircraft (S/7930/Add. 1635-1640, 1643, 1644, 1647, 1649-1652, 1654-1672, 1674-1687, 1689, 1691-1708, 1710-1722 and 1724-1728).

11. In a letter dated 14 September (S/10790), the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic recalled his statement in the Security Council on 10 September (see section 4 (f) below) that, by its failure to condemn Israel and compel it to put an end to its military operations against Syria the Council had condoned more bloodshed, thus threatening peace and security. He added that statements subsequently made by Israeli officials, including the Prime Minister, had revealed Israel's aggressive intentions, which endangered world peace and security. Therefore, he said, the Council must compel Israel to end its aggression and refrain from launching any new attacks against the Syrian Arab Republic.

12. In letters dated 8 September, 17 and 30 October (S/10781, S/10809 and S/10820), the Syrian Arab Republic complained that Israeli aircraft had bombarded a number of villages in its territory, causing death and injuries to many civilian citizens. With regard to the attack on 17 October, Syria added that official Israeli statements indicated that the attack was not in retaliation for any specific act but the first move in carrying out a sterner policy towards the enemy. The Israeli attack against populated areas near Damascus was also in pursuance of a campaign of terror against the Palestinian people.

13. In its reply dated 1 November (S/10823), Israel stated that its action in Syria was part of its war on Arab terror warfare, which was protected by Syria, and noted that in its letter Syria had omitted any reference to principles of international law and the United Nations Charter which obliged Syria to reach a peaceful agreement with Israel and to refrain from protecting terror organizations.

14. Between mid-September and December the Chief of Staff of UNTSO continued to report (S/7930/Add.1731-1736, 1738-1744, 1746-1761,

1763–1766, 1768–1822, 1826, 1829, 1831–1834, 1836, 1841–1843, 1845, 1847–1850, 1852) almost daily firing incidents in the Israel-Syria sector involving artillery, mortar and automatic-weapons fire, as well as air activity in that sector involving overflights by either Syrian or Israeli jet aircraft. His reports during the month of November indicated that the incidents had intensified. On 9 November, the Chief of Staff stated that he had followed with deep concern the increasing frequency of serious incidents both in the Israel-Syria and Israel-Lebanon sectors and noted that the incidents of 9 November had resulted in a further worsening of the situation in the area (S/7930/Add.1797). In that report, the Secretary-General stated that he fully shared the concern of the Chief of Staff. Again, on 22 November after reporting a series of incidents that had occurred the previous day in both the Israel-Syria and Israel-Lebanon sectors, the Secretary-General stated that he was gravely concerned at the scale of the incidents of 21 November, which had been even more serious than those of 9 November and constituted a further aggravation of the situation in the area (S/7930/Add.1811).

15. In a letter dated 9 January (S/10860), the Syrian Arab Republic complained that Israeli jet aircraft had attacked a number of villages, in addition to military positions, killing many children, women and other civilians. Syria drew the attention of the President of the Council to the gravity of the situation and said that the Council's failure to act had encouraged Israel to pursue its aggression against a State Member of the United Nations.

16. Israel replied on 16 January (S/10861) that its air action had been directed against bases of terrorist organizations and Syrian military installations and that communiqués issued by those organizations, as well as by Syrian officials, had confirmed that fact. The situation along the Israel-Syria cease-fire line, the letter added, depended on Syria's willingness to abide by its international obligations. During 1972, 122 armed attacks had been perpetrated from Syrian territory along the cease-fire line, resulting in 5 Israelis killed and 11 wounded. When Syria put an end to such assaults, the letter concluded, there would be no need for Israeli action.

17. Between January and June 1973, the reports

of the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, like those submitted previously, continued to indicate a variety of incidents on the cease-fire line of the Israel-Syria sector involving firing incidents and aircraft overflight (S/7930/Add. 1853–1856, 1858, 1860–1862, 1864–1867, 1870, 1872–1874, 1876, 1877, 1882, 1883, 1887, 1890–1893, 1895–1897, 1899, 1901–1903, 1905, 1909–1917, 1919–1921, 1923, 1924, 1926, 1928, 1929, 1931, 1934, 1935, 1937, 1940–1945, 1947, 1949, 1950, 1953–1956, 1958, 1959, 1961, 1962, 1964–1990, 1992–1993, 1996–2001, 2009–2011, 2014–2015, 2018–2022).

4. COMPLAINTS BY ISRAEL AND LEBANON

(a) *Communications to the Council, reports of the Secretary-General and requests for a meeting*

18. In a letter dated 20 June 1972 (S/10706), Israel submitted a complaint to the President of the Council concerning attacks carried out by terrorists operating from Lebanese territory and stated that terror organizations were in full control of the southern part of Lebanon, where the attacks had originated. Israel demanded that Lebanon take effective measures to prevent those attacks and to put an end to terror operations conducted against Israel from Lebanese territory.

19. Between 16 and 30 June the Secretary-General continued to circulate supplemental information (S/7930/Add.1635–1637, 1640, 1648, 1650–1653) on the basis of reports received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO concerning the Israel-Lebanon sector. The reports indicated that there had been flights by Israeli jet aircraft over localities in southern Lebanon and contained complaints by Lebanon that Israeli forces had, on many occasions, crossed the border and directed their artillery or mortar fire into Lebanese territory, causing casualties and damage. The complaints were not always confirmed by the observers because, as explained in the reports, the location of the alleged incidents was outside the observation range of the observation posts.

20. In a report dated 21 June (S/7930/Add. 1643), the Chief of Staff reported that Israel jet aircraft had been observed attacking with bombs general target areas in the southern region of Lebanon. The report contained complaints by Lebanon charging that, on the same day, Israeli armoured forces had penetrated Lebanese territory and attacked a vehicular column, killing 5 military

personnel and capturing 5 Syrian officers, 1 Lebanese officer and 3 gendarmes. The complaint also charged that Israeli aircraft had bombed two Lebanese towns and a village, killing 9 civilians and wounding 24, and also destroying or damaging 40 houses and 16 civilian vehicles.

21. In a letter dated 23 June (S/10715), the representative of Lebanon stated that Israel's persistent aggression against Lebanon had culminated in a large-scale air and ground attack against his country on 21, 22 and 23 June. In view of the extreme gravity of the situation, Lebanon requested the convening of an urgent meeting of the Security Council.

22. In a letter (S/10716) also dated 23 June, the representative of Israel requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the continued armed attacks, shelling, sabotage, incursions, acts of air piracy and other acts of terror and violence perpetrated from Lebanese territory against Israel.

(b) *Consideration at the 1648th to 1650th meetings
(23-26 June 1972)*

23. At the 1648th meeting on 23 June 1972, the provisional agenda listing the letters of Lebanon and Israel (S/10715 and S/10716) under separate headings was adopted. The representatives of Lebanon and Israel, and, subsequently, the representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic, Egypt, Kuwait and Jordan were invited, at their request, to participate in the debate without the right to vote.

24. At the same meeting, the representative of Lebanon said that, on 21 June, an Israeli patrol, consisting of two jeeps supported by an armoured patrol, had entered Lebanese territory in the central region of southern Lebanon and destroyed Lebanese vehicles. At the same time, a Syrian military delegation of seven officers had been visiting the same region during a traditional exchange of visits between army officers of the Syrian Arab Republic and those of Lebanon. The delegation, escorted by one Lebanese officer and five military policeman, had been travelling in a convoy of civilian cars about 400 metres inside Lebanese territory. The convoy had been ambushed by an Israeli military armoured unit composed of five tanks and three half-tracks, which had opened fire on the party. Four Lebanese military policemen had been killed, and a fifth, who had been injured,

had been abducted by the Israeli forces and later died of his wounds in Israel. Five Syrian officers and the Lebanese officer had been kidnapped. One Syrian officer had been wounded and another had managed to escape.

25. He rejected Israel's allegation that the Syrian officers had been captured while engaged in hostile acts against Israel and denied that any infiltration or shelling of Israel had taken place from Lebanese territory or that any element had crossed the Lebanese border to lay mines in the occupied Golan Heights.

26. He then recalled that, in September 1970 and in February 1972, the Council, in response to Lebanon's complaints, had stopped short of taking decisive action against the aggressor. Lebanon had shown its good faith in doing everything to promote conditions of peace in the area and had asked for the strengthening of United Nations machinery under the Armistice Agreement, but Israel had refused to co-operate with the Council or to allow United Nations observers to operate on its territory. The reports of the United Nations observers had not once come up with any facts showing that hostile action had been undertaken from Lebanese territory. On the contrary, some of them contained ample evidence of consistent Israeli violations of Lebanese sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Council, on the basis of many Lebanese complaints, had strongly condemned Israel for its aggression against Lebanon and warned it against the repetition of such acts. Lebanon put its trust and faith in the Council and had come before it for justice against the aggressor that had been disturbing the peace in the area and the world for years in defiance of many United Nations resolutions. Lebanon had two immediate requests of the Council, namely, a very strong condemnation of Israel for its repeated acts of aggression and the immediate return to Lebanon of the Syrian and Lebanese officers who had been abducted by Israeli forces on 21 June.

27. The representative of Israel said that on 20 June, Arab terror organizations based in Lebanon had opened bazooka fire on an Israeli civilian bus and wounded two elderly passengers. Hours later, two Israeli soldiers had been injured by the explosion of a mine planted in the same region by a terror squad from Lebanon. The following day, the Israeli air force and artillery had reacted in self-defence against concentrations of terrorists

in the south-eastern region of Lebanon. Approximately 100 metres from the border an Israeli patrol had encountered a military convoy, which had opened fire. In the ensuing clash, five Syrian officers, one Lebanese officer, a soldier and four gendarmes had been taken prisoner. Early on 23 June, terror squads had opened bazooka fire from Lebanon on the town of Kiryat Shmona. Israeli forces had returned fire. Israel continued to hope that Lebanon would abide by its international obligations and put an end to the criminal activities of the terror organizations. However, to claim, as Lebanon sometimes did, that terror operations from Lebanon were a function of the presence in that country of Palestinian refugees was to play on gullibility or ignorance. Lebanon had allowed the terror groups to turn that country into a base of operations and to establish headquarters in Beirut. As an example, he cited the Lod airport massacre on 30 May and said that the Arab reaction had been one of callousness and frivolity and that Lebanon had disclaimed responsibility for the attack, which had been initiated, planned and perpetrated from its territory. The Lebanese Government had the obligation under international law and the Charter to ensure that its territory was not used as a springboard for aggression against a neighbouring State. When Lebanon repudiated that obligation, it left Israel no alternative but to act in self-defence.

28. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the new aggressive action of Israel was an act of brigandage incompatible with international law. Israel's policy of continued aggression in the Middle East, which had been repeatedly condemned by the Security Council and the General Assembly, had kept that area in a state of dangerous military tension fraught with extremely serious consequences for international peace. Israel was committing new acts of aggression precisely at a time when certain important international problems were being solved on a realistic basis and the international climate was improving, and when prospects were being opened for a renewal of the Jarring mission and for the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). Israel, however, opposed such international efforts to bring about a peaceful political settlement in the Middle East and was attempting to play for time in the hope that by a policy of *fait accompli* it might be able to convert

the occupied territories into Israeli colonies. The Security Council must categorically condemn Israel's new acts of aggression and demand the immediate release of the members of the Syrian delegation taken prisoner by Israeli forces.

29. The representative of the Sudan said that the aggression of 21 June could be justified neither as a reprisal for the Lod incident nor by the allegations in the letter of the representative of Israel or his statement to the Council. Israeli forces had illegally entered Lebanon, massacring innocent people and destroying houses. Israeli aircraft had joined in that action on two occasions, killing 11 innocent people. The Sudanese delegation strongly condemned Israel's repeated aggression against Lebanon and its abduction of Syrian and Lebanese citizens. The Council must take urgent action to ensure the immediate and unconditional release of the kidnapped Syrian and Lebanese officers.

30. The representative of China said that his Government and people strongly condemned the aggressive crimes of Israel and expressed firm support for the Lebanese Government and people in their struggle to resist aggression, protect their territory and safeguard their sovereignty. The Security Council must severely condemn Israeli Zionism for its crime of armed aggression against Lebanon and firmly demand that the Israeli authorities immediately stop their aggression, return the abducted Syrian and Lebanese personnel, compensate for all the losses caused by Israeli aggression and guarantee against the recurrence of similar incidents.

31. The representative of Somalia said that the Security Council should take prompt and resolute measures against Israel's aggression in order to bring about the immediate release of the kidnapped Syrian and Lebanese officers and should condemn the Israeli aggressors, who had become a constant menace to peace, security and stability in the Middle East and who continued to defy the authority of the Security Council.

32. At the 1649th meeting on 24 June, the representative of Egypt said that the Israelis were conducting themselves in the occupied Arab territories as colonizers. They had destroyed entire villages, expelled populations *en masse* and committed infamous crimes against innocent people. In the background of the problem there were three occupied Arab countries, structural

changes carried out in the occupied territories, a Palestinian population under the yoke of Israeli occupation and Israeli forces powerfully armed by the United States. Calm would return to the area when the United Nations resolutions were implemented, when the Jarring mission was resumed, when the Israeli forces withdrew totally from all the occupied Arab territories and when the rights of the Palestinians were safeguarded. The Security Council should condemn Israel for premeditated aggression against Lebanon and calling upon Israel to liberate the Syrian and Lebanese officers unlawfully abducted from Lebanese territory.

33. The representative of Kuwait stated that what Israel called terrorism resulted from the indignation of the Palestinian people, which was being denied its rights and had demonstrated the will not to perish in the abysmal misery of sordid camps. The tranquillity of the Middle East and the achievement of a long-sought-after peace were contingent upon Israel's withdrawal from all Arab territories and the implementation of the United Nations resolutions on the rights of the Palestinians in their homeland.

34. The representative of Jordan said that even though the current Israeli violence against Lebanon was an expression of the Israeli violence that had created the Arab-Israeli problem, it was only the immediate violence against Lebanon that the Council must judge, punish and control. The latest victims must be guaranteed against future repetition of the crime. Israel must be brought under the law of nations and made to comply with the international will.

35. The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic said that his Government fully associated itself with the complaint submitted by Lebanon. The first aspect of the item related directly to Syria. The ambush of five high-ranking Syrian officers on a peaceful visit in southern Lebanon was a flagrant violation of international law, and Israel should be condemned for it. The problem was not really the existence of Israel but the existence of 3 million Arabs. The Golan Heights had been emptied of its population to make room for settlers from all over the world. The tragic thing was that the international community had not been able to grasp the real meaning of the conquest taking place as a colonial conquest in the Near East and to understand that whenever

Israel spoke of peace it was hypocrisy, a sham.

36. The representative of the United States of America said that his Government fully supported the territorial integrity and the political independence of Lebanon and was aware that the Government of that country had made efforts to control terrorist elements on its territory. It hoped that all authorities in the area, including particularly the Government of Israel, would facilitate and not impede those efforts by Lebanon. It was the belief of his Government that the way to solve the problem was through direct liaison and co-operation between the parties. Both Israel and Lebanon should have more frequent recourse to the international facilities for the exchange of information and consultation on border matters, and there should be an end to attacks and terrorism across the border. To obtain United States concurrence any draft resolution before the Council would have to be balanced and be concerned about terrorist acts as well as Israeli attacks.

37. The representative of India said that there might be more understanding for the Israeli position if, indeed, its existence as a State were threatened. But since 1967 it had been clear to the most uninitiated that Israel could have no such fears, for it was many times more powerful than Lebanon, and Lebanon was helpless when faced with Israel's military strength. There could be no justice unless Israel withdrew from the Arab territories it occupied and the dispossessed people of Palestine regained their rights.

38. The representative of Belgium said that his country had never ceased to repudiate the military reprisal actions by Israel against Lebanon, but at the same time had asked Lebanon to contain and effectively control the activities of the Palestinian fighters and prevent acts of sabotage and ambush against civilian targets from being organized from its territory. The request of Syria and Lebanon for the release of officers and policemen captured by Israel forces was legitimate.

39. The representative of Japan deplored all actions that resulted in the loss of innocent lives and added that violations of the cease-fire should be stopped, regardless of origin or motive. He urged the Security Council to call upon Israel to desist and refrain from any ground and air actions against Lebanon and to take prompt measures conducive to the return to normalcy, including the release of the Syrian and Lebanese officers.

40. The representative of Panama said that his country was against terrorism and in favour of a lasting peace between Israel and the Arab countries. He added that his country had asked the Government of Lebanon to prevent the Palestinian fighters who enjoyed the hospitality of that country from using its territory to launch attacks against Israel.

41. The representative of Guinea deplored the repeated acts of aggression against Lebanon by Israel, which was an expansionist State. The Council should condemn Israel for its criminal acts against Lebanon and should call for the immediate release of the five officers kidnapped by the Israeli army, the cessation of Israeli hostilities against Lebanon and withdrawal of Israel from all occupied Arab territories.

42. The representative of Italy said that most of the violence in the Middle East sprang from the lack of progress towards the peaceful settlement of the general situation, which was deteriorating. To eradicate the source of violence the parties involved must give full implementation to resolution 242 (1967). Conditions must be created for the reactivation of the Jarring mission. Italy would support a draft resolution calling on Israel to end the large-scale military operations against Lebanon and on the parties concerned to act in the spirit of the relevant Geneva Convention and proceed to an exchange of prisoners.

43. The representative of Argentina said that punitive expeditions and preventive war were totally incompatible with the purposes, principles and prescriptions of the Charter. There should be an immediate cease-fire, and the officers captured by Israel on 21 June should be returned without delay.

44. The representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland said that the senseless escalation of violence and reprisals could best be ended through a just and durable settlement in accordance with resolution 242 (1967). The United Kingdom deplored all acts of violence and condemned the appalling incident at Lod airport to which particular reference had been made. Israel had stated that it was the responsibility of Lebanon to curb terrorist actions against Israel, but the large-scale military reprisals by Israel were hardly the way to achieve that end and went far beyond the legitimate exercise of the right of self-defence. His delegation hoped that Lebanon

would step up its efforts and take all possible measures to prevent terrorist activities from being launched against Israel from Lebanese territory. It further hoped that the officers forcibly removed from Lebanese territory would be released.

45. Speaking as the representative of Yugoslavia, the President said that the Council was again confronted with a policy of aggression, force and utter disregard of the Charter and of United Nations resolutions that were being pursued on a greater scale and more frequently. It was the root-cause of all the tensions afflicting the Middle East. Though not condoning every act of individual terrorism, the world must never deny to people the right to fight for their liberation against the large-scale terrorism of occupation and aggression. The Council must condemn the latest Israeli attacks, ask for the immediate cessation of Israeli aggression against Lebanon and other neighbouring countries, warn Israel not to repeat such acts, take measures to prevent further aggression and request the immediate release of all prisoners taken as a result of Israel's latest aggression.

46. At the 1650th meeting on 26 June, the Security Council decided to add, as subitem (b) of the first item on its agenda, "Letter dated 26 June 1972 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10720)". In that letter, the representative had requested that the Syrian Arab Republic be considered an integral party to the Lebanese complaint.

47. The representative of France introduced the following draft resolution (S/10722), sponsored by Belgium, France and the United Kingdom:

[This draft was adopted as Resolution 316 (1972) and is printed as doc. 16 in *International Documents on Palestine 1972*.]

The representative of France said that although it was up to Lebanon to control the activities of the *fedayeen* on its territory, everyone knew perfectly well that the situation was the direct result of the occupation by Israel of territories conquered by force. One condition for lasting peace in the region, he added, was to respect the independence and integrity of Lebanon. His delegation agreed with the representative of the United Kingdom that the Israeli operations were out of all proportion with the right of self-defence.

48. The representative of Argentina said that he would vote for the three-Power draft resolution.

49. The representative of the United States introduced a draft resolution (S/10723), which read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Having noted the contents of the letter of the Permanent Representative of Lebanon [S/10715] and the letter of the Permanent Representative of Israel [S/10716],

"Having heard the statements of the representatives of Lebanon and Israel,

"Gravely concerned at recent terrorist and military acts of violence in the area which have brought about a deterioration in the situation,

"Deploing the tragic and unjustifiable loss of life and property resulting therefrom,

"Convinced that the cause of peace requires the exercise of the utmost restraint by all parties concerned,

"1. Condemns acts of violence in the area;

"2. Calls for an immediate cessation of all such acts;

"3. Calls on all Governments concerned to repatriate all armed forces prisoners they hold in custody."

50. The representative of Panama said that his delegation would abstain in the vote because the three-Power draft resolution gave greater weight to the condemnation of one aspect of violence than to another.

51. The representative of the Sudan objected to the paragraph in the preamble of the three-Power resolution that deplored the tragic loss of life resulting from all acts of violence and retaliation. The paragraph should refer specifically to the acts of aggression committed between 21 and 23 June by Israel against Lebanon. Otherwise it might be misinterpreted.

52. The representative of Somalia said that he would have preferred a draft resolution that clearly condemned Israel and, at the same time, called upon it to release forthwith the Syrian officers abducted in Lebanese territory. However, Somalia would vote for the three-Power draft resolution.

53. The representative of China said that the three-Power draft resolution failed to reflect fully the actual state of affairs and failed to call on Israel to abandon fundamentally its policies of aggression and war, to compensate for the losses suffered by the victims of aggression and to refrain from future

acts of aggression. The phrase "deploring all acts of violence" in the sixth preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 2 might be interpreted as making no distinction between the aggressors and the victims of aggression. China had serious reservations on such wordings; nevertheless, it was prepared to vote in favour of the three-Power draft resolution.

Decision: *At the 1650th meeting on 26 June 1972, the three-Power draft resolution (S/10722) was adopted by 13 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (Panama and United States of America) as resolution 316 (1972).*

54. The draft resolution submitted by the United States of America was not put to the vote in view of the adoption by the Council of the three-Power draft resolution.

55. Speaking after the vote, the representative of the United States said that a resolution to have been fair should have been balanced and should have been concerned with terrorist attacks as well as with Israeli attacks, and should have shown concern for the casualties on both sides of the border. It should have asked for the repatriation of all armed forces prisoners. Most importantly, it should have at least carried the hope of making that area closer to peace. The three-Power draft resolution had not met those requirements, and the United States had been forced to abstain.

56. The representative of the United Kingdom said that resolution 316 (1972) fairly reflected the situation that had precipitated the current meetings and struck an appropriate balance. As for the question of prisoners, the resolution rightly concentrated on the personnel referred to in paragraph 3. But it was clearly high time, both on humanitarian grounds and as a contribution towards the lessening of tension in the area, that there was a general release of other captured persons.

57. The representative of Belgium said that paragraph 2 implied that the Government of Lebanon should take all necessary steps to contain and effectively control the activities of the Palestinian fighters and thus avoid acts of sabotage against Israel being organized from its territory. Paragraph 3 implied that, although the release of the military personnel captured on 21 June on Lebanese territory should be immediate, there should also be a general exchange of prisoners between the countries involved in the Middle East conflict.

58. The representative of Italy said that the text of the resolution did not fully reflect Italy's views,

even though Italy had voted for it. Italy would have preferred a resolution more in the spirit of accommodation and reconciliation.

59. The representative of India said that, although his country shared the common concern for the human misery and suffering that had occurred at Lod airport, that incident did not in any manner diminish in India's eyes the condemnation of Israel that the Council had expressed in its resolution.

60. The President, speaking as the representative of Yugoslavia, said that while regretting the loss of innocent lives one had to keep in mind the basic facts and causes responsible for the developments in the Middle East and never deny the right of a people to fight for its liberation and freedom.

61. The representative of Israel said that the text adopted by the Council was inequitable and immoral. By failing to address itself to the armed attacks against a Member State, the resolution was contrary to basic principles of the Charter.

62. The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic said that the Council, by asking Israel to release the five Syrian officers, as well as the Lebanese officers and security personnel, had done the minimum that could be done under the circumstances.

63. The representative of Lebanon expressed his gratitude to the sponsors of the resolution and to those who had voted for it, but said that the resolution adopted did not fully satisfy Lebanon, because Israel had ignored previous resolutions by the Council warning Israel against repetition of its attacks on Lebanon.

(c) *Subsequent communications to the Council and requests for a meeting*

64. In two separate letters dated 5 July (S/10730 and S/10731), the representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon requested a meeting of the Security Council in view of Israel's refusal to abide by Security Council resolution 316 (1972), which had expressed the strong desire that appropriate steps would lead to the release in the shortest possible time of all Syrian and Lebanese military and security personnel abducted from Lebanese territory by Israeli forces on 21 June 1972.

65. In a letter dated 10 July (S/10735), the representative of Mauritania expressed his Government's indignation in connexion with the kidnapping of Syrian and Lebanese officers by Israeli armed forces on Lebanese territory. He urged the

Council to take all appropriate steps to ensure the immediate implementation of resolution 316 (1972).

66. By a letter dated 18 July, the representative of Israel requested an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the mutual release of all prisoners of war, in accordance with the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949.

(d) *Consideration at the 1651st to 1653rd meetings (18-21 July 1972)*

67. At the 1651st meeting on 18 July, and after a procedural debate regarding the provisional agenda, the Council, at the recommendation of the President, decided to consider the requests of Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic first, and then to schedule a later Council meeting to consider the request made by Israel. The adopted agenda read as follows:

"The situation in the Middle East

"(a) Letter dated 5 July 1972 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10730)"

"(b) Letter dated 5 July 1972 from the Chargé d'affaires *ad interim* of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10731)".

With the consent of the Council, the President invited the representatives of Afghanistan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco and the Syrian Arab Republic to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

68. At the same meeting, the President read a message from the Secretary-General in which he stated that he felt he should report on the implementation of resolution 316 (1972) to the current meeting of the Council. The Permanent Representatives of Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic had expressed to him their Governments' concern regarding the implementation of resolution 316 (1972) and had requested the good offices of the Secretary-General for the return of the Lebanese and Syrian officers abducted by Israeli forces on 21 June 1972. However, it appeared that in the prevailing circumstances a generally acceptable solution was not yet in sight; but he would pursue his efforts with all the parties concerned by any means available and hoped that those efforts, together with those of the President of the Council, might yet result in arrangements acceptable to all the parties concerned.

69. The President then said that, like the Secretary-General, he was bound to report to the Council on his efforts in that regard but that it had not been possible to find a solution to the problem.

70. The representative of Lebanon said that, when resolution 316 (1972) was adopted, his delegation had not entertained any false hope that Israel would abide by it. Since the incident of 21 June 1972, the Syrian and Lebanese military personnel had remained hostages in Israel, in defiance of the Security Council resolution and in violation of international law and the Lebanon-Israel Armistice Agreement. Furthermore, the Israeli authorities had stated that they would release the abducted military personnel only within the context of a general exchange of prisoners of war. But the question of the abductees could not and should not be confused or connected with any other question relating to prisoners of war captured in other areas, which was not before the Council. Recalling how the military personnel had been abducted by Israeli forces on 21 June in Lebanese territory, he said that Israel sought to extort a ransom, justifying its action on the basis of the provisions of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949. Referring to resolution 316 (1972), he said that paragraph 4 of that resolution had stated that, if Israel failed to release the military personnel abducted on Lebanese territory, the Council would "reconvene at the earliest to consider further action". Lebanon was requesting the Council to take that further action and was of the opinion that the Council should consider the application of effective measures, even sanctions, against Israel.

71. The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic said that the abduction on Lebanese territory of Syrian and Lebanese military personnel by Israeli forces was in flagrant violation of the sovereignty of a Member State of the United Nations, and Israel's claim that those military personnel were prisoners of war and, consequently subject to exchange of prisoners of war on the basis of the Geneva Convention was a bankrupt claim that had been already rejected by the Council. Israel, in fact, had taken hostages, and its demands so far had amounted to blackmail; therefore, it should be condemned for its non-compliance with a decision of the Security Council

and should be called upon immediately to release the abducted Syrian and Lebanese personnel without any conditions whatsoever. Failing that, sanctions should be applied to Israel.

72. The representative of Afghanistan said that, although the issue before the Council was of great importance, the real issue was the question of the Middle East, and as long as a state of war existed, such incidents as the one currently being considered were bound to happen again and again. After stating that some of the big Powers demurred from implementing the decisions they had voted for, including resolution 242 (1967), he called for an effective effort to strengthen the authority of the Jarring mission and urged the Council to put all its weight and authority behind the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to get the peace negotiations off the ground. With regard to the items on the current agenda, he said that his country supported the demands of the representatives of Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic.

73. The representative of Morocco said that Israel had never wanted to facilitate the task of the Organization to bring about a just and humane solution to the Middle East conflict. Now, through the abduction of hostages, it wished to attain certain results linked to the final solution of the crisis. The Security Council must condemn that attempt and demand the return of the hostages without prior conditions.

74. The representative of Mauritania said that Africa, in its attempts to mediate in the Middle East, had collided with the intransigent attitude of Israel and its refusal to subscribe to the principle of non-annexation of territories by force. The heads of African States had condemned Israel for that attitude, which hindered the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). If the Council did not take forceful measures against Israel, the confidence placed in that body would be seriously shaken. However, Mauritania was convinced that the Security Council would be equal to its immense responsibilities.

75. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the Council should take effective steps in order to force Israel to respect international law and the desires of the international community of States expressed in the decisions of the Council and to bring about the establishment of a just and durable peace in the

Middle East on the basis of the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from all occupied Arab territories and the implementation of the other provisions of resolution 242 (1967). With regard to the issue before the Council, the Council should condemn Israel's refusal to implement resolution 316 (1972) and, in accordance with that resolution consider further action that would ensure Israel's compliance with the Council's decisions and the immediate release of the abducted Syrian and Lebanese military personnel.

76. The representative of Yugoslavia said that his delegation was prepared to support any proposal that would reconfirm the requirements and demands of resolution 316 (1972) and envisage firmly and precisely the means for its implementation, as well as necessary further action in case that objective was not immediately achieved.

77. At the 1652nd meeting on 20 July, the representative of Somalia introduced a draft resolution (S/10742) sponsored by Guinea, Somalia, the Sudan and Yugoslavia and said that, since quiet diplomacy had failed to bring about the release of the Syrian and Lebanese personnel referred to in paragraph 3 of resolution 316 (1972), the Council had been forced to reconvene in accordance with paragraph 4 of that resolution. The four-Power draft resolution he was introducing was simply a reaffirmation of the earlier resolution. The text of that draft resolution was as follows:

[This draft was adopted as Resolution 317 (1972) and is printed as doc. 17 in *International Documents on Palestine 1972*.]

78. The representative of India said that the Council's responsibility under paragraph 4 of resolution 316 (1972) should be discharged without further delay. No attempts should be permitted to confuse the issue under discussion with any other issue concerning the return of combatants captured by the different sides in the course of war. With regard to the four-Power draft resolution, he said that there were elements in the draft that he would have liked to have strengthened, but he realized that the actual wording had been arrived at as a result of negotiations; therefore his delegation would support the draft resolution.

79. The representative of China said that the Council should condemn Israel for its refusal to implement the Council's resolution and firmly reject its using abduction as a means of blackmail.

The Council must ask the Israeli authorities to return immediately and unconditionally the abducted Syrian and Lebanese personnel. If Israel continued to refuse to implement the resolution, the Council then must consider further and more effective action in accordance with the provisions of the Charter. He concluded that his delegation would vote in favour of the four-Power draft resolution.

80. The representative of the Sudan said that the implementation of many Council resolutions was long overdue, and resolution 316 (1972) was the latest of a long series. It was up to the Council to restore its credibility and self-respect and act resolutely before it was too late.

81. At the 1653rd meeting on 21 July, the representative of Panama said that his delegation would vote in favour of the four-Power draft resolution.

82. The representative of India announced that his delegation would become a sponsor of the four-Power draft resolution, thus making it a five-Power draft resolution.

Decision: *At its 1653rd meeting on 21 July 1972, the Council adopted the five-Power draft resolution (S/10742) by 14 votes to none, with 1 abstention (United States of America), as resolution 317 (1972).*

83. The representative of Japan said that the case before the Council was how to implement Security Council resolution 316 (1972) and to effect the earliest possible release of the captured Syrian and Lebanese personnel. That was why Japan had voted in favour of the five-Power draft resolution. However, the release should be carried out without prejudice to the problem of the general release of prisoners of war. Japan, as a matter of principle, favoured the release of all prisoners of war as soon as actual hostilities had ceased.

84. The representative of the United Kingdom said that his delegation had voted in favour of the draft resolution, even though it had serious doubts about the wisdom of having further recourse to the Council at a time when certain efforts were still being made to obtain the release of the personnel in question. He regretted that it had not been possible to reach agreement on a text that incorporated some language covering the possibility of progress towards a general release of prisoners of war. Such language would have had to be non-prejudicial and have made clear that the Council did not consider agreement on a general release

as a necessary prerequisite for the return of the military personnel referred to in the resolution.

85. The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic thanked all the members who had voted in favour of the five-Power draft resolution. In urging implementation of resolutions 316 (1972) and 317 (1972), Syria was not pleading for Arab rights alone but for the life and integrity of the Security Council itself.

86. The representative of Italy said that, in the spirit of the resolution just adopted, Italy renewed its appeal to Israel for the release of the Syrian and Lebanese officers. But his delegation wished also to plead with all parties concerned for a general exchange of all prisoners of war, in line with their declared policy of finding a peaceful solution to the Middle East crisis.

87. The representative of France hoped that the new appeal of the Council would be heeded by Israel. He also would like to see another problem taken up by the Council in the near future, namely, the problem of a general exchange of prisoners of war by mutually agreed procedures.

88. The representative of Yugoslavia said that his delegation had sponsored and voted for resolution 317 (1972) because it considered that the Council had to act again in the absence of Israel's further refusal to implement the provisions of resolution 316 (1972).

89. The representative of Belgium said that he had voted in favour of the resolution because, in reaffirming resolution 316 (1972), the Council confirmed its wish that appropriate steps would immediately lead to the release of the abducted military and security personnel. The text of the new resolution therefore clearly stipulated that there should be far-reaching consequences that would flow from that release, namely, the mutual exchange of all war prisoners.

90. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that his delegation had voted in favour of the draft resolution, although it considered that the condemnation of Israel for failure to implement resolution 316 (1972) should have been couched in stronger language.

91. Speaking as the representative of Argentina, the President said that he trusted that Israel would now proceed to release all the abducted military personnel.

92. The representative of Lebanon said that his delegation agreed with the principles expressed

in the Council regarding prisoners of war. Yet there was also the matter of the 2,500 to 3,000 combatants from the Gaza Strip, Sinai, the west bank of Jordan and the Golan Heights who were languishing in the prisons of Israel. They, too, were prisoners of war.

(e) *Communications to the Council and reports of the Secretary-General from July to September 1972 and request for a meeting*

93. Between July and early September, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO continued to report flights by Israel aircraft over southern Lebanon, as well as border crossings by Israeli forces. On many occasions, Lebanon complained, and United Nations military observers confirmed, that Israeli forces had penetrated Lebanese territory and remained there in dug-in positions (S/7930/Add. 1654, 1656-1659, 1661, 1663, 1664, 1665, 1667, 1670-1688, 1690-1728).

94. In supplemental information dated 9 September (S/7930/Add.1726), the Chief of Staff of UNTSO reported a complaint by Lebanon that Israeli jet aircraft had launched bomb attacks against the towns of Rachaiya el Ouadi and Rafid in the southern region and the refugee camp of Naher El Bared, north of the city of Tripoli, killing 17 persons and wounding 35 in the latter locality, and that Israeli forces had previously penetrated Lebanese territory several times and blown up a house. The observers' reports indicated that on 7 and 8 September Israeli jet aircraft had overflown several villages in the Syrian Arab Republic and in the southern region of Lebanon. In supplemental information dated 10 September (S/7930/Add.1729), the Chief of Staff reported that observers had undertaken, at the request of Lebanon, an inquiry into casualties and damage allegedly caused by Israeli air attacks on Rachaiya el Ouadi and Rafid on 8 September and had been shown damage done to three buildings in Rachaiya. In Rafid, they noted that two houses had been demolished and that many others, including one described as a school, had been damaged. The Lebanese authorities had stated that 10 persons had been killed and two wounded in Rafid. In the inquiry made on 9 September (S/7930/Add.1730) at the Palestinian refugee camp of Nahr El Bared, the observers had been shown damaged houses, railway tracks and a destroyed plantation. Casualties were said to be

3 Lebanese and 7 Palestinians killed, 2 Lebanese and 22 Palestinians wounded.

95. In a letter dated 8 September (S/10780) Lebanon complained that, on that date, Israeli aircraft had raided several villages in southern Lebanon, killing 12 civilians and wounding 34, according to preliminary information on the incidents.

96. In a letter dated 8 September (S/10781), the Syrian Arab Republic complained that on that date Israeli military aircraft had bombarded four villages in the coastal region of Syria, killing one woman and wounding several other civilians.

97. By a letter dated 9 September (S/10782), the Syrian Arab Republic requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider Israel's attacks on Syrian territories, of which it had informed the Council in its letter of 8 September (S/10781).

98. By a letter dated 10 September (S/10783), Lebanon, further to its letter of 8 September (S/10780) and in view of the gravity of the situation endangering the peace and security of the country, requested an urgent meeting of the Council.

(f) *Consideration at the 1661st and 1662nd meetings (10 September 1972)*

99. At the 1661st meeting on 10 September, the President stated that the meeting had been convened at the request of the Syrian Arab Republic, but that a few minutes before the meeting, a request for a meeting had also been received from the representative of Lebanon. Accordingly he suggested that the provisional agenda be revised as follows:

"The situation in the Middle East

"(a) Letter dated 9 September 1972 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10782),

"(b) Letter dated 10 September 1972 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10783)".

Decision: *The agenda, as amended, was adopted.*

100. With the consent of the Council, the President invited the representatives of Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic, pursuant to their requests, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. He also informed the Council

that, on 9 September, the Secretariat had informed the Permanent Representative of Israel of the decision to convene a meeting of the Security Council on 10 September. He had later been informed by the representative of Israel that, because 10 September was the Jewish New Year, according to Jewish religious law, the Israeli delegation would not be able to attend the meeting.

101. The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic stated that, on 8 September, at 5 p.m., Israel's air force had launched rockets against several places populated by civilians, killing and wounding many civilians, including women and children. Israel had resumed its attacks on 9 September. He added that those aerial operations had been described by the Vice-Premier of the Israeli Council of Ministers as a first stage in a total offensive. The Council, he said, had before it the facts of culpable, clear-cut aggression, carried out by Israel against a peaceful Syrian population, without any motive or justification apart from Israel's persistent and obstinate determination to hold on to territory that it had acquired illegally during its aggression of 5 June 1967. He requested the Council to compel Israel to halt immediately all military operations, to condemn it for its attacks and to take all appropriate measures to prevent a renewal of aggression.

102. The representative of Lebanon said that, between 5 and 5.30 p.m. on 8 September, 24 Israeli military aircraft had carried out an indiscriminate raid against several communities in northern Lebanon. As a result of those attacks, 15 Lebanese civilians had been killed. Israel had claimed that it was aiming at commando camps, yet in one area civilians had been hit and in another, there were neither refugees nor commando camps. The refugee camp attacked near Tripoli was run by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Lebanon had long suffered from Israeli acts of aggression and had previously come to the Security Council seeking measures to stop attacks against its civilian population. Each time the Council had warned Israel against repetition of these acts. Once again Lebanon requested the Council to condemn Israel for its premeditated and unprovoked attacks and to take all appropriate measures to prevent any recurrence of such aggression.

103. The representative of the United States

stated the Council was once again seized of a problem with which it had repeatedly failed in the past to come to grips in an equitable way. It was meeting on a complaint by Syria, which made no reference to the tragic events of Munich, although there was an obvious connexion. Syria, which failed to condemn the murder of innocent Israeli athletes, continued to harbour and encourage terrorist organizations that had openly championed such acts. The root of the problem was the absence of peace in the Middle East, which must not be exploited as a pretext for violence on any side. His Government, he added, was engaged in a major effort along with other members of the international community, to put an end to terrorism and violence. His Government urged that the issue of terrorism in all its aspects should receive the highest priority from the General Assembly. The commendable initiative of the Secretary-General in placing the question on the Assembly's agenda should ensure that the world could no longer close its eyes to that pressing matter. Though the United States would continue to work for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, it considered that one-sided resolutions of the type that the Council had so frequently adopted in recent times would not contribute to the goal of peace but would encourage perpetrators of acts of terrorism. The kind of resolution that could be helpful was one that expressed concern about the renewal of terrorist attacks on innocent people, by deploring the loss of innocent lives on both sides and the outbreak of renewed violence in the Middle East. It would state that any encouragement or support for those kinds of acts of terrorism was unacceptable in a civilized society and was, indeed, inimical to the maintenance of the cease-fire and to peace in the Middle East. It would condemn the unprovoked terrorist attack that had shattered the world—the one at Munich on 5 September by terrorists of the so-called Black September organization. And it would call upon States that were harbouring and supporting such terrorists to cease such encouragement and support and take all necessary measures to bring about an end to those acts.

104. The representative of Somalia said that there would have been an opportunity for a meaningful debate if the representative of Israel had been present. However, in matters of international peace and security involving the loss of

life, the Council could not afford to suspend its deliberations because of religious or political susceptibilities. The least the Council could do was to call for an immediate cessation of hostilities. To that effect the representative of Somalia introduced a draft resolution (S/10784), which later was sponsored additionally by Guinea and Yugoslavia and read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Deeply concerned by the deteriorating situation in the Middle East,

"Calls on the parties concerned to cease immediately all military operations and to exercise the greatest restraint in the interest of international peace and security."

105. Another draft resolution was submitted by the representative of the United States (S/10785), which read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Gravely concerned at the renewal of terrorist attacks on innocent persons,

"Deploing the loss of innocent lives on both sides and the outbreak of renewed violence in the Middle East,

"Convinced that acts of terrorism, and any encouragement and support for such acts, are totally unacceptable in a civilized society and are inimical to the maintenance of the cease-fire in the Middle East,

"1. Condemns the senseless and unprovoked terrorist attack in Munich on 5 September by terrorists of the so-called Black September Organization which resulted in the loss of life of numerous innocent victims;

"2. Calls upon those States harbouring and supporting such terrorists and their activities to cease their encouragement and support of terrorists and to take all necessary measures to bring about the immediate end of such senseless acts."

106. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics expressed surprise at the pretext under which the representative of Israel had refused to take part in the Council's discussion. The holiday he had invoked had not prevented Israel and its armed forces from beginning and continuing further acts of aggression against the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon. In view of the new acts of unprovoked aggression by Israel, his delegation considered it advisable that the draft resolution submitted by Somalia and two other States be voted upon immediately. Commenting

on the United States' statement, he said that the essence of realism in the Middle East was the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied territories and the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). There was no basis for linking the new acts of aggression with the distressing incidents that had occurred in Munich. What was at issue was a deliberate act of provocation planned by Israel, and no artificial motivations could be used to justify it.

107. The representative of Guinea stated that she could not understand why one would wish to make the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon responsible for acts committed by commandos. The death of the Israeli athletes in Munich had been deplored, but hundreds of lives must not be sacrificed as a result. The international community could not allow a State to attack others merely because of its strength and the support it received. She concluded by expressing the hope that the Security Council would be able to adopt at once a resolution calling for an immediate cessation of Israeli aggression against the peaceful population of the Syrian Arab Republic.

108. The representative of Belgium proposed suspension of the meeting for a few hours to enable delegations to study the two draft resolutions carefully, and hold consultations to obtain the necessary instructions from their Governments.

109. The representative of Somalia said that the primary duty of the Council was to ensure the cessation of military operations. The draft resolution he had introduced would need no instructions from Governments, since it was purely an act of humanity that should be voted on the same day.

110. Following a procedural discussion in which statements were made by the representatives of Argentina, France, Guinea, India, Italy, the Sudan, the USSR, Yugoslavia, the United Kingdom and the United States, the President adjourned the meeting until later that afternoon.

111. At the 1662nd meeting on 10 September, the representative of the United Kingdom introduced three amendments (S/10786) to the three-Power draft resolution. The amendments, sponsored by Belgium, France, Italy and the United Kingdom, would have provided for:

(1) The insertion of a second preambular paragraph reading:

"Deploing deeply all acts of terrorism and violence and all breaches of the cease-fire in the

Middle East";

(2) In the operative paragraph, the replacement of the words "the parties" by "all parties";

(3) In the operative paragraph, the replacement of the words "cease immediately all military operations" by "take all measures for the immediate cessation and prevention of all military operations and terrorist activities".

112. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the aim of the amendments was clear. Violence had again erupted within the Middle East context and the horrors of terrorism and reprisal had again fallen upon innocent victims. Whatever the relationship of cause and effect between the killings at Munich and the incidents described by the representatives of Syria and Lebanon, whatever the justification or lack of justification, the resort to force against national or international law was to be condemned. The Council could not condemn the one kind of violence and condone the other.

113. The representative of Somalia stated that the sponsors of the draft resolution held that, if the amendments were accepted, it would alter the whole purpose of the original three-Power draft, which did not condemn or condone acts of violence but simply addressed itself to the necessity of an immediate cessation of all military operations in the area.

114. The representative of Yugoslavia said that the three-Power draft resolution was an interim text that called for the immediate cessation of all military operations in the area. Accordingly, it should be voted on without delay and, then, if the Council wished, the roots of the crisis could be discussed.

115. The representative of the Sudan said that his delegation would support the three-Power draft resolution. He added that inasmuch as the Council was faced with a situation of naked aggression in which civilians had lost their lives, it must prevent any further deterioration of the situation. He regretted that certain delegations were trying to inject the question of terrorism into what he described as a straightforward question of security.

116. The representative of India said that the two complaints before the Council were not a new matter. The Council had dealt with two similar complaints earlier in the year. The pattern of Israel's activities had been clear for some time,

and his delegation had drawn repeated attention to it. There was no justification for Israel's recent actions by which it had violated international law and the cease-fire. However, certain speakers before him had indicated that those actions had been taken in reprisal for the tragic events at Munich. India had condemned the Munich events. But the situation in the Middle East had involved similar events from the days before the establishment of Israel. It was not possible to select only one or two links in a long chain and ignore the others. To consider the entire chain of events would take time and would not eliminate the immediate threat that confronted Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic. The tragedy of Munich had happened six days earlier and, since then, no attempt had been made to bring it before the Council. He was not even certain that the tragedy was an appropriate subject for the Security Council, inasmuch as it consisted of terrorism by private groups and not by States. A distinction must be drawn between the acts of terrorism by private groups and the acts of military vendetta by organized Governments. His delegation would reject the four-Power amendments. As to the United States draft resolution, he considered that it was unbalanced and entirely silent on the recent Israeli attacks.

117. The representative of Panama stated that his Government had categorically condemned the massacre of Israeli athletes at Munich. The world was also moved at seeing that reprisals for those crimes had left a sad balance of desolation and death in Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic. His delegation believed that the acts were closely linked and therefore would support any draft resolution that would condemn with equal emphasis acts of terrorism and reprisal. His delegation, however, had been instructed to abstain on the two draft resolutions before the Council, for neither of them was likely to achieve useful results. Panama sought respect for the territorial integrity of the Arab States and wanted the Israelis to live free from fear. The proposed amendments were a step in the right direction, and his delegation would vote for them.

118. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that everyone deeply deplored the events at Munich and that the Committee on Sports under the Council of Ministers of the USSR had issued a statement expressing its deepest regret. However, to put the events at

Munich on the same footing as the new acts of aggression by Israel would be to condone the aggressive policy of the Israeli Government. The Council must reject as entirely unfounded any reference whatsoever by Israel and its supporters to certain events at the Olympic Games to justify Israeli provocation. To draw a parallel between acts of terror committed by persons in a desperate situation and those of a State that had become an aggressor was to remove from that State the responsibility for the murder of hundreds of innocent people. That was why his delegation would support the three-Power draft resolution. The Security Council's task was to call a halt to military operations immediately; then it could proceed to a discussion of other questions that were of particular interest to individual delegations or groups of delegations.

119. The representative of Japan said that his delegation strongly held that military operations should be stopped and violations of the cease-fire should be halted. His delegation, therefore, supported the draft resolution submitted by Somalia, Guinea and Yugoslavia. Japan had consistently and repeatedly expressed its regret and abhorrence of all acts of violence, particularly indiscriminate attacks that resulted in the loss of innocent lives. His Government censured, in the strongest terms, all acts of violence and terrorism, regardless of their origin or motive. His delegation, therefore, could also accept the amendments proposed by the four European countries. The recurrence of violence in the Middle East demonstrated once again the urgent need to eliminate the source of tension in that area. In that connexion, the Japanese delegation emphasized the importance of implementing Security Council resolution 242 (1967), in order to bring about a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

120. The representative of the United States said that his delegation would vote in favour of the four-Power amendments; they were the very least that was required on the part of the Council, if it was to address itself to the problem as it existed.

121. The Council then proceeded to vote, first, on the four-Power amendment (S/10786) and, then, on the three-Power draft resolution (S/10783). In putting the four-Power amendment to the vote, the President stated that a separate vote on each paragraph of the amendment had been requested by India.

Decision: *At the 1662nd meeting, on 10 September 1972, the first paragraph of the amendment received 8 votes in favour, 4 against (China, Guinea, Sudan and Yugoslavia) and 3 abstentions (India, Somalia and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) and was not adopted, having failed to obtain the required majority.*

The second paragraph of the amendment received 9 votes in favour, and 6 against (China, Guinea, Somalia, Sudan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Yugoslavia) and was not adopted owing to the negative vote of two permanent members of the Council.

The third paragraph of the amendment received 8 votes in favour, 7 against (China, Guinea, India, Somalia, Sudan, Union of Socialist Republics and Yugoslavia) and was not adopted, having failed to obtain the required majority.

The three-Power resolution (S/10784) received 13 votes in favour, 1 against (United States of America) and 1 abstention (Panama) and was not adopted owing to the negative vote of a permanent member of the Council.

122. Following the vote, the representative of the United States said that the Council would have done neither the parties nor itself any good by adopting a draft resolution that ignored realities by addressing itself to only one form of violence. He added that it was a double standard to suggest that States must control their own forces but need not control irregular forces in their territory.

123. The representative of Belgium said that he had voted in favour of the draft resolution to demonstrate his country's concern following the tragic events that had occurred in the Middle East and continued dangerously to increase tension in that part of the world. It was the Council's duty to end any military activity likely to jeopardize international peace and security. He regretted the rejection of the four-Power amendments, which had the merit of balancing the text of the draft resolution by not ignoring the problem of blind terrorism.

124. The representative of India stated that, even though the Council was dealing with the immediate problem of the Lebanese and Syrian complaints, his delegation was not against establishing a cause-and-effect chain of events. It had abstained on the first paragraph of the amendments because it would have balanced the two actions, even though one had been taken by private groups and the other by a Government. It had voted for the second amendment because it would have made the resolution more comprehensive. It had

opposed the third amendment because it implied that Governments were in a position to prevent all terrorist activities.

125. The representative of Yugoslavia said that the events of Munich could not have any direct connexion with what had been happening in the Middle East for years. All attempts to solve the problems of that region had failed because of Israel's constant refusal to respond positively to United Nations resolutions. The Council must reject the Israeli concept of a self-arrogated right to conduct major aggressive military operations against the territories of its Arab neighbours.

126. The representative of France stated that his country condemned all acts of violence. With regard to the two complaints before the Council, the most urgent task was to put an end to military activities and prevent their recurrence. That was the objective of the appeal contained in the three-Power draft resolution; therefore, his delegation had supported it.

127. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stressed the inadmissibility of putting on equal footing individual acts of terror committed by people who had been placed in an extremely desperate situation, and acts of aggression committed by States. Israel, he said, was committing an international crime by ordering its armed forces to intrude into the air space and territories of Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic. Though the events of Munich merited the deepest possible regret, they were just one more episode, one more consequence of the war of aggression still being waged by Israel against Arab countries. In a way, Israel had contributed to the tragic events of Munich by approving the actions of the Munich police in firing on the helicopter containing the Israelis and Arabs. Had it not been for the position taken by Israel, the athletes and the Arabs who were involved might be in another country and would, without any doubt, be alive. To prevent a recurrence of events like the one in Munich Israel had to comply with United Nations resolutions by halting its aggression against Arab countries, withdrawing from the occupied territories and respecting the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. Further disregard by Israel of the positions of the absolute majority of the Members of the United Nations and the decisions and demands of the Security Council would make it necessary to apply sanctions

against Israel as an aggressor. In conclusion, he stated that, by its veto, the United States had rejected a just proposal and bore a very heavy responsibility for the further development of events in the Middle East.

128. The representative of Argentina said that his delegation had voted for the three-Power draft resolution because it had called for immediate cessation of all warlike acts, and had supported the European amendments because they had been designed to emphasize the Council's condemnation of all acts of terrorism. Argentina condemned both acts of terrorism and acts of reprisal and called on all parties concerned to redouble their efforts to achieve that just and lasting peace called for in resolution 242 (1967), which the majority of the Members of the United Nations supported.

129. The representative of Italy said that he had voted for the three-Power draft resolution in response to the appeals from the representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon. Italy consistently condemned all acts of warfare and reprisals that were carried out in violation of international law and the principles of the Charter. Noting that some representatives had maintained that there was no connexion between the Munich incident and the military operations in Syria and Lebanon, he said that perhaps there were sufficient legal grounds for that contention, but to proceed with that approach would be to move in a moral and political vacuum. Therefore, his delegation deeply regretted that the proposed amendments had not been adopted.

130. The representative of the Sudan stated that he had voted for the three-Power draft resolution because his delegation believed that the killing should stop. It was most regrettable that other incidents, like the Munich incident, had been injected into the debate to make it more complex. The Munich incident and similar questions were irrelevant to the situation before the Council. His delegation believed that the amendments had been designed to delay the adoption of the draft resolution, and it regretted that a permanent member of the Council had used the veto to stop a call for ending aggression and sparing human life.

131. The representative of Guinea regretted the rejection of the three-Power draft resolution and hoped that rejection would not be exploited by Israel as a victory that allowed it freedom to

embark on new escalations and new acts of aggression against the peaceful territories of Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic.

132. The representative of the United Kingdom said that he would have greatly preferred to see the proposed amendments incorporated in the draft resolution, for they would have made it a more realistic reflection of the circumstances and atmosphere in which the meeting was taking place. However, the United Kingdom could not fail to support a call for an end to military operations and for restraint in the future. His delegation would like to see a greater exercise of restraint by all parties so that the basic problem of the Middle East could be approached by the path of conciliation rather than by that of force.

133. The representative of Somalia said that by its veto the United States had given the green light to Israel and any other Member in the area to continue military operations. He noted that there had been considerable talk about terror and terrorism but that it would be difficult to say what each delegation meant by those terms. The term violence, he suggested, was preferable. Somalia was against all acts of violence for the sake of violence, but situations arose where violence, however regrettable it might be, perhaps became justifiable in pursuit of a legitimate cause or in pursuit of legitimate defence. The Council had met to stop the killing taking place as a result of aerial bombardments. If the Council could not muster a unanimous vote to call for an immediate cessation of such killing, he doubted its right to exist.

134. The President, speaking as the representative of China, said that Israel's armed aggression against the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon was utterly intolerable to all countries that defended the principles of the Charter and to all the peoples who upheld justice. The history of the Middle East since the Second World War had been one of incessant aggression and expansion by Israeli Zionism and of the continuous fight of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples against that aggression and expansion. Israel had tried to use the Olympic event as a pretext to expand its war of aggression against Arab countries. The incident was unfortunate, but the root-cause lay in the frenzied aggression committed by Israeli Zionism over a long period against the Palestinian and other Arab peoples. The Security Council must severely

condemn Israeli zionism for its aggression against Syria and Lebanon and demand that Israel immediately stop all its aggression. It must ask Israel earnestly to implement the relevant Security Council resolutions. His delegation had voted for the three-Power draft resolution, even though it failed to condemn Israeli zionism. His delegation had reservations in that respect, but it deeply regretted that even so minimum a draft resolution had failed of adoption because of the veto of a permanent member.

135. The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic said that his country was showing restraint and respected the cease-fire but that it could not allow the enemy to continue its aggression and permit the massacre of hundreds of peaceful citizens. That was why his Government had asked for the convening of the Council, in order to safeguard peace and security in the Middle East. The proposed three-Power draft resolution could not have prevented Israel from continuing its aggression, because it had not condemned Israel and had not confronted Israel with its responsibilities in accordance with the Charter. Israel would continue to push the Middle East towards war and threaten international peace and security.

136. The representative of Lebanon stated that the three-Power draft resolution had been weak, yet even so it had been defeated because of a certain psychosis that had been created in the Council to link what had happened in Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic to what had happened in Munich. Why was it, he asked, that Lebanon always had to pay the price for what happened somewhere else in the world? He hoped that the negative vote of the United States would not be used as encouragement and as a green light for Israel to continue its attacks against Lebanon.

137. Before adjourning the meeting, the President announced that he had been informed that the United States would not insist on a vote on its draft resolution (S/10785) at that meeting.

(g) *Subsequent communications and reports received between 11 September and 30 December 1972*

138. Between 10 and 16 September the reports of the Chief of Staff of UNTSO (S/7930/Add.1731-1736) referred to continued overflights of Lebanese territory by Israeli jets and penetration by Israeli forces into Lebanon.

139. By a letter dated 11 September (S/10787), the representative of Egypt transmitted to the Secretary-General the text of a statement made by the official spokesman of his Government concerning Israel's acts of aggression against the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon. The statement pointed out that Israel had chosen the most populous refugee camps against which to conduct its aerial raids, and had used American Phantom planes in those raids. By refusing to restore their legitimate rights to the Palestinian people and by refusing to relinquish territories it had occupied, Israel was challenging the Charter and resolutions of the United Nations with the encouragement of the United States of America, which could not be absolved from its responsibility in that respect.

140. In a letter dated 16 September (S/10794), Israel drew the attention of the President of the Council to further attacks against its territories by terrorists based in Lebanon and stated that attacks carried out on 6, 14 and 15 September against Israeli military patrols had resulted in the death of three Israeli soldiers. Israel warned of more attacks by terrorists who, it reported, were concentrating along the borders of Lebanon.

141. In a letter addressed on the same day (S/10795) to the President of the Council, Lebanon complained that Israeli forces had launched a massive land and air attack against southern Lebanon, penetrating 25 kilometres inside Lebanese territory. Those forces had bombed and shelled 15 towns and villages and three military positions. Furthermore, Palestinian refugee camps in the vicinity of Al Nabatieh had been attacked with napalm bombs. The Lebanese armed forces had engaged the invading Israeli forces, and the Lebanese Government had declared a state of emergency.

142. That unprovoked aggression, the letter added, endangered not only the peace and security of Lebanon but that of the Middle East. It constituted a violation of the Charter, the Security Council resolutions, the Armistice Agreement and international law and should therefore be condemned by the international community.

143. In a letter dated 17 September (S/10796), Israel informed the President of the Council that, on the previous day, Israeli forces had struck against bases and concentrations of terror organizations in southern Lebanon and that, as a result of those

measures, 130 structures serving as bases of terror groups had been demolished and 40 of their members had been killed. The fact that the target of Israel's action had been bases of murder squads had been corroborated in communiqués issued by terror organizations and in Syrian and Egyptian radio broadcasts. The action undertaken by Israeli forces, the letter added, was part of Israel's defence effort against terror organizations operating from Lebanese territory while Lebanon shirked its international obligations harbouring terror squads in the midst of its population.

144. By a letter dated 21 September (S/10799), Lebanon informed the President of the Council that Israel's attacks on Lebanon on 16 September had resulted in 18 Lebanese military personnel killed, 49 wounded and 5 missing, as well as 25 civilians killed and 40 wounded. One hundred and nine houses in 16 towns and villages had been totally destroyed, 324 homes damaged and 2 bridges destroyed. Water, electricity and irrigation installations had been bombed, and hundreds of civilians' automobiles destroyed. The Israeli forces had later embarked on a campaign of terrorization and looting of the civilian population. The Council, the letter went on, had repeatedly warned that measures would be taken against Israel if the latter continued its aggression against Lebanon. However, in the absence of effective measures by the Security Council, Israel had persisted in its terror campaign, and the Council therefore assumed a grave responsibility for its failure to protect one of the peaceful Members of the Organization. Photographs showing the victims of Israel's action were annexed to the letter.

145. In a reply dated 27 September (S/10801), Israel referred to its letter on 17 September (S/10796) and stated that in its letter of 21 September Lebanon had tried to cover up its responsibility for permitting the use of its territory as a base for terrorist attacks against civilians in Israel and other countries. As long as Lebanon did not fulfil its international obligation and put an end to the killings initiated from its territory, it would remain an accomplice in such crimes. The letter stressed that Israel's action had been directed against terrorist bases. It denied Lebanon's charges that there had been looting of the civilian population by Israeli forces and maintained that the only structures destroyed had been those used as terrorist

centres. Israel could not acquiesce in the continuation of terrorist activities from Lebanese territory and, the letter concluded, the Lebanese Government must bear responsibility for continuing to refuse to halt those activities.

146. In a letter dated 16 October (S/10808), Lebanon charged that, on the preceding day, Israeli aircraft had bombed four locations in south and south-eastern Lebanon, killing and wounding several persons in the process and inflicting severe damage to houses and public utilities. In the past Israel had offered pretexts for its previous attacks, but the attack of 15 October showed, as Mrs. Meir had stated, that Israel intended to feel free to attack wherever there were Palestinians. That policy of systematic and unprovoked aggression endangered the independence, security and integrity of Lebanon and constituted a flagrant defiance of United Nations principles. Under the circumstances, the Security Council could not remain indifferent to those facts and must find appropriate means to deal with the situation.

147. In a letter dated 17 October (S/10809), the Syrian Arab Republic charged that on 15 October an Israeli air squadron had attacked civilians in an area near the town of Missiaf. The letter stated that Israeli military authorities had made it clear that such attacks were intended as harassment rather than retaliation.

148. In a letter dated 18 October (S/10811), Israel, in reply to the letters from Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic (S/10808 and S/10809), stated that air action in Lebanon had been taken against two terrorist bases from which attacks on Israeli civilians had been initiated and against a terrorist sea base and a motor pool on the Mediterranean coast of Lebanon. With regard to action taken in the Syrian Arab Republic, the letter stated that it had been directed against a Fatah training camp. In its war against terror organizations Israel had every right and was duty-bound to take measures to bring their activities to an end. The Arab Governments that provided the terrorist organizations with shelters and financial and political support could not be absolved of responsibility for the terror warfare. As an avowed objective of the terror organizations was the destruction of the State of Israel, Israel had no choice but to strike at those organizations wherever they could be reached.

149. In supplemental information dated 16

September (S/7930/Add.1737), the Chief of Staff of UNTSO reported heavy ground and air activity by Israeli forces in the vicinity of observation posts (OP) Ras and Khiam in the Israel-Lebanon sector. He also reported that Israeli jet aircraft had made four strikes with bombs and rockets in the vicinity of OP Khiam on the same day. The same report recorded a complaint by Lebanon that four Israeli armoured brigades supported by aircraft had attacked along two axes in the southern region. The complaint was partially confirmed by United Nations military observers, who also confirmed that Israeli forces were still in Lebanese territory as of 1200 hours GMT. On 18 September, the Chief of Staff reported (S/7930/Add.1739 and 1740) a Lebanese complaint that Israeli forces were continuing their action inside Lebanese territory. That complaint was not confirmed by United Nations military observers.

150. From late September to the end of December, the reports of the Chief of Staff (S/7930/Add. 1741-1761, 1763, 1766, 1768-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1798-1808, 1811, 1814, 1816-1847, 1849-1852) indicated that overflights of Lebanese territory by Israeli jet aircraft, as well as penetration by Israeli forces into Lebanese territory, had continued. The reports contained complaints by Lebanon, not confirmed by United Nations observers, to the effect that Israeli ships had entered Lebanon's territorial waters. On 15 October, there was a report (S/7930/Add.1767) of intensified air activity in southern Lebanon. On that occasion, Lebanon complained, and the observers confirmed, that 20 Israeli jet aircraft overflew the area of southern Lebanon and the Bekaa region, bombing several localities and causing injuries to three civilians.

151. In supplemental information dated 2 November (S/7930/Add.1788), the Chief of Staff issued up-dated lists of the observation posts, outstations and control centres set up by UNTSO in the Suez Canal, Israel-Syria and Israel-Lebanon sectors.

(h) *The question of increasing United Nations observation posts in the Israel-Lebanon sector*

152. By a letter dated 30 October (S/10818), the President of the Security Council informed the Secretary-General that, following consultations with the Council members on the subject of the

Secretary-General's memoranda of 25 and 27 October, and after referring to the Security Council consensus of 19 April 1972, there had been no objection to acceding to Lebanon's request for an increase in the number of observation posts in the Israel-Lebanon sector.

153. In his memorandum of 25 October, published as annex I to the letter, the Secretary-General stated that, as a result of the Security Council consensus of 19 April on the subject of additional observers in the Israel-Lebanon sector, three United Nations observation posts had been set up in southern Lebanon and the number of observers increased from 7 to 21. On 23 October, he added, Lebanon had requested an increase in the number of United Nations observation posts and observers in that sector. Subsequently, he had requested the Chief of Staff of UNTSO to submit recommendations to him on the arrangements to be made, in particular the number of additional observation posts to be established and the number of additional observers, supporting staff and equipment required for that purpose.

154. Appended to the above memorandum was the letter dated 23 October from the representative of Lebanon stating that, in view of the situation in southern Lebanon, his Government was requesting an increase in the number of United Nations observation posts and observers, as extension of the scale of the observation system would provide UNTSO with wider observation coverage of the armistice demarcation line.

155. In his second memorandum dated 27 October and published as annex II to document S/10818, the Secretary-General stated that the Chief of Staff in pursuance of his request, had informed him that, after consultations with the Lebanese authorities and a joint reconnaissance of the possible areas for additional posts, he recommended that two additional observation posts be set up, one at Marouahine and the other south-east of Markaba. He also recommended that existing OP Naq be relocated to Labboune. The new arrangement would require an increase of the number of observers from 21 to 34, in addition to 4 field service officers, who could be provided from other UNTSO sectors for a limited period. The eventual need for additional observers would have to be assessed in the light of the later experience. The Secretary-General felt that the new observation posts, together with the relocation

of OP Naq, would increase the coverage of the armistice demarcation line and thus make the cease-fire observation more effective. If there was no objection, he would proceed with the arrangements recommended by the Chief of Staff.

156. During the consultations among the Council members on 30 October, the representative of China made a statement, which was circulated at his request in a note issued on that day by the President of the Council (S/10819). In that statement China expressed its firm support of the Arab peoples in their struggle to resist aggression and safeguard their sovereignty and territorial integrity, and of the Palestinian people in their struggle to restore their national rights and said that it had always held different views in principle on the question of sending United Nations observers. However, in view of the request made by the country concerned and the prevailing circumstances China would not oppose the proposal for an increase in the number of observers.

157. In a letter dated 3 November (S/10825), the representative of India stated, with reference to the letter of 30 October from the President of the Council to the Secretary-General (S/10818), that, although his delegation had readily concurred with the decision reflected therein, it had expressed its reservations during the consultations with regard to the procedure followed for coming to that decision.

158. In a report dated 2 November (S/10824), the Secretary-General stated that following receipt of the letter from the President of the Council of 30 October (S/10818), he had instructed the Chief of Staff of UNTSO to proceed immediately with the implementation of the arrangements set forth in his memorandum of 27 October. Subsequently, the two proposed additional observation posts had been set up and become operational on 2 November 1972. In addition, OP Naq had been relocated and renamed OP Lab. The former OP Naq had been converted to an outstation called Naqoura outstation and would have administrative functions. Each of the new posts would cover up to 10 kilometres of the armistice demarcation line, and the observers would move as the situation required and at the request of the Lebanese authorities. He reported that Israel had been informed by the Chief of Staff of the new arrangements, and the UNTSO logistics convoy dispatched from UNTSO headquarters in Jerusalem

had crossed both the Israeli and Lebanese checkpoints without delay.

159. In a further report dated 22 February 1973 (S/10824/Add.1), the Secretary-General, after recalling his statement that the future need to recruit additional observers would have to be assessed in the light of experience, noted that the Chief of Staff had carefully assessed the personnel requirements of UNTSO to determine whether he could avoid new recruitments while maintaining the operations of UNTSO at the current level and had reported to him that, by giving more flexibility to the deployment of observers and assigning functions of a non-operational nature to field service staff, he would be able to manage without the 13 additional observers originally requested. The Secretary-General endorsed the recommendations of the Chief of Staff, and pointed out that the Government of Finland was willing to provide four additional observers to replace four Finnish vehicle drivers/mechanics who had observer status and who had been repatriated without replacement. In conclusion, the Secretary-General stated that it was his intention to implement the recommendations of the Chief of Staff not later than 15 March 1973.

160. In a letter dated 30 March (S/10907), the President of the Council informed the Secretary-General that, with regard to his report of 22 February, he had consulted with the members of the Council, who had expressed no objection to implementing the recommendations of the Chief of Staff as set forth in the above report.

161. In an additional report dated 2 April (S/10824/Add.2), the Secretary-General, recalling that he had informed the Security Council of his intention to implement the recommendations of the Chief of Staff not later than 15 March, stated that, at the request of the President of the Council, he had agreed to postpone the proposed action until the end of March. After referring to the letter of the President of the Council, he said that on 30 March he had taken the necessary action to provide UNTSO with four additional Finnish observers and four field service officers.

(i) *Communications and reports received between 1 January and 12 April 1973 and request for meeting*

162. From 1 January to early April the Chief of Staff continued to report regularly on various incidents in the Israel-Lebanon sector (S/7930/

Add. 1853-1860, 1862-1863, 1865-1898, 1900-1959) involving crossing and recrossing of the border by Israeli forces and temporary occupation of positions inside Lebanese territory by those forces. The reports indicated frequent flights by Israeli jet aircraft over the southern part of Lebanon and recorded complaints by the Lebanese authorities about those flights and other incidents.

163. In a letter dated 21 February 1973 (S/10885), Lebanon complained that armed Israeli terrorist bands had landed north of Tripoli and had attacked two Palestinian refugee camps. At the refugee camp of El Bedaoui 13 persons had been killed and 10 injured, and at the refugee camp of Naher El Bared 17 had been killed and 10 injured. Those acts of aggression were in violation of the Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Israel-Lebanon Armistice Agreement and fitted well into Israel's policy of striking at the Palestinian people wherever they might be.

164. Israel, in a letter dated 21 February (S/10887), replied that its action had been directed against terrorist centres where foreign terrorists were being trained for action against Israel. Those camps, the letter added, were used as headquarters for Al Fatah and the Popular Front, which operated one of the camps, and Black September. The letter listed various acts of terrorism carried out by members of those organizations and stated that it was Israel's duty to protect its people from attacks by terror organizations that were permitted to remain in Lebanon and enjoyed its support.

165. With regard to the above incidents, the Chief of Staff reported, on 21 February (S/7930/Add.1906), that a complaint had been received from Lebanon alleging that an airborne Israeli force had attacked the Palestinian camps of El Bedaoui and Naher El Bared, north of Tripoli, and that there had been several killed and injured. However, the complaint had not been confirmed by the United Nations observers, as the location of the incident was outside their observation range.

166. In a report dated 10 April (S/7930/Add.1957), the Chief of Staff stated that a complaint had been received from Lebanon alleging that, during the night of 9/10 April, Israeli forces had attacked and destroyed several civilian houses in Beirut and a gasoline station in Saida and that several persons had been killed and wounded and property had been damaged. He added that

Lebanon's complaint had been confirmed by United Nations military observers for the portion of the complaint pertaining to damage in Beirut and Saida.

167. In a letter dated 11 April (S/10911), Lebanon charged that, on the preceding night, Israeli naval units had landed south of Beirut and debarked a squad of Israeli terrorists who had driven away in civilian cars to predetermined objectives, where they had killed three prominent Palestinian leaders. Two of the policemen who had clashed with the attackers had been killed and wounded. Another group of Israeli terrorists had blown up a building and a garage in other parts of the city. The attack had killed 12 persons and wounded 29. The letter referred to Israel's attack of 21 February on Palestinian refugee camps and reiterated Lebanon's protest and condemnation of Israel's repetitious aggression which had been condemned by the Security Council. In pursuance of a policy of attacking the Palestinian people without provocation, the letter continued, Israel had engaged in acts of warfare, aggression and terrorism against Lebanon in violation of the Armistice Agreement of 1949, international law and all norms of international morality. Lebanon hoped that the Security Council would take the necessary measures to put an end to Israel's aggression.

168. Israel replied on the same day (S/10912) that its action of 9/10 April had been against terrorist bases, headquarters and hideouts in the Beirut area. Official statements issued in Beirut had confirmed that those killed had been leaders of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Reiterating that Lebanon was a centre for the planning and execution of terrorist attacks against civilians in Israel and elsewhere, the letter added that, by allowing its territory to be exploited and abused by terrorists, Lebanon had forfeited the right to claim respect for its territory and that the only way for Lebanon to extricate itself from that situation was by fully observing its international obligations and eliminating completely the presence of the terrorist groups and their activities on and from Lebanese soil.

169. By a letter dated 12 April (S/10915), the representative of Algeria transmitted to the President of the Council a message from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria regarding the act of aggression by Israel against the capital of Lebanon.

The Foreign Minister stated that Israel's policy of escalation was designed to stir up conflict in the Middle East so that Israel could impose its will on the Arab countries and the people of Palestine. He urged that the Council act to ensure respect for its decisions, adding that lasting peace in the region depended on the restoration of the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people and the withdrawal of Israel's aggressive forces.

170. By a letter dated 12 April (S/10913) the representative of Lebanon drew the attention of the President of the Council to Israel's aggression against Lebanon on 10 April, and in view of the gravity of that act and the threat it posed to the peace and security in the Middle East, he requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to deal with the question.

(j) *Consideration at the 1705th to 1711th meetings (12-20 April 1973)*

171. At its 1705th meeting on 12 April, the Council included the complaint of Lebanon (S/10913) in its agenda. The representatives of Lebanon and Israel, and subsequently those of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, and Jordan were invited, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

172. The representative of Lebanon stated that on 10 April, a squad of 35 Israeli terrorists in civilian clothes had landed in the southern outskirts of Beirut and driven in civilian Lebanese cars towards predetermined objectives in the city. They had attacked buildings in several areas, killing three members of the Palestine Liberation Organization and blowing up buildings. A total of 12 people had been killed, including two Lebanese policemen, two Lebanese civilians, three Syrian workers, four Palestinians and an Italian woman. Twenty-nine persons, all Lebanese, had been wounded. Lebanon, which depended on the Charter of the United Nations and the Security Council for its protection, considered that the Council had an obligation not only to find solutions to problems but to offer protection to States that were victims of aggression. The Council had repeatedly passed resolutions regarding Israel's aggression against Lebanon and other Arab States, but those resolutions had been met with Israel's contempt and defiance. He noted that Lebanon was a peaceful country that relied not on military

power but on international order and legality for its protection. It was the responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter to protect small, peaceful and defenceless States. Israel alleged that it was conducting warfare against terrorism in order to prevent future terrorist acts, and that terrorist organizations were harboured in Lebanon with the connivance of its Government. In fact, however, it was Israel that was maintaining itself by means of State-organized terrorism. The history of Israeli terrorism in the Middle East was well known. Zionist terrorism had driven 1.5 million Palestinians out of their homeland, and most of them were living in refugee camps as a result of a continuing process of terror and terrorism. Of those refugees, 300,000 lived in Lebanon, which could not be held responsible for their desire to return to their homes and for their spirit of resistance against the aggressor. Lebanon, which had deployed every effort to promote peaceful conditions in the area, could not bear the responsibility that should be borne by the international community to solve the problem of the Palestinians. Israel's repeated acts of aggression, he concluded, could not go unpunished, and the Council should take a more meaningful action than condemnation so as to put an end to Israeli aggression against Lebanon.

173. The representative of the United States stated that the events in Lebanon had been followed by an attempt to spread a big lie, namely, a charge that the United States Government had connived or colluded in those events and that the American Embassy in Beirut was harbouring persons who had been involved. That accusation which, he added, had originated with those who opposed a peaceful settlement and practised terrorism, was totally without foundation. He hoped that reasonable people would recognize how defamatory and irresponsible such a charge was. His Government deplored violence and regretted the mounting toll in innocent lives, and had not had any part in, or knowledge of, the Israeli raid on Lebanon on 10 April.

174. The representative of Israel charged that Lebanon had convened the Council to seek a licence for the continuation of terrorism. While the world had been reacting with indignation to the actions of Arab terror groups, the Arab States had continued to give them support and still harboured terrorist bases within their borders.

His Government, he stressed, was duty-bound to protect the lives of its citizens and to put an end to the assaults directed against men, women and children. That was the objective of its action on the night of 9/10 April against terrorist bases, headquarters and hideouts in the Beirut area, in particular, the Al Fatah headquarters there. Casualties had been inflicted on the terrorists, including some leaders of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Under the leadership of those men, terrorist actions in the last two years had totalled 105 attacks resulting in 228 casualties, including 116 deaths. It was common knowledge that Lebanon was a centre for the planning and execution of terrorist attacks against civilians in Israel and elsewhere. Terrorists maintained their headquarters, workshops for the manufacture of weapons and recruitment and information offices in Lebanon's capital with the consent of the Lebanese authorities. Nothing could justify Lebanon's agreement to the maintenance of terror centres and bases on its territory. As long as the Lebanese Government chose to do so it must be considered an accomplice in the terrorists' campaign. Israel's action against the terrorist centres in Beirut had saved the lives of many in the Middle East and other regions, and if that action had been taken earlier, many innocent lives would have been spared.

175. The representative of Saudi Arabia said that Lebanon had never been an aggressor and had never encroached on its neighbours. It was one of the freest countries in the world; otherwise it would not have been possible for spies to prepare the recent terrorist act by Israel in Lebanon. There were about 300,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, and such a country, which had many sects living in peace together, could not engage in internal strife or civil war in order to discover and punish those conniving to perpetrate any action against Israel. The responsibility for that situation fell on the United Nations, where the major Powers had voted to create Israel. As long as there were Palestinian refugees dispersed all over Arab lands and the world at large, there would be no peace in the area or anywhere in the whole world and terrorism would prevail. It was the responsibility of the major Powers to put an end to that situation. The frustrated Palestinians were not accountable to Lebanon, to Egypt or to Jordan, and because of their frustration they had

developed psychoses which generated violence and endangered the life of everyone.

176. At the 1706th meeting on 13 April, the representative of Algeria said that, with the help received from the United States, Israel was practising the same terrorism for which it had condemned the Palestinians. The Palestinian people were waging a struggle for survival as an Arab people. It was true that terrorism was inhumane, but the Palestinians had no regular army to fight the Israeli forces, and they had resorted to the only form of struggle open to them. In face of the struggle of an entire people, it was an illusion to think that Israeli terrorism could break the determination of the Palestinians. The Middle East problem, he continued, would not be solved so long as Israel maintained its Zionist doctrine, which opposed the rightful claims of the Palestinians to live in their own country and claimed to represent all Jewish colonies in the world.

177. The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic said that the real question before the Council was the terrorism practised by Israel as a doctrine, a faith and a cult. It was Israeli terrorism that should be considered by the Council, particularly in its flagrant violation of the sovereignty of Member States. Under the pretext of security, Israel was striking deep into Arab territories, and sooner or later, with one aggression after another, would achieve the "great Israel". Its terrorism was escalating, and it was preparing international public opinion for a new war against the Arab countries to eliminate forever what remained of the Palestinian people. Israel, he said, would not have attained those dimensions of arrogance had it not been for the unconditional support of the United States, and he questioned whether that support was not an invitation to Israel to do whatever it chose to do against the Arab countries. Affirming that his country's attitude concerning the question of Palestine and Israel's aggression against the Arab countries was based on the principles of the Charter and international law, he said that peace in the Middle East depended on the recognition of the right of the people of Palestine to their land and to the free exercise of their right to self-determination and on the complete, immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israel forces from all occupied Arab territories.

178. The representative of the Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics said that in the last four years the Council had 10 times taken up questions involving Israel's aggressive acts against Lebanon and that it was no accident that Israel should have refused to support General Assembly resolution 2936 (XXVII) on the non-use of force in international relations and the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. In the light of the latest events, he went on to say, it had become even more obvious that that resolution, which protected the lawful interests of the victims of imperialist and colonial aggression through its provision regarding the non-use of force in international relations, also reaffirmed the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force. Consequently any further act of aggression by Israel should be considered not only a breach of the Charter but a breach of that new rule of international law. In upholding that resolution the Security Council was duty-bound to take appropriate measures to secure the full implementation of that provision. He then recalled that the Council had, in recent years, warned Israel that if it continued its aggressive acts against Lebanon, the Council would consider further actions under the Charter. Israel, he added, had continued to ignore and violate the decisions of the Security Council and the resolutions of the General Assembly. Turning to the events under consideration, he said that Israel's actions in Lebanon were part of Israel's policy of intimidation and State terror. The latest operation had been praised by the Israeli Government and pictured as a kind of retaliatory measure. The USSR, he affirmed, was against all international terrorism that upset the diplomatic activity of States and their representatives. It was also opposed to attempts to influence the policy of States by acts of terrorism, as well as terrorist acts by individuals. The USSR was just as firmly opposed to terrorist acts by irresponsible individuals being used by the aggressor as justification for its own aggressive action against other countries. Accordingly, his delegation condemned Israeli terrorist methods and Israel's raising terrorism to the rank of national State policy. The Soviet Union felt that there was urgent need for a just settlement in the Near East on the basis of Council resolution 242 (1967), which provided for the withdrawal of Israel troops from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967, and recognized the need to ensure the exercise

of the lawful rights of the Arab people of Palestine. In that respect, the permanent members of the Security Council ought to make every effort to curb Israeli aggressions. The Soviet Union was prepared to make every necessary effort to bring about a political settlement and was prepared immediately to resume consultations among the five permanent members of the Council to help the Secretary-General's Special Representative. His Government was concerned at the tension in the area, which had been further exacerbated by the recent Israeli raids against Lebanon. The Security Council had not only condemned Israel but warned it of more effective measures under the Charter, should it continue its aggressive acts. The time had come for the Security Council to take those effective measures and halt Israel's acts of aggression.

179. The representative of the Sudan said that from the moment of its creation by the United Nations, Israel had based its existence on military settlements and a huge military institution built on the old organs of terrorism, such as Haganah, the Irgun and the Stern gangs that had been responsible for murders before and after the creation of Israel. All the incidents of violence cited by the representative of Israel and for which he held Lebanon responsible were the ultimate results of Israel's own aggression and terrorism. From the statements of the representative of Israel before the Council and his repeated rationalizations of the crimes against Lebanon, it appeared that aggression against that country would continue to be repeated in the name of the security of Israel. Israel's ultimate aim was to exterminate the 2.5 million Palestine Arabs who claimed their right to self-determination. However, a people determined to struggle for its inherent rights could not be frightened by force of arms or dissuaded by a bribe of 1 per cent of Arabian oil revenues as had been naïvely suggested by the representative of Israel. The Palestinians should no longer be called refugees and forced to live on charity, as it was the duty of the United Nations to uphold their rights. The Council should condemn Israel's acts of aggression against Lebanon in the strongest terms and if Israel continued to take the law into its own hand and extend its terrorism, the Council should seriously consider applying effective measures against it under the Charter.

180. The representative of Yugoslavia said that

the latest Israeli raid was the latest example of an escalated war-like policy based on the use of military force. The previous acts of aggression by Israel against two refugee camps and the downing of a civilian aircraft were also tragic events to be seen in the context of the policy of ready use of naked force. His Government, as well as the United Nations, had condemned the policy of intimidation by force and of territorial expansion. However, what was particularly onerous was that a stronger, larger and better equipped force had been used against a small, weak and peaceful country whose only protection was the United Nations. It was in that context that the Council had to react and meet time after time. The most recent attack constituted a most blatant example of international terrorism—terrorism by States. It was quite inadmissible to link it or equate it with individual terrorist activity. The principal reason for the crisis in the Middle East was Israel's refusal to comply with Council resolution 242 (1967) and other relevant United Nations resolutions that covered Israel's hold on the occupied Arab territories and its expansionist policy and constant denial of the basic rights of the Palestinians. Therefore, the Council must stress that it was not prepared to tolerate Israel's total disrespect for the international community, for the United Nations and for its decisions. It must condemn the Israeli attack on Lebanon and the assassination of the Palestinian Liberation Movement members there.

181. At the 1707th meeting on 16 April, the representative of Egypt said that the aggression against Lebanon on the night of 10 April had not been committed by common criminals but by Israeli soldiers trained and ordered by their Government; the Israeli authorities who lauded those acts of murder had served notice that they would be repeated in Lebanon and elsewhere, which suggested that Israel had assigned to itself an imperial role in the area. All the condemnations and warning of the Council concerning Israeli aggression against Lebanon had had no effect on the authorities of Tel Aviv; consequently, those authorities espoused murder and assassination as a formal State policy and practice. It was unbelievable that Israel should continue to receive ever increasing massive military and economic assistance from a Member State, after all the Council resolutions relating to attacks against

Lebanon alone. It was inconceivable that such massive aid should be provided to Israel while it occupied the territories of Egypt, Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic, made a mockery of the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence and boycotted the peace mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. A ban on provision of military supplies and financial aid to Israel was essential for the attainment of peace in the Middle East. The Council should call upon all Member States, especially the permanent members, to interrupt their economic assistance and military supplies to Israel. He announced that he intended to ask for a full review of the entire Middle East situation by the Council, including specific steps for a thorough examination of United Nations efforts to implement all its resolutions and to apply the basic principles of the Charter. Egypt would soon request a full report by the Secretary-General's Special Representative. The Council and the world had the right and the duty to know whether peace efforts in the Middle East had reached a dead end.

182. The representative of China said that his delegation wished to express its utmost indignation and strong condemnation of the aggression committed by Israeli Zionists. The incident of 10 April was the continuation of a series of atrocities committed by the Israeli Zionists over a long period and another proof that they resorted to aggression as their State policy. Statements by Israeli officials had extolled that incident, and the Israeli representative in the Council had openly declared that Israel would assume the right to attack Palestinians. It was just that the Palestinian people who had been driven from their homeland should fight for their rights to national existence and against the Israeli aggressors. The Palestinian and other Arab peoples would unite closely and push to the end their struggle against the aggressors. The connivance and encouragement of the two super Powers were the basic reasons for Israel's refusal to withdraw from large tracts of Arab territories. The two super Powers were deliberately maintaining a situation of "no war, no peace" in the Middle East and making deals at the expense of the Palestinian and other Arab people's national rights, territory and sovereignty so as to facilitate their contention for important strategic points and oil resources in that area. One super

Power had been supporting the Israeli aggressors with arms and economic aid. The other was pouring a steady flow of manpower into Israel to supply the aggressors with sources for troop recruitment and technical specialists. His delegation reaffirmed that the Chinese Government and people firmly supported the Palestinian, Lebanese and other Arab peoples in their just struggle against the Israeli aggressors and considered that the Council must condemn and stop Israel's aggression.

183. Charging that the representative of the Soviet Union, in a statement on 13 April, had made attacks and threats against the Chinese and other delegations that opposed the Soviet proposal regarding the non-use of force in international relations, he recalled that the Chinese delegation, at the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly, had made a full analysis and refutation of the Soviet delegation's argument, which distorted the spirit of the Charter. In again playing up the theory of the absolute non-use of force in international relations, which made no distinction between the aggressor and the victim of aggression, and at a time when the Israeli Zionists had just committed serious aggression against the Palestinian and Lebanese peoples, the Soviet position amounted to whitewashing the aggressors' crime.

184. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the statement by the representative of China was slanderous and a distortion of the position of the USSR and of the substance of General Assembly resolution 2936 (XXVII) on the non-use of force in international relations and the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. That resolution, the Soviet representative emphasized, despite the slanderous assertions of the representative of China, helped the victims of aggression and untied their hands in the struggle against the aggressor. In that resolution the United Nations expressed its support for the fighters for national liberation. It was for that very reason that the South African racists and the Portuguese colonists—who were stifling the freedom of the African peoples—had voted against that resolution. And now China found itself in the same company. The statement just made by China confirmed, moreover, that China sided with the Israeli aggressors because it was

going along with them in the fight against General Assembly resolution 2936 (XXVII) on the non-use of force in international relations and the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. He called upon the Chinese representative to desist from trying to lead the Security Council in the direction of anti-Sovietism and slander against the Soviet Union and, instead, to put forward concrete proposals designed to stop Israeli aggression against the Arab States.

185. The representative of China said that the Soviet representative's proposal on the "non-use of force" was purely hypocritical and reactionary. He pointed out that in 1968 the Soviet Union had sent large numbers of troops to invade the capital of one of its allies, that in 1971 it had supported by force the dismemberment of a State Member of the United Nations, that it now maintained a large number of troops and military bases beyond its borders and that it stationed a million troops along the frontiers of China to threaten China. Was all this in conformity with the principle of the "non-use of force in international relations"? One should not only listen to someone's words but also look at his deeds, and by so doing it would not be difficult to see his true features.

186. At the 1708th meeting on 17 April, the representative of the United Kingdom said that he took part in the debate in a spirit of profound depression. Far from moving forward, the search for peace in the Middle East went backwards. Far from peace and counsels of moderation prevailing, there was ever-increasing violence, with the scene dominated by extremists. His Government consistently deplored all acts of violence and terrorism in the Middle East and sympathized with the cause and fate of the Palestine refugees, who had been the subject of endless United Nations debates and resolutions. It was not surprising that bitterness and hatred should grow in their hearts and that, in despair, some should turn to violence. However, the international community could not tolerate the killing of innocent people, the murder of diplomats and the disruption of communications. Not only must the Palestinians exercise restraint, but all Governments concerned must exert themselves to control violence. To deplore the acts of violence of the terrorist organizations, however, was not to condone Israel's attacks on Lebanon. Those, too, must be condemned. They constituted an act of official

violence which could under no circumstances be justified under the Charter. To accept such action would be to revert to a state of international anarchy. While his Government could not agree that terrorism could be justified, it was not blind to the need to eradicate its root-causes and to deal with its underlying problems. The United Nations must show the refugees that the world had not forgotten them, and their legitimate aspirations must not be overlooked in any final settlement. The debate had ranged beyond the subject on the agenda but the wider issues of the Middle East situation could not be over-looked since until those issues were grappled with, such incidents would continue. His delegation would be glad to see the Council call upon the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to renew their efforts to promote agreement on the basis of resolution 242 (1967).

187. The representative of Indonesia said that the problem of terrorism and counter-terrorism could not be considered apart from its root-causes, which were two-fold: the injustice inflicted upon the Palestinians, which had continued for 25 years, and the continued occupation by Israel of territories belonging to three Arab countries. He noted that efforts to implement resolution 242 (1967) had not succeeded in eliminating the second root-cause and added that as long as the Palestinians were deprived of their land and as long as Israel insisted on occupying lands belonging to others it would be illusory to imagine that violence born of political despair would cease. His country could not condone senseless acts of violence and wanton terrorism, but it did not view violence committed by desperate and frustrated people in the same light as the acts of terrorism committed by a Government in order to continue its unlawful occupation of other people's land. In resolution 280 (1970) the Security Council had already warned Israel that such flagrant violation of the peace could no longer be tolerated. His delegation was of the opinion that the time had come to take adequate and effective steps as referred to in resolution 280 (1970) and to implement fully the decisions which the Council had taken in the past. Indonesia, he said, would continue to support the struggle of the Arab peoples and was aware that any action by the Council, to be effective, could only be taken with the concurrence and co-operation of the permanent members of the Council.

188. The representative of Guinea said that fundamental to the problem in the Middle East was the inalienable right of the Palestinian people to a home, so that they could put an end to their wanderings, which had lasted almost a quarter of a century. She felt that it was imperative to seek an equitable solution to that situation and that the time had come for the international community to undo its error. The hope, once again, lay with the Powers which more than other Members of the Organization held the key to the solution of the Palestinian tragedy because it was they who created the problem. In particular, she called upon the Government of the United States, which provided Israel with financial and military assistance, to make Israel comply unconditionally with the provisions of resolution 242 (1967) and General Assembly resolution 2949 (XXVII).

189. The representative of Austria said that his Government condemned all acts of violence not only out of dedication to the principle of the peaceful solution of conflicts but out of deep respect for human life. Confronted with the recent violence, his Government shared with all delegations on the Council an extreme sense of urgency in seeking appropriate action. Council actions should be directed against the continuation of violence, but condemnation of violence by the Council could only achieve its aim, if it was directed against all forms and all sources of violence. Declaring that the absence of a solution and the passage of time explained the growing sense of frustration that had bred unrest and tension, he said that there existed a widely recognized basis for a solution. It lay in resolution 242 (1967), which contained all the elements required to bring about peace, justice and security for all nations in the area, including a just settlement of the refugee problem. That resolution demonstrated that the United Nations was not incapable of devising the platform for a solution.

190. The representative of the United States asked if the recent acts of terror and counter-terror were to be accepted as the new rules of engagement in a tragic unresolved war and said that his country opposed violence and terror from whatever source and of whatever kind. Violence by conventional forces and violence by terrorists were to be condemned equally. One was as ugly as the other. Violations of the sovereignty of one State by another State should not be condoned, nor should murders,

by individuals or groups, in violation of basic human rights. No Member State should attack another. Any such action only bred further violence. Neither should any State allow its territory to be used for the launching of terrorist attacks outside its territory. No State should harbour elements which attacked other States, or nationals of that State, wherever they might be. Such individuals, he said, depended on the support or acquiescence of Governments, contrary to General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV) on friendly relations; therefore, it was the duty of each State not to condone or abet those acts of terrorism, whether they were directed against its own citizens or against the citizens of other countries. The real problem in the Middle East was how to break the vicious circle of violence. The overriding task of the Council was to move from recrimination to even-handed condemnation of all forms of violence, or there would be no progress towards peace. There must be an end to both cross-border attacks and individual acts of violence. The United Nations must leave no doubt as to the international community's disapproval of unwarranted and unnecessary loss of innocent lives from acts of terrorism and military responses to it. The time had come when there must be a halt to all acts of terror by all sides, and the Council should facilitate the turn from violence to peace, using the framework for an overall settlement that existed in resolution 242 (1967). That resolution, which called for a just settlement of the refugee problem, pointed the way to the goal of a lasting peace through which all the peoples of the Middle East could achieve security and justice. His Government recognized that peace in the Middle East could be achieved only by taking into full account the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinians.

191. The representative of Tunisia said that Israel would not succeed in silencing the Palestinians by attacks and incursions into Lebanon or elsewhere. He urged that the problem was no longer of concern solely to the Arabs and Jews of Palestine but to the entire international community, which should work towards an equitable solution. In 1947, he added, when the partition of Palestine was decided, the international community had been concerned only to satisfy the Zionists, who took advantage of sympathies aroused by Hitler's holocaust. At that time the Arab

world was mostly under foreign domination, and instead of accepting the portion of Palestine that had been allocated to it under the United Nations partition resolution, the Arabs of Palestine had chosen to reject partition and suddenly had found themselves chased from their homes to neighbouring Arab countries and to date they had been denied the right to exist in their own country or elsewhere. Even resolution 242 (1967) referred to the Palestinians only as refugees, whereas the question of their national rights was paramount in any settlement. It was obvious that the problem of Palestine remained before the Council and that it called for two conclusions: first that the international community should take action to ensure that international law was applied in respect to the Palestinian people; second that the Security Council should hear the representatives of the Palestinian people. His Government held that the responsibility of the great Powers and the super-Powers was decisive in the Middle East but believed that concerted effort by small and medium-sized countries, including the Arab countries, could design an intelligent and bold strategy that would lead to a more just assessment of the situation by the major Powers.

192. The representative of Australia said that his delegation found the continuing spectacle of violence and violent reprisal saddening and disturbing and felt that it must be deplored. The complete polarization of attitudes that had become frozen over the years helped to aggravate the already difficult task of the United Nations, particularly that of the Council. In his delegation's view, the first and most positive step would be to break the cycle of aggression and reprisal and turn back the wave of murderous violence and terror that had spread outwards from the area across the world. For his delegation, there could be no doubt that the incident at Beirut amounted to murder planned, directed and acknowledged by the Government of Israel and a deplorable intrusion upon the sovereignty of another Member State. As such, it must be censured. However, whether it was to be regarded as an act of aggression, retaliation, precaution or self-defence, it was only one of a succession of acts of violence and some of the neighbouring countries of Israel could scarcely escape charges of complicity in some of them. In conclusion, he warned that, if the United Nations failed to put an end to the further

escalation of international terrorism, it was liable to have matters taken out of its hands.

193. At the 1709th meeting on 18 April, the representative of Kenya said his delegation regretted the human suffering that had ensued as a result of the spiralling cycle of violence in the Middle East, and in the name of human dignity and peace, it condemned all acts of terrorism and counter-terrorism. In his view, Lebanon's complaint could not be treated outside the context of the situation in the Middle East or in isolation from the questions of the future of the Palestinians and the occupied territories. He called on the members of the Council, as well as all other Members of the United Nations, to use the Charter of the United Nations as their guide in the conduct of their relations with other States, as it constituted the bedrock on which a just, fair and lasting peace could be built. The Council could not sit idly by while the Charter was daily violated; rather it should reactivate the machinery already set up in resolution 242 (1967). The Council, finally, must call upon the major Powers to ensure that the Secretary-General's Special Representative was given a chance to bring the parties together.

194. The representative of India said that Israel had the right, as did all other sovereign States, to defend its own territory and its own citizens within its own State. But he denied that it had the right to protect its citizens by using the force of arms against citizens in another country. Such a right would contradict the United Nations Charter and the rule of international law. If a citizen of Israel was put in jeopardy in a foreign country, Israel had every right to seek redress through the usual process of bilateral arrangements. India condemned and deplored terrorism wherever it occurred and by whomever it was perpetrated, but it realized that if just solutions to problems were greatly delayed, people suffering from injustice and frustration would fall back on desperate measures, which often resulted in death and injury to innocent victims. The solution, he believed, must surely lay in an equitable and just end to the problems, as had been attempted in resolution 242 (1967), which unfortunately had not yet been implemented. He agreed with the Foreign Minister of Egypt that the time had come to ask for a full report from the Secretary-General and his Special Representative. It would also be welcome if the permanent members renewed their

discussions. His delegation had some doubts as to whether New York was the right place for an objective debate on the Middle East problem and and was, therefore, all the more grateful that the Foreign Minister of Egypt had travelled a long distance in his search for a just solution to the problem.

195. The representative of Panama said that his Government was greatly concerned at the recurrence of acts of violence and condemned them emphatically. International terrorism was a scourge that afflicted all the world and should in the opinion of his delegation, be studied as a separate problem. With regard to the complaint of Lebanon, Panama felt that Israel's attack against Lebanon was in open violation of international law and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a State Member of the United Nations. Panama, which could not condone such acts, pronounced itself in favour of Lebanon and insisted that its territorial integrity be respected. His delegation would like to see a lasting peace established on the basis of resolution 242 (1967) but wished to express its fear that, if violence continued, there might be another conflict in the area, with unforeseeable consequences for all mankind.

196. The representative of France said his country attached particular importance to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon, a small country that was devoted to peace. Under the pretext of ensuring the security of its nationals Israel had declared that it must combat Palestinian terrorism the most recent manifestations of which had been the incidents in Khartoum and Cyprus. His delegation condemned all acts of violence and felt that the Palestinian cause had gained nothing from the infringement of the most elementary human rights, but it was obliged to draw a distinction between Palestinian terrorism, which was the result of uncontrollable elements, and the Israeli counter-terrorism organized and controlled by a State Member of the United Nations. In the view of his delegation, it was asking the impossible to expect that Lebanon should be able to control the legitimate aspirations of some 300,000 refugees living on its territory. The Beirut incident, and other similar ones could only jeopardize the efforts of those seeking a just and lasting peace in the area. He felt that the supply of arms to any of the parties could only serve to delay the restoration of peace. True peace required of the parties to the

conflict a firm determination to negotiate and demanded that the Arab countries recognize the existence of Israel and that Israel concede that it could not indefinitely remain in possession of territories that did not belong to it. Therefore, his delegation continued to believe that the principles contained in resolution 242 (1967) must finally be applied and that the Secretary-General and his Special Representative should continue their efforts. A resumption of the meetings of the permanent members of the Security Council could be useful, but, in the meantime, the request of Lebanon should be answered, and the Israeli attack must be condemned.

197. The President of the Council, speaking as the representative of Peru, said that this country condemned acts of violence against innocent victims, as well as arbitrary and unilateral reprisals, because both damaged the legal order. For his delegation, an international agreement was needed that would take into account the frustrated aspirations of a whole people. He added the world could not ignore the painful conditions of the people of Palestine, which remained removed from its ancestral home in a situation that could only lead to despair and violence. The Council has justly perceived that complex problem when, in resolution 242 (1967), it had laid down an integral approach to the Middle East question, including the Palestine tragedy, and provided the only possible framework for a just and lasting peace. What was needed, it appeared, was a new type of cease-fire, and the Council must therefore urge Israel to refrain from actions such as those currently being considered by the Council. That would pave the way for more long-range measures that could be taken in the future.

198. The representative of Egypt said that he had come to the Council to show his country's concern about the assault on Lebanon and to ask the Council to deal with the main problems of aggression, occupation, expansion and colonization. With regard to the question under consideration, he said that, when violence was discussed in the future, the accused should be brought before the Council. The representative of Tunisia has suggested that the Palestinians be heard in the Council. The United Nations had divided Palestine into two parts and therefore considered that Palestinians had a country. The Council should realize that it was not simply 33 months of cease-

fire that had passed, but 33 months of occupation which could only be described as simply intolerable.

199. On 19 April a draft resolution was submitted by France and the United Kingdom (S/10916) which read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Having considered the agenda contained in document S/Agenda/1705,

"Having noted the contents of the letter of the Permanent Representative of Lebanon (S/10913),

"Having heard the statements of the representatives of Lebanon and Israel,

"Grieved at the tragic loss of civilian life,

"Gravely concerned about the deteriorating situation resulting from the violation of Security Council resolutions,

"Deeply deploring all acts of violence resulting in the loss of life of innocent individuals and the endangering of international civil aviation,

"Recalling the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Lebanon of 23 March 1949 and the cease-fire established pursuant to resolutions 233 (1967) and 234 (1967),

"Recalling its resolutions 262 (1968) of 31 December 1968, 270 (1969) of 26 August 1969, 280 (1970) of 19 May 1970 and 316 (1972) of 26 June 1972,

"1. Expresses deep concern over and deplores all acts of violence which endanger or take innocent human lives;

"2. Condemns the repeated military attacks conducted by Israel against Lebanon and Israel's violation of Lebanon's territorial integrity and sovereignty in contravention of the Charter of the United Nations, of the Israel-Lebanon Armistice Agreement and of the Security Council's cease-fire;

"3. Calls upon Israel to desist forthwith from all military attacks on Lebanon;

"4. Warns Israel that, if such attacks were to be repeated, the Council would meet to consider what further and more effective steps or measures could be taken to ensure against their repetition."

200. On the same date an amendment to the two-Power draft resolution was submitted by Guinea, India, Indonesia and Yugoslavia (S/10917) which provided for the addition of the following paragraph at the end of the draft resolution:

"5. Calls upon all States to refrain from providing any assistance which encourages such

military attacks or impedes the search for a peaceful settlement.”

201. At the 1710th meeting on 20 April, the representative of Egypt said that the Middle East situation defied any solution because of the support lent by the United States to Israel in underwriting its occupation by military and financial assistance. The Declaration on friendly relations contained in General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV) had been invoked. That Declaration affirmed the inviolability of international boundaries, the prohibition of military occupation, the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force and the non-recognition of such acquisition, as well as the prohibition of armed reprisal. It also supported the right of all peoples to self-determination which certainly included the people of Palestine. He expressed the hope that the Council, having heard all the statements, would respond favourably to his request to reconvene in the near future in order to review and examine in depth the situation in the Middle East. The Council, he added, should be assisted by a comprehensive report prepared by the Secretary-General on the efforts undertaken by the United Nations pertaining to the situation in the Middle East since June 1967. He inquired how much time the Secretary-General anticipated that the preparation of such a report would take and submitted a draft resolution (S/10918) with that end in view. He expressed the hope that a member of the Council would request that his proposal be put to the vote and that it be accorded priority in the voting. The draft resolution read as follows:

[This draft was adopted as Resolution 331 (1973) and is printed as doc. 31 below.]

202. The Secretary-General stated that it should be possible to prepare a report such as that proposed by the representative of Egypt in three to four weeks. He recalled that on 4 January 1971 he had issued a comprehensive report (S/10070) covering the activities of the Special Representative from 1967 to the end of 1970, and that, since then, there had been other reports concerning the activities of the Special Representative.

203. The representative of Jordan, said that his country, which had had more than one-third of its population under occupation since 1967, had a direct interest in a serious review of the situation and early action to roll back Israeli occupation, liberate the people in its bondage, restore the

rights of the masses of people in exile and establish a just and lasting peace in the area. For six years the Arab countries involved had sought every avenue for a peaceful settlement. The occupying Power, however, was consolidating its occupation and absorbing the occupied areas. Settlements had been established, large-scale expropriation of land was taking place with the forcible removal of the owners and Arab Jerusalem had been annexed and its unique and universal religious character had been suppressed by blind religious chauvinism. Such a process of continuing aggression must be halted, and that was the primary responsibility of the Security Council.

204: The representative of the Sudan said that his delegation was formally making a motion, in accordance with rule 38 of the rules of procedure, that the Council should vote on the draft resolution submitted by Egypt, which he hoped it would adopt unanimously.

205. The representative of the United States said that his delegation was far from certain about the usefulness of the review proposed by the Foreign Minister of Egypt. In the emotional circumstances of the moment his delegation was concerned lest new discussion produce contention, lest contention produce new difficulties for those who must seek to construct the framework of a lasting peace in the Middle East.

206. Following statements in explanation of vote before the vote, the President inquired whether there was any objection to proceeding to a vote on the Egyptian draft resolution (S/10918) in accordance with the request of its sponsor that it should be given priority in the voting and the request of the representative of the Sudan that it should be put to the vote in accordance with rule 38 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure. There being no objection, he further inquired whether the Council agreed to approve the draft resolution without a vote.

Decision: *At the 1710th meeting on 20 April 1973, the Egyptian draft resolution (S/10918) was adopted unanimously as resolution 331 (1973).*

207. At the same meeting the representative of France introduced a revision (S/10916/Rev.1) of the draft resolution sponsored by France and the United Kingdom. He stated that its text had been the subject of long negotiations and seemed to meet the essential points of concern which had emerged

in the Council in connexion with the complaint by Lebanon. In the revised text, operative paragraph 1 was amended by the substitution of the word "condemns" for the word "deplores" and operative paragraph 4 was deleted.

208. The representative of Guinea, on behalf of the sponsors of the four-Power amendment (S/10917) to the two-Power draft resolution, withdrew that amendment because, she explained, it had referred to the original text of that draft resolution and not to the revised text.

209. At the 1711th meeting on 21 April, the representative of India stated that the changes made in the two-Power draft resolution had modified the principle that there could be no equation or balance between individual acts of violence and State-controlled raids into other States, as well as the principle that the Council had to draw a sharp distinction between those who took the law into their own hands and those who came to the Council for redress. The revised draft blurred the perspective of the total picture of the situation in the Middle East. His delegation would have preferred the first text together with the four-Power amendment. The Indian delegation's logical attitude would therefore, have been to abstain in the vote. However, Lebanon found the present text acceptable and it would not be right not to support the draft and so offer any possible comfort to Lebanon. Consequently India would vote for the two-Power draft resolution.

210. The representative of Guinea said that her country had always affirmed the right of the people of Palestine to fight for the reconquest of their national territory. She felt that the Palestinian people could not be denied that right and that the general problem of the Middle East could not be separated from the specific case presented by Lebanon. Because the revised two-Power draft condemned the liberation movements and Israel on equal footing, her delegation, in order to be consistent, would abstain in the vote on it.

211. The representative of China said that his delegation found much of the contents of the two-Power draft acceptable. However, there were expressions that lent themselves to ambiguity, as they failed to distinguish between the aggressor and the victim of aggression, and therefore might be used by the Zionists to oppose the Palestinian and other Arab peoples. His delegation had made active but unsuccessful efforts to rectify those

erroneous expressions. In the circumstances, his delegation would have to abstain in the voting on the revised two-Power draft resolution.

212. The representative of Indonesia said that his delegation would have been happier if the draft resolution had remained in its original form. Indonesia, however, would vote for the revised draft, because Lebanon considered that it met a large portion of its requirements and was prepared to live with it, and because his delegation considered its adoption as an interim measure since the Council had already adopted resolution 331 (1973) and would accordingly examine the situation in the Middle East following the submission of the Secretary-General's report on the situation.

213. The representative of the Sudan said that the draft resolution should have contained a precise reference to the acts of violence and terrorism committed directly by Israel on 10 April instead of referring in a general way to acts of violence for which Israel had ultimate responsibility because of its policy of aggression, occupation and terrorism. His delegation opposed any effort to interpret paragraph 1 as applicable to the Palestinian national liberation movement. In compliance with the wishes of Lebanon, his delegation would vote in favour of the two-Power draft resolution.

214. The representative of Kenya said that his delegation would vote for the two-Power draft resolution, because it considered that it introduced the basic equity into the situation.

215. The representative of Panama said that, because Lebanon considered the text acceptable and because it reaffirmed the right of Lebanon to have its territorial integrity and sovereignty respected, his delegation would vote in favour of the two-Power draft resolution.

Decision: *At the 1711th meeting on 21 April 1973, the revised two-Power draft resolution (S/10916/Rev.1) was adopted by 11 votes to none, with 4 abstentions (China, Guinea, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and United States of America) as resolution 332 (1973).*

216. Resolution 332 (1973) read as follows:

[For the text see doc. 32 below.]

217. Following the vote, the representative of Yugoslavia said that, although his delegation regarded the resolution as unbalanced and might appear to equate official terrorism by a Member

State with other acts of violence, it had voted in favour of the revised text because the representative of Lebanon indicated that since it condemned Israel's repeated attacks against Lebanon it met some of Lebanon's basic requirements.

218. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics expressed satisfaction that the Council had adopted on the previous day an important decision to consider within a short time the over-all situation in the Middle East in all its aspects. In his view, that resolution could constitute a turning point in the quest for a peaceful solution to the Middle East conflict on the basis of resolution 242 (1967). With regard to the two-Power draft resolution, he said that it was not sufficiently decisive or strong. His delegation would have voted for the initial text but could not support the revised draft because it did not provide effective measures to stop the aggression of Israel.

219. The representative of the United States said that his Government opposed international violence and terrorism from whatever source and of whatever kind, and had called for a move away from recrimination to even-handed condemnation of all forms of violence. Although his delegation was pleased that the resolution condemned both violence and terrorism, it had withheld its positive vote because the resolution focused too much on the meaningless exercise of trying to parcel out blame and fell short of meeting the full dimensions of the challenge facing the Security Council. His Government had no intention of taking steps that would alter the arms balance in the Middle East or otherwise contribute to instability, but he emphasized that the United States did not propose to sit idly by while others poured arms into the Middle East for one side, thus inevitably tempting some Governments to believe that with those new arms they could risk another round in the Middle East war. His Government had in the past six years sought insistently an agreement among the major arms suppliers to limit weapons shipments to that part of the world. The United States stood ready to participate at any time in such an arrangement if others were willing to put aside their special political objectives and work with the United States toward the goal of a reduced military confrontation.

220. The representative of Australia said that his delegation had voted for the revised draft resolution because the changes in the text had gone

some distance towards injecting a measure of balance into the resolution.

221. The representative of Austria said that his delegation had voted for the two-power draft resolution because, in many respects, it condemned all acts of violence and addressed itself in no uncertain terms to a particular case. The resolution, moreover, was an urgent appeal to all parties involved to halt the use of violence and to exert all their influence in order to eliminate all acts of violence. It was also an important reaffirmation of Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

222. The representative of the United Kingdom said that his delegation had been prepared to accept a draft with additional paragraphs. However, the resolution just adopted preserved the essential features of the original submitted by the sponsors and met the needs of the situation in responding to the complaint of Lebanon at the same time that it made clear the Council's abhorrence of all acts of violence. He regretted that the resolution had not been supported by all members of the Council.

223. The President, speaking as the representative of Peru, said that he had voted in favour of the draft resolution because, in its revised form, it contained the basic principles that had to be reflected in the Council's decision.

224. The representative of Israel said that the Security Council, by adopting resolution 332 (1973) had demonstrated that, because of its structure and composition it could not deal equitably with questions pertaining to the Middle East situation. The adoption of that resolution confirmed that, there was international law on the one hand, and words produced in the Council on the other, and that the twain rarely met. The resolution also confirmed that, in the absence of United Nations action against international terrorism, it was incumbent upon Governments to combat that scourge by their own means, and his Government would continue to protect its people from Arab murder attacks.

225. The representative of Lebanon said that, like most of his colleagues in the Council, he was not satisfied with the resolution. Lebanon would have wished more and had requested the Council to take further steps. In the past, the Council had adopted resolutions condemning the acts of Israel against Lebanon and had warned Israel against further attacks, pledging to take new steps and new

measures, should there be a repetition of such attacks. The Council had just acted on a complaint by Lebanon, following a specific act of aggression against Lebanon admitted by the guilty party. In a sense, the new resolution met certain of Lebanon's requirements; but his delegation was unhappier with it than with the earlier text.

(k) *Reports to the Council received from 12 April to 15 June 1973*

226. From 12 April through 15 June, the Secretary-General continued to circulate reports received almost daily from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO (S/7930/Add.1959-1967, 1969-2023) concerning incidents in the Israel-Lebanon sector.

B. *Questions concerning the treatment of civilian populations in Israel-occupied territories and related matters*

227. In letters dated 15 and 23 June 1972, Israel (S/10700) and Egypt (S/10717) exchanged charges and counter-charges regarding the condition of the local inhabitants in the Gaza and Sinai area. Israel stated that, contrary to Egypt's claim, life in those areas was marked by tranquillity and development and added that Egypt's claim was made in order to divert attention from its hostile and destructive policy of active support of Arab terror organizations. Egypt replied that Israel's claims were refuted by its official statements and by the International Committee of the Red Cross, which during April and May had reported acts of mass deportation, mass destruction, deportation of civilians and expropriation of property in the occupied territories of Sinai and Gaza.

228. In a letter dated 28 June (S/10724) Israel charged that the Jews of Syria were living in constant fear for their lives and that they were frequently the victims of violence by the authorities as attested by statements made all over the world in information media and at international conferences and assemblies where protests were voiced against the persecution of Jews in Syria.

229. In a letter dated 29 June (S/10726), Jordan informed the Secretary-General that during the second half of May and the month of June Israel had deported to the east bank 14 persons who had lived in the occupied west bank and in Gaza. Therefore, measures should be taken to put an end to Israel actions that violated United

Nations resolutions and the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949.

230. In a letter dated 28 June (S/10725), Egypt charged that Israel was pursuing a policy of terror aimed at compelling the civilian Arab population in the occupied areas to leave in order to make room for alien immigrant settlers in the land owned by the Arab people. Israel's terror warfare against innocent civilians had involved many measures which the Zionist propaganda machinery claimed had been made in the name of Israel's peace and security. However, no such propaganda effort to deny its deliberate aggression could disguise Israel's criminal intention for neither hypocrisy nor criminality would succeed in silencing the voices of resistance.

231. In a reply dated 3 July (S/10727), Israel stated that Egypt had distorted Israel's statements regarding Israeli policies with respect to terror warfare and terrorism in the Gaza Strip. Egypt's ire at those policies was due to the frustration of its schemes to keep those regions in constant terror and turmoil.

232. In a letter dated 4 January 1973 (S/10857), Egypt complained about the displacement of inhabitants and the destruction of towns, villages and homes, including refugee camps, undertaken by Israel in the Gaza Strip and the Rafah area in order to consolidate the illegal Israeli military occupation in defiance of numerous United Nations resolutions.

233. In a reply dated 17 January (S/10862), Israel stated that Egypt's letter was an expression of unhappiness with the fact that Israel had not kept the Gaza region in the state of misery and stagnation in which it had been found after 19 years of Egyptian occupation. Since 1967, there had been full employment and a rise in the standard of living. Egypt and other Arab States had tried to prevent that development by fomenting terror and violence, but had failed owing to the measures adopted by the Israeli authorities there.

234. In a letter dated 4 April (S/10908), Egypt complained that Israel was pursuing a systematic policy of coercing the civilian population of the occupied territory in order to compel them to leave. Invoking security measures its authorities had killed three persons and arrested 20 in the Gaza Strip during March, in violation of the Geneva Convention. Therefore, Egypt asserted measures should be taken to end Israel's breaches

of law and morality and to protect the human rights of the inhabitants of the occupied territories.

235. Israel replied on 9 April (S/10910) that the three persons killed in the Gaza Strip had been terrorists responsible for attacks in the area.

236. In a letter dated 7 April (S/10909) Egypt, Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic complained that according to recent reports Israel was considering a proposed legislation to authorize Israeli individuals to purchase land and property in the occupied territories. Israel, it was pointed out, had already taken other prejudicial measures in the occupied territories, such as expropriation of land and property, establishment of Israeli settlements, annexation of Arab Jerusalem, transfer of refugees and integration of the economy of the occupied areas with that of Israel. Such measures were in violation of the Charter, the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and United Nations resolutions and were the cause of deep concern. Therefore, they contended, action should be taken to oblige Israel to desist from any further such actions in the occupied territories.

C. The situation in and around Jerusalem and its Holy Places

237. During the period covered by this report, the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General received several communications pertaining to the situation in Jerusalem and its Holy Places.

238. In a letter to the Secretary-General dated 10 August 1972 (S/10760), Jordan drew attention to new measures taken by Israel in violation of United Nations resolutions pertaining to Jerusalem and aimed at completing the Judaization of the Old City. In the preceding month, 3,500 Arab inhabitants of the Old City had received evacuation notices from "the Company for the Development of the Jewish Quarter in the Old City of Jerusalem", an Israeli company entrusted by the Israeli Government with the task of evacuating Arab inhabitants from the expropriated areas, the demolition of Arab buildings and the planning and construction of new buildings for new Jewish inhabitants. In view of those illegal actions, Jordan maintained that it was urgent that effective steps be taken to stop such Israeli measures that violated the United Nations resolutions and the

fourth Geneva Convention of 1949.

239. In a reply dated 18 August (S/10765) Israel stated that the Jewish quarter of eastern Jerusalem, the subject of Jordan's complaint of 10 August, had been occupied by Jordan in 1948, its buildings destroyed and its entire Jewish population exiled. During 19 years of Jordanian occupation, Israel added, no Jews had been permitted to set foot in that quarter.

240. In a further letter dated 23 October (S/10814), Jordan again protested continued Israeli measures designed to change the character of occupied Jerusalem and to obliterate its Arab character. Israel, the letter said, was building 13 Jewish quarters on the ruins of Arab villages and quarters that had been or were being demolished in the area. Construction had also been continuing on confiscated Arab land inside and outside the walls of the Holy City in order to encircle the remaining Arabs of Jerusalem with residential, industrial and military buildings inhabited by Israelis. Once completed, those 13 quarters would contain 35,000 housing units, capable of accommodating 122,000 new Israeli Jewish residents, thus forming an Israeli Jewish population, many times larger than the Arab population and constituting a radical and a very serious change in the demographic and cultural composition of the City, as well as a physical mutilation of its historic character. Jordan held that the international community was duty bound to take speedy action to stop that development and to enforce the resolutions adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly in regard to Jerusalem.

241. In a letter dated 25 November (S/10845), Egypt transmitted the text of a resolution adopted by the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in Paris in 1972,³⁹ urgently calling upon Israel to take the necessary measures for the scrupulous preservation of all sites, buildings and other cultural properties, especially in the Old City of Jerusalem, and to desist from any alteration of the features of the City, as well as from any archaeological excavations.

242. In a letter dated 14 December (S/10848), Jordan complained that measures recently taken

³⁹ This resolution is printed as doc. 21 in *International Documents on Palestine 1972*.

by the Israeli Military Governor of Hebron, on the west bank, which would increase the area allocated to Jews inside the Ibrahimi Mosque, were designed to obliterate the Islamic character of that prominent shrine and turn it into a synagogue.

243. In a reply dated 20 December (S/10851), Israel stated that the Jordanian complaint on the question of freedom of worship and the protection of holy sites was a distortion that ignored Jordan's record during its 19 years' occupation of west bank areas, including part of Jerusalem.

244. In a letter dated 14 February 1973 (S/10882) Jordan drew the attention of the Secretary-General to recent serious damage in the Al Aqsa Mosque, for which, he charged, Israel was responsible. One major wall of the Mosque had collapsed on 11 February in the same spot where a fire had broken out in August 1969 and threatened the entire structure. According to engineering experts the damage had been caused by cracks in the wall resulting from the 1969 fire and the drilling and demolition activities being carried out under the Mosque by the Israelis ostensibly as "archaeological excavations" which, should they continue, would cause the collapse of the other walls and, ultimately, the destruction of one of the holiest places of Islam. Israel, Jordan said, must halt all destructive activities in and around the Holy Places of Jerusalem. The international community could not stand and watch Israel defy the United Nations resolutions on Jerusalem and thus destroy the possibility of peace in the area.

245. In a reply dated 16 February (S/10883), Israel stated that Jordan had failed to report that a partial collapse of an interior wall had occurred during work carried out by Arab labourers digging for new marble pillars and that the work was being done under the direction of the Moslem Council in charge of the Mosque. According to a statement by that Council, the collapse of the wall had been anticipated and precautionary measures taken, and the continuation of the work in the Mosque would not be affected by the collapse of the wall. Moreover, Israel stated, that work was in no way connected with, or affected by, any archaeological activity, which was being conducted outside the area of the Mosque.

246. A number of communications were addressed to the Security Council on the question of holding a military parade in Jerusalem.

247. In a letter dated 23 April (S/10919), Jordan informed the Secretary-General of a reported Israeli plan to hold a military parade in Jerusalem on 7 May 1973 to celebrate Israel's twenty-fifth anniversary and stated that the parade would extend to occupied Jerusalem. Jordan recalled that, on a similar occasion in April 1968, the Security Council had, in its resolution 250 (1968), called upon Israel to refrain from holding a military parade in Jerusalem, and that after Israel had proceeded with the parade on 2 May 1968, the Council, in its resolution 251 (1968) had deeply deplored the holding of that parade in disregard of its resolution of 27 April. Jordan also recalled the many other resolutions pertaining to the status of Jerusalem and the rights of its inhabitants and calling upon Israel to take no further steps in the occupied section of Jerusalem that might purport to change the status of the city or prejudice the rights of the inhabitants, the interests of the international community or a just and lasting peace. Israel, however, had persistently taken measures and implemented policies designed to change the physical, demographic and religious character of Arab Jerusalem and incorporate it into Israel. Israel's contemplated parade on 7 May, Jordan concluded, would not only defy the United Nations but affront the universal spiritual values embodied in Jerusalem.

248. In a note dated 30 April (S/10922),⁴⁰ the President of the Security Council said that, in a statement he had made orally to the Permanent Representative of Israel on 27 April, he had pointed out that he had been informed by Jordan of Israel's intention to hold a military parade in Jerusalem on 7 May that would extend to Arab Jerusalem. As a result of consultations with all members of the Council, he then drew the attention of Israel to resolution 250 (1968) of 27 April 1968, in which the Council had called upon Israel to refrain from holding a similar parade, as well as to resolution 251 (1968), in which the Council had deeply deplored the holding by Israel of the military parade, in disregard of the Council's unanimous decision on 27 April 1968.

249. In a further letter dated 8 May (S/10924), Jordan complained that, despite the statement of the President of the Council to Israel on 27 April 1973, Israel had held a large military parade in

⁴⁰ Printed as doc. 23 below.

Jerusalem on 7 May, partly in the sector occupied since June 1967, in violation of successive General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on Jerusalem and other aspects of the Middle East conflict. Its ugly exhibition of militarism in the Holy City should be a sharp reminder to the international community of the plight and agony of Jerusalem in Israeli captivity. Nothing, Jordan stated, could save the city and its inhabitants but the effective implementation of the United Nations resolutions and a speedy termination of Israeli occupation.

D. General statements and other matters brought to the attention of the Security Council in connexion with the situation in the Middle East

250. During the period under review, the Security Council and the Secretary-General received several communications relating to the Lod Airport incident of May 1972, the question of terrorism in the Middle East, the hijacking of aircraft and the incident in which a Libyan airliner was shot down over Sinai by Israeli air force planes.

251. The incident at Lod Airport in May 1972 continued to be the subject of communications containing charges and counter-charges by Israeli and some Arab countries. In letters dated 16 and 23 June 1972 (S/10701, S/10712, and S/10713), Israel continued to hold the Arab Governments responsible for the activities of Arab terror organizations which had culminated in the massacre at Lod Airport on 30 May 1972. In letters dated 16 and 20 June (S/10702 and S/10707) Lebanon and the Libyan Arab Republic rejected that responsibility. Lebanon stated that it could not be responsible for the actions of "non-Lebanese" travelling to Israel from a foreign country on a foreign airliner. Furthermore, the three Japanese who had perpetrated the outrage at Lod Airport had never set foot on Lebanese soil. The Libyan Arab Republic expressed the view that the incident was not an isolated one but part of the conflict in the Middle East caused by Zionist aggression against the Palestinian people.

252. In a letter dated 20 June 1972 (S/10704), the Syrian Arab Republic, after referring to previous letters to the Secretary-General concerning the annexation by Israel of the occupied Golan Heights, stated that unequivocal statements

had been issued by Israeli leaders following the 1967 war, affirming Israel's annexation of occupied Arab territories. The letter contained quoted statements and excerpts of articles from newspapers and magazines, all confirming Israel's intention to retain the occupied territories and to settle it with new emigrants, in violation of the inalienable right of the Arabs of Palestine and the newly displaced persons from occupied Arab territories to return to their homes, as well as in disregard of United Nations resolutions and the Geneva Conventions.

253. In communications dated 28 June and 3 July (S/10725 and S/10727), Egypt and Israel exchanged charges and counter-charges regarding terrorism in the Middle East. Egypt charged that Israel had followed a policy designed to attain its expansionist aims and that it practised terrorism in the name of peace and security. Israel replied that Egypt was denying a neighbouring people its right to life and seeking to destroy Israel and its people. Egypt had initiated and given full support to Arab terror organizations and had identified itself with their operations.

254. In a letter dated 6 July (S/10732), Israel drew attention to the problem of prisoners of war. According to the letter, Egypt at that time held 10 Israeli prisoners of war and the Syrian Arab Republic 3, while Israel was holding 61 prisoners of war from Egypt, 45 from the Syrian Arab Republic and 5 from Lebanon, all of whom were covered by the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. The letter added that, despite Israel's repeated offer to arrange, through the International Committee of the Red Cross, the United Nations or diplomatic channels, for a general release and repatriation of all prisoners of war held by the parties, those efforts had been rejected by Egypt and the Syrian Arab Republic, contrary to their obligations under article 118 of the Convention.

255. In a further letter dated 8 September (S/10779), Israel complained of a campaign of atrocities and bloodshed pursued by Arab terror organizations against Israel, culminating in the murder of 11 Israeli sportsmen carried out on 5 September at the Olympic Games in Munich.

256. Stating that Arab States had initiated the establishment of the terror organizations, Israel added that the Arab policy of terror and murder was a grave threat to the general desire throughout

the world to seek solutions of problems through negotiations and coexistence, and it was incumbent on the family of nations to take fundamental action to eliminate terrorism by exerting influence on the Arab Governments that backed and assisted terror organizations. In conclusion, Israel insisted that the Arab States put an end to the activities of the terror organizations by terminating the support given them and taking effective measures to prevent operation of terror organizations in and from their territory.

257. In a letter dated 11 September (S/10788), in reply to the above letter, Egypt stated that the general desire in the world to seek solutions of problems through negotiation had been threatened by Israel and its denial of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. Israel's policy of retaining Arab territories, it added, and its bombing of Arab villages in Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic could hardly be considered means of coexistence. It was Israel that had introduced terror and terrorism into the Middle East. Peace would be achieved in the area only when Israel shed its policy of non-compliance with United Nations resolutions, its persistent denial of the Palestinians' rights, and its policy of official terrorism and naked aggression.

258. Replying in a letter dated 14 September (S/10791), Israel stated that the Egyptian letter of 11 September highlighted that Government's identification with, and responsibility for, terrorist activities and added that it was Egypt that had initiated terror warfare by establishing in the early 1950s the so-called *fedayeen* squads and extending to them political, ideological and material support. Despite significant developments in the world, Egypt had rejected all Israeli peace initiatives and refused to participate in any meaningful negotiations.

259. In letters dated 8 and 10 November (S/10827 and S/10829), Egypt and Israel again accused one another of introducing terrorism into the Middle East. Egypt reiterated that, since its establishment, Israel had practised terrorism against the Arab population and continued to do so by bombing civilian centres. Israel again stated that it was common knowledge who had carried out and continued to carry out acts of terrorism against the people of Israel throughout the world. Egypt's letter had the obvious aim of diverting attention from its responsibility for the spread of terrorism.

260. In a letter dated 26 October (S/10816), Israel stated that on 23 October the Netherlands authorities at Amsterdam Airport had detained a man en route to Brazil, carrying an Algerian diplomatic passport, when it was discovered that his luggage contained booby-trapped letters, grenades, fuses and explosives. The man, Israel added, was known to be a member of Al Fatah, representing that terror organization in Latin America and pursuing his activities under the cover of his Algerian diplomatic passport, which constituted evidence of the close co-operation between Arab Governments and the Arab terror organizations.

261. In a letter dated 30 October (S/10817), Israel reported the hijacking on 29 October of a Lufthansa aircraft by members of Arab murder squads, which, it said, underscored the Arab Governments' responsibility for terror warfare. The aircraft had been hijacked after taking off from Beirut Airport and had carried to Tripoli, the Libyan Arab Republic, the three Arab murderers responsible for the killing of 11 Israeli Olympic sportsmen in Munich. Libyan authorities, it stated, had received the hijackers and the Munich murderers with jubilation.

262. In a letter dated 26 February 1973 (S/10891), Egypt transmitted the text of a resolution on the Middle East adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity at its twentieth ordinary session, held in Addis Ababa from 5 to 12 February 1973,⁴¹ condemning Israel for its refusal to withdraw from all occupied Arab territory and calling for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israel from those territories occupied since 5 June 1967. The resolution also declared that Security Council resolution 242 (1967) remained a valid basis for a fair and just solution to the Middle East situation and reaffirmed its support of General Assembly resolution 2949 (XXVII), which reaffirmed that the acquisition of territories by force was inadmissible.

263. During the month of March 1973, the Security Council received a number of communications with regard to an incident that had taken place on 21 February involving a Libyan civilian airliner which had resulted in the death of 106 civilians.

264. In a letter dated 2 March (S/10893), Egypt

⁴¹ Printed as doc. 58 below.

charged that on 21 February, a Libyan airliner proceeding from Benghazi to Cairo had deviated from its original course owing to navigational difficulties and bad weather conditions and had accidentally overflowed the occupied Egyptian territory of Sinai, where it had been intercepted by four Israeli fighters. Despite the fact that the aircraft was civilian, the Israeli fighters, without warning, had attacked the airliner with cannon fire and missiles, resulting in the crash of the aircraft and the death of 106 civilians. Israel's action in shooting down a civilian aircraft, the letter continued, was a flagrant and serious threat to the safety of international civil aviation and a violation of the fundamental legal norms and standards of international and civil aviation, that had been condemned by world public opinion. With its letter Egypt transmitted the text of a resolution adopted on 28 February by the Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization at its nineteenth extraordinary session condemning the Israeli action and directing that an investigation be made.

265. In a reply dated 5 March (S/10895), Israel transmitted excerpts of a statement made on 28 February by Israel's representative at the Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization. In that statement the Israeli representative had said that his Prime Minister had expressed her deep sorrow at the loss of human life resulting from the Libyan airliner incident and also her regret that the pilot had not heeded the warning given to him in accordance with international procedure. The representative had added that his Government had declared its readiness to make *ex gratia* payments to the families of the victims and to the survivors. Referring to the circumstances surrounding the incident, the representative had stated that the incident of the aircraft had arisen from a series of errors and omissions on the part of the Libyan airliner and the Egyptian control system, which had led the Israeli air defence system to assume that the plane had penetrated Sinai air space on a hostile mission. It had penetrated a closed military zone in Sinai and had not responded to the signals of the Israeli jet aircraft and their instructions to land. On the basis of the above assumption, which had later proved to be erroneous, the operational decision had been taken to compel the aircraft to land and, consequently, the airliner had been hit. It had at-

tempted to land, but at the moment it touched the ground, it had crashed. The representative had expressed the hope that the neighbouring Arab countries would respond to Israel's appeal and that channels of swift communications for cases of emergency would be jointly set up so that it would be possible to overcome errors without ignoring security requirements.

266. In a letter dated 12 March (S/10902), Egypt commented on Israel's letter, and quoted the pilot of the Israeli aircraft, who had stated that he had shot at the airliner's wings to force it to land before it could reach the coast. In Egypt's view, that statement showed that the shooting had been carried out with the intention of blowing up the plane in mid-air, for a fighter pilot could not be unaware that the fuel tanks of a Boeing were situated in the wings. Therefore, the burden of responsibility for the incident lay with Israel.

267. In a reply dated 14 March (S/10904), Israel charged that Egypt's only interest in the matter was to distort and exploit the incident for purposes of propaganda warfare against Israel. Egypt had no intention of co-operating in arrangements and procedures that would avert such disasters in the future, and had already rejected Israel's proposal to establish means of communications for emergency situations.

268. In a letter dated 22 February (S/10889), the Permanent Representative of Guyana transmitted to the Secretary-General a statement dated 21 February by the representatives of non-aligned countries at the United Nations expressing shock at the shooting down of a Libyan civilian aircraft by Israeli forces and sympathy for the loss of innocent civilian lives and property. The statement also strongly condemned the unwarranted acts of aggression and international terrorism that aggravated tension in the Middle East and threatened peace and security.

E. Activities of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East and related developments

1. REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

269. In a report dated 15 September 1972 (S/10792), which was also submitted to the General Assembly, the Secretary-General recalled that, in accordance with his mandate under Security

Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, he had continued to report on the activities of Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, his Special Representative to the Middle East, and also recalled that General Assembly resolution 2799 (XXVI) had requested him to reactivate the mission of his Special Representative and to report thereon as appropriate to the Security Council and to the General Assembly.

270. Following the adoption of resolution 2799 (XXVI), Ambassador Jarring had held meetings in New York with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt and Israel and with the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations to discuss arrangements for the reactivation of his mission. From 10 to 27 January 1972, he had had further inconclusive talks in New York and had also visited West Africa and met with President Senghor of Senegal and President Ould Daddah of Mauritania in connexion with the initiative of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1972 concerning the Middle East situation.

271. After further meetings with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt in Cairo on 19 and 20 February, he had held discussions with the Jordanian authorities and with the Israeli authorities, respectively, on 23 and 25 February. He had then returned to New York, where he had continued to see representatives of the parties until 24 March. He had subsequently returned to Headquarters from 1 to 4 May and from 1 to 12 August for a review of the positions of the parties.

272. In spite of those continued efforts, the Secretary-General concluded that it had not been possible to make any substantial progress but that efforts would continue.

273. During its 1710th meeting on 20 April 1973, the Security Council adopted resolution 331 (1973). (See above, section A, Subsection 4 (j).)

274. In pursuance of Security Council resolution 331 (1973), in which he was requested to submit to the Security Council as early as possible a comprehensive report giving full account of the efforts undertaken by the United Nations pertaining to the situation in the Middle East since June 1967, the Secretary-General, on 21 May, submitted a comprehensive report (S/10929) that covered the different aspects of the Middle East conflict, including the status of the cease-fire, the situation in the occupied territories, the question of Jerusalem

and the Palestine refugee problem.

[There follows a summary of the report printed as doc. 8 below.]

2. CONSIDERATION AT THE 1717TH TO 1726TH MEETINGS (6-14 JUNE 1973)

279. In accordance with resolution 331 (1973), in which the Council decided to meet following the submission of the Secretary-General's report and requested the Secretary-General to invite his Special Representative to be available during the Council's meeting in order to render assistance to the Council in the course of its deliberations, the Council held 10 meetings from 6 to 14 June to consider the question of the situation in the Middle East.

280. At the 1717th meeting on 6 June, the Council included in its agenda the following item:

"Examination of the situation in the Middle East:

“(a) Security Council resolution 331 (1973)

“(b) Report of the Secretary-General under Security Council resolution 331 (1973) of 20 April 1973 (S/10929)”.

281. In the course of the discussion, the President invited, at their request, the representatives of Egypt, Israel and Jordan, as well as the representatives of Algeria, Bahrain, Chad, Guyana, Iran, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, the Syrian Arab Republic, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Republic of Tanzania to participate in the debate without the right to vote.

282. Introducing the report prepared in response to resolution 331 (1973) of 20 April 1973 (S/10929), the Secretary-General said that his report described great efforts but little progress. It remained clear that a settlement must primarily depend on the Governments concerned, which had not been able so far to devise an effective means of reaching such a settlement. Consequently, he said, the Middle East problem had been brought again and again to the United Nations during the past 25 years. During that period, however, the Council and the various instrumentalities set up by it and by the General Assembly had played a vital role in limiting conflict and in preserving the truce. Declaring that there were a series of seemingly insurmountable obstacles to the process of conciliation and settlement in the Middle East and that there were,

in the Council, representatives and groupings with fundamentally different attitudes toward certain problems, including the problem of the Middle East, he noted that it was difficult for the Council to act unanimously in promoting a settlement. Nevertheless, he recalled the Council, more than five years earlier, had been unanimous in adopting resolution 242 (1967), thus demonstrating its ability to agree on a basic approach to the complex problem of the Middle East. Although the Council's search for a peaceful settlement had raised hopes of the possibility of progress, it could not succeed if the parties concerned did not wish to avail themselves of its efforts and its advantages as a forum for discussion and an instrument for peace.

283. The representative of Egypt said that his delegation had requested the Council to re-examine the Middle East situation after six years of effort and endurance had failed to put an end to the Israeli military occupation of Egyptian territories. The hope of millions of his country's people had remained turned to the United Nations awaiting tangible results of various efforts and deliberations. Their hopes, unfulfilled, were giving way to disillusion and scepticism, and they questioned what the Council could do, while the aggressor was digging more fortifications and changing the physical character of the occupied Arab territories in order to create more of its so-called new facts with which to confront the world. In resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947, he recalled, the General Assembly had recommended the partition of Palestine, as it had existed under the British Mandate, into an Arab State and a Jewish State, and Member States had given the Jewish State their recognition within the frontiers allotted to it by that resolution. In the past quarter of a century, the world had witnessed the Palestinian people being systematically turned into a nation of refugees huddled in the Gaza sector and on the west bank of the Jordan River, while the Jewish authorities systematically imported hundreds of thousands of aliens to replace the people of Palestine in their homeland. In June 1967, the military forces of Israel had invaded and occupied the rest of what had been left to the people of Palestine, including Arab Jerusalem. Those forces had violated international boundaries and had crossed into the west bank of Jordan and the Palestinian sector of Gaza and seized parts of Egypt and the Syrian Arab Republic, where they

still remained. In November 1967 his country had requested an urgent meeting of the Council to consider Israel's refusal to withdraw its armed forces from the territories that it had occupied in June 1967. On 22 November of that year, the Council had chosen to deal simultaneously with the problem of Israel's aggression against Jordan, Syria and Egypt and the problem resulting from the 1947 partition of Palestine. Contrary to Israel's declaration in 1967 that it had no territorial designs against the Arab States, Israel insisted now and had officially communicated to the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, that it would never return all the occupied territories. All the United Nations resolutions adopted on various aspects of the conflict had remained mere documents, and the heavy hand of military occupation was still stifling the national life of the afflicted countries. In contrast Egypt had accepted the package deal embodied in resolution 242 (1967) and had given the Special Representative of the Secretary-General its active support. In response to Mr. Jarring's identical aide-mémoires addressed to Egypt and Israel on 8 February 1971⁴², Egypt had given him the serious commitments that he had asked for, including readiness to enter into a peace agreement with Israel, if Israel also carried out all its obligations under the Charter. Israel had blocked the Jarring mission, and when it was suggested in February 1972 that the parties should exchange clarifications of their position with a view to formulating provisions for inclusion in a peace treaty, Israel had also scuttled that effort, insisting that the so-called Jarring initiative of 8 February 1971 had been outside his terms of reference. The four permanent members of the Security Council who had supported Jarring's aide-mémoire of 8 February had expressed satisfaction with Egypt's response and had asked that Israel give a similar reply. Israeli leaders, he continued, kept insisting on direct negotiations with the Arab States "with no prior conditions". Egypt accepted talks without prior conditions. But Israel, though claiming that everything was negotiable, had declared officially that it would not withdraw to the boundaries existing prior to 5 June 1967, which in itself constituted a pre-condition. Occupation

⁴² See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-sixth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1971*, document S/10403; printed as Annex 1 to doc. 413 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

was another pre-condition, though basic norms of international law contained a rule on the non-validity of treaties imposed under occupation.

284. Israel's policies showed that it was looking not for a peaceful settlement for at least a decade but for any pretext to justify further expansion. While the military occupation remained, Israel continued its active war and its changes in the physical character and demographic composition of the occupied Arab territories. It was destroying towns and villages and deporting inhabitants, while establishing military and paramilitary settlements in the Arab territories. It was the responsibility of the Council to declare that all changes carried out by Israel in the occupied territories were null and void. Member States should refrain from giving Israel aid that might help it in its continued occupation. Help, on the contrary, should be given to the victims of the military occupation. In its resolution 242 (1967), the Security Council had called for the withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the lands that they had occupied and stressed the right of all nations of the area to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries. The contention that omission of the word "the" in resolution 242 (1967) meant that acquisition of the entire territory of a Member State was not permissible but that acquisition of some amounts of its territory was permissible did not really warrant any comment. Obviously, the Council had not resolved and could not resolve that secure boundaries for Israel should be established inside Egypt or inside the Syrian Arab Republic. The Israeli borders that the Council had wished to be fixed and recognized could exist only within the geographical area of Palestine dealt with in General Assembly resolution 181 (1947). Egypt, he said, had come to the Security Council to secure the immediate Israeli withdrawal from the Arab territories occupied in 1967. A solution was needed that would satisfy the aspirations of the Palestinian people and restore justice and peace to the area. He asked whether Israel accepted the principle of non-acquisition of territory by force and whether the Israeli representative would reply in the negative or not at all. He emphasized that a so-called partial or interim settlement was completely and definitely unacceptable to Egypt.

285. In connexion with the Council's discussion of the item, the representative of Egypt, by a letter dated 1 June (S/10941), had transmitted to the

President to the Security Council the text of an article on Israel's "Occupied territories" published in the *Daily Telegraph* (London), 1 June 1973.

286. The representative of Israel said that his country had sought peace with Egypt for 25 years and had attempted repeatedly in the last six years to reach a peaceful agreement with Egypt and other Arab States. It had repeatedly declared that it sought not to freeze the existing situation or to perpetuate the cease-fire lines but to replace them in peace with secure and agreed boundaries established through negotiation with each of its Arab neighbours. That position was clear and could not be distorted by misrepresentation of Israeli actions and misquotations from Israeli statements. He gave the following account of developments in the search for peace since 1967. To the call for peace in the area Egypt and other Arab States had reacted with the Khartoum resolution of 1 September 1967 calling for "no recognition, no negotiation, no peace with Israel".⁴³ When the Secretary-General's Special Representative commenced his mission, Israel had presented to him a detailed agenda for direct peace talks that had been rejected by Egypt. Egypt had refused, and Israel had accepted Mr. Jarring's proposals in March 1968 that the parties send delegations to Cyprus for conferences under his auspices. Subsequently, Egypt had intensified its violations of the cease-fire along the Suez Canal, until it had, in 1969, declared the so-called war of attrition against Israel, which had failed. In August 1970, the cease-fire had been restored on the initiative of the United States and an understanding had been reached to resume the Jarring talks. However, no sooner had that arrangement entered into force than Egypt had violated it by moving missiles into the standstill zone. Nevertheless, in December 1970, Israel had decided to try again to help advance the peace mission and had invited Mr. Jarring to Jerusalem for conversations with the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs and presented him with Israel's views on "essentials of peace" for transmission to the Governments of Egypt and Jordan. But the effort to initiate a meaningful exchange had collapsed and Egypt had threatened that it would not prolong the cease-fire. In his memorandum of 8 February 1971 Mr. Jarring had suggested that Israel accept the Egyptian

⁴³ See doc. 412 in *International Documents on Palestine 1967*.

position on the question of withdrawal. Israel had been asked not only to agree to withdraw to the old line but to give a prior commitment to do so and Egypt had been requested to give a commitment to enter into a peace agreement with Israel. Israel had expressed its readiness to pursue the talks without pre-conditions. However, Egypt had insisted that Israel should accept the Egyptian *diktat*. Accordingly, Mr. Jarring's memorandum and the General Assembly resolutions supporting it continued to remain obstacles preventing progress by the Jarring mission. Moreover, Egypt had not agreed to the United States proposal that Israel and Egypt enter into proximity talks for a special arrangement to reopen the Suez Canal. Despite that record of the past six years, he said, Israel had not given up hope for peace and understanding with its neighbours and would strive for peace with determination to safeguard its rights but also with understanding and respect for the rights of other States. However, Israel was determined to resist all forms of coercion, including various attempts by the Arab States to impose their will. The experience of the past few years had demonstrated that there could be no imposition of solution from the outside, which would only render the situation even more complex than it was. Under no circumstances would Israel relinquish its right under international law to have peaceful boundaries established at last through negotiation and agreement; nor would Israel acquiesce in any other change in the substance, balance or interpretation of resolution 242 (1967). The one method that had not been applied throughout the years was that of dialogue between the parties. The one way in which the United Nations could contribute to the solution of the problem would be by encouraging the parties to enter into negotiations. After noting the statement that Egypt accepted direct negotiations with Israel without prior conditions, he added that what Minister El-Zayyat had said subsequently had destroyed the significance of that declaration. Nevertheless, the Council should call on the parties to enter into direct negotiations without any pre-conditions and in Israel's view, the most practical way would be to begin with the proximity talks for the reopening of the Suez Canal. Israel sought an honourable dialogue in which the parties would engage in a joint effort to find mutual accommodation. If Egypt recognized Israel's

right to independence and sovereignty and sought genuine peace, there could be no reason to hesitate about entering into a serious dialogue with Israel for the good of all nations in the area.

287. The representative of Jordan said that his country, a major party in the conflict, was torn by occupation and suffered daily in economic, human and emotional terms. Therefore, it had a direct and urgent interest in serious action by the Council to end the occupation and was united in that goal with its Arab partners. Though the Arab parties concerned had accepted the Security Council's resolution, Israel had reversed its position and spoke of retaining the occupied Arab territories in part or in totality under any circumstances. In that respect, the Security Council was governed by the Charter and by its resolution 242 (1967), which emphasized in its preamble the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war, thus establishing a decisive criterion on how its provision for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied territories was to be understood. However, for the past six years Israel had been actively doing and saying the very opposite of what the United Nations had decided. It was consolidating its occupation and absorbing and transforming the areas under its occupation. Over a half million Arabs from the occupied territories had had to flee the area of hostilities in 1967. East Jordan had received some 400,000 displaced persons, who had not been allowed to return to their former places of residence despite several Security Council and General Assembly resolutions to that effect. The Council had refrained from taking action on that shocking spectacle because the cease-fire system had not collapsed and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General was still technically engaged in his peace-making operation. Those appearances were deceptive, however, and it was imperative for the Council to work against the freezing of the present situation, which was contrary to the very basis of the Charter.

288. Every time the Arab parties had responded positively to the initiatives of the Special Representative, the Security Council or the General Assembly, Israel had met those initiatives negatively. The Arab parties had made clear commitments to accept and implement resolution 242 (1967) but Israel had neither accepted the principle of withdrawal nor even given the Special Representative its definition of the extent of its so-called

secure boundaries. When four permanent members had held consultations to offer support to the Special Representative, Israel had raised sharp, protesting noises to frustrate that initiative. Israel had virtually boycotted the Special Representative's mission since February 1971, when he had made ordinary and logical suggestions involving the principle of withdrawal. Israel had also rejected any peaceful redress for the Palestinians, including the appeals and demands of the United Nations that they be allowed repatriation or compensation. Instead, it was inviting Jews from all over the world to emigrate and settle in the homes of the Palestinian Arabs. Force and militarism governed Israel's approach to the problem that it had created with its neighbours. That was why the Council could not accept the role of an observer. The conditions of peace and justice were achievable, and the position of his country was simple and reasonable. Jordan wanted the occupying forces to evacuate its national soil and continued to believe that the legitimate and inalienable rights of the Palestinian Arabs must be respected. That was the foundation of a just and lasting peace in the area.

289. At the 1718th meeting on 7 June, the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania stated that he had come to convey to the Council the feelings of Africa regarding the situation in the Middle East, which was a threat to international peace and security. The Council must take concrete action to dislodge the aggressor and to put right the situation brought about by Israel's aggression. Africa's concern stemmed from the fact that Israel had developed an immunity to international public opinion comparable to that of the minority racist régimes in southern Africa. Israel had defied the calls of the United Nations, OAU, the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, institutions and individuals to withdraw from Arab territories and had continued to flout world public opinion and to pursue its aggression and expansionism. He had come to the Council to warn Israel that unless it heeded those international calls, OAU would be compelled to take all political and economic measures against it. The African people, who were already concerned at the erosion of the authority of the United Nations in dealing with the problem of *apartheid*, had every reason to be apprehensive at the spectacle of a régime playing

havoc with the security and independence of a North African State. Africa expected from the Council firm and positive action designed to bring an end to the situation in the Middle East. His delegation wished to appeal to the Council to take decisive measures calculated to eliminate the consequences of the 1967 war, to restore the legitimate rights of the Palestinians and to establish conditions of a just and lasting peace in the area.

290. The representative of Nigeria expressed the hope that every effort would be made by all the parties concerned to secure the successful implementation of resolution 242 (1967), which had been accepted by them. His country, and, indeed, Africa were very concerned with the situation in the Middle East in general and with the continued occupation of part of the territory of Egypt in particular. As a result, OAU had, on several occasions, passed resolutions reaffirming its support of resolution 242 (1967) and other relevant United Nations resolutions. More recently, the Heads of State and Government of 41 independent African countries meeting in Addis Ababa had unanimously adopted a resolution (circulated at his request in document S/10943)⁴⁴ noting with deep concern that Israel had not only refused to implement the numerous resolutions calling upon it to withdraw from all occupied African and Arab territories but had continued to practise a policy of intimidation with a view to creating in those territories a state of *fait accompli* aimed at serving its expansionist designs and deploring the systematic obstruction by Israel of all efforts to reach a peaceful settlement. He said that with his colleagues from Chad, the United Republic of Tanzania, Guinea, Algeria, Kenya and the Sudan, he had come to the Council as spokesman of Africa on the matter to demonstrate their solidarity with the United Nations and their faith in its resolutions, and to plead that every effort should be made to implement resolution 242 (1967).

291. The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic wondered whether the Council was ready to exercise its power to put an end to the situation in the Middle East or if it would, through inertia, continue to tolerate *faits accomplis*. It was his delegation's view that the conflict could not be solved until the problem of Palestine had been settled on the basis of the restoration of the national

⁴⁴ Printed as doc. 91 below.

rights of the Palestinian people. Under the pretext of security and encouraged by the military, economic, political and diplomatic support of the United States, Israel had been guilty of armed aggression against the neighbouring Arab States. It had defied all the resolutions of the United Nations and consolidated its occupation in the Golan Heights by building colonies, one after the other, as it had done in all other occupied Arab territories. If the acquisition of territories by force was admissible, the United Nations had lost its *raison d'être*. If not, the Council must adopt the necessary measures to redress the situation.

292. Israel, having achieved most of its territorial objectives, stated that it was now ready for peace. However, such a peace would be based on annexation and denial of the legitimate national rights of the people of Palestine. His country wanted peace in order to safeguard civilization and to continue to progress on the basis of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the rules of international law and the tenets of justice and equity. The consequences of Israeli aggression must be liquidated by the unconditional withdrawal of all Israel forces from all the occupied territories and by the recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to their land and to self-determination. Only that could create a climate conducive to progress towards a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

293. At the 1719th meeting on 8 June, the representative of the United Arab Emirates said that violence in the Middle East was continuing to disturb the peace not only in that region but throughout the world. However, the final solution to the problem of violence was to be found in the elimination of its deep-rooted causes. It was his Government's belief that peace and stability could not be restored to the area so long as the occupation continued and so long as the Palestinian people continued to be deprived of their fundamental rights in their homeland.

294. The representative of Guyana said that the Council could not contemplate a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict without dealing with the central issue of the plight of the dispossessed Palestinian Arabs; nor could it condone the acquisition of territory by the threat or use of force in violation of international law or the maintenance of the *status quo*, which would lead to the legitimization of acts of aggression and the institutionaliza-

tion of illegality. The Council should take resolute action in the discharge of its responsibilities under the Charter. He drew attention to the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Georgetown in August 1972⁴⁵ (circulated at his request in document S/10944), which had expressed solidarity with Egypt, Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic in their legitimate struggle to recover their territorial integrity, called for the full restoration of the rights of the Arab people of Palestine, acknowledged unequivocally that the acquisition of territory through force was wholly impermissible and recorded the intention of non-aligned countries to follow closely the evolution of the situation in the Middle East.

295. At the 1720th meeting on 11 June, the representative of Kuwait said that the root of the problem lay in the tragic denial of the rights of the Palestinians. Years of dispersion had not stifled their yearning to return to their homeland. Peace and the rights of the Palestinians were so intertwined and indivisible that the denial of the latter obliterated the former. Respect of the rights of the Palestinians, he said, constituted one of the two pillars of a durable peace, strict adherence to the principle of non-acquisition of territory by force being the second pillar. Israel's insistence on direct negotiations was not an honest statement of a genuine desire for peace but a decoy for Arab surrender. Israel wanted to use its superior military power and bargaining position to impose its own harsh peace terms on the Arabs. Its primary concern was how much territory it could annex and how few Arab refugees it would be required to repatriate. The Arabs had a genuine and growing fear of Israel's expansionist nature. The United Nations must embark on a serious and unrelenting effort to attain peace in the region. It had special responsibility towards the Palestinians who had been dispossessed because of its decision to partition their homeland. The international community was also duty bound to take measures designed to bring about Israeli withdrawal from Arab territories and the achievement of peace based on justice.

296. The representative of Algeria said that the crisis of the Middle East involved above all, the dispossession of the Palestine people from its home-

⁴⁵ Printed as doc. 119 in *International Documents on Palestine 1972*.

land and the denial of its inalienable rights. The injustice towards the Palestinians, approved by the United Nations despite the fundamental principles of its Charter, could never be considered an irreversible fact. The Zionist State had been established through repeated aggression, terrorist actions, provocations and, above all, the systematic application of a vast plan for the annexation of territory. The 1967 aggression, however, had only served to emphasize the existence of a Palestine nation, which had been affirmed with more force and vigour as a fundamental element in any lasting solution. Palestinian resistance could be extended over years, even over generations, but sooner or later it would finally make its purpose a reality. In its recent resolutions, OAU had noted that, despite the many United Nations resolutions enjoining Israel to withdraw from all occupied African and Arab territories Israel had only persisted in refusing to implement those resolutions, and had even done its utmost to create in those territories a fait accompli to serve its expansionist goals. The African heads of State had recognized the tragedy of the Palestinian people and the fact that respect for their inalienable rights was an essential element in any just and equitable solution. They, too, had underlined the danger to the security and unity of the continent posed by the continuation of Israeli aggression that could impel the member States of OAU to take individual or collective political and economic measures against Israel. They were convinced that Israel was encouraged by the support of the United States. The role of that country could not be brought into play in the problem of the Middle East if it continued to practise a partisan policy in the area.

297. At the 1721st meeting on 11 June, the representative of the Sudan said that the Palestinian people's fight for regaining its land was one with that of the people of Guinea (Bissau), Angola, Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe. The Middle East conflict, which had brought economic stresses to many parts of the world, had also caused suffering in some parts of Africa because of the closure of their traditional route of communication. He added that Africa would like to see the Secretary-General's Special Representative resume his mission. Africa stood by resolution 242 (1967), which was not ambiguous and should be implemented as it was; a time-limit should be set for the

total withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from all occupied Arab territories. It was time that the United States came out clearly on that issue for its own sake and for the sake of world peace.

298. The representative of Egypt said that in connexion with the Special Representative's aide-mémoire of 8 February 1971, he wished to put three questions to the Secretary-General. First, as the aide-mémoire dealt obviously with the Egyptian sector only, had the Special Representative intended to follow that aide-mémoire with others for Jordan, on the subject of the Palestine refugees and for the Syrian Arab Republic, if that Government should express its willingness to receive such an aide-mémoire? Second, the aide-mémoire had not mentioned the Palestine territory of Gaza but he sought confirmation of Mr. Jarring's explanation that the absence of a reference to the Gaza Strip, which had been entrusted to Egyptian administration under the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Agreement of 1949, was without prejudice to the status of the strip as Arab territory occupied by Israel which should be de-occupied. Third, he sought confirmation that the representative of the United States in his capacity as the Chairman of the meeting on 24 June 1971 of the four-Power talks had informed the Secretary-General officially, if orally, that the representatives of the four permanent members of the Security Council welcomed and supported the initiative of the Special Representative in his aide-mémoire of 8 February and believed that, in taking that initiative, he was acting fully in accordance with the terms of his mandate under Council resolution 242 (1967). The Egyptian representative then recalled the three questions that he had put earlier regarding the principle of non-acquisition of territories by force, the principle of territorial integrity and the principle of self-determination and asked if the Council could have adopted or could adopt decisions or resolutions that could be interpreted as allowing the breach of three principles.

299. The representative of the United Kingdom said that his Government could not regard with equanimity the current situation of "no war, no peace". He must note however that some advances had been made since June 1967 towards the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. Those steps included resolution 242 (1967) itself, the declared willingness of Egypt

to enter into a peace agreement with Israel if the latter State would give certain commitments covering the implementation on its part of the resolution, and the analogous undertaking given by Jordan. Recently, the United States had made efforts to open negotiations on an interim arrangement designed to bring about some measure of withdrawal by Israeli armed forces and the re-opening of the Suez Canal. His Government would be glad to see such an interim arrangement come into effect, provided it was a step towards an over-all settlement under resolution 242 (1967) and acceptable to the parties. There had also been efforts by the African heads of State in 1971, as well as useful exchanges between the United States and the USSR and consultations among four permanent members of the Council, where progress had been made particularly on international guarantees. British views on a settlement had been made clear in a statement by the Foreign Minister at Harrogate on 31 October 1970. Those views had not changed. On the two specific points raised by the Foreign Minister of Egypt, the United Kingdom believed that any just and lasting settlement must take into account the views of all the peoples of the area, including the Palestinians, and that the old international boundary between Egypt and the former Mandated Territory of Palestine should be confirmed in a settlement as the international frontier between Egypt and Israel, subject to whatever arrangement was agreed upon regarding the special problem of Gaza. The primary objective of the Council should be to provide renewed impetus to the mission of Mr. Jarring. That mission remained in his view the best hope for progress.

300. At the 1722nd meeting on 12 June, the representative of Guinea said that Israel had systematically opposed solutions likely to restore peace in the area and violated the Security Council's cease-fire resolutions. The General Assembly year after year had adopted resolutions recognizing that the Palestinian refugee problem derived from the fact that the inalienable rights of the refugees had been denied them and that integral respect for the inalienable rights of the Palestinians was indispensable to the restoration of a just and lasting Middle East peace. Guinea reaffirmed its unqualified support for the just cause of the Palestinians. In his view, the Council should take the efficacious measures provided by the Charter to

give effect to its decisions.

301. The representative of Morocco said that Israel, in a challenge to the Charter, interpreted resolution 242 (1967) as not implying the restitution of all territories occupied by force. It wanted secure and recognized boundaries, but it wished to impose a solution whereby those frontiers would pass somewhere through Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian national territory. He insisted that there could be no hope for peace in the Middle East unless justice and dignity were restored to the Palestinians. The United Nations should take definite and energetic action to compel Israel to abide by the relevant United Nations resolutions and withdraw its armed forces from all the occupied territories and to respect and guarantee the inalienable rights of the Palestinians in their national territory. In connexion with his statement, the representative of Morocco, in a letter dated 6 June to the Secretary-General (S/10942), transmitted the text of a message from the King of Morocco concerning the Security Council debate on the Middle East crisis.

302. The representative of Yugoslavia said that his country's stand proceeded from basic principles and positions: rejection of any policy based on force; non-recognition of gains through conquest and inadmissibility of Israel's acquisition of any territories by force as a result of the aggressive war against its neighbours; the restoration of territories taken by force; non-recognition of changes effected in the occupied territories; total and unconditional withdrawal of Israel's armed forces to the lines existing prior to 5 June 1967; respect for all internationally recognized boundaries in the region; the right of all States of the Middle East, including Israel, to independence, national sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference and their right to live in peace and develop freely within secure and recognized borders; respect for the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, because peace in the Middle East could be lasting only if it respected the legitimate interests of all peoples of the region; and solution of the Middle East conflict by peaceful political means. In particular, if Israel accepted what was the core of the problem—the non-acquisition of territory by force and respect for international boundaries—it would be possible to find mutually acceptable solutions for the remaining problems.

303. At the 1723rd meeting on 12 June, the

President, speaking as the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, said that his delegation favoured the implementation of all provisions of resolution 242 (1967) and supported Mr. Jarring's mission and his aide-mémoire. The USSR constantly adhered to its course of principle in its Middle East policy, the substance of which lay in the granting of comprehensive support and assistance to the Arab States that had been the victims of Israeli aggression. It firmly opposed attempts to bypass the Security Council and the United Nations in settling the problem. During the four-Power talks, the USSR had issued a warning on the inevitable failure of such attempts; the facts had confirmed that the USSR was right. New attempts to supplant United Nations machinery could not fail to alert everyone genuinely interested in a true, just and lasting settlement in the Middle East. There was no basis for disregarding and bypassing United Nations machinery in a Middle East settlement. The Council must vigorously demand from Israel respect for, and compliance with, its decisions and, finally, must find ways to exert an active and effective influence on those who sabotaged or blocked a settlement and who pursued the bankrupt policy of proceeding from a position of strength. The USSR was ready to give all possible support to United Nations efforts designed to bring about a settlement of the Middle East problem on the basis of the implementation of all the provisions of resolution 242 (1967) and other United Nations decisions.

304. The representative of Iran said that resolution 242 (1967), which had been accepted by Egypt, Israel and Jordan, through its emphasis on the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war, had set forth the requirements for peace in the Middle East: withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the occupied territories; termination of all claims or states of belligerency and the right of all parties to live in peace and within agreed and recognized boundaries, guaranteeing freedom of navigation through waterways in the area; achievement of a just settlement of the Palestinian refugee problem; and establishment of demilitarized zones. A sincere application of the resolution would lead to an equitable settlement. The refusal of Israel to commit itself to withdraw from the territories of Egypt, Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic was an

obstacle to a meaningful dialogue. The negative attitude of Israel seemed most unjustified inasmuch as Egypt had shown courage and goodwill in responding positively to Mr. Jarring's questionnaire.

305. Pursuant to a request made by the representative of Egypt in the course of the meeting, document S/10948 was issued, containing excerpts of statements made by Council representatives in explanation of their vote before or after the vote on resolution 242 (1967) on 20 and 22 November 1967.

306. At the 1724th meeting on 13 June, the representative of Saudi Arabia said that his country insisted on the complete and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Arab territories occupied since June 1967 and on the right of the Palestinian people to return to their homeland. It stood strongly behind Egypt in declaring that, if the Zionists refused to withdraw, there would be no other choice than to resort to action compelling them to do so. It was the duty of Saudi Arabia to raise its voice, not so much to protest past Council inaction as to warn Council members that evading a prompt solution might lead to a situation that even the super Powers would not be able to contain.

307. The representative of Kenya said that he was speaking on behalf of his country and the OAU, which had taken a series of decisions on the Middle East question since 1967. Member States had a responsibility to fulfil, in good faith, obligations assumed by them under the Charter of the United Nations and had solemnly undertaken to refrain from the threat or use of force against the integrity and political independence of any State. Resolution 242 (1967) offered the only basis for an equitable and just resolution of the Middle East crisis. There could not be a derogation, for any reason whatsoever, from the principle of the territorial integrity of States and the concomitant duty not to violate existing international boundaries and international lines of demarcation.

308. The representative of France said that the continued occupation by Israel of sizable areas of territory belonging to three neighbouring countries obviously constituted a standing violation of the principles recognized by the community of nations, especially the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force. That situation should be ended in accordance with United

Nations resolutions, in particular, resolution 242 (1967), which provided all of the parties concerned with the guarantees indispensable for a lasting peace. France understood Israel's concern to safeguard its security, but the occupation of territories that obviously belonged to neighbouring countries would not ensure that security. From the text of resolution 242 (1967), it was clear that Israel's commitment to withdraw from the territories occupied in June 1967 should be balanced by an end to belligerency and by recognition of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the States concerned, including Israel. The two essential elements in resolution 242 (1967) were inseparable: no withdrawal without commitments for peace, but no commitments for peace without withdrawal. Accordingly, the Israeli response to Mr. Jarring's memorandum of 8 February 1971 constituted a prior condition that nothing could justify. In stating that it would not withdraw to the lines existing prior to 5 June 1967, Israel was undermining the balance in resolution 242 (1967). The dialogue should begin on a footing of relations of equality and not on a footing of relations of force. The concept of secure and recognized boundaries was in no way contradictory to the principle of withdrawal from the occupied territories, nor did it preclude the introduction of minor changes by mutual agreement. An internationally recognized frontier, taking into account the case of Gaza, already existed between Egypt and Israel, while the necessary international guarantees were set out in paragraph 2 of resolution 242 (1967). No settlement could or should overlook the problems of the Palestinians. The Council should clearly reaffirm the validity of resolution 242 (1967) in its totality, bearing in mind the fact that any change would threaten the balance of the resolution. The Council's role could not be confined to recalling the past, however, and it should call for a resumption of the action carried out heretofore by the Secretary-General and his Special Representative "to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement".

309. The representative of the United Arab Emirates said that his Government was disturbed by the apparent failure of the United Nations to deal effectively with the dangerous situation arising out of Israel's continued occupation of the lands it had seized in June 1967. Although the

meaning of resolution 242 (1967) was clear, and had been explained to Arab delegations at the time of its adoption as relating to the possibility of minor and mutually agreed frontier rectifications, Israel continued to demand substantial changes and insisted on direct negotiations, which in the circumstances could mean only negotiations on the extent of territorial concessions the Arabs would have to make. The Arab representatives had come to the Council in quest of peace with Israel, which must recognize, unless it wished to remain forever an outcast, that a grievous injustice had been inflicted on the Arabs of Palestine and that enduring conditions of peace and harmony could be attained only through respect for their rights as human beings entitled to freedom and security in their own homeland.

310. The representative of Lebanon noted that his country was not directly concerned with resolution 242 (1967), as it had not participated in the 1967 hostilities. Nevertheless it had been the victim of several aggressive attacks for which Israel had been condemned on several occasions by the Council. His Government had consistently maintained that the Lebanese-Israeli Armistice Agreement of 1949 remained valid, a position which had been upheld by the United Nations. On the wider problem of peace in the Middle East, Lebanon stressed the principle that to be lasting, peace must be based on justice for the Palestinian people and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the territories occupied as a result of the 1967 hostilities. Lebanon had assumed a leading role in defence of the legitimate and inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, and as a country of Christians, Moslems and Jews had a paramount interest in the problem of Jerusalem.

311. At the 1725th meeting on 14 June, the Secretary-General replied to the three questions addressed to him by the representative of Egypt at the 1720th meeting. He said that Mr. Jarring had informed the representatives of the parties at the time of his intention to submit an aide-mémoire relating to Israel and Jordan; and in connexion with the Syrian Arab Republic he had noted that the Syrian Arab Republic had not accepted resolution 242 (1967) and had not agreed to enter into contact with him. If it were to do so, an aide-mémoire relating to Syria might have been submitted. In reply to the second question, the Secretary-General said that, under the Egyptian-

Israeli Armistice Agreement of 1949, Gaza was not Egyptian territory, but had been put under Egyptian administration pending the conclusion of a peace settlement. For that reason, Gaza had not been covered in the aide-mémoire, as had been explained at the time by Mr. Jarring to the United Arab Republic representative. As to the third question, the Council would recall that the Secretary-General had not been present at or associated with the four-Power meeting, but that the representative of the permanent member of the Council who had presided over a particular meeting provided the Secretary-General with information about matters discussed during the meeting. A note on the oral report to the preceding Secretary-General on the meeting of four of the permanent Council members on 24 June 1971 covered the general sense of that meeting as stated on 11 June by the Foreign Minister of Egypt.

312. The President referred to the three questions posed to the Council by the representative of Egypt on 11 June. The basis for an answer was provided by the Charter of the United Nations and the decisions of its major organs. He stressed that the Charter contained clear and precise provisions concerning the principle of the non-acquisition of territory by force or war and the closely allied principle of the territorial integrity of States. Those principles had a direct relation to fundamental documents of a general nature adopted by the United Nations, including the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV)), the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security (General Assembly resolution 2734 (XXV)), and numerous other resolutions on the Middle East question adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly. In connexion with the question whether the principle of self-determination was applicable to the Palestinian Arabs, it was clear from Articles 1 and 55 of the Charter that the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples was one of the fundamental principles of the Charter. That principle was also emphasized in the Declaration of Friendly Relations and other United Nations resolutions, in particular General Assembly resolution 194 (III), which were applicable to the Palestinian Arabs.

313. The representative of the United States, referring to the President's statement, said that there had been no consultations on the three questions addressed to the Council.

314. The representative of Israel stated that the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter were crucial to the situation in the Middle East, as Israel had been subjected to armed aggression by the Arab States since 1948.

315. The President stated that he had confined himself to mentioning the provisions of the Charter and the decisions of organs of the United Nations directly related to the problem touched upon in the questions of the representative of Egypt.

316. The representative of Australia said that the Council should seize the opportunity to help the Arab States and Israel in the direction of the kind of settlement that they must ultimately reach between themselves. Australia would work to secure support for negotiations towards such an agreement, both in the United Nations and in all its diplomatic endeavours. Both Egypt and Israel had expressed readiness to enter into talks without pre-conditions, and they must be helped to rid themselves of the siege mentality. One aim of talks between Egypt and Israel would be to bring about a territorial settlement or series of settlements to replace, on a permanent basis, the temporary arrangements arrived at in 1949 under the Armistice Agreements. Another aim would be to devise a solution to the plight of the Palestine refugees under which those unfortunate people could be assured of permanent homes and given hope in place of despair for the future and, perhaps, even some kind of national identity.

317. The representative of Indonesia said that his country supported the struggle of the Palestinians to secure their just and lawful rights, which had been recognized many times by the Assembly and the Council, as well as the demands of the Arab States for Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories. The Council should go beyond the ritual of making statements and take concrete steps to overcome the impasse in the Middle East on the basis of its resolution 242 (1967). Moreover, to arrive at a definitive solution, the voice of the Palestinians should be heard. New guide-lines could be formulated so that continued efforts by the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to implement the resolution might have a better chance of achieving con-

crete results. If the United Nations was not capable of restoring to the Palestinians their just rights, if it could not prevail upon Israel to vacate all Arab territories occupied as a result of aggression, it must be expected that the Arabs would endeavour to redress the situation by the only means left to them, and that was by force.

318. The representative of Peru said that the Special Representative had been right in trying to end the impasse through his initiative of 8 February 1971. The positive Egyptian answer to the aide-mémoire was a step forward and constituted a substantial concession. Unfortunately, the key phrase in Israel's reply—"Israel will not withdraw to the pre-5 June 1967 lines"—was an obstacle to the continuation of the Jarring mission and a step backward in the application of resolution 242 (1967). The key to true security lay in the observance of the principles of coexistence, which implied recognition by the neighbouring Arab countries of the State of Israel, as well as the withdrawal of forces by Israel from the occupied territories and a solution to the problem of the Palestine people. The task that devolved upon the Council, after having laid down the guide-lines for a just and lasting peace in the region, was to ensure compliance with its decision taken six years ago.

319. The representative of Austria said that resolution 242 (1967) represented principles on which the orderly conduct of international relations must rest: the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war, the emphasis on the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, Israel as well as its Arab neighbours, and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries. If such basic relevance were attributed to the provisions of the resolution, it followed that all of them must be fulfilled to permit it to achieve its objectives, including the just settlement of the problem of the Palestinian refugees. The Council's main concern should be to develop the full potential of the parties' acceptance of that resolution and their declared willingness to seek a resolution by peaceful means. No avenue should be left untried. At the same time, it would hardly be conducive to success if one and only one approach were to be declared acceptable by one or the other party. The principal objective should be [to] set in motion a process which built upon agreed elements, advanced step

by step and combined political realism with strict respect for principles; this process would create confidence as it continued and would ultimately result in an overall settlement. In contacts with members and the parties his Government had probed the possibilities of a common effort to that effect.

320. At the 1726th meeting on 14 June, the representative of the United States said that resolution 242 (1967) had been the result of compromise and did not define the terms of settlement but contained a set of provisions and principles which constituted a framework for the terms of a final settlement. The terms to be negotiated must therefore be consistent with those provisions and principles, not just with some of them, but with all taken together. If the terms of a settlement did not meet that test, they could not form part of a just and lasting peace. Resolution 242 (1967) called for agreement, which clearly meant agreement between the parties concerned. Mr. Jarring had been selected to assist the parties to that end. The United States had never seen how such agreement would be possible without an ongoing, serious negotiating process, direct or indirect, that engaged the parties themselves. The Council should do everything possible to encourage the parties to engage in such a dialogue. The overriding interest of the United States in the Middle East was in a peace that would end fear and uncertainty and allow Arab and Israeli alike to reside within secure and recognized boundaries. The United States urgently desired friendly and enduring relations with all countries of the Middle East. Resolution 242 (1967) was silent on the specific question of where the final border between Israel and its neighbours should be located. It neither endorsed nor precluded the armistice lines existing between Israel, Egypt, Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic on 4 June 1967 as the final secure and recognized boundaries. The question of boundaries must be viewed in the context of the total thrust and intent of that resolution. The United States was prepared to support a fresh attempt by Mr. Jarring based on his mandate in resolution 242 (1967). It agreed with those who had held that the Council had a responsibility to help bring about implementation of the resolution. Implementation required agreement, and agreement required negotiations. The process might begin with an agreement on some Israeli withdrawal in the Sinai and

a reopening of the Suez Canal within the context of an extended cease-fire as the first stage on the road to a final settlement. Such a first step would be firmly linked to a final agreed settlement. Whether a beginning was made in that or another way was less important than that such a process be started without delay.

321. The representative of Panama said that resolution 242 (1967) possessed the elements that would enable the parties, through negotiations and agreements, to reach an acceptable solution in the search for peace. The Jews in Panama had contributed significantly to the economic, social and cultural development of the country and the Arabs were hard-working and had earned the affection of the Panamanians. The nationalist policy of Gamal Abdel Nasser with regard to the Suez Canal and his ideas on the permanent sovereignty which peoples had a right to exercise over their natural resources had captured the imagination of the majority of Panamanians. Panama supported the principle of the inadmissibility of the annexation of territories by force or military conquest. It believed that the Arab States, simultaneously with the troop withdrawal, should reach agreement with Israel on guaranteeing to Israel not only recognition as a free and sovereign State but its right to live in peace behind secure and recognized boundaries. The refugee problem should be approached by Israel with its Arab neighbours with all the special interest owed to a situation in which more than 2 million human beings were clamouring for an equitable and permanent solution. Panama also was concerned over the fate of the Holy Places of Jerusalem. It appealed for the necessary guarantees of freedom of access to the Holy Places, not for devout Catholics alone, but for the believers of all three religions.

322. The representative of Qatar said that there would be no Middle East peace so long as Israel was arrogantly occupying Arab territories and denying the Arab people their fundamental right to freedom and self-determination. In considering a just and equitable formula, due regard must be given to the right of the Palestinians to return to their homeland.

323. The representative of India said that Israel's argument that no boundary for it had ever been worked out was not valid. Its boundaries had been defined by the United Nations with precision when Palestine was partitioned and had

been accepted by Israel. The international frontiers between the old Mandated Territory of Palestine and the neighbouring territories of Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt had never been in question. Israel had told the Special Representative that it would no longer respect the international boundaries in Egypt, in the Syrian Arab Republic, or anywhere else in territories it had occupied beyond the old Mandated Territory. That attitude, together with Israel's refusal to confirm the principle of the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war, was inconsistent with the Israeli claim that it had accepted resolution 242 (1967) and with the Israeli assertion that all claims of either side were open to negotiations. The word "negotiations" did not occur in resolution 242 (1967), which simply requested the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with its provisions. Mr. Jarring had set about that task assiduously and delicately, but had failed because of the Israeli attitude. Nevertheless, in spite of Israel's reservations about, if not rejection of, resolution 242 (1967), it could still serve as a basis for progress. Israel should make a declaration, in formal and unequivocal terms, accepting the principle of inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by force, and commit itself to withdraw from all Arab lands occupied as a result of the June 1967 conflict. The Arab countries concerned should make a declaration, again in formal and unequivocal terms, committing themselves to respect and acknowledge the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and its right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. All countries concerned should, simultaneously but separately, declare that they would respect the rights of the Palestinian people in every field. Inevitably, Israel, if it intended to be a democratic State, would have to accommodate the Palestinians by guaranteeing them basic civil and political rights. The Secretary-General or his Special Representative should publish a document containing the points on which both sides had agreed in response to Mr. Jarring's aide-mémoire of 8 February 1971, covering specifically the solution of the refugee problem as decided by the United Nations resolutions, the reopening of the Suez

Canal, transit facilities and demilitarized zones. The principle of secure and recognized boundaries was mainly a political concept and only secondarily a military affair. In the geographical position of Israel and in the context of modern arms, a secure boundary was only feasible for all the States of the Middle East, not merely Israel, if it was founded upon mutual respect, friendship, cooperation and understanding.

324. The representative of China said that the essence of the Middle East question was aggression versus anti-aggression and of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples fighting for national liberation. The restoration of the Palestinians' right to national existence and the Arab countries' struggle to recover lost territories constituted an integral whole. So long as the lost territories were not recovered and the Palestinians' national right was not restored, there could be no true settlement of the so-called Middle East question. In recent years, the two super-Powers had been both contending and colluding, taking advantage of the temporary difficulties facing the Palestinian and other Arab peoples to make dirty political deals at the expense of their right to national existence and to their territories and sovereignty. The two super-Powers were deliberately creating and maintaining a situation of "no war, no peace" in the Middle East to facilitate their contention for important strategic points and oil resources and the division of spheres of influence. China firmly opposed and strongly condemned Israeli Zionist aggression and expansion against the Palestinian and other Arab peoples. China did not oppose the Jewish people and the people of Israel; but it was firmly opposed to the Israeli Zionist policies of aggression and expansion. The Chinese delegation firmly held that the Israeli Zionists must be strongly condemned for their prolonged aggression, that the Israeli authorities must be asked to withdraw immediately from the Egyptian, Syrian and all other Arab territories that they had occupied, and that the right of the Palestinians to national existence must be restored.

325. The representative of Bahrain said that the situation in the Middle East was a single problem based on the eviction of the Palestinian people from its homeland. The war of June 1967, through the occupation of the territories of Egypt, Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic, was only an aggravation of the situation. Bahrain hoped that

the Council members would lead the Israeli authorities to declare unequivocally their support of the principle of the non-acquisition of territory by force in the Charter, to withdraw their troops from all the Arab territories occupied and to recognize the right of the people of Palestine to self-determination.

326. At the conclusion of the debate the President said that an exchange of views on the matter with the members of the Security Council had revealed a common view that suspension of the Council meeting for a short period would be useful for further pondering on the results of the discussion of the question in the Security Council and further unofficial consultations among its members. There was a general understanding that the Security Council would resume its examination of the situation in the Middle East, for which purpose a meeting of the Council would be convened in the middle of July on a date to be determined following consultations among the members of the Council.

327. At the 1728th meeting on 15 June the Council heard a statement by the representative of Chad on the question of the Middle East, in accordance with an arrangement made at the 1725th meeting. The representative of Chad said that the Council was duty bound to call on Israel to rescind all action and to abandon all policies and practices affecting the population of the occupied territories and to reaffirm that all action taken to create settlements in those territories, including Jerusalem, was null and void. It was high time that the Palestinians should be allowed to participate in negotiations on the questions of foremost concern to them. The Assembly and the Council should explore what they could do to give the Palestine Liberation Organization observer status. The Security Council should reach a constructive settlement rather than abdicate its authority and refer the matter to the General Assembly. The problems of security and war fell within its purview; the Assembly had only powers of recommendation. The Council should be prepared to do its utmost to end the impasse in the Middle East. It should require that Israel withdraw from the occupied territories, and it should associate the people of Palestine in the negotiations with the parties to the conflict rather than just mention them in the course of its debates.

3

Report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA (Introduction)⁴⁶**September 10, 1973**

1. During the period 1 July 1972 to 30 June 1973 covered by this report there was no progress towards a settlement of the basic Palestine refugee⁴⁷ problem in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly⁴⁸ and the Security Council;⁴⁹ the Israeli military occupation of the West

Bank,⁵⁰ the Gaza Strip and part of the Golan Heights in Syria, territories within the Agency's area of operation,⁵¹ continued; and the vast majority of the refugees and other persons displaced from these territories as a result of the hostilities of 1967 were still unable to return.

2. The present state of the Palestine refugee problem has been outlined in a report by the Secretary-General of 18 May 1973 (S/10929)⁵² in response to a request by the Security Council for "a comprehensive report giving a full account of the efforts undertaken by the United Nations pertaining to the situation in the Middle East since June 1967". Paragraphs 35 to 42 of the report, which was under consideration by the Security Council at the end of June, deal with the refugee problem: they refer to the General Assembly's repeated regret at the failure to effect repatriation or compensation as provided for by paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) or to make substantial progress in the programme endorsed by resolution 513 (VI) for the reintegration of refugees, either by resettlement or repatriation; to General Assembly resolutions regarding the rights of the Palestine refugees and of the people of Palestine in relation to the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East; to resolutions calling for the return of displaced persons (including refugees) who fled from the occupied territories since June 1967,⁵³ and to resolutions concerning the refugee camps in the Gaza Strip. The first two of these matters have been mentioned regularly in reports by the Commissioner-General of UNRWA, since lack of action on them has constituted the continuing, underlying justification for the programmes carried out by UNRWA under successive

⁴⁶ Introduction to *Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 1 July 1972–30 June 1973, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 13* (U.N. doc. A/9013), pp. 1–14.

⁴⁷ A Palestine refugee, by UNRWA's working definition, is a person whose normal residence was Palestine for a minimum of two years preceding the conflict in 1948 and who, as a result of this conflict, lost both his home and means of livelihood and took refuge, in 1948, in one of the countries where UNRWA provides relief. Refugees within this definition or the children or grandchildren of such refugees are eligible for Agency assistance if they are (a) registered with UNRWA, (b) living in the area of UNRWA's operations, and (c) in need. [This and following notes are part of the document unless otherwise indicated.]

⁴⁸ Pertinent General Assembly resolutions:

194 (III) of 11 December 1948; 212 (III) of 19 November 1948;
302 (IV) of 8 December 1949; 393 (V) of 2 December 1950;
513 (VI) of 26 January 1952; 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952;
720 (VII) of 27 November 1953; 818 (IX) of 4 December 1954;
916 (X) of 3 December 1955; 1018 (XI) of 28 February 1958;
1191 (XII) of 12 December 1957; 1315 (XIII) of 12 December 1958;
1456 (XIV) of 9 December 1959; 1604 (XV) of 21 April 1961;
1725 (XVI) of 20 December 1961; 1856 (XVII) of 20 December 1962;
1912 (XVIII) of 3 December 1963; 2002 (XIX) of 10 February 1965;
2052 (XX) of 15 December 1965; 2154 (XXI) of 17 November 1966;
2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967; 2341 (XXII) of 19 December 1967;
2452 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968; 2535 (XXIV) of 10 December 1969;
2656 (XXV) of 7 December 1970; 2672 (XXV) of 8 December 1970;
2728 (XXV) of 15 December 1970; 2791 (XXVI) and 2792 A to E (XXVI) of 6 December 1971; and 2963 A to F (XXVII) and 2964 (XXVII) of 13 December 1972.

⁴⁹ Pertinent Security Council resolutions and documents: resolutions 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967, 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 and 331 (1973) of 20 April 1973 and the Secretary-General's report thereunder (S/10929 of 18 May 1973), and resolution 332 (1973) of 21 April 1973.

⁵⁰ Throughout this report the term "West Bank" means the occupied West Bank of Jordan.

⁵¹ The Agency headquarters is located in Beirut, Lebanon, and the five Field Offices are in Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic, east Jordan, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Reference in this report to Fields refer to these geographical areas.

⁵² Printed as doc. 8 below [ed. note].

⁵³ UNRWA distinguishes between refugees (defined at the beginning of this document), displaced refugees (i.e. refugees who became refugees for a second time in June 1967), and displaced persons (i.e. persons who became refugees for the first time in June 1967) [ed. note].

extensions of its mandate⁵⁴ since it was established 23 years ago. The passage of time has not made action less urgent, and the General Assembly's resolutions on respect for the rights of the refugees and the rights of the people of Palestine as an element in any just and lasting peace show how the problem of the refugees has been further complicated and the political dimension enhanced since the hostilities of 1967.

3. It is against this background of General Assembly resolutions that UNRWA must carry out its mandate, with little specific guidance from the resolutions conferring that mandate, which, in effect, has come to consist of maintaining, to the extent UNRWA's resources permit, the programmes it has gradually developed over the years. These programmes—relief, health and education—have in many respects the character of quasi-governmental services and form a part, and in some of the host countries an important part, of the social and economic fabric. There can be no doubt of the importance the Palestine refugees attach to them or about the serious consequences their collapse would cause. In particular, the education programme, which absorbs half the Agency's budget and caters for more than a quarter of a million children, cannot

be treated as if it were merely one of a number of self-liquidating or otherwise short-term projects of the United Nations system that can be terminated or truncated with only minor inconvenience. And yet these programmes, and indeed the existence of the Agency, are again threatened because methods of voluntary financing are deficient in coping with inflation and devaluation of a basic currency on the recent scale.

4. The Secretary-General has pointed out, in paragraph 41 of his report of 18 May 1973, that six years since they left the West Bank, the Gaza Strip or the occupied Golan Heights in Syria, hundreds of thousands of displaced refugees and other persons have still not been able to return. Last year the representative of Israel in the Special Political Committee gave a figure of 44,176 for the number of those from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip who had returned since 1967. The Agency is not involved in the arrangements for return, but on the best information available to it only about 7,400⁵⁵ of the 44,176 are refugees, and these refugees include about 1,000 who have returned from Egypt to the Gaza Strip. This figure of about 7,400 may be compared with 90,000 displaced refugees living in the emergency camps in east Jordan (along with some 45,000 displaced persons) and in the Syrian Arab Republic in which the Agency provides services and many more than this number of displaced refugees outside these camps. Thus, despite repeated calls on Israel by the General Assembly, while many Arabs have been allowed to enter the occupied territories and Israel for short visits, comparatively few of the refugees who were displaced in 1967 have been allowed to return for residence and those who have returned for this purpose represent a disproportionately small percentage of the total of 44,176.

5. In the meantime, as the following account of the Agency's general operations indicates, frustrations and uncertainties, the continued military occupation of areas where more than a third of the refugees still reside, violent action and

⁵⁴ Information concerning the origin of the Agency and its mission and work will be found in the following reports and other United Nations documents:

(a) Final report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East (28 December 1949) (A/AC.25/6, parts I and II);

(b) Report of the Secretary-General on Assistance to Palestine refugees: *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourth Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, Annexes*, vol. II (A/1060), p. 14;

(c) Proposals for the continuation of United Nations assistance to Palestine refugees. Document submitted by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly at its fourteenth session (*Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourteenth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 27, document A/4121);

(d) Report by the Secretary-General under General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V) and Security Council resolution 237 (1967) (A/6787 and Corr.1. For the printed text, see *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-second Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1967*, document S/8124.)

(e) Reports of the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA (*Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 35, document A/8264; A/8476 and Corr.1; and *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-seventh Session, Annexes*, agenda item 40, document A/8849);

(f) Pertinent Economic and Social Council resolution: 1565 (L) of 3 May 1971.

⁵⁵ The figure of 3,000 for displaced refugees who had returned which was given in the Commissioner-General's statement of 2 November 1972 to the Special Political Committee was an error. It omitted returns to the Gaza Strip from Egypt and the more recent returns to the West Bank. The latest figure available to the Agency is approximately 7,400 but may omit some refugees who have returned but have not applied for reinstatement on West Bank or Gaza rolls because they had no ration entitlement.

reaction, and the absence of any reasonable foundation for an ordered future on which people can build their hopes and aspirations, continue to plague the Palestine refugees as they have done for the past quarter century.

Finance

6. The Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, appointed by the General Assembly at its twenty-fifth session, submitted its third report on 24 October 1972.⁵⁶ The report gave an account of the various efforts that had been made to increase the Agency's income and the degree of success that had attended them.⁵⁷ The Group did not find it possible "to recommend any new ideas as viable solutions to UNRWA's financing problems". There was general agreement in the Group that voluntary contributions from Governments must continue to be the principal source of the Agency's funds but no agreement on the question whether any part of UNRWA's budget should be transferred to the United Nations regular budget, the feasibility of such a transfer being left open for possible further discussion in the event of the extension of the Group's mandate. "In the final analysis", the Working Group said, "it must be clearly recognized and understood that the future of UNRWA is eventually a question of the political will of Member Governments"; and it added that "the provision of relief assistance, health services and educational facilities to the Palestine refugees in the Middle East is a task which should be considered to be the common responsibility of *all* the Members of the United Nations".

7. The report emphasized the gravity of the situation, pointing out that "a gap of approximately 10 per cent between contributions and required expenditures is likely to persist unless further and continuous efforts are made to secure the increased contributions necessary". The Group concluded that "further vigorous and constant fund-raising activities on behalf of the Agency, in close consultation with the Commissioner-General of UNRWA, are essential" and suggested various ways in which they might be carried out. By

resolution 2964 (XXVII) the General Assembly requested the Working Group to "continue its efforts in co-operation with the Secretary-General and the Commissioner-General, for the financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for a further period of one year".

8. The Agency's financial situation in fact improved in the course of 1972; income increased from an estimated \$46.3 million at the beginning to an actual \$51.5 million when the accounts were closed after the end of the year, and actual expenditure was held to less than income by again making no payment in respect of subsidies to Governments. On 1 January 1973 cash in hand, while still inadequate at about \$3.5 million, was more than at the beginning of 1972, estimated income for 1973 was higher at \$53.4 million, and while there was still an estimated deficit of \$1.25 million, there was some prospect of eliminating it during the year by means of further increases in contributions.

9. A major part of the increase in income in 1972 (over \$2.1 million of it) came from the European Economic Community, which signed a Convention with the Agency on 18 December 1972 under which the Agency's full requirements of sugar and virtually the full cost of the supplementary feeding programme were met for 1972-73, with provision for renewal for a further two years.

10. In February, however, the Agency was severely affected by the devaluation of the United States dollar against the currencies of Lebanon, Syria and Jordan, where operating costs at once sharply increased. In subsequent months the United States dollar depreciated further against these currencies and estimates of expenditure had again to be increased. There was some benefit to the Agency from contributions expressed in currencies that had appreciated against the dollar, notably the West German mark and the Swedish kroner, but it was far outweighed by the adverse effects. These adverse effects were aggravated by accelerating inflation, and increases in cost-of-living allowances alone added \$1.9 million to local staff costs in 1973. By 15 June 1973 the estimated deficit had increased to \$4.1 million.

11. The outlook for 1974 was even more alarming as further inflation must be assumed. The rise in the price of flour would also reduce the amount of flour received from contributions in

⁵⁶ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-seventh Session, Annexes, agenda item 40, document A/8849.*

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, paras. 57-65.

kind with a monetary limit (although enough flour was expected to be available to cover ration issues in 1974, allowing for the running down of stocks). On the basis of the increased cost of flour, which, though donated, affects the figure for budget expenditure, and on the basis of 1973 income, a deficit of \$10.4 million was forecast, i.e. the gap to which the Working Group referred would widen from 10 per cent to over 15 per cent.

12. The adverse effects of the devaluation of the United States dollar on the Agency were not confined to the budget. The movement out of local currencies of assets set aside by the Agency to meet liabilities to participants in the contributory Provident Fund scheme for Area (local) staff had been accelerated after the events of 1967 and by 1968 they were all in Eurodollars, where they were earning a satisfactory return and had reached a figure of \$28.4 million on 1 January 1973. Participants' credits are recorded in the local currencies of their salaries, however, and the Agency's liabilities are therefore in these currencies, so that the dollar devaluation of August 1971 created a gap between assets and liabilities which has been widened by the devaluation of February 1973, and the depreciation of subsequent months. The implications of these developments indicated a need for review of the Provident Fund scheme and through the co-operation of the Director-General of the International Labour Organisation the Commissioner-General was able to arrange for a study by the Social Security Division of the ILO.

13. With the emergence of an even more acute financial crisis, the threat of reductions in services has returned. Since all basic ration commodities are donated in kind and the education programme, almost entirely cash payments, represents nearly half of the total budget, the UNRWA/UNESCO school system is put in jeopardy. If the deficit for 1973 persists at the same level until the end of the year, cash in hand will be insufficient for payment of the salaries of the Agency's staff of more than 14,500 at the end of January 1974, and may even run out before then. The Commissioner-General informed the Chairman of the Working Group and the Secretary-General of the deterioration in the financial situation and attended a meeting of the Group on 19 June at which fundraising measures were discussed. On 21 June the Chairman of the Group sent an appeal for further

contributions to all States Members of the United Nations or members of specialized agencies and arrangements were made by the Group for appropriate follow-up in capitals.

General operations

14. Despite periods of disturbance due to fighting the Agency maintained its full services in Lebanon but little could be done to rectify ration rolls. On 8 September 1972 nine refugee children playing in the vicinity of the Nahr-el-Bared River were killed and 26 injured in an Israeli air attack on the outskirts of Nahr-el-Bared camp; on 16 September several Agency installations in Nabatieh camp, including installations that were occupied by Palestinian organizations, were damaged in an Israeli air attack in which there was one refugee casualty, and operations were interrupted by the simultaneous incursion by Israeli forces into south Lebanon; on 21 February 1973 in an Israeli incursion by sea and air at Nahr-el-Bared and Beddawi in north Lebanon, a number of Agency buildings and shelters were damaged by cross-fire and blast and three small Agency buildings that had been occupied by Palestinian organizations since October 1969 were blown up.

15. In May during fighting involving Lebanese security forces and Palestinian organizations in and around Beirut, Agency services in Beirut camps were disrupted in varying degrees because staff could not cross firing lines and because of curfews. A state of emergency was in force between 2 and 23 May but the full range of services was resumed early in this period and no serious food shortage occurred. The Agency recorded 50 dead and 130 wounded among registered refugees and an Agency survey estimated damage to Agency installations and Agency-built shelters at about \$20,000 and damage to shelters constructed by the refugees themselves at about \$55,000.

16. The six camps in and around Beirut affected by the fighting in May have a population of no more than about 18,500 Palestine refugees officially registered as residing in shelters in them, but this population rises to about 22,000 if Palestine refugees officially registered elsewhere in Lebanon but living in these camps are added, and many thousands of foreigners, some Lebanese and some Palestine refugees registered in other host countries who have come to seek work in Beirut also live in the

agglomerations loosely referred to as the "refugee camps" and consisting, in fact, of the "official camps", interspersed land, and the peripheries. Some of these camps are so overcrowded that it would be difficult to make any radical improvement in living conditions without transferring part of the population elsewhere, which, apart from any other considerations, would raise acute problems of land, finance and employment. Remedial action by the Agency has therefore been limited to the improvement of drains and paths, some progress being made in this way by a combination of Agency funds for cement and "self-help" by refugees.

17. On 25 and 26 June 1973, in response to repeated representations by the Agency to the Government since October 1969, some of the Agency buildings occupied by Palestinian organizations in camps in and around Beirut were returned to the Agency, and arrangements were in hand for the return of the remainder and also of Agency buildings in camps in north and south Lebanon. With two exceptions, Agency buildings that before October 1969 had been allocated as offices to the Government representatives in the camps were not returned.

18. Four new schools were completed or nearing completion during the year, at Rashidieh, Wavell, Ein el-Hilweh and Burj el-Shamali, and will provide over 100 classrooms badly needed to alleviate overcrowding.

19. In the Syrian Arab Republic the arrangement whereby the duties of Field Director were combined with those of Field Director for Lebanon, the incumbent residing in Beirut and visiting Syria for two or three days a week, was brought to an end. With the concurrence of the Government, a separate Field Director was appointed for Syria, with residence in Damascus, with effect from 1 May 1973. It had become increasingly clear with the growing complexity of the Agency's work that the duties could not be combined without detriment to one or other Field.

20. The closure by the Syrian authorities of the frontier between Lebanon and Syria on 8 May during the fighting in Lebanon and its continued closure after the cease-fire made it necessary to seek special permission from the authorities for the movement of Agency supplies from Beirut to Syria and Jordan, and while permits were initially obtained without undue delay,

about 4,000 tons of goods, including rice and flour, were still awaiting permits on 30 June, none having been obtained since 6 June. Despite agreement on procedure for applications for Syrian visas for Agency staff at headquarters travelling to or through Syria on duty, difficulties arose over individual cases, including two senior international staff members to whom visas were refused. The Commissioner-General has made further representations to the Government on the subject.

21. Apart from some improvements in the Agency's health services in Syria (see para. 30), a further 500 cement block shelters were completed in Qabr Essit camp to replace tents but problems over land use and allocation still held up construction at Jaramana and Dera'a. Forty-two additional classrooms were completed either in new schools or as additions to existing schools, in order to ease the pressure on accommodation from the annual increase in the school population. On 22 January 1973 the buildings comprising the Agency's training centre at Homs, which had not been used for their original purpose since 1965, and until the middle of 1970 were occupied by Syrians displaced from the Quneitra area in 1967, were handed over to the Government for use as an agricultural school on terms that ensured that places would be available without charge to Palestine refugees. In co-operation with the Government, progress was made in overtaking the backlog in rectification of ration rolls by the elimination of dead and absent refugees and their replacement by eligible children not hitherto receiving rations. The responsibility for caring for displaced persons in Syria who are not registered refugees was entirely assumed by the Government of Syria in 1967, and has continued to be borne by the Government.

22. In east Jordan, where one third of the refugees registered with the Agency are to be found, a notable development was growing participation in "self-help" projects for the improvement of amenities and facilities in camps. Thirty-one projects were completed to an estimated value of \$55,400, of which the Agency contributed some \$5,900 mainly in the form of cement and other materials, the refugees \$18,800 and other donors the remainder. These projects included the concreting of school playgrounds in whole or in part to provide recreational facilities and improvements to roads and drains. In October, the new Amman

training centre for men and women, built with NEED⁵⁸ funds, was formally opened by H.M. King Hussein. Discussions were held with the Government authorities on procedures for the rectification of ration rolls which would provide rations for some of the 203,270 children not receiving rations at present (including some of the 39,254 displaced refugee children not on Agency ration rolls who receive rations at Government expense) but little progress had been made by 30 June.

23. The Agency continued to co-operate with and assist the Government of Jordan in caring for displaced persons to the extent that its resources permitted. Displaced persons who reside in the post-1967 "emergency" camps and number about 45,000 (and about 3,000 others in the "established" camps) benefit from Agency medical, sanitation and other camp services, and displaced children to the number of over 7,500 attend Agency schools. On behalf of the Government the Agency distributes rations to displaced persons and hot meals to some displaced children, contributing 50 per cent of the cost of transport and distribution of the former and the whole cost of preparation and distribution of the latter. The cost of food-stuffs and the main burden of caring for the displaced persons is, however, fully borne by the Government of Jordan.

24. In the West Bank of Jordan co-ordination of the economy with that of Israel by the occupying Power continued and the nexus between the two was strengthened. The shortage of semi-skilled and unskilled Israeli labour in building and agriculture provided employment for refugees as for West Bank residents, much of it with Israeli farmers or entrepreneurs engaged in the development of Israel or in Israeli construction projects in east Jerusalem and the environs. While there were immediate material benefits for many refugees, the longer-term economic effects and also the cumulative, pervasive social and cultural effects were becoming apparent and causing concern. The combination of demand for labour and price inflation was beginning to attract into employment women from the home and children from school. The situation under occupation was not static after six years and changes were taking place among and around the refugees over the shape, direction and pace of which they could

exert little or no influence.

25. The Agency could not be unaffected by the changes taking place in the West Bank and, as time went on, in the Gaza Strip also. With growing employment, the question arose of the need for the issue of rations on the same scale. The Agency could not regard the present situation of military occupation as other than temporary, there was evidence that the demand for employment in Israel could drop at short notice in accordance with economic requirements, and the Commissioner-General did not consider that it would be proper or appropriate to make wholesale cuts in rations by means of exceptional procedures. The Agency's policy was to continue with the work of rectification of ration rolls under normal procedures, eliminating the dead or absent and removing refugees with income in excess of the approved minimum from the category of eligibility for rations, while retaining the means to restore rations rapidly if the need arose in view of the abnormal circumstances. In response to representations from staff the Agency carried out a special study of the rise in the cost of living in the West Bank in terms of the Jordan dinar from 1967 to 1973 and, as a result, cost-of-living allowances in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were further increased, though not, for lack of funds, by the full amount required to bridge the gap between the increase as measured and total remuneration at the time the study was undertaken. Rising costs were also responsible for further delay in the expansion of Kalandia Training Centre.

26. "Self-help" projects have been a feature of Agency programmes in the West Bank for many years and by the beginning of 1973 had reached a value of \$80,000 of which the Agency contributed \$30,000, mainly in materials. They ranged from small projects such as concreting pathways and school-yards to the construction of three classrooms at Kalandia preparatory girls school and Youth Activity Centres in Askar and Dheisheh camps, costing together more than \$10,000.

27. In the Gaza Strip, as in the West Bank, employment opportunities were good but the same comments as for the West Bank are valid in regard to the nature of the employment and the high cost of living. The Agency again made repeated representations about the living conditions of families whose houses were demolished in July and August 1971 by the Israeli military authorities and who were obliged to improvise

⁵⁸ Near East Emergency Donations, Inc. [ed. note].

or share shelter. As a result the Israeli Military Administration agreed to carry out a joint survey with the Agency. This survey took place in 1973 and showed that 706 families were still inadequately housed, of whom 266 must be described as in urgent need. The Agency has again asked the Israeli authorities what action they propose to take to provide for the families inadequately housed. In connexion with the construction of housing and road-widening in Rafah and Khan Yunis carried out by the Israeli Military Administration, 873 shelter rooms, affecting 383 families, were demolished but those occupants who did not purchase new houses in the projects were found accommodation in shelters vacated by other refugee families moving into the project, and compensation was paid for construction and improvements that had been carried out by the refugees themselves. Thirty-nine of the families whose houses were demolished in 1971 were also rehoused in the course of this operation. The taking over, without prior consultation, of the Agency's sanitation services in part of Beach (Shati) camp by the Municipality of Gaza under the Acting Mayor appointed by the Military Governor obliged the Agency to protest and seek information on future policy (see para. 124 below). Otherwise Agency services operated normally, and good progress was made in rectifying ration rolls by the removal of the dead and absent and those refugees with a substantial steady income and by the admission of eligible children previously debarred by ration ceilings. It should be noted that the Agency, which does not operate a relief programme in the Arab Republic of Egypt, provides no services, and now makes no contribution to the cost of services, for displaced refugees and other displaced persons who left the Gaza Strip for Egypt in or immediately after June 1967 or who were in Egypt at that time and unable to return. This responsibility is borne by the Government of Egypt.

Health

28. The Agency maintained its comprehensive health care programme and continued to provide preventive and curative medical services, nursing care, environmental sanitation and nutritional support for eligible refugees. There was a continued increase in costs in private hospitals in which beds are retained for refugee patients and the Agency was obliged to raise rates of subsidy. In the West

Bank of Jordan the introduction by the Military Administration of a health insurance scheme affected the long-standing arrangements for the unrestricted referral of refugee patients to government hospitals, clinics and other medical facilities without charge to the patient.

29. Through surveillance and preventive measures, with emphasis on sanitation and health education, the gastro-enteric infections were kept at about the same levels as in the previous year and cholera, which broke out in the Syrian Arab Republic and the West Bank, was confined to one case in the former and seven in the latter among the refugee population.

30. Improvements in Agency health facilities included the completion of health centres at Irbed in east Jordan and at Jaramana in the outskirts of Damascus City and an extension of the health centre in Balata camp near Nablus in the West Bank to accommodate the maternal and child health programme. A health centre is also under construction to replace an old building in Bureij camp in Gaza. Funds were allocated and plans are being prepared for the construction of new health centres in Syria at Nairab camp near Aleppo and in the emergency camps at Sbeineh and Qabr Essit near Damascus; in all three cases, the present buildings are dilapidated and most unsatisfactory. The construction of three supplementary feeding centres in Syria, in Jaramana, Qabr Essit and Sbeineh was authorized to replace unsatisfactory buildings with funds from a special EEC contribution. So far as environmental sanitation is concerned, in the West Bank municipal water supplies have been extended to Nur Shams and Camp No. 1 near Nablus, Jalazone camp has been connected with a regional water supply, and the water supplies in the following camps have been improved: Aida, Tulkarem, Dheisheh and Arroub. A municipal sewerage scheme was extended to Nairab camp near Aleppo, and surface drainage has been improved in Mía Mía and Ein el Hilweh camps in Lebanon, Am'ari camp in West Bank and Husson camp in east Jordan. Good progress was made with family latrine construction in east Jordan, Gaza and the Syrian Arab Republic.

31. The twenty-sixth World Health Assembly, meeting at Geneva, discussed once again the subject of "Health Assistance to Refugees and Displaced Persons in the Middle East". During

the debate appreciation of UNRWA's health service was expressed by several delegations. In adopting resolution WHA26.56 on 23 May 1973 (see annex II), the Assembly: (a) requested "the Director-General to intensify and expand to the largest extent possible the organization's programme of health assistance to the refugees and displaced persons in the Middle East"; and (b) decided "to establish a special committee of experts appointed by three Member States chosen by the fifty-second session of the Executive Board in consultation with the Director-General to study the health conditions of the inhabitants of the occupied territories in the Middle East, in all its aspects and to submit a comprehensive report on its findings to the Twenty-seventh World Health Assembly".

32. The Commissioner-General would like to record his appreciation of the co-operation received by the Agency from the Ministries of Health in all fields in carrying out its health programme.

Education

33. Apart from the continued absence of some textbooks, which was prejudicial to effective teaching and learning, the UNRWA/UNESCO education programme operated smoothly in all fields of the Agency's operation, but in Lebanon the fighting reported in paragraph 146 below caused some interruption in May 1973. Enrolments in UNRWA/UNESCO schools rose to 255,984, there were 3,967 students in UNRWA/UNESCO training centres (1,164 in teacher training and 2,803 in vocational and technical education) and the total teaching staff reached 7,747. More than 150 classrooms and ancillary rooms in new and existing schools were completed and about half of a further instalment of 161 were already under construction at the end of June 1973. There is still an urgent need for more classrooms to cope with a school population that has been increasing at the rate of approximately 12,000 a year and a programme for the construction, in a first phase, of 482 classrooms and 175 ancillary rooms, including 57 science laboratories, was drawn up in detail, with estimates of capital and associated recurrent costs, and submitted to a potential donor.

34. The increase of nearly 400 in the numbers in the training centres was due mainly to expansion at Wadi Seer and Amman in east Jordan and the

restoration of suspended training capacity at Sibliin in Lebanon. This increase may be regarded as evidence of the high importance the Agency and the refugees attach to the programme and of the financial support provided in the form of special contributions from Governments, non-governmental organizations and individuals. In addition, a sum of more than \$250,000 was allocated for the replacement of training equipment and the modernization of courses, in order to enable the centres to continue to meet the changing needs of the area and maintain the same quality of instruction.

35. The two-year project of financial assistance by the United Nations Development Programme to the UNRWA/UNESCO Institute of Education (referred to in paragraph 27 of last year's report⁵⁹) enabled this important institute to maintain its full level of operation and, with increased financial assistance from the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), to expand its extension services for Government educationalists engaged in the in-service training of teachers.

36. Preliminary arrangements were made for the establishment, on an experimental basis, of two Education Development Centres, one in Amman (Jordan) and one in Gaza. Their purpose will be to work at field level on the improvement of the quality of instruction in Agency schools by closer co-ordination, more systematic deployment of advisory and supervisory staff and reinforcement of existing resources devoted to in-service training of education personnel, development of teacher-learning aids and library services for teachers.

Relations with other organs of the United Nations system

37. UNESCO and WHO have continued their collaboration with UNRWA in the conduct of the education and health programmes, thus assuring the professional competence of the Agency's policy and activities in these two fields. The UNESCO staff, including associate experts, made available to UNRWA from or through UNESCO without reimbursement, now number 23. UNESCO continued its efforts to increase contributions to the UNRWA/UNESCO education programme, co-ordinating them with the Working Group and the

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, Twenty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/8713 and Corr.1 and 2).

Agency, and in October-November 1972 the UNESCO General Conference renewed the appeal issued by the Director-General on 1 January 1971.

38. By 30 June 1973, eight Governments and one private donor had responded to the WHO appeal based on resolution WHA24.32 of 18 May 1971,⁶⁰ for funds for the health programme. Contributions so far received amount to \$9,921 in cash and to \$5,000, at the donor's valuation, in medical supplies. A further \$1,400 has been pledged. The number of WHO staff made available to UNRWA without reimbursement is five.

39. The two-year UNDP project of financial assistance to the UNRWA/UNESCO Institute of Education mentioned above (para. 35) took effect on 1 July 1972. UNICEF has continued to waive its annual fee of \$10,000 for procurement services for the Agency and has increased its assistance to the Institute's extension services, thereby enabling the Institute to make the results of its experience available to more Governments in the region at their request.

40. The Agency co-operated with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in the promotion and sale in its area of operation of the new record, "Top Star Festival", and received payment of \$28,093 as its share of the net profits realized from the sale of the record in 1972.

41. At the request of UNRWA, the ILO has undertaken to make a study of UNRWA's Area Staff Provident Fund scheme for the purpose of advising on any changes which should be made in the light of problems brought to a head by the devaluation of the United States dollar.

42. The Agency's accounts for 1972 have been audited by the United Nations Board of Auditors and their report will be reviewed by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly.

Assistance from voluntary agencies and other non-governmental organizations

43. The Commissioner-General again acknowledges the generous assistance provided by a large number of voluntary agencies, business and professional organizations and individuals. In the

course of the year, several new donors added their support to those regularly contributing funds and supplies for the Agency's programmes. Many of these contributors follow the operation of the Agency's programmes closely through correspondence and field visits, with benefit to the Agency's work.

44. The projects financed by these contributions are noted in the appropriate sections of the present report. The main organizations were: American Near East Refugee Aid, Inc. (ANERA); the Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO); the Association for the Commemoration of Osaka Expo '70; Australians Care for Refugees (AUSTCARE); the Council of Organizations for Relief Services Overseas, Inc. (CORSO) of New Zealand; the Christian Reformed World Relief Committee of the USA; the Danish Refugee Council; Federations of Business and Professional Women; the Finnish Refugee Council; the Gulbenkian Foundation; a group of Japanese business organizations; the Lutheran World Federation; the Norwegian Refugee Council; OXFAM of the United Kingdom; the Red Lion and Sun Society of Iran; the Swedish Save the Children Federation (Rädda Barnen); the Unitarian Service Committee of Canada; the Women's Auxiliary of UNRWA; the World Alliance of Young Men's Christian Associations; and Zonta International. Contributions made direct to UNRWA from non-governmental sources are recorded in table 20 of annex I.

45. The Commissioner-General also wishes to pay tribute to the devoted service rendered to the refugees by voluntary agencies in the area of the Agency's operation (see table 17 of annex I).

Summary and conclusion

46. The Agency's most urgent and vital problem is still financial and it is again rapidly coming to a head. Devaluation of the United States dollar and accelerating inflation have reversed the more favourable trend of 1972 and the Agency is now faced with estimated deficits over \$3 million in 1973 and over \$10 million in 1974 and the prospect of a cash crisis at the beginning of 1974. Working capital and cash resources cannot accommodate these deficits, and unless the deficits can be eliminated services will have to be reduced in 1974. Because ration items are donated and supplementary feeding is met from a special contribution

⁶⁰ Printed as doc. 437 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971* [ed. note].

(in kind and in cash), because health services are a bare minimum and also represent only 12.9 per cent of the budget, and because education absorbs 47.3 per cent of the budget and is almost entirely cash expenditure, the main reduction is bound to be in the education programme. The size of the estimated deficit for 1974 would entail a very drastic reduction; for example, the elimination of the whole of the preparatory cycle (the last three years of general education in the UNRWA/UNESCO system) would be necessary to save as much as \$7.5 million.

47. Reductions of this nature and on this scale would cause more hardship, frustration and bitterness among the Palestine refugees; would

wreck the hopes for future self-support of many thousands of young refugees; would create grave problems for the host Governments; and would heighten tension, and encourage further violence in the region. In the Commissioner-General's opinion, a decision with such serious political consequences and such ominous implications for peace and security is not an administrative matter to be dealt with by an appointed official. It is a decision that ought to be taken at a governmental level, and in the absence of a governing body for UNRWA with executive responsibilities, the Commissioner-General must seek and receive guidance and directions from the General Assembly.

Special Reports Submitted to the General Assembly

4

Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation by Israel of General Assembly Resolution 2963 C (XXVII) of December 13, 1972⁶¹

September 18, 1973

1. The present report is submitted to the General Assembly in pursuance of its resolution 2963 C (XXVII) of 13 December 1972 concerning Palestine refugees in the Gaza Strip. In paragraphs 3 and 4 of the resolution, the General Assembly called upon Israel "to desist forthwith from all measures that affect the physical structure and the demographic composition of the Gaza Strip" and "to take immediate and effective steps for the return of the refugees concerned to the camps from which they were removed and to provide adequate shelters for their accommodation". In paragraph 5 of the same resolution, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General, after consulting with the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, to report as soon as possible and whenever appropriate thereafter, but in any case not later than the opening date of the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly, on Israel's compliance with and implementation of the resolution.

2. In a note verbale dated 22 January 1973 addressed to the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations, the Secretary-General drew attention to the provisions set forth in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the resolution and requested the Government of Israel to forward to him, as soon as possible, any relevant information on the implementation of those provisions. In a second message to the Permanent Representative, dated 28 June 1973, the Secretary-General requested the Government of Israel to make the required information available to him not later than 31

August 1973 as he planned to submit the report that had been requested of him before the opening of the twenty-eighth session of the Assembly.

3. The reply to this message was set forth in a note verbale dated 30 August 1973 from the Acting Permanent Representative of Israel, which reads as follows:

The Acting Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and, with reference to the Secretary-General's note of 28 June 1973 concerning General Assembly resolution 2963 C (XXVII) of 13 December 1972, has the honour on instructions from his Government, to state the following:

As pointed out on previous occasions, e.g. in the reply of the Permanent Representative of Israel of 8 August 1972 to the note of the Secretary-General of 26 June 1972, published in document A/8814 of 15 September 1972, the measures taken by the Israeli authorities in refugee camps in the Gaza area in 1971, were designed to put a stop to the campaign of terror, murder and sabotage unleashed there by criminal terrorist organizations based in Arab States and actively sustained and supported by these States. These measures were directed exclusively and specifically against the agents of these organizations and were indispensable to save the lives of the potential victims of their outrages.

The victims of those murderous activities—men, women and children—were mainly members of the local Arab population, including refugees. Pertinent details on this matter, as well as the relevant figures of the casualties caused by the terrorists—exceeding 1600—are set out in the aforesaid letter of the Permanent Representative of Israel.

By virtue of their responsibility, as stipulated also in Security Council resolution 237 (1967), to ensure the safety, welfare and security of all the inhabitants in the area under their control, the Israeli authorities took the necessary action to protect the lives of the local population.

In view of the conditions obtaining in the refugee camps, it was necessary to lay out access roads there, which unavoidably involved the demolition of a number of shelters.

As explained previously, every possible care was taken to avoid undue hardship to the inhabitants concerned. Alternative accommodation was provided for and accepted by most of these people, but some refugees

⁶¹ UN doc. A/9155. The resolution is printed as doc. 11 in *International Documents on Palestine 1972*.

expressed a preference for arrangements of their own choice. Furthermore, compensation was paid for expenses that had been incurred by inhabitants on improvements in the structures which had been demolished, and cash grants were given for the cost of moving into new housing. Assistance was also provided in connexion with employment.

It has subsequently appeared that some of the arrangements made at the time by a number of refugees had not proved satisfactory to them. The Israeli authorities declared their readiness to look into these cases, and a joint survey by the competent Israeli authorities and representatives of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency was carried out and has recently been completed. The necessary action is now being taken to provide suitable housing for the people concerned, in accordance with their needs.

As is well known, the security measures taken, as aforesaid, by the Israeli authorities have been most successful and have greatly benefited all the local inhabitants, including the refugees, who were enabled to engage in work and other normal activities without fear of terrorist attacks on their lives.

It has been generally acknowledged that the situation in the Gaza area had improved out of all recognition. The misery and stagnation prevailing there during the 19 years of Egyptian misrule have been replaced by progress and prosperity.

Following upon a debate which again was exploited by Arab and several other delegations for their usual political and propaganda ends, not at all conducive to the advancement of the true interests of the refugees and displaced persons, resolution 2963 C (XXVII) was adopted, although it deliberately ignored the true situation and distorted the facts. For this reason the delegation of Israel was among those who voted against it.

The Acting Permanent Representative of Israel avails himself of this opportunity to renew to the Secretary-General the assurances of his highest consideration.

4. The following report on developments concerning the matters relating to refugees in the Gaza Strip referred to in the resolution is based on information received from the Commissioner-General of UNRWA.

5. Since 11 January 1972, there have been five cases of punitive demolition of shelters in the Gaza Strip (see A/8814, paragraph 5). In four of these five cases the actual demolition was carried out by the occupants of the shelters in order to salvage the materials and preserve the contents of the shelters.

6. The Agency has continued to seek specific information from the Israeli authorities on their

plans for the rehousing of the 914 families who were found by the Agency in May 1972 to be still unsatisfactorily housed as a consequence of the 1971 demolitions in Gaza, described in documents A/8383 and Add.1 and A/8814. On 23 December 1972, in a letter to the Foreign Minister of Israel, the Commissioner-General of UNRWA referred to the attempts he had made to obtain information from Israeli authorities on their plans and asked for clarification of the intentions of the Israeli Government. The Deputy Commissioner-General also raised the matter at a meeting with the Military Governor of Gaza and North Sinai on 28 December 1972. The Governor was reminded of the Agency's claim of approximately \$417,000 in respect of the demolition of Agency-built shelters, in July/August 1971, which the Israeli authorities have so far not paid and settlement of which could finance construction by the Agency of housing for these refugees. In a letter of 11 February 1973 to the Commissioner-General, the Foreign Minister replied that he was aware of the need that still existed for accommodation. He referred to the reaffirmation by the Israeli delegation during the debate in the General Assembly on the Commissioner-General's report of the willingness of the Government of Israel to try to solve the problems of those refugees with a valid claim and to progress that had already been made. At meetings with Foreign Ministry officials on 21 February and with the Foreign Minister on 22 February, the Commissioner-General pursued the matter and was assured of the concern of the Government of Israel to do what was necessary. Reference was made to the rehousing of some of the families in a housing project at Rafah and the Commissioner-General was told further consideration would be given to the possibility of accelerating rehousing. On 19 March UNRWA's Field Director in the Gaza Strip was told by the Military Governor that he had been authorized to reopen the joint survey of families inadequately housed. The Agency agreed to participate in this survey.

7. The joint survey was conducted between 28 March and 5 June 1973, with a supplementary joint survey between 13 and 30 July 1973. A total of 942 families⁶² were covered by the surveys; 706

⁶² The 942 families were selected by the Agency on the basis of preliminary surveys made in March and May 1973 of the condition at that time of the 2,554 families who were affected by the 1971 demolitions. [Original note.]

families were found to be still inadequately housed, of whom 266 were considered to be serious cases of hardship. The figures of 706 and 266 families mentioned above include, respectively, 25 and 6 families who had been moved to El Arish after the 1971 demolitions but had subsequently returned. The Israeli military authorities have said they will not provide housing for these families, as this was provided for them in El Arish. The Agency has continued to ask the Israeli authorities for information on the action they propose to take to provide for the 706 families still inadequately housed.

8. The 236 families considered in the surveys as being adequately housed at the time may not be able to maintain this position. Some claim they are already under pressure from landlords to vacate their present accommodation, some have family members temporarily residing outside Gaza who were not taken into account at the time of the surveys but whose return to the Strip and to their families would result in overcrowding and some claim that even though at present adequately housed, the rent is too high for their means.

9. There were further demolitions in the last quarter of 1972 in Rafah camp in Gaza. The Agency first became aware of the intentions of the Israeli authorities in this regard towards the end of October 1972 when the Israeli Governor of Rafah informed a junior Agency official of plans to construct a new road between two government housing projects (one of which is in Sinai). This road would cut across Rafah camp and involved the demolition of a number of shelters. Compensation would be paid for private structures only, but the refugees affected would be eligible to purchase new housing in the government housing project in Rafah.

10. The Agency made representations as well as inquiries about this development. On 2 November 1972 the UNRWA Field Office Director wrote to the Senior Liaison Officer of the Military Governor stressing the Agency's concern about the intended demolitions. He also raised the matter at a meeting with the Military Governor of Gaza and North Sinai on 6 November 1972. The Commissioner-General (then in New York) referred to it in a letter of 17 November 1972 to Ambassador Jacob Doron, the Deputy Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations and the representative in the Special Political Committee at the twenty-seventh session of the

General Assembly.

11. According to the information available to the Agency, the refugee residents of Rafah camp whose shelters were to be affected by the construction of the new road were notified by the Governor of Rafah on 1 December 1972 that they had one month within which to demolish the shelters themselves, so that they could salvage whatever materials might be useful for them, failing which the shelters would be bulldozed. They were also informed of the terms and conditions on which the new housing would be available. (A three-roomed house would cost IL 3,000 (\$714) for cash or IL 3,500 (\$833) with a down payment of IL 1,000 (\$238) and monthly payments of IL 50 (\$12); a two-roomed house would cost IL 2,500 (\$595) for cash or IL 3,000 (\$714) on the instalment plan.) The Governor is understood to have informed the refugees that those who could not afford the new housing would be allotted the vacant shelters of refugees who applied for the new housing and whose shelters were not scheduled for demolition.

12. The Military Governor of Gaza and North Sinai has informed the Agency's Field Office Director that the new road is part of a master plan for roads in Rafah. This was subsequently confirmed at a press conference held on 22 December 1972 (reported in the *Jerusalem Post* of 24 December) by the Israeli Co-ordinator for the occupied territories, General Gazit, who distinguished between the July/August 1971 operations and the present road construction in Rafah, the first as motivated by security considerations and the second by a desire to improve living standards. He said that the operations would be extended to all the camps in the Gaza Strip and that the population of Rafah camp (which on 31 December 1972 stood at between 40,000 and 45,000) would be reduced to half its present number. He also referred to a scheme under consideration by the Israeli authorities to sell plots of land to refugees for construction of housing. The Agency's present understanding is that the military authorities in the Gaza Strip are levelling plots of land near Gaza and Beit Lahia and that refugees living in the Beach and Jabalia camps will be offered land for purchase and construction of their own houses.

13. There have also been demolitions in the Khan Yunis camp in March/April 1973 for the purpose of the construction of new roads. These

demolitions took place on the same basis and on the same lines as the demolitions in the Rafah camp.

14. The demolitions in the Rafah and Khan Yunis camps mentioned above have affected so far 216 families in Rafah and 167 families in Khan Yunis. The families affected by these demolitions have either moved into the new government housing or have been provided with alternative vacant shelters in their respective camps. The Agency is following up a few cases in which satisfactory alternative accommodation has not yet been provided. In Rafah, shelters comprising 260 Agency-built rooms, 36 rooms built with Agency assistance (for all of which no compensation was paid) and 221 privately built rooms (for which compensation was presumably paid direct to the refugees) were destroyed. In Khan Yunis, shelters comprising 240 Agency-built rooms, 5 rooms built with Agency assistance and 111 privately built rooms, were demolished. The total number of shelter rooms affected in the Rafah and Khan Yunis demolitions is 873. Thirty-nine of the families whose houses were demolished in 1971 were also rehoused in the course of this operation. The present position is that there are three government housing projects in the Rafah area and another in the Khan Yunis area.

15. Regarding the families affected by the July/August 1971 operations who left the Gaza Strip, the Agency has been informed by the Israeli authorities that of the 251 families said to have gone to El Arish (see A/8814, para. 6), some 60 to 80 families are still there.

5

Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation by Israel of General Assembly Resolution 2963 D (XXVII) of December 13, 1972⁶³

September 18, 1973

1. The present report is submitted to the General Assembly in pursuance of its resolution 2963 D (XXVII) of 13 December 1972 which dealt with the displaced inhabitants who had fled the Israel-occupied areas since the outbreak of hostilities

in June 1967. In paragraphs 4 and 5 of the resolution, the General Assembly called upon Israel "immediately to take steps for the return of the displaced inhabitants" and "to desist forthwith from all measures affecting the physical, geographic and demographic structure of the occupied territories". In paragraph 6 of the same resolution, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to follow the implementation of the resolution and to report in detail thereon to the General Assembly.

2. Since the termination of the mission of his Special Representative on Humanitarian Questions in the Middle East, Mr. Nils-Göran Gussing, in September 1967, the Secretary-General has had no United Nations source of first-hand complete information concerning the questions raised in the above-mentioned resolution. He therefore must in the main look to the Israel Government for the information required for the fulfilment of the reporting responsibility placed upon him by the General Assembly.

3. By a note verbale dated 22 January 1973 addressed to the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations, the Secretary-General drew attention to the provisions set forth in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the resolution and requested the Government of Israel to forward to him, as soon as possible, any relevant information on the implementation of those provisions. In a second message to the Permanent Representative, dated 28 June 1973, the Secretary-General requested the Government of Israel to make the required information available to him not later than 31 August 1973 as he planned to submit the report that had been requested of him before the opening of the twenty-eighth session of the Assembly.

4. The reply to this message was set forth in a note verbale dated 30 August from the Acting Permanent Representative of Israel, which reads as follows:

The Acting Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and, with reference to the Secretary-General's note of 28 June 1973 concerning General Assembly resolution 2963 D (XXVII) of 13 December 1972, has the honour, on instructions from his Government, to state the following:

Being well aware of the humanitarian aspects of the problem of the displaced persons who fled as a result of the hostilities of June 1967, the Government of Israel has continued to seek to reconcile the return of displaced

⁶³ UN doc. A/9156. The resolution is printed as doc. 11 in *International Documents on Palestine 1972*.

persons with its responsibility for the safety, welfare and security of the local population and the security of the State itself.

The conditions obtaining in the area are not, however, such as to permit a large scale return of the aforesaid persons. Arab Governments continue to give aid and support to terrorist organizations established in and acting from their soil, as well as to other subversive activities. Acts of aggression across the cease-fire lines are encouraged and supported by those Governments, whilst at the same time they continue to oppose any action conducive to the reduction of terrorism or likely to advance the cause of peace. This completely negative approach to the problems of the region is the openly proclaimed policy of the Arab Governments.

Furthermore, facilities established by Israel for the orderly movement of people across the cease-fire lines, are being taken advantage of by these Governments for purposes of subversion, thus deliberately seeking to undermine any improvement of the situation.

In the circumstances the Government of Israel would be failing in its basic duties and obligations if it were to close its eyes to this attitude of the Arab Governments and permit a massive influx of persons from countries, which never cease to proclaim their enmity towards Israel. To act in such an irresponsible manner cannot be expected of the Government of Israel or any other Government.

Yet despite all these difficulties, the Government of Israel has also during the last year, as in previous years, continued to facilitate the return of persons, who had been displaced in 1967. The special arrangements for family reunion and hardship cases have been maintained, and co-operation in this respect with the local Arab authorities has continued. The total figure of displaced persons who have returned to their homes since 1967 stands now at nearly 50,000. Further details on this matter will be provided by the delegation of Israel in the course of the debate on the report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA at the forthcoming session of the General Assembly.

In conclusion, it must be observed that the annual debates in the General Assembly on the reports of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA are used as an opportunity by Arab and several other delegations to be exploited for political and propaganda purposes, in a manner which complicates and confounds the issue and which intentionally hinders efforts to advance the real interests of the refugees and displaced persons. Resolution 2963 D (XXVII) failed to take into account the true conditions prevailing in the area, and the Israel delegation, for this reason, was among those voting against it.

The Acting Permanent Representative of Israel avails himself of this opportunity to renew to the Secretary-General the assurances of his highest consideration.

5. The Secretary-General has obtained from the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East such information as is available to the Commissioner-General regarding the return of refugees registered with the Agency. The Agency is not involved in any way in the arrangements for the return of the refugees and its information is based in the main on Agency records relating to requests by returning refugees for retransfer of rations to the areas to which they have returned. It is possible that some refugees may have returned who did not ask for the provision of rations or services by the Agency, in which case the fact of their return would not necessarily be known to it. So far as is known to the Agency, up to June 1973 about 6,200 displaced refugees returned from east Jordan to the West Bank and 220 from east Jordan to the Gaza Strip. In addition, about 1,000 displaced refugees returned to the Gaza Strip from the Arab Republic of Egypt. A breakdown of the figure of about 6,200 refugees who have returned to the West Bank shows that very few (less than 100) are from the Jericho area.⁶⁴

6

Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine⁶⁵

September 29, 1973

Note by the Secretary-General

The twenty-seventh report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, covering the period from 30 September 1972 to 29 September 1973, the text of which is attached to the present note, was transmitted by the Chairman of the Commission for communication to the States Members of the United Nations in accordance with paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 512 (VI) of 26 January 1952, and paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 2963 A (XXVII) of 13 December 1972.

Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine

1. In paragraph 3 of resolution 2963 A (XXVII)

⁶⁴ See also para. 4 of doc. 3 above.

⁶⁵ UN doc. A/9187.

of 13 December 1972, the General Assembly noted with regret that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine had been unable to find a means of achieving progress in the implementation of paragraph 11 of Assembly resolution 194 (III), and requested the Commission to exert continued efforts towards the implementation thereof and to report thereon to the Assembly as appropriate, but not later than 1 October 1973. The present report is submitted pursuant to that request.

2. In its twenty-fourth⁶⁶ and twenty-fifth⁶⁷ reports, covering the periods from 24 December 1965 to 30 September 1966 and from 1 October 1966 to 30 September 1967, the Commission responded to earlier requests by the General Assembly in its resolutions 2052 (XX) of 15 December 1965 and 2154 (XXI) of 17 November 1966 in connexion with the implementation of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III). In those reports the Commission noted that examination of various ways in which it might be possible to intensify its efforts with any prospect of advancing matters towards the implementation of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III) had compelled the conclusion that all the ways envisaged presupposed substantial changes in the situation. Far from there having been any evidence of such changes, the events which had occurred in 1967 had further complicated an already very complex problem.

3. In the course of the last year, in response to formal requests from interested parties, and after consultation with the Legal Counsel of the United Nations, the Commission decided that these interested parties could have access to certain documents⁶⁸ of the Commission with the understanding that the recipient Governments will continue to treat valuation figures contained therein on a confidential basis. Copies of such documents will be furnished on the understanding that any

expenses shall be borne by the delegation(s) concerned.

4. Although various other developments have taken place since the submission of the Commission's last report,⁶⁹ the situation described in that report remains essentially unchanged as regards the circumstances governing the possibilities open to the Commission. The Commission, while regretting that it has not been in a position to carry forward its work further, nevertheless remains determined to continue its endeavours as soon as this is possible.

7

Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories⁷⁰

October 25, 1973

INTRODUCTION

1. The Special Committee was established by the General Assembly in resolution 2443 (XXIII), adopted at its 1748th plenary meeting on 19 December 1968.⁷¹ By that resolution, the General Assembly decided to establish a Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, composed of three Member States; requested the President of the General Assembly to appoint the members of the Special Committee; requested the Government of Israel to receive the Special Committee, co-operate with it and facilitate its work; requested the Special Committee to report to the Secretary-General as soon as possible and whenever the need arose thereafter; and requested the Secretary-General to provide the Special Committee with all the necessary facilities for the performance of its task.

2. The following Member States were appointed on 12 September 1969 to serve on the Special Committee: Somalia, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia.

⁶⁶ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Annexes*, agenda item 32, document A/6451. [This and following notes are part of the report.]

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, *Twenty-second Session, Annexes*, agenda item 34, document A/6846.

⁶⁸ (a) Microfilms of land registers received from the Mandatory Government;

(b) RP-1 forms (identification of property parcels including individual valuation figures);

(c) Index of Owners' Names (which provides means of direct reference to the holdings recorded in the name of each owner).

⁶⁹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-seventh Session, Annexes*, agenda item 40, document A/8830. [Printed as doc. 4 in *International Documents on Palestine 1972*.]

⁷⁰ UN doc. A/9148 excluding Note by the Secretary-General, list of contents, Letter of Transmittal and Annex.

⁷¹ Printed as doc. 256 in *International Documents on Palestine 1968*.

The Government of the Somali Democratic Republic appointed Mr. Abdulrahim Abby Farah, Permanent Representative of Somalia to the United Nations at that time, to represent Somalia on the Special Committee. The Government of Sri Lanka appointed Mr. H. S. Amerasinghe, Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the United Nations, to represent Sri Lanka on the Special Committee. The Government of Yugoslavia appointed Dr. Borut Bohte, Associate Professor of the Faculty of Law of Ljubljana University and member of the Federal Assembly of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as its representative on the Special Committee. On 24 June 1971, the Government of Somalia informed the Secretary-General that Mr. Hussein Nur Elmi, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, now Permanent Representative of Somalia to the United Nations, had been appointed to act instead of Mr. A. A. Farah on the Special Committee.

3. On 5 October 1970, the Special Committee submitted its first report (A/8089), in accordance with Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII) and 2546 (XXIV). The report was discussed in the Special Political Committee at its 744th-751st meetings from 7 to 11 December 1970 (A/SPC/SR.744-751). On 15 December 1970, at its 1931st plenary meeting, the General Assembly examined the report of the Special Political Committee and adopted resolution 2727 (XXV).⁷²

4. On 17 September 1971, the Special Committee presented its second report (A/8389 and Corr. 1 and 2), prepared in accordance with the terms of General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII), 2546 (XXIV) and 2727 (XXV). On 10 December 1971, the Special Committee presented a third report containing information which had become available after the completion of its second report (A/8389/Add.1 and Add.1/Corr. 1 and 2). These reports were discussed in the Special Political Committee at its 798th to 803rd meetings from 13 to 16 December 1971 (A/SPC/SR.798-803). On 20 December 1971, at its 2027th plenary meeting, the General Assembly considered the report of the Special Political Committee and adopted resolution 2851 (XXVI).⁷³

5. On 25 September 1972, the Special Com-

mittee presented its fourth report in accordance with the terms of General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII), 2546 (XXIV), 2727 (XXV) and 2851 (XXVI). The report was discussed in the Special Political Committee at its 849th to 855th meetings from 30 November to 7 December 1972 (A/SPC/SR.849-855). On 15 December 1972, at its 2112th plenary meeting, the General Assembly examined the report of the Special Political Committee (A/8950) and adopted resolution 3005 (XXVII).⁷⁴

6. The present report has been prepared in accordance with the terms of General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII), 2546 (XXIV), 2727 (XXV), 2851 (XXVI) and 3005 (XXVII).

I. MANDATE

A. *Interpretation given by the Special Committee of its mandate*

7. The Special Committee had given its interpretation of its mandate in its first report to the Secretary-General (A/8089, chap. II), in which the Special Committee determined the scope of its investigation in regard to:

(a) Which are the territories that should be considered as "occupied territories";

(b) Who is covered by the term "population" of the occupied territories;

(c) What are the "human rights" of the population of the occupied territories;

(d) What are the "policies and practices" referred to in resolutions 2443 (XXIII) and 2546 (XXIV).

In its subsequent reports (A/8389 and Corr.1 and 2, chap. II; A/8389/Add.1 and Corr.1 and 2, para. 8; and A/8828, chap. II), the Special Committee reiterated this interpretation in the light of the relevant General Assembly resolutions and continued to exercise its functions according to that interpretation. The Special Committee considers that the General Assembly requested it to investigate practices and policies of the Government of Israel affecting the human rights of the population of the territories occupied by Israel as a result of the hostilities of June 1967. In its first report (A/8089, paras. 36-38), the Special Committee defined these rights as, briefly, those

⁷² Docs. 317 and 337 in *International Documents on Palestine 1970*.

⁷³ Docs. 409 and 430 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

⁷⁴ Docs. 5 and 13 in *International Documents on Palestine 1972*.

which the Security Council referred to as "essential and inalienable" in its resolution 237 (1967). The instruments of international law in which these rights are clearly defined are the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, of 12 August 1949,⁷⁵ the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949⁷⁶ and the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land.⁷⁷

8. The Special Committee must emphasize the fact that the population of the occupied territories, by the very fact of its being in a territory occupied as a result of hostilities, is entitled to the special protection afforded by international law. This protection, in so far as the right to return is concerned, equally applies to those persons normally resident in the areas now under occupation, but who have left those areas under the pressure of the hostilities. This was stated by the Special Committee in its first report (A/8089, para. 35).

9. The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 are the instruments that give this special protection. As stated in article 154 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, "this ... Convention [is] supplementary to Sections II and III of the Regulations annexed to the ... Conventions of The Hague".

10. These instruments protect the person and property as well as the identity of the population under occupation. The right of the population of the occupied territories to an identity of their own is further strengthened by the unequivocal pronouncements of the General Assembly, notably its resolution 181 (II), whereby their right to a homeland was acknowledged.

11. The mandate of the Special Committee is therefore to ascertain whether the policy or practices of the occupying Power constitute an infringement of the rights of the population of the occupied territories.

12. The Special Committee's procedure has been to determine whether the human rights which are referred to in paragraph 8 of General Assembly resolution 3005 (XXVII) are rights

which are protected under international law in conditions of occupation and whether, in fact, the evidence before the Special Committee proves beyond reasonable doubt that the policies and practices of the Government of Israel in the occupied territories constitute an infringement of those rights, taking into account the reasons adduced by the Government of Israel in justification of such policies and practices.

B. General Assembly resolution 3005 (XXVII) of 15 December 1972

13. In its resolution 3005 (XXVII), the General Assembly mentioned, in particular, the following policies and practices as being among the allegations to be investigated by the Special Committee:

"(a) The measures concerning the establishment of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories and the moving into the occupied territories of an alien population, contrary to the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949;

"(b) The situation concerning the annexation of any part of the territories occupied by Israel since 5 June 1967;

"(c) The exploitation and the looting of the resources of the occupied territories;

"(d) The changes in the physical character or demographic composition or institutional structure of those territories, including the transfer or deportation of population thereof or the demolition of houses and towns therein;

"(e) The pillaging of the archaeological and cultural heritage of the occupied territories;

"(f) The interference in the freedom of worship in the holy places of the occupied territories;"

14. It may be noted that among the policies and practices affecting the human rights of the population of the occupied territories which the General Assembly mentioned in resolution 3005 (XXVII), the following have not been expressly referred to in previous resolutions of the General Assembly on this subject:

"...

"(c) The exploitation and the looting of the resources of the occupied territories;

"...

"(c) The pillaging of the archaeological and cultural heritage of the occupied territories;

"...

"(f) The interference in the freedom of worship in the holy places of the occupied territories."

⁷⁵ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75, No. 972, p. 135. [This and following footnotes are part of the report.]

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, No. 973, p. 287.

⁷⁷ *The Hague Conventions and Declarations, 1899-1907* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1918).

15. In addition to the international instruments that it has deemed heretofore applicable, the Special Committee therefore considered the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (14 May 1954)⁷⁸ to be relevant. On the question of rights concerning property, the Special Committee gave due attention to the relevant sections of the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Special Committee did so because of the considerable evidence before it on the disposal of property in the occupied territories by the occupying Power or by agencies for which it is responsible.

C. Provisions and interpretation of international law on the disposal of property in occupied territories by the occupying Power

16. The evidence before the Special Committee this year indicates that the Government of Israel appears to draw a distinction between State and private property in the occupied territories, particularly as far as the disposal of such property is concerned. The Special Committee has analysed this evidence in chapter III, sections A and C, of the present report.

17. The Special Committee is of the opinion that this distinction between state-owned and privately-owned property in the occupied territories for the purpose of disposal of such property calls for a precise statement of the rules of international law on the subject.

18. As the Special Committee has had occasion to point out in its earlier reports (A/8389 and Corr. 1 and 2, para. 45), the Fourth Geneva Convention specifically prohibits the annexation of occupied territory as well as the transfer of parts of the occupying Power's own civilian population into the occupied territory. The Geneva Convention is based on the premise that the occupation of territory in wartime is essentially a temporary, *de facto* situation and cannot imply any right whatsoever to dispose of occupied territory. "A decision on that point [the annexation of occupied territory] can only be reached in the peace treaty. That is a universally recognized rule which is endorsed by jurists and confirmed by numerous rulings of international and national courts."⁷⁹

The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 also endorse this interpretation. Article 46 of the regulations annexed to the Conventions specifically prohibits the confiscation of private property. With regard to public property in occupied territory, article 55 of the regulations lays down that,

The occupying State shall be regarded only as administrator and usufructuary of public buildings, real estate, forests and agricultural estates belonging to the hostile State and situated in the occupied territory. It must safeguard the capital of these properties, and administer them in accordance with the rules of usufruct.

In the seventh edition of Oppenheim's *International Law*, Lauterpacht, commenting on the subject of warfare on land, states that,

Appropriation of public immovables is not lawful so long as the territory on which they are found has not become State property of the occupant through annexation. During mere military occupation of enemy territory, a belligerent may not sell, or otherwise alienate, public enemy land and buildings, but may only appropriate their produce.⁸⁰

As regards immovable private property, Lauterpacht goes on to state,

Immovable private enemy property may under no circumstances or conditions be appropriated by an invading belligerent. Should he confiscate and sell private land or buildings, the buyer would acquire no right whatever to the property.⁸¹

19. The Fourth Geneva Convention and The Hague Conventions make it abundantly clear that, irrespective of whether the land belongs to the State or to private individuals, the occupying Power has no right under international law to acquire ownership of such property. Any such acquisition, therefore, is *ipso jure* invalid.

20. As regards the rights of a usufructuary, the Special Committee would observe that the distinction must be drawn between renewable and non-renewable resources. For example, the produce of an orchard, which is a renewable resource, would perish or go to waste if the occupying Power were precluded under the law

International Committee of the Red Cross, 1958), p. 275.

⁸⁰ *International Law: A treatise by L. Oppenheim, Vol. II, Disputes, War and Neutrality*, H. Lauterpacht, ed., Seventh Edition (Longmans, London, 1952), section 134.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, vol. 249, No. 3511, p. 215.

⁷⁹ Commentary on the Fourth Geneva Convention (Geneva,

from taking such produce. On the other hand, the right of usufruct on the part of the occupying Power cannot reasonably be held to extend to non-renewable resources, such as hydrocarbons and other deposits. The exercise of usufruct over such non-renewable resources would be totally inadmissible in law as it could, over a period of time, lead to the depletion or even complete exhaustion of a valuable asset. Moreover, any exploitation of non-renewable resources inevitably results in erosion of a capital asset and is inconsistent with the principle prescribed in article 1 of the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, that "all peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources" and that, "in no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence". As Lauterpacht has further observed, the occupying Power is only "usufructuary, and is therefore prohibited from exercising his right in a wasteful or negligent way so as to decrease the value of the stock and plant. Thus, for instance, he must not cut down a whole forest, unless the necessities of war compel him."⁸² This prohibition would apply with greater force to the exploitation of non-renewable resources.

D. *Provisions and interpretation of international law relating to cultural property in occupied territories*

21. The relevant provisions of international law on the protection of archaeological and cultural property in occupied territories are embodied in the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, of 14 May 1954.

22. This Convention provides:⁸³

Article 1

DEFINITION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY

For the purposes of the present Convention, the term "cultural property" shall cover, irrespective of origin or ownership:

(a) movable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people, such as monuments of architecture, art

or history, whether religious or secular; archaeological sites; groups of buildings which as a whole, are of historical or artistic interest; works of art; manuscripts, books and other objects of artistic, historical or archaeological interest; as well as scientific collections and important collections of books or archives or of reproductions of the property defined above;

(b) buildings whose main and effective purpose is to preserve or exhibit the movable cultural property defined in sub-paragraph (a) such as museums, large libraries and depositories of archives, and refuges intended to shelter, in the event of armed conflict, the movable cultural property defined in subparagraph (a);

(c) centres containing a large amount of cultural property as defined in subparagraphs (a) and (b), to be known as "centres containing monuments".

Article 2

PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY

For the purposes of the present Convention, the protection of cultural property shall comprise the safeguarding of and respect for such property.

Article 4

RESPECT FOR CULTURAL PROPERTY

1. The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect cultural property situated within their own territory as well as within the territory of other High Contracting Parties by refraining from any use of the property and its immediate surroundings or of the appliances in use for its protection for purposes which are likely to expose it to destruction or damage in the event of armed conflict; and by refraining from any act of hostility directed against such property.

2. The obligations mentioned in paragraph 1 of the present article may be waived only in cases where military necessity imperatively requires such a waiver.

3. The High Contracting Parties further undertake to prohibit, prevent and, if necessary, put a stop to any form of theft, pillage or misappropriation of, and any acts of vandalism directed against, cultural property. They shall refrain from requisitioning movable cultural property situated in the territory of another High Contracting Party.

⁸² *Ibid.*, sect. 134.

⁸³ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 249, No. 3511.

4. They shall refrain from any act directed by way of reprisals against cultural property.

5. No High Contracting Party may evade the obligations incumbent upon it under the present Article, in respect of another High Contracting Party, by reason of the fact that the latter has not applied the measures of safeguard referred to in Article 3.

Article 5

OCCUPATION

1. Any High Contracting Party in occupation of the whole or part of the territory of another High Contracting Party shall as far as possible support the competent national authorities of the occupied country in safeguarding and preserving its cultural property.

2. Should it prove necessary to take measures to preserve cultural property situated in occupied territory and damaged by military operations, and should the competent national authorities be unable to take such measures, the Occupying Power shall, as far as possible, and in close co-operation with such authorities, take the most necessary measures of preservation.

3. Any High Contracting Party whose government is considered their legitimate government by members of a resistance movement, shall, if possible, draw their attention to the obligation to comply with those provisions of the Convention dealing with respect for cultural property.

23. According to article 36, this Convention is supplementary to the regulations annexed to the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.

24. The Special Committee, in interpreting this part of its mandate, has taken note of the recommendation on international principles applicable to archaeological excavations adopted by the UNESCO General Conference at its ninth session, held at New Delhi in 1956, paragraph 32 of which states that,

In the event of armed conflict, any Member State occupying the territory of another State should refrain from carrying out archaeological excavations in the occupied territory. In the event of chance finds being made, particularly during military works, the occupying Power should take all possible measures to protect these finds, which should be handed over, on the termination of hostilities, to the competent authorities of the

territory previously occupied, together with all documentation relating thereto.⁸⁴

Although this recommendation does not have the same binding force as the provisions of the Convention itself, the Special Committee would draw attention to the fact that it reflects the *opinio juris* of an authoritative source and is, moreover, in keeping with the spirit of the Convention.

25. The Special Committee observes that, in the international instruments regulating the conduct of an occupying Power, the basic principle is that occupation is a temporary, *de facto* situation and that the occupying Power may be considered, for the duration of the occupation, as being the administrator of the occupied territories. The occupying Power has of necessity only a temporary status, which is terminated by an appropriate peace settlement. The basic duty of the occupying Power is, therefore, to maintain the situation in the occupied territories as it was prior to the occupation, carrying out minimal changes that are essential and unavoidable for the preservation of the cultural property itself. Article 5 of the Hague Convention is clearly based on this principle and, therefore, for the purposes of this article, activities like archaeological excavation in occupied territories by the occupying Power are not, *per se*, contemplated. It is clear that paragraph 1 of article 5 is based on the premise that the safeguarding and preservation of the cultural property in occupied territories would continue to be undertaken by "the competent national authorities of the occupied country" and the occupying Power "shall as far as possible support" these competent authorities. The role of the occupying Power is therefore a secondary one, which cannot replace the competent national authorities. This is confirmed in paragraph 2 of article 5, where the Convention provides that, in the case of cultural property damaged by military operations in regard to which the competent national authorities are unable to take measures for their preservation, the occupying Power is only allowed to "take the most necessary measures of preservation" and this, "in close co-operation with such authorities".

26. The Special Committee is of opinion that the silence of the Hague Convention on whether

⁸⁴ UNESCO document 9C/RESOLUTIONS, chap. I, sect. A, appendix I.

an occupying Power does or does not have the right to carry out archaeological excavations in occupied territory should be interpreted as precluding such excavations. This is the only interpretation that is consistent with the basic principle that occupation does not bestow ownership on the occupying Power and, therefore, apart from minimal exceptions justified by considerations of security or military necessity, which are specifically mentioned in the Convention, the occupant acquires no right to dispose of property, including cultural property, in the occupied territories. This interpretation is further strengthened by the recommendation of the UNESCO General Conference held in New Delhi in 1956 (see paragraph 24 above).

II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK

27. The Special Committee continued its work under the rules of procedure which appeared in its first report to the Secretary-General (A/8089, annex III).

28. The Special Committee held a series of meetings at United Nations Headquarters in New York from 26 February to 5 March 1973 to review its mandate consequent to the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 3005 (XXVII) and to decide on the organization of its work for the year. At these meetings, the Special Committee decided that, during 1973, it should continue its investigative work and simultaneously increase its efforts to secure a more direct arrangement to safeguard the human rights of the population of the occupied territories. The Special Committee decided to follow developments in the occupied territories as it had done in the preceding years and to seek information from other sources. The Special Committee agreed to leave open the possibility of a visit to the Middle East.

29. With regard to its efforts to secure a more direct arrangement to safeguard the human rights of the population of the occupied territories, the Special Committee reviewed the positions taken by certain delegations in the Special Political Committee at the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly and noted that several speakers had expressed the same desire as the Special Committee for a more direct arrangement to safeguard the human rights of the population of the occupied territories. It noted the suggestions that had been put forward in the Special Political

Committee and, through the use of the Secretary-General's good offices, sought to ascertain whether the delegations who had expressed these views would be prepared to co-operate in an effort to find a workable arrangement to safeguard the human rights of the population of the occupied territories.

30. At this series of meetings, the Special Committee decided to address the Governments concerned.

(a) On 1 March 1973, the Special Committee addressed the following letter to the Governments of Egypt, Jordan, the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon:

Sir,

At its current series of meetings, the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories re-examined its mandate in the light of General Assembly resolution 3005 (XXVII), adopted on 15 December 1972, in operative paragraph 8 of which the Assembly indicated the following policies and practices as requiring investigation by the Special Committee:

(a) The measures concerning the establishment of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories and the moving into the occupied territories of an alien population, contrary to the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949;

(b) The situation concerning the annexation of any part of the territories occupied by Israel since 5 June 1967;

(c) The exploitation and the looting of the resources of the occupied territories;

(d) The changes in the physical character or demographic composition or institutional structure of those territories, including the transfer or deportation of population thereof or demolition of houses and towns therein;

(e) The pillaging of the archaeological and cultural heritage of the occupied territories;

(f) The interference in the freedom of worship in the holy places of the occupied territories."

The Special Committee would be grateful if Your Excellency's Government would communicate to me, c/o the Secretary of the Special Committee, Room 3194A, United Nations, New York, by 15 April 1973 if possible, any information, documentary or otherwise, relating to the policies and practices referred to in resolution 3005 (XXVII). The Special Committee would wish to draw particular attention to certain policies and practices that have not been examined in detail in the past, such as the exploitation and the looting of the resources of the occupied territories, mentioned in subparagraph (c), the pillaging of the archaeological

and cultural heritage of the occupied territories, mentioned in subparagraph (e), and the interference in the freedom of worship in the holy places of the occupied territories, mentioned in subparagraph (f). The Special Committee would appreciate receiving the names and addresses of persons or organizations who would be in a position to supplement any information which Your Excellency's Government might be able to furnish. The names of such persons or organizations would be kept confidential by the Special Committee if so desired.

The Special Committee, in its letter to the Governments of Egypt and Jordan, referred to earlier requests for information that it had made and inquired whether such information would be forthcoming.

(b) On 2 March 1973, the Special Committee addressed the following letter to the Government of Israel:

Sir,

At its current series of meetings, the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories re-examined its mandate in the light of General Assembly resolution 3005 (XXVII), adopted on 15 December 1972, in operative paragraph 8 of which the Assembly indicated the following policies and practices as requiring investigation by the Special Committee:

“(a) The measures concerning the establishment of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories and the moving into the occupied territories of an alien population, contrary to the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949;

“(b) The situation concerning the annexation of any part of the territories occupied by Israel since 5 June 1967;

“(c) The exploitation and the looting of the resources of the occupied territories;

“(d) The changes in the physical character or demographic composition or institutional structure of these territories, including the transfer or deportation of population thereof or the demolition of houses and towns therein;

“(e) The pillaging of the archaeological and cultural heritage of the occupied territories;

“(f) The interference in the freedom of worship in the holy places of the occupied territories;”

In its four reports to the Secretary-General (A/8089, A/8389 and Add.1 and A/8828) the Special Committee had stated its finding on the evidence before it, with reference to the situation in the occupied territories existing at that time. The Special Committee would find it most helpful if your Government would communicate to it any information, documentary or other-

wise, concerning the policies and practices referred to in resolution 3005 (XXVII). The Special Committee would appreciate receiving the names and addresses of persons or organizations that might be prepared to furnish such information to the Special Committee. The names of such persons or organizations would be kept confidential by the Special Committee if so desired.

Furthermore, the Special Committee would draw your attention to an earlier communication addressed to Your Excellency's Government on 15 September 1972. By this communication, the Special Committee sought certain information that has not been forthcoming. The Special Committee would appreciate knowing if Your Excellency's Government has this information and if so, whether it would furnish it to the Special Committee.

The Special Committee would also request Your Excellency's Government to re-consider its position and to co-operate with the Special Committee by allowing it to enter Israel and Israeli-held territories in order to carry out the appropriate investigation.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

31. The Governments of Egypt, Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic acknowledged the letter of the Special Committee. The Governments of Egypt and the Syrian Arab Republic transmitted information on the situation of the civilian population of the occupied territories.

32. On 10 April 1973, at United Nations Headquarters, the Special Committee heard the testimony of Dr. Israel Shahak, of the Israeli League for Civil and Human Rights. Dr. Shahak's testimony is reproduced in document A/AC.145/RT.58.

33. The Special Committee met again from 18 to 29 June 1973 at the United Nations Office at Geneva to review information and to consider the evidence it had before it. At these meetings, the Special Committee conducted consultations with a representative of UNESCO on the question of alleged pillaging of the archaeological and cultural heritage of the occupied territories and considered the replies furnished by Governments to the request of the Special Committee for information.

34. The Special Committee gave further attention to additional information that had been provided on the cases of Mr. Sadaddim Kamal, Mr. Mohammed Sheikh Eid and Mr. Mohammed Derbas. The Special Committee also received allegations of specific cases of violations of human rights which had been made by Governments and considered further information on these allegations.

35. At the series of meetings held in the United Nations Office at Geneva from 25 August to 3 September 1973, the Special Committee examined further evidence and information that had become available since its June meetings. The Special Committee held a further series of meetings at Headquarters from 1 to 12 October 1973 to consider and adopt its report to the Secretary-General.

III. ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE

36. Consequent on the adoption of General Assembly resolution 3005 (XXVII), the Special Committee continued its investigation of allegations of violations of human rights of the population of the occupied territories and adopted, as the main framework of its investigation, the allegations referred to by the Assembly in paragraph 8 of the resolution.

37. The Special Committee, though still denied access by the Government of Israel to the occupied territories to conduct its investigation on the spot, continued to follow developments in the occupied territories through the Israeli press and other sections of the foreign press, as well as through press reports of statements by members of the Government of Israel and other Israeli leaders. In addition, the Special Committee took note of information contained in United Nations documents, some of which contained the texts of letters from the Governments of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the Syrian Arab Republic (see annex I below). The Special Committee also took note of the information communicated to it by the International Committee of the Red Cross and contained in its publications.

38. As in the past, the Special Committee did not allow its investigation to suffer from the Government of Israel's refusal to co-operate with it. However, there are certain allegations, the investigation of which could be more thoroughly conducted *in situ*. The investigation of such allegations continues to be seriously hampered by the Government of Israel's denial to the Special Committee of access to the occupied territories.

39. In its investigation of the policies and practices followed by Israel in the occupied territories to establish whether or not these policies and practices were in violation of the human rights of the population of those territories, the Special

Committee has examined those sources which it deems unimpeachable, namely, the statements made by the members of the Government of Israel and other Israeli leaders, as well as Israeli reports of measures being taken in the occupied territories, where such statements and reports have not been challenged, contradicted or refuted.

A. *Allegations of a policy of annexation and settlement*⁸⁵

40. In resolution 3005 (XXVII), the General Assembly indicated that the investigation by the Special Committee should include:

"(a) The measures concerning the establishment of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories and the moving into the occupied territories of an alien population, contrary to the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949;

"(b) The situation concerning the annexation of any part of the territories occupied by Israel since 5 June 1967; . . .

"(d) The changes in the physical character or demographic composition or institutional structure of those territories, including the transfer or deportation of population thereof or the demolition of houses and towns therein; . . .".

41. Allegations that such measures were being taken in the Gaza Strip and the Rafah area were made by the Government of Egypt in a letter dated 4 January 1973 from the Permanent Representative of Egypt addressed to the Secretary-General and forwarded to the Special Committee in accordance with the request of the Permanent Representative of Egypt (A/8998-S/10857).

42. On the basis of its investigation, the Special Committee finds that there is conclusive evidence that the Government of Israel is following a policy of establishing settlements in the occupied territories, populating them with Israeli nationals, some of whom are new immigrants and, with regard to certain parts of the occupied territories, such as Hebron (West Bank), Rafah and Sharm el-Sheikh (Sinai) and the Golan Heights, the Government of Israel has adopted long-range plans for settlement.

43. The evidence before the Special Committee clearly establishes the fact that the Government

⁸⁵ Evidence of allegations of annexation and settlement has been analysed by the Special Committee in its earlier reports (A/8389 and Corr.1 and 2, para. 47; A/8389/Add.1 and Corr.1 and 2, chap. I; and A/8828, chap. III.A).

of Israel is continuing with its policy of the unilateral annexation of the occupied part of Jerusalem and the enlargement of the municipal boundaries of the city by the incorporation of considerable areas of land forming part of the occupied West Bank.

44. Furthermore, with regard to certain areas, such as the region around Bethlehem, between Jerusalem and Jericho, and around Nablus and Rafah, the Government of Israel has expropriated several tracts of land, some of considerable extent, for alleged "security" or "military" reasons. The Government of Israel and agencies acting under its authority are acquiring property through expropriation, barter and other measures, in a manner "to create contiguous, viable tracts". This was noted by Mr. Y. Agmon, Director-General of the World Zionist Organization's Settlement Department, in a report appearing in *The Jerusalem Post Magazine* on 8 September 1972. In some of these areas, as in Rafah, the Government of Israel has proceeded to establish Israeli settlements after evicting the local population and has moved Israeli nationals into those settlements.

45. In chapter I, section C above, the Special Committee has outlined the provisions of international law on the disposal of property in occupied territory by the occupying Power and its interpretation of these provisions. It stated there that, under these provisions, the occupying Power has no right to acquire ownership of immovable property in occupied territory, irrespective of whether such property belongs to the State or to private individuals, and that such acquisition was *ipso jure* invalid. The Special Committee has done so because the evidence before it this year indicates that the Government of Israel appears to draw a distinction between State and private property in the occupied territories, particularly in justification of measures designed to acquire property in the occupied territories. Thus, for example, during the month of April 1973, a controversy developed in Israel when certain members of the Israeli Government proposed that land in the occupied territories should be purchased by individual Israelis, apparently with the approval of an authorized government body and under its control. Up to that time, the decision of the Government was in favour of maintaining its prohibition against the private purchase of land in the occupied territories by Israelis or foreigners. This, according

to Mr. Israel Galili (Minister without Portfolio, Chairman of the Government Committee for the Settlement of the Territories), "did not impose any restrictions on settlement plans" (*The Jerusalem Post*, 10 April 1973). It is an admitted fact, however, that several of the settlements established in the occupied territories are located on "State or government-owned land", as it was described by Mr. Y. Agmon, Director-General of the World Zionist Organization's Settlement Department (*The Jerusalem Post Magazine*, 8 September 1972). Again, in *The Jerusalem Post*, Arab affairs reporter, Mr. A. Safadi, referring to the southern Sinai in a report which appeared on 25 July 1973, states that the ownership of the Bedouin population of the southern Sinai "has never been backed legally, as the bulk of Sinai is state property". The Special Committee emphasizes that, irrespective of the ownership of the property before the occupation, the Government of Israel acquires no rights of ownership whatsoever by the acquisition, through expropriation, barter or any other measure, over any area in the territories occupied during the June 1967 hostilities. The evidence before the Special Committee shows that the Government of Israel purports to acquire immovable property in the occupied territories through the adoption of a variety of measures, as is illustrated in subsection (v), paragraphs 79 to 87 below.

46. The Special Committee also finds that, since the hostilities of June 1967, Israel has consistently refused to allow the inhabitants of the occupied territories, who fled their homes during the hostilities or who were expelled thereafter, to return to their homes. The Special Committee notes that, according to some reports, some persons are being repatriated to their homes in the occupied territories on humanitarian grounds; the figure of 8,000 persons, repatriated in 1972 under the "family reunification scheme", was reported in *The Jerusalem Post* on 13 October 1972. However, in the same newspaper, on 15 October 1972, it was reported that 3,000 persons were emigrating from the Gaza Strip every year and that 2,000 persons had left the West Bank over the preceding three years. The vast majority of those who fled, who were forced to leave their homes in June 1967 or who were expelled thereafter, including practically the whole population of the Golan Heights, remain homeless and are denied their right to return.

47. The Special Committee confirms the resumption of measures in the Gaza Strip designed to perpetuate the exile of thousands of civilians by their dispersal. These measures were first undertaken in 1971 with the avowed purpose of constructing "security" roads in the refugee camps in the Gaza Strip to facilitate the maintenance of law and order and to attempt to suppress guerilla activity. They have been resumed this year in other areas in the Gaza Strip for the avowed purpose of improving the living conditions of the refugees. The Special Committee does not object to any measure that would improve the security, safety and welfare of the population of the occupied territories; however, it is convinced that the true interests of security, safety and welfare of the civilian population are best served by measures other than those that would leave thousands homeless, drive them into compulsory exile and deny to them and their posterity the lands and homes of their ancestors. The measures being undertaken in the Gaza Strip have this effect: as reported in *The Jerusalem Post* on 25 December 1972, out of a total of 13,336 families displaced by "security" measures in 1971 in the three refugee camps of Jebeliya, Shati and Rafah, "some 80 per cent of the displaced persons did not avail themselves of the alternative housing offered by the authorities in 1971. Most of them found their own housing in the various camps." As regards the policy behind such measures, the Special Committee cites the statement by the Defence Minister at a press conference in Gaza on 12 June 1973, as reported in *The Jerusalem Post* on 13 June 1973:

As long as the refugees remain in their camps, the Defence Minister said, their children will say they come from Jaffa or Haifa. But the refugees want to get out of the camps and build their own homes—and when they do so, they will say they are 'from Khan Yunis or Deir il-Balah'. They have not accepted the Zionist theory that Israel is here by right, he added, but they 'hate us much less now than they used to'.

In the same speech, the Defence Minister also said:

They [the civilian population in the Gaza Strip] want to be neither Jordanians, nor Egyptians, nor Israelis, but would like some sort of a Palestinian state—and I can understand them.

48. These measures are all elements of the same policy, which the Government of Israel is following,

contrary to its obligations under international law, of annexing and settling the occupied territories.

49. In the following paragraphs, the Special Committee cites, by way of illustration, some examples of the evidence in proof of the existence of these policies and practices.

1. *Evidence of the existence of a policy of the Government of Israel to establish settlements in the occupied territories*

50. A statement was delivered in the Knesset by the Prime Minister of Israel, Mrs. Golda Meir, reported in *The Jerusalem Post* on 26 July 1973, to the effect that "plans had been drawn up, for administered areas . . . urban as well as rural settlement. The vast majority of the settlements set up so far had been established on uncultivated land." Elsewhere in the same issue, referring to the same speech on the settlement of the occupied territories, another report states that the Prime Minister "spelled out the Government's achievements in settlement, specifically mentioning the settlement of the Golan Heights, the Jordan Rift, the Etzion Bloc [West Bank], the Gaza region, the Rafah approaches, Ophira [Sharm el-Sheikh] and Kiryat Arba". The Prime Minister is quoted as saying:

These outposts and settlements are seeds which will develop in the future, growing in population and becoming more firmly rooted. This settlement activity has deepened our roots in the land and strengthened the foundations of the State [and] preparations and plans are under way for the continuation of this important activity, whether rural or urban settlement . . .

51. A statement was made by Defence Minister Moshe Dayan in the course of a speech to the Lawyers' Guild in Tel Aviv, reported on 18 February 1973 in *Ha'aretz* and *The Jerusalem Post*, according to which Mr. Dayan urged the Government "to implement its declared policy of large-scale urban and rural settlement" in the occupied territories. According to the *Ha'aretz* report, Mr. Dayan emphasized the need to accelerate the rate of establishment of settlements in the occupied territories by State and private funds, pointing out that "we have many young men and women who are willing to settle in the territories. The immigration from the Soviet Union is going at a satisfactory speed, the financial aid from Jewish people has reached unprecedented records

and our military strength is covering our plans giving them security not known to us before.”

52. A statement was made by Defence Minister Moshe Dayan, reported in *The Jerusalem Post* on 30 March 1973, “urging acceleration of settlement of the occupied territories”. The report adds that Mr. Dayan expressed his indignation over the failure by the Government to implement its decision to establish an urban settlement at Nebi Samwil, near Jerusalem.

53. A statement was made by Israeli Minister Moshe Kol, reported in *Ha'aretz* on 22 April 1973, calling for the “speeding up in the designation of settlement areas in the Jordan Valley and other locations for the youth of Hapoel Hatzioni Moshav organization”.

54. A statement was made by Defence Minister Moshe Dayan in the course of an interview by the British Broadcasting Corporation, reported in *The Jerusalem Post* on 15 May 1973, to the effect that Israel should stay forever in the West Bank “because this is Judea and Samaria, this is our homeland. We could have as well stayed in America and Russia had we not wanted to come here.”

55. A statement was made by Deputy Minister of Transportation, Mr. G. Yaakovi, in the course of a speech to the Haifa Lawyers' Guild, reported in *Ha'aretz* on 2 May 1973, to the effect that Israeli settlement in Eretz Israel “including the West Bank, is based on the power of our right and the right of our power”. The report adds that, according to the Deputy Minister, the right of Israel to exist as a State was not limited to the 1949 armistice line and that, without the recognition of the historical right, there would be no justification for the return to Zion and for the existence of the State of Israel.

56. A statement was made by Minister-without-Portfolio Israel Galili, reported in *The Jerusalem Post Magazine* on 23 February 1973, that,

The Knesset is well aware that the Government rejects the ‘maximalist’ position which would yield not one inch and that, within the frame-work of a peace treaty, it would be ready to order the pull-back of Israel's armed forces on certain fronts to agreed and defensible borders. The Knesset also endorsed lines of Government policy regarding urban and rural settlements on the territory of the homeland ... The Knesset is kept informed about the establishment and existence of each of the outposts that have been set up since the Six-day

War in accordance with the authorized decision of the Government.

2. *Evidence of the fact that the policy of the Government of Israel to establish settlements in the occupied territories continues to be implemented*

57. Reports appeared in *Ha'aretz* on 5 November 1972, in *The Jerusalem Post* on 6 and 7 November 1972 and in *Ma'ariv* on 7 November 1972, of the inauguration of two settlements in the Gaza Strip; one settlement, called Netzaren, located 5 kilometres south of Gaza and the other, Morg, located south of Khan Yunis.

58. A report appeared in *The Jerusalem Post*, on 11 October 1972, of a decision by the Ministerial Committee on Settlement to change the status of the settlement of Dai Zahav (Dahab), on the East coast of the Sinai peninsula on the Gulf of Tiran, to that of a permanent civilian settlement.

59. A report appeared in *Ha'aretz*, on 26 September 1972, of the approval of a plan to build 8,000 apartments in Nebi Samwil, north of Jerusalem.

60. A report appeared in *The Jerusalem Post*, on 28 November 1972, quoting Housing Minister Sharef as stating that, since 1967, the construction of 24,000 apartments had been started in Jerusalem. The bulk of these apartments were being built in the occupied part of Jerusalem or on the 1949 Armistice Line; these housing developments will total 32,000 units when completed in five years' time.

61. A report appeared in *Ha'aretz* and *The Jerusalem Post*, on 12 October 1972, of an announcement of six new settlements to be established during 1973, three of which were planned for the Golan Heights, two in northern Sinai and one in the Jordan Valley.

62. A report appeared in *Ha'aretz*, on 9 November 1972, of the inauguration of the first industrial project in the southern Golan Heights. According to this report, the settlement, which will have 100 housing units by 1973, involved an investment of IL 3.5 million for factory equipment and IL 4 million for construction.

63. A report appeared in *The Jerusalem Post*, on 4 February 1973, of a statement by Mr. Avni, Deputy Director-General of the Housing Ministry, to the effect that seven rural settlements were planned in the occupied territories for 1973 and

that in all, since 1967, 40 such settlements had been established in the occupied territories.

64. A report appeared in *Ma'ariv*, on 29 January 1973, of 10 settlements having been established in the West Bank between the Beit Shean Valley and Jericho. According to the same report, the possibility of establishing one or two regional centres was being discussed "in view of the increasing number of settlements" in the Jordan Valley.

65. A report appeared in *Ha'aretz*, in January, of the establishment of a Nahal settlement, called Kur, on 1,000 dunams of land belonging to "absentees of a neighbouring village", while the village itself was given 4,000 dunams belonging to absentees from another village. According to the same report, no more Israeli settlements were to be built in the Jordan Valley "because almost no land fit for agriculture is left in the area".

3. *Evidence of the existence of detailed plans that indicate the continued implementation of a policy to annex certain areas of the occupied territories, such as the area in the southern part of the Gaza Strip, near Rafah, another area in the southern part of Sinai, particularly at Sharm el-Sheikh and the city of Hebron in the West Bank*

(a) *Southern Gaza Strip and Rafah*

66. Following the eviction of the inhabitants of an area of about 20,000 dunams near Rafah early in 1972 and the fencing off of this land "for security reasons" referred to in paragraph 47 above and in the last report of the Special Committee (A/8828, paras. 42 to 45), it was announced by the Director-General of the World Zionist Organization's Settlement Department, Mr. Y. Agmoni, as reported in *The Jerusalem Post* on 8 September 1972, that three new settlements were to be located on the land formerly used by Arabs near Rafah, on part of the same area that was closed off for security reasons.

67. A report appeared in *The Jerusalem Post*, on 24 May 1973, of a judgement by the Israeli High Court of Justice dismissing an appeal by the nine Bedouin tribes evicted from the Rafah area on the grounds that the eviction was justified for security reasons.

68. A disclosure was made in *Ha'aretz*, on 24 October 1972, of details of a plan drawn up by the Defence Ministry to construct a city in the southern part of the Gaza Strip, followed by

reports of the debate that took place within the Government as to whether this city should be constructed or not, ending in a decision to construct a "regional centre" of urban character with 300 housing units, which coincided with the official proposal by Defence Minister Moshe Dayan to build a coastal city. On 26 December, *Ha'aretz* reported that this regional centre was to be constructed in the same area as that designated by the Defence Ministry in its plan for the coastal city.

69. Relocation continued for alleged security and welfare reasons of the refugee population in the Gaza Strip, as reported in *The Jerusalem Post* on 5 September 1972 and in *Ma'ariv* on 19 October 1972.

(b) *Sharm el-Sheikh and southern Sinai*

70. An announcement was made by the Deputy Director-General of the Housing Ministry, Mr. S. Avni, as reported in *The Jerusalem Post* on 4 February 1973, of a four-stage plan for the construction of residences for Israelis in Sharm el-Sheikh. According to this plan, 90 families were to be housed in two apartment blocks in 1973, 225 housing units were to be added in 1974, 370 apartments in four buildings of eight floors each were to be added during the third phase and 320 apartments in six blocks were to be constructed during the fourth phase. In all, housing for 1,000 families is planned in addition to 100 privately-built units, which are reported to be at an advanced stage of construction.

71. A report appeared in *The Jerusalem Post*, on 25 July 1973, of the existence of "a consensus in the Government" that the district of South Sinai cannot be separated from Israel. According to the report, the Government was currently "intensively" developing the regions east of the coastal area, including Sharm el-Sheikh, while promoting the Israeli presence in other areas, including the western coast. The report describes the area as stretching south from the southern outskirts of Eilat to a point north of Santa Caterina, west to near Abu Rodeis on the western peninsula coast and having an area of approximately 23 million dunams (larger than Israel by over 2 million dunams). The report adds that, in addition to the settlement plans for Sharm el-Sheikh, where, according to the Director of the Government Committee administering Sharm el-Sheikh, Mr. R. Aloni, 4,000 families—about 17,000 persons—would be settled by 1985, more families would be

settled simultaneously at the new settlements of Di-Zahav (Dahab), Neviot (Nuweibeh) and Taba along the eastern coast of the Sinai peninsula on the Gulf of Tiran. On the western coast, A-Tor is being developed into an agricultural observation centre, while further north, about 550 persons already live in a new settlement, Shalhevet, near the Abu Rodeis oil centre. The population of the southern Sinai, according to the report, consists of about 11,000 Bedouin, who were paid IL 100,000 in compensation for plantation land on the site of the new settlement. The report states that the ownership by the Bedouin of the land they cultivated has never been backed legally as the bulk of Sinai is State property. The Bedouin are being resettled at three major centres, which were being provided with various government services, and many of them have moved south near the new settlements, where they are employed in construction.

(c) *Hebron (West Bank)*

72. With regard to Hebron, the Special Committee has received further evidence to indicate that the policy pursued by the Government of Israel of establishing settlements has continued (A/8828, paras. 32 and 33). The following are quoted by way of illustration.

73. A report appeared in *The Jerusalem Post*, on 25 October 1972, of a letter addressed to Agriculture Minister H. Givati by Rabbi M. Levinger, under the title "Chairman of the local council in Kiryat Arba [the Israeli settlement in Hebron]" in which he complained about the lack of Jewish industry in Hebron and accused the Government of prolonged delay in granting permits to establish industries in the settlements. The report added that, despite these delays, the settlers had established a carpentry shop, a metal works and had opened shops near the Ibrahimi Mosque. On 4 May 1973, *The Jerusalem Post* reported the official opening of a floor tile plant in Hebron, one of 17 industrial plants which the Government would help establish in that town.

74. A statement was made in the Knesset by Housing Minister Z. Sharef, as reported in *Ma'ariv* and *The Jerusalem Post* on 28 February 1973, to the effect that, by 1974, 600 housing units would be constructed in Hebron. According to the report in *The Jerusalem Post*, 634 apartments would be constructed under phase one of the plan and 1,000 under phase two. Housing Minister Sharef

made another statement in the Knesset, reported in *The Jerusalem Post* on 12 April 1973, that a commercial centre was to be constructed in the Jewish settlement in Hebron.

75. A statement was made by Housing Minister Z. Sharef, reported in *The Jerusalem Post* on 30 August 1973, to the effect that private building by Israeli settlers was to be allowed at the Hebron settlement. According to the report, settlers already living in the settlement would be allowed to purchase their "publicly-owned" apartments. Mr. Sharef was reported as having stated that his Ministry would make building land available, without restrictions, to public housing companies and private contractors willing to build at the settlement under a Government-assisted housing programme; a permanent building-loan fund for settlers wishing to build their own houses was to be set up by the Housing Ministry. The report added that new building was to include commercial premises for a private market and that the settlement's business centre was to be replanned to serve 1,000 families.

4. *Evidence of the policy of the Government of Israel to place new immigrants in these settlements*

76. A report appeared in *Ma'ariv*, on 9 November 1972, to the effect that two of the three settlements planned for the Golan Heights for 1973 were to be populated by newly arrived Soviet immigrants.

77. A report appeared in *The Jerusalem Post*, on 26 December 1972, to the effect that the regional centre planned for Rafah is to include 350 families of new immigrants to be settled there.

78. A statement was made in the Knesset by Absorption Minister N. Peled, as reported in *The Jerusalem Post* on 12 April 1973, inviting Jewish settlers in Hebron "to try and persuade immigrants in absorption centres to make their homes in Kiryat Arba [the Israeli settlement in Hebron]". According to the report, the Absorption Ministry would give every help to immigrants wishing to settle in Hebron, but it could not force them to go there by administrative order.

5. *Evidence of the policy of the Government of Israel of expropriating land in the occupied territories*

79. A statement was made by Mr. Y. Tsur, Directorate Chairman of the Jewish National Fund, as reported in *The Jerusalem Post* on 6 October 1972, that the Fund had improved 180,000

dunams of land since the June 1967 hostilities, "most of it for new settlements". Mr. Tsur is reported as having stated that the Jewish National Fund had spent IL 26 million in the Golan Heights and, during the next three years, it will spend another IL 40 million to prepare 1,500 farming units "for the sixteen settlements already established in the Heights and for the new ones to be set up at the rate of one a year".

80. A report appeared in *The Jerusalem Post*, on 12 October 1972, concerning the taking over of 70 square kilometres of land south-east of Jerusalem by the army for military manoeuvres. The report also stated that thousands of dunams of agricultural land on the western end of the West Bank had been released in September 1972, probably as compensation.

81. A report appeared in *The Jerusalem Post*, on 22 December 1972, concerning a protest by the mayor of Bethlehem to the Defence Minister about the closing off of 70 square kilometres near the city.

82. A report appeared in *Ma'ariv*, on 27 December 1972, concerning the closing off of 70,000 dunams of land between East Jerusalem and Jericho by military order. According to the report, Defence Minister Moshe Dayan disclosed this fact in the Knesset and stated that he was not prepared to give reasons for the closing off of the area.

83. A report appeared in *Ma'ariv*, on 2 January 1973, concerning a protest by farmers against the closing off by the army in the Nablus area, since 1967, of 40,000 dunams of land used for pasture and agriculture by the villagers of Tubas. According to the report, military government sources gave security as the reason for the closing off.

84. A report appeared in *The Jerusalem Post*, on 10 January 1973, that a statement was made by Defence Minister Moshe Dayan to the effect that 70 square kilometres of land north-east of Bethlehem had been closed off by military authorities, but were not confiscated. According to the report, the land was mostly rocky and uninhabitable and landlords were to be permitted free access to their property. The report stated that owners claimed that the land was going to be used for eventual settlement. However, the Defence Minister assured owners that no settlements would be established unless the land was (a) State or

abstentee property, (b) purchased against full payment, or (c) traded for other real estate with the owner's consent. The provisions of international law on the disposal of immovable property in occupied territory are discussed in chapter I, section C, paragraphs 16 to 20 above.

85. A report appeared in *The Jerusalem Post*, on 16 August 1973, of the closing off of 350 dunams of vineyards near Bethlehem for military purposes. The report stated that this was the third take-over of land in the Bethlehem area and that "landlords were being told that they could apply for compensation once they proved legal ownership".

86. A report appeared in *The Jerusalem Post Magazine*, on 8 September 1972, in which Mr. Y. Agmoni, Director-General of the World Zionist Organization's Settlement Department, was quoted as having said that, of the 49 settlements established in the occupied territories:

(a) Three of the settlements established in the Gaza Strip were established on land formerly used by Arabs "on part of a 20,000 dunam tract closed off for security reasons in 1969";

(b) Of 11 settlements in the lower Jordan Valley, seven are on Government-owned land and the remainder on abandoned Arab property, "the owners having fled across the Jordan during the war";

(c) "Many of the other settlements, especially those in the Golan Heights, have been established on land from which Arabs fled during the June 1967 hostilities".

87. The Special Committee took note of a complaint of the Arabs Students' Committee of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, dated 10 December 1972, against the expropriation of property belonging to 63 persons living on the hill known as French Hill in Jerusalem, near Mt. Scopus, by the Israeli Lands Authority. This complaint was submitted by Dr. Israel Shahak in the course of his testimony before the Special Committee (A/AC.145/RT.58, p. 32).

B. Allegations of ill-treatment of detainees⁸⁶

88. In its previous reports, the Special Committee analysed certain cases in which the evidence

⁸⁶ Evidence of ill-treatment while under detention was analysed by the Special Committee in its previous reports (see A/8089, paras. 78-111; A/8389 and Corr.1 and 2, paras. 59-67; A/8389/Add.1 and Corr.1 and 2, paras. 23-30; A/8828, paras. 62-73).

was compelling. It recorded its conviction that general prison conditions, despite reported efforts at improvement, were bad, mainly owing to overcrowding. The Special Committee had stated its position that, in the absence of sufficient corroborative evidence, it was unable to reach a conclusive finding in regard to the numerous allegations of ill-treatment while under detention that had been made before it. Although it was not able to reach a conclusive finding with regard to these cases, in the opinion of the Special Committee, they provided strong evidence to justify continued investigation. The Special Committee is continuing its investigation of such cases, including that of Mr. Mohammed Derbas and of Mr. Moayyad Othman el-Bahsh, on which it had received further evidence (A/8828, paras. 62-73). In addition, the Special Committee would reiterate its judgement, expressed in its previous reports (A/8089, para. 108, A/8389 and Corr.1 and 2, para. 66 and A/8828, para. 90) that a number of cases did provide strong evidence of a regular practice of ill-treating detainees, mainly during interrogations. These are the cases of:

Mr. Sadaddin Kamal (A/AC.145/RT.11; A/8089, paras. 78 and 79);

Mr. Youssef Salahat (A/AC.145/RT.21; A/8089, paras. 78, 96 and 100);

Mr. Abu Ras (A/AC.145/RT.20; A/8089, paras. 93-95);

Mr. Majeb Mohammed Issa El-Khattab (A/AC.145/RT.23; A/8089, paras. 96 and 100);

Mr. Suleiman M. Sheikh-Eid (A/AC.145/RT.24; A/8089, paras. 98 and 99);

Mr. Munir Abdullah Ghannam (A/AC.145/RT.23; A/8089, para. 102);

Mr. Abu Rumeile (A/8089, paras. 80 and 86);

Mr. Ismael Abu Mayaleh and his wife, Mrs. Abla Tahha (A/AC.145/RT.22; A/8089, paras. 78, 85 and 101).

1. *Evidence of ill-treatment while under detention*

89. Since the adoption of its last report, the Special Committee has received a number of allegations of ill-treatment of detainees, particularly during interrogation.

90. The Special Committee reiterates its conviction that allegations of this nature are best investigated on the spot, particularly because it has no access to corroborative evidence owing to the refusal of the Government of Israel to co-operate with it. The Special Committee notes,

however, that, judging by information contained in reports appearing in the Israeli press, interrogation procedures are often very long. In this testimony before the Special Committee, Dr. Israel Shahak, the Chairman of the Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights, stated that it was his experience that in Gaza, for example, ill-treatment of persons under interrogation was commonplace (A/AC.145/RT.58, pp. 16-18). He referred to a number of cases where, he said, the accused have filed complaints against such treatment, though the majority do not complain officially, out of fear of reprisal. Dr. Shahak mentioned the cases of Hadija Mohammed Abd El-Hadi, 25 years old (A/AC.145/RT.58, pp. 10-12), whom he met personally shortly after she was released after interrogation, during which she complained of ill-treatment. Mrs. Abd El-Hadi was pregnant at the time of her arrest. He mentioned that case of Ata Khalil Kimri, 17 years old (A/AC.145/RT.58, pp. 23-25), who also complained of ill-treatment, and of Muhammed Musa Ibrahim Zaharan from Bidu, near Ramallah, West Bank (A/AC.145/RT.58, p. 13), who has been imprisoned since July 1967 and whose very existence is denied by the Israeli authorities, although it is repeatedly alleged that he has been seen in prison several times, most recently in Nablus prison. Dr. Shahak also alleged that the following persons from the Golan Heights were ill-treated during interrogation earlier this year, after having been arrested on suspicion of spying for the Syrian Arab Republic (A/AC.145/RT.58, pp. 26-29): Fuad Qassam Sh'ar, Mohammed Salah N'rai, Abdallah Hussein El Kish, Yusuf Shakib Abu-Jabel, Faiz Naaman Abu-Jabel, Es'ad Muhammed Safadi and Hail Hussein Abu-Jabel.

91. The Special Committee is continuing its investigation of these cases.

2. *Evidence of prolonged detention prior to trial*

92. The evidence that has come before the Special Committee since the adoption of its last report shows that prolonged periods of detention between the arrest and the conviction of civilian persons are common. Persons who are being interrogated are not, as far as the Special Committee can establish, allowed visits by the International Committee of the Red Cross. It cites, by way of example, the following cases, all of which have been reported in *The Jerusalem Post*:

(a) Yousef Mahmoud Elbaz, 23 years old,

and Fawzi Aboul Hadi Liman, 24 years old, both from El-Burej Camp in Gaza, who were arrested on 31 August 1971 and sentenced to life imprisonment on 12 September 1972;

(b) Zakariya Abdullah Halaby, 20 years old, and Ahmed Abu Hazeria, 20 years old, both from Gaza, arrested shortly after 3 November 1971 and sentenced on 4 October 1972;

(c) Jafer Mohammed Hussni Awadi, 20 years old, arrested in November 1971 and sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment on 25 January 1973;

(d) Youssef Atalla Mohammed Al-Ajraami, arrested in February 1972 and sentenced to life imprisonment on 10 April 1973;

(e) Mas'ad Salem Aboud Ghanid, 19 years old, from a village near El-Arish, Sinai, arrested in December 1971 and sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment on 9 May 1973;

(f) Mohammed Youssuf Abdul Hadi Al-Zizi, 20 years old, from Gaza, arrested in July 1972 and sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment on 9 May 1973;

(g) Ahmed Abu Suleiman Sanjar, 36 years old, arrested December 1971 and acquitted on 9 May 1973.

3. Evidence on prison conditions

93. The Special Committee took note of reports furnished in publications of the International Committee of the Red Cross, according to which the number of civilian detainees in 12 places of detention visited by its delegates was nearly 2,100 Arab civilians as of the twenty-fifth series of visits by their delegates, which took place between 6 March and 27 April 1973.⁸⁷ The Special Committee took note of the statement by Defence Minister Moshe Dayan in the Knesset, as reported in *The Jerusalem Post* on 14 December 1972, to the effect that 2,200 persons from the occupied territories were still in prison and 140 were in administrative detention as of mid-December 1972.

94. The Special Committee has received further evidence to indicate that prison conditions continue to be bad, mainly due to overcrowding. The Israeli press reported the two strikes of 200 detainees of the prison at Kfar Yona, in January and in February 1973, and the hunger strike of the detainees at Beit Lid security prison in February 1973. According to reports appearing in *Ha'aretz* and *The Jerusalem Post* on 4 May 1973, two detainees

were murdered in Ashkelon prison by their fellow inmates. A report appearing in *The Jerusalem Post*, on 6 May 1973, cited prison officials as claiming that Ashkelon prison was still overcrowded, "making it impossible to ensure the safety of each individual prisoner".

C. Allegations of exploitation of the resources of the occupied territories⁸⁸

95. In resolution 3005 (XXVII), the General Assembly indicated, in paragraph 8, that the investigation by the Special Committee should include "(c) The exploitation and the looting of the resources of the occupied territories".

96. In its last report, the Special Committee analysed examples of economic measures, which, in the view of the Special Committee, contributed to the policy of annexation.⁸⁸ The Special Committee questioned the Israeli claim that the economic situation in the occupied territories has materially improved during the occupation. The Special Committee expressed the opinion that this alleged improvement was merely the natural consequence of an under-developed economy being brought into a close relationship with, and placed unavoidably in a position of dependence on, a more developed economy.

97. The Special Committee stated that, even though the standard of living in the occupied territories may have risen, the question of the dependence of the occupied territories on the economy of the occupying Power caused the Special Committee serious misgivings as to whether the policy adopted by the occupying Power, which has brought such an economic situation into being, is in consonance with the fundamental rights of the population of the occupied territories. The Special Committee referred to the principle of a people's sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources, which derives from their right of self-determination as expressly prescribed by article 1 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

98. The Special Committee cited evidence in justification of its opinion. It stated that this evidence created the impression of a policy and

⁸⁷ *The ICRC in Action—Information Notes*, No. 199 b, 29 June 1973.

⁸⁸ The Special Committee analysed the economic effects of the measures taken by the occupying Power in pursuance of its policy in its last report (A/8828, chap. III, paras. 75–77).

a situation which conformed to the classic pattern of colonial economic dominance and exploitation. The Special Committee expressed the view that such a policy, if given free reign, would reduce the economy of the occupied territories to a position of almost entire dependence on the economy of the occupying Power for a long time after the end of the occupation. In this sense, the Special Committee came to the conclusion that the occupation was causing undue interference in the economic life of the occupied territories and even if, for the sake of argument, it were conceded that certain short-term benefits were accruing to the population of the occupied territories, the situation could in the long-run prove irreversible and, therefore, prove detrimental to the economic future of these territories.

99. The evidence that has come before the Special Committee since the adoption of its last report confirms this conclusion. This evidence shows that the occupying Power is exploiting the labour resources, as well as the natural resources in the territories, such as the agricultural and mining potential.

1. *Evidence of over-all economic exploitation of the occupied territories*

100. The economy of the occupied territories is subservient to that of the occupying Power. Defence Minister Moshe Dayan, in a statement reported in *The Jerusalem Post* on 14 December 1972, said that the standard of living in the West Bank had risen by 45 per cent between 1968 and 1971 and that, during the same period in the Gaza Strip, it had risen by 58 per cent. In the opinion of the Defence Minister, as quoted in that report, "economics was the fly-wheel that kept Israel and the areas connected". According to a report appearing in *The Jerusalem Post* by the economic editor on 15 October 1972, Israel was selling IL 200 million per year more than it was buying from the occupied territories. The same report states that the price level in the occupied territories had increased by one third since 1968.

101. The interdependence of the two economies was the subject of another report by the economic editor, which appeared on 26 March 1973 in *The Jerusalem Post*, according to which the economies of Israel and the occupied territories had become so dependent on each other that "restoration of the former borders would harm the economies of both Israel and the occupied terri-

ties". The report stated that statistics show that Israel's economic growth "is now vitally dependent on the productive resources of the territories and they are no longer viable without the connexion with Israel". The report added that Israeli economic activities in the occupied territories are treated as extensions of the Israeli economy, "irrespective of their actual location". Referring to the influx of labourers from the occupied territories, the report stated that:

This involves social and national strains and problems, but should this process be reversed—or even stopped—the Israeli economy would be severely handicapped. It is no less evident that the restoration of the Green Line [1949 Armistice line] as a frontier obstructing the free movement of goods and people would cause an economic collapse in the territories which have by now become an adjunct to the Israeli economy, even though their inhabitants may resent it ... altogether one may estimate that close to one half of the territories' income now depends on ties with Israel.

2. *Evidence of exploitation of the resources of the occupied territories*

(a) *Labour*

102. Evidence of exploitation of labour lies in the admitted fact that over 50,000 workers from the occupied territories are now employed in Israel, mostly in the construction industry. *The Jerusalem Post* reported, on 27 March 1973, that workers from the occupied territories constituted 21 per cent of Israel's building workers and, on 18 May 1973, the same newspaper reported a statement by Labour Minister Y. Almogi to the effect that the number of these workers had reached a peak of 57,000 early in 1973, the equivalent of 5 per cent of the whole labour force of Israel. The Special Committee notes that the employment of these persons is of a precarious nature, for, where necessary, they are dismissed and replaced by Israeli workers. For example, as reported in *Ha'aretz* on 18 October 1972, 100 Arab women from the occupied territories lost their jobs (classifying peanuts in Beersheba) when they were replaced by 70 women who were new immigrants from the Soviet Union.

103. The evidence before the Special Committee shows that the occupying Power is engaging in widespread exploitation of the resources of the occupied territories, to the detriment of the civilian population of these territories.

(b) *Agriculture*

104. With regard to exploitation of the agricultural resources of the occupied territories, the Special Committee would refer to the report appearing in *The Jerusalem Post Magazine* on 8 September 1972, according to which the 49 settlements that have been established in the occupied territories during the five years of occupation had "already begun making a significant contribution to the country's [Israel's] food production ... during the preceding year, these settlements had an agricultural production valued at IL 46 million ... the seemingly arid land on which many of the settlements were founded has proved to be an agricultural gold mine". This report quotes the Director-General of the World Zionist Organization's Settlement Department, Mr. Y. Agmon, as stating that, of the new settlements, three in the southern part of the Gaza Strip are located on land formerly used by the local population, many of the settlements in the Golan Heights have been established on land belonging to the civilian population who fled during the June 1967 hostilities, and of the 11 settlements established in the lower Jordan Valley, seven are on Government-owned land and the remainder on property belonging to the civilian population who fled during the June 1967 hostilities. According to Mr. Agmon: "The exchanges were purely voluntary. The farmers got at least a dunam of equally good land for every dunam they gave and in most cases more." The decision on which territories to settle is made by the Government for political and security reasons and no settlement is established unless it can be made economically viable. In the view of the Special Committee, this evidence shows that the civilian population of the occupied territories is being deprived of the actual and potential agricultural resources of these lands.

(c) *Hydrocarbon and other deposits*

105. Another example of the exploitation of natural resources by the occupying Power is illustrated by the evidence received by the Special Committee concerning the exploitation of the oil resources in the Sinai. According to a report appearing in *The Jerusalem Post* on 26 March 1973, the oil presently being extracted from the Sinai by the occupying Power was "currently enough to cover four fifths of Israel's requirements". This was confirmed by Deputy Finance Minister Zvi Dinstein in a statement reported in *The Jerusa-*

lem Post, on 8 June 1973, to the effect that "petroleum from Sinai is meeting about two thirds of the country's needs today".

106. The Special Committee would refer to the provisions of international law on the subject referred to in chapter I, section C, above (paragraphs 16 to 20), according to which it is clear that, irrespective of whether the property belongs to the State or to private individuals, the occupying Power has no right under international law to acquire ownership of such property and any such acquisition is invalid. The rights of the occupying Power, under these international instruments, are those of a usufructuary and, in the view of the Committee, these rights would only extend to those resources that may be characterized as being renewable. Since mineral and hydrocarbon deposits cannot be considered as being renewable, the Special Committee is of the view that the Government of Israel has no right under international law to draw on such resources.

D. *Allegations of interference in the freedom of worship in the holy places and of interference with the family rights, manners and customs of the civilian population of the occupied territories*

1. *Interference in the freedom of worship*

107. In paragraph 8 of resolution 3005 (XXVII), the General Assembly indicated that the investigation by the Special Committee should include "(f) The interference in the freedom of worship in the holy places of the occupied territories".

108. The Special Committee has received several allegations of interference by the occupying Power in the freedom of worship in the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron.

109. On 14 December 1972, the Permanent Representative of Jordan, in a letter addressed to the Secretary-General (A/8975-S/10848), brought to the attention of the Special Committee at the request of the Permanent Representative, alleged that the occupying Power had taken certain measures with regard to the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron "designed to turn this prominent Islamic shrine ... into a synagogue by gradually obliterating its Islamic character and excluding Muslims from worshipping in it".

110. The Special Committee took note of the letter dated 20 December 1972 from the Permanent

Representative of Israel addressed to the Secretary-General (A/8995-S/10851) referring to the letter of the Permanent Representative of Jordan and rejecting the allegations made in that letter.

111. On 21 May 1973, the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic, in a letter addressed to the Special Committee, drew its attention to reports of measures that the military occupation authorities in Hebron were putting into effect in the Ibrahimi Mosque, which were interfering with the religious practice by the local population.

112. On 18 July 1973, the Permanent Representative of Egypt, in a letter addressed to the Special Committee, drew its attention to the above measures being taken in the Ibrahimi Mosque. The Permanent Representative of Egypt alleged that these measures were in violation of article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949⁸⁹ which laid down, *inter alia*, that the inhabitants of the occupied territories "are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for ... their religious convictions and practices," and that such measures negated the Charter, resolutions and decisions of the United Nations and its competent organs with regard to the occupied territories.

113. The measures referred to in the letter of the Permanent Representative of Egypt were the following:

(a) The occupation of the hall of the Ibrahimi Mosque and its transformation in order to convert it to a Jewish synagogue called Abrahami Synagogue;

(b) Taking over the part of the Ibrahimi Mosque known as El-Yaakoubiya, placing the Old Testament books in it and preventing Moslems from entering it,

(c) Restricting and limiting, by force, the Moslem praying hours to two and one half hours only;

(d) Permitting the exercise of Jewish praying inside the Ibrahimi Mosque even during the Moslem praying;

(e) Transgressing and ridiculing Moslems while praying inside the Mosque;

(f) Preventing the guardians of the Mosque to prepare it for prayers.

114. The relevant provisions of international law safeguarding the rights of the population of the occupied territories to freedom of worship are the following:

(a) Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention: "Protected persons are entitled, in all circum-

stances, to respect for ... their religious convictions and practices ...".

(b) Article 46 of the regulations annexed to the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907: "...religious convictions and practice, must be respected ...".⁹⁰

115. In the commentary to the Fourth Geneva Convention on the respect for religious convictions and practices, the following is stated:⁹¹

Religious freedom is closely connected with the idea of freedom to practice religion through religious observances, services and rites. Protected persons in the territory of a Party to the conflict or in occupied territory must be able to practise their religion freely, without any restrictions other than those necessary for the maintenance of public law and morals.

116. The Special Committee has examined the allegations made before it and the evidence available to it on these allegations, consisting of the aforementioned letters of the Governments of Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic and the information appearing in Israeli press reports.

117. A report appearing in *The Jerusalem Post*, on 7 November 1972, stated that arrangements were first made after the June 1967 hostilities under which Jewish persons would be allowed to worship at the Tomb of the Patriarchs, claimed to be located in the Ibrahimi Mosque, at specified times and in a specified area. According to the report, this arrangement was drawn up in early 1968 and extended in November 1972 after approval by the Government of Israel earlier that month. Under the new arrangements, the times that Jews were allowed access, namely, between 7 a.m. and 11.30 a.m., were extended by an extra hour in the afternoon and the location where Jews were allowed to worship, which, according to a report in *The Jerusalem Post Magazine* on 17 November 1972, was restricted under the previous arrangement to the Hall of Abraham and Sarah, "was extended to the Hall of Jacob and Leah and they have been authorized to erect a roof over a neighbouring courtyard" in order to

⁸⁹ *The Hague Conventions and Declarations, 1899-1907* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1918).

⁹¹ Jean S. Pictet, ed., *The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Commentary on the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War* (Geneva, International Committee of the Red Cross, 1958), p. 203.

⁸⁹ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75, No. 973.

house the growing number of Jewish worshippers. "Furthermore, they can bring in an Ark containing a Tora and benches into the praying area."

118. The Special Committee notes that, apart from the question of the legitimacy or otherwise of Jewish worship in the Ibrahimi Mosque, the measures forming the subject of the complaints are the direct result of the increasing number of Israeli settlers in Hebron. The Special Committee refers to its findings concerning the establishment of Israeli settlements in Hebron in its previous reports (A/8389 and Corr. 1 and 2, paras. 48 (d), (iv) and (viii) and A/8389/Add.1, and Corr. 1 and 2, paras. 12 (e) to 15) and its analysis of evidence on Hebron in this report. The Special Committee has referred to the origins of the present problem when, in a letter dated 3 June 1968 (A/7103, S/8609) the representative of Jordan complained to the Secretary-General that, "In April 1968, about eighty Orthodox Jews moved into the Park Hotel on the northern outskirts of the city [Hebron], ostensibly to celebrate the Passover holiday, but then announced that they had come to stay". At that time, the Government of Israel had dismissed the Jordan complaint as magnifying and distorting the matter in question (A/7105, S/8626).

119. In its reports, the Special Committee continued to examine and comment on subsequent measures taken by the Israeli Government as part of its policy to establish and enlarge the settlements in Hebron. One result of this policy has been to bring about a situation, as a result of which the civilian population of the occupied territories, in this case the inhabitants of the city of Hebron, are not allowed the freedom to worship in the same manner as they had before the occupation.

120. The Special Committee finds that, irrespective of the legitimacy of the claims that the Hebron Mosque is a Moslem as well as a Jewish holy place, the freedom of Moslems to worship in the Mosque has indeed been interfered with and this in a manner contrary to article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention and article 46 of the regulations annexed to the Hague Conventions.

2. *Allegations of interference with the family rights, manners and customs of the population of the occupied territories*

121. The relevant provisions of international law safeguarding the right to respect for the family rights, manners and customs of the population of

the occupied territories are the following:

(a) Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention: "Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their ... family rights ... their manners and customs."

(b) Article 46 of the Regulations annexed to the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907: "Family honour and rights ... must be respected."

122. In his testimony before the Special Committee, on 10 April 1973, Dr. Israel Shahak, Chairman of the Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights, alleged that the Israeli Superior Rabbinate had officially employed a certain Rabbi Hanannia Deri, whose job was to look for persons among the civilian population of the occupied territories who have "Jewish blood" and to force them to return to their ancestral religion. It was explained to the Special Committee that, since the term "Jewish blood" is really "Jewish descent in female line only", the result of such activity is to tear families apart by force. Dr. Shahak alleged that this activity was a regular practice that took place only in the occupied territories and not in Israel, "where this would not be tolerated"; he cited one case and spoke of the existence of approximately 80 others, stating that the existence of this practice was publicly known because Rabbi Deri himself had admitted this in the press. Dr. Shahak alleged that Rabbi Deri carried on his activities with the connivance or unofficial approval of the Military Government of the occupied territories (A/AC.145/RT.58, pp. 32-38).

123. At the time of the adoption of its report, the Special Committee was continuing its investigation of these allegations.

E. *Allegations of measures in contravention of the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of 14 May 1954*⁹²

124. In paragraph 8 of resolution 3005 (XXVII), the General Assembly indicated that the investigation by the Special Committee should include "(e) The pillaging of the archaeological and cultural heritage of the occupied territories".

125. On 14 February 1973, the Permanent Representative of Jordan, in a letter addressed to the Secretary-General (A/9045-S/10882), and

⁹² United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 249, No. 3511, p. 215.

brought to the attention of the Special Committee at the request of the Permanent Representative, alleged that the wall in the Al-Aqsa Mosque had collapsed and that this was caused by the following:

(a) The cracks in the wall that resulted from the fire set to the Al-Aqsa Mosque under Israeli occupation in 1969;

(b) Drilling and demolition activities that the occupying Israeli authorities have been undertaking underneath the Mosque under the pretext of 'archaeological excavations'. These 'excavations' have undermined the foundation of the wall which ultimately caused the collapse of the latter.

126. The Special Committee took note of the letter dated 16 February 1973 from the Permanent Representative of Israel addressed to the Secretary-General (A/9046-S/10883) referring to the letter of the Permanent Representative of Jordan and rejecting the allegations made in that letter, stating the following:

The Jordanian letter refers to the collapse of a wall in the Al-Aqsa Mosque on 11 February 1973. It fails to mention that it was a partial collapse of an interior wall two metres long which occurred, in the course of work carried out by Arab labourers digging foundations for new marble pillars and that the work is being executed on the initiative and under the direction of the Moslem Council in charge of the Mosque. In fact a statement issued immediately by that Council explained that the collapse of the wall had been anticipated and precautionary measures taken. The statement added that the continuation of the Moslem authorities' construction work in the Mosque will not be affected by the collapse of the wall. Indeed it is proceeding normally in accordance with plan. It is in no way connected with, or affected by, any archaeological activities, all of which are being conducted outside the area of the Mosque.

127. The Special Committee took note of the resolutions of the General Conference of UNESCO and the decisions of its Executive Board on the implementation of the Hague Convention in the occupied territories. The Special Committee considered the information contained in the reports of the Director-General of UNESCO on the implementation of these decisions. These reports reproduce, *inter alia*, allegations of violations of the Hague Convention by the Government of Israel in the occupied territories, replies by the Government of Israel to these allegations and information furnished by the Commissioners-General for Cultural Property appointed under the Regulations

for the Execution of the Hague Convention and the special consultants appointed by the Director-General of UNESCO, carrying out the relevant resolutions of the UNESCO General Conference and the decisions of the UNESCO Executive Board.

128. At the request of the Special Committee, UNESCO furnished it with all information on UNESCO's activities in the occupied territories by way of implementation of the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. The Commissioners-General for Cultural Property, who were appointed in accordance with the Regulations for the Execution of the Hague Convention were: Mr. K. Brunner (Switzerland), accredited to Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic, and Mr. H. J. Reinink (the Netherlands), accredited to Israel. Mr. Brunner was appointed on 1 December 1967 and Mr. Reinink was appointed on 3 December 1967. Mr. Brunner remained Commissioner-General until his death in February 1972 and was replaced by Mr. G. De Angelis D'Ossat in September 1972. Mr. Reinink continues with his duties as Commissioner-General for Cultural Property accredited to Israel. In addition to the implementation of the Hague Convention by the appointment of Commissioners-General, two special consultants were appointed by the Director-General of UNESCO to carry out specific assignments. Thus, Mr. De Angelis D'Ossat was appointed special consultant by the Director-General under resolution 3.343, adopted by the fifteenth General Conference, in which it addressed "an urgent international appeal in accordance with [United Nations General Assembly resolution 2253 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967], calling upon Israel:

(a) to preserve scrupulously all the sites, buildings, and other cultural properties, especially in the Old City of Jerusalem;

(b) to desist from any archaeological excavations, transfer of such properties and changing of their features or their cultural and historical character.

[and invited] the Director-General to use all the influence and means at his disposal, in co-operation with all parties concerned, to ensure the best possible implementation of this resolution.

129. Mr. G. De Angelis D'Ossat visited the occupied territories from 4 to 18 June 1969. His report is referred to in the Director-General's

report to the Executive Board of 19 September 1969.⁹³

130. The Director-General sent another special consultant to Jerusalem, Mr. Raymond Lemaire, who submitted his report to the Director-General on 7 October 1971.⁹⁴ Mr. Lemaire's task was to prepare a report for the Director-General dealing with "the factual situation in the City of Jerusalem, and with the plans and intentions of the Israeli authorities in so far as they had already been made public by these authorities or might be made public during his visit".⁹⁵ The Special Committee was seized of an information note, presented by the Director-General of UNESCO to the Executive Board, containing "extracts broadly representative of the report rendered to him by the special consultant".⁹⁶

131. The Executive Board of UNESCO, at its eighty-eighth session, adopted decision 4.3.1, in which it invited:

the Director-General to ensure the presence of UNESCO in the city of Jerusalem with a view to securing an efficient implementation of the resolutions of the General Conference and the Executive Board in this respect.⁹⁷

132. On 19 July 1972, the Director-General of UNESCO proposed that he implement this decision by engaging the services of an expert. On 6 October 1972, the Government of Israel accepted the Director-General's proposal. At the time of the adoption of the present report, the Director-General of UNESCO was in the process of engaging the services of this expert. The UNESCO Executive Board, by decision 4.5.1, taken at its ninety-second session, specified the mandate of the representative of the Director-General and included the examination of the measures undertaken by the occupation authorities in Jerusalem to determine whether these were resulting in modifications in the character of the Old City.

133. The Special Committee examined the reports of the Director-General on the activities of the Commissioners-General and the special consultants. In addition, it consulted with a representative of UNESCO at its meetings held

in June 1973.

134. The Special Committee notes that the implementation of the Hague Convention in the occupied territories is being seriously hampered by the lack of agreement on its interpretation. The Government of Israel has interpreted the Hague Convention as not prohibiting excavation by the occupying Power in the occupied territories. The Government of Jordan maintains that, under the Convention, archaeological excavations in the occupied territories are prohibited.

135. The Special Committee is aware of the difficulties encountered by UNESCO owing to this lack of agreement on the interpretation of the Hague Convention. In chapter I, section D, above, the Special Committee has given what it considers to be the proper and reasonable interpretation of international law on the subject.

136. The Special Committee is of the opinion that the evidence available to it establishes the fact that the occupying Power has taken, and is taking, measures contrary to the Hague Convention inasmuch as these measures amount to acts of disposal of property over which the occupying Power has acquired no right. In so doing, the occupying Power is threatening the cultural heritage of the population of the occupied territories. The gravest instance of the violation of the Hague Convention is that of Jerusalem, where extensive archaeological excavations and other measures are being carried out. These measures, together with other practices and policies reported by the Special Committee in this and earlier reports, would seem to the Special Committee to fit in with a deliberate design and policy on the part of the occupying Power to effect radical change in the character of the city.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

137. In the present report, the Special Committee has analysed evidence that came before it since the adoption of its last report on 25 September 1972. The report is the result of a continuing investigation reflected in the preceding reports of the Special Committee, which were considered by the General Assembly at its twenty-fifth, twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh sessions.

138. In summary, the Special Committee has established that Israel is still following a policy which is contrary to the provisions of the applicable

⁹³ UNESCO document 83 EX/12.

⁹⁴ UNESCO document 88 EX/47, para. 2.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 1.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 4.

⁹⁷ Full text in doc. 436 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971* [ed. note].

international law concerning occupation and is thereby violating the human rights of the population of the occupied territories. As illustrated in chapter III above, this policy has in particular the effect of denying the population of the occupied territories their right to self-determination. The population of the occupied territories cannot be regarded merely as an aggregate of individuals, but rather as a community entitled to live under the protection of a State or of an administration established through a recognized legal process. The Special Committee has in mind the areas of the Golan Heights, the West Bank, southern Gaza Strip and Sinai. The Special Committee would draw attention to the fact that, as of 19 August 1973, 44 settlements have been established in the occupied territories, with approximately 5,000 inhabitants. An additional 35 are planned for the next five years and regional centres are to be built in the Golan Heights, the Jordan Valley, the southern Gaza Strip (Rafah) area and at Sharm el-Sheikh. These regional centres are described as civic centres providing economic and social co-ordination for settlements that have already been established, usually in concentrations that necessitate the creation of these regional centres in order to function as a cohesive force. This is the case in the Golan Heights, where 16 settlements have been established—five in the North-East Golan, six on the east shore of the Sea of Galilee and five in the south and south-eastern parts of the Heights. In the West Bank, a concentration of 11 settlements has been established in the Jordan Valley, stretching northward from the north shore of the Dead Sea to a point over half way up the Jordan Valley. Other settlements in the West Bank include Hebron, one on the western shore of the Dead Sea, one north-west of Jerusalem and another one in the Qalqilya-Tulkarm area. In the Gaza Strip, a concentration of three settlements has been established in the southern-most region, where the Strip borders Egypt. Three other settlements have been established in other areas of the Gaza Strip, stretching northward. In the Sinai, two settlements have been established on the north shore and three on the eastern coast of the Sinai peninsula, including a town that is planned for Sharm el-Sheikh, the construction of which is already under way.

139. The Special Committee is of the opinion that any transactions for the acquisition of land

between the State of Israel and Israeli nationals on the one hand, and the inhabitants of the occupied territories on the other, have no validity in law and cannot be recognized as legal changes in ownership. Even the payment of compensation does not render such transactions valid or confer legal title. The Special Committee's reason for expressing this opinion is that the inhabitants of the occupied territories, in the absence of the protection and guidance of the régime under which they lived before the occupation, are not acting as free agents. The disposal of the property of individuals in any State is liable to control and regulation by the State in accordance with State policy. This indispensable factor for the conferment of legality on private land transactions does not exist in the occupied territories. It is incumbent on the United Nations to state unequivocally that these transactions are not recognizable. They would create a formidable obstacle to the restoration of the *status quo ante* the hostilities of June 1967. If it is the intention and desire of the United Nations that the territories under occupation by the State of Israel as a result of the hostilities of June 1967 should be vacated and should not be subject to acquisition by Israel, the United Nations cannot permit conditions to be created which would leave in the heart of these territories, after the cessation of the military occupation, large areas and settlements which are claimed to have been acquired by the State of Israel or its nationals.

140. In Jerusalem the policy declared by the Government of Israel in 1967 of annexation of the occupied part of the city and areas bordering on it continues. Thus, large-scale projects have been undertaken and others are projected to remove the local civilian population and substitute Israeli nationals for them. Plans have been announced for the creation of new suburbs north and east of the city to be populated by Israeli nationals. The General Assembly and the Security Council have repeatedly declared invalid all measures by which the occupying Power has purported to annex the occupied part of Jerusalem.

141. In addition to the establishment of these settlements that have been completed and are functioning, roads and other communications have been laid down and plans are being made to expand and consolidate these settlements. For instance, a consensus in the Government of Israel, reported in 1973, was that the South Sinai region

"could not be separated from Israel" and that plans were in train to settle areas on the western coast of the Sinai peninsula, at Abu Rodeis and El-Tur. In addition to these plans, considerable areas have been expropriated or "closed off", usually for "security reasons"; areas around Bethlehem and southern Gaza Strip are an example. In some of these areas, settlements have already been established. Reasons of "security" are invoked by the occupying Power in justification of measures that, in fact, deprive the civilian population of the occupied territories of the protection which international humanitarian law seeks to ensure for them. In its last report, the Special Committee stated that the provisions of international law concerning measures taken for security reasons were designed to be used in exceptional circumstances and under pressure of urgent necessity. The occupying Power has continued to use security grounds indiscriminately and has arbitrarily converted an exception into a rule of conduct or definite policy. This is a negation of the very letter and spirit of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Conventions. Indeed, the measures taken by the occupying Power do not appear any longer to be even remotely relevant to security considerations. The official pronouncements of members of the Government of Israel and the measures that have been taken in the occupied territories are primarily inspired by the basic Zionist ideology that the whole area rightfully belongs to Jews in the biblical meaning of the Land of Israel. It is clear to the Special Committee that the Government of Israel regards its presence in the occupied territories as a "return" to the "Land of Israel" rather than as territory occupied as a result of hostilities. Pronouncements to that effect have been made repeatedly by the responsible Ministers in justification of measures taken in the occupied territories. This doctrine, which is the basis of the policy of the Government of Israel in the occupied territories, cannot for a moment be entertained, much less accepted by the organization to which the State of Israel owes its very creation.

142. Apart from these settlements and plans for the future, the occupied territories are being exploited economically. The oil reserves of the Sinai are being exploited by Israel and meet two thirds of her needs.

143. The agricultural potential of the occupied

territories is being developed for the exclusive use of the Israeli settlements in those territories. The Director of the World Zionist Organization, in an interview appearing in *The Jerusalem Post Magazine* on 8 September 1972, has described this development in the following terms: "the seemingly arid land on which many of the settlements were founded turned out to be an agricultural gold-mine". Labour too is being exploited. Workers from the occupied territories (57,000 of them) are employed in Israel, mostly in construction, as and when required; they are only employed as long as no Israeli workers are available. On 7 August 1973, Prime Minister Golda Meir and Defence Minister Moshe Dayan told Israeli settlers in Rafah that they should not employ local labour so that many more Jewish families could be settled in Rafah. They are treated as an exploitable and dispensable human commodity on sufferance.

144. In addition to the above, the Government of Israel has continued to refuse to repatriate those who fled or who were expelled during and after the June 1967 hostilities. It has been clearly stated, on the other hand, that several of the Israeli settlements have been established on land belonging to those persons and, in some cases, as in that of Fik in the Golan Heights, in the village itself.

145. While refusing to allow the persons who were driven out by the hostilities or expelled thereafter to return to their homeland, the occupying Power is utilizing new Jewish immigrants to populate the new settlements. This is a serious misuse of the fulfilment of one right (the right to leave one's own country) to the detriment and prejudice of other rights (the right to return to one's own country and the right of self-determination).

146. As the only United Nations organ entrusted with the human rights aspect of the Middle East question, the Special Committee's major cause for concern is that the provisions of international law are being contravened by the occupying Power without check and with impunity. The international community has not attempted to take the proper initiatives to see that United Nations resolutions are respected and implemented. Neither has it sought ways to contain the complete disregard for international law which the occupying Power has shown and continues to show through its unrelenting pursuit of a policy premised on the

denial of the basic rights of the population of the occupied territories.

147. In its last report, the Special Committee regretted that, despite the specific recommendation that it had made repeatedly in its earlier reports, its mandate was renewed with no attempt or any action to provide a machinery for the supervision of the implementation of the international law protecting the human rights of the population of the occupied territories.

148. The arrangement proposed by the Special Committee (A/8389 and Corr. 1 and 2, para. 91),⁹⁸ inspired by the Protecting Power formula envisaged under the Geneva Conventions, is intended to ensure adherence to the Hague and Geneva Conventions, which protect civilian persons living in occupied territory. This machinery, or one similar to it, should be established to provide future protection for the population of the occupied territories.

149. The occupation, however, has lasted more than six years; during this time the population of the occupied territories, because of the absence of machinery to implement the applicable conventions, has not been able to benefit in any manner from the protection afforded by international law. On the other hand, measures have been taken during these six years that are in violation of the applicable

international law. These measures, such as the establishment of settlements, the transfer of population, and those referred to by the Special Committee in chapter III above, are openly admitted by the Government of Israel and are a matter of government policy. The arrangement proposed by the Special Committee can only apply to the future. The United Nations is guilty of a grave dereliction of its responsibility. What it has failed to prevent it must even at this late stage attempt to cure. The violations of the human rights of the population of the occupied territories that have been committed since June 1967 must receive the special attention of the General Assembly if a further deterioration of this situation is to be averted. It is incumbent on the Assembly to take effective action to deter Israel from adopting any further measures that must, despite any disclaimers, have the effect of consolidating the occupation and annexing the occupied territories to Israel.

150. The measures taken by Israel so far are not only a grave infringement of the rights of the civilian population of the occupied territories, but present the most formidable obstacle to peaceful negotiation and to a just settlement of the Middle East problem.

V. ADOPTION OF THE REPORT

151. The present report was approved and signed by the Special Committee on 15 October 1973 in accordance with rule 20 of its rules of procedure as follows:

H.S. AMERASINGHE (Sri Lanka)
Chairman

H. NUR ELMİ (Somalia)

B. BOHTE (Yugoslavia)

⁹⁸ The Special Committee had recommended:

“(a) That the States whose territory is occupied by Israel appoint immediately either a neutral State or States, or an international organization which offers all guarantees of impartiality and effectiveness, to safeguard the human rights of the population of the occupied territories;

“(b) That suitable arrangements be made for the proper representation of the interests of the large population in the occupied territories which has not yet been given the opportunity of exercising the right of self-determination; and

“(c) That a neutral State or international organization, as described in (a) above, be nominated by Israel and be associated in this arrangement.”

Under this arrangement, the State or States or international organization so nominated might be authorized to undertake the following activities:

(i) “To secure the scrupulous implementation of the provisions relating to human rights contained in the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions and in particular to investigate and determine the facts in the case of allegations of the violation of the human rights provisions of these Conventions or of other applicable international instruments;

(ii) “To ensure that the population of the occupied territories is treated in accordance with the applicable law;

(iii) “To report to the States concerned and to the General Assembly of the United Nations on its work.”

the search for a peaceful settlement of the Middle East problem and in particular of the activities of the Jarring mission, it may be useful first to recall briefly the efforts made by the Organization to deal with particular aspects of the situation in the Middle East.

A. *Status of the cease-fire*

3. Shortly after the outbreak of the hostilities on 5 June 1960, the Security Council adopted two resolutions calling for an immediate cease-fire [*resolutions 233 (1967) of 6 June and 234 (1967) of 7 June 1967*]. Following the adoption of those resolutions, the Governments of Jordan, Israel, the United Arab Republic¹⁰⁰ and Syria successively announced their acceptance of the cease-fire. Fighting stopped on the United Arab Republic and Jordanian fronts by 8 June and on the Syrian front on 10 June. At the cessation of hostilities the Israeli forces had reached the east bank of the Suez Canal, except for the Port Fuad area at the northern tip, in the United Arab Republic; they also occupied the west bank in Jordan and the western part of the Golan Heights in Syria. No fighting took place between the Israeli and Lebanese forces and the 1949 armistice demarcation line between Israel and Lebanon has remained unaltered.

4. In order to make the cease-fire effective between the Israeli and Syrian forces, the Security Council adopted two further resolutions on 9 and 12 June respectively [*resolutions 235 (1967) and 236 (1967)*]. On the basis of these resolutions and after obtaining the agreement of the two parties concerned, the Secretary-General established a United Nations operation for the observation of the cease-fire in the Israel-Syria sector. A similar operation was later set up in the Suez Canal sector in pursuance of the consensus approved by the Security Council on 10 July 1967 [*see 1366th meeting, para. 125*] and with the agreement of both parties concerned. Much later, at the request of the Lebanese Government and after the Security Council consensus of 19 April 1972 [*S/10611*], a third observation operation was set up in the Israel-Lebanon sector, but on the Lebanese side only. There is no machinery for the observation of the cease-fire in the Israel-

Jordan sector. On several occasions the Secretary-General has drawn attention to the fact that in the absence of a decision by the Security Council no such machinery could be established.

5. The responsibility for the cease-fire observation operations has been entrusted to the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO) and the United Nations military observers assigned to that mission. At the same time, UNTSO has continued to maintain the machinery for the supervision of the 1949 General Armistice Agreements, but as Israel no longer recognizes those Agreements, UNTSO has been unable to carry out those of its functions and duties relating to them.

6. Where cease-fire observation operations exist, United Nations military observers are stationed in the cease-fire sectors on both sides in the Suez Canal and Israel-Syria sectors and on one side only in the Israel-Lebanon sector. The United Nations observers do not carry arms and have no enforcement power. Their main function is to observe the situation in the cease-fire sectors and report to the Security Council, through the Secretary-General, on violations of the cease-fire that they have observed, such as firing, exchanges of fire, overflights and forward military movements (see the supplemental information reports in the S/9730/Add. series). They may also receive complaints from the parties, and, when the latter so request, they may carry out inquiries on those complaints. It should be noted that they can only observe developments within the observation range of the observation posts. Air attacks and raids carried out by armed forces against targets far behind the forward defended localities cannot be observed. When guerrilla activity takes place in a cease-fire sector, United Nations observers are generally unable to observe or identify the irregular forces involved.

7. Nevertheless, despite these shortcomings, the reports of the observers have proved to be useful as an independent and impartial source of information for assessment by the Security Council of the situation in the cease-fire sectors. It may also be pointed out that the presence of United Nations observers in an area can be helpful in preserving the cease-fire in ways other than reporting. The mere fact of their watchful presence can be something of a deterrent to military activity, and in dealing with the parties concerned they can use their influence

¹⁰⁰ The name of the United Arab Republic was changed to the Arab Republic of Egypt on 2 September 1971. [Original note.]

to defuse dangerous situations. When fighting does break out, they can quickly intervene on the spot with opposing local commanders to arrange immediate cease-fires. The Chief of Staff of UNTSO and the observers may also use their good offices to facilitate operations of a non-military nature in the cease-fire sectors. For example, when a leak occurred in an oil pipeline between the Israeli and Syrian forward defended localities in November 1967 arrangements were made, through the good offices and safe conduct of UNTSO, for the necessary inspection and repairs to be carried out by technical personnel of the oil company [S/7930/Add.57].

8. Since June 1967, three observers have died in line of duty. One observer was killed near Kuneitra during the hostilities of June 1967 and the other two in the Suez Canal sector in July 1969 and July 1970, respectively. In addition, 13 observers were injured in varying degrees while performing their duties.

9. I have been following the situation in the cease-fire sectors very closely and have endeavoured through the exercise of my good offices and appeals to the parties to reduce tension and prevent escalation. In this connexion I should mention the efforts I made in close co-operation with the President of the Security Council for the release of the Syrian and Lebanese military and security personnel abducted by Israeli armed forces from Lebanese territory on 21 June 1972. Those efforts, initiated in June 1972 in the exercise of my good offices, were later specifically endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 317 (1972) of 21 July 1972. They have not as yet proved successful.

10. When serious incidents break out, the parties themselves generally bring them to the attention of the Security Council, giving, of course, their own versions of them. In the most serious cases, one or both parties concerned often—but not always—request a meeting of the Security Council to consider the matter. A full account of the consideration of the various incidents by the Security Council may be found in the Council's own records and need not be repeated here. However, for reference purposes, a list of the various meetings held by the Security Council on cease-fire matters since June 1967, the complaints of the parties brought before it and the decisions it has taken on them is given below:

(a) *1365th and 1366th meetings (8 and 9 July 1967)*

Subject matter: United Arab Republic complaint concerning Israeli violations of the cease-fire in the Suez Canal sector on 8 July 1967 and Israeli complaint concerning United Arab Republic violations on the same day.

Decision: Consensus of the Security Council of 10 July 1967 authorizing the Secretary-General to station United Nations military observers in the Suez Canal sector with the agreement of Israel and the United Arab Republic.

(b) *1369th-1371st meetings (24 and 25 October 1967)*

Subject matter: United Arab Republic complaint concerning Israeli attacks against the Suez area on 24 October 1967 and Israeli complaint concerning the sinking of the Israeli destroyer *Eilat* by United Arab Republic forces on 21 October.

Decision: Resolution 240 (1967) of 25 October 1967 condemning the violations of the cease-fire and demanding that the Member States concerned cease immediately all prohibited military activities in the area and co-operate fully and promptly with UNTSO.

(c) *1401st-1407th meetings (21-24 March 1968)*

Subject matter: Jordanian complaint concerning Israeli attacks against the east bank of Jordan on 21 March 1968 and Israeli complaint concerning continuous armed attacks against Israel from Jordanian territory.

Decision: Resolution 248 (1968) of 24 March 1968 condemning the military action launched by Israel, deploring all violent incidents in violation of the cease-fire and declaring that such actions of military reprisal and other grave violations of the cease-fire could not be tolerated and that the Security Council would have to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against repetition of such acts.

(d) *1409th-1412th meetings (30 March-4 April 1968)*

Subject matter: Jordanian complaint concerning renewed Israeli attacks against the east bank of Jordan on 29 March 1968 and Israeli complaint concerning Jordanian violations of the cease-fire.

Decision: Statement by the President of the Security Council at the 1412th meeting on 4 April

1968 to the effect that the members of the Council were deeply concerned at the deteriorating situation in the area and that the Council would keep the situation under close review.

(c) *1434th–1440th meetings (5–16 August 1968)*

Subject matter: Jordanian complaint concerning Israeli air attacks against the Jordanian city of Salt on 4 August 1968 and Israeli complaint concerning continuous violations of the cease-fire by Jordan.

Decision: Resolution 256 (1968) of 16 August 1968 condemning the further military attacks launched by Israel and warning that if such attacks were to be repeated the Council would duly take account of the failure to comply with the resolution.

(f) *1416th–1452nd meetings (1–18 September 1968)*

Subject matter: Israeli complaints concerning an ambush laid by United Arab Republic soldiers against an Israeli patrol on the east bank of the Suez Canal on 26 August 1968 and firing by United Arab Republic forces against Israeli forces on 8 September 1968 and United Arab Republic complaint concerning Israeli shelling of Port Tawfiq, Suez, Ismailia and Kantara on 8 September.

Decisions:

- (i) Statement by the President of the Security Council at the 1448th meeting on 8 September 1968 to the effect that the Council deeply regretted the loss of life and requested the parties strictly to observe the cease-fire;
- (ii) Resolution 258 (1968) of 18 September 1968 insisting that the cease-fire ordered by the Council must be rigorously respected, reaffirming its resolution 242 (1967), and urging all the parties to extend their fullest co-operation to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the speedy fulfilment of his mandate.

(g) *1456th and 1457th meetings (1 and 4 November 1968)*

Subject matter: United Arab Republic complaint concerning Israeli air attacks against civilian targets in upper Egypt and Israeli complaint concerning recent United Arab Republic attacks against Israel.

Decision: None.

(h) *1460th–1462nd meetings (29–31 December 1968)*

Subject matter: Lebanese complaint against Israeli air attack against the civil international airport of Beirut on 28 December 1968 and Israeli complaint concerning Lebanese assistance to irregular forces operating from Lebanon against Israel.

Decision: Resolution 262 (1968) of 31 December 1968 condemning Israel for its premeditated military action and issuing a solemn warning to Israel that if such acts were to be repeated the Council would have to consider further steps to give effect to its decisions.

(i) *1466th–1473rd meetings (27 March–1 April 1969)*

Subject matter: Jordanian complaint concerning Israeli air attacks against the area of Salt on 26 March 1969 and Israeli complaint against Jordanian violations of the cease-fire, including assistance to terrorist groups operating against Israel from Jordanian territory and shelling of Israeli villages by Jordanian forces.

Decision: Resolution 265 (1969) of 1 April 1969 deploring the loss of civilian life and damage to property, condemning the recent premeditated air attacks launched by Israel on Jordanian villages and populated areas and warning once again that if such attacks were to be repeated the Council would have to meet to consider further more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against their repetition.

(j) *1498th–1502nd and 1504th meetings (13–26 August 1969)*

Subject matter: Lebanese complaint concerning Israeli air attacks against villages in southern Lebanon on 11 August 1969 and Israeli complaint against intensified armed attacks against Israel from Lebanese territory.

Decision: Resolution 270 (1969) of 26 August 1969 condemning the premeditated air attack by Israel on villages in southern Lebanon, deploring all violent incidents in violation of the cease-fire and the extension of the area of fighting and declaring that such actions of military reprisal and other grave violations of the cease-fire could not be tolerated and that the Council would have to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against their repetition.

(k) *1537th–1542nd meetings (12–19 May 1970)*

Subject matter: Lebanese complaint concerning Israeli ground and air attacks against Lebanon on 12 May 1970 and Israeli complaint concerning continuous armed attacks against Israel from Lebanese territory.

Decisions:

- (i) Resolution 279 (1970) of 12 May 1970 demanding the immediate withdrawal of all Israeli armed forces from Lebanese territory;
- (ii) Resolution 280 (1970) of 19 May 1970 deploring the failure of Israel to abide by resolutions 262 (1968) and 270 (1969), condemning Israel for its premeditated military action, declaring that such armed attacks could no longer be tolerated and repeating its solemn warning to Israel that if they were to be repeated the Council would consider taking adequate and effective steps or measures in accordance with the relevant articles of the Charter to implement its resolutions.

(l) *1551st meeting (5 September 1970)*

Subject matter: Lebanese complaint concerning Israeli ground and air attacks against Lebanon on 4 and 5 September 1970.

Decision: Resolution 285 (1970) of 5 September 1970 demanding the complete and immediate withdrawal of all Israeli armed forces from Lebanese territory.

(m) *1643rd and 1644th meetings (26 and 28 February 1972)*

Subject matter: Lebanese complaint concerning Israeli ground and air attacks against Lebanon on 25 February 1972 and Israeli complaint concerning continuous armed attacks against Israel from Lebanese territory.

Decision: Resolution 313 (1972) of 28 February 1972 demanding that Israel immediately desist and refrain from any ground and air military action against Lebanon and forthwith withdraw its military forces from Lebanese territory.

(n) *1648th–1650th meetings (23–26 June 1972)*

Subject matter: Lebanese and Syrian complaints concerning Israeli ground and air attacks against Lebanon on 21, 22 and 23 June 1972 and Israeli complaint concerning continuous armed attacks against Israel from Lebanese territory.

Decision: Resolution 316 (1972) of 26 June 1972 calling upon Israel strictly to abide by its resolutions and to refrain from all military acts against Lebanon, condemning, while profoundly deploring all acts of violence, the repeated attacks of Israeli forces on Lebanese territory and population, expressing the strong desire that appropriate steps would lead to the release in the shortest possible time of all Syrian and Lebanese military and security personnel abducted by Israeli armed forces on 21 June 1972 from Lebanese territory and declaring that if those steps did not result in the release of the abducted personnel or if Israel failed to comply with the present resolution the Council would reconvene at the earliest to consider further action.

(o) *1651st–1653rd meetings (18–21 July 1972)*

Subject matter: Lebanese and Syrian complaints concerning the refusal of Israel to release the abducted Lebanese and Syrian military and security personnel in accordance with Security Council resolution 316 (1972) and Israeli request for the mutual release of all prisoners of war.

Decision: Resolution 317 (1972) of 21 July 1972 reaffirming resolution 316 (1972), calling on Israel for the return of the abducted personnel without delay and requesting the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General to make renewed efforts to secure the implementation of the resolution.

(p) *1661st and 1662nd meetings (10 September–1972)*

Subject matter: Lebanese complaint of Israeli attacks against Lebanon on 8 September 1972 and Syrian complaint of Israeli attacks against Syria on the same day.

Decision: None.

(q) *1705th–1711th meetings (12–21 April 1973)*

Subject matter: Lebanese complaint concerning Israeli raids in Beirut and Sidon on 10 April 1973.

Decision: Resolution 332 (1973) of 21 April 1973 expressing deep concern over and condemning all acts of violence which endangered or took innocent human lives, condemning the repeated military attacks conducted by Israel against Lebanon and calling upon Israel to desist forthwith from all military attacks on Lebanon.

11. A review of the major incidents that have

disrupted the cease-fire since June 1967 shows that guerrilla activity has been involved in many cases and that this involvement has been a factor both in the maintenance of the cease-fire and in the debates of the Security Council on the subject. It should be noted that some serious incidents were not brought before the Security Council. Indeed, the most serious breakdown of the cease-fire was never considered by the Council.

12. That breakdown concerned the fighting between the Israeli and United Arab Republic forces from early 1969 until 7 August 1970 and was due to the different positions of the parties concerning the implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions. One side refused to continue to observe the cease-fire which it regarded as in effect perpetuating foreign occupation of its sovereign territory, while the other side contended that it would observe the cease-fire as long as the other party was willing to do so. When the first exchanges of fire took place in February 1969 the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council the concern expressed by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO that continued firing in the Suez Canal sector, if not checked, might result in a more serious breach of the cease-fire. Soon the fighting escalated and by the end of 1969 had reached a high level of hostilities. During the whole period of the fighting the Secretary-General reported in detail all the developments observed by the observers and appealed on several occasions for an end to the hostilities. The fighting came to an end on 7 August 1970 under a proposal initiated by the United States Government. Under that proposal the Governments of Israel, Jordan and the United Arab Republic agreed to designate representatives to discussions to be held under Ambassador Jarring's auspices and, in order to facilitate the latter's task of promoting agreement as set forth in Security Council resolution 242 (1967), they undertook strictly to observe the resolutions of the Council as from 7 August 1970 (see also paras. 64–66 below).

13. That tragic episode underlines the fact that in the present circumstances the maintenance of the cease-fire depends essentially on the willingness of the parties concerned to abide by it. But this in turn depends on the prospects of achieving a just and accepted settlement of the Middle East problem, and so long as such a settlement is not in sight the cease-fire will remain precarious and unstable.

B. Situation in the occupied territories

14. In the aftermath of the June 1967 hostilities, the Security Council on 14 June 1967 adopted resolution 237 (1967) in which it called upon the Government of Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations had taken place and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who had fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities, recommended to the Governments concerned the scrupulous respect of the humanitarian principles governing the treatment of prisoners of war and the protection of civilian persons in time of war contained in the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and requested the Secretary-General to follow the effective implementation of the resolution and to report to the Council. That resolution was later endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967.

15. On 6 July 1967, the Secretary-General appointed Mr. Nils-Göran Gussing as his Special Representative to obtain for him on the spot the information required for the proper discharge of his responsibilities under those resolutions. The Secretary-General issued a report on the mission on 2 October 1967 [*S/8158*], which set forth the findings of the Special Representative concerning the safety, welfare and security of the population in the areas under Israeli control, the situation of displaced persons from those areas and the question of their return, the treatment of prisoners of war and the question of minorities.

16. In two notes dated 19 April and 31 July 1968 respectively [*S/8553* and *S/8699*], the Secretary-General informed the General Assembly and the Security Council of his approaches to the Governments concerned in order to send a new representative to the area under Security Council resolution 237 (1967) and General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V). The Secretary-General pointed out that concern about humanitarian questions in the Middle Eastern area was frequently brought to his attention, but since the termination of the Gussing mission there had been no United Nations source of first-hand information on those problems. Israel agreed to the proposed mission but insisted that the Special Representative should look into the situation of the Jewish communities in the Arab countries in the area. The United Arab Republic, Jordan and Syria also accepted the Secretary-General's proposal, but they emphasized

that the mandate of the Special Representative should be within the scope of the two above-mentioned resolutions and Syria made it clear that that should not include the "so-called Jewish minorities in Arab countries". In view of the difficulties concerning the scope and terms of reference of the proposed mission, the Secretary-General concluded that there was no basis at that time on which the mission could proceed.

17. On 27 September 1968 the Security Council adopted resolution 259 (1968) in which it requested the Secretary-General urgently to dispatch a special representative to the Arab territories under military occupation by Israel following the hostilities of 5 June 1967 and to report on the implementation of resolution 237 (1967). It also requested the Government of Israel to receive the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, to co-operate with him and to facilitate his work and recommended that the Secretary-General be afforded all co-operation in his efforts in this regard.

18. In a report dated 14 October 1968 [S/8851], the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that he was unable to give effect to the decision of the Council. Israel had insisted that parallel assurances should be received from the Governments of the Arab states that had participated in the war that the Special Representative would have the access and co-operation indispensable to the fulfilment of his mission concerning the Jewish minorities in their countries. The Arab States had reiterated their opposition to including the question of Jewish minorities in the mandate of the Special Representative.

19. At its twenty-third session the General Assembly, by its resolution 2443 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968, established a Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, composed of three Member States. At the following session the Assembly adopted resolution 2546 (XXIV) of 11 December 1969, in which, among other things, it expressed its grave concern at the continuing reports of violation of human rights in the occupied territories, called upon the Government of Israel to desist forthwith from its reported repressive practices and policies towards the civilian population in those territories and requested the Special Committee to take cognizance of the provisions of the As-

sembly's resolution.

20. The Government of Israel has withheld its co-operation from the Special Committee, whose members are Somalia, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia, claiming, among other things, that it had been illegally constituted. The Special Committee has submitted three reports to the General Assembly: in 1970, in 1971, and in 1972.¹⁰¹ In those reports the Committee set forth its findings based on information it had been able to obtain from sources from the occupied territories and recommended, among other things, that an alternate arrangement be made that would enable a direct and on-the-spot investigation of allegations of violation of human rights and that a protecting power be designated under the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 for the population of those territories. The General Assembly considered those reports at its twenty-fifth, twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh sessions and each time it has requested the Special Committee to continue its work and has called upon Israel to co-operate with the Special Committee and to facilitate its tasks [*resolutions 2727 (XXV) of 15 December 1970, 2851 (XXVI) of 20 December 1971 and 3005 (XXVII) of 15 December 1972*]. In this connexion the Assembly has also called upon Israel to rescind forthwith and desist from all policies and practices affecting the human rights of the population of the occupied territories and reaffirmed that all measures to settle the occupied territories, including Jerusalem, were null and void.

21. The Commission on Human Rights considered matters relating to human rights in the occupied territories at each of its sessions since the beginning of 1968 and has adopted six resolutions on the subject: resolutions 6 (XXIV) of 27 February 1968, 6 (XXV) of 4 March 1969, 10 (XXVI) of 23 March 1970, 9 (XXVII) of 15 March 1971, 3 (XXVIII) of 22 March 1972 and 4 (XXIX) of 14 March 1973. In particular, the Commission, in its resolution 6 (XXV), entrusted a Special Working Group of Experts with the mandate to investigate allegations concerning Israel's violations of the fourth Geneva Convention and endorsed the conclusions of the Special Working Group in its resolution 10 (XXVI).

¹⁰¹ Printed in *International Documents on Palestine 1970, 1971 and 1972* as docs. 317, 409 and 5 respectively.

22. The question of the return of displaced persons who had fled the occupied territories has also been dealt with by the General Assembly in conjunction with the problem of Palestine refugees (see para. 41 below).

C. *Question of Jerusalem*

23. Following the June 1967 hostilities the question of Jerusalem was first considered by the General Assembly at its fifth emergency special session. By its resolution 2253 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967 and resolution 2254 (ES-V) of 14 July 1967, the Assembly considered that the measures taken by Israel to change the status of the city were invalid, called upon Israel to rescind all measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any action which would alter the status of Jerusalem, and requested the Secretary-General to report to it and to the Security Council on the situation.

24. In pursuance of General Assembly resolution 2253 (ES-V) the Secretary-General submitted a report on 10 July 1967 [S/8052] based on the information he had obtained from the Israeli Government. In his message to the Secretary-General the Israeli Foreign Minister indicated that the measures referred to in the General Assembly's resolution related to the integration of Jerusalem in the administrative and municipal spheres and furnished a legal basis for the protection of the Holy Places in Jerusalem.

25. After the adoption of Assembly resolution 2254 (ES-V), the Secretary-General appointed Ambassador A. Thalmann of Switzerland as his Personal Representative in Jerusalem in order to obtain information on the situation in the city. The Secretary-General's report on the activities of the Thalmann mission was submitted on 12 September 1967 [S/8146]. The report contained a description of the measures taken by the Israeli Government in order to integrate the parts of the city which had not been under Israeli control before June 1967. In particular, it referred to a law passed on 27 June 1967 providing that the law, jurisdiction and administration of the State should apply in any area of the State of Israel designated by the Government by order, as well as to an order issued by the Government on 28 June declaring the law, jurisdiction and administration of the State of Israel to be in force in the Old City and certain surrounding areas previously under

Jordanian control.

26. On 27 April 1968 the Security Council adopted resolutions 250 (1968) in which it called upon Israel to refrain from holding the military parade in Jerusalem which was contemplated for 2 May 1968. When the military parade was held as scheduled, the Security Council, on 2 May 1968, adopted resolution 251 (1968) in which the Council "deeply deplores the holding by Israel of the military parade in Jerusalem on 2 May 1968 in disregard of the unanimous decision adopted by the Council on 27 April 1968".

27. On 21 May the Security Council adopted resolution 252 (1968) in which it considered that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, including expropriation of land and properties thereon, which tended to change the legal status of Jerusalem were invalid and could not change that status. It also urgently called on Israel to rescind all such measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any further action which tended to change the status of Jerusalem and requested the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of the resolution. On 11 April 1969 the Secretary-General submitted a report [S/9149] in pursuance of Security Council resolution 252 (1968),¹⁰² which indicated that the Israeli Government's position in the matter remained the same. In this and a subsequent report dated 30 June 1969 [S/9149/Add.1]¹⁰³ the Secretary-General circulated an unofficial translation of certain Israeli legislative and regulatory texts published in the Israel Official Gazette, which are relevant to the situation in Jerusalem.

28. At the request of Jordan the Council met on 30 June 1969 and adopted on 3 July resolution 267 (1969) in which it censured all measures taken to change the status of the city of Jerusalem, confirmed that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel which purported to alter the status of Jerusalem, including expropriation of land and properties thereon, were invalid and urgently called once more upon Israel to rescind forthwith all measures taken by it which might tend to change the status of the city and to refrain from all actions likely to have such an effect. The Council also requested Israel to inform it without any further delay of its intentions

¹⁰² Doc. 331 in *International Documents on Palestine 1969*.

¹⁰³ Doc. 337 in *ibid*.

with regard to the implementation of the provisions of the resolution and requested the Secretary-General to report to it on the matter. In pursuance of resolution 267 (1969) the Secretary-General submitted a report on 5 December 1969 [S/9537]¹⁰⁴ in which he transmitted the information he had obtained from the Israeli Government. Israel took the position that it was inconceivable that Jerusalem should be torn apart again or that any international interest could be served by pressing for the dismemberment of the city.

29. On 21 August 1969 a fire occurred at the Al Aqsa Mosque in the Old City of Jerusalem and caused extensive damage to the building. At the request of the Arab Governments and others, the Security Council met to discuss the matter. In its resolution 271 (1969) of 15 September 1969, the Council recognized that any act of destruction or profanation of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in Jerusalem or any encouragement of, or connivance at, any such act might seriously endanger international peace and security. It determined that the execrable act of desecration and profanation of the Holy Al Aqsa Mosque emphasized the immediate necessity of Israel's desisting from acting in violation of United Nations resolutions and rescinding forthwith all measures and actions taken by it designed to alter the status of Jerusalem, and it called upon Israel scrupulously to observe the provisions of the Geneva Conventions and international law governing military occupation and to refrain from causing any hindrance to the discharge of the established functions of the Supreme Moslem Council of Jerusalem, including any co-operation that that Council might desire from countries with predominantly Moslem populations and from Moslem communities in relation to its plans for the maintenance and repair of the Islamic Holy Places in Jerusalem. The Council further condemned the failure of Israel to comply with its resolutions on the question of Jerusalem and called upon it to implement them forthwith. It also requested the Secretary-General to follow the implementation of the resolution and report thereon to the Council.

30. In compliance with this request, the Secretary-General submitted a report on 16 December 1969 [S/9559]¹⁰⁵ based on information obtained

from Israel. The Israeli Government charged that the genesis of the Council's resolution was the attempt of Arab States to exploit the fire in the Al Aqsa Mosque for propaganda purposes and to excite religious passions throughout the Moslem world. It went on to say that the report of the Commission of Enquiry appointed by the President of the Israel Supreme Court was published on 23 September 1969 and that the trial of the person accused of arson in connexion with the fire was in progress. In the meantime the Mosque had been temporarily repaired and prayers were being conducted as usual.

31. In a report dated 18 February 1971 [S/10124] and subsequent addenda of 20 April and 20 August 1971 [S/10124/Add.1 and 2] the Secretary-General brought to the attention of the Security Council an exchange of correspondence between him and the Permanent Representative of Israel concerning a master plan for the construction of housing developments in an area within and outside the Old City walls.

32. At the request of Jordan, the Security Council met again on 16 September 1971 to consider the question of Jerusalem. By its resolution 298 (1971) of 25 September 1971 the Council reaffirmed its resolutions 252 (1968) and 267 (1969). It confirmed that all legislative and administrative actions taken by Israel to change the status of the city of Jerusalem, including expropriation of land and properties, transfer of populations and legislation aimed at the incorporation of the occupied section, were totally invalid and could not change that status. The Council urgently called upon Israel to rescind all previous measures and actions and to take no further steps in the occupied section of Jerusalem which might purport to change the status of the city and requested the Secretary-General, in consultation with the President of the Council, to report to it within 60 days on the implementation of the resolution. In his report dated 19 November 1971 [S/10392],¹⁰⁶ the Secretary-General stated that after consultation with the President of the Security Council, it had been agreed that the best way of fulfilling his responsibilities under resolution 298 (1971) was through a mission of three members of the Security Council. He had in mind as members of the mission the representatives of Argentina, Italy and Sierra

¹⁰⁴ Doc. 347 in *ibid.*

¹⁰⁵ Doc. 348 in *ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ Doc. 414 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971.*

Leone. However, an exchange of letters with the Government of Israel had provided no indication that Israel was willing to comply with the Council's resolution. Consequently, it was not possible for the Secretary-General to fulfil his mandate.

33. On 23 April 1973 the Permanent Representative of Jordan addressed a letter to the Secretary-General [S/10919], in which he drew attention to reports that the Israeli Government intended to hold a large military parade in Jerusalem on 7 May 1973 to celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the establishment of Israel and that the parade would extend to the Arab sector of Jerusalem. In that connexion, the President of the Security Council, after consulting all members of the Council, drew the attention of the Permanent Representative of Israel on 27 April 1973 [S/10922]¹⁰⁷ to the provisions of Security Council resolutions 250 (1968) and 251 (1968) concerning the holding by Israel of a military parade in Jerusalem on 2 May 1968. In a second letter to the Secretary-General dated 8 May 1973 [S/10924] the Permanent Representative of Jordan complained that the Israeli Government had held the parade and he stated that this action was, "besides being an open defiance of the Security Council's most recent and direct pronouncement, a flagrant violation of the spirit and intent of the Council's unanimously adopted resolutions 250 (1968) of 27 April 1968 and 251 (1968) of 2 May 1968".

34. In connexion with the question of Jerusalem a reference should be made to the status of Government House, which serves as the headquarters of UNTSO. A controversy on this matter has arisen between the Israeli Government and the United Nations after the hostilities of June 1967. In exchanges of correspondence with the Israeli Permanent Representative in August 1967 [S/7930/Add.27 and 29] and in February, April and August 1971 [S/10124 and Add.1 and 2], the Secretary-General has made clear his position that the United Nations has the right to the exclusive and undisturbed occupancy and possession of the full Government House compound as it was constituted on 5 June 1967.

D. Palestine refugee problem

35. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

(UNRWA), established by the General Assembly in 1949, has continued to provide assistance to Palestine refugees in the form of food, shelter and health and educational services after the hostilities of June 1967, but as a result of those hostilities the Agency has been confronted with new responsibilities and new problems.

36. At the beginning of June 1967 there were 1,344,576 Palestine refugees registered with UNRWA. Of these 722,687 were living in Jordan, 144,390 in Syria, 160,723 in Lebanon and 316,776 in the Gaza strip. As a result of the hostilities about 180,000 refugees and 200,000 newly displaced persons fled from the west bank and the Gaza strip to east Jordan, and about 17,000 refugees and 100,000 Syrians left the occupied Golan Heights for other parts of Syria. Many of the displaced persons were in dire need of assistance, and UNRWA provided them with emergency relief, mainly in the form of rations, blankets and temporary shelters. In occupied territories UNRWA has continued to provide assistance to the refugees who remained there, but adjustments have had to be made to deal with the new situation. While the Agency's relationship with the Governments in the Arab host countries has remained unchanged, its activities have been affected in some areas by the military and political situation arising from the intensification of the Middle East conflict.

37. In its resolution 2252 (ES-V) adopted on 4 July 1967 during the fifth emergency special session, the General Assembly commended the Commissioner-General of UNRWA for continuing the activities of the Agency in the prevailing situation and endorsed his efforts to provide temporary emergency assistance to the newly displaced persons. The Assembly also welcomed Security Council resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967, in which the Council, among other things, called for the return of those inhabitants who had fled the areas of military operations since the outbreak of hostilities.

38. Since the fifth emergency special session, the General Assembly has periodically considered the annual reports of the Commissioner-General on the activities of UNRWA and has invariably given its support to the Agency whose mandate has been extended until 30 June 1975 [resolutions 2341 A (XXII) of 19 December 1967, 2452 B (XXIII) of 19 December 1968, 2535 A (XXIV) of 10 December 1969,

¹⁰⁷ See doc. 23 below.

2672 A (XXV) of 8 December 1970, 2792 A (XXVI) of 6 December 1971 and 2963 A (XXVII) of 14 December 1972]. In this connexion the General Assembly has given special attention to the financial difficulties of UNRWA and has called for increased voluntary contributions to meet the needs of the Agency. When the financial situation became critical in 1970, the Assembly established a working group to study all aspects of the financing of UNRWA [resolution 2656 (XXV) of 7 December 1970]. At the twenty-seventh session the Assembly endorsed the conclusion of the Working Group that further vigorous and constant fund-raising activities on behalf of UNRWA were essential and requested it to continue its efforts, in co-operation with the Secretary-General and the Commissioner-General, for the financing of the Agency for a further period of one year [resolution 2964 (XXVII) of 13 December 1972].

39. When considering the refugee problem, the General Assembly has repeatedly noted with regret that the repatriation or compensation of the refugees as provided for by paragraph 11 of its resolution 194 (III) has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed by its resolution 513 (VI) for the reintegration of refugees, either by repatriation or resettlement, and that the situation of the refugees has therefore continued to be a matter of serious concern. The Assembly has also noted with regret that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine was unable to find a means of achieving progress in the implementation of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III) and has requested the Commission to exert continued efforts towards this objective. In its last report to the Assembly, dated 29 September 1972,¹⁰⁸ the Conciliation Commission indicated that the situation which had prevented all progress towards implementation of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III) remained essentially unchanged. The Commission expressed its determination to resume its endeavours as soon as it was possible to carry forward its work, while pointing out that its ability to do so would depend not only on an amelioration of the situation but also on the willingness of the parties to co-operate with it.

40. In conjunction with its consideration of the problem of the Palestine refugees the General

Assembly has also adopted in 1969, 1970, 1971 and 1972 resolutions in which it recognizes that the problem arose from the denial of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian refugees under the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and that the full respect for the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine is indispensable for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East [resolutions 2535 B (XXIV), 2672 C (XXV), 2792 D (XXVI) and 2963 E (XXVII)].

41. The plight of the displaced persons who have fled from the occupied territories since June 1967 has also received the continued attention of the General Assembly. The Assembly has repeatedly called upon the Government of Israel to take effective and immediate steps for the return without delay of the displaced persons to their homes and camps [resolutions 2252 (ES-V), 2452 A (XXIII), 2672 D (XXV), 2792 E (XXVI) and 2963 D (XXVII)]. In his reports to the Assembly on this subject of 9 September 1969,¹⁰⁹ 27 August 1971 and 13 September 1972,¹¹⁰ the Secretary-General has transmitted the information he has received from the Government of Israel. According to the latest information received, which was dated 8 August 1972, more than 40,000 displaced persons have returned to their homes since 1967. The Israeli Government also indicated that the conditions prevailing in the area did not permit a large-scale return of displaced persons and that the extent and rapidity with which the return could be facilitated was inevitably affected by political and security conditions. The Commissioner-General in his statement to the Special Political Committee during the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly indicated that among the approximately 40,000 displaced persons who had returned some 3,000 were UNRWA refugees.

42. Another specific question considered by the General Assembly concerns the refugees in the Gaza strip. In 1971 the Commissioner-General of UNRWA submitted a special report¹¹¹ on operations carried out by the Israeli military authorities in the Gaza strip that had resulted in the demolition of large numbers of shelters in refugee camps and the removal of approximately 15,000

¹⁰⁹ Doc. 342 in *International Documents on Palestine 1969*.

¹¹⁰ Doc. 6 in *International Documents on Palestine 1972*.

¹¹¹ Doc. 410 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

¹⁰⁸ Doc. 4 in *International Documents on Palestine 1972*.

refugees from those camps. The General Assembly has twice called upon Israel to desist from further destruction of refugee shelters and from further removal of refugees from their present places of residence and to take immediate and effective steps for the return of the refugees concerned to the camps from which they were removed and to provide adequate shelters for their accommodation [resolutions 2792 C (XXVI) and 2963 C (XXVII)]. The Assembly has also called upon Israel to desist from all measures that affect the physical structure and the demographic composition of the Gaza Strip. On 15 September 1972 the Secretary-General submitted a report on the subject to the General Assembly¹¹² based on the information that he had received from the Israeli Government and the Commissioner-General of UNRWA. The Israeli Government indicated that the measures taken by the Israeli authorities were necessitated by security considerations and that where shelters had to be demolished all possible safeguards were taken to avoid undue hardship to the inhabitants of the affected shelters. The Commissioner-General of UNRWA reported that no further demolitions with their attendant removal of refugees had taken place since August 1971, although there had been some demolitions of individual shelters as a punitive or deterrent measure. The Commissioner-General also indicated that according to the Agency's information many refugees affected by the demolitions were still living in unsatisfactory conditions and that he was pursuing the matter with the Israeli authorities.

II. THE SEARCH FOR A SETTLEMENT

Adoption of Security Council resolution 242 (1967)

43. In the discussions in the Security Council and in the General Assembly at its fifth emergency special session following the hostilities of June 1967, the view was widely held that not only should the immediate effects of those hostilities be dealt with, but that the time had come for a peaceful settlement of all aspects of the Middle East situation. Several proposals giving recognition to that view in one form or another were put forward, but none obtained the necessary majority.

44. In November 1967, the Security Council considered several proposals relating to the estab-

lishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East and on 22 November 1967 adopted resolution 242 (1967), the text of which reads as follows:

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East.

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. *Affirms* that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

- (i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
- (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. *Affirms further* the necessity

(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

As I stated in the Security Council on 20 April 1973 [1710th meeting], the activities of the Special Representative in pursuance of resolution 242 (1967) have been described in a series of reports by the Secretary-General, notably the detailed reports of my predecessor dated 4 January 1971 [S/10070] and 30 November 1971 [S/10403].¹¹³

¹¹² Doc. 7 in *International Documents on Palestine 1972*.

¹¹³ Printed in *Interim Documents on Palestine 1970 and 1971* as docs. 329 and 413 respectively.

The information in the sections covering activities up to November 1971 has been taken from those reports, for the most part verbatim.

*Activities of the Special Representative
from December 1967 to May 1968*

45. On 23 November 1967 the Secretary-General reported to the Council [S/8259] that he had invited Ambassador Gunnar Jarring of Sweden to accept the designation as the Special Representative mentioned in paragraph 3 of the Council's above-mentioned resolution. Ambassador Jarring accepted this designation and arrived at United Nations Headquarters on 26 November, where he entered into consultation with the representatives of Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and the United Arab Republic (Syria, the other State concerned, did not at that stage or later accept the Security Council resolution). After those consultations with the parties, Ambassador Jarring established the headquarters of the United Nations Middle East Mission in Cyprus.

46. When the Special Representative first met with the parties in December 1967, he found that the Israeli Government was of the firm view that a settlement of the Middle East question could be reached only through direct negotiations between the parties culminating in a peace treaty and that there could be no question of withdrawal of their forces prior to such a settlement. In a letter dated 27 December, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel communicated to the Special Representative a proposal that Israel and the United Arab Republic representatives should, as a first step, discuss an agenda for peace. The Israeli proposals for such an agenda were:

1. *Political and juridical problems.* The replacement of cease-fire arrangements by peace treaties ending the state of belligerency, ending all hostile acts and threats and embodying a permanent undertaking of mutual non-aggression.

2. *Territorial and security problems.* The determination of agreed territorial boundaries and security arrangements. Agreement on this measure would determine the deployment of armed forces after the cease-fire.

3. *Navigation problems.* Practical methods should be discussed for ensuring free navigation for all States including Israel in the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba when the cease-fire is replaced by peace. In the light of tragic experience, it is evident that international declarations cannot by themselves solve this problem. Concrete measures and guarantees are required.

4. *Economic problems.* Proposals for terminating boycott practices and instituting normal economic relations.

47. The United Arab Republic and Jordan, for their part, insisted that there could be no question of discussions between the parties until the Israeli forces had been withdrawn to the positions occupied by them prior to 5 June 1967. Reacting specifically to the Israeli proposals for discussing an agenda for peace, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic, in an aide-mémoire presented on 30 December 1967, stated that the withdrawal of Israel's forces to the positions held prior to June 1967 was a basic and preliminary step to a peaceful settlement in the Middle East.

48. An Israeli proposal for discussions on an agenda for peace with Jordan was submitted to the Special Representative in a letter dated 7 January 1968. It followed the same general lines as the proposal for the United Arab Republic but contained more detailed suggestions for economic co-operation, as well as the following new topics:

Humanitarian problems. In the proposed negotiation, high priority should be given to a solution of the refugee problem with international and regional co-operation.

Religious and historical sites. Access to sites of special religious significance should be discussed. The Government of Israel clarified its views on this subject in several verbal and written communications to the United Nations.

It was also stated:

In the meantime, it is urgent that breaches of the cease-fire and activities by El Fatah and other such organizations should be suppressed and every effort made on both sides to avoid exchanges of fire.

49. The proposals, when communicated to the Jordanian authorities by the Special Representative, were objected to in the same way as the proposals to the United Arab Republic had been.

50. Faced with these conflicting positions, the Special Representative sought to obtain from the parties an assurance that they would implement Security Council resolution 242 (1967), in the hope that such a declaration would be regarded as a basis for subsequent discussions between the parties. The Special Representative received from the Israeli Foreign Minister a number of written formulations of Israel's position on the Security Council resolution of which the last, dated 19 February 1968, read as follows:

1. The Government of Israel, out of respect for the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967 and responding affirmatively thereto, assures you of its full co-operation in your efforts with the States concerned to promote agreement and to achieve an accepted settlement for the establishment of a just and lasting peace, in accordance with your mandate under the resolution.

2. Israel's position has throughout been that the best way to achieve the objective of the Security Council resolution is through direct negotiations. However, as a further indication of Israel's co-operation, we are willing that this be done in a meeting convened by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

3. On 12 February 1968, I informed you of Israel's acceptance of the Security Council's call in its resolution of 22 November 1967 for the promotion of agreement on the establishment of peace. The United Arab Republic is also aware of Israel's willingness as explained on 1 February to negotiate on all matters included in the Security Council's resolution. We accept the sponsor's view that the principles recommended for inclusion in the peace settlement are integrally linked and interdependent.

4. We have noted the United Arab Republic's willingness to 'implement' the Security Council's resolution and fulfil its obligations thereunder. It is a matter of concern that the United Arab Republic statements, unlike those of Israel, do not specifically use the precise terms of the resolution in such crucial matters as 'agreement' and the 'establishment of a just and lasting peace', and that the United Arab Republic has not yet agreed to a process of negotiation without which, of course, a declaration of willingness to fulfill the resolution is of no substantive effect. The resolution is a framework for agreement. It cannot be fulfilled without a direct exchange of views and proposals leading to bilateral contractual commitments. The United Arab Republic position is, therefore, still deficient in important respects. We are, however, conscious of the importance of the fact that the United Arab Republic and Israel have both responded affirmatively to the call for co-operating with you in the mission laid upon you by the Security Council. At the same time, it would be unrealistic to ignore that there have been sharp differences of interpretation of what the resolution entails. To subscribe to similar declarations does not of itself solve practical issues at stake.

5. It is accordingly urgent to move forward to a more substantive stage and to embark on a meaningful negotiation for achieving the just and lasting peace called for by the Security Council.

In discussions with the Special Representative on that date, the Foreign Minister stated that Israel would not object to an indirect approach to negotiations provided that it was designed to lead to a later stage of direct negotiations and agreement.

51. In a series of meetings with Ambassador

Jarring over this period, the United Arab Republic Foreign Minister gave assurances that the United Arab Republic was ready to implement the Security Council resolution as a whole and to fulfil its obligations under it, but stated that it would not accept direct negotiations. As the Foreign Minister stated in a meeting held on 20 February 1968, the United Arab Republic accepted indirect negotiations; however, the first step must be an Israeli declaration "in clear language" that it would implement the Security Council resolution.

52. The Jordanian authorities expressed a similar point of view to the Special Representative.

53. The Special Representative then proceeded to United Nations Headquarters for consultations with the Secretary-General. Returning to the area at the beginning of March, he informally presented to the parties, to ascertain their reactions, a draft letter from himself to the Secretary-General, which would be worded as follows:

The Governments of Israel and the United Arab Republic [Jordan] have both indicated to me that they accept Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 for achieving a peaceful and accepted settlement of the Middle East question and intend to devise arrangements, under my auspices, for the implementation of the provisions of the resolution.

The two Governments have expressed their willingness to co-operate with me in my capacity as Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the discharge of my tasks of promoting agreement and achieving such a settlement.

In view of the urgency of the situation and with a view to expediting efforts to reach settlement, I have invited the two Governments to meet with me, for conferences within the framework of the Security Council resolution, in Nicosia. I have pleasure in informing you that the two Governments have responded favourably to this invitation.

54. In the ensuing two months, Ambassador Jarring paid repeated further visits to the countries concerned with a view to obtaining their acceptance of the idea of meetings under his auspices. Israel eventually accepted, without conditions, the text proposed by the Special Representative. Jordan and the United Arab Republic continued to press for a more precise declaration by Israel of its willingness to implement the resolution.

55. Eventually the Jordanian authorities indicated that they would accept the text of the Special Representative's draft letter provided the invitation was to meetings in New York, a change of venue that was not acceptable to Israel. Finally, in a

written statement dated 9 May, the United Arab Republic Foreign Minister reaffirmed the readiness of his country's Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York to meet with the Special Representative to continue the contacts which the latter had been having with the parties for the implementation of resolution 242 (1967). In that connexion, he referred to previous suggestions for a time-table for the implementation of the resolution. The United Arab Republic Foreign Minister repeated that the United Arab Republic was ready to implement the resolution as a whole and as a "package deal". He insisted, however, that Israel should do likewise, including complete withdrawal.

56. Ambassador Jarring was faced with a position where there was agreement, though clearly with considerable differences of interpretation, on the first two paragraphs of his proposed invitation, but where there was disagreement on the third paragraph containing the actual invitation. Further journeying backwards and forwards between the various countries was unlikely to be productive. In consultation with the Secretary-General, Ambassador Jarring therefore decided that talks should take place in New York without a formal invitation.

57. During his stay in the Middle East from December 1967 to May 1968, the Special Representative also visited Beirut on three occasions. The Lebanese Government expressed its full support for a solution according to Security Council resolution 242 (1967). Lebanon, however, had no territory under occupation and therefore did not have the same detailed involvement in the settlement as the United Arab Republic and Jordan. The Special Representative did not visit Syria, whose Government, as noted above, had not accepted the Security Council resolution.

58. Ambassador Jarring left the area on 10 May 1968 and arrived at Headquarters on 15 May.

*Activities of the Special Representative
from May 1968 to June 1970*

59. Ambassador Jarring held inconclusive discussions with the Permanent Representatives in New York in May and June 1968, resumed direct contact with the parties in the Middle East in August and September and held discussions in New York with the Foreign Ministers of the parties during the 1968 session of the General Assembly.

In the course of these discussions, the positions of the Governments of Israel and the United Arab Republic were set out in written statements, which made clear the essential differences between them. On the one hand, Israel regarded the Security Council resolution as a statement of principles in the light of which the parties should negotiate peace and, on the other hand, the United Arab Republic considered that the resolution provided a plan for settlement of the Middle East dispute to be implemented by the parties according to modalities to be established by the Special Representative. It was also abundantly clear that there was a crucial difference of opinion over the meaning to be attached to the withdrawal provisions of the Security Council resolution, which according to the Arab States applied to all territories occupied since 5 June 1967 and according to Israel applied only to the extent required when agreement had been reached between the parties on secure and recognized borders between them.

60. The Special Representative made two further visits to the Middle East; first in December 1968 and secondly in March and April 1969. On the latter occasion, he submitted a series of questions to the parties and received detailed replies giving their attitudes towards the various provisions of resolution 242 (1967).¹¹⁴

61. It had been the hope of Ambassador Jarring in submitting his questions, that the replies might show certain encouraging features that might make it possible to invite the parties for a series of meetings between them and him at some mutually convenient place. However, the replies were in general a repetition of attitudes already expressed to Ambassador Jarring on numerous occasions from the beginning of his mission. They showed continued serious divergencies between the Arab States and Israel both as regards the interpretation to be given to the Security Council resolution and as to the procedures for putting its provisions into effect.

62. Ambassador Jarring returned to Headquarters from 12 September to 8 October 1969 and from 10 to 26 March 1970, but found no new elements that would permit him to organize active discussions with the parties.

63. On 3 April 1969, the Permanent Representatives of France, the Union of Soviet Socialist

¹¹⁴ See docs. 44, 59, 386 and 388 in *International Documents on Palestine 1969*.

Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America began a series of meetings on the Middle East question aimed at arriving at a common interpretation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and a common formulation of the general provisions of a peaceful settlement. The meetings continued at various intervals up to September 1971. After each such meeting, the Chairman conveyed the substance of the discussions to the Secretary-General, who kept Ambassador Jarring informed.

Attempt to hold discussions under the Special Representative's auspices (June-September 1970)

64. In June 1970, the Government of the United States of America proposed to the Governments of Israel, Jordan and the United Arab Republic that they should each advise Ambassador Jarring as follows:

(a) that having accepted and indicated their willingness to carry out resolution 242 (1967) in all its parts, they will designate representatives to discussions to be held under his auspices, according to such procedure and at such places and times as he may recommend, taking into account as appropriate each side's preference as to method of procedure and previous experience between the parties;

(b) that the purpose of the aforementioned discussions is to reach agreement on the establishment of a just and lasting peace between them based on (i) mutual acknowledgement by the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Israel of each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence, and (ii) Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict, both in accordance with resolution 242 (1967);

(c) that, to facilitate his task of promoting agreement as set forth in resolution 242 (1967), the parties will strictly observe, effective 1 July at least until 1 October, the cease-fire resolutions of the Security Council.

65. Having been informed by the United States Government that the States concerned had accepted its peace initiative, the Secretary-General invited Ambassador Jarring to return immediately to Headquarters, where he arrived on 2 August. On 3 August, the United States Secretary of State briefed the Secretary-General and the Special Representative on the initiative and communicated the text quoted above.

66. The Secretary-General informed the Security Council in a note dated 7 August [S/9902] that Ambassador Jarring had received confirmation

from the Permanent Representatives of those States of their acceptance and that he had addressed to the Secretary-General a letter as described above. The Secretary-General was informed by the United States Representative that his Government had received the acceptance of the Governments of the United Arab Republic and Israel to a standstill cease-fire for a period of 90 days from 2200 GMT on the same day. The Secretary-General and Ambassador Jarring had previously been informed by the United States Secretary of State that his Government would take responsibility for organizing the standstill cease-fire.

67. Ambassador Jarring at once entered into contact with the parties and, after considering their views on the time and place of the discussions, on 21 August addressed to them invitations to take part in discussions opening at New York on 25 August. He met on the appointed day with representatives of each of the parties. However, the Permanent Representative of Israel, who had been designated by Israel as its representative for the initial phase of the talks, then stated that he had been instructed by his Government to return to Israel for consultations. On his return on 8 September, he communicated to Ambassador Jarring the decision of his Government not to participate in the talks under Ambassador Jarring's auspices so long as the cease-fire standstill agreement was not observed in its entirety. Israel claimed that the Government of Egypt had gravely violated the agreement. The discussions were thus terminated for the time being.

*General Assembly debate of
October and November 1970*

68. On 26 October 1970, the General Assembly, which had had the situation in the Middle East on its agenda since 1967, but had not discussed it, resumed consideration of the question at the request of the United Arab Republic.

69. On 4 November, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2628 (XXV), the operative part of which read as follows:

[See doc. 330 in *International Documents on Palestine 1970*].

Resumption of the discussions

70. Immediately following the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2628 (XXV), Ambassador Jarring entered into contact with the representa-

tives of the parties in order to invite them to re-enter into talks under his auspices for the purpose of reaching agreement on the establishment of a just and lasting peace. The representatives of Jordan and the United Arab Republic informed him that their Governments continued to be willing to do so; the representative of Israel stated that the matter was under consideration in the Israeli Cabinet.

71. On 30 December 1970, Ambassador Jarring received in Moscow a message from the Foreign Minister of Israel in which the latter informed him of the readiness of the Government of Israel to resume its participation in the talks.

72. On 4 January 1971, the Secretary-General issued a comprehensive report [S/10070] covering the activities of his Special Representative up to that date.¹¹⁵

*Discussions under the Special Representative's auspices
(January-March 1971)*

73. Ambassador Jarring resumed his discussions with the parties at Headquarters on 5 January 1971 and pursued them actively. He held a series of meetings with the representatives of Israel (including meetings with the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister during a brief visit to Israel made from 8 to 10 January at the request of that Government), of Jordan, and of the United Arab Republic. In addition, he held meetings with the Permanent Representative of Lebanon, which is also one of the States directly concerned with the Middle East settlement.

74. At an early stage in those meetings Israel presented to Ambassador Jarring, for transmission to the Governments concerned, papers containing its views on the "Essentials of Peace". Subsequently, the United Arab Republic and Jordan having received the respective Israeli papers, presented papers containing their own views concerning the implementation of the provisions of Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

75. During the remainder of January, Ambassador Jarring held further meetings with the representatives of Israel, Jordan and the United Arab Republic, in the course of which he received further memoranda elaborating the positions of the parties. The memoranda indicated that the parties held differing views on the order in which items should

be discussed. More important, each side was insisting that the other should be ready to make certain commitments before being ready to proceed to the stage of formulating the provisions of a peace settlement.

76. On the Israeli side there was insistence that the United Arab Republic should give specific, direct and reciprocal commitments towards Israel that it would be ready to enter into a peace agreement with Israel and to make towards Israel the various undertakings referred to in paragraph 1 (ii) of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). When agreement was reached on those points, it would be possible to discuss others, including the refugee problem; such items as secure and recognized boundaries, withdrawal and additional arrangements for ensuring security should be discussed in due course.

77. The United Arab Republic continued to regard the Security Council resolution as containing provisions to be implemented by the parties and to express its readiness to carry out its obligations under the resolution in full, provided that Israel did likewise. However it held that Israel persisted in its refusal to implement the Security Council resolution, since it would not commit itself to withdraw from all Arab territories occupied in June 1967. Furthermore in the view of the United Arab Republic Israel had not committed itself to the implementation of the United Nations resolutions relevant to a just settlement of the refugee problem.

78. The papers received by Ambassador Jarring from Israel and Jordan relating to peace between those two countries showed a similar divergence of views. Israel stressed the importance of Jordan's giving an undertaking to enter into a peace agreement with it that would specify the direct and reciprocal obligations undertaken by each of them. Jordan emphasized the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and expressed the view that the essential first step towards peace lay in an Israeli commitment to evacuate all Arab territories.

79. Ambassador Jarring felt that at that stage of the talks he should make clear his views on what he believed to be the necessary steps to be taken in order to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), which the parties had agreed to carry

¹¹⁵ Doc. 329 in *International Documents on Palestine 1970*.

out in all its parts. He then reached the conclusion, which was shared by the Secretary-General, that the only possibility of breaking the imminent deadlock arising from the differing views of Israel and the United Arab Republic as to the priority to be given to commitments and undertakings—which seemed to him to be the real cause for the existing immobility in the talks—was for him to seek from each side the parallel and simultaneous commitments that seemed to be inevitable prerequisites of an eventual peace settlement between them. It should thereafter be possible to proceed at once to formulate the provisions and terms of a peace agreement not only for those topics covered by the commitments but with equal priority for other topics, in particular, the refugee question.

80. In identical aide-mémoire handed to the representatives of the United Arab Republic and Israel on 8 February Ambassador Jarring requested those Governments to make to him certain prior commitments. Ambassador Jarring's initiative was on the basis that the commitments should be made simultaneously and reciprocally and subject to the eventual satisfactory determination of all other aspects of a peace settlement, including in particular a just settlement of the refugee problem. Israel would give a commitment to withdraw its forces from occupied United Arab Republic territory to the former international boundary between Egypt and the British Mandate of Palestine. The United Arab Republic would give a commitment to enter into a peace agreement with Israel and to make explicitly therein to Israel, on a reciprocal basis, various undertakings and acknowledgements arising directly or indirectly from paragraph 1 (ii) of Security Council resolution 242 (1967).¹¹⁶

81. On 15 February, Ambassador Jarring received from the representative of the United Arab Republic an aide-mémoire in which it was indicated that the United Arab Republic would accept the specific commitments requested of it, as well as other commitments arising directly or indirectly from Security Council resolution 242 (1967). If Israel would likewise give commitments covering its own obligations under the Security

Council resolution, including commitments for the withdrawal of its armed forces from Sinai and the Gaza Strip and for the achievement of a just settlement of the refugee problem in accordance with United Nations resolutions, the United Arab Republic would be ready to enter into a peace agreement with Israel. Finally the United Arab Republic expressed the view that a just and lasting peace could not be realized without the full and scrupulous implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and the withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces from all the territories occupied since 5 June 1967.¹¹⁷

82. On 17 February, Ambassador Jarring informed the Israeli representatives of the contents of the United Arab Republic reply to his aide-mémoire.

83. On 26 February, Ambassador Jarring received a communication from the representative of Israel, in which, without specific reference to the commitment which he had sought from that Government, Israel stated that it viewed favourably "the expression by the United Arab Republic of its readiness to enter into a peace agreement with Israel" and reiterated that it was prepared for meaningful negotiations on all subjects relevant to a peace agreement between the two countries. Israel gave details of the undertaking which in its opinion should be given by the two countries in such a peace agreement, which should be expressed in a binding treaty in accordance with normal international law and precedent. Israel considered that both parties, having presented their basic positions, should now pursue the negotiations in a detailed and concrete manner without prior conditions.

84. On the crucial question of withdrawal on which Ambassador Jarring had sought a commitment from Israel, the Israeli position was that it would give an undertaking covering withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from "the Israeli-United Arab Republic cease-fire line" to the secure, recognized and agreed boundaries to be established in the peace agreement; Israel would not withdraw to the pre-5 June lines.¹¹⁸

85. On 28 February, Ambassador Jarring informed the United Arab Republic representative of the contents of the Israeli communication.

¹¹⁶ Printed as Annex I to doc. 43 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

¹¹⁷ Printed as doc. 277 in *ibid*.

¹¹⁸ Printed as doc. 42 in *ibid*.

The letter held that it was improper for the Israeli authorities to have responded to his Government's reply, which had been addressed to Ambassador Jarring and which would have full effect only if the Israeli authorities would give the commitment requested of them by Ambassador Jarring.

86. In accepting the the United States proposal for renewed discussions under Ambassador Jarring's auspices [see *S/10070, paras. 33 and 34*], the parties had agreed that they would observe strictly, for a period of 90 days from 7 August 1970, the cease-fire resolutions of the Security Council. In response to the recommendation of the General Assembly in resolution 2628 (XXV), the cease-fire had been extended for a further period of three months. In a report of 1 February 1971 [*S/10070/Add.1*] submitted as that period was expiring, the Secretary-General appealed to the parties at that stage of the discussions to withhold fire, to exercise military restraint and to maintain the quiet that had prevailed in the area since August 1970.

87. In response to that appeal, the Foreign Ministry of Israel, in a communiqué released in Jerusalem on 2 February, announced that Israel would observe the cease-fire on a mutual basis; in a speech to the National Assembly on 4 February, the President of the United Arab Republic declared the decision of the United Arab Republic to refrain from opening fire for a period of 30 days ending on 7 March.

88. In a report dated 5 March, Secretary-General U Thant made the following statement:

Ambassador Jarring has been very active over the past month and some further progress has been made towards a peaceful solution of the Middle East question. The problems to be settled have been more clearly identified and on some there is general agreement. I wish moreover to note with satisfaction the positive reply given by the United Arab Republic to Ambassador Jarring's initiative. However, the Government of Israel has so far not responded to the request of Ambassador Jarring that it should give a commitment of withdrawal to the international boundary of the United Arab Republic.

While I still consider that the situation has considerable elements of promise, it is a matter for increasing concern that Ambassador Jarring's attempt to break the deadlock has not so far been successful. I appeal, therefore, to the Government of Israel to give further consideration to this question and to respond favourably to Ambassador Jarring's initiative.

To give time for further consideration and in the hope that the way forward may be reopened, I once more appeal to the parties to withhold fire, to exercise military restraint and to maintain the quiet which has prevailed in the area since August 1970. [*S/10070/Add.2, paras. 14-16.*]

Further developments (March-November 1971)

89. In response to the Secretary-General's appeal, the Israeli Government once again made clear its willingness to continue to observe the cease-fire on a basis of reciprocity. The President of the United Arab Republic, in a statement to the nation on 7 March, declared that his country no longer considered itself further committed to a cease-fire or to withholding fire. That, however, did not mean that political action would cease.

90. On 11 March, the Israeli representative informed Ambassador Jarring that his Government was awaiting the reaction of the United Arab Republic Government to the Israeli invitation in its reply of 26 February to enter into detailed and concrete discussion [see *para. 83 above*]. When that statement of the Israeli representative was brought to the attention of the United Arab Republic representative, he maintained that his Government was still awaiting an Israeli reply to Ambassador Jarring's aide-mémoire.

91. Subsequently, the talks under Ambassador Jarring's auspices lapsed. He therefore left Headquarters to resume his post as Ambassador of Sweden in Moscow on 25 March.

92. Although he returned to Headquarters from 5 to 12 May and from 21 September to 27 October and held certain consultations elsewhere, Ambassador Jarring found himself faced with the same deadlock and with no possibility of actively pursuing his mission.

93. Indeed, during much of that time the promotion of agreement between the parties was the object of two separate initiatives. The first was an effort by the United States of America to promote an interim agreement providing for the reopening of the Suez Canal, and the second a mission of inquiry conducted by certain African Heads of States on behalf of the Organization of African Unity. Both initiatives were described to Ambassador Jarring and the Secretary-General by the sponsors as designed to facilitate the resumption of Ambassador Jarring's mission. Nevertheless, while they were being pursued, they

obviously constituted an additional reason for him not to take personal initiatives.

94. The Secretary-General and his Special Representative were briefed by the United States Secretary of State on his Government's initiative after his trip to the Middle East in April 1971. However, there has been no subsequent indication of positive results.

95. The Organization of African Unity mission of inquiry, consisting of the Heads of State of the Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Zaire), Nigeria and Senegal, under the chairmanship of the President of Senegal, visited Israel and Egypt on two occasions in November 1971. The report of that mission was communicated to the Secretary-General and to the Special Representative by the President of Mauritania, Chairman of the Committee of 10 African Heads of State to which the mission had reported.

96. The mission noted certain positive elements in the replies it had received from the two Governments. Both parties had renewed their acceptance of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and were ready to resume indirect negotiations under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring. The mission came to the conclusion that the success of renewed negotiations could be regarded as assured, if the practical application of the concept of secure and recognized boundaries did not oblige Egypt to alienate part of its national territory and that it was necessary to obtain Israel's agreement to the putting into effect (without territorial annexation) of arrangements offering sufficient guarantees to ensure its security.

*Discussion at the twenty-sixth session of the
General Assembly*

97. On 30 November 1971, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council and to the General Assembly a comprehensive report [S/10403] on the activities of the Special Representative from 4 January 1971.¹¹⁹ This report contained, *inter alia*, a call by Secretary-General U Thant for the appropriate organs of the United Nations to review the situation once again and to find ways and means to enable the Jarring Mission to move forward.

98. The report was before the General As-

sembly when it debated the situation in the Middle East at its twenty-sixth session. On 13 December 1971, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2799 (XXVI), the operative part of which read as follows:

[See doc. 429 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.]

Further attempts to reactivate the Jarring Mission

99. In consultation with my predecessor, Ambassador Jarring immediately after the adoption of Assembly resolution 2799 (XXVI) held meetings with the Foreign Ministers of Egypt and Israel, who were still in New York, and with the Permanent Representative of Jordan to discuss arrangements for the reactivation of his mission. On assuming office, I invited Ambassador Jarring to come to New York, where further talks took place from 10 to 27 January 1972. After extensive consultations with me, Ambassador Jarring went to West Africa on 28 January and met the President of Senegal, who had been the Chairman of the group of four African Heads of State which had visited Egypt and Israel towards the end of 1971. He also visited the President of Mauritania, who had been Chairman of the Committee of Ten, to which the group of four had reported, and received further information about the results of that visit.

100. After consulting further with me, Ambassador Jarring paid a visit to Cairo, where he met the Egyptian Foreign Minister on 19 and 20 February 1972. He held discussions with the Jordanian authorities in Amman on 23 February and with the Israeli authorities in Jerusalem on 25 February. After reporting to me at Geneva on 27 February, Ambassador Jarring returned to New York, where he continued to see representatives of the parties.

101. In their initial contacts with Ambassador Jarring in New York, the Egyptian representatives took the view that in reactivating his mission, he should ask the Israeli authorities for a commitment to withdraw their troops from occupied Egyptian territory as requested by Ambassador Jarring in his aide-mémoire of 8 February 1971 and as called for in General Assembly resolution 2799 (XXVI). They were not prepared, in the absence of such a commitment, to take part in discussions with the Israeli authorities.

102. On the other hand, the Israeli authorities

¹¹⁹ Printed as doc. 413 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

made it clear that they were not prepared to give the commitment requested or to give any other form of statement of equivalent effect on the question of withdrawal. They reiterated their public statements that they did not consider themselves bound by General Assembly resolution 2799 (XXVI). They stated that they continued to be ready to take part in negotiations with Egypt without prior conditions on all the points raised by each side, which on the Israeli side included the determination of secure and recognized boundaries. However, they held that before discussions could take place under Ambassador Jarring's auspices, he should give an assurance that he considered his mandate to be based solely on Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and that he did not consider himself bound by General Assembly resolution 2799 (XXVI) or by his aide-mémoire of 8 February 1971.

103. Despite this continuing deadlock, Ambassador Jarring persevered in his attempt to reactivate his mission. In the meetings in Cairo, the idea was put forward that, as a means of getting round the deadlock, the parties should exchange, through him, clarifications of their positions on the various subjects dealt with in resolution 242 (1967) with a view to formulating provisions for inclusion in a peace treaty. The Egyptian authorities continued to hold the view that progress towards a settlement lay through the acceptance by Israel of the principle of withdrawal according to Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and of General Assembly resolution 2799 (XXVI); nevertheless, in an effort to break the impasse, they were prepared to take part in the process of clarification.

104. Ambassador Jarring brought the same idea to the attention of the Israeli authorities in Jerusalem and they agreed to give the matter serious consideration. However, when he resumed his discussions with the Israeli representative in New York on 8 March, he was asked to give assurances, which he should also bring to the attention of the Egyptian authorities, that he would be guided solely by Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and that he did not consider himself bound by his aide-mémoire of 8 February 1971 and General Assembly resolution 2799 (XXVI).

105. Ambassador Jarring, after consulting with me, assured the Israeli Government that his mandate was defined in Security Council resolution 242 (1967). However, General Assembly resolution 2799 (XXVI), which endorsed Ambassador Jarring's aide-mémoire of 8 February 1971, represented the constitutionally adopted judgement of a major organ of the United Nations and had to be regarded as such. It was indicated to the Israeli authorities that their acceptance of the Assembly resolution was not a condition for the clarification procedure that had been suggested.

106. In the event, it was not possible to reactivate the mission of Ambassador Jarring with regard to Egypt and Israel.

107. In his discussions with the Jordanian authorities, Ambassador Jarring found them concerned about lack of progress. In their view, the withdrawal of Israeli forces in their sector was a highly important matter, as it affected a very large population living under occupation or as refugees. If talks were reactivated with regard to Egypt and Israel, they were anxious that they should be carried out simultaneously as regards Israel and Jordan.

108. In view of the continuing deadlock, Ambassador Jarring returned to his post in Moscow on 24 March. Subsequently, he returned to Headquarters from 1 to 4 May and from 1 to 12 August for a further review of the positions of the parties and consultations with all concerned. He also had other contacts elsewhere with representatives of the parties and met twice with me in July 1972 in Geneva to discuss what further useful action might be taken. He also returned to Headquarters at the beginning of the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly and again just prior to the Assembly debate on the situation in the Middle East.

109. However, as I stated in my report dated 15 September 1972 on the activities of the Special Representative:

In spite of our continued efforts, it has not been possible to make substantial progress. As can be seen from published statements of the parties, an agreed basis for discussions under Ambassador Jarring's auspices does not seem to exist at the present time. Despite this situation, we shall continue our efforts. [*S/10792, para. 5.*]

*Discussion at the twenty-seventh session
of the General Assembly*

110. The General Assembly held a further discussion of the situation in the Middle East from 29 November to 8 December 1972.¹²⁰ At the conclusion of the discussion, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2949 (XXVII), the operative part of which read as follows:

[See doc. 10 in *International Documents on Palestine 1972*.]

*Situation since the adoption of
General Assembly resolution 2949 (XXVII)*

111. The General Assembly in its resolution envisaged further action by the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, for whose efforts it expressed full support. However, the parties have continued to maintain their respective positions as previously explained.

112. Thus the basic deadlock remains. In the circumstances, Ambassador Jarring concluded, and I concurred, that there was no useful action that he could take following adoption of General Assembly resolution 2949 (XXVII), and he remained at his post as Swedish Ambassador in Moscow until after the adoption of Security Council resolution 331 (1973).

113. The problem of the Middle East has preoccupied me ever since I became Secretary-General. In an effort to find any way of making progress towards a settlement I have engaged in continuous discussions not only with the Foreign Ministers and representatives of the parties themselves, but also with numerous other Governments that are concerned with the problem. I have also been in continuous touch with the members of the Security Council on the question, and I have been alert to any changes of attitude or of procedures that might lead to progress in achieving a peaceful settlement.

III. OBSERVATIONS

114. Although the Security Council has in the last six years dealt with a number of different aspects of the Middle East problem, it has not considered the problem as a whole since the

adoption of resolution 242 (1967) on 22 November 1967. In its forthcoming meetings the Council will therefore, in a sense, be taking up the consideration of the Middle East question where it left off at that time.

115. For more than 25 years, the United Nations, and in particular the Security Council, has had a major and universally recognized responsibility in relation to the Middle East question. It should not be forgotten that although the United Nations has not proved able, in this very difficult situation, to bring about a just and lasting settlement, various instrumentalities of the United Nations set up by the Security Council and by the General Assembly have, throughout this period, played an important role in limiting conflict and in preserving the tenuous truce which has prevailed in the area for most of the time.

116. The problem before the Council is an extremely complex and difficult one, which no Government or group of Governments has been able to solve outside the framework of the United Nations. But the procedures of the Council still offer valuable possibilities for limiting conflict and also for assisting the countries of the region to find the way to a solution to their problems, if they so wish. The Security Council is, as far as I know, the only forum where all the parties to the conflict have been able to meet together in the same room. In the forthcoming debate it is to be hoped that this advantage may be used for constructive moves towards a settlement.

117. Five and a half years have passed since the adoption of resolution 242 (1967), and, after many and various attempts to pursue the aims of that resolution, the Council itself is now resuming the search for peace in the Middle East. It goes without saying that I as Secretary-General, my Special Representative, Ambassador Jarring, the Secretariat, and the various instrumentalities of the United Nations in the Middle East are at the disposal of the Governments concerned and of the Council itself to assist in whatever way we can in the Council's efforts. Obviously these efforts can only be useful if the parties concerned wish to avail themselves of them. But if that wish is present, the new effort to find a way to a settlement in the Middle East need not be futile. That effort should include a new appraisal of the possibilities and procedures of the Council itself for conciliation and an exploration of all the means by which

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, Twenty-seventh Session, Plenary Meetings, 2092nd, 2094th, 2095th, 2097th to 2103rd and 2105th meetings. [Original note.]

the framework of the United Nations might be used to assist the parties in reaching a just and lasting settlement.

118. Certainly both reason and self-interest indicate that such a settlement is long overdue. The tensions and conflicts of the Middle East are a heavy burden not only on the countries of the area, but also on the international community itself. It is my earnest hope that in embarking on this new effort all those concerned will find it possible to look to the future and to take advantage of the international instrumentalities at their disposal and of the general and fervent desire of the international community to open a new and more harmonious chapter in the history of the Middle East.

9

Reports by UNTSO Chief of Staff Siilasvuo giving first information on the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East¹²¹

October 6, 1973

The following interim reports on the situation in the cease-fire sectors on 6 October 1973 have been received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

1. The first report dispatched at 1214 GMT reads: "General heavy activity along Israel-Syrian and Suez Canal sectors. Further information will follow".

2. The second report dispatched at 1221 GMT reads: "General air and ground activity now in Israel-Syria, Suez Canal and Israel-Lebanon sectors. OP Copper (Suez Canal sector) reports ground fighting in its area on east side of the Suez Canal. OP Khiam (Israel-Lebanon sector) reports air activity and anti-aircraft fire in Arkoub region."

3. The third report, dispatched at 1340 GMT reads: "General heavy air and ground activity continues along all sectors. Egyptian ground forces have crossed the Suez Canal in vicinity of OPs Copper, Yellow, Pink, Red and Blue. Syrian forces have crossed the area between the limits of the forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire lines in the vicinity of Quneitra and

near OP November. Detailed summaries of incidents now under preparation."

10

Report by UNTSO Chief of Staff Siilasvuo detailing the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East¹²²

October 6, 1973

Further to the information contained in document S/7930/Add.2141, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo, has submitted the following additional interim report concerning the situation in the cease-fire sectors as of 1400 hours¹²³ on 6 October 1973:

Israel-Syria sector

1. OP reports on ground activity:¹²⁴

(a) OPs Zodiac and One: From 1158 and still in progress intense artillery fire by Syrian forces. From 1300 and still in progress Syrian forces tanks, vehicles and infantry crossed SFDLs (the Syrian forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire lines on the Syrian side) in the vicinity of OP Zodiac.

(b) OPs Yoke, X-Ray and Six: From 1156 and still in progress intense artillery, tank and rocket fire by Israel and Syrian forces (exchange of fire). United Nations Military observers could not determine which party fired first. From 1225 and still in progress Syrian forces tanks, armoured personnel carriers and infantry crossed SFDLs between OPs Yoke and X-Ray.

(c) OPs Winter, Five and Two: From 1203 and still in progress intense artillery and tank fire by Syrian forces. Syrian forces tanks crossed SFDLs westward in vicinity of OP Winter.

(d) OPs Three, Victor, Uniform, Four and November: From 1158 and still in progress intense artillery and tank fire by Syrian forces. From 1230 and still in progress Syrian forces tanks, armoured personnel carriers and infantry crossed SFDLs in vicinity of OP Uniform.

(e) OPs Sierra, Romeo and Seven: From 1200 and still in progress intense artillery fire by Syrian forces. From 1252 and still in progress Syrian

¹²² UN doc. S/7930/Add. 2142.

¹²³ All times GMT [Original note.]

¹²⁴ The locations of the observation posts established by UNTSO are given in document S/7930/Add.1788. [Original note.]

¹²¹ UN doc. S/7930/Add. 2141.

forces tanks and infantry crossed SFDLs in vicinity of OP Sierra.

2. OP reports on air activity:

(a) OP Victor: Between 1157 and 1158 Syrian forces jet aircraft attacked with bombs target south-south-west of OP.

(b) OP Romeo: Between 1158 and 1159 Syrian forces jet aircraft attacked with rockets target north of OP.

(c) OP Three: Between 1159 and 1200 Syrian forces jet aircraft attacked with rockets target north of OP.

Suez-Canal Sector

1. OP reports on ground activity:

(a) OPs Green and Charlie: From 1200 and still in progress intense artillery fire by Egyptian forces. From 1212 and still in progress intense artillery fire by Israel forces (exchange of fire).

(b) OPs Pink, Kilo, Lima, Red, Blue and Mike: from 1200 and still in progress intense artillery and mortar fire by Egyptian forces. At 1210 Egyptian forces crossed the Canal from west to east in vicinity of OPs Kilo, Lima, Pink, Red and Blue.

(c) OPs Hotel, Foxtrot and Silver: From 1201 and still in progress intense artillery and mortar fire by Egyptian forces. At 1210 Egyptian forces crossed Canal from west to east in vicinity of OPs.

d) OPs Copper, Echo and Yellow: From 1202 and still in progress artillery and mortar fire by Egyptian forces. At 1210 Egyptian forces crossed Canal in vicinity of OPs Copper and Yellow.

(e) OP Orange: At 1210 Egyptian forces crossed Canal from west to east in vicinity of OP.

2. OP reports on air activity:

OP Blue: Between 1203 and 1204 Egyptian forces jet aircraft attacked with rockets targets north-east and south-east of OP.

11

Report by the Secretary-General reviewing the status of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO)¹²⁵

October 22, 1973

1. The status of the United Nations military observers of the United Nations Truce Super-

vision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO) as of 1200 hours GMT 22 October 1973 is as follows:

UNTSO Headquarters at Government House, Jerusalem

Chief of Staff of UNTSO

8 observers

Israel-Lebanon sector

ILMAC¹²⁶ headquarters, Beirut,
and 5 OPs

32 observers based
at Beirut

Israel-Syria Sector

(a) ISMAC¹²⁷ headquarters, Damascus,
and 9 OPs (5 closed)

47 observers based
at Damascus

(b) Tiberias Control Centre, Quneitra
Outstation and 7 OPs (3 closed).

41 observers based
at Tiberias

Suez Canal sector

West side of Canal

UNTSO Liaison Office at Cairo,
Ismailia Control Centre (closed)
and 9 OPs (all closed)

42 observers based
at Cairo

East side of Canal

(a) Kantara Control Centre at Rabah

2 observers

(b) Gaza Outstation

2 observers

(c) 0 OPs (all closed)

39 observers based
at Jerusalem
(2 are still missing)

Israel-Jordan sector

UNTSO Liaison Office at Amman

2 observers

2. It may be useful to recall briefly the history of UNTSO:

(a) UNTSO was initially established in June 1948 for the purpose of supervising the truce called for by the Security Council in pursuance of the Council's resolutions 50 (1948) of 29 May 1948 and 54 (1948) of 15 July 1948.

(b) After the four General Armistice Agreements concerning the Middle East had been concluded

¹²⁶ Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission.

¹²⁷ Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission.

¹²⁵ UN doc. S/7930/Add. 2210.

in 1949 under the auspices of the United Nations Mediator, UNTSO, under Security Council resolution 73 (1949) of 11 August 1949, was given the task of assisting the parties in the supervision of the Armistice Agreements.

(c) After the hostilities of June 1967, three cease-fire observation operations were established by UNTSO in pursuance of Security Council decisions: one in the Israel-Syria sector in accordance with Security Council resolutions 235 (1967) of 9 June 1967 and 236 (1967) of 12 June 1967;¹²⁸ one in the Suez Canal sector in pursuance of the Security Council consensus of 9/10 July 1967;¹²⁹ and one in the Israel-Lebanon sector in pursuance of the Security Council consensus of 19 April 1972.¹³⁰

3. As indicated in the reports submitted by the Secretary-General to the Security Council following the outbreak of hostilities in October 1973, all the OPs in the Suez Canal sector have had to be evacuated (S/7930/Add. 2161 and 2165). Similarly eight OPs in the Israel-Syria sector have had to be evacuated (see S/7930/Add.2204, para. 2, and Add.2205, para. 2). The remaining eight OPs in the Israel-Syria sector, as well as the Quneitra Outstation, have continued to function, despite damage to their facilities. In the Israel-Lebanon sector all five OPs have remained fully operational. Reports received from the five OPs in the Israel-Lebanon sector, as well as the eight remaining OPs in the Israel-Syria sector, are transmitted to the Security Council in the S/7930/Add. . . . series. This practice will continue.

4. It is with the greatest regret that the Secretary-General informs the Security Council that, in spite of intensive efforts to trace them, two observers from OP Copper in the Suez Canal sector, Captain G. Banse (France) and Captain C. Olivieri (Italy), are still missing. An active effort is still being made to trace them. It will also be recalled that Captain D. Tjorswaag of Norway and his wife and daughter were killed in Damascus on 9 October 1973. The Secretary-General wishes to reiterate here his deep appreciation to all the military observers and the supporting personnel of UNTSO for their courage and devotion to duty. Since the outbreak of fighting on

6 October 1973 they have carried out their tasks in an exemplary manner, despite great difficulties and danger and have rendered outstanding service to the Organization.

5. Pending a further directive from the Security Council, the Secretary-General has instructed the Chief of Staff of UNTSO to hold the United Nations military observers in readiness in their present locations.

12

Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 339 (1973)¹³¹

October 24, 1973

1. In its resolution 339 (1973) of 23 October 1973, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General "to take measures for immediate dispatch of United Nations observers to supervise the observance of the cease-fire between the forces of Israel and the Arab Republic of Egypt, using for this purpose the personnel of the United Nations now in the Middle East and first of all the personnel now in Cairo". This report on the implementation of the Security Council resolution is based on information received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo, as of 2030 hours¹³² on 24 October 1973.

2. At 2335 hours on 23 October General Siilasvuo informed the Secretary-General that he had instructed the Officer-in-Charge of Ismailia Control Centre to deploy as soon as possible and as a first step, in co-operation with the Egyptian authorities, three observer teams, one in the northern sector, one in the central sector and one in the southern sector of the Suez Canal area. General Siilasvuo also indicated that the Israeli military authorities had been informed of this and that he would discuss with them a similar observation operation based on Kantara Control Centre at Rabah on the east side of the Canal. The above information was conveyed to the Security Council by the Secretary-General at its 1748th meeting on the same day.

¹²⁸ See docs. 244 and 245 in *International Documents on Palestine 1967*.

¹²⁹ See doc. 258 in *ibid*.

¹³⁰ See doc. 15 in *International Documents on Palestine 1972*.

¹³¹ UN doc. S/7930/Add.2219. For the resolution see doc. 35 below.

¹³² All times GMT. [Original note.]

3. The following instructions were issued to the three observer teams:

(a) The northern team would divide into two patrols, one patrol (patrol 11) to proceed via Port Said to the vicinity of AMR (approximate map reference) 748-945 and one patrol (patrol 12) to proceed to the vicinity of AMR 745-900.

(b) The central team would divide into two patrols, one patrol (patrol 13) to proceed to the vicinity of Abu Suweir station (AMR 722-873) and one patrol (patrol 14) to proceed to the road junction 11 kilometres south-west of Abu Suweir.

(c) The southern team would divide into three patrols, one patrol (patrol 15) to proceed along the new road north and parallel to the railroad line to the vicinity of Gebel Eweibid station (AMR 730-827), one patrol (patrol 16) to proceed along the desert road to the vicinity of the road junction at AMR 730-818 and one patrol (patrol 17) to proceed along the road from Cairo to AMR 745-777 south of Gebel Ataqah Tehn, north east to Maj Mat Sidi Asadat (AMR 756-790, approximately 20 kilometres south-south-west of Suez).

(d) Each patrol must be accompanied by a liaison officer from the Egyptian forces as is the invariable practice for UNTSO patrols.

4. As soon as the required Liaison Officers were made available by the Egyptian authorities, the United Nations observer patrols set off. As of 1030 hours on 24 October seven observer patrols were on the move from Cairo to the points indicated in the paragraph above.

5. By 1600 hours, 24 October, the Ismailia Control Centre had reoccupied its former headquarters at Ismailia and resumed operations. The situation regarding the seven patrols as reported by the Control Centre as of 2030 hours is as follows:

(a) *Patrol 11*: On move to its assigned location. No contact with the patrol since 1540 hours.

(b) *Patrol 12*: In assigned location (AMR 745-900) as of 2000 hours.

(c) *Patrols 13 and 14*: They have reached the location assigned for patrol 14, 18 kilometres south-west of Abu Suweir. Between 1745 and 1753 patrol 14 reported sporadic tank fire and intense small-arms fire by unidentified forces.

(d) *Patrols 15, 16 and 17*: They were in the vicinity of the location assigned for patrol 15 (AMR 730-827) but had to withdraw westward owing to the intense exchange of tank and artillery fire

between Egyptian and Israeli forces which was in progress in that area. The patrols would proceed to their assigned locations morning of 25 October.

6. General Siilasvuo also tried to dispatch observer patrols from Kantara Control Centre at Rabah. However, in his discussions with the Israeli authorities in the early morning of 24 October, they initially stated that United Nations military observers should not proceed to the battle zone before there was an effective cease-fire. In this connexion the Defence Minister of Israel, General Dayan, requested General Siilasvuo to convey to the Egyptian authorities the following message: "Defence Minister Dayan wishes to know if cease-fire can be agreed upon between Egyptian and Israeli forces commencing at 0500 hours today 24 October." This message was immediately passed to the Egyptian authorities in Cairo who accepted the cease-fire proposal. During the day of 24 October it was not possible to dispatch United Nations observers to the forward positions from the Israel side. However, after the Secretary-General and his collaborators at Headquarters had got in touch with the Israel Permanent Representative and with General Siilasvuo in Jerusalem, the Permanent Representative of Israel officially assured the Secretary-General that the Israel forces would fully co-operate with General Siilasvuo in regard to the deployment of observers. Upon being informed of this, General Siilasvuo initiated urgent measures to deploy observers on the Israel side. He has reported that six patrols from Kantara Control Centre at Rabah are expected to move towards Israel forward defended localities along the northern, central and southern parts of the Egypt-Israel front on 25 October.

7. As of 1330 hours on 24 October General Siilasvuo had received four complaints from the Egyptian authorities and one from the Israel authorities as follows:

(a) The first Egyptian complaint reads: "The ARE authorities strongly protest against the movement and redeployment of Israel forces in the southern sector of the Suez Canal zone outside of the 22 October cease-fire lines, breaching both Security Council resolutions, requiring cease-fire and withdrawal to the above-mentioned cease-fire lines."

(b) The second Egyptian complaint is as follows: "Since 0600 hours on 24 October Israel

forces have been firing with tanks and machine-guns on troops and civilians in the southern sector of the Canal. At 0730 Israel forces assaulted and occupied the naval base of Adabia (approximately 7 kilometres south-south-west of Suez). We strongly protest against these flagrant violations of the cease-fire resolutions."

(c) The third Egyptian complaint reads: "At 0815 on 24 October three Israel forces armed motor boats entered the Port of Adabia. We strongly protest against this serious breach of the cease-fire resolutions."

(d) The fourth Egyptian complaint alleged that on the morning of 24 October Israel forces had attacked the Egyptian Third Army in the desert south-east of Suez and east of the Canal after the agreed time for the cease-fire.

(e) The Israeli complaint alleged that since 0500 hours on 24 October Egyptian forces had been violating the cease-fire in the area of the Suez-Cairo road and south of the Bitter Lakes, using tanks, artillery and aircraft.

The above complaints were not confirmed by United Nations observation as at the times mentioned in the complaints United Nations military observers were not yet deployed for observation of the cease-fire.

8. General Siilasvuo has recommended an increase, as soon as possible, in the number of observer teams to a total of twelve, six on each side. This would require 132 observers, including staff, for the Suez Canal sector and an increase of 43 military observers above the currently authorized total of 221 for the entire mission. The Secretary-General has approached a number of Governments which are already providing observers in the Suez Canal sector, with a view to obtaining the required additional observers.

13

Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 340 (1973)¹³³

October 27, 1973

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of Security Council resolution 340 (1973) of 25

October 1973 in which the Council, among other things, decided to set up immediately a United Nations Emergency Force under its authority and requested the Secretary-General to report within 24 hours on the steps taken to this effect.

Terms of reference

2. (a) The Force will supervise the implementation of operative paragraph 1 of resolution 340 (1973), which reads as follows:

"1. Demands that immediate and complete cease-fire be observed and that the parties return to the positions occupied by them at 1650 hours GMT on 22 October 1973;"

(b) The Force will use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of the fighting, and co-operate with the International Committee of the Red Cross in its humanitarian endeavours in the area.

(c) In the fulfilment of its tasks, the Force will have the co-operation of the military observers of UNTSO.

General considerations

3. Three essential conditions must be met for the Force to be effective. Firstly, it must have at all times the full confidence and backing of the Security Council. Secondly, it must operate with the full co-operation of the parties concerned. Thirdly, it must be able to function as an integrated and efficient military unit.

4. Having in mind past experience, I would suggest the following guidelines for the proposed Force:

(a) The Force will be under the command of the United Nations, vested in the Secretary-General, under the authority of the Security Council. The command in the field will be exercised by a Force Commander appointed by the Secretary-General with the consent of the Security Council. The Commander will be responsible to the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General shall keep the Security Council fully informed of developments relating to the functioning of the Force. All matters which may affect the nature or the continued effective functioning of the Force will be referred to the Council for its decision.

(b) The Force must enjoy the freedom of movement and communication and other facilities that are necessary for the performance of its tasks. The Force and its personnel should be

¹³³ UN doc. S/11052/Rev.1. For the resolution see doc. 36 below.

granted all relevant privileges and immunities provided for by the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. The Force should operate at all times separately from the armed forces of the parties concerned. Consequently separate quarters and, wherever desirable and feasible, buffer zones will have to be arranged with the co-operation of the parties. Appropriate agreements on the Status of the Force will have to be concluded with the parties to cover the above requirements.

(c) The Force will be composed of a number of contingents to be provided by selected countries, upon the request of the Secretary-General. The contingents will be selected in consultation with the Security Council and with the parties concerned, bearing in mind the accepted principle of equitable geographic representation.

(d) The Force will be provided with weapons of defensive character only. It shall not use force except in self-defence. Self-defence would include resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council. The Force will proceed on the assumption that the parties to the conflict will take all the necessary steps for compliance with the decisions of the Security Council.

(e) In performing its functions, the Force will act with completed impartiality and will avoid actions which could prejudice the rights, claims or positions of the parties concerned which in no way affect the implementation of operative paragraph 1 of resolution 340 (1973) and operative paragraph 1 of resolution 339 (1973).

(f) The supporting personnel of the Force will be provided as a rule by the Secretary-General from among existing United Nations staff. Those personnel will, of course, follow the rules and regulations of the United Nations Secretariat.

Proposed plan of action

5. If the Security Council is in agreement with the principles outlined above, I intend to take the following urgent steps:

(a) I propose, with the consent of the Security Council, to appoint the Commander of the Emergency Force as soon as possible. Pending the Commander's arrival in the mission area, with the consent of the Council given at its meeting of 25 October 1973, I have appointed the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General E. Siilasvuo,

as interim Commander of the Emergency Force, and have asked him to set up a provisional headquarters staff consisting of personnel from UNTSO.

(b) In order that the Force may fulfil the responsibility entrusted to it, it is considered necessary that it have a strength in the order of 7,000.

(c) The Force would initially be stationed in the area for a period of six months.

(d) In my letter of 25 October to the President of the Security Council, I proposed, as an urgent interim measure and in order that the Emergency Force may reach the area as soon as possible, to arrange for the contingents of Austria, Finland and Sweden now serving with the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) to proceed immediately to Egypt. I am at present actively engaged in the necessary consultations, bearing in mind the considerations in paragraph 4 (c) above, with a view to making requests to a number of other Governments to provide contingents of suitable size for the Force at the earliest possible time. As the Members of the Council are aware, this is a complex matter in which a number of factors have to be taken into account. I shall report further to the Council as soon as possible.

(e) In addition to the countries requested to provide contingents for the Force, I propose to request logistic support as necessary from a number of other countries, which may include the Permanent Members of the Security Council.

Estimated cost and method of financing

6. At the present time there are many unknown factors. The best possible preliminary estimate based upon past experience and practice is approximately \$30,000,000 for a Force of 7,000, all ranks, for a period of six months.

7. The costs of the Force shall be considered as expenses of the Organization to be borne by the Members in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter.

14

Progress report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations Emergency Force¹³⁴**October 28, 1973***Establishment and Command of the Force*

1. By its resolution 340 (1973) of 25 October 1973, the Security Council decided to set up immediately under its authority a United Nations Emergency Force, and by resolution 341 (1973) of 27 October it decided that the Force shall be established in accordance with the Secretary-General's report of the same date on the implementation of resolution 340 (1973) (S/11052/Rev. 1).

2. On 25 October, the Secretary-General in a letter to the President of the Security Council proposed certain interim measures in order that the Emergency Force (UNEF) should reach the area as soon as possible, and the Council authorized the Secretary-General to proceed in accordance with this proposal.

3. Accordingly, the Secretary-General immediately appointed Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, as the interim Commander of UNEF. General Siilasvuo set up the provisional headquarters of the Force in Cairo, staffed by a provisional headquarters staff consisting of personnel from UNTSO.

Composition

4. The Secretary-General also arranged for military personnel of the contingents of Austria, Finland and Sweden serving with the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) to proceed immediately, with the concurrence of the Governments of those three countries, to Egypt as the first elements of UNEF. The Government of Cyprus and the Governments of Greece and Turkey were consulted and raised no objections, subject to rapid replacement in Cyprus of the units transferred to UNEF. The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland promptly made available, free of charge to the United Nations, aircraft of the

Royal Air Force to transport the troops to Egypt.

5. The first flight carrying 35 Finnish soldiers of UNFICYP, including the contingent Commander, left Cyprus at 1832 GMT on 26 October. On their arrival in Cairo they were received by General Siilasvuo who assumed command. The Emergency Force was thus established. There followed within less than two hours flights carrying 27 Austrian and 40 Swedish officers and other ranks from UNFICYP, and flights continued thereafter at frequent intervals.

6. By 0600 GMT on 28 October, the strength of the Force was as follows:

Austria	166
Finland	215
Sweden	<u>204</u>

Total 585

In addition, 48 vehicles as well as other contingent freight and equipment totalling 443,591 lbs have been delivered in Cairo.

7. The Secretary-General has requested the three Governments to take urgent measures to bring their contingents up to the strength of an effective working battalion for the purposes of the United Nations Emergency Force.

8. At the request of the Secretary-General, the Government of Norway has offered to provide transport aircraft for the Swedish reinforcements. This service is being provided free of charge to the United Nations.

9. The Secretary-General has been in touch with the Government of Ireland with a view to having the personnel of the Irish contingent serving with UNFICYP transferred to UNEF very shortly.

10. As the members of the Security Council were informed on 27 October 1973, the Secretary-General has requested the Government of Canada to provide the logistic component of the Force.

11. The Secretary-General wishes to express his appreciation to all the Governments who have made this rapid initial establishment of the Force possible. He also wishes to take this opportunity to express his appreciation to those Governments who have offered contingents for the Force. As stated in his report to the Security Council (S/11052/Rev.1, paragraph 5 (d)), consultations are in progress on the further additions to the Force.

Deployment

12. The first advance party of 50 all ranks from the Finnish contingent established a United Na-

¹³⁴ UN doc. S/11056; a number of further progress reports were submitted by the Secretary-General under the numbers S/11056/Add.1 etc.

tions presence in the Israel-controlled area west of Suez city on 27 October. The main body of Finnish troops was to be deployed in the area on 28 October.

13. In this area, at kilometre marker 109 on the Cairo-Suez road, a meeting took place on 27 October at 2340 GMT between high level military representatives of Egypt and Israel in the presence of UNEF representatives. UNEF was represented by the Commander of the Finnish contingent and an Irish officer from UNEF headquarters. The preliminary exchange of views covered matters relating to the observance of the cease-fire as well as humanitarian questions.

14. The advance party of the Swedish contingent has arrived in Ismailia and will be reinforced shortly.

15. The Austrian contingent, now in Cairo, will be deployed in the Bitter Lakes area south of Ismailia as soon as the necessary logistic arrangements have been completed.

16. The Force Commander has initiated discussions at a high level with both parties, and co-ordination arrangements are being established with the Egyptian and Israel authorities.

17. In its activities, UNEF has enjoyed the full co-operation of the military observers of UNTSO, who have been operating patrols in the area. General Siilasvuo is ensuring that the operations of both organizations are co-ordinated.

Humanitarian activities

18. The Secretary-General's report as approved by the Council (S/11052/Rev.1, paragraph 2 (b)) requires the Force to "co-operate with the International Committee of the Red Cross in its humanitarian endeavours in the area". UNEF headquarters has established contact with Red Cross representatives for this purpose.

19. At the meeting referred to in paragraph 13 above, which was held on 27/28 October between Israeli and Egyptian officers in the presence of UNEF representatives, it was agreed that a convoy consisting of some 100 lorries driven in groups by UNEF military personnel would proceed from a point on the forward edge of the Egyptian line on the Cairo-Suez road through Israel held territory to a point on the western bank of the Suez Canal. The contents of each lorry would then be loaded into ferries or amphibious vehicles by a group of Egyptian soldiers

crossing the Canal for this purpose unarmed. Members of the Israel forces would check the contents of the lorries at the loading point under UNEF and Red Cross supervision. UNEF personnel would also be stationed at the east bank of the Canal to supervise the unloading from ferries or amphibious vehicles.

20. In accordance with this agreement, a convoy comprising 125 lorries started in the morning of 28 October and reached the forward edge of the Egyptian line at 0657 GMT. At 0820 GMT hours the first group of 10 lorries with UNEF drivers proceeded through Israel held territory.

* * *

21. The Secretary-General wishes to pay tribute to the interim Commander of the Force, General Siilasvuo, his staff, and to the officers and men of the Force, as well as to the Commander and personnel of UNFICYP, for the speed and efficiency with which they have carried out the first stages of the mandate entrusted to UNEF by the Security Council.

15

Report by the Secretary-General on the status of the ceasefire observation operations in the Middle East¹³⁵

October 29, 1973

1. With the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East (see document S/11055), there are now two United Nations peace-keeping missions in the Middle East: the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO). It may be useful to outline briefly the status of the cease-fire observation operations carried out by UNTSO.

Egypt-Israel sector

2. In pursuance with the consensus approved by the Security Council on 9/10 July 1967, United Nations military observers were stationed along the Suez Canal on both sides of it to observe the cease-fire. Fifteen observation posts (OPs) were established for this purpose, eight on the

¹³⁵ UN doc. S/11057.

east side of the Canal and seven on the west side (see S/7930/Add.1788).

3. As reported in documents S/7930/Add.2161 and 2165 those OPs had to be evacuated following the outbreak of hostilities on 6 October 1973, and by 9 October all the OPs had been closed.

4. Following the adoption of Security Council resolution 339 (1973) of 23 October 1973, the Chief of Staff made arrangements for the deployment of United Nations observers in the vicinity of the forward defended localities (FDLs) of the Egyptian and Israeli forces in order to supervise the cease-fire called for by the Security Council. There are now at present nine United Nations patrols from the Egyptian side controlled from the Ismailia Control Centre and six from the Israeli side controlled from the Kantara Control Centre (at Rabah).

5. As of 28 October those patrols are in the following localities:¹³⁶

Ismailia Control Centre

Patrol 11	AMR 741-909
Patrol 12	AMR 745-890
Patrol 13	AMR 740-871
Patrol 14	AMR 712-857
Patrol 15	AMR 729-827
Patrol 16	AMR 729-827
Patrol 17	(20 kilometres south-west of Suez)
Patrol 18	(at Ismailia Control Centre)
Patrol 19	AMR 729-827

Kantara Control Centre

Patrol 21	AMR 751-911
Patrol 22	AMR 752-882
Patrol 23	AMR 757-813
Patrol 24	(1 kilometre north of Adabiya)
Patrol 25	AMR 779-833
Patrol 26	AMR 776-814

6. The United Nations military observers have continued to carry out their observation duties after the establishment of UNEF. As provided for in the report of the Secretary-General of 27 October 1973 (S/11052/Rev.1) UNEF will have

the co-operation of the military observers of UNTSO in the fulfilment of its tasks.

Israel-Syria sector

7. The cease-fire observation operation in the Israel-Syria sector was first set up in pursuance of Security Council resolutions 235 (1967) of 9 June 1967 and 236 (1967) of 12 June 1967. In this connexion, seven OPs, as well as the Quneitra Outstation, were established along the limits of the Israel forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire line on the Israeli side and nine OPs were established on the Syrian side.

8. During the hostilities of 6 October 1973, eight OPs were evacuated, but the remaining ones have continued to function (see S/7930/Add.2161, 2204 and 2205).

9. Following the adoption of Security Council resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973), the existing cease-fire arrangements were readjusted to the new situation and some of the United Nations military observers were redeployed. According to the redeployment plan, three OPs and the Quneitra Outstation on the Israel side and two OPs on the Syrian side have continued to function as before, while the duties previously performed by the other OPs have been transferred to the United Nations patrols. Those on the Israeli side are controlled by the Tiberias Control Centre, and those on the Syrian side by the headquarters of the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission (ISMAC) in Damascus.

10. As of 28 October the following OPs and patrols are in operation:

ISMAC, Damascus

OP Uniform	MR 2366-2621
OP Romeo	MR 2294-2459
Patrol 31	AMR 2449-2982
Patrol 23	AMR 2299-3078
Patrol 33	AMR 2444-2814
Patrol 34	AMR 2531-2937
Patrol 35	AMR 2534-2853

Tiberias Control Centre

Quneitra Outstation	MR 2277-2822
OP Five	MR 2290-2787
OP Two	MR 2306-2736
OP Seven	MR 2203-2408
Patrol 41	AMR 2368-3028
Patrol 42	AMR 2432-2968
Patrol 43	AMR 2398-2816

¹³⁶ MR—map reference; AMR—approximate map reference.
[Original note.]

Israel-Lebanon sector

11. The cease-fire observation operation in the Israel-Lebanon sector was established in pursuance of the consensus approved by the Security Council on 19 April 1972. A total of five OPs were established on the Lebanese side of the armistice demarcation line (ADL), under the control of the headquarters of the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission (ILMAC) in Beirut.

12. The October 1973 hostilities have not affected this armistice demarcation line, and all five OPs in that sector have continued to function as before.

13. The locations of the Five OPs, as well as Naqoura Outstation, are as follows:

Naqoura Outstation	MR 1629-2805
OP Lab	MR 1643-2772
OP Hin	MR 1770-2790
OP Ras	MR 1920-2785
OP Mar	MR 1998-2921
OP Khiam	MR 2071-3025

Future reports on the status of the cease-fire

14. Up to now the information received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO concerning the status of the cease-fire have been transmitted to the Security Council as supplemental information reports in the S/7930/Add. ... series, which was initiated after the outbreak of the June 1967 hostilities. Since then, in the course of more than six years, no less than 2,237 addenda have been circulated. As a matter of convenience, future reports on the status of the cease-fire will be circulated in a new series as addenda to the present report.

16

Report of the Secretary-General on the Middle East peace conference submitted in pursuance of Security Council Resolution 344 (1973)¹³⁷

December 24, 1973

The following information is communicated in accordance with paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 344 (1973) of 15 December 1973. The Peace Conference on the Middle East was

convened by the Secretary-General on 21 December 1973 in Geneva. The following Governments were represented: Egypt, Israel, Jordan, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America. The Secretary-General, as Chairman, opened the Conference at 11 a.m. on the same day and made a statement, which is attached. The Conference, in two public sessions on 21 December, heard statements from the representatives of the USSR, the United States, Egypt, Jordan and Israel.¹³⁸ After informal consultations among the delegations and with the Secretary-General, the Conference met again in closed session at 11 a.m. on 22 December. At the close of that session, the Secretary-General summed up the conclusions of the Conference about its future work as follows:

After both formal and informal deliberations, the Conference reached a consensus to continue its work through the setting up of a military working group, as well as other working groups which the Conference may wish to establish. The military working group will start discussing forthwith the question of disengagement of forces. The working groups will report their findings and recommendations to the Conference, which is continuing on an ambassadorial level. The Conference at the foreign ministers level will reconvene in Geneva as needed in the light of developments.

Text of a statement by the Secretary-General at the opening in Geneva of the Peace Conference on the Middle East

It is a great honour for me to open this historic conference and to welcome the representatives of the participating Governments. It is also a source of gratification to me that this unique event is taking place under the auspices of the United Nations. The Palais des Nations has housed many historic meetings, but none has been of more potential importance, both to the Governments concerned and to the international community as a whole, than this conference on peace in the Middle East.

I am certain that I am speaking on behalf of all the participants in the Conference when I also take this opportunity to thank sincerely the Federal and Cantonal authorities of Switzerland for their valuable assistance. We are indeed most grateful for their unfailing and generous

¹³⁷ UN doc. S/11169. For the resolution see doc. 39 below.

¹³⁸ See docs. 216, 217, 341, 342 and 218 below.

co-operation in making the necessary arrangements possible.

There is no need to remind the distinguished representatives of the Governments here assembled of the concern of the international community for the success of our deliberations. This concern was emphasized most recently by the Security Council when it expressed the hope that the Conference would make speedy progress towards the establishment of a just and durable peace in the Middle East. The United Nations has been seized of the various aspects of the Middle East conflict for more than a quarter of a century and has devoted an immense amount of time and effort both to keeping the peace and to the search for a just and lasting settlement.

On 11 October of this year, five days after bitter fighting had broken out once again in the Middle East, I appealed to the Governments concerned to look urgently to the possibility of turning the tragic conflict into a starting point for a new effort at a real settlement.¹³⁹ Similar appeals were made by numerous Governments. Now, two months later, this new effort is taking shape in Geneva. None of us, I know, underestimates the difficulties of the task ahead, but the very fact of this Conference—and the willingness of the Governments concerned to respond to this new effort to find a just and lasting settlement—is a source of encouragement and hope for all mankind.

The basis for this meeting was laid down in Security Council resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973. That resolution called upon the parties for an immediate cessation of all firing and a termination of all military activity. It called upon the parties to start immediately the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all its parts, and it decided that negotiations should begin at once between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

In subsequent resolutions on 23 and 25 October, the Council confirmed its decisions on an immediate cessation of all kinds of firing and of all military action, called for United Nations observations of the cease-fire and decided to set up a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). The United

Nations military observers and the Force were immediately put into the field, and they continue to exert their best efforts to keep the peace.

On 11 November, the representatives of Egypt and Israel, under the auspices of the Commander of UNEF, met at kilometre marker 101 on the Cairo-Suez road and signed the six-point agreement which had been communicated to the Secretary-General on 9 November by the Secretary of State of the United States. In subsequent meetings, the modalities for the implementation of five of the six points were agreed upon by the parties and were put into effect with the assistance of UNEF and the International Committee for the Red Cross. It is gratifying that, in this way, the humanitarian aspects of the six-point agreement have been largely fulfilled.

I am aware of the outstanding humanitarian problems relating to the Middle East questions as a whole. The Commander of UNEF, in close co-operation with the International Committee of the Red Cross, is making persistent efforts to find solutions to some of these problems, and I myself have taken initiatives in an effort to resolve others. It is my earnest hope that through such efforts and through the proceedings of this Conference rapid progress may be made in this regard.

On the implementation of one point of the agreement, namely, the question of the return to the October 22 positions in the framework of agreement on the disengagement and separation of forces under the auspices of the United Nations, the parties have not so far reached accord, although detailed exploratory discussions have been held. I hope that through its deliberations this Conference may make progress on this important matter, as well as embarking on the next step envisaged in resolution 338 (1973), namely, the negotiations aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

The presence of the Secretary-General of the United Nations here today reflects the deep concern of the international community in the Middle East question. It also symbolizes the willingness of the Organization to be of assistance whenever the parties require it. I want to assure all the parties here present that in that spirit I and my staff, both at United Nations Headquarters and in the Middle East, stand ready to be of assistance in any way that may seem useful to them. We have, I believe, amply demonstrated this readiness

¹³⁹ See doc. 25 below.

to act promptly in the critical events of recent months.

Before concluding, may I express appreciation to all the Governments which, by their spirit of co-operation and their desire to make progress on this most complex and crucial question, have made possible the convening of this Conference today. The Conference has a unique opportunity to come to grips with a most difficult, dangerous and complex international problem. If this opportunity is not seized, the world will inevitably be confronted once again with a dangerous and highly explosive situation in the Middle East. Unless progress can be made, the cease-fire and the United Nations peace-keeping arrangements already in operation in the area will remain fragile,

and there will be an ever present danger that fighting will break out again.

The Conference presents a historic challenge to its participants not only because the eyes of the world are upon it but because the situation in the Middle East, with all its manifold implications, urgently demands the statemanship, courage, patience and vision of each and all the participants. I know that these qualities are not lacking in this room. I am sure that all the participants share a sense of urgency and will not fail to seize the opportunity to build a lasting structure of peace in the area. It is an opportunity which may not recur for a very long time. I wish this Conference all success in its noble task.

Debates on the Middle East War

17

General Assembly, 2143rd meeting; statements by Syria, Israel and Egypt¹⁴⁰

Monday, October 8, 1973

The meeting came to order at 10.30 (15.30 gmt).

THE PRESIDENT (interpretation from Spanish): With the Assembly's permission, I shall now call on the representatives of the States which have sent the letters distributed as documents A/9190, A/9203 and A/9204 to make statements of an informative character, and thereafter we shall continue the general debate.

The signatory of the first document is the representative of Egypt. Since he is not now in the hall, I shall call on the signatory of the second document, the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic.

MR. ISMAIL (Syrian Arab Republic) (interpretation from French): The day before yesterday I addressed to you, Mr. President, on instructions from my Government, a letter relating to the new and cowardly aggression of Israel against my country. As it was practically impossible to convene the General Assembly on the same day, I requested you to be good enough to circulate my letter as an official document to all the delegations.

Now I wish to bring to the attention of representatives additional information concerning the aggression of which my country is a victim. The Israeli attack started at 1400 hours (Syrian local time) on 6 October 1973 all along the front line. Land and air forces participated in the attack. From the very outset the attack was massive and reached such proportions that it appeared unquestionable that it was part of a preconceived plan. The Syrian forces had to react and a battle is raging on land and in the air.

The last news from Syria informs us that the Israelis have attempted to launch an attack by

sea against the harbour installations of Tartus and Latakia and came up against the resistance of our coast guards, resulting in an engagement between the two sides.

The simultaneous attack launched against Egypt shows unquestionably the deliberate, planned nature of the Israeli aggression, which is designed to bring about further territorial expansion at the expense of Syria and Egypt, in order to compel them by force to accept the conditions that Israel was unable to impose upon them by any other means.

Israel had started to carry out its new plan of aggression before the attack of 6 October. In fact, on 13 September last, Israeli bombers penetrated Syrian air space to a depth of more than 100 kilometres, with the intention of bombing strategic and economic targets. They were prevented from doing so by our fighter aircraft following an air combat which resulted in losses on both sides. That attempted aggression provided an inkling of Israel's intentions in this respect.

Since then Israel has embarked upon a massive concentration of troops on our borders and the imminent attack was expected at any moment. That is why Israel was unable this time to take advantage of a surprise attack.

The salient feature of this new war of aggression launched by Israel against Syria and Egypt is that it constitutes an indescribable challenge to world public opinion and the international community. It comes after the resolution of the Organization of African Unity and that of the Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Countries held recently at Algiers.

It also comes after the resolutions of the United Nations and of its various organs and after the draft resolution presented to the Security Council by the non-aligned countries, which was accepted by all the members of the Security Council except the United States. In all of these resolutions, Israel was explicitly condemned or reproved for its aggressive and expansionist policy. These resolutions represent the censuring attitude of

¹⁴⁰ Excerpted from the provisional verbatim record, UN doc. A/PV.2143, pp. 2-16, 22-36.

reproval adopted by the international community towards Israel.

Thus, this new war of aggression launched by Israel may be taken as a direct challenge to the international community, as well to the international organizations which adopted the resolutions to which I have just referred. It is also a challenge flung individually at all the States which voted for these resolutions.

At present we are fighting to repel the aggressor. We are exercising our right of self-defence. We do not wish to bring death to anyone. We are attempting to prevent the aggressor from sowing death and destruction in our own land. We are asking that, at last, this wound, which is constantly shedding blood in our region, should be treated and finally healed once and for all. We are calling for the strict application of the principles of the United Nations Charter: in other words, that an end be put to the occupation of Arab territory usurped by force; that our territorial integrity be safeguarded; that the principle of self-determination, recognized for all peoples, including the Palestinian people, be applied as an inalienable right flowing from the United Nations Charter.

THE PRESIDENT (interpretation from Spanish): I now call on the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel.

MR. EBAN (Israel): There is not a single man or woman inside this hall or outside it who does not know, in the depths of his heart, that Egypt and Syria have dealt a heavy and sudden blow to the most cherished of all human causes, the cause of international peace.

The premeditated and unprovoked assault which they launched across the cease-fire lines on the Day of Atonement, 6 October 1973, will surely rank in future history as one of the basest acts for which governments have ever been responsible. It is Israel's unshakeable resolve that this assault shall be frustrated and repelled. For if it were to have any success, the hope of peace would die.

Let there be no doubt that this attempt to smash the cease-fire structure is a violation—a massive violation—of international law. The cease-fire is an international agreement. It was accepted by Egypt, Syria and Israel in response to a decision of the Security Council in which all three Governments concurred. Security Council resolution 233 (1967) of 6 June 1967 reads:

The Security Council,

...

1. Calls upon the Governments concerned to take forthwith as a first step all measures for an immediate cease-fire and for a cessation of all military activities in the area; .

Israeli and Egyptian consent was soon expressed and within 30 hours the cease-fire was formalized on the ground. A few days later, the Security Council decided that "the Governments of Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic have announced their mutual acceptance of the Council's demand for a cease-fire" and demanded "that hostilities should cease forthwith" (*Security Council resolution 235 (1967)*).

The mutual commitment by Syria and Israel has never been questioned or repudiated by either Government. Indeed, both have invoked it in complaints and demands to the Security Council.

The Egyptian-Israeli cease-fire was in force by mutual agreement until 1968. On that date the Egyptian Government announced that it was repudiating the cease-fire. It later explained that it proposed to wage what it called a war of attrition. By the summer of 1970, this war of attrition had achieved no result except the death of many hundreds, the devastation of large areas near the Suez Canal, and the growing involvement of the Middle East in the policies and rivalries of the Powers.

In the summer of 1970, Egypt and Israel, through the good offices of the United States, renewed the cease-fire which came into effect on 7 August 1970. That was a moment of high relief for the Middle East and for the world. It seemed to illuminate a new vision and a new hope for, together with the cease-fire, the two Governments agreed to solve their remaining disputes by negotiations on the basis of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). Israel undertook that, on the establishment of peace, with secure and agreed boundaries, forces would be withdrawn to the secure boundaries which would be determined by negotiation in the peace agreement. And thus a clear international consensus emerged concerning the method of attaining peace in the Middle East.

The stages were clear: first, cease-fire; second, negotiation; third, agreement on the conditions of coexistence, including the boundary question; fourth, withdrawal to the agreed boundaries with

the establishment of permanent peace. To this policy of maintaining the cease-fire and offering negotiations on the final settlement I pledged Israel again, to the General Assembly, on 3 October this year.

The Syrian representative in that debate pledged his Government to a policy of unceasing war. The Egyptian Foreign Minister, probably knowing what lay ahead, prudently postponed his address from last week to the next. He knew what he was doing. The assault of 6 October must have been at a high stage of preparation.

Across this horizon, bleak and gray but not entirely bereft of hope, with a spark of prospect for negotiation on the horizon, across all of this came the answer from Egypt and Syria on 6 October. Their answer to the hope of peace was the squalid recourse to war. Their answer to the vision of a peaceful developing Middle East has been to fill the region, for these two or three days, with blood, much blood, and tears and rancorous passions. Anything except dialogue; anything rather than negotiation; anything except the respect of existing engagements and the quest for new agreements; anything but that.

I wish to inform the General Assembly of how this crisis evolved. It evolved quickly, but it did have its prelude. At 4 a.m. Israeli time, 10 in the morning in New York, six hours before the outbreak, a telegram reached me from Jerusalem telling me that authentic information, as well as the evidence on the ground, indicated that there was going to be a joint Egyptian and Syrian attack later in the day, with the aim of crossing the cease-fire line at the Suez Canal and the cease-fire line at Golan.

Two hours later diplomatic representatives in Israel, beginning with the United States, which had sponsored the cease-fire, were informed of this expectation. The United States Ambassador in Israel was informed several hours before the assault that Israel would not take any pre-emptive action, would bear the sacrifice which that renunciation implied, but would, of course, repel any Egyptian or Syrian movement. His Government, and later other Governments, were invited to inform Cairo and Damascus and others accordingly. Similar exchanges were held here in New York at Foreign Minister level.

We know the answer. Egypt first invented an imaginary sea battle, with imaginary Israeli

ships, at an imaginary place, at an imaginary time: the most dramatic non-existent battle in the history of war. This was alleged to have taken place hours after Egypt's plan of attack was revealed and communicated by us to other Governments. Egypt and Syria have no evidence whatever to show for this falsehood—for the simple reason that it is a falsehood—by which millions of people in this country and others have been insulted.

After the mendacity came the aggression, an attack from north and south, with the cease-fire lines crossed in heavy force.

There are two circumstances here which are deeply impressed on our minds and which will be engraved in our memories whenever we come to consider what our security demands, what kind of adversaries we face. First, there is the choice of the day. There is only one day in the year on which there is a virtual paralysis of internal and external communications, on which the nation turns aside from all material concern, unique in the spiritual calendar of mankind, an intense celebration of reflection and of humility. The logistic effects of the Day of Atonement are that there is no communication between Israel and the outside world on any normal level, and not even within the country itself.

This gross mendacity about an Israeli initiative is refuted by the United Nations observers' report¹⁴¹ which reports to you specifically about Egyptian encroachments across the cease-fire line, about Syrian encroachments across the cease-fire line. Where in that or in any other document is there the slightest reference to any Israeli encroachment across the cease-fire line? What is the independent evidence that the Foreign Ministers of Egypt and Syria are able to bring in support of their invented myth about the non-existent ship passing silently in the non-existent night?

There is also the evidence of normal common sense. Across the world, people must be asking themselves this question: how idiotic would a man have to be to believe that on a day when there were no communications, no activity, no radio, no ability to summon reserves, when the vast majority of our soldiers were in their homes or synagogues, when even forward posts were manned at minimal level—that precisely on that day Israel would launch a war, on the day holiest to all those who

¹⁴¹ See doc. 10 above.

cherish Jewish solidarities, in order to invite thousands of Egyptian and Syrian tanks to attack across a relatively undefended and totally quiescent line?

No, there is no doubt: Egypt and Syria exploited a physical vulnerability arising from a spiritual vocation which the Jewish people can never renounce.

Egypt concentrated for this assault more than 3,000 tanks, 2,000 guns, nearly 1,000 aircraft and, according to Egyptian spokesmen, 600,000 men, all armed with weapons of Soviet manufacture of the most modern type, including bombers, ground missiles, missile boats. Against them, on the first day, regular Israeli garrisons in the most defensive posture that a nation can ever dream of allowing itself in a situation of regional tension. And on the Syrian side, 1,000 tanks and corresponding numbers of weapons in the air. Now all that brutal force crashed uprovoked across the cease-fire line.

We have suffered tragic losses of life and blood; Egypt and Syria have suffered much more, as the result of their leaders' cynical aggression. But President Sadat once told us that he would not care if a million people were killed provided that he secured his objective. I admit that the sacrilegious exploitation of the Day of Atonement and Israel's renunciation of preventive action during those critical hours have cost us dear. But the Egyptian and Syrian advantage has been and will be brief. Israeli forces are now successfully repelling the enemy on both fronts. It is vital that Egyptian and Syrian forces shall not be allowed to remain anywhere beyond the cease-fire lines. The replacement of cease-fire lines by mutually accepted permanent boundaries must be done by negotiation and peace, not by treacherous, uprovoked, Pearl Harbour attacks.

Finally, pending the further elaboration of our position at a meeting, which I understand has been requested, of the Security Council, I want to say something about the lessons of this experience.

First, about the nature of the hostility that we face. The nature of the hostility that Israel faces is such that no security concern can be exaggerated. When President Sadat said in an Egyptian newspaper that he admired Hitler, all the world smiled indulgently. The Soviet Union, which had resisted Hitler, heroically but belatedly, went on supplying arms. Other nations shrugged their shoulders.

When the Egyptian Prime Minister praised the murder of pilgrims and tourists at Lod, we were told "It is only propaganda". Anti-Semitic literature abounds in Cairo, a spiritual heroin, fraught with death and decay. There is too much international indulgence for that hostility. There was indulgence for it at the Algiers Conference. There was indulgence in a speech in which a fine continental tradition of peace, fidelity, constancy and friendship was violated by the President of Zaire on this platform. There is too much indulgence of this hostility. We really must take Egyptian and Syrian statements of hostility at their face value.

Second, there is one nightmare that will always be in Israeli minds no matter what the future may bring. Imagine that in a mood of suicidal stupidity we had gone back to the previous armistice lines instead of negotiating boundaries in the framework of peace. If we had performed that folly, then the attacks of 6 October, springing from close at hand, at our very throats and hearts, would have done such destruction to our vital centre that perhaps Israel and all its people, and all the memories, hopes and visions which have moved our history, might now all be lost—lost, swept away in a fearful massacre.

How right we were to insist on negotiating with the utmost precision the boundaries of a peace settlement. How wrong were those who counselled us otherwise. For there are three things that are vital, not only to Israel's existence and security but to the peace of the Middle East: first, peace itself; second, negotiation as the pathway to peace; and third, within the framework of a negotiated peace, the establishment of secure boundaries which will give some assurance against the prospect of fatal injury to our nation arising from the kind of sudden assault that took place a few days ago.

There are, of course, other horizons beyond this, but the immediate task, to which we are giving all our mind and heart and sacrifice, is to restore the entire structure of the cease-fire.

The cease-fire consists of two elements: abstention from fighting and the lines and positions agreed by the parties as the lines and positions of the cease-fire.

We cannot help at this very solemn and tragic hour but think back upon the waste and the anguish and the avoidable suffering of the past two decades. All our Arab neighbours together, developing

countries, have spent in this period something like \$20,000 million on war. The result: nothing. The achievement: nothing. If it is said that this war is on behalf and for the sake of refugees, the tiniest fraction of that expenditure would have been sufficient to solve all the refugee problems in the Middle East 50 times over. This, then, is the lesson of the uselessness and the waste of hostility.

But at this moment we have a more urgent concern. It is to bring the bloodshed to a halt and the cease-fire back to its integrity by ensuring that no Egyptian or Syrian forces shall remain beyond the legitimate and agreed cease-fire lines. It is from that point, and only from that point, that we should take our further journey towards the horizons of peace.

MR. EL-ZAYYAT (Egypt): Mr. President, I am sure that my colleagues and you understand the importance of the historic moment in which we are living and which necessitated contacts on my part with my capital that did not allow me to be here at the beginning of this meeting of the Assembly.

Mr. President, last Saturday, because there was no Assembly meeting, I sent you a letter in which I stated the following:

At 6.30 hours a.m. (New York time) today, Saturday, 6 October 1973, Israeli air formations and naval units attacked Egyptian forces stationed in the areas of El Zaafarana and El Sukhna on the Gulf of Suez. (A/9190, para. 1)

We repelled that aggression. The pattern was familiar. A decoy of seemingly not very strong naval units attack in order that, later on, high-flying Phantoms may attack the defenders. This is what has been called the "decoy", and it happened in Syria on 13 September of this year.

I also informed you in that letter that:

"Egyptian forces are at present"—as indeed they are at this very moment—"engaged in military operations against the Israeli forces of aggression in the occupied territories" of Egypt and Syria.

The aggression launched today along the Egyptian and Syrian fronts is a continuation of Israel's policy of annexation and consolidation of its occupation of Arab territories beginning with Jerusalem and its insistence on the humiliation of the Arab people and the breaking of their will. (*Ibid.*, paras. 2 and 4)

Subsequently I added other statements to that letter, and you were kind enough, Mr. President, to have them circulated as a document of this Assembly.

Let me first state that the Foreign Minister of Israel has seen fit to say in the public media that these were lies. Although he was kind enough to say that if I had said these things, they were lies, I do not choose to use the same vocabulary, out of respect for you, Mr. President, and for the Assembly—but first of all, really, out of respect for myself. However, although I am not an expert on lying, I do not want to leave this point without referring to one thing in the statement of the Foreign Minister of Israel contained in the verbatim records of the Assembly meeting on Wednesday, 3 October 1973. Mr Eban said: "We accepted Ambassador Jarring's proposal, rejected by Egypt" and so on (2139th meeting, page 33). That is perhaps not a lie, but it certainly is a gross omission and distortion. Ambassador Jarring is at the United Nations, or should be. If he is not available in person, his reports are available, and he can say—as he indeed said—who has indeed co-operated with him and who it is that has caused his failure to accomplish anything during the long period of his mission.

Secondly, in the same statement Mr. Eban said that "When four eminent Heads of African States visited our region in 1971" (*ibid.*) they reported that Israel had co-operated and that Egypt had not. Of course, I shall not ask those African Presidents to reply; I would not dare to ask that. But would not Mr. Eban take it as a reply that from this rostrum one of them, President Mobutu of Zaire, declared before the world the rupture of his country's relations with Israel because of Israel's lack of co-operation—lack of co-operation, not co-operation—with the African Heads of State, with the United Nations and with all efforts at peace?

Again, in the same statement, Mr. Eban tells the Assembly that the Israelis have abstained "from changing the political and juridical status of the administered territories and have not closed any options for a negotiated peace" (*ibid.*). That two-fold statement calls for a two-fold correction. First, Israel is indeed changing everything in the occupied territories; the United Nations has a committee which can say so. Jerusalem has been annexed and Israel declares that this is

not negotiable. Secondly, as for the closing of options, I think that it is Israeli policy to close each and every option and to declare in advance that it seeks the partitioning of Egypt, after having partitioned Palestine, and that it seeks the partitioning of Syria and of Jordan. And indeed, Israel tells the Assembly in an official document that it will never go back to the lines from which it attacked in 1967—that is, that Israel will have to get a portion of the lands of Egypt, Syria and Jordan.

I have said that, although it was not in my prepared statement, because if what I have reported is called a lie then I think that those who accuse me of lying should at least be beyond suspicion—and I do not think that they are.

I wish to inform this Assembly that Egyptian forces have now crossed to the eastern bank of the Suez Canal where they have hoisted Egypt's flag on Egyptian territory east of the Canal. Syrian forces are liberating their territory, the Golan. By this act, dedicated to the safeguarding of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Arab nations, the sons of Egypt and Syria are equally defending and safeguarding the fundamental principles of our Charter.

This act of self-defence is not an act of madness, as Mrs. Meir has said it is. It was, and is, madness to expect us and other Arabs to suffer in silence the continued occupation of our lands. It was, and is, madness to expect the world you represent here to suffer in silence while the United Nations Charter is trampled on.

When the General Assembly met here in an emergency special session in June and July 1967, Israel asserted that it sought no territorial aggrandizement, but only the termination of belligerency and a peace agreement. We asked the Assembly to resolve that the armed forces of Israel be withdrawn immediately, fully and unconditionally.

Some countries, mainly Latin American countries and the United States, sought to link the withdrawal with the termination of belligerency. There was, however, never any doubt on the part of those who supported this concept as to the absolute necessity of the withdrawal of the Israeli military forces from all the territories occupied as the result of Israel's aggression in 1967. All who supported the Latin American draft resolution made it clear that they rejected terri-

torial expansion and that they equally rejected retention of the territories as a means to impose territorial concessions on the victim countries.

No words, Mr. President, expressed this more eloquently than your own when you spoke here on behalf of Ecuador on 28 June 1967. You stated:

... I have specific instructions from my Government to state that we absolutely reject any territorial conquest through force and the retention of occupied territories as a means of exerting pressure for later negotiations; we shall therefore vote in favour of the withdrawal of the Israel forces to the lines of the *status quo ante*. (1539th meeting, para. 21)

It was on the basis of that sentiment that, later on, United Nations resolutions were formulated. They all expressed the obvious and fundamental principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war. We have accepted the resolutions of the General Assembly as the verdict of the international community. These resolutions sought to establish a just and lasting peace, a peace which, by necessity, rejects domination and territorial expansion.

Throughout the past six years Israel has sought, and sought only the perpetuation of its occupation, confident in its might, convinced of its military invincibility. Egypt, on the other hand, has co-operated fully with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Jarring. In 1968, Egypt formally proposed to him the setting up of a time-table for the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). Egypt then welcomed the four-Power talks which took place at the beginning of 1969 on the initiative of France. In the summer of 1970, the United States made a proposal under which the parties would agree to carry out Security Council 242 (1967) in all its parts, appoint representatives to contact Ambassador Jarring, and observe a 90-day cease-fire.

Egypt accepted that initiative in full. Israel appointed Minister Eban to be its spokesman with Jarring. I was designated by my Government to enter into those discussions. However, in the first place, Mr. Eban never appeared and his Deputy no sooner announced that he was entering into talks with Jarring than he in fact spoke no more. The 90-day cease-fire commented on 7 August 1970. Israel withdrew from contacts with Ambassador Jarring on 6 September 1970. Egypt

further accepted a call from the General Assembly to extend for another three months the 90-day cease-fire which was to end on 5 November 1970. That period was further extended for one month by President Sadat in a speech that he gave on 4 February 1971. After that, there was no cease-fire.

However, a few days later, on 8 February 1971, came the decisive test of the intentions of the parties towards the establishment of a just and lasting peace, when the Special Representative of the Secretary-General submitted his two identical aide-memoires, carrying the same date of 8 February 1971. Egypt's reply to that aide-memoire was positive. Israel refused to commit itself even to respect Egypt's historical international boundaries. Israel, indeed, formally declared instead that it would not withdraw to the positions the Israelis had occupied before 5 June 1967; and this was in reply to Ambassador Jarring's asking them to withdraw to Egypt's international border with Palestine under the British Mandate.

Thus we came to a third standstill. All the efforts made through 1968, 1969 and 1970, foundered on the rock of Israel's policy of territorial expansion, a Zionist policy which again became apparent after Israel launched its aggression on 5 June 1967, when it declared its annexation of Jerusalem.

Numerous efforts have been made since 1971 to impress upon Israel that it should renounce its expansionist and annexationist policy. Africa, represented by 10 African Heads of State tried; Secretary-General U Thant made appeals; the General Assembly adopted a number of resolutions; all were aimed at convincing Israel to renounce its expansionist and annexationist policy. Israel's attitude was one of defiance and arrogance. It responded with a new phase in its policy of aggression and terrorism: the shooting down of a Libyan civilian plane in mid-air, killing more than 130 innocent civilians, was soon followed by the hijacking of another civilian aircraft and the murder of many other persons in cold blood. The attack on the south of Lebanon was soon to be followed by the lawless murders in Beirut and the consolidation of the occupation and the systematic Israelization of the conquered lands went on as a declared policy of the Government of occupation, indeed, in its electoral platform as its declared policy for the future.

Six years have now passed since Israel began to occupy Syrian, Egyptian and Jordanian territory, after the previous expansions in Palestine. The question our people asked and were asking was: Did the United Nations indeed intend to terminate war, belligerency and occupation, and bring about a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area could live in security? Or rather did the United Nations by action or inaction encourage the prolonging and consolidation of occupation and the maintaining of belligerency?

To answer that question, last May Egypt requested the Security Council to meet and to consider the situation in the Middle East. Discussions in the Council were of great importance and value. There emerged two clear positions: the one of the overwhelming majority of the members of the Council, and the position of Israel. The former was a position in favour of the application of the Charter principles, whereas the latter was an anti-Charter stand. Fourteen members of the Security Council out of 15 stood firmly behind the principle of non-acquisition of territory by war, of territorial integrity and of self-determination. Thirteen members supported a draft resolution which strongly deplored Israel's lack of co-operation with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, supported his initiative taken in conformity with his mandate and contained in his aide-memoire of 8 February 1971, and expressed the conviction that a just and peaceful solution of the problem of the Middle East can be achieved only on the basis of the respect of national sovereignty, territorial integrity, the rights of all States in the area, and the rights and legitimate aspirations of the Palestinians. Changes which may obstruct a peaceful and final settlement or which may adversely affect the political and other fundamental rights of all the inhabitants in those territories should not be introduced or recognized. This is almost the text of the draft resolution which was accepted by 13—supported really by 14—and sadly only the United States of America voted against the draft resolution.

As a result of the failure of the Security Council to take a decision, owing to the veto of the United States, Israel escalated its arrogant policy of violence and aggression. On 13 September last, Israel committed the aggression against Syria I just referred to. On 6 October—this month—

Israel launched its aggression against Egypt. In between those dates and even before, Israel, resorting to State terrorism, tried to convey the message that it really dominated the area and there was no way other than to accepting its dictates.

We have been and will always be loyal to the international order which this Organization represents and which it is meant to defend collectively. It is our responsibility, sanctioned by the Charter, to try our best to repel the aggression and to put an end to the occupation of our land. The perils inherent in Israel's refusal to abide by the Charter are by no means confined to the Middle East. In these historic hours we feel tied more than ever to the great human struggle which took place on the soil of Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America—and we are inspired by its ultimate success. The history of the nations assembled here tells us that the mighty can be defeated. This history of the nations assembled here tells us that justice will overcome.

When I was reading from the speech of Mr. Eban, I came across a quotation from the statement by the Chancellor of Germany, Mr. Brandt. Now perhaps I may be allowed to quote from a statement just made by the Foreign Minister of France. Mr. Jobert said:

(spoke in French)

Does an attempt to set one's feet back in one's own house constitute surprise aggression?¹⁴²

(continued in English)

This is our question: If we are trying to set our feet back on our land, our home, can that be called aggression? Or can it be called an act of liberation, for which we indeed expect the Assembly's full support?

We know that the peoples of the world whom you represent here have willed that tyranny be eradicated, that justice be upheld and that peace prevail. We know that their will shall prevail.

Mr. President, I thank you for allowing me to make this statement. It is our intention that the item on the Middle East should be taken up in due course. But it is not our intention to have a debate now. I am saying this for the benefit of the friends who I know would like to support us, who indeed do support us. The time will come for that support.

[After a statement by the delegate of Saudi Arabia the General Assembly continued its general debate.]

The meeting rose at 12.55 (17.55 gmt).

18

Security Council, 1743rd meeting; statements by USA, Egypt, China, Israel, United Kingdom and USSR¹⁴³

Monday, October 8, 1973

The meeting came to order at 18.10 (23.10 gmt).

MR. SCALI (United States of America):

The United States has requested that the Security Council be convened today in order that it might deal urgently with the current situation in the Middle East.

For the first time in more than three years, armed hostilities have broken out on a massive scale in the Middle East. The cease-fire we have sought to maintain has been broken. The recourse to tragic violence we have sought to avoid is upon us.

Reports based on United Nations sources appear to indicate that the air attacks in the Golan Heights were initiated by Syrian MIG aircraft and that the first firing on the Suez front, which took place at the same time as the Syrian attack, was from west to east. The subsequent development of the fighting has been fully covered in the press.

In the days before fighting broke out, we received reports of intensified military activities in the Middle East area. We watched these developments closely, but until a few hours before military operations started we were unable to conclude that these activities were a prelude to actual fighting. This is a region in which alarms and alerts are fairly frequent. In themselves, military movements would not necessarily indicate that combat was about to begin. When, very shortly before the

¹⁴² See doc. 135 below.

¹⁴³ Excerpted from the provisional verbatim record, UN doc. S/PV.1743, pp. 3-12, 17, 22-35, 36-43.

initial attacks took place, we received indications that this was the fact, we immediately undertook intensive diplomatic efforts in hopes that the outbreak of hostilities might be prevented. We discussed the situation directly with Israel and Egypt. We consulted other permanent members and exchanged views with many Governments represented in this Council. Others in and outside of the area pursued parallel efforts. We kept in close touch with Secretary-General Waldheim, who also lent his great weight and prestige to the efforts. Unfortunately, those efforts did not prevent the outbreak, and intensive fighting continues.

In so serious a situation we felt that we could not fail to exercise our responsibility, as a permanent member of the Security Council, in order that it might be seized of the grave situation which has arisen. Not to have done this would have been to fail in our obligations under the Charter. We hope that in the days ahead the Council by its deliberations can restore in some measure its historic role of constructive ameliorator in the most critical and explosive area in the world.

Definitive judgements as to constructive action are difficult in view of the fluidity of the situation. My Government itself has made no such judgements. Nor have we felt it would be constructive to divert the Council's energies and attention to the question of assessing blame.

Our purpose today is not to sift conflicting reports or to assess responsibility for what has occurred. Our purpose is to help promote a solution for the tense and dangerous situation confronting us.

We recognize that it is difficult to separate proximate from underlying causes. The former may be clearcut, but the latter are complex, and perceptions of right and wrong inevitably vary. It has been over six years since the present abnormal situation was created in the wake of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. That war in turn followed 18 years of abnormal armistice. For the failure to move from abnormal armistice and cease-fire to political accommodation and peace there is more than enough blame to go around. All concerned have missed opportunities to make that transition over the past 25 years.

We have given preliminary thought to the direction in which this Council might move in dealing with this problem so that new opportunities to make practical progress towards peace can be created and the present tragedy can be made a

new beginning rather than simply another lost opportunity. As we see it, there are a number of principles which the Council must seek to apply.

First, in a situation where fighting is raging unchecked, the most appropriate means must be found for bringing the hostilities to an end. Military operations must be halted. The guns must fall silent so that additional human suffering may be avoided and the search for peace may proceed.

Second, conditions must be restored in the area that would be conducive to a settlement of the long-standing differences in the Middle East. There must be respect for the rights and positions of all the States in the region. A beginning must be made towards converting the sharp confrontation of violently opposing claims and counter-claims, which for over a quarter of a century has made true stability impossible, to a more reasoned discourse aimed at genuine reconciliation. The least damaging way to bring this about is to have the parties concerned return to the positions before hostilities broke out.

Third, in all its efforts the Council must be mindful of the need for universal respect for the integrity of those instruments and principles of settlement for the Middle Eastern dispute which have received the adherence of the interested parties and the support of the Council's authority. The foundations so laboriously achieved in the past for negotiations looking towards a Middle Eastern peace must not be destroyed under the stress of a military emergency.

These principles, in the opinion of my Government, constitute the framework within which we can act in this Council to reduce the prevailing tension in the Middle East and to prepare for a reinvigoration of the process of peacemaking. We are prepared to discuss these principles, and any others which other members may put forward, as a basis for our further action.

What we seek in this Council is not a war of words, but a broad consensus which will enable the Council to put the full weight of its influence behind the task of restoring peace so that the Middle East can be set on a new course pointing towards a better era in the region.

Let us then renounce the sterile gains of propaganda and turn to serious discussion. The situation is urgent; the need is great; and time presses upon us.

THE PRESIDENT:¹⁴⁴ I thank the representative of the United States for his kind words addressed to me.

The next name on the list of speakers is that of the representative of Egypt, on whom I now call.

MR. EL-ZAYYAT (Egypt): I thank you, Mr. President, and the other members of the Council for having granted me the honour of participating in this debate.

Until we heard the beginning of the statement of the representative of the United States of America, we had not intended to ask to be allowed to speak. But he has asserted some facts and proposed some action. I am very grateful to him and would like to register our thanks for the assertion of his responsibilities as the representative of a permanent member of the Security Council. According to his letter, in accordance with Article 24 of the Charter the Members of the United Nations have conferred primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security on the Security Council and have given special responsibilities to the permanent members of the Council. It is good to hear that the permanent members of the Council are conscious of their responsibility and of the Council's responsibility.

But I have been in this Council before. On 6 June this year I came here to give a full review of our efforts to secure the implementation of the peaceful settlement prescribed and endorsed by the principal political organs of the United Nations. I concluded my statement by quoting some words used by the Emperor of Ethiopia on 30 June 1936 in his speech before the League of Nations, when his country was facing a situation similar to that which we face. This is what he said:

The issue before the Assembly today is a question of collective security....

I ask the great Powers who have promised to guarantee collective security to small States what measures do they intend to take.

Representatives of the world, I have come to Geneva to discharge in your midst the most painful of the duties of the Head of a State. What answer am I to take back to my people? (1717th meeting, p. 47)

I asked the Security Council in June: What message am I to take back to my people as a result of these meetings? And at the end of the meetings I said that I had got two messages: the first was that of full support by world public opinion; the second, unfortunately, was that of the blocking of the Council's action by the veto of the representative of the United States of America.

We came to the Council seeking its support to put an end to an occupation maintained and consolidated for some six years on a part of Egypt's land and soil, as well as on parts of two sister States. Fourteen of the 15 members around this table firmly supported Egypt's claim. Egypt's position was fully anchored in the most sacred principles of the Charter. Yet we all witnessed how the collective will of the members of the Council was paralysed and rendered inoperative by the veto of the representative of the United States of America.

This attack on 6 October, mentioned in my letter to the General Assembly which is reproduced in an Assembly document, is not an isolated act; it is the pursuit of the same policy of arrogant power recently escalated by Israel against all Arab countries neighbouring it.

On that day Israeli air formations attacked the Egyptian forces stationed in the area of El Zaafarana and El Sukhna on the Western Bank of the Gulf of Suez, while Israeli naval units were approaching the Western coast of the Gulf. The time and place for this attack were carefully and deliberately selected. The attack was aimed at El Sukhna, where the construction of an oil pipeline carrying oil from Suez to the Mediterranean was to begin. They chose to make the attack only a few days after the announcement of an agreement to construct the pipeline.

I do not want to speak about what holiday this attack took place on, but it seems that people in the area should know that this is also the Moslem holy month of Ramadan. Israel's latest act of aggression was preceded by the large-scale aerial attack against Syria on 13 September, in preparation for the co-ordinated further aggression against the two countries. Israel, having found itself isolated from world public opinion, resorted to the only language which it can speak, unfortunately—the language of war.

¹⁴⁴ President of the Security Council during October 1973 was Sir Laurence McIntyre, Permanent UN Representative of Australia.

The policy of closing all options before the Arabs, before Egypt, except the option of surrender, the policy of making despair the element to induce us to kneel and accept Israel's *diktat*, has failed.

Following the attack of 6 October, our sons have responded to the policy of arrogance. They have crossed to Egyptian territory east of the Suez Canal and raised the flag of Egypt on the territory of Egypt. They are fighting, and even while I am speaking now, the town of Port Said is being heavily bombarded. I wish that the name of Port Said did not have to be evoked again in the hearts of Egyptians. But it is a town which has been assailed before and which has emerged victorious; and it will emerge victorious again.

Foreign Minister Eban, on television here in the United States, was told, "The Egyptians say that they are going back to their territories?" His reply was, "Yes; they claim also Jerusalem to be their territory, and Israel to be their territory"—thus equating exactly their positions in Sinai, the Golan, the West Bank of Jordan and Jerusalem with Israel.

It has been said here that no effort is going to be made to assess blame. We welcome that, although we know where the blame lies; but perhaps that is a negative thing. However, I do not know how to marry that assertion with the statement that United Nations observers have found that Egypt began attacking and is attacking. May I ask the Secretary-General, through you, Mr. President, if his observers are at El Sukhna and El-Zaafarana? May I ask him if he, in the name of the United Nations, can tell you that there has been no firing, no attack on El Sukhna and El Zaafarana? Why use the name of the United Nations? Leave this to the radio and television stations and other managed-mass-information media, but do not use it in the Security Council. I would like the Secretary-General to tell me whether they really have assessed if there was an attack on El Sukhna and El Zaafarana on 6 October or not, and if this attack took place prior to the events which I have described to the Council now. Why use the name of the United Nations?

Then there were a number of suggestions and principles. One was to return to the positions before hostilities broke out. If that means the positions before hostilities broke out in June 1967,

then I must say that it was the wish of the Council in July this year precisely to condemn the continuation of the occupation since that date. That would be a very good sign that the United States was withdrawing its veto of that resolution. But if it means something else, if it means that we are called upon to give up part of our country for another to occupy, then I fail to understand it and will not reply to it.

An invitation to a country and people to offer part of their territory to be occupied by another Power may come from the palaces of emperors or dictators, but it cannot come from the United Nations, not from this house, not from this hall.

The Foreign Minister of France asked this morning: "Does an attempt to set one's feet back in one's own house constitute surprise aggression?"¹⁴⁵ The occupied land of Egypt is our home. The people who are dying today, now, in Egypt, are our sons, brothers, colleagues; they are dying so that their Egypt may live intact with its territorial integrity preserved, so that no territory can be taken as a result of war, so that war will have no fruit. They are not dying for Egypt alone; they are dying for us, for you, for the world, for this United Nations.

MR. HUANG (China) (interpretation from Chinese): With the connivance and support of the super Powers, the Israeli Zionists have been frantically pursuing a policy of aggression and expansion over a long period. They have not only maintained the occupation of large tracts of Arab territories they illegally seized during the 1967 war of aggression, but flagrantly launched on 6 October fresh military attacks on a large scale in expanded aggression against Egypt, Syria and the Palestinian guerillas. This is a serious provocation not only to the entire Arab people but to those countries and peoples in Asia, Africa and Latin America and the rest of the world who uphold justice. The Chinese Government and people express great indignation at and most strongly condemn these new acts of aggression committed by the Israeli Zionists.

With the support of other Arab countries, the army-men and civilians of Egypt, Syria and Palestine are heroically resisting Israeli aggression and have dealt blows at its aggressive arrogance. It is perfectly just for them to rise in resistance to

¹⁴⁵ See doc. 135 below.

the invading enemies on their own sacred territories. The Chinese Government and people admire them for their bold and just action and express firm support to them.

Since 1967 the United Nations has adopted a series of resolutions, calling for or demanding Israeli withdrawal from the large tracts of Arab territories it illegally occupied during its war of aggression in 1967. To date, who has ever seen Israel withdrawing even an inch from the illegally occupied Arab territories? In paragraph 1 of Article 1, the United Nations Charter expressly provides for "the suppression of acts of aggression". One may ask: what has the United Nations done for the "suppression" of Israeli acts of aggression? Today, when the Egyptian, Syrian and Palestinian army-men and people are courageously resisting the Israeli aggressors in face of the fresh aggression by the Israeli Zionists, some people, under the pretence of fairness, are pointing their fingers at this or that instead of supporting and praising their resistance. Some people have even made the preposterous proposal that Egypt and Syria withdraw to their positions prior to their counter-attack against the aggressors. Is this not an open encouragement to acts of aggression and permission for the Israeli aggressors to perpetuate their occupation of Arab territories?

Overtly and covertly conniving at and supporting the Israeli policies of expansion and aggression, the two super-Powers have directly inflated the aggressive arrogance of the Israeli Zionists. In energetically advertising the fallacious argument about the so-called "*détente*", their purpose is none other than to lull the will of the Arab and Palestinian people to fight against aggression. Driven beyond the limit of their forbearance by the fresh military aggression launched by the Israeli Zionists, the army-men and civilians of Egypt, Syria and Palestine this time have broken through the situation of "no war, no peace" deliberately maintained by the super-Powers in the Middle East, and have taken courageous and bold actions for resistance to and expulsion of the aggressors. This reflects a new awakening of the Arab countries and the Palestinian people. Even though they might yet encounter some temporary difficulties and setbacks in the struggle against aggression, we are convinced that so long as they persevere in struggle and strengthen their unity, they will certainly recover their lost

territories and enable the Palestinian people finally to attain their national rights.

If the Security Council is to adopt any resolution at all, it must condemn all the acts of aggression by the Israeli Zionists in the strongest terms, give the firmest support to the Egyptian, Syrian and Palestinian peoples in the just action they are taking to resist the aggressors, demand the immediate withdrawal of the Israeli Zionists from all the Arab territories they have occupied and explicitly provide for the restoration of the national rights of the Palestinian people.

THE PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Israel.

MR. EBAN (Israel): I thank the members of the Security Council for inviting me to participate in the Council's work—and not for the first time.

I made a statement on Israel's behalf this morning in another organ of the United Nations concerning the massive armed attack launched against us on the Day of Atonement from the west and the north, and the very cruel loss and suffering which have resulted from that attack.

After studying the addresses made today by the representatives of the United States and China and by the Foreign Minister of Egypt I shall seek to address the Security Council at a future meeting. It would, I think, be helpful if at the next meeting the Foreign Minister of Egypt would bring to the table some evidence for the odious falsehood about an attack by Israeli naval forces at Sukhna and Zaafarana, an attack which, as he knows and as I know, did not take place. I almost think it would be more courteous to manufacture some evidence than not to bring any at all, because he and I know that no such thing took place.

But tonight I would answer only one very fundamental question which the Foreign Minister of Egypt asked in June of this year and reiterated tonight: What, he asked, could he have brought back then to his people. The answer is, he could have brought back to his people the fact that the door of negotiation is open to Middle Eastern Governments—negotiation that would replace war by peace, hostility by co-operation, cease-fire lines by agreed and secure boundaries. And when I say "negotiation", I mean not any unilateral imposition but a detailed, precise study by both parties of what it is that concerns and preoccupies

and afflicts the other, and how those concerns, those preoccupations and those anxieties may be brought into maximal harmony.

After all, everything else has been tried. War has been tried, with nothing but tragic results; fragile, vulnerable, provisional armistices and cease-fires have been tried; public accusation has been tried; endless Egyptian statements threatening Israel's destruction have been tried. One thing alone has not been tried: building peace by negotiation has not been tried. Surely the time has come to embark upon the adventure of negotiated peace. That is what should have been said in June of this year and on many other occasions before and since, and it is what should be said on the problems that face us as a result of the attacks from the west and the north—and they came, as has been said tonight, from the west and the north—as well as on the perspectives which open out from this crisis.

As I have said, Mr. President, I should like to address the Council more fully at a future meeting.

SIR DONALD MAITLAND (United Kingdom): Mr. President, I should like first to extend to you the good wishes of my delegation on your assumption of the presidency. Your skillful handling of the difficult informal consultations which led up to this meeting has already shown us how fortunate we are that the presidency is in such experienced hands as we embark on this important debate.

As soon as my Government learned of the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East last Saturday, it instructed me to explore urgently with you, Sir, and with our colleagues how best the Security Council could discharge its responsibilities. We were gratified that you set immediate consultations in hand. It is right that this meeting should now be taking place. The Security Council has primary responsibility under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security, and I do not believe that responsible opinion across the world would have understood it if the Council had not become actively seized of this crisis.

The first objective for the Council must be to secure the earliest possible end to the fighting. That is the first concern of my Government. We must all deplore the loss of young lives that has already taken place and continues even as we talk in this chamber. In addition to our

humanitarian concern, we must recognize that fighting in that vitally important area of the world carries with it grave risks that the conflagration will spread. The situation is far too dangerous for this Council to stand by while large-scale hostilities continue unchecked.

That is the urgent task that faces us. We should not allow ourselves to be deflected from it by engaging now in attempts to apportion blame or attribute responsibility. The ultimate verdict may well be that the basic factor was the frustration of the international community in its efforts to bring about that just and lasting peace in the Middle East of which the promise was held out by Security Council resolution 242 (1967) nearly six years ago.

But we should resist the temptation to look backwards. Once we have accomplished our first task of bringing the fighting to an end, we may find that we have a new opportunity to overcome the frustration of which I have spoken, to break the political deadlock.

On the basic aspects of the problem I wish to make it clear that my Government's position is unchanged. We still regard the prescription set out in Security Council resolution 242 (1967) as the corner-stone of any settlement. We maintain the views set out by my Secretary of State at Harrogate on 31 October 1970, when he described in detailed terms how a settlement might be achieved.

Ever since 1967, and particularly over the past three years, my Government has been urging on all concerned, at every opportunity, in every possible forum, the overriding necessity for a peaceful settlement in accordance with Security Council resolution 242 (1967). If there was anyone who was still disposed to doubt this, surely the present outbreak of hostilities will have convinced him.

What I am suggesting is that this Council has two immediate responsibilities: first, to issue an urgent call for a cessation of the fighting; and, secondly, to treat these tragic events as a catalyst for starting a genuine diplomatic process in order to achieve the peaceful settlement that has for far too long eluded us.

MR. MALIK (Union of Soviet Republics) (interpretation from Russian):

The Security Council is once again forced, upon the proposal of one of the members of the Council, to consider the question of the situation in the Middle East. The views of the Soviet Union with regard to the convening of the Council on this matter at this time were expressed in the course of consultations held by the President of the Security Council with members of the Council on 6 October. Our fundamental position was and is that to convene the Security Council was not entirely appropriate, but since it has been convened the Soviet delegation would like to make the following statement.

The general approach of the Soviet Union to the situation in the Middle East cannot fail to be determined by such a decisive factor as the fact that war is going on there between Israel, which has occupied the land of others, and the victims of its aggression, the Arab States, which have striven to recover their land. The war continues between the aggressor, Israel, which has set its foot on Arab soil and has attempted to appropriate it by force, and the Arab States, whose peoples are determined to liberate their land from the foreign occupiers and, as was quite rightly stated today at a plenary meeting of the General Assembly by the Foreign Minister of Egypt, Mr. El-Zayyat, legitimately and justly wish to return to their own homes.

The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. Brezhnev, in his statement today, 8 October, in Moscow at a luncheon in the Kremlin in honour of the Prime Minister of Japan, Mr. Tanaka, who is on an official visit to the Soviet Union, made the following statement in connexion with the situation in the Middle East:

The process of the easing of international tension is gathering strength, but in certain parts of the world it is being interrupted by new flare-ups of conflict and tension. One piece of evidence of this is the war which has once again broken out in the past few days in the Middle East. Fighting is going on there between the aggressor, Israel, and the victims of aggression, Egypt and Syria, which are striving to liberate their territory. It is natural that all our sympathies should be on the side of the victims of aggression. So far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it has been and remains a firm supporter of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East and guaranteed security for all countries and peoples of the area, which is situated so near to our own frontiers. We are still ready to make our contribution to the ensuring of such peace.

Who, apart from the aggressor himself, would dare to deny the correctness, the justice and the legitimacy of the desire and aspiration of the Arabs to drive out the foreign occupiers from the Arab lands and homes and to return to those homes? It is precisely this situation which is decisive if we want properly to describe and understand the situation that now exists in the Middle East; it is the decisive factor in any search for ways of solving the Middle East problem.

What should be the way out of this situation, and along what lines should ways of solving this problem be sought? We are profoundly convinced that the solution to the problem should be sought first and foremost by resolving the question of the withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied Arab territories. It should be absolutely clear to everyone—and it has long since been high time the aggressor as well as those who continue to give the aggressor their patronage understood this themselves—that the situation in the Middle East requires no new decision on the Middle East on the part of the United Nations. What is required is to ensure that the good decisions already taken in the relevant resolutions of the major organs of the United Nations, the Security Council and the General Assembly, should be put into effect. Now, what is needed for this? For this what is needed primarily is that both parties to the conflict should state clearly and distinctly before the United Nations and the whole world their readiness to comply with these decisions. The Arab Republic of Egypt—and this was mentioned by Mr. El-Zayyat in his statement—gave its consent. Israel has not given such consent—so far anyway. The statement of the Foreign Minister, Mr. Eban, today did not give us any sign of such consent. However, it is quite clear that for a beginning what we need, first and foremost, is for Israel, which has occupied Arab territories, clearly and distinctly to state its readiness immediately to proceed to a withdrawal of its troops from the occupied Arab territories.

In the light of this irrefutable and irreversible fact, a discussion in the Security Council of the situation in the Middle East cannot be isolated from the whole complex of the Middle East problem—primarily and particularly from the substance of decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly adopted formally earlier, requiring the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Arab

territories occupied in 1967. This demand of the United Nations for the total withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Arab territories occupied in 1967 has been laid down in repeated decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly and only recently was once again unanimously supported and confirmed by all countries of the African continent in resolution 10 of the anniversary session of the Organization of African Unity and also by all the non-aligned countries, or, as they are otherwise known in United Nations circles, the "third world" countries, in the decisions of the Fourth Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in Algiers.

Without a solution of this fundamental, cardinal problem and without a clear-cut statement on the part of Israel of its readiness to withdraw all its troops from occupied territories, the Security Council cannot take any constructive decision in the present circumstances in the Middle East. The adoption of any new resolution, unless there has been some settlement of this major key issue, would once again be exploited by the aggressor simply to divert attention, as in the past, from this key issue, to continue its occupation and appropriation and annexation of the lands of others occupied by the Israeli annexationists.

That is the position of the Soviet Union. It has once again been confirmed in the statement of the Soviet Government of 7 October, which I consider necessary to bring to the attention of all the members of the Security Council. I should like to read out the text of that statement, as follows:

[The statement is printed as document no. 131 below.]

The meeting rose at 19.40 (00.40 gmt, Tuesday, October 9).

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Security Council, 1744th meeting; statements by France and Syria¹⁴⁶

Tuesday, October 9, 1973

The meeting came to order at 16.00 (21.00 gmt).

MR. DE GUIRINGAUD (France) (interpretation from French):

Once again there is war in the Near East. In the Israeli-Egyptian and in the Israeli-Syrian sectors large-scale military operations are taking place and they are the largest since June 1967. Although there are no sufficiently accurate data as to the number of soldiers involved on both sides, Government communiqués and the information in the press give us a rather clear idea of the extent of the battles.

The news, which has just been confirmed, of bombing by Israeli forces of a building housing representatives of the Soviet Union in Damascus, under the ruins of which it is reported that many persons were found, gives, if that were still necessary, a tragic framework for our debate. I wish to express to the Soviet delegation our sad condolence in these painful circumstances.

Clearly the situation we face may in the days to come undergo unforeseeable developments such as to jeopardize in the long run any chance of peace.

What we must note is that the operations are taking place in the Egyptian and Syrian territories which were occupied by Israel in June 1967. That element seems to me to be essential in so far as it will be decisive in the assessment which our Council must make on the situation.

Indeed, I do not believe that members of the Council could be satisfied with a hasty decision, knowing in advance that it will not be complied with and that it would merely constitute, in a problem that is already so complex, an additional factor of complication.

The international community of which our Council is the most legitimate expression will, I hope, assume its responsibilities and define the measures that can bring about an end to the present situation with respect for the legitimate rights of the parties to the dispute.

Here I shall simply recall that the position of France remains unchanged. France is in favour of a peaceful settlement of the conflict and of a negotiated solution in accord with the various United Nations resolutions and in particular in accord with resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967. My Government has never ceased to reaffirm this on many occasions here, before

¹⁴⁶ Excerpted from the provisional verbatim record, UN doc. S/PV.1744, pp. 11-15, 18-22, 31-37.

the General Assembly and elsewhere, whenever there was an opportunity to do so.

This necessary link to be established between the present events and the situation as a whole should be the main concern of our Council. It would be futile to attempt to impose on the adversaries provisional measures which would settle nothing, just as it would be futile to impose on them commitments which are not coupled with sufficient guarantees.

Some may object that the Council faces an emergency situation and must, accordingly, adopt emergency measures. But in our opinion that would mean disregarding the essential facts of the problem which we have been facing for a long time.

In the Near East, for a quarter of a century, countries which because of close proximity are condemned, so to speak, to coexistence do not manage to establish peaceful relations among themselves. A deep distrust, dating very far back, ceaselessly opposes them, whereas everything should on the contrary bring them closer together, as though the difficulties were beyond remedy and, as is shown in many other cases, can therefore not be the subject of a solution that is acceptable to all.

The latest events in this situation, however spectacular, constitute but a new phase in this confrontation. Has not the time come for us to attack the roots of the ill and in good faith seek the means to overcome this kind of inevitability? But to this end our Council must not confine itself to examining present events. It must, on the contrary, divert itself to promoting the quest for a solution that will cover every facet of the problem. This quest for a solution has been spoken of for a very long time and the parties to the dispute have declared themselves to be in favour of it. But, so far, every attempt made to start the quest for a solution has been sealed by failure. There is more or less general agreement on the principles contained in resolution 242 (1967), but there is no agreement on their implementation. The fact of occupation, because it creates relationships of inequality, constitutes the major obstacle.

In these circumstances is it not the role of our Council above all to promote the rapprochement of the parties in a common quest for a negotiated settlement to which the international community would provide the indispensable guarantees?

Our deliberations, I believe should be directed to that end and the resolution which we might adopt should, it seems to me, take into account all those elements. It goes without saying that my delegation is not opposed to the adoption of a cease fire; but, if we go no further, we will once again have satisfied our consciences at a small cost, without succeeding in bringing about a change in attitudes which alone can progressively lead to peace.

The time has come for the international community to put an end to this war which, whether open or latent, has not ceased for 25 years. The time has come for our Council really to assume its responsibilities and to attempt a major effort to define the framework for genuine negotiations.

MR. ISMAIL (Syrian Arab Republic) (interpretation from French): Once again the Near East is the theatre of armed conflict. Once again my country is the victim of a war of aggression launched by Israel on 6 October of this year. Finally, the explosive situation to which we have constantly drawn the attention of the whole world, and particularly that of the United Nations, has produced its unavoidable fruit, a bitter fruit—war. No one knows how this total war, which Israel has launched against the Arabs for the third time, will end, what its consequences will be, what extent it will assume and what forces and what Powers will be involved in it. All this depends upon the intention of the Israeli aggressor and upon his plans for expansion. However, Israel must not be unaware of the fact that one can always start a war, but one can never guarantee how it will end. We Arabs, the victims of permanent Israeli aggression since 1948, know but one thing: our fatherland and our resources are the subject of covetousness of world-wide Zionism and its imperialist satellites and allies. It is our sacred duty to counteract these Zionist and imperialist designs by all the means at our disposal. That world peace would suffer, that consumer societies would be exposed to disturbances, is something about which we have launched cries of alarm much too often in an attempt to warn the whole international community. Regularly every year, from the rostrum of the General Assembly of the United Nations, we have emphasized the explosive nature of the situation in our region.

On numerous occasions we have drawn the attention of the Security Council and of the different organs of the United Nations to the expansionist and hegemonic designs of Israel. Most recently, in the course of conversations which we had with a number of heads of delegations to the present session of the General Assembly, we emphasized the imminent aggression that Israel was carefully preparing. Everybody seemed to listen to us and to say that we were right, but unfortunately all of this remained without effect, without any concrete results. Why? In the present system of the United Nations our Organization is paralysed by the improper use of the right of veto. We find ourselves in a situation where this veto had been utilized against justice and logic and against the will of 14 members of the Security Council. And that means that it has been used against the will of the whole world except Israel. If the veto has been provided as an exclusive privilege to the permanent members of the Security Council by virtue of the special responsibilities which they have for the preservation of world order, one cannot see how that right can be used to block the Security Council's machinery and to prevent it from fulfilling its principal function as defined in the United Nations Charter, namely, to safeguard international peace and security.

Some might argue that the right of veto is a privilege of political discretion whose use is left entirely to the judgement of the beneficiary Powers. That argument is more than fallacious because those very ones who use the veto improperly cannot claim that those who drafted the Charter had the slightest intention to include in it a provision which might be used against justice and logic and even against international peace. If the veto is a political privilege which does not always fit into the rules of law, it is not possible under any circumstances to admit that its use is left entirely to the discretion of the beneficiary States because that would be tantamount to having world peace depend upon the selfish and arbitrary will of a single State. In all cases where the use of the veto does not correspond to a situation of law and of justice it must necessarily and exclusively serve the cause of world peace. That is how we understand this famous right of veto.

Unfortunately, the Government of the United States has acted against right, logic, common sense and the interest of world peace—in other

words, against the rational and democratic conception of the right of veto. Israel, which interprets the American veto as encouragement, increases its attacks against the Arab countries, and I would mention most specially the air attack against Syria on 13 September last. We state nothing but the truth when we say that the war that Israel launched against Syria and Egypt on 6 October of this year is the direct result of the promise, stated on many occasions, that the United States would never let the Security Council adopt a resolution against the interests of Israel. Moreover this right of veto as it was conceived and included in the Charter almost three decades ago no longer, in our view, corresponds to the realities of international life and it is essential to consider the amendments that must be made in this respect.

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The Foreign Minister of Israel also calls for a return to the positions held before 6 October. After that, he says, he will be ready to negotiate to come to agreement on secure frontiers. How can a country agree to negotiate while its territory is occupied by a foreign Power? How can it agree to negotiate when the occupier declares that he will never agree to withdraw from the major part of the territory he occupies? For Israel, Jerusalem is not negotiable. The sector of Gaza, the Golan and Sharm el-Sheikh can, under no circumstances, be returned. The West Bank of Jordan, according to the Dayan plan or the Allon plan, is to be the area where these plans are going to be put into effect, both plans giving that Arab region a hybrid status, reconciling by some means military Israeli presence with Jordanian sovereignty.

The policy of annexation and fait accompli of General Dayan is at present adopted by the party in power and constitutes its primary feature in the electoral campaign now in progress in Israel.

These are the circumstances in which Israel is inviting the Arabs to enter into negotiations without prior conditions—and I emphasize this: “without prior conditions”.

Recent European history shows that any negotiations under conditions of foreign occupation can only lead to surrender, and any agreement which confirms the surrender is bound to yield to the thrust of nationalist forces that emerge, and ultimately will be swept away.

As for the Israeli thesis of secure frontiers, it

is but a fallacious and rather thin argument. Nowadays the whole world is aware that there is no geographic obstacle that could have any valid effect against modern weapons; and in fact, Israel, which has enormous quantities of the most perfected types of weapons, is advancing this fallacious argument in order to justify its policy of annexation. The front line in Syria, established after the 1967 war, is on a plain and Syrian guns can easily reach the settlements built in the Golan. According to the Israeli thesis, it would be legitimate for Israel to require that its final borders should be placed some score kilometres deeper into Syrian territory.

The Israeli Foreign Minister has called for a return to the positions before 6 October. We have refused to concede his country's right to call upon others to observe and comply with the cease-fire, Israel having occupied the whole of the Golan, having taken advantage of the non-compliance with the cease-fire ordered by the Security Council in its resolution 235 (1967), and also having taken advantage of the violation of resolution 236 (1967). Israel cannot call for the return to positions occupied before 6 October because such positions happen to be in our national territory. And the fight we are waging now, and which was provoked by the Israeli attack, cannot be qualified as anything other than a national liberation fight, which is in conformity with the principles of the United Nations and in accordance with the norms of international law.

We are not seeking in any way to cause loss of human life and the destruction of property when this potential is not mobilized against our security and when it is not necessary to liberate our occupied territory. We are not threatening the survival of anyone. Our goal can be none other than to recover usurped Arab territory. Is it too much to ask for support in our liberation struggle from all peace-loving and justice-loving countries? Is it too much to ask of the United Nations to give us support in an action that is in accordance with resolutions that are being trampled underfoot by Israeli militarism?

The Foreign Minister of Israel has attempted to exploit the religious and humanitarian sentiments of his audience by stressing that the alleged Arab attack was launched when the people of Israel were celebrating an annual holy day. I should like to recall that it is a peculiar feature

of the Israelis to strike when the moment appears to be least likely for beginning an attack. We have endured that experience on several occasions and we have suffered much from it. I shall add^{*} that the Islamic world as a whole has been engaged since 27 September in the sacred Ramadan fast, which is a month of prayer and charity. In the mind of Israel, an attack during the month of Ramadan resulting in a new Israeli victory brings the maximum of humiliation to the Arabs and obliges them to capitulate.

The representative of the United States yesterday made a statement in which he set forth the position of his Government. That statement calls for several comments, which I shall attempt to make very briefly.

First, the report of the United Nations Observers cannot always and in all cases be considered, alone, as evidence of the whole truth. In the majority of cases, Israeli military aircraft have avoided the front-lines, where the United Nations Observers are posted in Syria, and have penetrated Syrian air space in the northern part of the country, coming from the west, after having covered a distance of over 300 kilometres in Mediterranean skies. The United Nations Observers naturally cannot, in such circumstances, report violations of the cease-fire by Israel.

Second, it is difficult to understand what the representative of the United States was attempting to say when he called on the Security Council to perform its historic role. Does he mean that the United States is then to abandon the improper use of the right of veto?

Third, it is impossible for us to understand on what legal or moral basis the United States wishes to see a return to the positions obtaining before 6 October. The cease-fire cannot be considered as a permanent régime, as this would in fact simply transform the cease-fire line into a definitive border between the belligerents. Right and morality shun this state of affairs and require that territory acquired by force be returned. For six years and four months the United Nations had been rendered incapable of finding and applying a solution that would guarantee a just and lasting peace, and everything indicated that the situation was to crystallize for the benefit of the connivance of certain Powers with Israel and the dangerous tendency shown by certain other Powers to coexist with Israeli aggression

and expansionism. Now that Israel, through its new aggression against the victims of the aggression of 1967, is providing an opportunity for application of the numerous resolutions of the United Nations calling for the withdrawal by Israel from all the occupied Arab territories, it would be absurd and contrary to the spirit of all of those resolutions to go back to the line obtaining before 6 October, which, by definition, was a provisional line, but which in practice turned out to be permanent and a constant defiance of United Nations authority, of the feelings of national dignity of all our peoples and the feelings of justice of all peace- and freedom-loving peoples.

I wish to affirm that we are unshakably attached to the principles of freedom and peace based on justice. We are at present fighting to repel the aggressor, we are exercising our right of self-defence. We do not wish to bring death to anyone. We are seeking to prevent the aggressor from sowing death and destruction in our land. We are staunchly loyal to the principles of the United Nations Charter, and as a small country we are in favour of strengthening the authority of the United Nations and enhancing its prestige. We abhor the necessity of devoting the greater part of our national income to the requirements of defence; we would prefer to be able to use all of our resources for the furthering of our well-being and the progress of our people. We have nothing whatsoever against the Jews as Jews. What we are fighting against is solely and exclusively colonialism and Zionist expansionism, which seek to assert themselves in our region at the expense of our people.

[The Council then discussed the Israeli air raid on Damascus and the delegates expressed condolence to the countries whose diplomatic missions had suffered losses. The debate continued with statements by the delegates of Indonesia and India.]

The meeting rose at 19.00 (24.00 gmt).

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Security Council, 1747th meeting; statements by all members except Australia, and by Saudi Arabia, Israel and Egypt¹⁴⁷

Sunday, October 21, 1973

The meeting came to order at 22.15 (03.15 gmt, Monday, October 22).

MR. SCALI (United States of America): The United States, together with the USSR, has called for this meeting of the Security Council with one purpose in mind: to take joint action and to present a joint proposition to the Council whose aim is to bring an immediate cease-fire in place and to begin promptly negotiations between the parties under appropriate auspices looking toward a just and durable peace based on the November 1967 Security Council resolution.

As the members of this Council know, the tragic fighting over the past 17 days has been both furious and costly. We believe that the prolongation of the war is not in the interests of the parties or the peoples in the area, and its continuance carries grave risks for the peace of the world. Because of this, President Nixon agreed that Secretary Kissinger should fly to Moscow, in response to an invitation of Secretary General Brezhnev. As a result of these discussions, the Council has before it the draft resolution agreed jointly by the United States and the Soviet Governments, on which both our Governments request immediate action on the part of the Security Council. The draft resolution has already been circulated to the members of the Council.

Let me make a few brief remarks regarding the three short paragraphs of the draft resolution, for they all stand clearly on their own words and speak for themselves.

The first paragraph calls for an immediate cease-fire. In our view, as well as that of the Soviet Union, this applies not only to the parties directly concerned but also to those who have joined in the fighting by sending units. This paragraph calls for the stopping of fighting in the positions presently occupied by the two sides. We believe that

¹⁴⁷ Excerpted from the provisional verbatim record, UN doc. S/PV.1747, pp. 3-11, 31-40, 53-61, 62-71, 72-77, 78-80, 81-86.

12 hours should allow ample time to achieve the practical implementation of this paragraph.

The second paragraph calls for the implementation of the Security Council resolution in all of its parts after the cease fire. The members of this Council as well as the parties concerned are fully familiar with Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and it needs no elaboration here. The paragraph is linked to paragraph 3 which calls for the immediate beginning of negotiations between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East. We believe that from the tragic events of the past 17 days there must be a new resolve, a new attempt to remove the fundamental causes that have brought war to the Middle East so frequently and so tragically. Another respite between two wars is just not good enough. And for our part, both the United States and the Soviet Union are ready to make our joint good offices available to the parties as a means to facilitate the negotiating process.

Finally, I want to report to the Council that both the Soviet Union and the United States believe that there should be an immediate exchange of prisoners of war.

We believe this is an historic moment for the Council. We believe that this Council, in exercising its primary responsibility in the field of peace and security, can make a major contribution to this end by adopting this draft resolution promptly.

MR. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): In the Middle East, because of the absence of a political settlement, war is continuing. For more than two weeks now fierce and bloody battles have been going on, entailing casualties and destruction. The situation which has been created in that area seriously menaces the maintenance of international peace. The dangerous situation created there requires that the Security Council take the most urgent and immediate measures to call a halt to the bloodshed and also with regard to a practical peaceful settlement on the basis of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967.

It is well known that in recent days intensive multilateral consultations have been going on, including high level meetings, in order to call a halt to the war in the Middle East. At the present time, as a result of these consultations, the Soviet Union, jointly with the United States, has tabled

in the Security Council a draft resolution (S/11036) designed to call a halt to military activities and immediately to implement practically Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) on a political settlement in the Middle East.

This draft resolution provides that all the parties to the present fighting should cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption by the Security Council of this decision, in the positions they now occupy.

The draft resolution also provides that the parties concerned should start immediately after the cease-fire the practical implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts.

The draft resolution also provides that the Security Council should decide that, under appropriate auspices, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations should begin between the parties concerned aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

The dangerous development of events in the Middle East, which runs counter to the easing of tension which has been achieved recently, requires of all who are interested in strengthening the cause of peace urgent efforts to turn back the course of events in that area into the channel of a peaceful and equitable settlement. And time will not wait.

The Soviet delegation considers that the Security Council should immediately act in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and take the necessary decision today, at this meeting of the Council, and the Soviet Union calls upon all members of the Security Council to do this.

THE PRESIDENT: I now invite the representative of Saudi Arabia to take a place at the Council table and to make a statement.

MR. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): I cannot compromise my conscience by keeping silent about this momentous meeting of the Council which reaffirms what has become common knowledge all over the world, namely, that the two super-Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, are once again engaged in the game of power politics and spheres of influence.

Here we come to the draft resolution, which, if adopted, may create a phoney *détente*, like the *détente* we are witnessing between the super Powers. This time it will be a *détente* between

some of the Arab leaders and some of the Jews, or the Zionists rather, because the Zionists want to expand until they get to western Iraq, until they get to the Nile. Then what will we have profited: the United Nations as an instrument for peace or as an instrument for delaying tragedy and perpetuating it?

Now, what is the alternative? It is a *fait accompli*, as de Gaulle once said to King Faisal in 1967 before the conflict of that year. It was in May. De Gaulle was maligned by many Zionists. He said: "But what can you do, it is a *fait accompli*". And His Majesty King Faisal retorted: "Did you consider the invasion of the Nazis a *fait accompli*, or did you leave and struggle until the Nazis were defeated?"

And now, and tomorrow, and the day after tomorrow, should there be a *fait accompli*, the Arab youth will not stay quiet. They will call those who make peace with the usurpers of the Palestine people traitors. Mark my words. I may not be living then, but here in the record let it figure: traitors. I know the youth in the Arab lands. That is the best we can do, the Security Council. As long as there is an injustice which is perpetrated, there will be another round, and still another round. I cannot tell you the intervals of those rounds because the age of prophecy has gone, but having been seized of the situation since the early twenties, I hope you will heed what I am saying. I am giving you warning here, members of the Council, that you are solving nothing—just because it does not suit the Soviet Union and the United States to come to grips. A military confrontation will bring down mankind. It might be suicide.

There will be other conflicts as long as the major Powers do not formulate their policies on the basis of justice. And the Arab people will struggle until injustice disappears in their area.

Now, is there a solution? It sounds like warlike talk here. Yes, there is a solution. Instead of the two super-Powers becoming the arbiters of what they think they may accomplish to serve their national interests, let me tell them what I think would be a fair solution. We do not want the Jews to suffer, nor do we want the Arabs to suffer. They hoisted a flag of their own, which is a symbol of colonialism—extreme colonialism, because the colonial Powers did not expropriate in the past the assets of the natives of the land. Live as

Jews, if you want to, amongst us, but not as Zionists. That flag is the symbol of your aggression. But you could adopt another flag, a flag that will fly over Jews and Arabs of Palestine. Let it be a crescent and inside of the crescent we will accept your star as Jewish, what you call the Star of David as Jews. Remember, that crescent is always surrounding you. If you try to be aggressive, it will close up on you.

Otherwise that symbol of aggression will lead to further aggression. Who begins it is beside the point. As we say in Arabic, "He who starts evil is really the aggressor". We did not go and hurt any Jew in Eastern and Central Europe, just as we have never hurt either the British or the French or the Americans. And they come to our region and wage war by proxy. Beware. There is no one who went to our area but disappeared. I am not going back before Alexander the Great. The Romans, the Seleucids, the Byzantines, the Seljuks, the Crusaders from all Western Europe, and our brothers the Ottomans—although it was a sort of a commonwealth, the Ottoman Empire.

Then it was the turn of the British and the French, in their Mandates, which was a sort of colonialism. And now it is the turn of whom? Of the Eastern and Central European Zionists who have started that movement of aggression amongst us. Where are those who preceded them? Gone with the wind. And you also in time will go with the wind. But we do not want to hurt you as people. We are defending ourselves from an alien culture, from an alien language, from an alien way of life. And that is why you have become a foreign element in the body social and body politics of the Arab world, causing an abscess, and the abscess is causing a high fever. And not until the puss of aggression is squeezed out for good and people live like brothers in peace, Jew or gentile, under a common flag, will there be peace in the land of Palestine and in the Middle East.

SIR DONALD MAITLAND (United Kingdom): When I addressed this Council on 8 October I suggested that we had two immediate responsibilities: first, to seek the earliest possible ceasefire and, second, to treat the renewal of hostilities as a catalyst for starting a genuine diplomatic process which would lead to a settlement.

In the 17 days since the present war began,

this Council has been unable to find a way of discharging either of these responsibilities. Meanwhile, the States involved in the fighting have suffered tragic losses and the risk to international peace and security has grown alarmingly. The conclusion must inevitably suggest itself that a solution to the Middle East problem is not to be found by military means. There is only one decisive victory to be gained. That is the achievement of a just and lasting peace.

The just and lasting peace which must now be sought with the utmost vigour could bring great benefits to the people of the Arab States and Israel. We know that they have for long sought the opportunity to devote their talents and their resources to the economic and social problems that face them and so create stability in place of tension, hostility and violence.

But it is not only the Arab States and Israel which have suffered. For many years now the interests of many countries in Europe, Africa and Asia have been closely affected. The will is strong in these three continents for lasting peace in the Middle East and they have the opportunity to express it in this debate.

My Government has too close a knowledge of the difficulties which will have to be overcome to believe that a settlement can be achieved tomorrow. A period of hard negotiation lies ahead.

But as we call tonight for a cease fire, the members of the Security Council possess one valuable asset which was not available on 6 June 1967. The only prescription for a settlement which commands unanimous agreement is already on our statute book as resolution 242 (1967). All energies can now be devoted to the implementation of that resolution in all of its parts. After six years of fruitless activity, the Security Council is fully justified in calling upon the parties to take immediate steps to that end.

The United Kingdom delegation will vote for the draft resolution sponsored by the Soviet Union and the United States. We believe that it offers a unique opportunity to stop the fighting and to start real progress at last towards a settlement.

I reminded the Council at the beginning of this debate of my Government's views on the detailed provisions of such a settlement, which would combine the requirements of sovereignty with those of security. I do not propose to restate

those views tonight. I wish only to say that they have not changed.

With regard to the draft resolution now before us, I should like to add two points. First, my Government believes that the efforts aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East would best be pursued under the aegis of the United Nations. This is how my delegation would interpret the reference to "appropriate auspices" in paragraph 3 of the draft resolution before us.

My second point is this. Since, as I have argued, there is no security in resort to military force and real peace can come to the Middle East only in the wake of a settlement, my Government hopes that as soon as the cease-fire has become effective, the United States and the Soviet Union will cease supplying arms to the area. As members of the Council know, my Government suspended all shipment of arms to the battlefield as soon as hostilities broke out. My Government acted at once out of the conviction that this was the only right policy if the aim is, as it must be, to seek reconciliation and prevent any further war between the Arab States and Israel.

In conclusion, may I say that my Government stands ready to play its full part in the urgent effort which must now be made to seek a lasting settlement.

MR. DE GUIRINGAUD (France) (interpretation from French): Following on the grave developments in the situation in the Middle East, the United States and the Soviet Union have jointly called for the immediate convening of the Security Council in order to place before it the draft resolution now before us for consideration. Mindful of the urgency of the matter, I shall be very brief. While we sit here listening to speeches, in the Middle East men are fighting, men are dying.

My delegation will vote in favour of the text submitted by the delegations of the Soviet Union and the United States, because that text meets the necessity of putting an immediate end to a struggle that has claimed far too many victims, a struggle the prolongation of which can bring only greater suffering and entail perhaps other dangers as well.

My delegation, however, would wish to make the following observations.

The draft now before the Council responds to the concerns of the French Government as expressed by our Prime Minister on 9 October in an address

before the National Assembly. In that statement, Mr. Messmer emphasized the link that must exist between a cease-fire and the immediate start of the process that should lead to a definitive settlement of the conflict in accordance with resolution 242 (1967), which was accepted by all and which offers all necessary guarantees for security. The draft before us also provides for the implementation of resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts. France abides by its interpretation of resolution 242 (1967), in particular as regards withdrawal, and by its conception of the role of our Council and its permanent members in the peace settlement and its implementation.

In submitting this draft resolution, the United States and the Soviet Union assume, in our view, the responsibility for contributing to the best of their ability to the implementation of resolution 242 (1967). However, as regards the negotiations provided for in the Soviet-American text in paragraph 3, my delegation wishes to stress that the phrase "under appropriate auspices" can mean nothing other than under the aegis of the Security Council.

Lastly, I should like to emphasize that the draft resolution on which the Council is about to vote will have its full effect and have a chance of leading to the restoration of peace only if it is understood that the Powers that have proposed this text intend to cease as soon as possible their massive deliveries of armaments to the belligerents.

My delegation fervently hopes that our Council will take a decision at the earliest possible moment in favour of the text before us. Too much blood has already been shed for our Council to show any hesitation whatsoever in adopting a draft resolution that offers the immediate advantage of bringing about a cease-fire and thus putting an end to the fighting, while at the same time opening the way to the over-all negotiation which alone will make possible the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

MR. SEN (India): By all standards I should be happy that fighting and bloodshed would end by the adoption of the draft resolution before us, but I am not, and this for two weighty reasons. First, for years now we have maintained that justice must be combined with peace. The justice we have repeatedly emphasized is that the Arab

lands occupied by Israel must be evacuated before serious and fruitful negotiations could start. Secondly, we have always been cautious, if not obstreperous, about any solution arrived at by the great Powers without full consultation with the general membership of the United Nations.

One might argue that that is exactly what we have been doing tonight, but let us examine briefly what has happened. At 8.30 tonight we made a formal call to find out if the Council was meeting tonight, having been told at 7 p.m. that such a meeting was planned and that a draft resolution had been worked out. The next two or three hours we spent in intensive consultation, but of course without instructions or guidance from our own Government.

Two matters are quite clear. The first is that the military situation on the field is difficult to assess and that the United States and the Soviet Union have come to an agreement the details of which are not fully known and perhaps cannot and should not be known to us now or in the foreseeable future. So, given this lack of knowledge—a lack explained by the United States reference to the prisoners of war, which is not mentioned in the draft resolution—we are indeed in great difficulty, which I do not have to elaborate.

Our second difficulty is that the two Powers, however great and however powerful, have come to an agreement and we have to underwrite it quickly. No non-aligned country can welcome this turn of events, not merely for this specific case but as a general rule to which we have repeatedly drawn attention. None the less, the general conclusion is clear: for whatever reasons the principal parties to the fighting seem to have accepted the joint draft resolution and we have very little choice left to us except to support it. But in doing so, we should make it clear that the implementation of resolution 242 (1967) means first that the Arab territories must be vacated subject to minor adjustments agreed to by the parties, secondly, that Israel has a right to exist as a sovereign State and, thirdly, that a proper settlement of the rights of the Palestinian people must be accepted.

Therefore, while we shall support the draft resolution, we cannot be unaware that it is vague—a vagueness compounded by the reference to resolution 242 (1967), which has bedevilled our discussions for six years because of these characteristics—and we shall support it in the hope that

this vagueness will not come in the way of a just solution. It is on this understanding that we are prepared to support the joint draft resolution, with many hesitations and several reservations, not the least of which is with regard to the reference to "appropriate auspices" under which the negotiations are to be held. We can only hope that our hesitations and reservations are unjustified.

MR. MUNGAI (Kenya): When addressing this Council on Wednesday, 10 October 1973, I stated that a cease-fire should come into effect immediately in the Middle East so that lives and property could be saved. I also stated that the parties concerned should enter into immediate negotiations with a view to solving other outstanding problems. My delegation still believes that Security Council resolution 242 (1967) remains a valid basis for negotiations among the parties concerned. I said that my delegation would participate in every possible constructive effort to bring about a normalization of relations in the Middle East. Bearing this in mind, Kenya welcomes the draft resolution contained in document S/11036, jointly sponsored by the Soviet Union and the United States and just introduced by the delegations of those two countries.

Referring to paragraph 1, my delegation heartily welcomes the call for an immediate cessation of fighting in the Middle East. All men of good will would expect the Council to do no less in the wake of the heavy toll of life so far, the heavy injuries inflicted on many people and the incalculable destruction of property in the area since the war broke out on 6 October.

Referring to paragraph 2, I have said before, and I have just said, that implementation of resolution 242 (1967) forms the basis for a solution in the Middle East. But for six years this resolution has not been implemented. I hope that now there is going to be an honest and earnest desire to have peace in this troubled area. Therefore it is hoped that the factors that have frustrated a realization of the implementation of resolution 242 (1967) will not now occur again.

Referring to paragraph 3, I believe that a permanent solution can be found only if both parties in the Middle East conflict have the will and the desire to live in peace with one another. No resolution can bring peace to that ravaged section of the world unless the will to live in peace

exists in both parties. If we are to understand that both parties are willing to meet and negotiate to arrive at a just and lasting peace, my delegation will welcome this, but I must make some observations in this regard. I would call upon the super-Powers to desist from accelerating the arms race in the area, because as long as these weapons are supplied they are going to act as catalysts to warfare in that region.

At the same time, my delegation believes that to implement resolution 242 (1967), to accomplish the withdrawal of troops, to ensure the inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, to ensure the freedom and rights of navigation in the region and also the rights of the refugees, an international system will be required to guarantee all these points. Yet I believe that the system should come from the United Nations and that there should be regular reports to the Security Council.

We in Africa are desirous of having peace in that region. We are a developing nation, and I should like to emphasize that we want to develop and we can only develop in an atmosphere of peace in the world. Unless there is peace we cannot achieve the results we should like to have. Although we are a small nation and not in a position to dictate any terms to anybody, I believe even small nations can come up with words of wisdom occasionally. Therefore I feel that the African countries should be listened to when we talk here, because of our small size and of our desire to have peace so that we can develop.

MR. BOYD (Panama) (interpretation from Spanish): We consider that the joint action taken by the United States and the Soviet Union in proposing the draft resolution in document S/11036 represents a step in the right direction, and for this reason the delegation of Panama will vote in favour of it. The suffering and pain of the peoples of the Middle East that are parties to the conflict are enormous. In particular we regret the large number of innocent victims. We hope that this cease-fire will minimize the serious risks entailed to world peace because of this war.

As the draft resolution we are to vote on speaks of the implementation of resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts, it is worth recalling that my delegation, in this Council on 14 June last, set forth the position of the Government of Panama

as regards the interpretation of resolution 242 (1967).

In conclusion, we express the hope that the negotiations to be carried out between the parties will lead to the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

MR. ANWAR SANI (Indonesia): I will be extremely brief, as I cannot improve on what my colleague from India, Ambassador Sen, has so clearly stated.

My delegation has decided to vote in favour of the draft resolution which has been jointly submitted by the Soviet Union and the United States of America. In doing so I would like to remind the Council of what I said in my statement on 9 October last:

Members have referred to resolution 242 (1967) as the basis for finding a solution to the Middle East problem. My delegation agrees with that view. However, when the Council adopted resolution 242 (1967), in its wisdom it left the provisions of that resolution open to contradictory interpretations, *a priori* dooming to failure efforts for their implementation. It seems to my delegation that adherence to resolution 242 (1967) alone will not help us towards a solution of the Middle East conflict, as has been proved by the failure of all efforts during the last six years. If resolution 242 (1967) has to be the basis of the search for a solution, the Council has to agree on one and the same interpretation in order to be able to implement its provisions effectively. (1744th meeting, page 71)

I said, furthermore:

As far as my delegation is concerned, the only interpretation of resolution 242 (1967) that can lead us toward peace in the Middle East is to follow the sequence of, first, withdrawal of Israel from occupied Arab territories, then negotiation as to outstanding issues, including the rights of the Palestinians. If these two aspects are settled, secure and recognized borders can be established and peace has a realistic chance of returning to the Middle East. (*Ibid.*, page, 72)

It is with this understanding that my delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution, especially with regard to its operative paragraph 2.

In conclusion, I would like to assure the Council that Indonesia will co-operate in all efforts to establish a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

MR. PEREZ DE CUELLAR (Peru) (interpretation from Spanish): My delegation could not object to the adoption of the joint draft resolution submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, despite its obvious imprecisions, since it is designed to put an end to the bloody conflict that has been intensified in these past three weeks, and since it reaffirms that Security Council resolution 242 (1967) is the framework for a just and definitive solution to the Middle East problem.

We fully agree that the cease-fire should determine the concomitant initiation of negotiations among the parties concerned, since, as we said on 11 October,

...this appeal [for an end to the struggle] must be couched in terms which will facilitate and, if possible, give an advance indication of the complete and long-term solution of the problem. (1745th meeting, page 27)

We trust that the "appropriate auspices" mentioned in the draft will directly involve the United Nations through the Secretary-General and the Security Council.

And it is worth recalling that the Council is composed of 15 members, 8 of which represent the so-called third world. We shall vote in favour of the draft resolution with satisfaction, because it represents the will of the Council to assume its responsibilities; and with hope, since we trust that the parties—that is to say, all the States and peoples concerned that should and must participate in the negotiations—are at last embarked upon the road to peace.

THE PRESIDENT: I now call on the representative of Israel, who, I understand, wishes to supplement his earlier remarks.

MR. TEKOAH (Israel): I should now like to refer to the draft resolution on which the Security Council is about to vote. In the General Assembly on 9 October and in the Security Council at its recent meetings, the Israel delegation explained its view on the origin of the war now raging in the Middle East. Israel has successfully resisted an attack which, had it succeeded in its objective, would have placed Israel's security in great jeopardy. Our Prime Minister said on 11 October that we have no ambition in this war except to repel an assault on our security. Our supreme national objective is the attainment of a negotiated peace.

Those considerations explain our positive attitude to the draft resolution, paragraph 1 of which:

“Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;”.

It is evident that Israel's compliance with the proposed cease-fire is conditional on its acceptance and observance by all the States taking part in this fighting.

Moreover, every Government accepting the cease-fire must obviously be responsible for ensuring that it should apply not only to its own troops but also to troops from other countries operating on its soil, as well as to irregulars of any kind. We have in mind, for example, the terrorists firing on villages in northern Israel from Lebanese territory, or infiltration across the border. The cessation of military activity must include the elimination of the blockade now imposed by the Republic of Yemen at the Bab el Mandab Straits. The obstruction of waterways to international navigation is certainly an act of war which this resolution should bring to an end.

We accept paragraph 2 of the draft resolution in the sense defined by Israel in its decision of 4 August 1970 in connexion with the United States cease-fire initiative, and also in our communication to the Secretary-General of 4 August 1970, and in the address of our Prime Minister, Mrs. Golda Meir in the Knesset on that day.¹⁴⁸

We attach great importance to the provision of the draft resolution in paragraph 3 deciding

“... that immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.” (*S/11036*)

We have constantly emphasized that the absence of free, direct, normal peace negotiations between Israel and its neighbours lies at the heart of the deadlock in the Middle East. Paragraph 3 of the draft resolution and the statement made by the representative of the United States represent important progress in international policy on this crucial point.

The hostilities launched on 6 October have resulted in hundreds of military personnel becom-

ing prisoners of war. We regard the release of all prisoners of war now held in the countries involved in the conflict as an indispensable condition of any cease-fire agreement.

In conveying its positive response to the proposal made by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Government of Israel hopes that the bloodshed and hostility which have tormented the Middle East for so many years will be replaced by an era of peace and co-operation between all the States in our region.

MR. HUANG (China) (interpretation from Chinese): In our speech at the Security Council meeting of 8 October in considering the question of Israeli aggression against Egypt and Syria, the Chinese delegation clearly pointed out that:

If the Security Council is to adopt any resolution at all, it must condemn all the acts of aggression by the Israeli Zionists in the strongest terms, give the firmest support to the Egyptian, Syrian and Palestinian peoples in the just action they are taking to resist the aggressors, demand the immediate withdrawal of the Israeli Zionists from all the Arab territories they have occupied and explicitly provide for the restoration of the national rights of the Palestinian people. (1743rd meeting, p. 28-30)

The draft resolution tabled today by the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics delegations has failed to reflect the above just position. It must also be pointed out that what the two super-Powers have done in the whole course of the current event has revealed their contention as well as collusion in the Middle East and their attempt to impose the situation of “no war, no peace” again on the Arab people. This time, these two super-Powers have hurriedly introduced a draft resolution of their concoction to the Security Council and asked for its immediate adoption allowing of no full consultation between the States members of the Security Council and preventing them from seeking instructions from their respective Governments. This practice of imposing one's views on the Security Council is most unreasonable and is one we cannot agree to.

In view of the foregoing, the Chinese delegation decides not to participate in the voting on the above draft resolution.

MR. KHALID (Sudan): For over two weeks now the Middle East has been inundated in blood

¹⁴⁸ See docs. 173 and 174 in *International Documents on Palestine 1970*.

while its children wailed and its mothers wept. In the process more countries were engulfed and the whole area was about to be incinerated by a contagious war. Ever since the outbreak of hostilities on 6 October, none of us sat idly by. With no sense of partisanship—this is no moment for that—let us praise the solidarity, serenity and sense of justice with which the problem was handled here by the oppressed and their supporters. Without their solidarity and serenity we could not have reached even this initial step. All that they have been calling for, and are still calling for, is an honourable peace, a peace without vilification, blood and hard feelings among countries that know full well that they depend on each other in a world where no country is an island unto itself.

Tonight we were hastily presented with a draft resolution that ostensibly seeks to bring permanent peace to the Middle East. To us—as to our Indian colleague—this draft resolution came as a surprise which we received with a great deal of misgiving, if only because of the complete lack of prior consultations.

Some have already welcomed this draft resolution in the sense that all's well that ends well. But is it really going to end well? The cease-fire is an initial step towards the badly needed solution of a problem that needs all our humility and awareness of the consequences attendant on any further faltering. By those words we mean humility and dispatch.

If there has been no peace in the Middle East for the last 25 years, it was because of national vanity and the ignorance that such vanity made possible. Israel and its supporters were prompted in their actions by an irrational subjective certainty which leads individuals as well as nations—to use the words of one of the better minds of this century—to what Freudians call “the death wish”.

Now that the myth of invincibility has been dislodged, one would hope that the pertinacity with which some people clung to myth will be at least diluted if not dissolved. But what is more important than this is that the great Powers which have always viewed the Middle East through the distorting prism of the Israeli myth should now have a fresh look to the problem, a look with realism and a sense of justice. This is why we guard against any further faltering, and this is how we view the references in the draft resolution to, first, the immediate implementation of Security

Council resolution 242 (1967) in all its parts, and, second, immediate negotiations concurrently with the cease-fire for the establishment of a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

For this end, all must be clear. We need not resort to ambiguities for sake of a compromise. Compromise is not an end in itself. Just and durable peace is the end. Ambiguity is the source of all our agony. Mr. Scali told us that we are all familiar with resolution 242 (1967), and indeed we are. We know what peace means. We know what territorial integrity means, and we know what inadmissibility of occupation means. We hope that at long last our minds will be at one with that of the United States on this issue, rather than resorting to the vacuous terms of constructive ambiguity.

MR. JANKOWITSCH (Austria): My delegation has welcomed the speed with which the Council has been called to meet tonight and is about to act. The new terrible war in the Middle East, the renewed bloodshed and destruction, has been a source of deep growing concern for the world community. In these days the eyes of the world community have been set on the United Nations, and I believe they are set upon us tonight.

The new and tragic events in the Middle East have, moreover, cast a large and menacing shadow over the prospects of peace in the world at large, prospects enhanced by recent progress in world détente.

My delegation took the earliest possible opportunity in the Council, on 9 October, to call for an immediate cessation of hostilities and renewed efforts to build a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. In the days following the first meetings of the Council, in the face of continued fighting, my Government repeated this call for an end to the hostilities. In a communiqué signed in Vienna on 12 October, the occasion of the visit of the President of Bulgaria to Austria, the two sides expressed their deep concern about the resumption of hostilities in the Middle East. It was their unanimous understanding that all efforts ought to be made for the immediate cessation of hostilities between the parties to the dispute, and that all the possible appropriate measures ought to be supported in order to attain, in the shortest possible time, a just and lasting peace in the Middle East on the basis of Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

It is, therefore, for these reasons that my delegation will support with its vote the draft resolution submitted jointly by the USSR and the United States of America. If the cease-fire is the most important step of the hour, concerted efforts to achieve peace, as set out in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the draft resolution before us will be the next urgent command to be followed immediately and concurrently.

As to the nature and shape of this peace, Austria remains firmly committed to the principles set forth in resolution 242 (1967), whose immediate implementation in all of its parts is now called for. We are fully aware of the delicate structure of balance represented by this draft resolution, whose combined elements have all to be faithfully respected in order to be operative. But we are sure that the cause of peace and the cause of justice can prevail only if this resolution is implemented.

We trust that in this task ahead the vast capital of experience and knowledge accumulated by the United Nations in 25 years of continuous peace efforts in the region will be a safe basis on which this new search for peace can be conducted. The Council is now about to exercise its primary responsibility for peace and international security. The Council and the United Nations, in the days to come, will need the full support of the international community, the support of the parties, whose fighting we hope will now come to an end, and the support of the permanent members of the Council, on whom the Charter confers a particularly heavy burden of responsibility.

We trust, however, that with this support, rapid and constructive action will be forthcoming, and my delegation is fully prepared to lend its support to all these efforts.

THE PRESIDENT: I now call on the representative of Egypt.

MR. EL-ZAYYAT (Egypt): I did hope that this would be a meeting at which I would not speak. But now, having asked for the floor, let me first send a fervent and respectful greeting to those who are standing on both sides of the Suez Canal, defending the freedom and the territorial integrity of their land, Egypt. Let me send an equally fervent and proud greeting to those who are standing on the territory of Syria, fighting for the freedom and territorial integrity of their land, Syria. Those are men who have preferred to

stand on their feet and die, rather than to live on their knees.

My heart also goes out to the families of the victims of the policies of aggression and violence, of the dreams of arrogant domination and of living by terror and trying to act as invincible supermen.

Having said that, let me state again that the targets of Egypt as I have explained them still stand: liberation of our lands, preservation of our territorial integrity, determination that the usurped rights of the Palestinians will be preserved. These are targets that are not ours alone. Indeed, they are yours; they are the targets for which the overwhelming majority of this Council voted and for which the overwhelming majority of the United Nations General Assembly voted, proclaiming again that the acquisition of territory as a result of war is inadmissible; that the territorial integrity of all nations is sacred; that the right of self-determination is one of the most fundamental rights, a right for which men have fought and for which this United Nations will always stand.

But I really asked to speak in order to say that I have not heard the two co-sponsors of the draft resolution say anything concerning the absurd conditions in the paragraphs of the Israeli *diktat* which we have heard in this room. Unless they are really adopted by the two sponsors and we hear them say so, I would consider them to be null and void and having no meaning at all, especially as they come from someone who has given pain to you, I am sure, Mr. President, and to everyone around this table by speaking about this Council and saying that it has been further debased. I am not a member of the Council. Had I been a member, I would certainly have moved that all those words of insult be stricken from the records of this Council.

MRS. JEANNE MARTIN CISSE (Guinea) (interpretation from French): I shall be very brief. My delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution in document S/11036, submitted by the Soviet Union and the United States, because our affirmative vote will express our position in favour of peace and for an end to violence.

For 17 days now war has been raging in the Middle East, blood is once again being shed and

thousands of human lives are being sacrificed. For these reasons, we welcome paragraph 1, of the draft resolution, which calls for an immediate cease-fire.

We are happy that the Council has assumed its responsibility for the re-establishment of peace and the maintenance of security in that part of the world that has suffered so greatly for 25 years. The joint initiative of the two Powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, was greeted with relief by my delegation, which has always placed responsibility on the great Powers in the conflict that pits the Powers in the Middle East against each other. The events we have been witnessing for the last few hours show that we have been quite right.

We express the hope that the resolution on which we shall shortly be voting will actually be put into effect. We should like to believe that its adoption will mean the withdrawal by Israel from all occupied Arab territories and the preservation of the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine. It will also mean for us that the negotiations envisaged in paragraph 3 of document S/11036 will be carried out under the auspices of the United Nations, through the United Nations.

THE PRESIDENT: There are no further speakers, and it is therefore my intention to ask the Council to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution contained in document S/11036. As no representative wishes to speak at this stage in explanation of his vote, I take it that the Council is ready to vote on the draft resolution.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: Australia, Austria, France, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Peru, Sudan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Yugoslavia

Against: None

China did not participate in the voting.

THE PRESIDENT: The result of the voting is as follows: 14 in favour, none against, and no abstentions; one delegation did not participate in the voting. Accordingly, the draft resolution is adopted.¹⁴⁹

MR. MOJSOV (Yugoslavia): The Yugoslav delegation has listened most attentively and carefully to the statements made by the co-sponsors of the draft resolution in document S/11036, the Permanent Representative of the United States, Mr. Scali, and the Permanent Representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Malik. Let us hope that the joint action of these two permanent members of the Security Council will indeed make a major contribution to a lasting and just peace, because peace without justice will bring the same consequences as those with which we have been faced during all these years.

Let us also hope that the termination of all military activities not only will save human lives, the lives of fighters and civilians of all the present belligerent parties, but will also save future generations from the same tragic losses, suffering and sacrifices.

In explanation of the vote of the Yugoslav delegation I would like to state clearly the following.

The Yugoslav position on the matter of the Middle East crisis, its origins and the steps to be taken towards its settlement is both firm and well known. It was recently stated clearly in the Council's debates in June and July. It was contained in the non-aligned countries' draft resolution which received 13 affirmative votes in the Security Council. It was stated at the Fourth Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned Nations in Algiers, and it was also stated in our statement in the general debate in the General Assembly, as well as in our statement in the Security Council on 9 October last.

Concerning the provisions of the resolution which has just been adopted, we note that the provision for the cease fire in place is firmly linked to the immediate start of negotiations for the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). We have supported resolution 242 (1967) since its adoption and have always considered it as an agreed basis for a settlement, and therefore all the principles and requirements of that resolution must be equally implemented. And here we would like to state most categorically our firm understanding of what that entails.

First, it clearly requires the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the territories occupied as a result of the 1967 war; and that means withdrawal to the lines of 5 June 1967. There can be no other interpretation because that same resolution postulates another basic principle which is generally

¹⁴⁹ Resolution 338 (1973) printed as document no. 34 below.

accepted by the United Nations, and that is the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war.

Second, following those two principles, it recognizes the right of all States and peoples in the region to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries, free from threats or acts of force. Secure and recognized boundaries cannot be based on conquest, terror or military occupation. We indeed agree that occupation means resistance, and that justified resistance leads to war, and that therefore peace and occupation cannot coexist. Secure and recognized boundaries result from peace, from the legal acceptance of such boundaries through the liquidation of the state of belligerency and any need to make war—which means that the occupation of all Arab territories acquired by war must be terminated. Such secure and recognized boundaries can then be guaranteed through some international system within the framework of the United Nations, once we have the commitment on the essential point: the withdrawal of troops from all occupied territories.

Third, the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine must be recognized and implemented. Our debates here in June and July, numerous resolutions of the General Assembly, and subsequent events have again proved that the plight and the fate of the Arabs of Palestine and their rights are one of the fundamental issues at stake. We cannot build the structure of peace leaving out the solution of this problem which, if left unsettled, will continue to cause major convulsions in the Middle East.

In saying all that, I should like everyone to note that it is the most fundamental Yugoslav position, the position of basic principle, that we the United Nations cannot negate any people's right to fight for the liberation of its territory. No cease-fire, including the one on which we have just decided, should be a cover for continued occupation and annexation. No cease-fire can survive unless it is clearly and specifically linked to the immediate beginning of the process of solving the basic problem, which is the problem of the occupation of all Arab territories. Resolution 242 (1967) postulates the territorial integrity of all the States in the area too. On the basis of that, a system can be devised to enable all the States in the region, including Israel, to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries, with all

the other principles of resolution 242 (1967) implemented as well.

In conclusion, I would like also to point out that the basic Yugoslav position was always that the over-all solution of the Middle East crisis, and particularly the implementation of resolution 242 (1967) in all its parts, should not only be based on the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, but also should be firmly in the hands of the United Nations and its organ, the Security Council. In this spirit, we understand the resolution just adopted, particularly its third paragraph.

The meeting rose at 01.30, Monday, October 22 (06.30 gmt).

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Security Council 1748th meeting; statements by Egypt, Israel, USA, USSR and China¹⁵⁰

Tuesday, October 23, 1973

The meeting came to order at 16.35 (21.35 gmt).

MR. EL-ZAYYAT (Egypt): A lot of precious time has already been lost since we asked that the Council should meet. I do not therefore propose to lose any more time. We have asked for a meeting of the Council to consider the non-implementation of its resolution 338 (1973), the breaking down of the cease-fire ordered by the Council.

Mr. President, if you would allow me, I would defer any remarks until the Council has taken a stand on this subject.

MR. TEKOAH (Israel):

Immediately after the adoption of resolution 338 (1973) the Government of Israel announced that it agreed to the cease-fire in accordance with that resolution. Iraq was first among the Arab Governments to reject the cessation of hostilities. It was followed by Libya, Algeria and others of the 10 Arab States participating in the aggression against Israel. Syria did not respond to the cease-fire call at all. Jordan made some positive affirmations, but announced that the Jordanian armed

¹⁵⁰ Excerpted from the provisional verbatim record, UN doc. S/PV.1748, pp. 3-5, 6-36.

forces on the Syrian front were under Syrian command and would abide by Syria's orders. A few hours before the cease-fire was to enter into force the Egyptian Government announced that it agreed to it.

The Government of Israel responded immediately with the following communiqué:

The Government of Israel has been informed that the Government of Egypt has instructed the armed forces of Egypt to cease hostilities in accordance with the Security Council resolution concerning a cease-fire. Following on this, the Government of Israel has given orders to the Israel defence forces to stop the fighting on the Egyptian front at 1852 hours this evening local time, provided it is confirmed that the Egyptians have indeed ceased hostilities. The cease-fire will therefore come into effect at the end of the 12-hour period stipulated in the Security Council resolution.

It soon became apparent, however, that Egypt's professed acceptance of the cease-fire was not being translated into action. Those who followed the news from the area yesterday as the hour of the cease-fire was approaching and then after the cease-fire deadline recall that there was virtually no time during which the Egyptian forces stopped shooting. The cease-fire never became effective. One report after another carried by international news agencies and correspondents at the front, broadcast over the radio and television, gave information of continued Egyptian attacks in violation of the cease-fire.

The shooting became particularly violent at 2038 hours when Egyptian forces opened fire on the Israel bridgehead on the west bank of the Suez Canal from the east and from the north. At 2056 hours the Egyptians opened fire on the Israel bridgehead from north of Deversoir. Later, Israeli forces were shelled from bazookas. At 2123 hours Egyptians again opened fire on the Israeli bridgehead. At 2132 hours there was bazooka shelling, and at 2134 hours the bazooka shelling of Israeli forces intensified and was extended in area.

While this was taking place the spokesman of the Israel defence forces repeatedly drew attention to these Egyptian attacks.

At 20 hours local time, only one hour and eight minutes after the cease-fire he announced:

Egyptian artillery fire at the area of Israel's bridgehead north of the Bitter Lake. Artillery fire on Israel

forces in the northern section of the front. Egyptian fire on Israel forces in the area of Ismailia.

At 2230 hours he announced that Egyptian forces had opened fire on Israel forces at several points along the cease-fire line. And early this morning, 23 October, at 0050 hours, we announced that the cease-fire had not been observed; that the Egyptians were shooting with all kinds of weapons in almost all sectors of the Egyptian front.

At 0555 hours the communiqué stated that the Egyptians had opened artillery and other fire on Israel forces towards the end of the night of 22-23 October; at 0800 hours, early this morning, that the Egyptians had opened heavy fire on Israel forces on the west bank of the Suez Canal; and at 0900 hours, that the Egyptian forces were continuing to violate the cease-fire in the southern sector of the Suez Canal.

Facing this situation, the Israeli defence forces were ordered to continue fighting in this sector of the front.

It is clear who accepted the cease-fire and who rejected it, who has observed it and who has violated it. Of all the 10 Arab States attacking Israel, there was only one that was willing to announce that it would order its forces to cease hostilities. However, even this announcement has thus far proved to be spurious.

In the light of the developments, Egypt's announcement yesterday that it accepted the cease-fire appears to have been nothing but a propaganda move under the cover of which the Egyptian forces expected to continue their attacks in places of their own choosing and in the hope that the Israeli forces would remain restrained by the cease-fire orders. It was inevitable that such a design should misfire. It was inevitable that the Israeli forces should react to Egyptian aggression.

That, and only that, is what has been happening since last night. Israel cannot acquiesce in the notion that the Egyptian forces should be free to attack us and to inflict casualties while the Israeli defence forces should remain passive, confined to their positions, and should refrain from taking all the action necessary for self-defence.

The fact of Egyptian aggression is the cause of Israel's military actions since yesterday, and it is the fact that will determine the Israel Government's attitude towards any draft resolution or resolutions submitted to the Security Council.

Israel's position remains as expressed in my statement to the Security Council on 21 October. Israel is prepared to cease fire immediately, provided Egypt ceases fire. As I emphasized in my statement at the last meeting, Israel accepted the cease-fire in the hope that all the Arab States would accept it and all the parties would observe it.

The problem which together with the actual observance of the cease-fire weighs most heavily upon us is the question of prisoners of war. Our experience in the past compels us to feel serious concern regarding the situation of Israeli prisoners of war and to strive for their speedy release in the framework of a general exchange of prisoners of war. We have taken note of the undertaking expressed at the Council meeting of 21 October on behalf of the sponsors of resolution 338 (1973) that "there should be an immediate exchange of prisoners of war" (1747th meeting, p. 6). As I declared on that occasion, we regard the release of all prisoners of war now held in the countries involved in the conflict as an indispensable condition of any cease-fire agreement. Israel expects that urgent action will be taken to bring that about.

MR. SCALI (United States of America): I have been authorized by my Government to co-sponsor with the Soviet Union a draft resolution which reads as follows:

"The Security Council,

Referring to its resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973,

1. *Confirms* its decision on an immediate cessation of all kinds of firing and of all military action, and urges that the forces be returned to the positions they occupied at the moment the cease-fire became effective;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to take measures for immediate dispatch of United Nations observers to supervise the observance of the cease-fire between the forces of Israel and the Arab Republic of Egypt, using for this purpose the personnel of the United Nations now in the Middle East and first of all the personnel now in Cairo."

I should like to reserve the right to comment briefly at a later stage of the proceedings.

MR. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): I should

like to reserve my right to speak on the substance of the question somewhat later.

Now I would simply state that the Soviet delegation, jointly with the United States delegation, is proposing this draft resolution, the aim of which is to confirm the decision taken by the Security Council on 22 October for a cease-fire and a peaceful political settlement in the Middle East, on the basis of resolution 242 (1967), and for the immediate withdrawal of troops to the positions they occupied at the time when the Council adopted the resolution on the cease-fire which came into force on 22 October 1973.

This draft resolution also provides that the Secretary-General be requested immediately to send observers from the United Nations to the cease-fire area.

I should particularly like to emphasize that both sponsors of the draft resolution, the Soviet Union and the United States, consider that the troops of the parties should be returned to the positions they occupied at the time the cease-fire adopted in resolution 338 (1973) came into force—that is, their positions at 1250 hours New York time on 22 October.

The Soviet delegation would urge members of the Security Council to take a decision immediately on the basis of the draft resolution now before it, and I formally propose that in view of the urgency of this question and the situation on the spot the draft resolution be put to a vote immediately and that all delegations wishing to speak should have an opportunity to do so after adoption of the draft resolution.

THE PRESIDENT: I still have on the list of speakers the names of some representatives who wish to speak before any voting takes place. The next speaker—

I call on the representative of the Soviet Union on a point of order.

MR. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): Mr. President, I have formally proposed that the draft resolution be put to the vote. I should like a vote on that procedural proposal to be taken immediately.

THE PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of China on a point of order.

MR. CHIAO (China) (interpretation from Chinese): Mr. President, the Chinese delegation would like to speak.

We cannot allow any imposition of view. May I speak now?

MR. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): Point of order, point of order.

THE PRESIDENT: The representative of the Soviet Union has raised a point of order.

Could I ask the representative of China to wait while we hear the point of order that is raised by the representative of the Soviet Union?

MR. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): Mr. President, this is not a question of imposing anything. It is a question of a draft resolution, which is known to all members of the Security Council, which in fact was known to them a few hours ago. It is a very simple one. The aggressor has violated the decisions of the Security Council on the cease-fire. I am referring to Israel. Egypt has applied to the Security Council, proposing that the Council be convened immediately. At the beginning the Council meeting was scheduled for 12 o'clock. Because of a number of efforts on the part of someone we started, in fact, at 4.30 p.m. This is a very urgent issue and according to the rules of procedure I have made a proposal that this draft resolution be voted upon and that the discussion be opened thereafter. I am making the formal motion that my proposal on the vote on the draft resolution be put to the vote for a decision by the Security Council.

THE PRESIDENT: I ask the representative of China to state what I understand is his point of order.

MR. CHIAO (China) (interpretation from Chinese): Mr. President, the statement just made by my colleague, Mr. Malik, is completely unreasonable. Before the United States and Soviet draft resolution is even tabled, you allow no one else to speak. This is the wrong attitude. We are firmly opposed to that. The United Nations is not a tool to be manipulated by the two super-Powers.

This morning the President of the Security Council informed the Chinese delegation that an urgent meeting of the Security Council would be held to discuss the so-called violation of the cease-fire in the Middle East. After we arrived at the conference hall the Chinese delegation was

told that there would be no Security Council meeting and that the United States and the Soviet Union would reach an agreement, which would then be transmitted through consensus to the Secretary-General for implementation.

The Chinese delegation firmly opposes such a malicious practice of using the United Nations Security Council as a tool to be juggled with by the two super-Powers at will. In our opinion, this also shows utter disrespect for the other States members of the Security Council. The Chinese delegation cannot tolerate such a practice. We have something to say. We believe that the other States members of the Security Council also have something to say from the bottom of their hearts.

Now the Chinese delegation would like to state once again our views on the Middle East situation and on the manipulation of the Security Council by the two super-Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union.

Since 6 October the broad masses of the army men and people of Egypt, Syria and Palestine have won a series of brilliant victories in their heroic fight against Israeli aggression. Egyptian national flags have again fluttered over the territories on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal which had been occupied for more than six years. The Syrian army men and people have inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy troops at the Golan Heights. The Palestinian guerrillas have also launched attacks valiantly. The sacred fight against aggression—

MR. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): Point of order.

MR. CHIAO (China) (interpretation from Chinese): This is unreasonable, Mr. President. It is unreasonable for the representative of the Soviet Union to interrupt my statement. Why should he have such a privilege?

THE PRESIDENT: I must say to the representatives of China that it is, I think, the normal practice of this Council when a point of order is raised by a member to give that member the opportunity—

MR. CHIAO (China) (interpretation from Chinese): Mr. President, I did not interrupt his statement. He should allow me to finish my statement. Mr. Malik, you can speak when it is your turn to do so. Could you not wait a little while?

MR. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): Point of order.

THE PRESIDENT: Could I appeal to the representative of the Soviet Union to allow—

MR. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): I am entitled to raise a point of order, Sir. I should like to state that he who is dragging out the adoption by the Security Council of an urgent resolution by empty talk in order to restrain the aggressor is actually helping the aggressor. Therefore, I insist that the draft resolution—which has been placed before a meeting of the Security Council that was convened urgently at the request of the victim of aggression—be put to the vote immediately. I have made this proposal and I should like to have it voted upon.

At this point a number of representatives, without having been called upon by the President, made interjections simultaneously from their places at the Council table, and others at the side of the Chamber called out.

THE PRESIDENT: Order, please. This meeting is suspended for ten minutes.

The meeting was suspended at 5.10 p.m. [22.10 gmt] and was resumed at 5.30 p.m. [22.30 gmt]

THE PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of China.

MR. CHIAO (China) (interpretation from Chinese): Mr. President, my statement was interrupted. I should like to express my dissatisfaction. I should like to voice my protest.

On 21 October the Soviet Union and the United States concocted a draft resolution allowing no one the time for consideration and allowing no one the time to report to and ask for instructions from their respective Governments, trying to railroad the draft resolution through the Council. Such imposition is intolerable. As far as the Chinese side is concerned, taking into consideration the over-all situation, we refrained from vetoing it and adopted the method of not participating in the vote. Originally we could have vetoed it. Why not? Why cannot a United States and Soviet draft resolution be vetoed? However, our goodwill has been abused.

Today, before the draft was introduced and even up to now we still do not have the Chinese text. How can we vote? Now, there is talk that we should take a vote right away. Does the world

belong solely to the United States and the Soviet Union? It does not. The Chinese have the right to speak. The other members of the Council have the right to speak. Because you interrupted my statement, Mr. President, I should like to start from the beginning.

I know that my colleague, Mr. Malik, has something to say. Of course, Mr. Malik, but please wait. What does it matter? If you have truth on your side, what does it matter if you wait a few moments? Is that not right? You should do things with style. Show your style. Why the hurry? There is no hurry. It does not matter. If you have something to say, you can say it. There is place for you to say it. You can say it here. Please wait, do not be in such a hurry. I have known you for decades. You have never changed your old habits. Why do you not change your ways a little bit?

Now, Mr. President, I should like to start from the beginning, and I ask for your indulgence.

This morning the President of the Security Council informed the Chinese delegation that an urgent meeting of the Security Council would be held to discuss the so-called violation of the ceasefire in the Middle East. After we arrived at the conference hall the Chinese delegation was told that there would be no Security Council meeting and that the United States and the Soviet Union would reach an agreement which would then be transmitted through consensus to the Secretary-General for implementation.

The Chinese delegation firmly opposes such a malicious practice of using the United Nations Security Council as a tool to be juggled with by the two super-Powers at will. In our opinion, this also shows utter disrespect for the other States members of the Security Council. The Chinese delegation cannot tolerate such a practice. We have something to say. We believe that the other States members of the Security Council also have something to say from the bottom of their hearts.

Now, the Chinese delegation would like to state once again our views on the Middle East situation and on the manipulation of the Security Council by the two super-Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union.

Since 6 October the broad masses of the army men and people of Egypt, Syria and Palestine have won a series of brilliant victories in their

heroic fight against Israeli aggression. Egyptian national flags have again fluttered over the territories on the eastern bank of the Suez which had been occupied for more than six years. The Syrian army men and people have inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy troops at the Golan Heights. The Palestinian guerrillas have also launched attacks valiantly.

The sacred fight against aggression and for the recovery of occupied territories waged by the army men and people of Egypt, Syria and Palestine has broken through the situation of "no war, no peace", deliberately created by the two super-Powers in the Middle East for their respective interests, exploded the myth about the "invincibility" of Israel and demonstrated the strong fighting will of the Arab and Palestine people, who have been greatly encouraged. At the same time, many Arab countries have successively sent out their troops to the front of war against aggression and fought shoulder to shoulder with the army men and people of Egypt, Syria and Palestine.

Many other Arab countries and people are giving active support and assistance by various means to this war against aggression, demonstrating the unprecedented militant unity of the Arab countries in their common fight against the enemy. The facts prove that the Arab and Palestinian people are heroic people and that the struggle they have been waging since 6 October is perfectly just. The United Nations and all justice-upholding and peace-loving countries and people of the world are duty bound to give the most active support and assistance to it, and no one has any right to engage in obstructions and sabotage.

However, we have to point out with indignation here that the two super-Powers have played a most inglorious role throughout the incident. It is known to all that the dangerous development of events in the Middle East is caused not by the Arab and Palestinian people but by the Israeli Zionist aggression and provocations with the support and connivance of the two super-Powers. After Israel unleashed the recent new provocations, the two super-Powers have successively supplied arms to the belligerent parties. Here it must be pointed out that in supplying arms to the Arab countries the purpose of the Soviet Union is by no means to give true support to them in resisting Israeli provocations, but to control the

development of the Middle East situation so that it will not go beyond the limits it has agreed to with the other super-Power.

The Soviet Union also made a big hue and cry that the Arab peoples' struggle against aggression had confronted *détente* with a "dangerous development of events" and that the development of the situation "ran counter to" the easing of tension recently attained.

What does this show? This shows that what the Soviet Union calls "*détente*" is based on the submissive prostration of all oppressed nations and peoples before the condominium of the two super-Powers. The United States and the Soviet Union, contending as well as colluding with each other, have blamed and obstructed in every possible way the just struggle of the Egyptian, Syrian and Palestine people against aggression and are trying by all possible means to strangle it, for the purpose of stopping the struggle of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples, biting their hands and leaving them at the mercy of the two super-Powers.

In order to further divide up spheres of influence in the Middle East and re-impose the situation of "no war, no peace" on the Arab peoples the two super-Powers, after hectic bargaining behind the scenes for their respective interests, produced a draft resolution at the Security Council early on the morning of 22 October in an attempt to use the United Nations and the Security Council as their hired tool to rubber-stamp the dirty deal of the two super-Powers.

All people with a discerning eye will see clearly that that so-called draft resolution is even more ambiguous than resolution 242 (1967) and is a scrap of paper, a fraud, which can solve no problems. Basically speaking, the Chinese delegation was not in favour of this so-called draft resolution. However, it was only taking into consideration the desire of certain countries concerned that the Chinese delegation refrained from voting against it and did not participate in the voting. As we have foreseen, as soon as that draft resolution was adopted, the Israeli Zionists immediately and flagrantly continued to expand their aggression against Egypt and Syria. It can thus be seen that what the Soviet Union calls justice is partiality towards Israel.

We firmly support Egypt and Syria in their just denunciation of Israel's expanded aggression. No matter what measures the Egyptian, Syrian

and Palestinian people may take on their own occupied soil for the recovery of their lost territories, they are all just, whereas any slight provocation made by Israel constitutes a criminal act.

We maintain that the two super-Powers, which have all along been obstructing and sabotaging the just struggle of the Army men and people of Egypt and Syria and which have concocted the said draft resolution must be held fully and unshirkably responsible for the recent expanded aggression by Israeli Zionism.

Following the resolution of 22 October, the United States and the Soviet Union have today introduced a new draft resolution on what they call supervising the cease-fire. This is a fresh insult to the United Nations. Like the previous resolution, this draft resolution is a mere scrap of paper which makes no condemnation of Israel's expanded aggression, puts the aggressor and the victim of the aggression on a par, and still fails to make the slightest mention of the demand for the immediate withdrawal of the Israeli aggressors from all the occupied Arab territories.

Fundamentally speaking, the Chinese delegation is opposed to this draft resolution.

I deem it also necessary to point out that the evolution of the United Nations to the present state of affairs has reached intolerable limits. What is the need for the United Nations? Would it not suffice to have the condominium of the United States and the Soviet Union plus a Secretary-General? Nevertheless, out of respect for the countries concerned, we would give consideration to this draft resolution. But we will never allow it to be imposed on us. They want to force through the draft resolution before it is distributed. What on earth kind of logic is this? If the countries concerned—I repeat, the countries concerned—want such a thing, we have no alternative, but the maximum we can do is to refrain from opposing it. But we are deeply convinced that the broad masses of the Arab people will never allow themselves to be controlled by the two super-Powers perpetually. History is long. The people will invariably carry on the struggle and live on. All this will be nothing but an interlude when we look back after a few decades.

Fundamentally speaking, the days are gone when the two super-Powers could manipulate and dominate the affairs of the world. Neither one super-Power nor the two super-Powers combined

can impose their will on the people of the world, on the third world countries and other States members of the Security Council. The Palestinian and other Arab peoples are politically conscious people with a strong will. Tested and tempered in the struggle against aggression over the past years and in the recent days, they will still less docilely allow themselves to be manipulated and duped by the two super-Powers. The 700 million Chinese people and the numerous third world countries and peoples, as well as all those upholding justice, sympathize with and support them.

So long as the national rights of the Palestinian people are not restored and the lost territories of the Arab countries are not recovered, there can be no lasting peace in the Middle East. The heroic Arab and Palestinian people will certainly draw the necessary lessons from what the two super-Powers have done, continue to break through the situation of "no war, no peace" which the two super-Powers try to reimpose on them, continue their persistent struggle, enhance their unity, act independently and on their own initiative, ceaselessly strengthen themselves, surmount all kinds of obstructions and difficulties and carry on the just struggle against aggression. The great Arab people will certainly win liberation.

Thank you, Mr. President, for your patience.

THE PRESIDENT: There are no further names inscribed on the list of speakers. I take it, therefore, that the members of the Security Council are now prepared to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution in document S/11039.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: Australia, Austria, France, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Peru, Sudan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Yugoslavia

Against: None

China did not participate in the voting.

THE PRESIDENT: The result of the voting is as follows: 14 in favour, none against, and no abstentions; one delegation did not participate in the voting. Accordingly, the draft resolution is adopted.¹⁵¹

¹⁵¹ Resolution 339 (1973) printed as document no. 35 below.

The meeting rose at 21.15 (02.15 gmt, Wednesday, October 24).

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Security Council, 1749th meeting; statements by Egypt, USSR, USA and Kenya¹⁵²

Wednesday, October 24, 1973

The meeting came to order at 18.50 (23.50 gmt).

THE PRESIDENT:

When I adjourned our last meeting I said that the Council would remain ready at any time to meet immediately as circumstances might demand.

Today I received an oral request from the representative of Egypt for the convening of an urgent meeting of the Council. The representative of Egypt later addressed to me a letter in the following terms:

Mr. President, Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to request an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the continuing violations committed by Israel of the cease-fire decided by the Security Council in its resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973) of 22 and 23 October 1973.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Dr. A. ESMAT ABDEL-MEGUID
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

The Security Council will now continue its consideration of the item on its agenda.

The first name inscribed on the list of speakers is that of the representative of Egypt, on whom I now call.

MR. EL-ZAYYAT (Egypt): These are dangerous times in the history of our country and, indeed, in the history of the Security Council. Dangerous times have a way of developing quickly. I must confess that this morning when we asked for the urgent convening of the Council we intended to discuss the breakdown of the cease-fire and Israel's non-compliance with the resolution the Council adopted only recently—that is the text

sponsored by the United States of America and the USSR. But in the meantime I have contacted Cairo and I think that a better way of describing the reason for my addressing the Council now is to inform it that a new war, a new aggression, has broken out in the Middle East, and at this moment—1 a.m. Cairo time—is going on.

On the East Bank of the Suez Canal, in Egyptian Sinai, our forces are being attacked now with laser-guided missiles and American Phantom jet aircraft. At the same time, on the West Bank of the Canal all the sectors are the battlefield of a new treacherous war, prepared and begun under the guise of the cease-fire suggested to this Council by the United States of America and the USSR and adopted by it. To be very precise, that applies to all the sectors except the North—and I hope I am not inviting an attack on the North, because it has perhaps been spared by an oversight.

We are fighting back. The people who heard me in the early days of October answering the question on television whether we were sure we were going to win the war and were dismayed because I said, "I don't care if we do", must now remember the reasons I gave for that answer. I said that there comes a time in the life of a nation when it has no option but to fight and sacrifice the cherished blood of its sons and daughters in order that their country can go on living in dignity and freedom, regardless of the outcome. It is not a question of calculation. It is a question of determination that, to repeat, we are going to live on our feet and fight and die on our feet rather than live on our knees.

The story of today is long but simple. At 4 o'clock this morning, New York time, it was my unpleasant task to call Mr. Waldheim, the Secretary-General, at home and to inform him that United Nations observers had not proceeded to their destinations. At 5 o'clock I knew that in fact they had begun moving but they had reported to their headquarters in Cairo that they were being prevented by Israeli forces from reaching their destinations. When we communicated to Cairo that some patrols—seven of them—had taken their places, they replied that only one had reached Ismailia and, with the full co-operation of the Egyptian authorities, had begun its work but the others were prevented by several means, including a direct call from the Minister of War

¹⁵² Excerpted from the provisional verbatim record, UN doc. S/PV.1749, pp. 3-12, 41-51, 78-82, 86-92.

of Israel, advising them not to go because the fighting was going on and there were no cease-fire lines and stating, "What are they going to do if the cease-fire lines are non-existent? They has better wait until the Israeli battle is won and the new cease-fire lines are demarcated." Then they would perhaps be welcome to come and preserve the *status quo* to be. If there were any sense—and there must have been sense—in the draft resolution the United States and the Soviet Union presented to this Council on Sunday, a draft resolution composed of several parts, one calling for a cease-fire on the spot, then what the Council meant and what the authors of the draft resolution meant was that the cease-fire on the spot must be preserved as it was 12 hours after the Council debate ended with the adoption of the resolution—which, as I have said, would be 1252 hours on 22 October 1973. That is what we have accepted in good faith. If that is what this Council, with great courtesy and great confidence, has accepted in good faith, then this is the meaning, and there cannot be any other meaning, of the Council's resolution of yesterday asking the forces to go back to the places where they were or should have stayed when the cease-fire went into effect according to the Council's resolution at the given hour on 22 October. If the cease-fire and the perhaps candid behaviour of Egypt in accepting it with the confidence it placed in the names of the two States that submitted the draft resolution are to be misused, if this new war is to take place and have its effects before Israel will agree and allow the United Nations observers to go there, these are going to be post-mortem observers who are going to go there to observe aggression staying in its place.

Because we still have confidence, we stated again yesterday the double responsibility that emanates from these two draft resolutions, the responsibility of the authors of the resolutions and the responsibility of the members of the Council which is indeed theirs by virtue of the Charter and by virtue of the adoption of the resolution. In regard to the first part, we ask that all members of the Council do their best to make sure that the observers are in their places observing the cease-fire, as it should have been and should be on the lines when the cease-fire took effect on 22 October. This is still our request. As far as the Secretariat is concerned, we know that it has the authority

and I am sure it has the will and the determination to send these observers and more, but, since observers cannot really effect the withdrawal of these forces to the places where they were, it is then our request that the two Powers that brought this resolution to the Council, including the Power that called on the Council to convene to begin with, should really interfere. I alluded to this yesterday. If it was not understood, I say it now loudly and clearly. These two super-Powers have forces in the Mediterranean. I think the reason they give to their taxpayers is that they are there to preserve the peace of the world. Well, the peace of the world is in danger, and we are calling upon them to make good their promise that this resolution is going to take effect, by helping the observers of the United Nations and the United Nations itself to bring back the forces of the parties to the conflict to where they were at the time when the cease-fire took effect on 22 October 1973. For this purpose our President has addressed letters directly to the President of the United States and to Chairman Brezhnev of the Soviet Union asking them to send forces for this purpose and has instructed me to call the Council into session in order to hear this message. If paragraph 1 of the resolution of 22 October is going to fall to pieces, other paragraphs are going to do so too, and we shall be exactly where we were, still facing the aggression that was and the aggression that is or is trying to be. We shall be facing the aggression of 1967 and its aftermath and also facing this new aggression, these treacherous attacks under the guise of a cease-fire which have been taking place and are taking place now with fresh soldiers and with fresh equipment—and it is no secret to us where this equipment is coming from.

As usual, I want to be brief and clear. If we do not know where the forces were when the cease-fire took effect, or should have taken effect, then perhaps some explanation should be given to us about the flight of two United States aircraft over Egypt and Syria several days ago at the speed of Mach-3. They did not come as aggressors. Obviously they came for reconnaissance, and they must have recognized something, I think they can tell the Council where our forces were.

There must be some other means of verification also. We are ready to be where we were on 22 October, when the Security Council resolution ordered a cease-fire to take effect so that a new

procedure could be undertaken to put an end to the war and to usher in a new era of peace. Without that, there is no hope for peace in the Middle East.

If we are asking for forces to intervene, it is because it is obvious that we cannot ask the United Nations observers to defy the military orders of military ministers of war that they should stay where they were or where they are now. If we are asking the United States and the Soviet Union to send forces, it is because they are two permanent members of the Security Council and have a special responsibility. They have the power of the veto, and with that power the work of all the other members of the Security Council was brought to nought when we tried to arrive at a peaceful solution in June and July of this year.

I have just received a message by phone from Cairo stating that the deputy head of the observers group, Colonel Hogan, had told them at 1910 hours New York time that the Israeli side has refused to allow the observers to go to the middle sector of Sinai. The words used were, "No, not for the time being". Colonel Hogan has told our Deputy Minister that he has contacted the Secretary-General and given him that information. Perhaps the Secretary-General will tell us what he knows about this message from Colonel Hogan and any other messages on this matter.

To conclude: First, we not only are reporting to the Security Council on the breakdown of the cease-fire and the total breakdown, therefore, of all resolutions on the cease-fire, but are also asking for a salvage operation because we, at least, do not take lightly the reports appearing in the press today that there have been 15,000 casualties in the Middle East so far—I am not giving Egyptian estimates; I am giving American estimates as they appeared in *The New York Times* today. We think that those 15,000 people who have become casualties could have done something better for their countries alive rather than having been doomed to death and murdered by people drunk with power, who think that this is the only politics they can impose and this is the only action that will succeed. It will not. Other power-drunk nations and régimes of the past do not exist today. We therefore hope that the Security Council resolution submitted by the United States and the Soviet Union on 22 October will be salvaged by those two States themselves or by any other

action deemed necessary by the Council.

Secondly, what is happening now is a new aggression. I think that with more details the Council will be in a position to judge better what I am alluding to as the aggression of tonight. The battle is taking place in Sinai and on the West Bank of the Suez Canal.

Before I conclude, however, I want to state that I am speaking not only of the soldiers, who are willingly giving their lives; I am speaking also about those civilians who are being brutally attacked and chased away from their homes, thus creating new problems which, of course, are welcome to Israel, but which are welcome to us also, because it is on the basis of the way all these problems are dealt with that Egypt will finally be convinced of the possibility or impossibility of having peace in the Middle East today.

MR. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The Security Council is again convened today in emergency session in connexion with the continuous and flagrant violation by Israel of the decisions of the Security Council concerning the cease-fire and military operations.

We have listened carefully to the statement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt, Mr. El-Zayyat, who has adduced incontrovertible facts of new aggression by Israel against Egypt. Those facts are bound to provoke indignation among members of the Council and firm condemnation and denunciation of Israel as an aggressor.

The Council is again witnessing a situation in which Israel, covering itself with coarse mendacity to the effect that it is allegedly complying with Security Council resolutions concerning the cease-fire, is in fact perfidiously continuing its military action, using all types of military forces and taking parts of Egyptian territory—after the decisions of the Security Council concerning the cease-fire and all military action. Those aggressive actions by the Government of Israel are a brazen violation of the Security Council's decision and in defiance of all members of the United Nations and of the whole world. The entire responsibility for this must be placed on the war criminals of Tel Aviv. For all these internationally punishable acts, the troika of the Tel Aviv hawks is responsible:

Premier Golda Meir, Minister for Foreign Affairs Eban and Minister of Defence Dayan. International precedents on this score are readily available.

Israel's violations of Security Council decision concerning the cease-fire are—as is now quite obvious to all—not an accident, not a miscalculation, mistake or misunderstanding. No, it is a carefully prepared, criminal and hypocritical imperialist provocation, specially planned, to use the cease-fire for the purpose of taking over new strategic positions advantageous to Israeli imperialism in the Middle East and to establish a clear balance of forces in favour of Israel.

The fact that the Security Council must constantly convene, hold meetings and day after day adopt decisions on one and the same issue, reverting again and again to a reiteration of its calls for the immediate cessation of military action by Israel may be explained only by the depth of the cynicism and lack of responsibility on the part of the aggressor, which is thoughtlessly playing with the fates of the peoples of the Middle East, including the fate of the Israeli people.

During the past two days, after the adoption of a decision by the Security Council concerning the immediate cessation of all military action and the cease-fire in the Middle East, Israeli military units, in violation of the two resolutions adopted on 22 and 23 October, are perfidiously continuing their incursion into Egypt's territory, bombing civilian communities and pouring napalm on Arab lands. And we ask: Is the Security Council to countenance this cynical affront, this unprecedented international banditry? How long will this trampling underfoot of Security Council resolutions and this perfidy to be countenanced? During the Second World War and before that, this was the aggressive practice: breach of faith and banditism by fascist aggressors, who were likewise trampling upon the elementary norms of international conduct and attitudes accepted in international relations.

The Soviet Government and the whole of the Soviet people are angrily protesting against the banditry of the military units of Israel in the Middle East and Israel's perfidy and demand that Israel put an end to its military activities, observe the cease-fire and draw back all its troops to the positions they occupied on 22 October 1973, in accordance with the Security Council's decision.

In view of Israel's continued aggression against the Arab States, the Soviet Government has warned Tel Aviv concerning the full weight of the responsibility and the most dire consequences that will flow from its aggression and its violations of the decisions of the Security Council.

The Soviet delegation demands that the Council immediately adopt firm measures to ensure Israel's implementation of the decisions and resolutions adopted by the Security Council. We urgently call upon the members of the Security Council, including those permanent members of the Council which, by virtue of special responsibilities placed upon them under the United Nations Charter to maintain peace, and in view of their special influence with Israel and ability to influence the course of events in the Middle East, to assume full responsibility in discharging their duty at this critical moment in the history of the countries of the Middle East. By acting as a co-sponsor of the draft resolutions adopted by the Security Council concerning the cease-fire and settlement of the situation in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council resolution 242 (1967), the United States of America assumed a great international responsibility and obligation to guarantee the implementation of those resolutions by Israel.

The representative of Yugoslavia, Comrade Mojsov, recalled to the Security Council Mr. Kissinger's visit to Tel Aviv—I am sorry that Mr. Scali is not here. The United States is bound to understand that now much is being tested in the Middle East, the stakes are high—the honour and dignity of the United States and international trust in it and in the new United States Secretary of State, Mr. Kissinger; these are the international stakes involved.

We hope and we insist that the United States will use every means available to it, and its weight, to bring to order the adventurers from Tel Aviv, to secure the implementation of the Security Council resolutions and to make a genuine step towards the establishment of a just peace in the Middle East. No reasonable man in the modern world will believe that the United States of America is powerless in this matter.

The Soviet delegation considers that it is essential to emphasize that the decisions of the Council concerning the cease-fire and military action constitute a first step—only the minimum—that was possible to achieve towards putting an

end to the bloodshed, halting aggression, averting a deterioration in the situation and not permitting an increase in the military conflict which is fraught with a serious threat to the cause of peace and not only in the Middle East.

Taking into account the most recent developments and events, the Soviet delegation considers that in the situation as it now obtains, the stage where the Security Council was obliged to limit itself to the adoption of a decision on the cease-fire has already passed. It is no longer sufficient to be content with a repetition or reaffirmation of resolutions adopted earlier. It is necessary to take resolute steps that will put an end to aggression and to curb the Israeli bandits.

The Security Council is obliged to carry out its direct duty under the Charter of the United Nations and compel the brazen aggressors to respect the Council, the Charter of the United Nations and the will of the world community. The only possible way of correcting the situation and directing the course of events in that region towards a peaceful settlement is that Israel must immediately be compelled to comply with the decisions of the Security Council, and the United States is obliged and bound to play a decisive role in this as a permanent member of the Security Council and as a co-sponsor of the two resolutions.

The delegation of the Soviet Union has carefully listened to the address of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt asking the United Nations and to the Soviet Union to adopt urgent necessary measures, including the dispatch of military contingents, to ensure the implementation of the Security Council resolutions concerning the cease-fire. In answer to this, I am empowered to say that, in the light of the fact that Israel is brazenly ignoring Security Council decisions, this address and the measures proposed by Egypt are undoubtedly justified and are entirely in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

The Soviet delegation considers also that in the present situation the time has come for the Security Council to reflect upon Chapter VII of the Charter and on the basis of the provisions of the relevant articles of that Chapter to adopt appropriate strict sanctions against Israel. The Soviet delegation considers that the time has come also for the Security Council to adopt a decision to appeal to all Members of the United Nations to sever diplomatic relations with Israel

and any other ties, because Israel is an aggressor State which is incorrigibly violating the decisions of the General Assembly, the Security Council and the United Nations as a whole.

In conclusion, I should like to say a few words concerning the United Nations Observers. I should like to bring to the attention of the Council that today I, on the instructions of my Government, very early turned to the Secretary-General with a corresponding statement to the effect that, on the basis of information obtained from Cairo, the decision of the Security Council concerning the immediate dispatch of United Nations Observers to supervise the observance of the cease-fire between the Egyptian and the Israeli armed forces was not being carried out. At 0900 hours GMT on 24 October there was not a single observer in the region of the cease-fire, and the headquarters of the observers in Jerusalem said that it did not show any sign of life, as the English version had it. This was the situation. This lack of activity is inadmissible in the implementation of decisions of the Security Council concerning the immediate dispatch of observers to the cease-fire line. On the instructions of the Soviet Government, I have turned to the Secretary-General to adopt urgent measures. He told me that he had had a sleepless night. He has been dealing all night with this question, and he received a message also from Cairo on the part of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt, Mr. El-Zayyat, who had appealed to him likewise. The measures are taken in the meantime, but the situation was very complicated at that time. It was very sharp and very tense. We see from today's discussion that Israel is ignoring decisions of the Security Council in relation to the sending of United Nations Observers to the cease-fire line. It does not admit to its side United Nations Observers. This is a flagrant violation of decisions of the United Nations Security Council, and no cynical statements of the part of the representative of Israel with references to Arab proverbs will cover up this flagrant violation by Israel of resolutions of the Security Council in regard to the cease-fire and in regard to the non-admission of the United Nations Observers to the cease-fire line. The Israeli Arabs will not help the Israeli representatives in the Security Council. The matter is serious. The matter involves war and peace, and not only in the Middle East, whereas he is trying to play—I cannot find the

right word—and trying to mask the bandit-like actions of his Government by quoting Arab proverbs. This indicates that he has no more arguments left that would be more serious and more convincing. He is trying to confuse the Security Council and lead it astray.

In view of the fact that the question of the United Nations Observers has arisen, I am trying to find out what the composition of the United Nations Observers was, and I find that the Security Council should know what the personnel are. Who are the members of the Observer teams? In considering this on the basis of official data of the United Nations Secretariat concerning the membership of the observers who are already in the Middle East, we cannot fail to turn our attention to the fact that they include only representatives of the Western States. With all due respect to the experience of their officers and their training and their knowledge of how to carry out international missions, I cannot agree with such a unilateral selection by the Secretariat of the United Nations. Of course they were recruited long before Mr. Waldheim was the Secretary-General of the United Nations, but nevertheless long ago the practice was established of such recruitment. Let us turn to the facts. Of 212 United Nations observers who are in the Middle East, more than half are citizens of the NATO countries and their Western military groups. This leads one to sad thoughts. They are citizens of the United States, Canada, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, France, Norway and Denmark, as well as representatives of their military groupings, Australia and New Zealand. Among the United Nations observers there are no citizens of any of the non-aligned countries. This is the picture. I think the Security Council should have its attention focused on this. Many say that times have changed. Yes, indeed they have changed. Probably the membership of the observers was recruited at a time when there were only 51 Members of the United Nations. Then a few were added. I think there were 78 at one point. But now there are 135. We are constantly waging a fight for just geographical representation in the staff of the Secretariat of the United Nations, where we all know there is a grip by the Western Powers. It is very difficult to break through if you are a representative of a socialist country. That is why, if we are truly to follow the Charter,

then here again we have to consider the equitable geographic distribution aspect of the matter. The time has come, if it becomes necessary, to increase the personnel of the United Nations observers in the Middle East. I think the socialist countries likewise, as well as those of the third world, or the non-aligned countries, as they are called, will find sufficiently experienced, well-trained, progressive and competent officers who are capable of carrying out this important mission from among their citizens—officers with military training.

I turn to the members of the Security Council with this proposal and I request those who are dealing with the recruitment of the staff of the United Nations military observers to take these views into consideration and to carry out in fact and in practice the principle of the United Nations Charter concerning equitable geographic distribution.

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MR. SCALI (United States of America): The Security Council meets tonight for the third time in four days on a note of increasing urgency. In spite of two Security Council resolutions adopted without a dissenting vote, calling upon the parties in the strongest terms to cease all fighting and to terminate all military activity, military operations have recurred in the zones of combat. As long as the fighting goes on even intermittently the parties incur increasing losses, the forces of hate and fear are strengthened, the difficulties of attaining a lasting peace deepen and the task of reconciliation becomes more difficult.

Tonight this Council is convened at the request of the delegation of Egypt. The Foreign Minister of Egypt has suggested that the Security Council invite the Soviet Union and the United States to send forces to the area to supervise the implementation of the cease-fire on the part of Israel and to assure its effectiveness. At the same time, the Council is confronted by claims from the Israeli side that Egyptian forces failed to abide by the cease-fire and are accordingly responsible for the fact that hostilities have recurred.

Let me say again, as I said yesterday, that it remains impossible to determine the accuracy of these contradictory charges. Until the impartial observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) can reach their

posts in the areas of contact and can report to the Chief of Staff of the Organization we will be unable to assess with certainty these conflicting claims. Accordingly, the United States believes that the Council has before it two urgent tasks: first, it must impress upon the parties, with renewed vigour, that each of them must comply immediately and fully with the cease-fire resolutions that we have adopted; and second, it should urge and encourage the Secretary-General and the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization to move as promptly as possible to place additional observers on the spot.

The Foreign Minister of Egypt has suggested that the Security Council invite the Soviet Union and the United States to send armed forces to the area of fighting in order to supervise implementation of the cease-fire. In the view of the United States this is not a time in which involvement by the great Powers, through the dispatch of their armed forces, could be helpful in creating conditions of peace. Our objective in the Middle East has not been to produce a military confrontation but rather to encourage restraint and caution on both sides.

The United States remains committed to Security Council resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973) in all their parts. We believe that the parties, with the assistance of the United Nations observers, can and will bring the fighting to an end. For our part, I can state that we have been in active and serious consultation with the Government of Israel to impress upon it the urgency of absolute adherence to Security Council cease-fire resolutions. We will continue to make these representations as required.

We also agree, as I said yesterday, that the forces of the parties should return to the positions they occupied when the cease-fire became effective. Mr. Malik, I believe, knows that we have exerted all our efforts to put the cease-fire into effect, to translate it from a carefully balanced appeal to a reality which will end the killing.

In keeping with the understanding that Secretary of State Kissinger negotiated with Soviet leaders in Moscow, in a spirit of friendship, as part of our effort to improve relations on a broad front with the Soviet Union, we have done our part to carry out that agreement calmly and without seeking to extract propaganda advantage. But this cannot be done merely by snapping our fingers.

In a highly emotional state of affairs, in time of war, it is not easy.

As a matter of principle, the United States believes today, as it made clear in my statement of 8 October, that return to positions held before hostilities broke out is the preferred means of opening the way to genuine reconciliation. We will continue to support this principle. But it can be applied only in the context of agreement as to the geographical and physical facts. Until actual cease-fire lines are demarcated and it becomes clear where the opposing forces were stationed at a given moment in time, there can be no agreed basis for firm truce lines. This emphasizes still further the need for completing the organization and placement of the truce supervision force and for ensuring that the Council and the parties are fully informed of the developments and the military commanders of the two sides instructed in compelling terms to stop the fighting.

The meeting was suspended at 21.40 (02.40 gmt, October 25) and resumed at 24.00 (05.00 gmt, October 25).

MR. ODERO-JOWI (Kenya): On 22 October 1973, this Council adopted resolution 338 (1973) in which it called

... upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy.

The Council also called

... upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts.

Finally, the Council decided

... that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

The Council, on the next day, that is, on 23 October 1973, adopted another resolution—resolution 339 (1973)—in which it confirmed

... its decision on an immediate cessation of all kinds of firing and of all military action, and urges that the forces of the two sides be returned to the positions they occupied at the moment the cease-fire became effective.

Furthermore, the Council requested the Secretary-General

... to take measures for immediate dispatch of United Nations observers to supervise the observance of the cease-fire between the forces of Israel and the Arab Republic of Egypt, using for this purpose the personnel of the United Nations now in the Middle East and first of all the personnel now in Cairo.

This evening the Council heard more evidence, and indeed the Council has before it clear evidence, of a complete breakdown in the cease-fire it ordered in resolution 338 (1973) and reinforced in resolution 339 (1973). The fourth Middle East war is continuing, and it is a war on a large scale; it is an unrelenting war, bringing with it death, carnage and scourge to the people of the area.

When we voted for resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973), we had hoped that the two super-Powers which were the sponsors of the two draft resolutions would spare no effort to stop the war; we had hoped that they would use all their influence, and indeed all their power, to vindicate peace and ensure the cease-fire called for by the Council. But these hopes have been in vain, and there is ample evidence that war is still raging in the Middle East.

In the current tragic Middle East situation, we have heard an appeal this evening from one of the parties to the conflict. We have heard an appeal from the Foreign Minister of the Arab Republic of Egypt for urgent action by this Council, and especially by two powerful permanent members of this Council, to stop the war. Egypt has asked for action to preserve life and property of the parties to the conflict in the Middle East. Indeed Egypt's appeal goes further than that. Egypt is appealing to this Council to help roll back the clouds of a potential world-wide conflict now hanging over our globe. This is the challenge this Council is facing this evening, and this is the objective of a draft resolution which I have the privilege of introducing on behalf of the delegations of India, Indonesia, Guinea, Yugoslavia, Sudan, Peru and Panama and on behalf of my own delegation.

The first paragraph of the preamble to that draft resolution recalls, as it must, resolutions 338 of 22 October 1973 and 339 of 23 October 1973.

In the second paragraph of the preamble we note with regret the reported repeated violations of the cease-fire in non-compliance with resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973).

In the third paragraph of the preamble we note with concern from the Secretary-General's report that the United Nations observers have not yet been enabled to place themselves on both sides of the cease-fire line.

I think enough has been said on both sides on the whole of this tragic situation, and I should like to spare the Council the burden of a repetition of what has already been said and is amply documented.

Operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution reads as follows:

"Demands that immediate and complete cease-fire be observed and that the parties withdraw to the positions occupied by them at 0550 GMT on 22 October 1973".

Operative paragraph 2 reads:

"Requests the Secretary-General, as an immediate step, to increase the number of United Nations observers on both sides".

Operative paragraph 3 reads:

"Decides to set up immediately a United Nations emergency force under its authority, and requests the Secretary-General to report within 24 hours on the steps taken to this effect".

Operative paragraph 4 reads:

"Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on an urgent and continuing basis on the state of implementation of this resolution as well as resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973)".

Operative paragraph 5 reads:

"Requests all Member States to extend their full co-operation in the implementation of this resolution as well as resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973)."

I have already made reference to resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973). I should like to make only a brief and passing reference to resolution 242 (1967), which, in the view of my delegation—and I am sure on this I am speaking for all the co-sponsors of this draft resolution—is the crux or the key to the solution of the Middle East problem. Resolution 338 (1973) calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). Now, the relevant paragraphs of resolution 242 (1967), which should be

implemented under resolution 338 (1973), are operative paragraphs 1 and 2, which read as follows:

1. Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

(i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. Affirms further the necessity

(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

Operative paragraphs 3 and 4 of resolution 242 (1967) lay down certain steps to be taken by the Secretary-General to ensure the fulfilment of the conditions set out in operative paragraphs 1 and 2. Now it is those provisions that resolution 338 (1973) seeks to vindicate and implement.

The co-sponsors of this draft resolution are not going to press for a vote now, because we would like its provisions to be discussed freely and to have the widest consultations on it. But we do hope that this will take place as speedily as possible to enable the Council to adopt this draft resolution, possibly later this morning.

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The meeting rose at 00.30 (05.30 gmt), October 25.

[At the Security Council's 1750th meeting, held on October 25, at 13.20-17.55 (18.20-22.55 gmt) the draft resolution was amended and then adopted as Resolution 340 (1973); see doc. 36 below for the text.]

Statements by UN Officials

23

Note by the President of the Security Council incorporating a statement reminding Israel of UN resolutions deploring the holding of military parades in Jerusalem¹⁵³

April 30, 1973

As a result of consultations with all members of the Security Council, the President of the Security Council made the following statement orally to the Permanent Representative of Israel on Friday, 27 April 1973:

The President of the Security Council has been informed by the Permanent Representative of Jordan in writing [S/10919], and subsequently orally, that the Government of Israel intends to hold a large military parade in Jerusalem on 1 May 1973 to celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the establishment of Israel. At the same time it was indicated that the parade would also extend to the Arab sector of Jerusalem occupied since June 1967.

In connexion with this matter, the President of the Security Council has held individual consultations with all members of the Council and, as a result, he wishes to draw the attention of the Permanent Representative of Israel to the provisions of resolution 250 (1968),¹⁵⁴ adopted unanimously by the Security Council on 27 April 1968, by which the Security Council, considering that the holding of a military parade in Jerusalem would aggravate tensions in the area and have an adverse effect on a peaceful settlement of the problems in the area, called upon Israel to refrain from holding the military parade in Jerusalem which was contemplated for 2 May 1968. He also wishes to draw attention to the provisions of resolution 251 (1968),¹⁵⁵ adopted unanimously on 2 May 1968, by which the Security Council, recalling resolution 250 (1968), deeply deplored the holding by Israel of the military parade in Jerusalem on 2 May 1968 in disregard of the unanimous decision adopted by the Council on 27 April 1968.

¹⁵³ U.N. doc. S/10922; text in *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-eighth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1973*, p. 35.

¹⁵⁴ Doc. 235 in *International Documents on Palestine 1968*.

¹⁵⁵ Doc. 237 in *ibid*.

24

Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council regarding Egypt's request that UN military observers be evacuated to Cairo¹⁵⁶

October 8, 1973

You will recall that by a consensus expressed by the President and approved by the Security Council at the 1366th meeting on 9/10 July 1967 (S/8047),¹⁵⁷ the Secretary-General requested the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO) "... to work out with the Governments of the United Arab Republic and Israel, as speedily as possible, the necessary arrangements to station United Nations Military Observers in the Suez Canal sector under the Chief of Staff of UNTSO". Since that time United Nations Military Observers have been stationed on both banks of the Suez Canal.

On the evening of 7 October 1973, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO received a request from the Egyptian Military authorities that the United Nations Military Observers be immediately evacuated to Cairo. The Chief of Staff replied that, in view of the Security Council consensus mentioned above, he would appreciate it if the Egyptian Government would make this request for the withdrawal of the Military Observers direct to the Secretary-General. I have asked the Chief of Staff of UNTSO for a complete report on the developments.

On the morning of 8 October I spoke with the Permanent Representative of Egypt on this matter.

¹⁵⁶ UN doc. S/11013. Arising from this letter the Security Council held informal consultations and agreed to accede to Egypt's request. The Secretary-General was informed accordingly on the evening of October 8 and confirmed the decision in a letter to the President of the Security Council the following day (UN doc. S/11017 dated October 10, 1973).

¹⁵⁷ See doc. 258 in *International Documents on Palestine 1967*.

The Permanent Representative of Egypt subsequently informed me that he had been instructed by his Government to express its thanks for the work and help of the United Nations Military Observers. Owing to the fact that the Observers are now behind the Egyptian lines, which puts them in physical danger and makes their presence unnecessary, the Government of Egypt requests the Secretary-General to take measures for their transfer to Cairo for their security.

In the light of the Security Council consensus of July 1967, I wish to inform you, as President of the Security Council, immediately of this development. Details of the actual developments in regard to individual Observation Posts will be reported to the Council when available in the normal way.

25

Statement by the Secretary-General regarding the Middle East war¹⁵⁸

October 11, 1973

I have up till now refrained from making a public statement on the conflict in the Middle East, because I did not want in any way to interfere with the efforts of the Security Council, which under the Charter has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Now, however, after more than five days of heavy fighting which has already caused appalling human losses, I feel obliged to speak out as Secretary-General. None of the parties is prepared to concede its objectives, either military or political. They would appear, therefore, to be embarked on a war of attrition with the gravest consequences not only for the region itself but for the world community as a whole. Who can possibly benefit from such a development? If the war continues, it will pose an increasing threat to international peace and security in a much wider context.

I am deeply concerned at this prospect. I, like so many others, am profoundly distressed to observe day by day the loss of countless lives, the destruction and misery, and the increasing danger

to civilian populations.

I am also profoundly concerned with the role of the United Nations in such circumstances. The primary purpose of our Organization is the maintenance of international peace and security. If we fail in that role the central point of the Organization's existence is jeopardized.

I know very well the important political reasons why the Security Council is not at present in a position to exercise a decisive influence in this affair. That situation has occurred before and it will doubtless occur again.

But after more than five days of this terrible war I feel it is my duty as Secretary-General of the United Nations to urge the members of the Council to consider once again how the obstacles to effective and peaceful action can be surmounted and the primary role of the Council can be reasserted in the interests of peace.

I have no detailed solution to suggest. I do, however, earnestly appeal to all the Governments concerned to look urgently to the possibility of turning this tragic conflict into a starting-point for a new effort at a real settlement.

I believe that if the Governments concerned were to take this attitude, they would find in the United Nations the instrumentalities to assist them to go forward. Naturally we in the Secretariat stand ready to provide whatever assistance we can. I am encouraged to note that some Governments have declared their readiness to assist.

I have no illusions about how difficult it is for countries in conflict to turn from war to peace. I have no wish to deflect any Government from what it believes to be its legitimate sovereign aims. I do, however, question whether the continuation of the war can possibly achieve those aims permanently for any of the parties. I am also deeply concerned at the wider threat to international peace and security which this situation may create.

I therefore earnestly appeal to the conflicting Governments to consider alternative courses, before it is too late, so that fighting and bloodshed may cease. I also hope that the member of the Security Council, as well as other Member States, will redouble their efforts to seek an end to the fighting and an immediate and determined resumption of the quest for a just and lasting settlement in the Middle East.

¹⁵⁸ Included in a letter to the President of the Security Council published as UN doc. S/11021.

Resolutions and Decisions

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

26

General Assembly Resolution 3089 (XXVIII) concerning the administration and finances of UNRWA and reaffirming the Palestinians' right to return and self-determination¹⁵⁹

December 7, 1973

A

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967, 2341 B (XXII) of 19 December 1967, 2452 C (XXIII) of 19 December 1968, 2535 C (XXIV) of 10 December 1969, 2672 B (XXV) of 8 December 1970, 2792 B (XXVI) of 6 December 1971 and 2963 B (XXVII) of 13 December 1972,

Taking note of the annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1972 to 30 June 1973,

Concerned about the continued human suffering resulting from the June 1967 hostilities in the Middle East,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolutions 2252 (ES-V), 2341 B (XXII), 2452 C (XXIII), 2535 C (XXIV), 2672 B (XXV), 2792 B (XXVI) and 2963 B (XXVII);

2. *Endorses*, bearing in mind the objectives of those resolutions, the efforts of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to continue to provide humanitarian assistance,

as far as practicable, on an emergency basis and as a temporary measure, to other persons in the area who are at present displaced and in serious need of continued assistance as a result of the June 1967 hostilities;

3. *Strongly appeals* to all Governments and to organizations and individuals to contribute generously for the above purposes to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and to the other intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations concerned.

B

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2963 A (XXVII) of 13 December 1972 and all previous resolutions referred to therein, including resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948,

Taking note of the annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1972 to 30 June 1973,

1. *Notes with deep regret* that repatriation or compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed by the General Assembly in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952 for the reintegration of refugees either by repatriation or resettlement and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern;

2. *Expresses its thanks* to the Commissioner-General and to the staff of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for their continued faithful efforts to provide essential services for the Palestine refugees, and to the specialized agencies and private organizations for their valuable work in assisting the refugees;

3. *Notes with regret* that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine has been unable

¹⁵⁹ U.N. doc. A/RES/3089 A.B.C.D.E. (XXVIII): text in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 30*, pp. 26–28. Adopted at the Assembly's 2193rd plenary meeting by the following votes:

Part A: 122 to none, with 2 abstentions

Part B: 121 to none, with 3 abstentions

Part C: 110 to 4, with 12 abstentions

Part D: 87 to 6, with 33 abstentions

Part E: 81 to 3, with 41 abstentions

See Appendix F for voting details.

to find a means of achieving progress in the implementation of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) and requests the Commission to exert continued efforts towards the implementation thereof and to report thereon as appropriate, but no later than 1 October 1974;

4. *Directs attention* to the continuing critical financial position of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, as outlined in the Commissioner-General's report;

5. *Notes with concern* that, despite the commendable and successful efforts of the Commissioner-General to collect additional contributions to help relieve the serious budget deficit of the past year, contributions to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East continue to fall short of the funds needed to cover essential budget requirements;

6. *Calls upon* all Governments as a matter of urgency to make the most generous efforts possible to meet the anticipated needs of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, particularly in the light of the budgetary deficit projected in the Commissioner-General's report, and therefore urges non-contributing Governments to contribute and contributing Governments to consider increasing their contributions.

C

The General Assembly,

Recalling Security Council resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967,

Recalling also its resolutions 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967, 2452 A (XXIII) of 19 December 1968, 2535 B (XXIV) of 10 December 1969, 2672 D (XXV) of 8 December 1970, 2792 E (XXVI) of 6 December 1971 and 2963 D (XXVII) of 13 December 1972, calling upon the Government of Israel to take effective and immediate steps for the return without delay of those inhabitants who had been displaced since the outbreak of hostilities in June 1967, and its resolutions 2792 C (XXVI) of 6 December 1971 and 2963 C (XXVII) of 13 December 1972, calling upon the Government of Israel to take immediate and effective steps for the return of the refugees concerned to the camps from which they were removed in the Gaza Strip and to provide adequate shelters for their accommodation,

Emphasizing the need for full implementation of the above-mentioned resolutions,

Having considered the reports of the Secretary-General of 18 September 1973,

Noting that the Israeli occupation authorities have persisted in adopting measures that obstruct the return of the displaced population to their homes and camps in the occupied territories—including changes in the physical and demographic structure of the occupied territories, by the displacement of inhabitants, the transfer of population, the destruction of towns, villages and homes, and the establishment of Israeli settlements—in violation of the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, as well as the pertinent United Nations resolutions, and reaffirming that it considers those measures null and void,

1. *Reaffirms* the right of the displaced inhabitants, including those displaced as a result of recent hostilities, to return to their homes and camps;

2. *Considers* that the plight of the displaced inhabitants continues because they have been prevented from returning to their homes and camps;

3. *Deplores* the refusal of the Israeli authorities to take steps for the return of the displaced inhabitants in accordance with the above-mentioned resolutions;

4. *Calls once more upon* Israel immediately:

(a) To take steps for the return of the displaced inhabitants;

(b) To desist from all measures that obstruct the return of the displaced inhabitants, including measures affecting the physical and demographic structure of the occupied territories;

(c) To take effective steps for the return of the refugees concerned to the camps from which they were removed in the Gaza Strip and to provide adequate shelters for their accommodation;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General, after consulting with the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, to report as soon as possible, and whenever appropriate thereafter, but in any case not later than the opening date of the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly, on Israel's compliance with and implementation of paragraph 4 of the present resolution.

D

The General Assembly,

Recognizing that the problem of the Palestine Arab refugees has arisen from the denial of their inalienable rights under the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

Recalling its resolution 2535 B (XXIV) of 10 December 1969, in which it reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine, and its resolutions 2649 (XXV) of 30 November 1970, 2672 C (XXV) of 8 December 1970, 2787 (XXVI) and 2792 D (XXVI) of 6 December 1971, 2955 (XXVII) of 12 December 1972 and 2963 E (XXVII) of 13 December 1972, in which it recognized, *inter alia*, that the people of Palestine is entitled to the right of self-determination,

Bearing in mind the principle of equal rights and self-determination enshrined in Articles 1 and 55 of the Charter and more recently reaffirmed in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and in the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security,

1. *Reaffirms* that the people of Palestine is entitled to equal rights and self-determination, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

2. *Expresses once more its grave concern* that the people of Palestine has been prevented by Israel from enjoying its inalienable rights and from exercising its right to self-determination;

3. *Declares* that full respect for and realization of the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine, particularly its right to self-determination, are indispensable for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, and that the enjoyment by the Palestine Arab refugees of their right to return to their homes and property, recognized by the General Assembly in resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, which has been repeatedly reaffirmed by the Assembly since that date, is indispensable for the achievement of a just settlement of the refugee problem and for the exercise by the people of Palestine of its right to self-determination.

E

The General Assembly,

Considering that the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East is in dire need of additional funds to meet its minimal annual expenses,

Noting that many Member States are not in a position to make any contribution to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East,

Noting also that many States, instead of contributing to the budget of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, prefer to extend direct aid to the Palestine refugees,

Taking into account that the contribution of the United States of America to the regular budget of the United Nations has been reduced to 25 per cent by General Assembly resolution 2961 B (XXVII) of 13 December 1972 on the understanding that the United States will endeavour to maintain and possibly increase its voluntary contributions to the various agencies and other organs of the United Nations,

Considering further the deep interest which certain Western European and other States have manifested in the Middle East for many years,

1. *Expresses its gratitude* to all States which have in the past generously contributed to the budget of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East;

2. *Appeals* to Member States, especially those with \$1,500 or more *per capita* income, to consider increasing their contribution to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.

27

General Assembly Resolution 3090 (XXVIII) expressing concern at UNRWA's financial situation and calling on the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA to continue its work¹⁶⁰

December 7, 1973

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2656 (XXV) of 7 December 1970, 2728 (XXV) of 15 December 1970, 2791 (XXVI) of 6 December 1971 and 2963 (XXVII) and 2964 (XXVII) of 13 December 1972,

Having considered the report of the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East,

Taking into account the annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1972 to 30 June 1973,

Deeply concerned at the financial situation of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, which continues to be serious, thereby endangering the essential services being provided to Palestine refugees,

Convinced of the continuing need for extraordinary efforts in order to maintain, at least at their present minimum level, the activities of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East,

1. *Commends* the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for its work;

2. *Notes with appreciation* the report of the Working Group;

3. *Requests* the Working Group to continue its efforts, in co-operation with the Secretary-General and the Commissioner-General, for the financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for a further period of one year;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the necessary services and assistance to the Working Group for the conduct of its work.

28

General Assembly Resolution 3092 (XXVIII) calling on Israel to comply with the Geneva Convention of 1949 and deploring Israel's breaches of the Convention¹⁶¹

December 7, 1973

A

The General Assembly,

Recalling the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949,

Recalling that Israel and the Arab States, some of whose territories have been occupied by Israel since 1967, are parties to that Convention,

Bearing in mind that the promotion of respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law is one of the basic objectives of the United Nations,

Bearing in mind, furthermore, that the States parties to that Convention undertake, in accordance with article 1 thereof, not only to respect but also to ensure respect for the Convention in all circumstances,

1. *Affirms* that the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, applies to the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967;

2. *Calls upon* the Israeli occupation authorities to respect and comply with the provisions of that Convention in the occupied Arab territories;

3. *Urges* all States parties to that Convention to endeavour to ensure respect for and compliance with the provisions thereof in the occupied Arab territories.

¹⁶⁰ U.N. doc. A/RES/3090(XXVIII); text in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Year, Supplement No. 30*, p. 28. Adopted unanimously at the Assembly's 2193rd plenary meeting. See appendix F for voting details.

¹⁶¹ U.N. doc. A/RES/3092 A.B. (XXVIII); text in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Year, Supplement No. 30*, pp. 28-30. Adopted at the Assembly's 2193rd plenary meeting by the following votes:

Part A: 120 to none, with 5 abstentions

Part B: 90 to 7, with 27 abstentions

See appendix F for voting details.

B

The General Assembly,

Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations as well as the principles and provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

Bearing in mind the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, as well as those of other relevant conventions and regulations,

Recalling its resolutions as well as those resolutions adopted by the Security Council, the Commission on Human Rights and other United Nations bodies and by specialized agencies on the question of Israeli policies and practices affecting the human rights of the population of the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967,

Considering that implementation of the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 cannot and should not be left open in a situation involving foreign military occupation and the rights of the civilian population of these territories under the provisions of that Convention and in accordance with the principles of international law,

Having considered the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories,

1. *Commends* the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories for its efforts in performing the tasks assigned to it by the General Assembly;

2. *Deplores* the continued refusal of the Government of Israel to allow the Special Committee access to the occupied territories;

3. *Expresses its grave concern* at the violation by Israel of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, as well as the other applicable international conventions and regulations, in particular the following violations:

(a) The annexation of certain parts of the occupied territories;

(b) The establishment of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories and the transfer of an alien population thereto;

(c) The destruction and demolition of Arab houses, quarters, villages and towns;

(d) The confiscation and expropriation of Arab

property in the occupied territories and all other transactions for the acquisition of land between the Government of Israel, Israeli institutions and Israeli nationals on the one hand, and the inhabitants or institutions of the occupied territories on the other;

(e) The evacuation, deportation, expulsion, displacement and transfer of the Arab inhabitants of the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, and the denial of their right to return to their homes and property;

(f) Administrative detention and ill-treatment inflicted on the Arab inhabitants;

(g) The pillaging of archaeological and cultural property in the occupied territories;

(h) The interference with religious freedom, religious practices and family rights and customs;

(i) The illegal exploitation of the natural wealth, resources and population of the occupied territories;

4. *Calls upon* Israel to desist immediately from the annexation and colonization of the Arab territories occupied by it since 1967, the establishment of settlements and the transfer of population to, from or within those territories, and from all the other practices referred to in paragraph 3 above;

5. *Declares* that Israel's policy of annexation, establishment of settlements and transfer of an alien population to the occupied territories is in contravention of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the principles and provisions of the applicable international law concerning occupation, the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the basic human rights and fundamental freedoms of the people, and is as well an impediment to the establishment of a just and lasting peace;

6. *Reaffirms* that Israel's policy of settling parts of its population and new immigrants in the occupied territories is a flagrant violation of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, and of the relevant United Nations resolutions, and urges all States to refrain from any action which Israel will exploit in carrying out its policy of colonizing the occupied territories;

7. *Reaffirms* that all measures taken by Israel to change the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure or the status of the occupied territories, or any part thereof, are null and void;

8. *Calls upon* all States, international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize any changes carried out by Israel in the occupied territories and to avoid actions, including actions in the field of aid, which might be used by Israel in its pursuit of the policies and practices referred to in the present resolution;

9. *Requests* the Special Committee, pending the early termination of Israeli occupation, to continue to investigate Israeli policies and practices in the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, to consult, as appropriate, with the International Committee of the Red Cross in order to ensure the safeguarding of the welfare and human rights of the population of the occupied territories, and to report to the Secretary-General as soon as possible and whenever the need arises thereafter;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General:

(a) To render all necessary facilities to the Special Committee, including those required for its visits to the occupied territories with a view to investigating Israeli policies and practices affecting the human rights of the population of those territories;

(b) To ensure the widest circulation of the reports of the Special Committee and of information regarding its activities and findings, by all means available through the Office of Public Information of the Secretariat;

(c) To report to the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session on the tasks entrusted to him;

11. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its twenty-ninth session the item entitled "Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories".

29

General Assembly Resolution 3101 (XXVIII) making arrangements for the financing of the UN Emergency Force¹⁶²

December 11, 1973

The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the cost estimates of the United Nations

Emergency Force established pursuant to Security Council resolution 340 (1973) of 25 October 1973 for the period from 25 October 1973 to 24 April 1974 and the report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions thereon,

Reaffirming its previous decisions regarding the fact that, in order to meet the expenditures caused by such operations, a different procedure is required from that applied to meet expenditures of the regular budget of the United Nations,

Taking into account the fact that the economically more developed countries are in a position to make relatively larger contributions and that the economically less developed countries have a relatively limited capacity to contribute towards peace-keeping operations involving heavy expenditures,

Also bearing in mind the special responsibilities of the States permanent members of the Security Council in the financing of such operations, as indicated in resolution 1874 (S-IV) of 27 June 1963 and other resolutions of the General Assembly,

1. *Decides* to appropriate an amount of \$30 million for the operation of the United Nations Emergency Force from 25 October 1973 to 24 April 1974 inclusive and requests the Secretary-General to establish a special account for the Force;

2. *Decides*, as an *ad hoc* arrangement, without prejudice to the positions of principle that may be taken by Member States in any consideration by the General Assembly of arrangements for the financing of peace-keeping operations:

(a) To apportion an amount of \$18,945,000 for the above-mentioned six-month period among the States permanent members of the Security Council in the proportions determined by the scale of assessments for 1974-1976;

(b) To apportion an amount of \$10,434,000 for the above-mentioned six-month period among the economically developed Member States which are not permanent members of the Security Council in the proportions determined by the scale of assessments for 1974-1976;

(c) To apportion an amount of \$606,000 for the above-mentioned six-month period among the economically less developed Member States in the proportions determined by the scale of assessments for 1974-1976;

¹⁶² U.N. doc. A/RES/3101(XXVIII); text in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Year, Supplement No. 30*,

pp. 122-123. Adopted at the Assembly's 2196th plenary meeting by 108 votes to 3, with 1 abstention. See appendix F for voting details.

(d) To apportion an amount of \$15,000 for the above-mentioned six-month period to the following countries among the economically less developed Member States in the proportions determined by the scale of assessments for 1974–1976: Afghanistan, Bhutan, Botswana, Burundi, Chad, Dahomey, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, Guinea, Haiti, Laos, Lesotho, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta and Yemen;

3. *Decides* that, for the purpose of the present resolution, the term “economically less developed Member States” in paragraph 2 (c) above shall mean all Member States except Australia, Austria, Belgium, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, the German Democratic Republic, Germany (Federal Republic of), Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, South Africa, Sweden, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Member States referred to in paragraphs 2 (a) and (d) above;

4. *Authorizes* the Secretary-General to enter into commitment for the United Nations Emergency Force at a rate not to exceed \$5 million per month for the period from 25 April to 31 October 1974 inclusive, should the Security Council decide to continue the Force beyond the initial period of six months, the said amount to be apportioned among Member States in accordance with the scheme set out in the present resolution;

5. *Invites* voluntary contributions to the United Nations Emergency Force both in cash and in the form of services and supplies acceptable to the Secretary-General.

30

General Assembly Resolution 3175 (XXVIII) affirming the right of the Arabs to permanent sovereignty over the natural resources of their territories under foreign occupation¹⁶³

December 17, 1973

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the relevant principles of international law and the provisions of the international conventions and regulations, especially the Fourth Geneva Convention, concerning the obligations and responsibilities of the occupying Power,

Recalling its previous resolutions on permanent sovereignty over natural resources, including resolution 1803 (XVII) of 18 December 1962 in which it declared the right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources,

Recalling the pertinent provisions of the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade,

Recalling also its resolution 3005 (XXVII) of 15 December 1972, in which it affirmed the principle of the sovereignty of the population of the occupied territories over their national wealth and resources and called upon all States, international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize or co-operate with, or assist in any manner in, any measures undertaken by the occupying Power to exploit the resources of the occupied territories or to effect any changes in the demographic composition or geographic character or institutional structure of those territories,

1. *Affirms* the right of the Arab States and peoples whose territories are under foreign occupation to permanent sovereignty over all their natural resources;

2. *Reaffirms* that all measures undertaken by Israel to exploit the human and natural resources of the occupied Arab territories are illegal and calls upon Israel to halt such measures forthwith;

¹⁶³ U.N. doc. A/RES/3175(XXVIII); text in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Year, Supplement No. 30*, p. 55. Adopted at the Assembly's 2203rd plenary meeting by 90 votes to 5, with 26 abstentions; the last paragraph, voted on separately, was adopted by 93 votes to 4, with 24 abstentions. See appendix F for voting details.

3. *Affirms* the right of the Arab States and peoples whose territories are under Israeli occupation to the restitution of and full compensation for the exploitation and looting of, and damages to, the natural resources, as well as the exploitation and manipulation of the human resources, of the occupied territories;

4. *Declares* that the above principles apply to all States, territories and peoples under foreign occupation, colonial rule or *apartheid*.

SECURITY COUNCIL¹⁶⁴

31

Security Council Resolution 331 (1973) requesting the Secretary-General to submit a comprehensive report on UN efforts in the Middle East since 1967¹⁶⁵

April 20, 1973

The Security Council,

Having heard the statement of the Foreign Minister of the Arab Republic of Egypt,

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the Security Council as early as possible a comprehensive report giving full account of the efforts undertaken by the United Nations pertaining to the situation in the Middle East since June 1967;

2. *Decides* to meet, following the submission of the Secretary-General's report, to examine the situation in the Middle East;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to invite Mr. Gunnar Jarring, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, to be available during the Council's meetings in order to render assistance to the Council in the course of its deliberations.

32

Security Council Resolution 332 (1973) condemning Israeli attacks on Lebanon¹⁶⁶

April 21, 1973

The Security Council,

Having considered the agenda contained in document S/Agenda/1705,

Having noted the contents of the letter of the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations (S/10913)

Having heard the statements of the representatives of Lebanon and Israel,

Grieved at the tragic loss of civilian life,

Gravely concerned at the deteriorating situation resulting from the violation of Security Council resolutions,

Deeply deploring all recent acts of violence resulting in the loss of life of innocent individuals and the endangering of international civil aviation,

Recalling the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Lebanon of 23 March 1949 and the cease-fire established pursuant to resolutions 233 (1967) of 6 June 1967 and 234 (1967) of 7 June 1967,

Recalling its resolutions 262 (1968) of 31 December 1968, 270 (1969) of 26 August 1969, 280 (1970) of 19 May 1970 and 316 (1972) of 26 June 1972,

1. *Expresses deep concern* over and condemns all acts of violence which endanger or take innocent human lives;

2. *Condemns* the repeated military attacks conducted by Israel against Lebanon and Israel's violation of Lebanon's territorial integrity and sovereignty in contravention of the Charter of the United Nations, of the Armistice Agreement between Israel and Lebanon and of the Council's cease-fire resolutions;

3. *Calls upon* Israel to desist forthwith from all military attacks on Lebanon.

¹⁶⁴ Members of the Security Council in 1973 were Australia, Austria, China, France, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Peru, Sudan, UK, USA, USSR and Yugoslavia.

¹⁶⁵ U.N. doc. S/RES/331 (1973); text in *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-eighth Year, Resolutions and Decisions*, p. 8. Adopted unanimously at the Council's 1710th meeting.

¹⁶⁶ U.N. doc. S/RES/332 (1973); text in *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-eighth Year, Resolutions and Decisions*, pp. 8-9. Adopted at the Council's 1711th meeting by 11 votes to none, with 4 abstentions (China, Guinea, U.S.S.R., U.S.A.).

33

Security Council Resolution 337 (1973) condemning Israel's hijacking of a Lebanese civil airliner¹⁶⁷**August 15, 1973***The Security Council,**Having considered* the agenda contained in document S/Agenda/1736,*Having noted* the contents of the letter from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10983),*Having heard* the statement of the representative of Lebanon concerning the violation of Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity and the hijacking, by the Israeli air force, of a Lebanese civilian airliner on lease to Iraqi Airways,*Gravely concerned* that such an act carried out by Israel, a Member of the United Nations, constitutes a serious interference with international civil aviation and a violation of the Charter of the United Nations,*Recognizing* that such an act could jeopardize the lives and safety of passengers and crew and violates the provisions of international conventions safeguarding civil aviation,*Recalling* its resolutions 262 (1968) of 31 December 1968 and 286 (1970) of 9 September 1970,

1. *Condemns* the Government of Israel for violating Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity and for the forcible diversion and seizure by the Israeli air force of a Lebanese airliner from Lebanon's air space;

2. *Considers* that these actions by Israel constitute a violation of the Lebanese-Israeli Armistice Agreement of 1949, the cease-fire resolutions of the Security Council of 1967, the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the international conventions on civil aviation and the principles of international law and morality;

3. *Calls* on the International Civil Aviation Organization to take due account of this resolution when considering adequate measures to safeguard international civil aviation against these actions;

4. *Calls* on Israel to desist from any and all acts that violate Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial

¹⁶⁷ U.N. doc. S/RES/337 (1973); text in *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-eighth Year, Resolutions and Decisions*, p. 10. Adopted unanimously at the Council's 1740th meeting.

integrity and endanger the safety of international civil aviation and solemnly warns Israel that, if such acts are repeated, the Council will consider taking adequate steps or measures to enforce its resolutions.

34

Security Council Resolution 338 (1973) calling for a ceasefire and immediate negotiations for a Middle East peace¹⁶⁸**October 22, 1973***The Security Council,*

1. *Calls upon* all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;

2. *Calls upon* the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;

3. *Decides* that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations shall start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

35

Security Council Resolution 339 (1973) reiterating its call for a ceasefire and requesting the Secretary-General to send observers to supervise the ceasefire¹⁶⁹**October 23, 1973***The Security Council,**Referring* to its resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973,

1. *Confirms* its decision on an immediate cessation of all kinds of firing and of all military action,

¹⁶⁸ U.N. doc. S/RES/338 (1973); text in *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-eighth Year, Resolutions and Decisions*, p. 10. Adopted at the Council's 1747th meeting by 14 votes to none; China did not participate in the voting.

¹⁶⁹ U.N. doc. S/RES/339 (1973); text in *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-eighth Year, Resolutions and Decisions*, p. 11. Adopted at the Council's 1748th meeting by 14 votes to none; China did not participate in the voting.

and urges that the forces of the two sides be returned to the positions they occupied at the moment the cease-fire became effective;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to take measures for immediate dispatch of United Nations observers to supervise the observance of the cease-fire between the forces of Israel and the Arab Republic of Egypt, using for this purpose the personnel of the United Nations now in the Middle East and first of all the personnel now in Cairo.

36

Security Council Resolution 340 (1973) calling for a return to the ceasefire lines of October 22 and deciding to set up a UN Emergency Force¹⁷⁰

October 25, 1973

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 338 (1973) of 22 October and 339 (1973) of 23 October 1973,

Noting with regret the reported repeated violations of the cease-fire in non-compliance with resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973),

Noting with concern from the Secretary-General's report that the United Nations military observers have not yet been enabled to place themselves on both sides of the cease-fire line,

1. *Demands* that immediate and complete cease-fire be observed and that the parties return to the positions occupied by them at 1650 hours GMT on 22 October 1973;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General, as an immediate step, to increase the number of United Nations military observers on both sides;

3. *Decides* to set up immediately, under its authority, a United Nations Emergency Force to be composed of personnel drawn from States Members of the United Nations except the permanent members of the Security Council, and requests the Secretary-General to report within 24 hours on the steps taken to this effect;

¹⁷⁰ U.N. doc. S/RES/340 (1973); text in *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-eighth Year, Resolutions and Decisions*, p. 11. Adopted at the Council's 1750th meeting by 14 votes to none; China did not participate in the voting. In a separate vote on paragraph 3 the voting was the same except that France abstained.

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Council on an urgent and continuing basis on the state of implementation of the present resolution, as well as resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973),

5. *Requests* all Member States to extend their full co-operation to the United Nations in the implementation of the present resolution, as well as resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973).

37

Security Council Resolution 341 (1973) deciding to set up the UN Emergency Force for an initial period of six months¹⁷¹

October 27, 1973

The Security Council,

1. *Approves* the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 340 (1973) contained in document S/11052/Rev.1 dated 27 October 1973;

2. *Decides* that the Force shall be established in accordance with the above-mentioned report for an initial period of six months, and that it shall continue in operation thereafter, if required, provided the Security Council so decides.

38

Security Council decision on the composition of the UN Emergency Force¹⁷²

November 2, 1973

United Nations Emergency Force (Security Council resolution 340 (1973) of 25 October 1973): implementation—second phase

1. The members of the Security Council met for informal consultations on the morning of 1 November 1973 and heard a report from the Secretary-General on the progress so far made in

¹⁷¹ U.N. doc. S/RES/341 (1973); text in *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-eighth Year, Resolutions and Decisions*, p. 11. Adopted at the Council's 1752nd meeting by 14 votes to none; China did not participate in the voting.

¹⁷² *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-eighth Year, Resolutions and Decisions*, p. 12. The decision is in the form of a statement made by the President of the Security Council at the Council's 1754th meeting.

the implementation of Security Council resolution 340 (1973).

2. After a lengthy and detailed exchange of views it was agreed that in regard to the next stage of implementation of resolution 340 (1973):

(a) The Secretary-General will immediately consult, to begin with, Ghana (from the African regional group), Indonesia and Nepal (from the Asian regional group), Panama and Peru (from the Latin American group), Poland (from the Eastern European regional group) and Canada (from the Western European and other States group), the latter two with particular responsibility for logistic support, with a view to dispatching contingents to the Middle East pursuant to Security Council resolution 340 (1973). The Secretary-General will dispatch troops to the area from these countries as soon as the necessary consultations have been completed. The Council members agreed that at least three African countries are expected to send contingents to the Middle East. The present decision of the Council is intended to bring about a better geographical distribution of the United Nations Emergency Force.

(b) The Secretary-General will regularly report to the Council on the results of his efforts undertaken pursuant to sub-paragraph (a) so that the question of balanced geographical distribution in the force can be reviewed.

3. The above-mentioned agreement was reached by members of the Council with the exception of the People's Republic of China which dissociates itself from it.

39

Security Council Resolution 344 (1973) on the role of the Secretary-General in the Middle East Peace Conference¹⁷³

December 15, 1973

The Security Council,

Considering that it has decided by its resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973 that talks among the parties to the Middle East conflict for the

implementation of resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 should be held under "appropriate auspices",

Noting that a peace conference on the Middle East situation is to begin shortly at Geneva under the auspices of the United Nations,

1. *Expresses the hope* that the Peace Conference will make speedy progress towards the establishment of a just and durable peace in the Middle East;

2. *Expresses its confidence* that the Secretary-General will play a full and effective role at the Conference, in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and that he will preside over its proceedings, if the parties so desire;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Council suitably informed of the developments in negotiations at the Conference, in order to enable it to review the problems on a continuing basis;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance and facilities for the work of the Conference.

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

40

Commission on Human Rights Resolution 4 (XXIX) deploring Israel's defiance of UN resolutions regarding human rights in the occupied territories¹⁷⁴

March 14, 1973

The Commission on Human Rights,

Guided by the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, as well as the principles and provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

Bearing in mind the provisions of the fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war,

Recalling the pertinent United Nations resolutions on the protection of human rights and the fundamental freedoms of the inhabitants of the occupied Arab territories,

¹⁷³ U.N. doc. S/RES/344 (1973); text in *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-eighth Year, Resolutions and Decisions*, p. 13. Adopted at the Council's 1760th meeting by 10 votes to none, with 4 abstentions (France, U.S.S.R., U.K., U.S.A.); China did not participate in the voting.

¹⁷⁴ *Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, 54th Session, Supplement No. 6* (E/5265, E/CN.4/1127), pp. 68-70. The resolution was adopted by 18 votes to 2, with 10 abstentions.

Further recalling that the General Assembly in its resolution 2949 (XXVII) declared "that changes carried out by Israel in the occupied Arab territories in contravention of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 are null and void," and called upon all States "not to recognize any such changes and measures carried out by Israel in the occupied Arab territories",

Taking note of the reports of the United Nations and other international humanitarian organization on the situation of the inhabitants of the occupied Arab territories.

Greatly alarmed by the continuation of the violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, by Israel, in the occupied Arab territories, in particular the destruction of houses, expropriation of Arab properties, ill treatment of prisoners, the pillaging of the archaeological and cultural heritage and the exploitation of the natural resources of those territories,

Deeply concerned by the fact that Israel continues to establish Israeli settlements in the occupied Arab territories, encourages massive immigration to that end, continues to deport and transfer the indigenous Arab population and refuses the return of the refugees and displaced persons to their homes,

Convinced that Israel's deliberate policy of annexation and of settlement in the occupied Arab territories is in contravention of the Charter of the United Nations, international humanitarian law and basic human rights and fundamental freedoms,

Deploring Israel's persistent defiance of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and its continued policy of violating the basic human rights of the population in the occupied Arab territories,

1. *Deplores* Israel's continued grave breaches of the fourth Geneva Convention in the occupied Arab territories, which were considered by the Commission on Human Rights as war crimes and an affront to humanity;

2. *Reaffirms* that all measures taken by Israel to change the demographic structure and status of the occupied Arab territories, including occupied Jerusalem, are null and void;

3. *Calls upon* Israel to comply with its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the principles of international humanitarian law, to

abide by its obligations under the fourth Geneva Convention and to respect and implement the relevant United Nations resolutions;

4. *Further calls upon* Israel to stop immediately the establishment of settlements in the occupied Arab territories and to rescind all policies and measures affecting the physical character and demographic composition of those territories;

5. *Calls upon* all States to do their utmost to ensure that Israel respects the principles of human rights and fundamental freedoms and that it desists from all acts and policies aimed at changing the physical character and demographic composition of the occupied Arab territories, particularly through the establishment of settlements and the deportation and transfer of the Arab population;

6. *Considers* that Israel's policy of settling parts of its population, including immigrants, in the occupied Arab territories, is a flagrant violation of article 49 of the fourth Geneva Convention, as well as of the relevant United Nations resolutions, and calls upon all States and organizations not to assist Israel in any way to enable it to pursue its policy of colonizing the occupied Arab territories;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to bring the present resolution to the attention of all Governments, the competent United Nations organs, specialized agencies and regional inter-governmental organizations, and to give it the widest possible publicity and to report to the Commission on Human Rights at its next session;

8. *Decides* to place on the provisional agenda of its thirtieth session, as a matter of high priority, the item entitled "Questions of the violation of human rights in the territories occupied as a result of hostilities in the Middle East".

UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL,
SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION

41

**UNESCO Executive Board Decision 92 EX/
4.5.1 calling on Israel to respect the historical
character of Jerusalem**¹⁷⁵

May 11, 1973

The Executive Board,

1. *Recalling* the Security Council resolution 252 of 21 May 1968, 267 of 3 July 1969 and 298 of 25 September 1971, and resolutions 2253 and 2254 (4 and 14 July 1967) of the United Nations General Assembly concerning measures and actions affecting the status of the City of Jerusalem,

2. *Recalling* resolutions 3.342, 3.343, and 3.422 adopted by the General Conference at its fifteenth and seventeenth sessions, and decisions 4.4.2, 4.3.1, 4.3.1, 4.4.1 and 4.3.1 adopted by the Executive Board at its 82nd, 83rd, 88th, 89th and 90th sessions respectively,

3. *Mindful* that since the fifteenth session of the General Conference, the Organization has urgently called upon Israel to desist from any archaeological excavations in the Holy City, and from any alteration of the features of the City of Jerusalem, an appeal which Israel did not respect,

4. *Aware* that the General Conference at its seventeenth session had:

(a) *Noted* that Israel persisted in not complying with the relevant resolutions and that its attitude prevented the Organization from undertaking the mission which is incumbent upon it under the terms of the Constitution;

(b) *Invited* the Director-General to continue his efforts to establish the effective presence of Unesco in the City of Jerusalem and thus make possible the actual implementation of the resolutions adopted by the General Conference and the Executive Board for that purpose;

5. *Taking note* of document 92 EX/16 in which the Director-General informs the Executive Board of the outcome of his efforts in compliance with paragraph 3 of resolution 3.422 adopted by the General Conference at its seventeenth session, and

especially his intention mentioned in paragraph 5 of the document to appoint a qualified person as his representative for Jerusalem,

6. *Expresses* its appreciation to the Director-General for this first achievement in the implementation of paragraph 3 of resolution 17 C/3.422, and its confidence that he will appoint a representative of the highest quality and integrity;

7. *Invites* the Director-General to include among the terms of reference given to his representative an instruction to study and report to him on changes to the features of the Holy City since the adoption by the General Conference of its resolution in 1968 and, through the Unesco presence in Jerusalem, to make possible the effective implementation of the resolutions and decisions adopted by the General Conference and the Executive Board, particularly paragraph 2 of resolution 17 C/3.422 of the General Conference at its seventeenth session, which called urgently upon Israel *inter alia*:

(a) to take necessary measures for the scrupulous preservation of all sites, buildings and other cultural properties, especially in the Old City of Jerusalem;

(b) to desist from any alteration of the features of the City of Jerusalem;

(c) to desist from any archaeological excavations, the transfer of cultural properties and any alteration of their features or their cultural and historical character, particularly with regard to Christian and Islamic religious sites;

(d) to adhere scrupulously to the resolutions of the General Conference;

8. *Invites* the Director-General to report to the Executive Board at its 93rd session on the implementation of this resolution.

42

**UNESCO Executive Board Decision 93 EX/
4.5.1 requesting the Director-General to re-
port on the implementation by Israel of all
previous UN resolutions concerning Jeru-
salem**¹⁷⁶

October 10, 1973

The Executive Board,

1. *Recalling* the Security Council resolutions

¹⁷⁵ UNESCO *Resolutions and Decisions Adopted by the Executive Board, 92nd Session, 25 April–12 May 1973*, pp. 25–26; the resolution was adopted at the 15th meeting by 31 votes to 1, with 6 abstentions.

¹⁷⁶ UNESCO, *Resolutions and Decisions Adopted by the Executive Board, 93rd Session, 12 September–11 October 1973*, p. 27; the resolution was adopted unanimously at the 25th meeting.

252 of 21 May 1968, 267 of 3 July 1969 and 298 of 25 September 1971, and resolutions 2253 and 2254 (4 and 14 July 1967) of the United Nations General Assembly, concerning measures and actions affecting the status of the City of Jerusalem and resolution 2949 (paragraph 7 and 8) of 8 December 1972, concerning the policies and practices affecting the physical character or demographic composition of the occupied Arab territories,

2. *Recalling* resolutions 3.342, 3.343 and 3.422 adopted by the General Conference at its fifteenth and seventeenth sessions and decisions 4.4.2, 4.3.1, 4.3.1, 4.3.1, 4.4.1, 4.3.1 and 4.5.1 (particularly its paragraph 7), adopted by the Executive Board at its 82nd, 83rd, 84th, 88th, 89th, 90th and 92nd sessions respectively, regarding the preservation of religious and cultural properties, particularly in the City of Jerusalem,

3. *Noting* that, since the 88th session, the Executive Board has decided that Unesco should be present in the City of Jerusalem in an attempt to ensure the effective implementation of the resolutions and decisions adopted by the General Conference and the Executive Board in this connexion,

4. *Taking note* of documents 93 EX/17 and 93 EX/17 Add. 1 Rev.,

5. *Decides* to re-examine at its 94th session this question in its substance and consequently invites the Director-General to present to the Executive Board at that session a comprehensive report on the implementation of this and the aforementioned resolutions and decisions.

WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION

43

World Health Assembly Resolution WHA 26.56 on health assistance to refugees and displaced persons in the Middle East¹⁷⁷

May 23, 1973

The Twenty-sixth World Health Assembly,

A

Mindful of the principle that the health of all peoples is fundamental to the attainment of peace

and security,

Considering that the non-return of the Palestinian refugees and displaced persons to their homes is gravely affecting their physical and mental health,

Having considered document A26/WP/5,

1. *Reaffirms* that the protection of the life and physical and mental health of the refugees and displaced persons necessitates that they immediately be afforded their right to return to their homes, in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations;

2. *Calls upon* Israel to refrain from such practices as the destruction of the refugee shelters and the dispersal of the refugees;

3. *Requests* the Director-General to intensify and expand to the largest extent possible the Organization's programme of health assistance to the refugees and displaced persons in the Middle East.

B

Conscious of its responsibilities to ensure adequate health conditions for all peoples particularly those who suffer from exceptional circumstances such as military occupation,

Having examined document A26/21,

Considering that the need for gathering and verifying facts on health conditions of the inhabitants of the occupied territories requires a comprehensive field investigation and contact with all parties directly concerned,

Bearing in mind the principles enshrined in the Constitution of the World Health Organization,

1. *Decides* to establish a special committee of experts appointed by three member States chosen by the fifty-second session of the Executive Board in consultation with the Director-General to study the health conditions of the inhabitants of the occupied territories in the Middle East, in all its aspects and to submit a comprehensive report on its findings to the Twenty-seventh World Health Assembly;

2. *Requests* the Special Committee to contact all Governments and institutions concerned, and obtain from them all necessary and relevant information on the situation;

¹⁷⁷ Annex II, *Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East*,

1 July 1972—30 June 1973, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 13* (U.N. doc. A/9013), pp. 104—105. Adopted at the 16th plenary meeting by 59 votes to 3, with 45 abstentions.

3. *Requests* the Governments concerned to co-operate with the Special Committee and particularly to facilitate its free movement in the occupied territories;

4. *Requests* the Director-General to provide the Special Committee with all facilities necessary for the performance of its mission.

44

World Health Organization Executive Board Resolution EB52.R21 on the selection of the special experts committee referred to in World Health Assembly Resolution WHA 26.56¹⁷⁸

May 29, 1973

The Executive Board,

Considering resolution WHA26.56 on health assistance to refugees and displaced persons in the Middle East,

1. *Decides* to refer to an *ad hoc* committee composed of Dr Esther Ammundsen, Dr A. Sauter and Professor J. Tigyi the selection of the three Member States to appoint members to serve on the special committee of experts in accordance with operative paragraph 1 of part B of resolution WHA26.56;

2. *Recalls* its discussions on the subject of the criteria for the selection of the three Member States as well as of the composition of the special committee of experts, with particular reference to the fields of specialization of the experts to be appointed;

3. *Asks* the *ad hoc* committee to begin by contacting those Members mentioned in the Executive Board's discussion and to complete the membership of the special committee of experts as soon as possible, and preferably before 15 July 1973; and

4. *Requests* the *ad hoc* committee to report on the action taken to the Executive Board at its fifty-third session.

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

45

International Civil Aviation Organization Assembly Resolution A19-1 condemning the shooting down by Israel of a Libyan civil airliner¹⁷⁹

February 28, 1973

The Assembly,

Having considered the item concerning the Libyan civil aircraft shot down on 21 February 1973 by Israeli fighters over the occupied Egyptian territory of Sinai,

Condemning the Israeli action which resulted in the loss of 106 innocent lives,

Convinced that this action affects and jeopardizes the safety of international civil aviation and therefore emphasizing the urgency of undertaking an immediate investigation of the said action,

1. *Directs* the Council to instruct the Secretary-General to institute an investigation in order to undertake fact findings and to report to the Council at the earliest date;

2. *Calls upon* all parties involved to co-operate fully in the investigation.

46

International Civil Aviation Organization Assembly Resolution A20-1 condemning Israel's hijacking of a Lebanese civil airliner¹⁸⁰

August 30, 1973

The Assembly,

Having considered the item concerning the forcible diversion and seizure by Israeli military aircraft on 10 August 1973 of a Lebanese civil aircraft chartered by Iraqi Airways,

Considering that Israel, by this action, violated Lebanese air space, jeopardized air traffic at Beirut civil airport and committed a serious act

¹⁷⁹ Text in ICAO Official Records, *Assembly-Nineteenth Session (Extraordinary)*, Resolutions and Minutes (ICAO doc. 9061), p. 11;

¹⁸⁰ Text as transmitted to the U.N. Secretary-General in a letter from the Permanent UN Representative of Lebanon, UN doc. S/11002 (A/9161) dated September 24, 1973; text in *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-eighth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1973*, pp. 37-38. The resolution was adopted by 87 votes to 1, with 4 abstentions.

¹⁷⁸ *Official Records of the World Health Organization, No. 211, Executive Board, Fifty-second Session, Decisions, Annexes*, p. 10.

of unlawful interference with international civil aviation,

Noting that the United Nations Security Council, by its resolution 337 (1973) adopted on 15 August 1973, has condemned Israel for violating Lebanon's sovereignty and for the forcible diversion and seizure of a Lebanese civil aircraft and has called on ICAO to take due account of the above-mentioned resolution when considering adequate measures to safeguard international civil aviation,

Noting that the ICAO Council, on 20 August 1973, condemned Israel for its action,

Recalling that the United Nations Security Council in its resolution 262 (1968) condemned Israel for its premeditated action against Beirut civil airport which resulted in the destruction of 13 commercial and civil aircraft, and recalling that the Assembly of ICAO in its resolution A19-1 condemned the Israeli action which resulted in the loss of 108 innocent lives and that the Council, by its resolution of 4 June 1973, strongly condemned the Israeli action and urged Israel to comply with the aims and objectives of the Chicago Convention,

1. *Strongly condemns* Israel for violating Lebanon's sovereignty and for the forcible diversion and seizure of a Lebanese civil aircraft and for violating the Chicago Convention;

2. *Urgently calls upon* Israel to desist from committing acts of unlawful interference with international civil air transport and airports and other facilities serving such transport;

3. *Solemnly warns* Israel that if it continues committing such acts, the Assembly will take further measures against Israel to protect international civil aviation.

47

International Civil Aviation Organization Council resolution condemning the shooting down by Israel of a Libyan civil airliner¹⁸¹

June 4, 1973

The Council,

Recalling that the United Nations Security Council in its Resolution 262 in 1968 condemned Israel for its premeditated action against Beirut

Civil Airport which resulted in the destruction of thirteen commercial and civil aircraft, and recalling that the Assembly of ICAO in its Resolution A19-1 condemned the Israeli action which resulted in the loss of 108 innocent lives and directed the Council to instruct the Secretary General to institute an investigation and report to the Council;

Convinced that such actions constitute a serious danger against the safety of international civil aviation;

Recognizing that such attitude is a flagrant violation of the principles enshrined in the Chicago Convention;

Having considered the report of the investigation team established by the Secretary General in accordance with the Resolution A19-1, and finding from it no justification for the shooting down of the Libyan civil aircraft;

1) *Strongly condemns* the Israeli action which resulted in the destruction of the Libyan civil aircraft and the loss of 108 innocent lives;

2) *Urges* Israel to comply with the aims and objectives of the Chicago Convention.

48

International Civil Aviation Organization Council resolution condemning Israel's hijacking of a Lebanese civil airliner¹⁸²

August 20, 1973

The Council,

Recalling that the United Nations Security Council in its resolution 262 (1968) condemned Israel for its premeditated action against Beirut civil airport which resulted in the destruction of 13 commercial and civil aircraft, and recalling that the Assembly of ICAO in its resolution A19-1 condemned the Israeli action which resulted in the loss of 108 innocent lives and that the Council, by its resolution of 4 June 1973, strongly condemned the Israeli action and urged Israel to comply with the aims and objectives of the Chicago Convention,

¹⁸¹ Text in ICAO, *Action of the Council, Seventy-ninth Session, Montreal, 29 May-27 June, 1973* (ICAO doc. 9097-C/1016), p. 33.

¹⁸² Included as Annex II to a note by the U.N. Secretary-General, U.N. doc. S/10990 of September 4, 1973; text in *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-eighth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1973*, pp. 27-28. The resolution was adopted by 28 votes to none, 2 members being absent.

Recognizing that Israel, by its action of 10 August 1973, has violated Lebanese air space, jeopardized air traffic at Beirut civil airport and captured a Lebanese civil aircraft,

Convinced that these actions seriously jeopardize the safety of international civil aviation,

Recognizing that these actions of Israel constitute a violation of the principles enshrined in the Chicago Convention and ignore the above-mentioned resolutions,

Considering that the United Nations Security Council, by its resolution 337 (1973) adopted on 15 August 1973, has condemned Israel for violating Lebanon's sovereignty and for the forcible diversion and seizure of a Lebanese civil aircraft and has called on ICAO to take due account of the above-mentioned resolution when considering adequate measures to safeguard international civil aviation.

Considering that the subject of the unlawful seizure of civil aircraft and of acts of unlawful interference with international civil aviation will be considered at the twentieth session (extraordinary) of the Assembly of ICAO and the Diplomatic Conference that will be held in Rome commencing on 28 August 1973,

1. *Condemns* Israel for violating Lebanon's sovereignty and for the diversion and seizure of a Lebanese civil aircraft;

2. *Considers* that these actions by Israel constitute a violation of the Chicago Convention;

3. *Recommends* that the Assembly at its twentieth session (extraordinary) include in its agenda consideration of these actions in violation of the Chicago Convention and take measures to safeguard international civil aviation;

4. *Recommends* that the Diplomatic Conference make provision in the conventions for acts of unlawful interference committed by States.

International

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Yugoslavia of President Sadat of Egypt (excerpts)¹

Brioni, January 12, 1973

At the invitation of President of the SFRY Josip Broz Tito, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, Anwar el Sadat, paid an official visit to Yugoslavia on January 11th and 12th, 1973.

In the course of their talks held on Brioni, the two presidents exchanged views on the international situation, with special reference to the situation in the Middle East. In the talks attention was also given to matters of bilateral cooperation, which both countries are equally interested in promoting.

During their talks the two presidents reviewed the latest developments in the Middle East situation, particularly in the light of Israeli defiance of all efforts to find a just settlement of the Middle East problem. They expressed grave concern over further aggressive actions undertaken by Israel against Syria and Lebanon and against the Palestinian people. They stated in particular that the Israeli policy posed a dangerous threat to the independence of the peoples of the Middle East and the Mediterranean area and to stability and international peace. The bombing of Syria and Lebanon,² which is taking place at the same time as the bombing of Vietnam, is the same method of pressure by brutal military force in order to impose terms which any sovereign country must adamantly reject.

The two presidents address an appeal to all countries, and especially to those in the immediate Mediterranean area, not to remain indifferent to the Israeli provocation, which endangers not only the countries of the Middle East and the Mediterranean but also peace in the entire world.

The two presidents again stressed that achievement of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East required full implementation of Security Council

Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 and resolutions of the General Assembly and other international organizations on this matter, which call for withdrawal of Israeli forces from all occupied Arab territories.

The two presidents welcomed the great support given by the most recent General Assembly resolutions on the Middle East, emphasizing the need for the international community to undertake the obligations arising from these resolutions.

They reaffirmed their support for the just struggle of the Palestinian people to regain their usurped rights in accordance with the UN resolutions. Any settlement of the Palestinian problem must be based on the will and rights of the Palestinian people.

President Tito stated that Yugoslavia would continue in accordance with its abilities to help the efforts of the Arab countries, the United Nations, the nonaligned countries and other countries to find a just political settlement of the Middle East problem.

President Anwar el Sadat acknowledged the support which Yugoslavia and its president personally are giving to the Arab people in removing the consequences of Israeli aggression.

The two presidents were pleased to note the high degree of activity and cooperation of the nonaligned countries, particularly at the UN General Assembly, where important results were achieved in implementation of the decisions of the Lusaka summit conference and the Georgetown ministerial meeting of nonaligned countries.³ This activity gave further affirmation to the policy of nonalignment as an important factor in the United Nations and in the world.

They noted the close connection between problems of European security and security of the Mediterranean and the Middle East crisis. In this connection, the two presidents expressed the hope that the conference on European cooperation and security would keep this fact in view and that its results would be a positive contribution

¹ Excerpted from the English text, *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXIV, 548 (February 5, 1973), pp. 15, 16.

² The Arabic text as published in *al-Ahram* (Cairo), January 13, 1973, does not mention Lebanon.

³ The decisions of these two conference are printed as docs. 217 and 218 in *International Documents on Palestine 1970* and docs. 118-120 in *International Documents on Palestine 1972*.

to true security in the Mediterranean and a just solution of the Middle East crisis.

50

Press interview statements by Prime Minister Chou En-lai of China discussing the Arab-Israeli conflict and suggesting ways of combatting Zionism and Israel⁴

Peking, January 14, 1973

Haykal: May I concentrate on the Middle East crisis?

Chou: There is now an agreement about the Vietnam problem, and you will recall that the war there lasted a long time. I wrote to President Gamal Abdel Nasser on this subject many times, telling him: "Your only hope is to rely on yourselves... and on your friends to help you."

Unfortunately we are far away from you.

There is a Chinese proverb that says: "The water that comes from far off cannot help to put out the fire that is near you."

The USSR, which is near to you, should have given you what you needed.

We do not sell arms but we give such as we have to our friends who are fighting. This is what we did with those who were fighting in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

We have not done what Shylock did in Shakespeare's play "The Merchant of Venice," who demands the payment of his debt in the living flesh of his debtor.

That was possible in the sixteenth century, but now we are at the end of the twentieth century.

We cannot imagine that the country in which Lenin was born sells arms to those who are fighting for their freedom.

In any case, we know what you have had to put up with from the Russians, because we had the same problem with them from 1953 to 1963, but I am not going to talk about the past.

Let us talk about your circumstances.

I have visited Egypt and I know its character.

The character and circumstances of Egypt make people's war a problem, but you should remember that war in any form is not an easy matter.

Vietnam has not had an easy problem to face.

They could make use of the mountains, forests and rivers but we know that during the second World War the Germans dropped eighty thousand tons of bombs on Britain, and that in ten years the Americans have dropped four million tons of bombs—five thousand times more than were dropped on Britain during her war against the Germans.

At the end of December, in ten days only, the Americans concentrated their strikes on North Vietnam and dropped on it forty thousand tons of bombs. That is to say, in ten days only the Vietnamese received half what the British received during the whole of the second World War—four years.

How can any country find its way to fight?

Circumstances are different in every country, but in all countries we must rely on the people to find the means to fight.

We have not fought alongside the Vietnamese but we have given them arms.

I said to American President Nixon when he came here: "If you continue the war against Vietnam we have an obligation to continue providing them with arms."

It was out of the question that we should ask the Vietnamese to pay for the arms we sent them. We gave them what we had without asking for payment and sincerely apologized to them because what we sent them was not commensurate with their heroic effort. Also, so great were their sacrifices that we could not keep up with their requirements in arms.

I said to President Richard Nixon: "It is impossible that there should be understanding between us except on the basis of a settlement of the Vietnam problem."

And today I ask you: What has the USSR done for you?

America is far away but it gives everything to Israel.

The USSR is near but it does not give you enough and trades in arms.

How many Jews were there in Palestine before the Balfour Declaration?

⁴ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the interview conducted by editor Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), February 23, 1973, pp. 3-5.

Haykal: Only seventy thousand.

Chou: And now there are three million in Israel.

I have nothing against the Jews as Jews but we are against Zionism. Marx was of Jewish origin and Einstein was a Jew. Kissinger is a Jew too.

But many Jews are among the more pernicious capitalists, and they are extremely dangerous.

Israel is a state that was not made by natural laws but by the folly of mankind.

The British made it by the Balfour Declaration, then the United States and France helped it, and the USSR was not far off. The USSR could have prevented the partition resolutions and prevented Israel entering the United Nations. The United Nations has not done much good, and the establishment of Israel was the worst thing it has done.

.

I must admit to you that we have not shown as much interest as we should in the Middle East crisis, but I imagine that when the Vietnam problem is solved interest will turn to the Middle East and the Mediterranean.

We support your attitude, but unfortunately our support is not as effective as it should be.

I have read the expression "No peace and no war" you have used in your articles, and since then we have used that expression even at the United Nations.

You are in a difficult position between the USSR and the United States, and this is what creates the state of "No peace and no war," as you have written. Our view is that the situation will continue if there is no appropriate formula for confronting the crisis. . . . You must study, and study in depth.

We believe that oil will be an important question in the coming years, and play a great part, and that the struggle will revolve around it.

It is a good thing for the Arabs that they have oil, but it is also regrettable.

It is a good thing because it is a power with which you can build your nation, and a regrettable one because the struggle over it is violent.

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I want to ask you what you think should be done to solve the Middle East crisis?

Haykal: Your Excellency, I have in fact constantly expressed my view, and I am still doing so, in spite of the many problems to which I have been exposed.

From the start I have thought that the only solution the laws of the world and the era can provide for us or for any other conflict, is a political solution, one element of which is the use of force.

This is different from a diplomatic solution which begins and ends in diplomatic circles only. It is also different from a military solution which begins and ends on the field of battle only.

In my view a political solution must be based on several points:

—A sound home front, strong in self-confidence and faith in its goal.

—The greatest possible mobilization of all available resources for Arab action.

—Openness to the world, allowing flexible and enlightened movement enabling us to be of benefit or to harm, to help or prevent (activity).

—Preparedness with armed force, which must be fully mobilized and used when necessary. From the first day I have said that the Israeli enemy will never move from the positions they occupied in our territory unless we evict them by force, or unless they are convinced that we have the strength—and the ability to use it—to make this possible.

Others have disagreed with me, and perhaps they were more extremist. But it has been my view that this is an age of reason and long-term planning, and I have always feared that the most extremist views may be a cover for the most surrenderist attitudes.

Chou: I understand what you say, but I want to lay special stress on the first point you raised—the sound and coherent internal front. This is the point of concentration in every struggle and the foundation of all success.

There is another thing connected with this—the spirit of the civilian population if fighting breaks out.

The morale of the civilian population is important, and I believe that our experience shows that it depends on two things:

a) Digging trenches, so that the masses may feel that they have secure shelters from danger.

b) The storage of foodstuffs, especially cereals. This was the strategy of Chairman Mao.

It is the safety and coherence of your home front that will make it possible for you to mobilize Arab efforts.

Then there is another question—the unification of the Palestinians.

We know that it is easy to talk about these problems from a distance, but it is you who are

actually experiencing them, and it is our belief that you are at a historical moment when you are facing the problem of the "courage of self-reliance."

There are many positive factors in your favour.

There are your own intrinsic national and Arab forces.

There is the international situation, which is fraught with problems and contradictions. You must exploit these contradictions to solve your problems.

The Chinese Foreign Minister is going on an extensive tour in March, during which he will visit Egypt,⁵ and it will be important that we should hear your views and that you should hear ours.

We seem to be returning to the era of relying on Foreign Ministers and their role will be increasingly important in the coming period. At one time this role was almost abolished by the frequency of meetings at summit level.

I also understand that you are going to send us a government delegation.

Haykal: I have also heard of that and believe that it will happen.

Chou: I hope that the situation on the international stage will have become clearer by the time this delegation arrives.

In this connection: When are you going to visit China again? You have visited the USSR fifteen times, and we have held this against you, but this is the first time you have visited China. Why are all your trips in one direction?

Haykal: It was not deliberate, but by force of circumstances. In the case of a journalist, the winds always carry him to where things are happening.

Chou: There are east winds too.

Press interview statements by President Mobutu of Zaire outlining his attitude concerning relations with Israel⁶

Peking, mid-January, 1973

Q. Africa is extremely important to us.

Arab North Africa is an integral part of Sub-Saharan Africa, as it is called. In our view freedom cannot be divided by imaginary lines, and prosperity cannot be divided between the brown and the black.

Then, as far as we are concerned, there is a security problem. Israel regards Africa as a lung through which to breathe despite the Arab blockade. Israel has found open doors in Africa and we regard this as a danger to our security, because Israel, in our view, is an extension of racism and colonialism.

May I ask you a direct question? Why do you retain military advisers from Israel in the Congo?

No one would disagree that in present circumstances you are the most powerful politician in Central Africa. That is why your attitude concerns us.

A. You used to boycott me and support Gizinga, as Lumumba's successor. What could I do? At that time I was the commander of the army and we needed training. Israel gave us the opportunity, so we went. I went with the nucleus of the parachute brigade. We were trained there and came back here with some advisers. Some of my colleagues came back very enthusiastic for Israel. The Israeli advisers lived among us.

The question we have to ask is: After that could we stand by our brothers in Africa or could we not?

In all African conferences we have stood by you as Africans.

I was a member of the mission of African Heads of State to study the Middle East problem, and I went to Egypt and then to Israel.

While the voting was going on at the United Nations on its latest resolution on the Middle East my Foreign Minister contacted me and said to me:

"In the Foreign Ministry we have now received two letters for you, a letter from Sadat and one from Golda Meir, each of them asking for our vote."

⁵ This planned visit did not take place, but Egypt's Foreign Minister Zayyat visited China, March 12-16, 1973 (*Le Monde* (Paris), March 17, 1973, p. 5).

⁶ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the interview conducted by editor Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), March 9, 1973, p. 4.

I said to my Foreign Minister: "Our line will be the African line." And we voted for you.

In all circumstances we shall take the African line, and be loyal to our African origins.

All the same I want to ask you about something: I do not know President Qadhafi, but you do. He pursues an energetic policy in Africa, but we disagree with him. Why does he pay certain African countries to sever their relations with Israel?

Q. I do not think that he has paid anyone to sever relations with Israel. There are African countries that have discovered Israel's true role. Uganda has done so, and so has Chad, and so have Niger and Mali, and Congo Brazzaville.⁷

These countries have, of their own free will and from their own experience, discovered that Israel is not serving Africa by all she is doing, but serving colonialism.

This is one question.

As for Qadhafi offering Arab aid to some of these countries, that is another question.

Do you object if an Arab country is in a position to offer aid to an African country? And why should we link the severing of relations with aid?

It is Israel that is trying to hint at this so as to impede the African current, which has started to discover the truth about her, from continuing to follow its impetuous course.

A. Tumbalbay, the President of Chad, told me "Qadhafi wants to see you." I wanted to go to Libya, but I do not want my people to say that I am going there to get aid.

We do not want aid. We are rich and we have our principles.

Q. I know that you give aid to certain African countries, and I want to ask you whether you give such aid to anyone so that he may sever relations with Israel. You have never asked that, so why should you imagine that Qadhafi does?

A. We in Zaire shall determine our attitude to Israel's continued occupation of African territories in the light of our African policy and from loyalty to our African origins.

You will see this, you will see it at the African summit conference that is to be held in Addis Ababa in May.

Communiqué issued after a visit by Israel Prime Minister Meir to Pope Paul VI⁸

Vatican City, January 15, 1973

This morning, January 15, 1973, at 12.15, His Holiness Pope Paul VI received in audience H.E. Mrs. Golda Meir, Prime Minister of Israel, who was accompanied by the Israel Ambassador to Italy H.E. Mr. Amiel E. Najjar. The conversation, which lasted about one hour, concerned the situation in the Middle East and the special problems affecting the Holy Land.

His Holiness, after recalling the history and sufferings of the Jewish people, explained the Holy See's point of view on questions which mainly concern its humanitarian mission, such as the refugee problem and the situation of the various communities living in the Holy Land, and on those questions belonging more especially to its religious mission, concerning the Holy Places and the sacred and universal character of the city of Jerusalem.

The Prime Minister stressed Israel's wish for peace and amply illustrated the Israeli position both on the possibilities for reaching a peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict by means of negotiations between the parties and on the above-mentioned questions. She also touched on the phenomenon of terrorism and the special situations of Jewish communities in certain parts of the world.

Finally, His Holiness, expressing his fervent prayers that justice and right may prevail to bring about peace and coexistence for all the peoples of the Middle East, again put forward the Holy See's proposal to do all in its power to achieve this aim.

⁷ These countries broke diplomatic relations with Israel as follows: Uganda on March 30, 1972; Chad on November 28, 1972; Congo on December 31, 1972; Niger on January 4, 1973; Mali on January 5, 1973 (*Keessing's Contemporary Archives* (Bristol), pp. 25236, 25601, 25715).

⁸ Translated from the Italian text as published in *Relazioni Internazionali* (Milan), XXXVII, 3 (January 20, 1973), p. 79.

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Statement by US Secretary of State Rogers emphasizing the importance of negotiations in the search for a Middle East settlement⁹

New York, January 17, 1973

The United States has in the last four years devoted serious and painstaking efforts toward this [Middle East peace] objective, one that has eluded the world for a quarter century. The 1970 cease-fire along the Suez Canal—the result of a U.S. initiative and in whose achievement Ambassador Rabin played an important role—was a signal advance. Fighting along the canal has been stopped for almost 2½ years, an accomplishment that continues to benefit all the parties.

But negotiations are not yet underway. We believe progress toward a solution can only be made through a genuine, meaningful negotiating process, direct or indirect. A decision to enter negotiations does not require changes in objectives or policies. Negotiations only require a willingness to look for solutions and to seriously and thoughtfully consider possibilities of mutual accommodation. Negotiations can bring about the mutual clarifications of concepts and the determinations of ultimate national interests from which a permanent peace can emerge.

When President Nixon expressed the hope four years ago that the world was moving from an era of confrontation to one of negotiation he was not speaking exclusively of relations among super-powers. He was speaking about the process and about the hope such a process provides for settling disputes among all nations. Thus, not only have there been serious and wide-ranging negotiations between ourselves, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China, but antagonists elsewhere across the globe are also involved in negotiation: East Germans with West Germans, Pakistanis with Indians, North Koreans with South Koreans. I think it is clear that the policies of the President have contributed to these gratifying developments and to the improvement of the climate for peace in all parts of the world.

The Middle East remains an exception to the effort to reconcile differences through an active dialogue. However, relaxation of tensions between the major powers, improved conditions in other countries of the area, and the maintenance of the military balance combine to make 1973 a favorable time for negotiations. We are convinced that both sides, Arabs and Israelis, want a settlement based on the U.N. Security Council resolution of November 1967. Thus, in our judgement the doors of diplomacy remain open.

The most realistic approach, we continue to believe, would be to begin with negotiations on an interim Suez Canal agreement. Such a development would:

- Separate the military forces of the two sides;
- Reinforce the cease-fire;
- Result in partial Israeli withdrawal; and
- Open the Suez Canal to international commerce.

Its conclusion and observance would build confidence and provide momentum toward a permanent settlement. Its achievement would be not an end of the process, but a first decisive step facilitating negotiations to carry out Security Council resolution 242 in its entirety.

President Nixon has publicly stated that we will be giving a very high priority to the Middle East. We will be active in ascertaining if and how we can help the parties initiate a genuine negotiating process.

The bonds between the United States and Israel are excellent. Our relationship with many of the Arab states is also excellent, and we have interests in and ties to the entire region. We earnestly hope that those ties will improve and expand.

No area of the world could benefit more from peace and from the healing that would follow than could the Middle East. In an area that is heir to a bitter history, it is understandable that leaders feel an obligation to previous generations, an obligation to seek to correct inequities of the past as they see them. But surely the obligation to future generations is even greater. What is of central importance is to keep the future in mind and to create conditions under which the peoples of the entire region can live at peace with each other. Certainly resumption of warfare would not advance this purpose. Generations to come in the Middle East will judge our era by what it hands on. It must hand on the achievement of peace, a peace

⁹ Excerpted from the text of an address given during a dinner in honour of Israel Ambassador to the US Rabin sponsored by the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXVIII, 1754 (February 5, 1973), pp. 130–131.

that will take into account the interests of Israel, of the Arab states, and of the Palestinians as well.

Ambassador Rabin, as one of the few men in Israel—or elsewhere, for that matter—who have attained the pinnacle in both war and diplomacy, your views carry great weight in both. As one who understands this country and knows American policies and aspirations at first hand, I know that you carry with you the same sense of purpose we feel: that every opportunity to overcome the diplomatic impasse must be seized upon in 1973 in a spirit of equity and with forward-looking determination to make concrete progress toward permanent peace in the Middle East.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the USSR of Foreign Minister Benhima of Morocco (excerpts)¹⁰

Moscow, January 25, 1973

Ahmed Taibi Benhima, Foreign Minister of the Kingdom of Morocco, was on an official visit to the USSR, over January 22–25, as a guest of the Soviet Government.

Special attention was paid to consideration of the Middle East situation. Once again the Sides strongly condemned Israel's aggressive expansionist policy, emphasizing that the continuing Israeli occupation of Arab territories is a serious threat to peace and international security and a gross violation of the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, as well as other UN decisions as regards Israeli troop withdrawal from the Arab lands captured in 1967. The Soviet Union and Morocco demand an Israeli troop withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories and reaffirm their support for the Arab population of Palestine battling for the restoration of their legitimate rights. They deprecate the Israeli policy of violence in the seized Arab lands and of alteration of their Arab makeup.

Both Sides maintain that all countries and peace forces exert pressure on Israel to fulfil the November 22, 1967 Security Council Resolution.

The Sides expressed the conviction that settlement of the Middle East crisis would help promote

peace throughout the Mediterranean and make the Mediterranean Sea a region of friendly cooperation.

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Resolution of the National Executive Committee of the Zionist Organization of America calling for US independence from foreign energy supplies¹¹

Washington, January 28, 1973

Noting that interested parties are exploiting the impending energy crisis in this country to campaign for a change of American policy in the Middle East and to reorient it toward a submission to the Arab states in their own war against Israel; and deeming this a grave disservice to the national interests of the United States and as subverting our vital foreign policy interests in that area to the particular interests of foreign states, many of whom are aligned with powers who seek to weaken America's world position to the detriment of our economy, our defense posture, and our role in the world,

Now, therefore we urge the President and the Congress to initiate a program that would search for new energy sources enabling us to free our country from foreign dependence on supply of our energy needs.

This should entail not only the search and tapping of new natural sources for energy but also a greater emphasis on the development and use of atomic energy, bearing in mind the need for environmental and security safeguards.

¹⁰ Excerpted from the English text, *Moscow News*, supplement to no. 5 (February 3, 1973), p. 11.

¹¹ As published in *The New York Times*, April 13, 1973, p. 14.

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Press interview statements by President Tito of Yugoslavia discussing the problems and prospects of Middle East negotiations after the Vietnam cease-fire agreement¹²

Brioni, February 5, 1973

Q. There are many indications that now, after the peace agreement has been signed in Vietnam, another dangerous hotbed of war might come into the foreground—the Middle East. What do you think of the situation in that area and what do you see as a wayout of the stalemate of “no war, no peace”, which has now lasted six years?

A. From the very beginning of aggression, we have constantly been present there. I had many meetings with Nasser. Later I had several talks with President Sadat. We had very good relations with Egypt even before aggression. We have regularly had consultations and frequent exchanges of views. Together with Comrade Kardelj and others we visited the area soon after the aggression. We visited and had talks in Cairo, Damascus and Baghdad.¹³ We wanted to see what could be done. They received material assistance from the Soviet Union and some other socialist countries, and we also made our contribution, within the confines of our possibilities; we also strove to give them political assistance, to talk them into accepting the solution which was eventually accepted, and this was not easy. We kept emphasizing that it was erroneous to think that the Israelis could be “thrown into the sea”. Even if they had the means and were militarily superior, they could not do it. Israel is recognized by many countries and is a member of the United Nations.

Only a small number of people still think that Israel will be liquidated. This is absolutely impossible. It is necessary to find a peaceful solution. We have told the leaders of the Arab countries that they must organize their defence, strengthen their army, rearm it, and heal their internal wounds, but that they should seek a peaceful solution through negotiation.

Needless to say, from the very beginning we have held the view that Israeli aggression must not be paid for with Arab territories. After the experience of the Second World War, which brought mankind so much evil, can a country guilty of aggression be permitted to be rewarded for it? This would be a precedent that would have no end. It would lead to constant outbreaks of local wars. Every one could say: well, Israel was allowed to gain advantages, why should not I be allowed to? In other words, even as a precedent this would be a dangerous thing. Moreover, it would also be a great injustice to the Arab countries. Therefore, no country should do anything to help Israel reap a reward. But the reason why Israel is so aggressive in its policy should primarily be ascribed to the fact that it enjoys enormous financial support and assistance in arms, not only from the Jewish community in the world, but also from the American government.

Our attitude towards the situation in the Middle East has not changed. We have never wavered on that point; we have always advised that a peaceful solution to the problems should be sought.

I think it was two years ago that President Sadat drew up a plan, a proposal for the opening of the Suez Canal.¹⁴ Many European countries, including Yugoslavia, have suffered great damage because of the closure of this canal. Ships must sail round the Cape of Good Hope to the Indian Ocean and the Far East, and this is very expensive. Consequently, President Sadat was ready to do it, on condition that Israel withdraw its troops from the canal a score of kilometres, but under firm guarantees that once the Suez Canal was opened Israel would withdraw within its frontiers of June 5, 1967, whereafter the final settlement of the conflict would be discussed.

Q. Then the opening of the Suez Canal would be only the first stage...

A. Yes, the first stage, and that after that modalities for the restoration of peace would be discussed.

During a recent visit President Sadat paid me, I found that his stand on this point was still the same, even though there had been various rumours that he had allegedly started negotiations with one

¹² Interview conducted by Dara Janečević of *Vjesnik* (Belgrade); excerpted from the English text as published in *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXIV, 550 (March 5, 1973), pp. 12–13.

¹³ See docs. 156, 159–161 in *International Documents on Palestine 1967*.

¹⁴ This was made public in a speech by President Sadat on February 4, 1971; see doc. 274 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

side, the USA, and that he was already willing to make some concessions, etc. As far as I could gather from our talks, I think that this is not so. Sadat is not willing to make any concessions, because he could not do so even if he wanted to, his people would not accept it. It is necessary to seek a solution involving the engagement of the United Nations or the four great powers, so that certain areas which both sides consider to be important for defence could be placed under the control of the United Nations or the four great powers. President Sadat agrees that the United Nations should again send its troops to the frontier, but on both sides of it. Sharm el-Sheikh and Gaza are particularly sensitive areas.

Q. And the Golan Heights?

A. This is something else. That is Syrian territory. The side which holds these heights dominates a good part of the territory of the other country, be it Israel or Syria. Therefore it would be necessary to find a solution to this problem. I do not know whether or not Syria is ready for such a solution.

Consequently, we have a stalemate here. But this situation, in fact this stagnation, which has lasted too long, could have undesired consequences. Because of this, after my recent talks with President Sadat I sent messages to the heads of a number of states concerning my talks with President Sadat, pointing to the ominous danger which could one day reach the boiling point and explode. This cannot go on any longer. I mentioned this to some people from the USA who visited me. I said that the young generation in Egypt was impatient, especially in the army. The student demonstrations in Cairo also show that the people are impatient and that everything should be done to induce or compel Israel to settle these questions, without reward, without payment in other people's territories.

Israel has already achieved much. It has succeeded in persuading the Arabs that the existence of Israel is a fact which cannot be changed, that it is necessary to create such relations between the Arab countries and Israel as would be useful to both sides. Israel is a very developed country, it has advanced industries and a high level of technology. If it had good relations with the Arab countries, it could exist extremely well, instead of coveting arid territories in the desert. Why

does it need Sharm el-Sheikh if the United Nations or the great power guarantee it free passage through the Gulf of Aqaba? What does it need Sharm el-Sheikh for, if Egypt allows its ships to use the Suez Canal? This is an aspiration, with imperialistic overtones, for Israel to control the entry to the Suez Canal from the Red Sea. Consequently, Israel is not right on this point and should be forced to forgo such demands.

There is also the question of Gaza, then the Palestinian problem, etc. President Sadat considers that the Palestinian problem must be solved in the context of the overall settlement of the Middle East crisis. Gaza, too, is absolutely an Arab territory, because over 300 thousand Arabs live there. The Israelis have only now started to settle it. They think that if they found kibbutzim there, the territory will be theirs.

Q. The Israelis have already begun to exploit Sinai. . .

A. They are extracting oil, 6–7 million tons of it. These oilwells were discovered and opened by the Egyptians.

Consequently, the situation in the Middle East is explosive and everything must be done to stop this danger. We will discuss these matters and take certain steps at the conference of the heads of state and governments of non-aligned countries. The non-aligned should become even more engaged on this issue; they should give more help to the Arab countries, so that the problem can be solved quickly in some way. But that is still far away; the conference of the non-aligned will take place in September.

Q. Views have been expressed that the Arab countries should call for a special meeting of all non-aligned countries to consider the Middle East problem, that is, the situation in that area. What do you think about this?

A. I have also heard that. There are such views, but I am not much in favour of them. It seems to me that this would be a little too hasty. Steps have now been taken to settle the Vietnamese problem. The USA will now be freer and we should see what steps it is going to take in the Middle East. But this is, of course, not only a matter of the USA, it also concerns other great powers—the Soviet Union, which will probably not keep aloof. That would not be right, because the Soviet Union has given considerable assistance to the Arab countries, especially to Egypt—the

Assuan dam, various factories, steelworks, etc. The material interests of the Soviet Union involved there are greater than American. In other words, the Soviet Union must also take part. But the voice of others, especially of the Mediterranean countries, must also be heard.

Q. May we revert to the problem of the Palestinians. Their situation is very difficult, indeed tragic. I talked again with Yasser Arafat, when he visited Yugoslavia last year. I asked him whether the Palestinians were ready to accept a compromise solution. He replied by asking: "But who is offering us one?" What do you think about this problem?

A. There are a few not very clear ideas about the solution of the Palestinian problem. There is, for example, the idea that the Palestinians should be given some area in Gaza, the Negev desert, or on the west bank of the Jordan, in so-called Transjordan, to form an autonomous state. It seems, however, that the Palestinians will not accept this solution. But an acceptable solution must be found. The matter must be discussed with the Palestinians. These people, to whom a great injustice has been done, must be helped. They cannot go on living in those camps. This is a terrible thing.

Because of all this we are extremely worried about the situation in the Middle East. It also worries many other countries. The problem must be tackled as soon as possible. Something must be done. A solution should be imposed upon Israel, if necessary, if it continues to resist. Israel would have to comply if the USA brought pressure to bear upon it, if it told Israel that it would stop supporting it financially, and if its frontiers of June 5, 1967, were guaranteed. I think that this must be done. We shall have to strive to achieve this solution. On the other hand, the Arab countries must give up any idea of being able to liquidate Israel. What will happen in 20–30 years is another matter. We cannot be prophets.

Q. But I have heard what the Israelis say about this and have seen what they have already done. They have founded a score or more kibbutzim on conquered territories and continue to settle them. Who is going to turn them out? In addition, they are militarily very strong and could continue to be unyielding...

A. I do not believe that they will be able to go on resisting interminably, because one day they could pay for it dearly.

Q. And Jerusalem?

A. This problem, too, will be settled in the context of the Middle East situation as a whole.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the USSR of National Security Adviser Ismail of Egypt (excerpts)¹⁵

Moscow, February 10, 1973

In the period February 7–10, 1973, Mr. Muhammad Hafiz Ismail, National Security Adviser to the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, visited the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Soviet Government.

During the conversations, which took place in a friendly atmosphere, there was an exhaustive exchange of views concerning the Middle East situation. The two sides stressed that a tense state of affairs, fraught with many dangers, prevails in the region. The continuing Israeli occupation of Arab lands constitutes a cause of this tension, the more so since Israel obstructs the implementation of the resolutions of the UN Security Council and General Assembly. With the support of the United States of America Israel is carrying out an expansionist, aggressive policy against the Arab states, is securing her occupation of the occupied Arab lands and is openly violating the political and human rights of the Arab Palestinian people.

Inasmuch as the Israeli aggressors are obviously defying world public opinion and are recklessly increasing the gravity of the situation they are thereby exposing the destinies of the peoples in the region to great danger.

The two sides expressed their determination actively to struggle for a just settlement in the Middle East so as to make a firm peace based on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 in all its parts.

They stressed the need for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the territories occupied in 1967 and the assurance of the legitimate rights of

¹⁵ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), February 11, 1973.

the Arab people of Palestine as being two basic conditions for the realization of a just and firm peace in the Middle East.

The Egyptian side declared its determination to reach a total settlement of the Middle East problem, and its refusal to consider any plans for a settlement based on so-called partial solutions.

The Soviet side gave expression to its full understanding of this position and believes that it harmonizes completely with the requirements of justice and the resolutions of the United Nations in letter and spirit and also with the interests of peace in the Middle East.

The two sides place on record the importance of joint action and solidarity on the part of the Arab countries in the struggle against the Israeli imperialist aggression. The Soviet side expressed its support for the struggle.

The Soviet side reiterated that in the face of Israel's stubborn rejection of a just political settlement in the Middle East the Arab states have the right to use any means in the struggle to liberate their lands.

The two sides reviewed the steps necessary to consolidate the struggle for a just settlement of the Middle East dispute. The Soviet side gave assurances of its continued political and economic backing and its support for Egyptian military capabilities in accordance with the terms of the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of May 17, 1971.¹⁶

The two sides pointed out that the complete friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union and Egypt are most important factors in the struggle against imperialist aggression in the Middle East with the aims of peace and security for its peoples.

Referring to the terms of the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation they expressed their deep desire to strengthen and develop Soviet-Egyptian relations.

The two sides pointed to the necessity of decisively blocking any attempt aimed at weakening Soviet-Egyptian friendship and the strong ties connecting Egypt with all the countries of the Socialist bloc.

The two sides stressed the importance of carrying out regular contacts between the leaderships of the Soviet Union and Egypt with the aim of

exchanging views and coordinating the steps and actions relevant to the subjects of concern to the two countries, a practice whose relevance and effectiveness is proven.

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Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the OAU condemning Israel for its expansionist policy and calling for full withdrawal from the occupied territories¹⁷

Addis Ababa, mid-February, 1973

The Council of Ministers

Notes with grave concern that a part of the territory of a member of our Organization, the Arab Republic of Egypt, continues to be occupied illegally and stubbornly by Israel, despite numerous resolutions of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, and the non-aligned countries,

Condemns Israel for its obstinate refusal to withdraw from all occupied Arab territory and for its expansionist policy which led to the uprooting of the Palestinian people from their rightful homes, and pledges its full support to the just cause of the liberation struggle of these people,

Calls for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israel from these territories occupied since 5 June 1967,

Expresses its full support and solidarity with the Arab Republic of Egypt and other Arab countries in their legitimate struggle to recover totally and by all means their territorial integrity,

Declares once again that Security Council resolution 242 (1967) remains a valid basis upon which a fair and just solution to the Middle East situation can be found and reaffirms its support of resolution 2949 (XXVII)¹⁸ adopted by the United Nations General Assembly which reaffirms that the acquisition of territories by force is inadmissible,

Invites all African States to unite their efforts in order to strengthen their solidarity with Egypt.

¹⁷ Presented to the UN by Egypt on February 26 and circulated on March 8 as UN doc. S/10891 (A/9050); text in *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-eighth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1973*, pp. 49–50.

¹⁸ Doc. 10 in *International Documents on Palestine 1972*.

¹⁶ Doc. 125 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

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Address by Israel's Defence Minister Dayan discussing the Zionist attitude to the partition of Palestine¹⁹

Tel Aviv, February 16, 1973

In what I have to say today I want to consider the stand taken by David Ben-Gurion on the Partition Plan put forward by the Peel Commission in 1937. I am doing this, of course, because I believe that it is of significance for us in connection with what has become the central issue of our political existence—the new borders.

At the session of the Labour Party Secretariat on February 1, Mr. Yitzhak Ben-Aharon expounded his stand in the “fundamental debate within Zionism on the relations between us and the Arabs, and on the way to establish the Jewish State in this part of the world.” When he explained his demand for withdrawal,²⁰ it emerged that he has turned from an opponent of the Partition Plan to a supporter—retroactively, after a “time out” of 36 years. Ben-Aharon said emphatically that he, personally, owed a debt of gratitude to Ben-Gurion from those days. “Ben-Gurion understood, decided and led the nation towards realism and political understanding.”

A key phrase in Ben-Aharon's speech was very similar to something Ben-Gurion said in the discussions on Partition. Ben-Aharon said “Hence we never agreed and never could accept that the Land of Israel can be divided into parts of varying degrees of sacredness, or of degrees of importance as instruments in the education of the Jewish people. We did not divide the Land of Israel in the consciousness of our generation, or its wonder and its messianic yearning. Nor did we divide it in the awareness of our real political rights during our successful struggle. Some wondered how we could weave into the Jewish awareness a mixture of values, wondered how we could combine a deep historical and traditional feeling that has always sanctified every foot of earth in the Land of Israel with the realistic political understanding that compelled us to accept the political division of the Land.

In fact, at the 20th Zionist Congress in 1937, during the debate on the Partition proposal,

Ben-Gurion said that concepts were being confused, and that some of our comrades were confusing spiritual concepts with political concepts. He said that the unity of the Land was an established fact in the heart of the Jewish people and in its history. “It was an iron fact that thousands of years of exile and insecurity could not shake or root out: apparently there was no power in the world that could root it out of the Jewish heart. But I fear that here our friends are confusing a spiritual concept with a political one and are confusing an aspiration with a practical fact. When they speak of the Whole Land as though it were a fact, as though it were in objective existence now, then they are disregarding truth. There is no Whole Land at the present time. The Land was one political unit only in the days of our national independence. And even then only during certain periods.”

I think, however, that Ben-Gurion and Ben-Aharon part ways beyond this point, beyond the question of the spiritual and the political concept of the Land.

Ben-Gurion welcomed Partition not because he feared for our demographic position, and not in order to avoid having to rule over Arabs (and the proposed Jewish State had a population of 300,000 Arabs and 400,000 Jews), but in order to be freed of the British Mandate and to have an independent Jewish State in which the way would be open for a great upswing in Zionist achievement.

“If we are to consider it carefully and responsibly we see that there are two choices available to us: a British Mandate or a Jewish State. Which of them will allow us to speed up the growth of the Jewish population's strength? Which of them will enable us to bring in the maximum number of Jews in the shortest possible time? Which will enable us to erect the strongest structure for the realization of the Zionist idea in the later stages? For neither the Mandate nor the proposed State are the final stage in the realization of Zionism. Each of them is a station on the way.

“By establishing the State I do not relinquish any one part of the Land of Israel, neither east nor west, north nor south. All I am willing to give up, under certain circumstances, are the British bayonets that accompany us on the road to Nablus or Jenin. I believe that we shall be able to settle in all parts of the land of Israel by peaceful means,

¹⁹ English text, *The Jerusalem Post*, February 18, 1973, p. 10.

²⁰ See also doc. 67 below.

without interference and without the aid of foreign bayonets as a result of the strength of the Jewish State, the strength of our creative effort and the justice of our case, and the strength of the friendly relations which the Jewish State will establish with its Arab neighbours."

Ben-Gurion's support of the Partition Plan was based on two closely linked assumptions: 1) The Jewish State would create opportunities for immigration, settlement and development, Zionist work that had been blocked or limited by the mandatory government. 2) Not only was Partition not the last stage, but we would become stronger in an independent State and be able to increase the areas of settlement beyond the Partition borders, and into all parts of the Land of Israel. Neither of these considerations apply today. Today's partition will offer us no keys to increased Zionist achievement; nor do any of those who wish to return to the Green Line (the 1967 border) now view this as any kind of "stage," or as a temporary withdrawal. What they have in mind is a permanent border for Israel.

The debate that is now in progress on Israel's borders is in fact part of the discussion of our relationship with the Arabs, and first of all of a peace agreement with them.

In 1937 the question of how a (peace) agreement was to be achieved with the Arabs also occupied a central position in the discussion of the Partition Plan. Ben-Gurion again foresaw two stages: Israel would gain in strength, and this would cause the Arabs to accept our existence and later to seek cooperation; Arab-Jewish co-operation would create the framework for Arab acceptance of Jewish settlement within the area of the Arab state.

"I see our future and the future of the Land in the restoration of its unity and wholeness through free agreement and the mutual practical needs of the Jewish and Arab peoples.

"The Jewish State will serve as an element—and possibly the main element—in an Arab-Jewish agreement whose outline and extent we may not yet be able to discern. Why has there been no such agreement up to now? The reason is simple: we are weak, and we are few. The Arabs do not see, or think they do not see, any benefit in an agreement with us that would enable us to grow. They claim—and there is some basis in reality to the claim—that this is an Arab country and

that they do not wish and cannot allow us to turn it into a Jewish country, or even into an Arab-Jewish country. They do not share the belief that our growth in this country is decreed by history, by fate. This belief can be held only by Jews. In Arab eyes the Jewish National Home was nothing but a British plot, a wicked plot that took the land from the Arabs, which they must fight to prevent it from being carried out.

"Only when the Jews have become a strong power in the Land will the Arabs recognize our existence and the great advantages for the resurgence of the Arab nations that can come from the friendship and aid of the Jewish people. Only when there is a Jewish nation in the Land will the pact between the two nations be made. The country cannot be divided into sections for historical, natural and economic reasons, and troublesome artificial borders will be abolished by mutual agreement and for the mutual benefit of the two sides which will have to respect each other."

Nothing came of the Partition Plan although it had the support of a majority at the Congress. The general assumption that the Mandate was coming to an end and that its place would be taken by Jewish and Arab states proved correct. Almost exactly ten years later the State of Israel was established in part of the former mandated area. Although the Israel of 1948 was four times as large as the Jewish State proposed in 1937, Ben-Gurion considered it "a tragedy for generations" that the Israel Defence Forces had not taken the West Bank down to the Jordan. Another 20 years passed and in 1967 Zahal reached not only the Jordan, but also the Suez Canal and Mount Hermon. Without any doubt, the military, economic and technological strength of Israel rose far beyond anything that Ben-Gurion might have expected the Partition State of 1937 to achieve.

When we look at the attitude of the Arabs towards us today can we say that Ben-Gurion was right in his prediction in 1937 that "when Jewish power becomes a reality in numbers, in economy and in Statehood... then the Partition that has been made necessary now by the Arab war against Zionism will be abolished by the free wish of the Arabs"? To our great regret this is not what has happened. Ben-Gurion looked on the Partition State of 1937 as a stage in Zionist development and expected that the borders of its Arab neighbour state would be open to Jewish

settlement in all parts of the country by agreement of the Arabs. It is now clear that if the Partition Plan had been capable of being carried out and Israel had been established within the borders proposed in 1937, it would have remained confined and under pressure and without any prospect of growth because we would not have been able to obtain the goodwill of the Arabs or their agreement to the establishment of Jewish settlements in their state.

It seems to me that in 1937 Ben-Gurion failed to recognize the full force of Arab national and personal opposition to the Zionist idea, and was mistaken in his assumption of a drastic change that would come in Arab attitudes towards us when we were stronger and a real Jewish State had come into existence.

Our achievements in this direction have remained very slight to this day. After 30 years of defending ourselves and carrying out reprisal actions, of wars and armistices, of conquest and withdrawal, of victories and relinquishment and above all, of an increase in strength far beyond anything that might have been expected, all that we may say is that perhaps the day is close when the leaders of the Arab states, or some of them, will despair of all hope of destroying us, and that only if our military strength is not allowed to disintegrate. But it is still a long way from this point to cooperation with us, and perhaps also a long time.

I would like to quote something more that Ben-Gurion said at the time of the Partition debate because it seems to me very topical. On the nature of the debate and on our approach to it he said, "Let us not gloss over differences of opinion nor pretend agreement with comrades and teachers and leaders in thrashing out this question, for every one amongst us can here look only into his own Zionist conscience to tell him which way he should go. We have been brought face to face with a Zionist debate that reaches down into the deepest levels, for it is a turning point in the history of the Jewish people. We are debating an issue that goes down to the roots of Zionism and to the soul of the Jewish nation. In this grave debate every one of us must look into his own soul and say what he finds there—say everything that he finds there."

On the nature of the subject under discussion he said: "There can be no disagreement among us

concerning the unity of the Land of Israel or our link with it, or our claim to the whole land. To our regret the unity of the Land of Israel is not a political fact at present. It has not been a political fact for many generations past. The land is cut and torn into four pieces. In the most faithful place, the heart of the Jewish people, the unity is engraved in letters that will not fade. You may root out a Jewish heart, but no power can root out the Land of Israel, the whole Land of Israel, from such a heart.

Finally, as the operative conclusion, he said: "What there will be here in another 15 years will depend on what happens here during this period. When a Zionist speaks of the Unity of the Land he does not mean its physical wholeness or metaphysical wholeness, but means Jewish settlement in the whole of the country."

From the Zionist point of view, then, the true criterion of what is called belief in the whole Land of Israel is not just the political ownership of some part of the country, nor the abstract belief in its wholeness; the purpose and touchstone of Zionism is to be found in all parts of the land.

I would like to add some points that must also, in the last resort, be translated into action.

Peace with the Arab countries, or progress towards such peace, even by stages, is our supreme aim today, and we must continuously listen for Arab readiness for peace. But we must also take into consideration that the day for which we are waiting may take a long time to come. We must not allow ourselves to be drawn into a situation in which we cannot hold out, in which we will be under pressure and forced to accept peace under conditions that do not suit us. We must so organize our work in the areas, our defence policies and our own development, that even a situation of "no war, no peace" cannot become intolerable.

We must speed up and widen the scope of our settlement in the areas. There must be settlement in both villages and towns, public building and private investment. Let us not say that it is beyond our powers to build the town of Yamit (on the coast south of Rafah) while we are planning additional towns in the sands of Rishon and east of Petah Tikva.

There is no shortage of willing hands: many young people would like to go out to settle in the areas, immigration from the Soviet Union is not negligible, and the financial help given us by the

Jewish people has risen to heights that had not been reached before. Our military strength protects our achievements and gives us a degree of security not known before. The Government of Israel decides what shall be done from the Suez Canal to the Hermon. Let us not ourselves impose arbitrary borders and limitation on settlement, or threaten ourselves with "glowing embers." Even if dangers do threaten our work it is better to dare and act than to endanger ourselves by inaction.

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Press statement by the permanent mission of the USSR at the UN protesting claims that the USSR is hindering Jewish emigration²¹

New York, February 23, 1973

Recently, propaganda agencies in Israel and Zionist and pro-Zionist organisations in some western countries, as well as certain organs of the press, have again been waging a slanderous anti-Soviet campaign, using the pretext of the so-called "Jewish question." Strange as it may seem, propaganda of this kind is also quite often disseminated through United Nations channels.

The hostile, slanderous and provocative nature of the campaign being carried out against the USSR by certain imperialist circles, by Israel and by Zionists all over the world, is aimed, *inter alia*, at distracting world public opinion from Israel's continued aggression against Arab states and from the crimes perpetrated by them in the occupied territories and from the upsurge of racialism and anti-semitism in a number of capitalist countries.

Attempting to divert the attention of world public opinion from Israel's criminal policies in the Middle East and her sabotage of a peaceful political settlement of the Middle East problem, the propaganda agencies of Israeli imperialist circles and of international Zionist organizations are raising a clamour with regard to, among other things, the existing procedure for Soviet citizens leaving the country for permanent [*sic*] *inter alia*, for the reimbursement to the state of the cost of university level education. However, this kind of

malicious slander has been completely disproved by the facts.

The procedure for Soviet citizens leaving for permanent residence abroad, established according to Soviet laws, applies to all citizens, regardless of their nationality.

The law on the reimbursement of state expenses involved in higher education, which is in force in the Soviet Union, is humanitarian by its nature; it takes account of a person's age, state of health, length of service, nature of studies and other individual factors.

It should be noted, that despite all the efforts of Israeli and international Zionism, there never has been and there is not any mass scale urge to leave the USSR for Israel. Thus, in 1972 the number of those who left the USSR for Israel only came to about 21,000. All in all, during the period since the Second World War, about 42,000 people left the Soviet Union for Israel, a number quite insignificant compared with emigration from other countries.

Furthermore, it is happening more and more frequently that persons of Jewish nationality who apply for permission to leave for Israel and are granted proper visas, then decide not to use them. Thus, in 1972 over 2,000 people did not use the permits granted to them. Hundreds of former Soviet citizens, who have left for Israel at various times and have partaken of the "Israeli paradise" are now deeply disappointed and are appealing to Soviet agencies with the request to return to the Soviet Union.

These facts once again expose the provocative nature of the slanderous campaign being launched against the USSR.

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Communiqué issued by the government of Israel after a Cabinet meeting held to discuss the Libyan airliner disaster²²

Jerusalem, February 25, 1973

The Government heard a supplementary report from the Chief of the General Staff on the findings of the investigation into the circumstances of the

²¹ English text, *Soviet News* (London), no. 5677 (February 27, 1973), p. 108.

²² English text as published in *The Jerusalem Post*, February 26, 1973, p. 2.

interception of the Libyan plane and on the authorized operational decision which was taken. The Government took note of this report.

The Government expresses the profound sorrow of Israel over the death of the passengers of the Libyan plane who died in the terrible disaster which occurred under circumstances of belligerency and incessant threats of acts of terrorism from the air.

The Government determines that the Israel Air Force acted in strict compliance with international law which applies to civil aviation in the air space over military deployments dividing states that are in a state of belligerency, and in accordance with our notifications on closure of this military area that were distributed previously to all states. The Israel Air Force took maximal warning measures for the purpose of bringing about the landing of the plane which penetrated the air space of the sensitive military area in Sinai, but unfortunately these warnings failed to achieve their purpose and the pilot did not effect the landing of his plane as required.

The Government will enable international factors competent to do so to obtain the information available to Israel concerning the interception of the plane.

In deference to humanitarian considerations, the Government resolves its readiness to effect ex-gratia payments to the families of the victims.

The Minister of Defence will make a statement to the Knesset²³ on the circumstances of the disaster and on the findings of the investigation.

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Television interview statements by US Assistant Secretary of State Sisco commenting on the situation after the Libyan airliner disaster and on the involvement of the US and the USSR in Middle East diplomacy²⁴

Washington, February 25, 1973

Mr. Herman: Mr. Sisco, what is the reaction of the U.S. Government to the shooting down of the Libyan plane by the Israelis?

A. Mr. Herman, it's a major tragedy, and I think it reflects the deep schism and the emotionalism and the distrust that have long been existent in the Middle East. I would hope, however, that this latest tragedy results in a cogent reminder—that is, if we need a cogent reminder—that we've got to get on with the job of getting this problem, as President Nixon said, off dead center.

Mr. Herman: Mr. Sisco, let me put a sort of little conundrum to you. This incident in the Near East, where the Israelis shot down this passenger plane with over 100 dead, is the kind of thing which ordinarily would have the Arab nations in a propaganda uproar. They would be denouncing; they would be shouting from the rooftops. Instead, we have utmost restraint shown by all the nations. We have Arab leaders making statements that they are optimistic. We have Mohamed el-Zayyat, the Foreign Minister of Egypt, saying today to the Arab Ambassadors in Cairo that Egypt will pursue the path of peace. The impression that you get from studying all these things is the Arab countries feel that something is going on, that we are, as President Nixon said, as you just quoted him, about to get the Middle Eastern crisis off of dead center. Is the United States about to undertake something which the Arabs know about which we do not?

A. Mr. Herman, President Nixon had some very useful discussions with King Hussein just two weeks ago. He had—he and Secretary Rogers, Deputy Secretary Rush, have had long and detailed, cordial, frank discussions with Mr. Ismail, the National Security Adviser of Egypt, who I might say made, in our judgment, an effective presentation of the Egyptian position. I think the important thing is this: that we do feel that this is a time for private diplomacy. We do feel that we need to explore thoroughly the views of all the parties, and that's the process that's going on, and this process will continue when the Israeli Prime Minister comes to our country next week.²⁵

Mr. Herman: Is there a key behind the key? Is the United States and the Soviet Union and their relationship the key to this key that you speak of?

the CBS program "Face the Nation", *Department of State Bulletin*, LXVIII, 1760 (March 19, 1973), pp. 322, 323–324, 326–327.

²³ Doc. 63 below.

²⁴ Excerpted from the transcript of the interview conducted by Robert Pierpoint, Marilyn Berger, and George Herman for

²⁵ Ismail was in Washington February 23–28; King Hussein had been there February 5–7, while Golda Meir was due to arrive February 26.

A. Well, I think that—

Mr. Herman: I guess what I'm really asking is, has the key of American-Soviet détente been turned and is that now working for the Middle Eastern peace?

A. When one talks about the Middle East, you can't talk about it apart from the overall relationships between the major powers. It was very significant, in my judgment, that at the summit last year in May, both the Soviet Union and the United States not only committed themselves to the goal of a political solution of the Arab-Israeli dispute based on the November 1967 Security Council resolution²⁶ but they also adopted a declaration of principles with particular emphasis on no confrontation between the major powers. I think that clearly there is a parallelism of interest between ourselves and the Soviet Union to maintain the present cease-fire, as uneasy as it is, and I think both sides recognize that to the degree to which we can achieve concrete understandings with the Soviet Union in our own bilateral relationships, to the degree that President Nixon has taken the lead in opening the dialogue with Communist China—we are achieving concrete agreements with respect to the Soviet Union—doing what he has done on Viet-Nam—that this obviously improves the overall climate, and it has an impact on the Middle East as well as other troubled areas in the world.

Miss Berger: Mr. Sisco, given the fundamental differences that continue between the two sides and given the explosiveness of the situation which President Nixon underlined this week, do you feel the United States and the other big powers can sit by any longer and allow the situation to continue, or do you think the time has come for them to move together with a parallel interest to get a settlement in the Middle East?

A. Miss Berger, we don't believe any major power or combination of major powers can develop the blueprint and impose it upon the parties. The United States has never seen itself as either a substitute for an agreement between the parties or a substitute for the actual process of negotiation itself. What we're trying to do is to get this negotiating process started between the principals in the area. Now I don't say that the major powers don't have an influence or they don't have an interest—

Mr. Herman: Excuse me. Are we now active—that struck an interesting note—are we now actually trying, are we now embarked on an initiative to work actively to get the parties back together again?

A. These discussions that are being held currently are in the context of exploring with all of the parties concerned as to what might be possible to get a serious negotiating process started. We are only in the exploratory stage. Further discussions will be held next week with Mrs. Meir, and then we will see.

Mr. Pierpoint: Mr. Secretary, this brings up the point of Mrs. Meir and the Israeli Government. We do have some influence on the Israelis. We do supply them with almost their entire military equipment, and obviously the Arabs feel that we are one-sided in our interest in this. Are we willing to put any pressure on the Israelis to give up any of the territories they took in the six-day war?

A. First, Mr. Pierpoint, I reject the notion that we're one-sided. We've been active in the last four years with one objective in mind; namely, to try to achieve a durable peace within the framework of the November 1967 resolution that meets the legitimate concerns of both sides, of the Israelis, of the Arab States, and, I might add, the Palestinians, because there is no durable peace that can be achieved in this area without meeting the legitimate concerns of the Palestinians. And the United States in these negotiations, in these discussions, has tried to play a genuine, honest broker for one reason—that it's in our interest. The "no war, no peace" situation in the area does not serve our interests; it does not serve the common cause of peace.

Miss Berger: Mr. Sisco, the Egyptians are absolutely convinced, however, that the Israelis will not negotiate if they continue to be assured of getting arms from the United States. And the very fact that they were American planes that were involved in the last incident just adds to their argument. What has the United States said to them that brings these remarks of optimism from the Egyptians now?

A. Well, Miss Berger, I think first of all the word "optimism" is overdrawn. I don't believe anybody that I know officially either on our side or on the Egyptian side has used the word "optimistic." I think that one can hope that in the present circumstances all sides have a continuing interest

²⁶ See doc. 88 in *International Documents on Palestine 1972*.

in maintaining some semblance of communication and that the political solution is the objective and as long as that's the case, then this offers opportunities for the United States, and it's for this reason that the President has said he's going to give this matter priority. This was the reason why he and Secretary Rogers have been active in exploring the possibility in recent weeks.

Mr. Pierpoint: Mr. Sisco, you did not answer my last question. I'm sure that was not altogether an oversight, but I'm going to try to repeat it, perhaps in a somewhat different way.

A. We'll try to do better on the next one.

Mr. Pierpoint: Have we, in fact, applied any pressure on Israel, or are we going to when Mrs. Meir is here apply any pressure on Israel, to be somewhat more reasonable on giving up any of the territories it took in the '67 war?

A. The question of pressure, Mr. Pierpoint, really misplaces the emphasis. What we're trying to do here is get a genuine negotiating process started. It's within the context of a negotiating process that, hopefully, the United States can exercise influence. We cannot substitute ourselves for the parties; we're here and ready to play a constructive role in trying to help reconcile matters, but you've got to have a serious dialogue going in which the United States can play a role.

Miss Berger: Mr. Sisco, the President went back to his very first statement on the Middle East this week when he talked about the explosive situation. In 1969 he called the area a powder keg. You might recall this had the Israelis very, very upset because they were seeking a hands-off attitude by the major powers. Does President Nixon's statement this week indicate a great new move by the United States to settle the issue? Does he want to get a settlement there as he did in Viet-Nam?

A. Oh, I think President Nixon has made very, very clear in the last 48 hours that he is giving this matter priority; he's determined, in his own words, to get this problem off dead center. He welcomed the Egyptian representative and was sure, and it's been confirmed since, that we've had useful discussions, but none of us—and President Nixon made this very clear the other day as well—none of us feel that, given the deep division, instant peace is possible. We would like to see this matter develop on a step-by-step basis, and we'd like to

contribute to that process, and we're available to the parties if they think we can be helpful.

Miss Berger: We're not going to insist on it?

A. I think I've answered your question.

Mr. Herman: One of the things perhaps that confuses people who are trying to figure out what's up, what's down, where the United States stands, is that on the one hand we've been providing aid to Israel; we've been talking about cooling things down in the Middle East; we're providing a three-year program of aid to the army in Jordan, \$4 billion to Iran. Are we really cooling things down? Or are we acting as munitions brokers?

A. Oh, I think we are. Regardless of the recent incidents, I'm convinced that the status quo today is much better than it has been in the last several years. Not only is the 30-month cease-fire in existence, the situation in Jordan is more stable, and regardless of the incidents along the Lebanese-Israeli border and the Syrian-Israeli border, the fact of the matter is that these have been limited to incidents, and above all, Mr. Herman, the possibility of confrontation between ourselves and the Soviet Union, as a result of the discussions between President Nixon last May and Mr. Brezhnev and the decision taken by President Sadat, the possibility of confrontation has been sharply reduced in the area.

Miss Berger: Do you think the Russians no longer want a state of controlled tension in the Middle East?

A. Well, again, I don't want to speculate on this. I think I've answered your question when I say that I'm convinced that both we and the Soviet Union see it to be in our interest that this cease-fire is maintained and that efforts continue to try to achieve practical progress toward an overall settlement.

Statement to the Knesset by Israel's Defence Minister Dayan explaining the circumstances of the Libyan airliner disaster (excerpts)²⁷

Jerusalem, February 26, 1973

In accordance with the Cabinet decision²⁸ I would like to make a short statement at the opening of the debate on the downing of the Libyan aircraft on Wednesday, February 21.

On Wednesday, at 1.45 in the afternoon, an aircraft flying at high speed at an altitude of 2,400 feet was picked up on radar screens at map reference point 29 degrees 40 minutes north 32 degrees 00 east, which is 32 nautical miles west of Ras Sudar. It was flying at a speed of 750 kph. in a north-easterly direction, towards Bir Gafgafa. When the plane was discovered—at first it was recorded by the Air Force defence network as “unidentified”—a series of actions by the air defence network, the Air Force command and the General Staff was set in motion.

This series of events was as follows:

At 1.56 the order was given for two of our Phantom planes to take off. The Phantoms identified the foreign aircraft as belonging to the Libyan Arab Airlines.

For seven minutes our planes flew around the Libyan aircraft signalling it with internationally agreed signs to follow them to land at Bir Gafgafa. Since the Boeing aircraft did not comply with the instructions given, as stated, by internationally accepted signals in a clear and correct manner, suspicions grew concerning its mission in penetrating (Sinai airspace).

At this point, demonstratively and in full view of the crew, warning shots were fired in the air. But the Libyan plane continued to ignore the shots from our aircraft. The assumption therefore was that the plane had entered the area on a hostile mission and preferred to take risks rather than obey the order to land.

At this stage it was accordingly decided that the aircraft must be compelled to land, even by gunfire. The pilot received an order to this effect, and acted accordingly.

The aircraft was hit, attempted to land, but

when it touched the ground it crashed. This occurred eleven minutes past two p.m., at map reference 30 degrees 25 minutes north 32 degrees 33 minutes east, at a distance of 55 kilometres west of Bir Gafgafa and 20 kilometres east of the Suez Canal line.

The incident of this aircraft arose from a series of errors and omissions on the part of the Libyan aircraft and the Egyptian control system. These errors and omissions led the Israeli air defence system to assume that the Libyan aircraft had penetrated on a hostile mission.

The aircraft penetrated a closed military zone in our territory and did not respond to our signals and instructions to land. On the basis of the assumption, which later proved to be erroneous, the operational decision was taken to compel the aircraft to land, and, as already stated, the aircraft was hit, attempted to land, but at the moment it touched the ground, it crashed.

From the time of its entry till its attempted landing, the Libyan aircraft was in Israel-controlled territory for approximately 13 and a half minutes.

This is, in a most summarized form, a description of the circumstances of this grievous catastrophe in which 106 people died and seven were injured. I know that the only correct solution is peace and normal neighbourly relations. But even in the absence of peace, there is nothing dearer than human life, and we must do everything possible to preserve it.

I still hope that the neighbouring Arab countries will respond to our appeal and that we will jointly determine swift channels of communication for cases of emergency, channels through which it will be possible to overcome errors without ignoring security obligations.

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the USSR of Defence Minister Ismail of Egypt²⁹

Moscow, March 2, 1973

Ahmed Ismail Ali, Defence Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian armed forces,

²⁷ Partial English text as published in *The Jerusalem Post*, February 27, 1973, p. 3.

²⁸ Doc. 61 above.

²⁹ English text supplied, on request, by Novosti Press Agency, Beirut.

was on an official friendly visit in the Soviet Union from February 26 to March 2, 1973, at the invitation of Marshal Andrei Grechko, the Soviet Defence Minister.

On February 27, Mr. Ali was received by Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

The Egyptian Defence Minister held talks with Soviet Defence Minister Marshal Andrei Grechko and other government and military leaders and visited the units of the Moscow military district.

During the talks which were held in a cordial and friendly atmosphere, the two sides discussed questions of mutual interest. They also had a widely ranging exchange of opinion on the further strengthening of cooperation between the armies of the two countries.

The Egyptian side expressed profound gratitude to the Soviet Union for its consistent aid and support for Egypt's just struggle against the imperialist Israeli aggression.

Egyptian Defence Minister Ahmed Ismail Ali invited Marshal Grechko to visit Egypt. The invitation was accepted with gratitude. The time of the visit will be arranged later.

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Political resolutions of the fourth conference of the National Religious Party of Israel³⁰

Jerusalem, early March, 1973

1. From its complete and unshakeable belief in the Divine Covenant, declared by the prophets of truth and justice, that God's people should return to the land of their ancestors to reclaim, protect, build and make it fertile and to establish within its frontiers promised by the Lord the Kingdom of the Torah and the Law, the National Religious Party, which is continuing its advance holding high the banner of religious Zionism, sees the political and security developments achieved by our generation in the Land of Israel as a start to the fulfilment of the Divine Will and an advance towards the full salvation of the people of Israel in the land of their fathers.

2. The Salvation Movement, whose principal

aim is to ingather the people of the Diaspora to their historical homeland, has always sought, and still does to this day, to renew the life of the nation in its country through peace and peaceful relations with all the neighbouring peoples. The state of Israel must seek by all means at its disposal to establish permanent peace between itself and the neighbouring states and to conclude a peace agreement with those states.

3. To reaffirm the three basic principles that must direct Israel's representatives at the negotiations;

a) Our historical religious right to the Promised Land of Israel.

b) The desire to make permanent peace.

c) The safeguarding of the state's security frontiers.

In the light of the above the National Religious Party cannot share in government responsibility if the government offers a peace plan involving any cession of parts of the Land of Israel, the land of our fathers.

4. To call on the government to take action without delay to settle the liberated areas of the Land of Israel with Jews through widescale temporary and permanent agricultural, village and urban settlement, including establishing new Jewish towns and populating them with both old and new immigrants.

5. To call on the government to take action without delay to establish at least one thousand accommodation units in Kiryat Arba-Hebron, to create the basis for a large Jewish town.

6. To reaffirm that there is no sovereignty over unified Jerusalem and its holy places except Israeli sovereignty.

7. To make Eytan 28 Liberation of Jerusalem Day³¹ and to celebrate it with appropriate dignity as a national festival and a holiday.

8. To congratulate the government and the Ministry of Religious Affairs on the great work they have done in uncovering the Wailing Wall, the remains of our holy places, and making the Wailing Wall Square a place of prayer for the people of the House of Israel, and to call on the government to lose no time in continuing operations to uncover the Wailing Wall so that it may be seen in its full splendour and glory.

³⁰ Translated from the Hebrew text, *Hatzofeh* (Tel Aviv), March 8, 1973; the conference was held March 1-7.

³¹ In 1967 this corresponded to June 7; in 1973, due to the differences between the Jewish and Christian calendars, it corresponded to May 30.

9. To insist that the administration of the holy places of the people of Israel in all the liberated areas be handed over without delay to the Jewish religious authorities.

10. To call on the government to speed up the full economic merger of the economy of the liberated areas with that of Israel.

11. To call on the representatives of Israel in the world to maintain a genuinely national appearance.

12. To stress to the world the historical religious basis of Israel.

13. To condemn the acts of terrorism of the Arab sabotage organizations and to call on the countries of the world to take all steps and make every effort required to put an end to these crimes.

14. To send sincere fraternal greetings to the members of the Movement and members of the nuclei of the "Bnai Akiva" settlements and the Hebrew Religious Youth who have settled in Gosh Etsion, the hills of Hebron, the Jordan Valley, the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip and the Rafah Approaches.

15. To call on all members of the Movement in the country and in the Diaspora, and especially the younger generation, to undertake settlement in the liberated parts of the Land of Israel and to establish the Law of the Torah: "You must take possession of the land and settle there."³²

66

Press interview statements by General Secretary Marchais of the Communist Party of France outlining proposed policy towards the Middle East in the event of a socialist victory in the forthcoming French elections³³

Paris, early March, 1973

Q. It is said that in case of a victory of the left in next March's legislative elections, the socialists would look after foreign affairs. Is that true? If so, wouldn't there be changes in the French position on the Middle East?

A.

From the end of 1968, and especially after the departure of General de Gaulle, notable changes have in fact come about in the foreign policy of the French government.

French ruling circles have undertaken to strengthen their links with the other imperialist powers, particularly with the US. This tendency to take more and more account of American interests has accelerated since the Pompidou-Nixon meeting in the Azores in December 1971. France's military cooperation with NATO has strengthened. French naval forces now take part in manoeuvres organized with the Fifth Fleet in the Mediterranean.

This military cooperation with the American imperialists takes on a special significance in this part of the world. It cannot in fact be forgotten that the US is unfailingly bringing its political, financial and material support (including support in the form of military material) to Israel, as well as to the reactionary regimes of Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

And now with the special authorization of M. Debré, French parachutists, including three generals and three colonels, have just stayed in Israel at the invitation of the Israeli army. It is significant that this group of parachutists also includes a representative of Marcel Dassault, the aircraft manufacturer and U.D.R. deputy. This French delegation made use of its stay in Israel to visit Golan and the West Bank.

Besides, one can observe that there is no longer any French initiative to find a solution to the Middle East crisis and that M. Maurice Schumann has brought up in the UN General Assembly the possibility of "arranging" borders between Israel and her Arab neighbours.

Concerning the Middle East, a left-wing government would attempt to contribute to a political settlement of the conflict and to re-establish peace and security, with respect for the sovereignty and right to exist of all the states in the area, as well as the national rights of the Arab people of Palestine. It would base its activity in this direction on the UN resolutions which, as is known, call for evacuation of the Arab occupied territories by Israel. Here, as elsewhere, one desire will prompt the leftist government: that of being active, dynamic, of taking initiatives—which is

³² *Old Testament*, Numbers, 33:53.

³³ Excerpted and translated from the French text of the interview conducted by Kamal Hemdane, *L'Orient-Le Jour* (Beirut), March 9, 1973, p. 6.

not the case with the present government—to bring about the realization of the objectives I have just mentioned.

As you can see, the common programme of the leftist government leans towards a firm and realistic French policy, devoted to rejection of imperialist encroachments, and to support and respect for the national rights of all the peoples of the region and the re-establishment of peace.

67

Press interview statements by General Secretary Ben Aharon of the Histadrut recommending an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied West Bank³⁴

Early March, 1973

Q. How do you view the situation in the Middle East at the moment?

A. It may appear a bit paradoxical, but as I see it there is already a state of peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors. There certainly is not a state of war. Almost six years have gone by since the six-day war and things are peaceful: we're accommodating a quarter of a million tourists from the Arab countries yearly; the bridges between Israel and Jordan are open; we are talking to the Jordanians and the Jordanians are talking to us. This is why I believe the Israeli authorities should ask themselves what they are doing in the West Bank. There are 600,000 Palestinian Arabs there. They don't want us. We don't want them. What we do want are viable borders with Jordan—established by agreement. If there is no agreement, no signature, then we should fix them ourselves.

Q. Why do Prime Minister Golda Meir, Defence Minister Moshe Dayan and others so strongly oppose your idea of unilateral withdrawal? Does it indicate reluctance on their part to withdraw from those occupied territories?

A. No. It's a simple strategic consideration on their part. They believe we have a card in our hand to play: territory in return for peace. They feel that giving up territory without waiting for

a formal peace agreement means giving up a negotiable commodity.

Q. How do you reply to that argument?

A. I don't think the occupied West Bank is a commodity. It's a liability.

Q. How so?

A. For two reasons. First, we are in the position of a foreign occupier. We're denying a people their natural political rights and therefore aggravating relations between the Arabs and Israel. The other is social: there are 60,000 Arab laborers from the administered territories working in Israel and people are getting used to the idea. Eventually, Israeli youngsters are going to grow up believing that there are certain jobs that are not fit for Jews but are all right for Arabs. It's not only going to be another element spoiling the Arab-Jewish relationship, it's also going to spoil the outlook of young Israelis.

Q. What about the settlements Israel is establishing in the occupied territories? Aren't they an impediment to peace with the Arabs?

A. The Arabs charge that this is a unilateral resolution of the borders by Israel. But the official point of view of the Israeli Government is that the way we are building our settlements in the Jordan Valley is no ultimatum to Jordan or to the Palestinians. Even those areas are open for discussion. We are not going to tell them: "Look, we have invested a million dollars here. This is now a part of Israel."

Q. But isn't it a form of annexation?

A. Well, sure—if there's no agreement.

Q. How much occupied territory would you be willing to give back to the Arabs? All the way back to the 1967 borders?

A. No, no, no. Nobody in Israel is willing to do that. I have no detailed map in mind. But as I see it, real estate is one thing the Arabs have plenty of. Territory is less an issue for them than for us.

Q. If territory is not the issue, what is?

A. I'm sure the problem for Egypt and the rest of the Arab world is not the size of the territory we occupy. The fact that it amounts to some 20,000 square miles—probably less than 1 per cent of all of Arab real estate—doesn't matter two hoots to them. What does matter to them is

³⁴ Interview conducted by Angus Deming, *Newsweek* (New York: International edition), March 19, 1973.

that there is this foreign element in the Arab world, located between Egypt and Jordan and having a European or Euro-American character. So we must do something to allay their prejudices and frustrations and convince them that our superiority in technology and science and armaments is not a threat to them—that, rather, it can be a boon to them. In other words, the issue is whether the Arabs agree to the existence of a Jewish state in this part of the world.

Q. How can you negotiate as basic and as emotional an issue as that?

A. This is probably what time must solve, what reason does not solve. Time has solved it as far as Jordan is concerned. Three years ago, our position vis-à-vis Jordan was worse than with Egypt. Today, Jordan has acknowledged that there can be no military solution, that Israel is there to stay.

Q. That's progress, but apparently not enough. Is Israel at all to blame?

A. I'm sure that the Israeli Government is stressing the territorial issue beyond its real value to us. And it is spoiling our image. I believe we are losing friends by presenting to the world a tough image, a tough stance. Everyone knows we are strong militarily, the strongest power here in the Middle East. Yet I believe a bit of a low profile from the point of view of Israel in presenting our case would have eased our situation from the standpoint of public opinion. In the final analysis, however, the issue is whether Sadat can stand up and tell his people one of these days: "Israel is there to stay. They're our neighbors. They've got a right to exist. We want peace with them. We're going to sit down now and negotiate peace with them." This is the real issue.

68

Television interview statements by US Secretary of State Rogers assessing the situation after US talks with Israeli and Egyptian officials³⁵

Washington, March 11, 1973

Mr. Keat: Mr. Secretary, the President has now had what he called his Mideast month of consultations with Arab and Israeli leaders. Have these conversations carried the movement toward some kind of negotiation any closer?

A. Well, we've had a very good round of discussions with the King of Jordan, with Mr. Ismail, who's President Sadat's chief assistant, and with Prime Minister Meir. We've been encouraged by the general tenor of the discussions, and we think that there is a desire on the part of everyone to try to work out a peaceful settlement. The problem is how to get the negotiations started.

Mr. Keat: Do you think they'll start this year?

A. Oh, I would not want to make a prediction. We're going to do everything we can to see if we can get them started.

Mr. Herman: Is there a desire on their part to have the United States mediate and to work on this problem?

A. Well, I think so. There's certainly a desire on the part of Israel, and Egypt from time to time has said that they felt very much along the lines that the United States could play a useful role. In fact, that's how we got started in it, on the question of the interim settlement. President Sadat said he hoped we could play a role.

Mr. Herman: Mr. Sisco, the Under Secretary of State, or Assistant Secretary of State, rather, for Middle Eastern affairs among others, said on this program some weeks ago³⁶ that he thought the groundwork and the atmosphere had been prepared for a movement toward peace. Mrs. Meir, the Prime Minister of Israel, said the following week that she saw no change, no movement of any kind. What do you see?

A. Well, I think what she had reference to and that's of course the truth—that is, that there's

³⁵ Excerpted from the transcript of the interview conducted by George Herman, James Keat, and Barry Serafin for the CBS program "Face the Nation", *Department of State Bulletin*, LXVIII, 1762 (April 2, 1973), pp. 379–380; the dates of the visits are detailed in a note to doc. 62 above.

³⁶ Doc. 62 above.

no specific initiative and no complete change in the negotiating position. But in terms of the general climate, I noticed an improvement. I think Mr. Sisco is right. In the discussions we had with Mr. Ismail, for example, he himself said that he was very encouraged by those discussions.

69

Press interview statements by Foreign Minister Eban of Israel expressing optimism on US efforts towards a settlement and calling on the UN to ignore the Middle East³⁷

Vienna, March 13, 1973

Q. The Vietnam war is over, the world is again concentrating on the Near East. What is Israel's present position on America's attempts at mediation?

A. We are following the United States efforts with great hope. First, because the Americans have a clear idea of the inequalities in the military power balance in the Near East. Secondly, because Washington has left no doubt as to its aversion to an "imposed settlement," and because Americans know that a fundamental solution can be reached only by those involved. Thirdly, because the United States is in an entirely different position from the other great powers: it is the only country to whom all parties to the conflict are really willing to come with their wishes and conditions. Within a single month, leading politicians from Jordan, Egypt and Israel visited the American capital.³⁸ Similar visits by representatives of these three countries to Moscow and Peking would be unimaginable. The Soviet Union spoiled its chances of acting as a mediator when it broke off relations with us. And Peking has been on one side from the beginning.

Q. What chance has the UN, has Kurt Waldheim, of being of help in the Near East?

A. The United Nations is in permanent crisis. At this time, it can play no meaningful role in

any conflict anywhere in the world. Waldheim's role at the Vietnam conference in Paris serves to emphasize the permanent decline of UN authority. The Secretary-General would have practically to found it anew to extricate it from its agony. But that is not the only thing hindering mediation. Consider the line-up of forces: on one side eighteen Arab states, on the other side Israel. Add to that the other Muslim countries and Israel stands confronted by 40 nations. Such a situation would be untenable for anyone. The greatest contribution the UN could make towards peace in the Near East would be to leave the problem as much as possible alone for at least a year or two.

Q. What effect will the French election results and Foreign Minister Schumann's probable stepping down have on French Near East policy?

A. I don't want to speculate here—either about policies or about persons. We have made some progress in the year but cannot expect spectacular changes in the near future. We have never understood the "wisdom" of the French in unstintingly supporting Libya, an especially radical element not only as regards Israel but also in relation to many other countries. We do not understand the value of a French embargo that applies to all countries except Libya. We do not like embargoes as such, but we certainly do not like discriminatory embargoes.

Nevertheless, the dialogue with Paris can and should continue. We are certain that improved Franco-Israeli understanding would be a stabilizing factor in the Near East.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to East Germany of a delegation of the Arab Socialist Union of Egypt (excerpt)³⁹

East Berlin, March 21, 1973

Both sides were agreed that the efforts to effect détente in Europe are an integral part of the struggle for world peace and for security in the Middle East.

³⁷ Excerpted and translated from the German text of the interview conducted by Heinz Nussbaumer, *Kurier* (Vienna), March 14, 1973.

³⁸ Israel's Prime Minister Meir visited the US from February 26–March 11, Jordan's King Hussein from February 5–7, and Egyptian Presidential Adviser Ismail from February 23–28. 1973), pp. 2–3.

³⁹ Excerpted from the partial English text, *Foreign Affairs Bulletin* (East Berlin), XIII, 10 (April 2, 1973), p. 66.

Detailed talks were held on the tense situation in the Middle East and on how to overcome the aftermath of the Israeli aggression. The political solution of the Middle East conflict remains an important requirement in order to secure national independence and social progress for the Arab peoples and to strengthen peace in the Middle East.

In this connection the SED [Socialist Unity Party of the German Democratic Republic] delegation expressed its appreciation for the endeavours of Egypt and the other Arab countries to establish in the Middle East a just and lasting peace on the basis of the implementation of the relevant UN resolutions which do not allow the forcible annexation of foreign territories and according to which any change carried out by Israel in the occupied areas is to be considered null and void and illegal.

The SED and the ASU stressed their firm conviction that the implementation of the UN Security Council resolution No. 242 of 22 November 1967 and of all other UN decisions on the Middle East issue, especially the complete withdrawal of the Israeli occupation troops from all occupied Arab areas, is the decisive prerequisite to a political solution of the Middle East conflict. Both sides assured the Arab people of Palestine of their active support and solidarity in its struggle for its legitimate rights. Both sides underlined that the struggle of the Arab peoples against aggression and imperialist forces in that region is an integral part of the national liberation movement against colonialism and imperialism on a world-wide scale.

They most energetically condemned the aggressive Israeli course supported by the USA and other imperialist states, and Israel's stubborn refusal to withdraw its troops from the occupied areas which has led to a situation endangering peace in the Middle East and in the whole world.

The SED delegation condemned Israel's recent attacks on Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinian people as well as the felonious attack on the Libyan civil aircraft.

In this respect the SED delegation stressed that—in view of Israel's persistent rejection of a just political solution in the Middle East and of the establishment of just peace—the Arab countries have the right to use all forms of struggle for liberating the occupied areas. The representatives of the SED assured the representatives of the ASU

that the German Democratic Republic resolutely rejects the illegal and provocative demands for so-called compensation put forward by Israel.

The two delegations agreed that it is an indispensable requirement for the successful struggle of the progressive Arab states and all Arab peoples against imperialism and Zionism, for freedom and social progress, to further strengthen the alliance between the community of socialist states and the Arab peoples and states.

They appreciated the decisive rôle played by the Soviet Union in the world-wide struggle for peace, national independence, democracy and social progress as well as in the active support for all anti-imperialist forces. They expressed their firm will to deepen relations with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and with the Soviet Union also in the future.

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71

Parliamentary enquiries made to UK Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home on EEC policy toward the Middle East conflict⁴⁰

London, March 21, 1973

Mr. Marten [Con.] asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement on the consideration by the Council of Ministers of the EEC of the Arab-Israel conflict in the Middle East.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: At the meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Nine in Brussels on 16th March my colleagues and I exchanged views on the situation in the Middle East.

Mr. Marten: Now that the Common Market, as the saying goes, can speak with one voice in foreign affairs, what is that one voice about the Middle East? If the voices are not all the same, what are the differences?

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: Everyone is anxious to find a solution for the Middle East. If Europe has a contribution to make—I say “if”, because this is not certain—we should concentrate on trying to be helpful. Therefore, we discussed the Middle

⁴⁰ Excerpted from *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), Fifth series, vol. 853 (March 19–30, 1973), cols. 421–423.

East with the desire to be helpful if, on some future occasion, our intervention was requested.

Mr. Kaufman [Lab.]: Is the Foreign Secretary aware that many people would prefer the Council of Ministers and the EEC not to involve themselves in this matter at all? However, while this is, on the one hand, a matter for the parties directly involved and, on the other, a matter for the United Nations, it is not a matter for the small, irrelevant group dominated by the spiteful and nasty French Government.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: I can easily recognise one person who thinks that we in the Community should not try to be helpful. I do not share the hon. Gentleman's attitude. I should have thought that anyone who had the interests of the Middle East at heart would wish to be helpful, and it is possible that the European Economic Community can be so.

Dame Joan Vickers [Con.]: When does the EEC intend to set up a Foreign Affairs secretariat?

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: That has not yet been brought up again.

Mr. Frank Allaun [Lab.]: Does not the Foreign Secretary think that it would be really helpful if the countries in the EEC agreed to supply arms to neither side? The most specific influence other countries can have on the Middle East is for them to call a boycott of arms to either side, and the EEC might well provide a start in this direction.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: I think that restraint is exercised by most European countries in relation to arms sales to the Middle East. It is certainly exercised by Britain. Various suggestions have been made—for example, that European countries might guarantee any settlement that is made. We in the Community should give serious consideration to that. It cannot do any harm. It may do some good.

72

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the USSR of Vice-Chairman Hussein of the Revolutionary Command Council of Iraq (excerpts)⁴¹

Moscow, March 24, 1973

Saddam Hussein, Vice-General Secretary of the Regional Leadership of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party (Baath) and Vice-Chairman of the Council of the Revolutionary Command of the Republic of Iraq, was on a friendly visit to the Soviet Union over March 21–24, 1973, at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government.

Saddam Hussein was received by L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

Talks were held between A. N. Kosygin, Member of the Politbureau of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and Saddam Hussein.

The meeting and talks, held in a comradely atmosphere, confirmed the desire of both Sides to go on strengthening and improving Soviet-Iraqi friendly relations in line with the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, signed between the USSR and Iraq on April 9, 1972.⁴²

The Sides reaffirmed the immutability of their positions set forth in the joint communiqué of September 20, 1972,⁴³ on the visit to the USSR by President of the Republic of Iraq A. H. Bakr, General Secretary of the Regional Leadership of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party (Baath), Chairman of the Council of the Revolutionary Command.

S. Hussein apprised the Soviet Side of the achievements scored by the Republic of Iraq under the leadership of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party in the sphere of strengthening its economic independence, particularly by way of building up the national oil industry and establishing sovereignty over its natural wealth, and also of the importance of the agreement, dated March 1 this year, with the Iraq Petroleum

⁴¹ English text, *Moscow News*, supplement to no. 14 (April 7, 1973), pp. 2–3.

⁴² Doc. 72 in *International Documents on Palestine 1972*.

⁴³ Doc. 138 in *International Documents on Palestine 1972*.

Company, which has sealed Iraq's victory in the matter of nationalizing and marketing its oil.

The Soviet Side declared its support for the steps taken by the Iraqi leadership in that direction and reaffirmed its readiness to continue developing all-round cooperation with Iraq, including in the sphere of oil.

The Sides emphasised with satisfaction that the developing contacts and relations between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party were an important factor in further strengthening friendly relations between the peoples of the Soviet Union and the Republic of Iraq. They reaffirmed their desire for and mutual interest in further developing these contacts and relations.

The Sides paid special attention to the situation in the Middle East, which continues to remain dangerous due to the continued imperialist Israeli aggression against the Arab people and attempts to perpetuate the occupation of Arab territories, to crush the Palestinian resistance movement, and also as a result of the extensive support given by world imperialism, Zionism and reaction.

The Republic of Iraq and the Soviet Union reiterated that a just and lasting peace cannot be established in this region without the aggressor quitting all the occupied Arab territories, without ensuring the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine. The Sides regard the Palestinian resistance movement as a component part of the Arab national-liberation movement and declare that they will continue rendering assistance and support to this movement.

The Sides pointed out the great importance of strengthening the solidarity and unity of action of the Arab states and of mobilizing all their resources in the struggle against imperialism, Zionism and reaction.

The Soviet Union and the Republic of Iraq reaffirmed that friendship of the Soviet Union with Iraq and other progressive Arab states accorded with the vital national interests of their peoples and was an important factor in promoting the national independence and social progress of the Arab peoples. They emphasised their invariable desire of further extending Soviet-Arab cooperation and the determination to foil any attempts of the imperialist and reactionary forces to undermine Soviet-Arab friendship.

The Sides pointed out with satisfaction that the

ending of the war and the restoration of peace in Vietnam opened up prospects for the establishment of a lasting and just peace in Indochina. The Soviet Union and the Republic of Iraq declare that they will continue to invariably side with the peoples of Indochina in their just cause.

The Sides believe that the visit of Saddam Hussein to the Soviet Union has made an important contribution to the development and strengthening of Soviet-Iraqi friendly relations based on the solid foundations of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Republic of Iraq.

73

Statement by Foreign Minister Medici of Italy noting Italy's positive attitude to Israel⁴⁴

Jerusalem, March 26, 1973

During our first exchange of views this afternoon, we have taken into particular consideration, as we shall also do in our next discussions, the situation in the Middle East. I think that every effort should be made, and all reasonable means used, to start political negotiations which, by implementing UN Resolution 242, may lead to a just peace.

Mr. Minister, as you have rightly pointed out in a recent speech, mutual harmonizing among the leaders of the parties concerned should be worked out in order to achieve this objective. A just peace would result not only in a dangerous source of tension being eliminated, but would also allow the resources and energies of the region to be fully made use of in order to bring about its economic and social development. In this way, peaceful and lasting coexistence among all the parties involved would become a reality.

This is the profound wish and sincere hope of the Italian government. I wish to emphasize the keen attention with which my government is following developments of the Middle East situation. In this connection, allow me to recall Italy's active participation in the movement for European

⁴⁴ Excerpted and translated from the Italian text as published in *Relazioni Internazionali* (Milan), XXXVII, 14 (April 7, 1973), p. 397; made in a speech during a dinner given in his honour.

unity and the activity it can display in this field. The positive development of our bilateral relations in the economic, scientific and cultural field is a further cause for satisfaction; I am convinced that this can be improved. Mr. Minister, your people is heir to an ancient culture and Italy has not forgotten its great sufferings and tragic experiences.

This year Israel celebrates the twenty-fifth anniversary of the proclamation of the state. She can be justly proud of the great progress achieved in such a short time and in so many fields. Peace, however, has not been achieved. We express the sincere hope that this anniversary year may signal the end of a long period of conflict and the beginning of negotiations which lead to an effective and lasting peace in this area. It is with these sentiments that I propose a toast to the health of the President of Israel, to Your Excellency, and to the prosperity of the people of Israel.

74

Resolutions and recommendations of the fourth conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Islamic countries (excerpt)⁴⁵

Benghazi, March 27, 1973

The Conference condemns the Zionist entity for its violation of the principles and resolutions of the United Nations, which is causing the situation in the area to deteriorate.

It called on the great powers which are permanent members of the Security Council to take the necessary measures to make the Zionists undertake an immediate, total and unconditional withdrawal.

The Conference expressed its appreciation of the role played by the Islamic countries and the efforts of the African and Asian countries towards finding a just solution of the problem of Palestine and the surrounding areas.

In connection with the danger constituted by Zionism in the Red Sea basin the Conference adopted a resolution calling on the member states to cooperate to the greatest possible extent toward unifying Islamic and Arab efforts for action in accordance with a joint plan for the confrontation of this danger which threatens the area.

With reference to the Zionist plan to annex and Judaize Jerusalem and to alter its religious and historical character, the Conference resolved the following:

1. To support the Palestinian people in their just struggle for the liberation of their land and for their right to self-determination, and to regard the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

2. To provide political, material and moral support to the people of Palestine to enable them to recover their usurped territories and to frustrate all attempts to eliminate the Palestine resistance movement.

3. To call on member states to open offices in the Islamic countries for the registration of volunteers for the holy war for the liberation of the Holy Land and also to open Palestine Liberation Organization offices.

4. To call on all the Islamic countries to adopt an unambiguous attitude in their relations with the Zionist entity, and to renew the call to sever political and economic relations with that entity.

5. To call on the great powers to stop providing the Zionist entity with arms and economic and technical aid, calculated to encourage it to persist in aggression, and threatening the security of the area.

6. To call on all countries to stop the emigration of Jews to occupied Palestine.

7. To implement the recommendation of the Third Islamic Conference on the establishment of a fund to be known as the Holy War Fund for Palestine.

8. To inform the Secretariat of all measures the Islamic countries take regarding special committees for making the masses aware of the aims of the Palestinian resistance and the truth about Zionism and its schemes.

9. To call on the General Secretariat to continue its efforts to stop the annexation and the alteration of the religious and historical character of the city of Jerusalem.

⁴⁵ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Fajr al-Jadid* (Tripoli), March 28, 1973. The conference was held March 24-27, 1973; Iran, Jordan, Morocco and Syria did not attend.

10. To call on the Secretary-General to follow up the implementation of these resolutions and recommendations and to submit to the next conference a report on what has been achieved in this field.

75

Interview statement by US Deputy Secretary of State Rush emphasizing the reopening of the Suez Canal as a first step towards a Middle East settlement¹⁶

Washington, March 29, 1973

Q. Earlier Mr. Sisco again advocated opening the Suez Canal as an interim first step toward a full agreement in the Middle East. He didn't discuss the impact of the opening on the national security of the United States. I wonder if any consideration has been given in this proposal toward the demilitarization of the canal or a restriction on military—that is, transit of naval vessels. I ask this question because, as you know, coming from the Pentagon, there is a feeling there that the opening of the canal would facilitate Soviet penetration in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.

A. Yes—of course one can go through the canal much quicker than he can go around the cape. But our primary objective in the Middle East is to insure the peace and to bring about a just peace. Now, our feeling is that the way to accomplish this—because the positions there, as they were in Berlin and as they were before the President went to China and as they have been in so many cases, seem to be irreconcilable—the best way to accomplish this is to take interim steps leading toward a peace and to get the two parties, or to get the parties, to talking to each other. The act of communication leads to better understanding, leads to a modification of objectives, and gradually might lead to an accommodation.

I do not feel the security picture would be very much affected whether the Suez Canal is opened or closed. But I feel that it is very, very

important to get Egypt and the Israelis talking to each other, taking interim steps leading toward peace and toward an ultimate settlement.

76

Press conference statements by USSR Prime Minister Kosygin on the question of arms supplies to Egypt and diplomatic relations with Israel¹⁷

Stockholm, April 5, 1973

Q. What is your opinion of the possibilities of achieving peace in the Middle East, and is it true that the Soviet Union has resumed deliveries of war material to Egypt?

A. Our opinion as to the possibility of a peace settlement in the Middle East remains unchanged. As to the Arab Republic of Egypt, we have a treaty with Egypt.¹⁸ You know that very well. The treaty remains in force. We consider that Egypt is entitled to have a strong army at the present time, in order to defend itself from the aggressor and to liberate its lands.

Q. Does Mr. Kosygin agree that if the Soviet Union means to contribute to achieving peace in the Middle East, then it ought to have diplomatic relations with both sides—Israel and the Arab states—and not only with one? If he does not, why not? If he does, why does not the U.S.S.R. take steps to bring this about?

A. I might agree with the questioner if the Arab states and Israel were both in the same position. Then we could have relations with both sides. I don't know if the questioner is aware who is the aggressor in the Middle East; can one behave in the same way to Israel, which has seized foreign territories and is committing outrages there, and to countries struggling to recover for their people lands which are traditionally theirs? We cannot do so. Of course we not only condemn aggression but will help countries fighting against it.

You know that we were one of the countries

¹⁶ Excerpted from the transcript of the address and subsequent questions and answers at the national foreign policy conference for editors and broadcasters, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXVIII, 1765 (April 23, 1973), p. 482.

¹⁷ Excerpted from the English text, *New Times* (Moscow), no. 15 (April, 1973), pp. 8–9.

¹⁸ Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation Between the USSR and the UAR, doc. 125 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

which voted at the U.N. for the establishment of the state of Israel. We still consider that the state of Israel has a right to exist. But that does not mean that we can accept aggression. We cannot forget that hundreds of thousands of Palestinians have been living in exile for many years, enduring bitter hardship.

77

Article by Israel Minister without Portfolio Galili claiming the West Bank and Gaza as legitimate areas for Jewish settlement (excerpts)⁴⁹

April 14, 1973

I was brought up to regard Judaea and Samaria and the Mediterranean coast as far as al-Arish as being a historical homeland, not only a homeland by spirit and heritage and the Book, but as fields for the effective embodiment of the Zionist movement through settlement. In all the discussions about the land of Israel allotted for immigration and settlement no one in the past has accepted that these areas should be excluded from the fields of Zionist embodiment, but recently attempts have been made here to change the past and to attribute to the fathers of the movement views and trends they did not believe in.

We have absolutely rejected the assumption that until peace comes there must be a vacuum in Judaea and Samaria. We have faithfully established a network of settlements, this network being based first and foremost on the assumption that, should there be no peace, we shall maintain the situation that came into existence with the cease-fire. As regards our right to settle, it is not our practice to publish detailed plans of future settlements not yet approved by the government.

The network of settlements we have established is well known, and I think it is right that we

should mention in general terms the basic future trends. As greatly as I esteem our activities in the field of settlement, I regard it as a duty to affirm that the foundations of our settlement in the new settlement areas are still extremely weak and must be strengthened, intensified and established more firmly. I mean, above all, the question of population settlement, and this is an aspect of the demographic situation. That is to say, we must increase the numbers of those Jews who have taken root in the new settlement areas and find a source of livelihood there. This depends, above all, on consolidating our tenure there by:

- a) Exploiting the agricultural possibilities within the given and limited framework of land and water.
- b) Continuing to discover sources of water by further drilling operations.
- c) Refusing to restrict our settlement in these parts of the homeland within the limits of agricultural possibilities.

Although we have settled in the new areas we have not so far defined the state of Israel's alternative territorial objectives in its struggle for peace, and many of us—perhaps every one of us—has an alternative map of his own, but in the Labour Party and in the government they have not yet decided on the final map. The time for that will come and we must do it only after careful thought and with a realization that peace is really within our grasp. In the meantime we shall have decided that as long as there is no peace we shall not withdraw or leave a vacuum, but settle, and the map of the settlements shows our ambitions. I do not guarantee that we shall realize all our aspirations, but who is simple enough to decide to establish this or that settlement when he knows that we are going to abandon it?

We are not establishing settlements so as to abandon them but so that they may be active settlements within the frontiers of the state of Israel. In no case have we decided that an area is closed to settlement, but we have criteria, and is there any risk in this?

I personally believe that the Jordan River will be our frontier with the Kingdom of Jordan, a political and security frontier, so that Hebrew settlements will flourish in the Jordan Valley,

⁴⁹ Excerpted and translated from the Hebrew text, *Yediot Aharonot* (Tel Aviv), April 14, 1973.

and so that no foreign army will cross from the east of the Jordan River. I am convinced that when there is peace the Arabs of the [West] Bank will enjoy not only material advantages of great value, but also the expression of their identity and full rights, part of which they will obtain in the state of Israel, and the other part in the state of Jordan.

78

Television interview statements by US Senator Fulbright (Dem.) calling for US pressure on Israel and charging that Israel controls the US Senate⁵⁰

April 15, 1973

Q. I would like to ask you about the Middle East. There has been a lot of news there this week starting with the Israeli raid against Beirut. Since that time the State Department has taken a very hard line on the Palestinian extremists and it appears as though the US has adopted an almost Israeli line as to how you deal with the Palestinians. Do you feel that is the best way of handling the problem?

A. No. If you recall I made, I thought, a very, my most thoughtful effort in this area thinking the only hope in that area is for a political settlement between Israel and Egypt and her neighbors and it has to be a political settlement that is acceptable to both. I think if we don't have that, this type of development that has recently occurred, that is the retaliation, the shooting down of an airplane and then the killing of some people, now the raid in Beirut, is a very dangerous development. There is only one way I can see to stop it, is for the US to take a very strong stand that this has to be settled—politically settled. The Israelis object to an "imposed" settlement. I don't know what they mean by an "imposed" settlement. It is quite obvious without the all-out support by the US in money and weapons and so on the Israelis could not do what they have been doing, so we bear

a very great share of the responsibility for the continuation of this, of this state of warfare.

Q. Should we be cutting back in our aid to Israel?

A. Well, it isn't that, that is too simplistic a way to do it. We should use every influence we have to persuade a political settlement. The US administration said in the beginning it should be along the lines of the '67 resolution, I think it is 242 of the UN with some adjustments in such places as the Golan Heights, Sharm al-Shaikh and Gaza Strip which I have supported, made a speech in connection, supporting that approach, and I think it was correct. I only regret that the government didn't follow through with it. Now I must say I think they received very great objections to that from the Senate and the great majority of the Senate of the US, somewhere around eighty percent are completely in support of Israel—anything Israel wants. It had been demonstrated time and again, and this has made it difficult for our government—in this instance I have thought the President and the Secretary had the right approach as evidenced by what was called the Rogers doctrine.

Q. Senator, to go back to your point about what we might do to get a political solution in the Middle East, I gather that what you are saying is the United States of America has great leverage with Israel and it ought to use that leverage to press Israel into concessions to make the peace possible?

A. Well, we have the leverage in the sense that we have supplied all the where-with-all—the major part of the where-with-all—to finance it and pay for everything Israel does. We don't have any leverage in the sense that Israel controls the Senate. The Senate is at her, is subservient in my opinion, much too much. We should be more concerned about the US's interests rather than doing the bidding of Israel. This is a most unusual development.

⁵⁰ Interview conducted by George Herman (CBS), Marvin Kalb (CBS) and Jerrold Schecter (*Time*) for CBS's "Face the Nation"; excerpted and transcribed from the videotape at US Information Service, Beirut.

Statement by Permanent UN Representative Crowe of the UK deploring Israel's raid in Beirut⁵¹

New York, April 17, 1973

My Government has consistently deplored all acts of violence and terrorism in the Middle East wherever and by whomsoever they have been committed. To take only the incidents of recent weeks, we deplore, and we must all deplore, the tragedy of Khartoum and the senseless terrorist activities in Nicosia. We deeply sympathize with the cause and the fate of the Palestine refugees who have been the subject of endless debates and resolutions in the United Nations which seem to have no influence on their lot. As they sit in their camps, often almost in sight of their former homes, it is not surprising that bitterness and hatred should grow in their hearts and that in despair some of them should turn to violence and extremism. But this is not the way to win sympathy for their cause. The international community cannot tolerate the killing of innocent people, the murder of diplomats and the disruption of communications that has been caused. Not only must the Palestinian leaders exercise restraint but also all the Governments concerned in the area must exert themselves to control this violence. They must not permit the wild men to disrupt international order. We have all given our endorsement to the Declaration on Friendly Relations and we are all committed to the Charter principles which it embodies. It is surely time for all of us to respond whole-heartedly to the appeal with which the Declaration ends—that is, its appeal to all States to be guided by these principles in their international conduct and to develop their mutual relations on the basis of the strict observance of them.

But to deplore the acts of violence of the terrorist organizations is in no way to condone the action of the Israeli Government in its attacks on Lebanon which are the occasion for the present meeting. Those too must be condemned. That was a Government-organized operation into the territory

of another sovereign State, an act of official violence which can under no circumstances be justified under the Charter. For the international community to accept such action as tolerable would be, not a return to the jungle as some speakers have said, because in many respects the jungle has its own natural laws, it would be rather to revert to a state of international anarchy. The representative of Israel has stated here that because the action in Beirut was directed against terrorists it needed no justification. In the view of my delegation every act of violence needs justification. Where the violence is international, the United Nations is legitimately concerned with it. The object of the United Nations is to try to establish order and peace in international relations. Recent events have cut at everything for which the United Nations stands.

But I said earlier that what we must do is to look towards the future. We must try to break out of this horrifying spiral of violence, counter-violence and further violence. As I said to the Assembly last December, while my Government cannot accept that terrorism is in any circumstances justified, we are not blind to the need to eradicate its root causes and to deal with the problems underlying it. We must show the hundreds of thousands of refugees in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Gaza and elsewhere that the world has not forgotten them. We must take note of, and we must take action on, their legitimate aspirations which must not be overlooked in any final settlement. In short we must once more give them a reason for living and hope for the future.

Introductory comment by US Secretary of State Rogers to his report "United States Foreign Policy 1972" presented to Congress (excerpt)⁵²

Washington, April 19, 1973

Third, in the Middle East, the only remaining area of chronic conflict in the world where no negotiations are in progress, we will actively

⁵¹ Made in a speech before the UN Security Council; excerpted from the provisional verbatim record, UN doc. A/PV.1708, pp. 6-7.

⁵² Excerpt relevant to the Middle East, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXVIII, 1767 (May 7, 1973), pp. 549-550.

encourage the parties to initiate, during 1973, a genuine negotiating process.

Some people claim that the conflict between Israel and the Arabs, which has now lasted in chronic or acute stages for 25 years, is impossible to resolve.

—Yet it has already proven possible to make progress through negotiation in other areas of passionate differences: in South and North Korea, South and North Vietnam, Pakistan and India, West and East Germany.

—New prospects for an improved quality of life lie before all peoples of the Middle East which could bring about a national and human resurgence when a just peace releases energies from preoccupation with the past.

—And the relaxation of tensions between the major powers, the continuing quest for a peaceful settlement in many countries of the area, and the maintenance of military calm make 1973 a favorable time for the process to get underway.

We know of no other way to arrive at the mutual clarifications of national interests necessary for progress toward peace than to engage, whether directly or indirectly, in negotiation. Outside forces cannot impose a settlement. We see no prospect for any other external means of narrowing differences.

For many months we have sought in the Middle East to convey one fundamental point: that agreement to negotiation requires no change of objectives but only a thoughtful approach to the possibility of mutually advantageous accommodation. That is the process that has taken place to the common benefit of peoples elsewhere—a process we ourselves have benefited from in Vietnam. It is a process that would also benefit the peoples in the Middle East—Palestinian, Israeli, and the peoples in the Arab states concerned. It is in such a process, and not in nihilistic terrorism of the kind that took the lives of two of our finest diplomats in Khartoum, that hope for a better future lies.

If, as a first step, negotiations on an interim Suez Canal agreement can be brought about and pursued to successful implementation, as we believe possible, the result would: reinforce the cease-fire, separate the military forces of the two sides, result in partial Israeli withdrawal, open the Suez Canal to international commerce, and, most importantly, create momentum toward a perma-

nent settlement based on U.N. Resolution 242.

I have placed such emphasis upon an interim agreement (not as an end in itself but as a step toward final agreement) because of our continuing judgment that it is there where the issues are most susceptible to successful results. We continue, of course, to be open to any ideas the parties may suggest. We do not, however, view an interim agreement as an end in itself and recognize the relationship between any first step toward peace and the broader context of a final Arab-Israeli settlement. As recent visits to Washington by King Hussein, President Sadat's emissary Mr. Ismail, and Prime Minister Meir have emphasized,⁵³ we remain in close consultation with the governments most intimately concerned.

81

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Iraq of Foreign Minister Macovescu of Rumania (excerpts)⁵⁴

Baghdad, April 24, 1973

At the invitation of the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Iraq, Mr. Murtada Said Abd al-Baqi, the Foreign Minister of the Socialist Republic of Rumania, George Macovescu, and a number of technical experts paid an official visit to the Republic of Iraq in the period April 20 to 23, 1973.

Reviewing the situation in the Middle East the two sides expressed their deep concern over the dangerous state of affairs in the region caused by the continued occupation of Arab territory by Israeli forces and by the continued attacks and raids carried out by those forces against other Arab territories, thus dangerously obstructing peace and international security. In these circumstances peace and justice in the region can only be achieved by the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the occupied Arab territories and by the Palestinian people's acquisition of all its rights in

⁵³ See docs. 62, 68 and 69 above.

⁵⁴ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Thawra* (Baghdad), April 25, 1973.

deciding its destiny in accordance with its national interests.

The two sides expressed their total support for the struggle of the Palestinian people to realize their goals.

82

Letter of protest from a group of Jews who emigrated from the USSR to Israel and then subsequently left Israel, delivered to the embassy of Israel in Austria⁵⁵

Vienna, April 27, 1973

We, former Soviet emigrés in Israel, consider it to be our duty to lodge a protest with the Israeli government against the continued deception of Soviet citizens of Jewish nationality and the entire world public. This deception is practised daily by Israeli propaganda organs and international Zionist organisations.

Under the pretext of being concerned for the fate of Jews, they are recruiting them into Israel while conducting an unbridled anti-Soviet campaign.

We, a group of former Soviet citizens who were taken in by the promises of Zionist propaganda, left for Israel and lived there for about two years, have seen for ourselves the tragedy of thousands and thousands of families, emigrés from the Soviet Union, men and women, the aged and children.

The overwhelming majority of Soviet Jews who arrived in Israel have seen from their own experience that no other country can replace their Soviet homeland for them and that psychologically, culturally and ideologically, they have nothing in common with the population living in the territory of Palestine in general and Israel in particular.

Israel turned out to be quite the opposite of the picture created in our imagination with the help of Zionist propaganda. Zionists are today practising a colonialist and racist policy toward the many-million strong Arab nation and toward the majority of Israel's people who have come from the Arab countries of North Africa. It is no

wonder, therefore, that people in Israel itself hate Zionism and the racist ideology which is being used by international imperialism against the interests of the working people.

All the vices of the infamous Zionist ideology and practices were manifested in the tragedies of Soviet Jews who found themselves in new conditions quite unacceptable to them.

Even the reactionary Israeli press does not conceal today that Soviet Jews have not accepted Israel. A morally decaying society which lives by the law of the jungle, broken and divided families, unemployment, financial dependence, alien surroundings, the need to struggle from the very first day for one's human and social rights, the humiliating position of women—all this affects people morally and is the cause of grave diseases, murders and suicides.

This is the price to be paid for the mistakes of people who have grown up in the conditions of Soviet society and who have found themselves in a backward eastern country, living in many respects under medieval laws.

We accuse international Zionism and its strike force—the ruling circles of Israel—of a cold-blooded, callous policy of deception which has led to tragedy for thousands of innocent people. As is known, international Zionists have been giving constant financial aid to the ruling circles of Israel, allegedly to support emigrés. The Israeli Zionists are using these funds first of all for new acts of aggression against Arab countries. The most cynical of these was the latest raid against Beirut.

Immediately upon arrival, most of the emigrés become heavily indebted for many years to come and only very few of them succeed in shaking off this burden.

Most of the emigrés from the Soviet Union would willingly return to the Soviet Union. But, unfortunately, many of them, who have already upset their well-adjusted lives, do not have enough strength, will, courage and means now to leave Israel and return to the Soviet Union.

The tragedy of the Soviet people who have found themselves in an alien country, transcends the bounds of a national problem and is being exploited by certain imperialist circles for political and ideological aims. Although these Soviet people have not accepted Israel and, on the other hand, Israel cannot receive most of the emigrés

⁵⁵ English text as published in *Soviet News* (London), no. 5686 (May 8, 1973), p. 196.

and provide them with jobs, western countries could not care less about the Soviet emigrés who, as soon as they leave the Soviet Union, become refugees whom no one needs, with all the consequences resulting from this.

How many hundreds of families are already roaming Europe and America in search of happiness and how many people have lost everything they had and have lost all hope of a happy present and a secure future?

The truth about Zionism generally and about Israel, which has brought much suffering to millions of Arabs and now to thousands of Soviet Jews, is already being realised by the deceived people.

We, people who have seen all this with our own eyes and experienced all this ourselves, say to the Zionists: Hands off Soviet citizens! Hands off the Soviet Union!

We appeal to international public opinion to do everything possible to bar the way to Zionism, as was the case with fascism, and not give it an opportunity to ruin people's lives.

We urge the Israeli government to end the anti-Soviet campaign and stop enticing Soviet citizens into Israel. We demand that the Israeli government stop its campaign of pressure on persons who are willing to leave Israel and call off financial and administrative measures preventing their departure from Israel.

83

Statement by Foreign Minister Jobert of France commenting on reports that Mirage jet fighters sold to Libya are in Egypt⁵⁶

Paris, May 2, 1973

At the end of the Council of Ministers meeting on Thursday, April 26, 1973, the minister charged with relations with Parliament declared in connection with a possible stationing of the Libyan "Mirages" in Egypt: "The government has not, to this day, received confirmation of the rumours circulating on the subject. Neither has it yet

received justifications for the anxieties expressed." It is the same today. Consequently, the government doesn't intend to confirm, in answer to the question made by Mr. Krieg, that these aircraft have or have not been placed at the disposal of the Egyptian army.

But the question asked should provide a useful opportunity for recalling, as has been done on several occasions—and they have been numerous—that the agreement made with the Libyan government in 1969 contains precise stipulations. They conform to the policy pursued by the government in the matter of exportation of military equipment, especially for the particularly sensitive Middle East. For it is agreed that this equipment should not be deflected from its normal use which, as we understand it, should be defensive—or dissuasive—in order to serve to aggravate tensions and increase the risks of new hostilities.

Mr. Chaban-Delmas, in January 1970, had recalled this policy, emphasizing that France's position was not to supply arms to the conflict.⁵⁷ This policy has not changed. These last three years, members of the government have recalled it on several occasions. Mr. de Lipkowski, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, again explained the government's view at length in the Senate on June 6, 1972,⁵⁸ noting that there could be no doubts about the engagements undertaken, nor about our wish to see them respected. Already at that time there was a certain amount of publicity concerning the supposed transfer of the aircraft to a neighbouring country, and the rumours spread in this way were not verified.

Then my predecessor, Mr. Maurice Schumann, on November 16, 1972,⁵⁹ at the tribune of the National Assembly, stressed our country's interest in being present in Libya on all levels, including that of military aid, so that this African and Mediterranean country should not be forced to turn towards very powerful states. But Mr. Schumann added that nothing authorized him to confirm that the Libyan armed forces would become engaged on the battlefield. Moreover, we had asked our ambassador in Tripoli some weeks previously to remind our [Libyan] counterparts of the conditions of the embargo policy. I should

⁵⁶ Statement made in response to a question by deputy Pierre-Charles Krieg [UDR] in the National Assembly; translated from the French text as published in *La Politique étrangère de la France: Textes et documents*, 1st semester, 1973 (Paris: La documentation française, 1973), pp. 135–136.

⁵⁷ Doc. 18 in *International Documents on Palestine 1970*.

⁵⁸ Doc. 93 in *International Documents on Palestine 1972*.

⁵⁹ Doc. 157 in *ibid*.

add that the government had also taken the opportunity of the Libyan Prime Minister Major Jalloud's visit to Paris in November 1972, to find out from him his government's intentions with regard to defence, and to remind him of our position.

It is obvious that planes are not destined either to stay on the ground or always to fly by the same route from a single base. Their movements are doubtless at the basis of the urgent approaches which have recently been made to us. We have of course been anxious—and what I have just said about our past action is an additional guarantee of this—to check that they are well-founded. We have approached the governments of both Cairo and Tripoli and asked them if the allegations in question were true. Both categorically gave us a negative answer. Moreover nothing to this day leads us to conclude that the agreements which were signed have been violated. We have so far received neither proofs nor explanations, although we are ready to do so, provided, of course, that they are, indeed, proofs.

Such are the details that I can give you, Mr. Krieg, at the moment, taking into account the position long held by the government and the information at its disposal up to now.

84

Report by US President Nixon to the Congress on US foreign policy (excerpts)⁶⁰

Washington, May 3, 1973

The focus of attention in the Middle East has been the prolonged crisis of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the persistent efforts to resolve it.

In my first Foreign Policy Report three years ago,⁶¹ I pointed out the serious elements of intractability that marked this conflict. It was a dispute in which each side saw vital interests at stake that could not be compromised. To Israel, the issue was survival. The physical security provided by the territories it occupied in 1967 seemed a better safeguard than Arab com-

mitments to live in peace in exchange for return of all those territories—commitments whose reliability could be fully tested only after Israel had withdrawn. To the Arabs, negotiating new borders directly with Israel, as the latter wished, while Israel occupied Arab lands and while Palestinian aspirations went unfulfilled, seemed incompatible with justice and with the sovereignty of Arab nations. A powerful legacy of mutual fear and mistrust had to be overcome. Until that was done no compromise formula for settlement was acceptable to either side. To the major powers outside, important interests and relationships were at stake which drew them into positions of confrontation.

The problem remains. For this very reason, I have said that no other crisis area of the world has greater importance or higher priority for the United States in the second term of my Administration. At the beginning of this year I met personally with Jordan's King Hussein, Egyptian Presidential Adviser Hafiz Ismail, and Israeli Prime Minister Meir to renew explorations for a solution.

The United States has no illusions. Instant peace in the Middle East is a dream—yet the absence of progress toward a settlement means an ever-present risk of wider war, and a steady deterioration of the prospects for regional stability and for constructive relations between the countries of the area and the world outside. Arab-Israeli reconciliation may seem impossible—but in many areas of the world, accommodations not fully satisfactory to either side have eased the intensity of conflict and provided an additional measure of security to both sides. Peace cannot be imposed from outside—but I am convinced that a settlement in the Middle East is in the national interest of the United States and that for us to abandon the quest for a settlement would be inconsistent with our responsibility as a great power.

The issue for the United States, therefore, is not the desirability of an Arab-Israeli settlement, but how it can be achieved. The issue is not whether the United States will be involved in the effort to achieve it, but how the United States can be involved usefully and effectively.

⁶⁰ Excerpts relevant to the Middle East, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXVIII, 1771 (June 4, 1973), pp. 784–785, 786–788.

⁶¹ Doc. 40 in *International Documents on Palestine 1970*.

The Situation Today. America's objective in the Middle East is still to help move the Arab-Israeli dispute from confrontation to negotiation and then toward conditions of peace as envisioned in UN Security Council Resolution 242.

But a solution cannot be imposed by the outside powers on unwilling governments. If we tried, the parties would feel no stake in observing its terms, and the outside powers would be engaged indefinitely in enforcing them. A solution can last only if the parties commit themselves to it directly. Serious negotiation will be possible, however, only if a decision is made on each side that the issues must be finally resolved by a negotiated settlement rather than by the weight or threat of force. This is more than a decision on the mechanics of negotiation; it is a decision that peace is worth compromise. It should be possible to enter such negotiations without expecting to settle all differences at once, without preconditions, and without conceding principles of honour or justice.

Two negotiating tracks have been discussed. One is Ambassador Jarring's effort to help the parties reach agreement on an overall peace settlement. The second is the offer of the United States to help get talks started on an interim agreement as a first step to facilitate negotiations on an overall settlement.

A persistent impasse, which is substantive as well as procedural, has blocked both of these approaches. It is rooted primarily in the opposing positions of the two sides on the issue of the territories. Israel has insisted that its borders should be the subject of negotiations and that substantial changes in the pre-1967 lines are necessary. Egypt, while stating its readiness to enter into a peace agreement with Israel, has insisted that before it could enter negotiations, even on an interim agreement, Israel must commit itself to withdraw to the pre-1967 lines. Jordan has also made clear its commitment to a peaceful settlement with Israel, but insists on the return of the occupied West Bank without substantial border changes and on restoration of a sovereign position in the Arab part of Jerusalem.

Recognizing the difficulty of breaking the impasse in one negotiating step—of reconciling Arab concern for sovereignty with Israeli concern for security—the United States has favored trying to achieve agreement first on an interim step. Since both Egypt and Israel asked us in 1971 to

help them negotiate such an interim agreement, we proposed indirect talks between representatives of the two sides brought together at the same location. In February 1972, Israel agreed to enter talks on this basis; Egypt has expressed reservations about any negotiations in the absence of prior Israeli commitment to total withdrawal from Sinai in an overall settlement.

The dilemmas are evident. Egypt's willingness to take new steps, for example, is inhibited by the fear that further concessions could erode the principle of sovereignty without assuring that Israel is interested in reaching agreement or will make appropriate concessions in return. Israel's incentive to be forthcoming depends on a difficult basic judgment whether its giving up the physical buffer of territory would be compensated by less tangible assurances of its security—such as Arab peace commitments, demilitarization and other security arrangements, external guarantees, and a transformed and hopefully more secure political environment in the Middle East. Urging flexibility on both parties in the abstract seems futile. Neither appears willing, without assurance of a satisfactory quid pro quo, to offer specific modifications of basic positions sufficient to get a concrete negotiating process started.

A step-by-step approach still seems most practical, but we fully recognize that one step by itself cannot bring peace. First, there is a relationship between any initial step toward peace and steps which are to follow toward a broader settlement. We are open-minded on how that relationship might be established in a negotiating process, and on what role the United States might play. But the relationship cannot be ignored. Second, all important aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict must be addressed at some stage, including the legitimate interests of the Palestinians. Implementation can occur in stages, and it should not be precluded that some issues and disputes could be resolved on a priority basis. But a comprehensive settlement must cover all the parties and all the major issues.

The issues are formidable, interlinked, and laden with emotion. The solutions cannot be found in general principles alone, but must be embodied in concrete negotiated arrangements. The parties will not be tricked into compromise positions by artful procedures. But there is room for accommodation and an overwhelming necessity to seek it.

Too often in recent history, Middle East turbulence has been compounded by the involvement of outside powers. This is an ever-present danger. Our efforts with other major powers to move from an era of confrontation to an era of negotiation have addressed this problem directly.

The nations of the Middle East have the right to determine their own relationships with the major powers. They will do so according to their own judgment of their own requirements. The United States has no desire to block or interfere with political ties freely developed between Middle East countries and other major nations in the world. We have our close ties with Israel, which we value, and we also have a strong interest in preserving and developing our ties with the Arab world. Other powers have the same right. But attempts at exclusion or predominance are an invitation to conflict, either local or global.

The first dimension of the problem is, of course, the direct involvement of the great powers in the Arab-Israeli conflict. A significant Soviet presence and substantial Soviet military aid continue in the area. The Soviet Union signed a friendship treaty with Iraq in April 1972.⁶² New shipments of Soviet military equipment have now been concentrated in Syria, Iraq, and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. The significant factor is whether the Soviet presence is paralleled by a Soviet interest in promoting peaceful solutions. The major powers have a continuing obligation to refrain from steps which will raise again the danger of their direct engagement in military conflict.

The danger of immediate U.S.-Soviet confrontation, a source of grave concern in 1970 and 1971, is at the moment reduced. The Moscow Summit and the agreement on the Basic Principles of our relations contributed to this, not only for the present but also for the longer term. Neither side at the summit had any illusions that we could resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, but there was agreement that we could keep it from becoming a source of conflict between us. The United States has no interest in excluding the Soviet Union from contributing to a Middle East settlement or from playing a significant role there. In fact, at the summit we agreed that we each had an obligation to help promote a settlement in accordance with Resolution 242.⁶³

The responsibilities and interests of the major powers in the Middle East go beyond the Arab-Israeli dispute. There are extensive political and economic ties between the countries of the region and the outside world. Here, too, there is a world interest in not allowing competitive interests to interfere with a stable evolution.

The United States considers it a principal objective to rebuild its political relations with those Arab states with whom we enjoyed good relations for most of the postwar period but which broke relations with us in 1967. We were able to restore diplomatic relations with the Yemen Arab Republic at the time of Secretary of State Rogers' visit there in July 1972; re-establishment of ties with Sudan followed shortly thereafter. We assigned two American diplomats to the interests section in Baghdad, Iraq, in 1972. We have just concluded an agreement with Algeria on a major project for the import of Algerian liquified natural gas. The United States is prepared for normal bilateral relations with all the nations of the Middle East.

The European Community is also expanding and consolidating direct ties with many nations of the Middle East and North Africa. This is a natural development; it builds on historical relationships and the economic advantages of geography. It gives these nations a greater stake in relations with the West. It gives the Western European countries an important role in maintaining the structure of peace beyond Europe. We are concerned, however, that as these relations evolve they not embody discriminatory arrangements which adversely affect our trade and that of other countries.

Economic competition in the Middle East between the United States and other free world nations could be particularly damaging in the critical area of energy. The traditional relationship between suppliers and consumers of energy has radically, and probably irrevocably, changed. In the Persian Gulf, where about two-thirds of the world's known oil reserves are located, Arab oil-producing countries have joined to reorder the relations with the international oil industry and the consumer countries. Iran has taken over operation of the companies working there. Our own requirements for Persian Gulf oil have been small—about ten percent of our total oil imports—but they will rise as U.S. energy demand expands.

⁶² Doc. 72 in *International Documents on Palestine 1972*.

⁶³ Doc. 88 in *ibid*.

Assurance of the continuing flow of Middle East energy resources is increasingly important for the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. This should be addressed as a common interest.

As for the relations between producer and consumer nations, here too we believe there is a shared interest. We both stand to gain from a stable and reliable economic relationship, ensuring revenues for them and energy resources for us. Oil revenues paid to Persian Gulf states have trebled in the last five years, financing their economic development and providing an expanding market for us. Their rapidly growing foreign exchange reserves give them increasing weight—and an increasing stake—in the international monetary system. We share these countries' desire to find arrangements which enhance the region's prosperity while assuring an effective means for meeting the world's demand for energy.

85

Television interview statements by Israel's Prime Minister Meir, Deputy Prime Minister Allon and Foreign Minister Eban discussing the possibility of war and of Israeli settlement in occupied territory, declaring Israel's concern in the fighting between the Palestinian resistance and the Lebanese army and insisting on the continued existence of the Jewish state⁶⁴

May 6, 1973

Q. Madam Prime Minister, during the past month Egyptian President Sadat has been threatening a shock in the Middle East, an attack on Israel, and you yourself during the past ten days have repeatedly warned that he must be taken seriously. Do you actually think that war now is a possibility?

Meir: What I said and say is that [by] all logical conclusions that one should reach, there is no sense in Sadat start shooting again. I am speaking for his own sake, the sake of the Egyptian people. It doesn't make sense; he can gain nothing

by it. We have no doubt whatsoever as to the results. I think he has no doubt as to the result. But since we cannot be sure that he thinks according to our logic, at least we must be prepared. He may do it at any time. We have known things like that happen before—

Q. Well, you see—

Meir: In '67 there was no sense for war.

Q. You seem much more concerned now than you were a year ago. What has changed?

Meir: Well, he has kept repeating that so many times, he has been setting so many dates that I think it would be wise for Israel to think that it might happen. And therefore we have to be prepared.

Q. Mr. Allon, an Associated Press story out of Cairo the other day quoted a senior Egyptian official as saying that Mrs. Meir's statements about a possible war might be a propaganda build-up for a preemptive strike by Israel. This sounds like a war of nerves. Do you think that the scenarios of 1967 may be replayed?

Allon: No, I don't think it is necessary because the entire geo-strategic situation has changed since. In 1967 we had no dimension of depth and the threatening Egyptian army alongside, with the other armies along the other borders. If they would have struck first, operationally speaking, that would have been much more difficult to defend the country than the other way that we chose to use. This time there is no need for that and as long as they are not really preparing themselves for an actual strike I don't think we have to do anything.

Q. Well supposing they were, do you rule out the possibility of a preemptive strike by Israel?

Allon: Well, a preemptive strike by all dimensional forces is unnecessary but if war becomes inevitable when the Egyptians make it clear that it is inevitable, of course certain measures may be necessary, but I prefer not to mention them in this press conference.

Q. Mr. Eban, the idea has been suggested that an explosion in the Middle East might actually be the only way to break out of the current stalemate. That it might take a war or crisis to force a political settlement. Do you think that that is conceivable?

Eban: No. I think that a breakdown of the ceasefire would create bigger deadlocks and worse

⁶⁴ Interview conducted by Lawrence Spivak, William Marman, Jim Hoagland, David Burrington and Terence Smith for NBC's "Meet the Press"; excerpted and transcribed from videotape at US Information Service, Beirut.

crises than any that exist. We are talking a great deal about the possibility of war, but we say in our judgment a war is not inevitable at all, but neither is it impossible. Therefore our only course is to make provision for both possibilities. I hope that our security people take the threats very seriously and act accordingly. On the political level we are entitled to remember that Sadat has been talking about war for very long without making it and that is also a possibility. It is impossible to be certain and therefore let us prepare for both contingencies.

Q. But do you see any chance that a settlement might come out of another war?

Eban: No. I think another war would make a settlement even further from us. It would create more hostilities, the tragedies of more families, lost and bereaved on each side. In no way can a settlement be advanced by war. Therefore, if he is talking about another war, this does not show that he is very sincere about the vision of a peaceful Middle East.

Q. Mr. Allon, Mrs. Meir has just said, repeatedly, the often enunciated Israeli position that there would be no preconditions. But it is clear from statements by the government and actions by the government that at a very minimum Israel is going to retain control over Sharm al-Shaikh, the Golan Heights, the Jordan valley, not to mention East Jerusalem. Why doesn't Israel annex these territories or make it clear that these are a minimum condition instead of continuing with this position of saying that all questions are open to negotiation?

Allon: Well, statements have been made by different governments of the area and in spite of that I think that the only way to clarify the possibilities for peace is by direct negotiations between the parties concerned. Now we deliberately refrain from acts of annexation just in order to keep the atmosphere more congenial for such negotiations and not to block the door for any sort of negotiations. Therefore I don't think we have to do anything legally but to preserve our right, of course, to put forward some suggestion around the conference table vis-à-vis the necessary changes or territorial changes which will provide Israel with secure boundaries or defensible borders and at the same time will meet a great deal of Arab aspiration.

Q. But given the Israeli action, given the 44 settlements in the territories, given the cities being built in Sharm al-Shaikh, in Hebron, is there any logical or reasonable man who could come to the conclusion that Israel did not intend to maintain control over these areas?

Allon: My dear, if the Arab governments decide to wait another twenty-five years, some more cities and villages may be built in some other areas. So the earlier they start to negotiate, the better for them and for the future of the Middle East.

Q. Mrs. Prime Minister, in 1970 Syria sent armour into Jordan during fighting between Palestinian guerrillas and King Hussein's army. Israel crudely signalled at the time that it would act militarily in Jordan if the Syrians joined the battle.⁶⁵ This week there has been bloody fighting in Lebanon between the army and the Palestinians. Is Israel prepared to act in Lebanon if a guerrilla take-over appears imminent or if other Arab states move to send forces to help the Palestinians in such a situation?

Meir: What we did in '70 and what I think we are duty bound to do at any time is, when something happens immediately across our borders we have to be very sensitive to what is happening and to be prepared on our borders to see that it does not spill over into our territory. So this is what happened in Jordan in 1970. It was not something, only something, between the army and the terrorist groups. But when Syria marched in then it became a question, and the attitude of Syria towards—not that we have peace with Jordan—it was quite natural that we should take action on our side of the border and so to hint to the Syrians that we are here, in case they have forgotten. Now the question in Lebanon is—if it comes to the same situation—we also will have to see that we are protected. By the way, may I suggest that I wonder if the Security Council is prepared to deal with the question of interfering with the sovereignty of an independent state like Lebanon, when people from Syria are sent in to help one part, the terrorist groups, who are fighting against the Lebanese army.

Q. The chain of events that led up to this latest fighting, the immediate chain of events, at any rate, grow pretty much from the Israeli raid on Beirut last month, in which three Palestinian leaders were killed. You have said and—you have declared war on terrorism.

⁶⁵ See doc. 242 in *International Documents on Palestine 1970*.

You have said that you will make Arab governments control the Palestinians. Do you see this type of fighting that is going on in Lebanon as vindication of your policy?

Meir: I don't think that we said that we are going to make Arab governments do one thing or the other. What we did say and what we are still saying, that every government of a sovereign state should see itself responsible and live up to the responsibility as to what is happening on its territory. And if it cannot do that, and since it is something of concern to us of—really a question of lives—therefore if they cannot do it, to our sorrow, we don't do it with joy, then we will have to take care of it ourselves. And when you say a raid on Beirut, it was not a raid on Beirut; it was a—we tried, and I think with great success, to know exactly where terrorists are, where their installations are and touched nothing in Beirut except these objectives.

Q. Mr. Allon, Israeli settlement in occupied Jordan is a very sore point. Much of the world or most of the world it seems, feels that this is making peace more remote. In this regard Defence Minister Moshe Dayan, referring to occupied Jordan said, "I think we have the right to settle anywhere. I don't think anybody has the authority to say the Jews are not allowed to settle down in their homeland—and this is our homeland." Do you agree with him on that?

Allon: Historically speaking, we the Jewish people have the right to settle down in any part of the land of Israel.

Q. You consider that the land of Israel?

Allon: Of course, this is the historic land of Israel and we consider our historic right for the land of Israel as the moral right for our very existence in this part of the world. But at the same time, as a sovereign country we can decide where to settle and where not to settle just because of political considerations. If we are ready, for instance, in principle, to compromise on a given piece of land in the West Bank it doesn't mean that we don't have a historic right on this particular land. In spite of this historic right we are ready to concede in order to achieve something not classed historic, which is peace. Therefore our policy of land settlement is selective in being considered by political as well as strategical considerations.

settling there after the peace agreement was reached with Jordan?

Allon: Well, this depends on the terms of the peace agreements. What we are trying to do today is to limit our land settlements only in particular areas of a most strategic value, and we do not implement our legitimate right to do it somewhere else or elsewhere just because we choose to do so. Politically speaking, I believe that by adopting this selective policy we manage to create important settlements for the future as well as having all options open for peace.

Q. Mr. Allon, I wanted to ask you about the intensive debate that has been going on in Israel about the occupied or the administered territories. You have recently given much more specific details of the plan that bears your name about the division of the West Bank territory, and one of the principles that seems to be clearly established there is to try to keep those areas with small or no population and to give back the areas of large population. This September in an interview with "Maariv"⁶⁶ newspaper, Mrs. Meir enunciated something of the same principle. Mr. Sapir in recent days has been talking about the fact of the demographic danger of absorbing a million Arabs. It would seem from all of these trends that Israel is shifting the basis for deciding what territories it will keep, at least in part, from security to Arab population.

Allon: Well, first, I prefer the term administered rather than occupied. Secondly, I don't think that Israel should be expected to act as a passive caretaker of a territory from which the Jordanian army attacked the Israeli state and the city of Jerusalem. This was a direct result of this assault and while there is no political solution we are there to administer the areas and treat nicely the population. And only when there is permanent political solution, of course, the final decisions about the legal jurisdiction will take place. Now about this plan. I am not objecting on it, it is not a bad one. Maybe it is not too good, but its only advantage is that all the other plans are probably worse. And I have nothing against the name of this plan too. But the idea of this plan is, of course, to seek a compromise, which takes into consideration both needs, ours and the Arabs, including the Palestinian community. To provide

Q. Well, would you insist on being able to continue

⁶⁶ *Maariv* (Tel Aviv), September 8, 1972.

Israel with defensible borders, borders that can be defended by ourselves, and by their mere existence the chance of averting other wars will grow. Secondly, to keep Israel, by and large, as a Jewish state, in character, with of course, a considerable Arab minority which we have always had.

Q. What size Arab—

Allon: Which was treated as equal citizens.

Q. What size Arab minority do you think would work in a Jewish state—ten percent—twenty percent—forty five?

Allon: We are about ten percent already within the jurisdiction of Israel. I am not going to be too accurate percentage wise, but I am—but there is also the quality of quantity. To add one million Arab inhabitants to our Arab population already may turn the country into a bi-national state, and we prefer to have it as a Jewish state with an Arab minority which will enjoy, of course, which enjoys already within our jurisdiction equal rights and also, also to try and answer some of the Arab hopes. They too, this million Arabs have some ideas which we must remember when we come to solve the problem. So this plan is trying to bring into account all possible considerations and this also, at least as far as I am concerned, directs me whenever I have to vote for any idea about refraining from settling somewhere or to establish a new settlement, I bear in mind this sort of a map which is not an accurate map but it is based on certain principles and the principles are guiding lines for me and probably for others as well.

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Appeal issued by the International Conference for Peace and Justice in the Middle East⁶⁷

Bologna, May 13, 1973

The International Conference for Peace and Justice in the Middle East was held in Bologna (Italy) from May 11 to 13, 1973.

⁶⁷ English text as published in *Middle East International* (London), no. 24 (June, 1973), p. 3. The Conference brought together delegates from 33 countries, including Israel and seven Arab countries, and was chaired by Romesh Chandra, General Secretary of the World Peace Council. The Israeli delegates

It brought together the representatives of international and regional organizations and representative delegations from countries of Europe, Asia, America, Africa, and Arab countries and Israel, reflecting different viewpoints but united in the desire to find the means of ensuring a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

Since the June 1967 war, the situation in this region has continued to deteriorate. The Israeli government continues, after six years, to occupy Arab territories with its armed forces. It is going ahead with the colonization of these territories and redoubling its measures to effect demographic and territorial changes. It continues to defy the decisions adopted by the United Nations. It strives, as do the Arab reactionary forces, to destroy by all means the national existence of the Palestinian people and to weaken the national and social liberation movement of the Arab peoples.

In underwriting this policy, especially by providing financial and military support, the government of the United States bears a major responsibility for the present situation.

This situation threatens peace in the Middle East, in the Mediterranean and in the world.

This conference urgently appeals to the peoples of all countries forcefully to express their determination to achieve a political solution to the conflict in the Middle East through the complete implementation of the U.N. resolutions of November 22, 1967;⁶⁸ and November 4, 1970,⁶⁹ which entail, first of all, withdrawal by the State of Israel of its armed forces from all the Arab territories occupied since June 1967 and recognition of the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine, and of their right to self-determination; together with the right of all the peoples and all the states of the Middle East to existence, independence, sovereignty and security.

The Conference also addresses this appeal to the parliaments and governments of all countries, in view of their responsibilities for the achievement of a just peace in the Middle East.

came mainly from left-wing groups, while the events in Lebanon prevented Palestinian organizations from participating (*Le Monde* (Paris), May 15, 1973, p. 2).

⁶⁸ Security Council Resolution 242; doc. 268 in *International Documents on Palestine 1967*.

⁶⁹ General Assembly Resolution 2628; doc. 330 in *International Documents on Palestine 1970*.

The world longs for a lasting peace, based on the principles of the United Nations and the right of the peoples to decide their own destiny.

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Press interview statements by Foreign Minister Scheel of West Germany stating that a Middle East settlement depends on a just solution of the Palestine question⁷⁰

Bonn, May 17, 1973

Q. Apart from mutual issues you will also certainly be discussing the Middle East conflict with your Arab interlocutors. What is the attitude of the Federal Government in this matter?

A. The Middle East conflict will undoubtedly be an important subject in the talks. Our attitude to it is based on our desire that tension be eased in the Middle East and that peace be made possible. Détente has made great progress in Europe; that should now be possible in the Middle East as well. It is, however, necessary that the legitimate interests of all parties be taken into consideration in any settlement.

We are of the opinion that Security Council Resolution 242 today still meets these conditions. The resolution contains concrete indications regarding all the questions of importance for a settlement. It would be welcome if a new attempt at responsible discussion were to be made soon. That would allow an initial clarification of this complex problem and might be a step in the right direction.

Q. Developments in the Middle East indicate that the Palestinians are moving ever more certainly into the foreground. How do you evaluate this new factor in the search for a solution to the Middle East conflict?

A. It seems to me that the Palestinians have always been an important factor in the total scene of the Middle East conflict. The Federal Republic has for many years given proof of this

conviction through its aid to the suffering. A peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict without a just solution of the problem of the Palestinians appears to me to be unthinkable.

88

Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Israel (RAKAH) on a peaceful settlement in the Middle East⁷¹

May 18, 1973

The Central Committee expresses its concern at the peril of a war conflagration in our region, in view of the continued occupation of the Arab territories for six years now. The Israeli government does everything in order to prevent the implementation of the Security Council Resolution 242, intensifies settlement and the creation of faits accomplis in the occupied areas, in order to prepare them for annexation; it continues acts of oppression, eviction, expropriation of lands and aggressive actions against the rights and against the very national existence of the Palestinian Arab people and against the neighboring Arab states. This policy is expressed by the barbaric bombing of refugee camps in Lebanon and the murder of the three Palestinian leaders in Beyruth.

The reiterated declarations of the prime minister, Golda Meir, negating the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian Arab people and even its very existence, express this policy of the Israeli government, which foils peace and aggravates the crisis. This aggressive and racist policy contradicts the true national interests of the Israeli people. Out of concern for the true national interest of Israel, the Central Committee condemns the Israeli government's policy which sabotages peace.

The Central Committee categorically denounces the provocative extreme declarations of the war minister M. Dayan, who calls for the annexation of the occupied areas and for extensive settlement therein. M. Dayan has designated for the Israeli people to live by the sword. The policy of the Israeli government, which leans on the support

⁷⁰ Interview conducted by Agence France Presse; translated from the German text, *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsmats der Bundesregierung* (Bonn), no. 60 (May 23, 1973), pp. 581-582. Foreign Minister Scheel visited Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon May 20-25.

⁷¹ Excerpted from the English translation as published in *World Marxist Review Information Bulletin* (Toronto), XI, 11-12 (August 31, 1973), pp. 71-72.

and backing of American imperialists, removes peace from the Israeli people, isolates Israel among the peoples of the world and also imperils Israel's future.

The positive developments in the international situation aroused confusion in the ruling circles. Internal polemics within the government intensified. But the opponents of the extreme adventurist positions of Dayan, within the government, are also drawing up annexationist plans of their own, and oppose the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian Arab people. Therefore, all bear responsibility for preventing the achievement of peace and for the danger of a renewal of war.

The Central Committee warns against the severe dangers stemming from the continuation of the Israeli government's refusal to respond to the repeatedly reiterated peace proposals of the government of Egypt, which is ready to sign a peace accord with the State of Israel on the basis of full implementation of the Security Council Resolution 242, on the basis of the border lines of June 4, 1967, the ensurance of the national rights of the Israeli and Palestinian Arab peoples alike. The full responsibility for the deterioration of the situation and for the danger of a new conflagration rests on the Israeli government and on the American imperialists, who obstinately attempt to foil every effort for a just and stable peace settlement.

The Communist Party of Israel calls upon all champions of peace in Israel to rally still more strongly their forces to intensify the struggle for changing the official policy, against occupation and for peace.

89

Press interview statements by Foreign Minister Scheel of West Germany reporting the Arab states' readiness to compromise and discussing West German relations with the Middle East⁷²

May 25, 1973

Q. Minister, do you have the feeling that there is a readiness in Cairo, Amman and Beirut to make sacrifices

for the sake of a Middle East peace?

A. All three governments have a strong desire to achieve a peaceful and, in their opinion, just solution in the Middle East as soon as possible. To that end the three countries are prepared to make concessions. From the Arab point of view concessions mean recognition and acceptance of the existence of the state of Israel.

Q. Did your trip signify the beginning of a more active Bonn policy regarding the Middle East?

A. The Federal Government has always given evidence of its great interest in the Middle East situation. The region lies so close to us geographically and is so important to us in every respect, especially economically, that we must be concerned about it. This trip showed, and was meant to show, that we are interested in a genuine and permanent normalization of our relationships with these states. The outcome has proved that we, in fact, have arrived at a better relationship.

Q. Were you able to refute the Arab charge that the German Middle East policy is one-sided?

A. We discussed this question in all conversations. We affirmed the declared policy of the Federal Government, namely our neutrality in the Middle East conflict and the impartiality of our Middle East policy. This was not questioned by our interlocutors.

Q. Several times during this trip you said that you could pass on the German experience in "defrosting" frozen situations.

A. Yes, but the question there and the question here cannot be compared. But perhaps experiences can be used relating to the procedure for thawing out frozen situations.

⁷² Excerpted and translated from the German text of the interview conducted by Frank Sommer, *Hamburg Morgenpost*, May 28, 1973, p. 8.

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the USSR of Foreign Minister Zayyat of Egypt⁷³

Moscow, May 29, 1973

In conformity with the agreement reached between the Sides Mohammed Hassan el Zayyat, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of Egypt, was paying a visit to Moscow from May 27 to 29, 1973.

M.H. el Zayyat had meetings and talks with A. A. Gromyko, Member of the Politbureau of the CPSU Central Committee, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

During the talks which proceeded in an atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding a broad exchange of opinions took place on the situation in the Middle East. The Sides have again stressed that the main cause of the remaining dangerous situation in this area continues to be Israel's unceasing aggression against the Arab states. Seeking to perpetuate the occupation of Arab lands and pursue the policy of constant expansion and of the enlargement of its territory at the expense of the neighbouring Arab states, Israel refuses to fulfil the well-known resolutions of the Security Council and sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations, grossly violates the UN Charter and the generally recognized standards of international law thereby seriously jeopardizing the cause of peace and security in the Middle East.

The Sides noted the invariability of their stands on the questions of a Middle East settlement; they emphasized that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East can be secured only on condition of Israel withdrawing its troops from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967 and ensuring the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine.

The Soviet Union and the Arab Republic of Egypt consider that the speediest elimination of the dangerous military seat in the Middle East and the establishment of a just peace in this region meet the interests of all the states and peoples of the world, and express the hope that the forthcoming discussion in the Security Council of the situation in the Middle East will help to step up

the struggle for a just settlement in this area.

Attaching important significance to this action the Sides address all members of the Security Council with an appeal to promote in every possible way a strict and full implementation of the corresponding resolutions of the United Nations on the Middle East and resolutely denounce those who hinder the fulfilment of these resolutions and endanger peace and universal security.

The Sides expressed deep concern over the recent clashes between the armed forces of the Lebanon and detachments of the Palestinian Resistance Movement. They noted with satisfaction that the Lebanon and the PRM are doing their best to settle the conflict in the interests of unity in the struggle against Israel's aggression.

The Sides reaffirmed their stands set out in the information made public on February 11, this year, on the stay in the USSR of M. H. Ismail, the Adviser to the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt on National Security.

The Soviet Side has again declared its support for the just struggle of the Arab peoples for the elimination of the aftermaths of Israel aggression.

After considering the development of friendly Soviet-Egyptian relations, the Sides reaffirmed the great importance of strengthening these relations as a major factor in the struggle against the imperialist aggression in the Middle East, for peace security and social progress of the Arab peoples. They expressed determination to further develop and consolidate the bonds of friendship and all-round cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Arab Republic of Egypt on a firm long-term basis of the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.⁷⁴

Mohammed Hassan el Zayyat, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of Egypt, invited A. A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, to visit the Arab Republic of Egypt. The invitation has been accepted with gratitude. The date of the visit will be specified later on.

⁷³ English text, *Moscow News*, supplement to no. 23 (June 9, 1973), p. 5.

⁷⁴ Doc. 125 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

91

Resolution of the Heads of State and Government of the OAU on Israel's continued occupation of part of Egypt⁷⁵**Addis Ababa, May 29, 1973**

The OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government in its tenth ordinary session in Addis Ababa from 27 to 29 May 1973,

Having heard the statement of His Excellency H. El Shafei, Vice President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, on the situation in the Middle East in general, and in particular on that resulting from the continued occupation of part of the territory of Egypt since the Israeli aggression of 5 June 1967,

Recalling all OAU resolutions adopted in this respect and specially resolution AHG/Res.67 (IX) adopted at the Summit Conference in Rabat,⁷⁶

Reaffirming resolution 2949 (XXVII) adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in December 1972,⁷⁷

Aware of the danger emanating from the deterioration of the situation in the north-east of Africa as a result of the continued aggression perpetrated against the territory of Egypt and other Arab territories—a danger which threatens the security, territorial integrity and unity of this continent,

Noting with deep concern that despite the numerous resolutions of the OAU and United Nations, calling upon it to withdraw from all occupied African and Arab territories, Israel not only persists in refusing to implement these resolutions, but also continues to practice a policy with a view to creating in the said territories a state of fait accompli aimed at serving its expansionist designs,

Deploring the systematic obstruction by Israel of all the efforts exerted to reach a peaceful solution to the problem at both the international and African levels,

Recalling in this respect the negative attitude of Israel towards the mission of the 10 African Heads of State mandated by the OAU to work for the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, which stipulated in particular, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from

all the occupied territories, in conformity with the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territories by force,

Noting with satisfaction that the Arab Republic of Egypt has spared no effort to reach a just and durable solution to the problem, and that these efforts have been characterized by the constructive co-operation of Egypt with international as well as African forums,

Noting further that the intransigence of Israel and its systematic refusal to abide by the will of the international community, constitutes a threat to the security of the continent,

Fully aware that the massive military, economic and other aids, as well as the political and moral support granted to Israel by certain Powers enable it to pursue its aggression and encourage it to commit acts of terrorism, especially the tragic act of shooting down the Libyan civilian aircraft which resulted in the loss of innocent lives,

1. *Takes note* of the statement of His Excellency H. El Shafei, Vice-President of the Arab Republic of Egypt;

2. *Strongly condemns* the negative attitude of Israel, its acts of terrorism and its obstruction of all efforts aimed at a just and equitable solution of the problem in accordance with the Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967;

3. *Calls once more* for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces from all occupied African and Arab territories;

4. *Declares* that all changes effected by Israel in the occupied territories are null and void, and pledges not to recognize any changes leading to a fait accompli or likely to jeopardize the territorial integrity of the countries which are victims of the Israeli aggression;

2. *Recognizes* that the respect of the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine is an essential element in any just and equitable solution, besides being an indispensable factor for the establishment of permanent peace in the region;

6. *Reaffirms* in the name of African solidarity and by virtue of article II, paragraph 1 (c) of the OAU Charter its active and total support for the Arab Republic of Egypt in its legitimate struggle to recover entirely and by all means its territorial integrity;

7. *Draws the attention* of Israel to the danger threatening the security and unity of the African continent as a result of its continued aggression

⁷⁵ Presented to the UN Security Council by Nigeria on June 7, 1973, and circulated in UN doc. S/10943; text in *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-eighth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1973*, pp. 70–71.

⁷⁶ Doc. 98 in *International Documents on Palestine 1972*.

⁷⁷ Doc. 10 in *ibid.*

and refusal to evacuate the territories of the State victims of that aggression and declares that the attitude of Israel might lead OAU Member States to take, at the African level, individually or collectively, political and economic measures against it, in conformity with the principles contained in the OAU and United Nations Charters;

8. *Earnestly calls upon* the big Powers supplying Israel with arms and military equipment of all kinds and granting it moral and political support that enables it to strengthen its military potential, to refrain from doing so;

9. *Strongly supports* the Egyptian initiative requesting the United Nations Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the explosive situation prevailing in the Middle East, and expresses the hope that the Security Council will take every appropriate measure to implement immediately the relevant resolutions adopted by the United Nations, so that a just and durable peace may be established in the region;

10. *Designates* the Foreign Ministers of Nigeria, Chad, the United Republic of Tanzania, Guinea, Algeria, Kenya and the Sudan to be the spokesmen to the OAU on this matter at the Security Council of the United Nations on 4 and 5 June 1973;

11. *Entrusts* the Current Chairman of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government to present the views of the OAU on the matter at the next session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

92

Statement by US Senator Fulbright (Dem.) opening hearings on energy by the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (excerpt)⁷⁸

Washington, May 30, 1973

It is our hope that these hearings will be conducted in a spirit of dispassionate concern for the national interest of the United States. We are well aware that this will not be easy because the energy problem overlaps with the emotionally charged Arab-Israel dispute. Compounding the issue of recent days is a rapidly accelerating arms race in

the Persian Gulf, which in turn reflects a struggle for influence in that crucial region among the Great Powers. The United States, which is by far the major supplier of arms to Israel, has also contracted to provide some four billion dollars worth of arms to Iran, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The Soviet Union, for its part, is deeply involved in Iraq as well as Syria and, to some remaining extent, Egypt. Britain and France are also involved in expanding arms sales to Middle Eastern countries.

In practice these various issues are inseparable. Possessing the great preponderance of the world's oil reserves, the Arab oil-producing states quite naturally are thinking about the leverage their oil wealth may provide them in their dispute with Israel and in their related dealings with the Great Powers who buy their oil. It may be unwise in particular instances, but it is a normal and familiar practice for nations to use economic leverage to advance what they conceive to be their national interests. For its part, the United States has not hesitated to use economic sanctions for political purposes in dealing with the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, Chile and other countries. The Israelis for their part—perhaps unwisely but no less understandably—use their regional military preponderance to advance their national interest as they conceive it. It contributes nothing—indeed it detracts from—public understanding to discuss these countervailing pressures in sanctimonious and overheated terms of “blackmail” and exposed “jugulars.” What we are witnessing in the Middle East at present is an alarming intensification of efforts on the part of all concerned to use the means at their disposal for their own interests and advantage. The important question is the interaction and possible conflict of these various interests, and the devising, if possible, of means of reconciling them. Obviously there is an overriding desire for peace in the area.

Just over a week ago, I made a statement in which I expressed apprehension that force might someday be used to wrest away the vast oil resources of the Persian Gulf from the militarily insignificant littoral states. Since then I have been relieved and reassured to have my apprehensions dismissed by such knowledgeable sources as *The New York Times*, which thought it “mischievous” even to suggest the possibility of military action to secure oil resources, and the Senator from Washington (Mr. Jackson), who thought my apprehension “most unfortunate”

⁷⁸ Excerpted from the partial text supplied, on request, by the US embassy, Beirut.

and "utterly irresponsible." As I said on May 21 when I expressed these fears, "I would like nothing better than to have them denied and repudiated by all concerned." So these denials are most welcome.

I am pleased to report too that I received a reply yesterday from the State Department to an inquiry which I had addressed to Secretary Rogers on May 11 regarding rumors of possible Israeli military action—rumors which I made clear in my letter I was "strongly disinclined to believe." The Department of State assured me yesterday that it "has no information that Israel is contemplating military action against any state." Acting Assistant Secretary Wright, who signed the letter, also stated: "I am authorized to assure you categorically that we are not engaged in, nor have we ever engaged in, support or encouragement in any way whatsoever of Israeli military actions." That also helps clear the air.

93

Radio interview statements by Israel Foreign Minister Eban commenting on President Bourguiba of Tunisia's suggestion of a meeting and the forthcoming UN Security Council Middle East debate⁷⁹

June 2, 1973

Q. President Bourguiba has set conditions in a newspaper interview for a meeting with an Israeli representative.⁸⁰ What is your reaction, Mr. Eban?

A. As I said yesterday, we have taken note of the views expressed by President Bourguiba in an Italian paper and later in a French paper. It is no secret that there are many contradictions between the Israeli and the Arab positions. Precisely for this reason there is need for and benefit in talks in which each side would express its view and proposals frankly. We shall clarify through appropriate channels the possibility of holding a meeting with President Bourguiba—a meeting which we are still prepared to hold.

Q. Ostensibly the prior contacts have meanwhile been conducted through the press. Do you approve of starting negotiations in such a way?

A. I am sure it would have been much better had the readiness to hold a meeting been expressed through a different channel. I am sure that a quieter approach to these matters would have helped to achieve progress. However, since President Bourguiba voiced his readiness in an Italian paper, we had no alternative but to find out first of all exactly what was said in that interview, and when we saw readiness to hold a meeting expressed in the interview, we immediately expressed our readiness. After all, this is our position—we are prepared to hold talks with any Arab leader without asking him in advance to agree with our views. However, Israel cannot be expected to look favourably on views which an Arab leader expresses prior to negotiations.

Q. Does it not seem as if a case of [words indistinct] has happened to President Bourguiba? Does it not seem as if he had fallen asleep in 1949 and was waking up today and proposing the partition borders?

A. This should not rule out talks with him. In our opinion, talks should be held without prior conditions to influence the positions of the parties taking part in the talks.

Q. The Security Council debate on the Middle East problem will begin next week. What in your opinion will the Arab line be, and what will Israel try to foil?

A. We have held contacts with the Security Council member states to propose that they do three things to oppose any change at Israel's expense in the basic international document of the Security Council Resolution 242 of November 1967; not to complicate the situation by setting up Security Council committees to replace the Jarring mission or to parallel it; and not to allow the Security Council to adopt definitions which contain hostility and threats and talk about sanctions, since this would not affect Israel's policy but would greatly cloud the atmosphere. The statements voiced in the three capitals I visited—Washington, Ottawa and London—give me the impression that our contacts were not in vain. It has been stated in the three capitals that there is no intention of changing the substance or the balance of the Security Council Resolution, and all of them, if I am not mistaken, have expressed doubt regarding

⁷⁹ Broadcast on Israel radio in Hebrew; excerpted from the English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4312/A/1,2; reprinted by permission.

⁸⁰ Doc. 250 below.

the need for a committee or a subcommittee, instead of the present UN representatives, to hold contacts with the parties. We shall continue to work for the removal of any obstacle in the way of negotiations, which, in our opinion, are the key to the problem.

Q. Is the doubt you spoke about, in your opinion, strong enough to bring the Americans to cast a veto if necessary?

A. If the states which have issued statements do what they have said, there will be no majority for the things I noted. The United States has clearly said that it will oppose a number of moves, and I understand that the only possible way to express opposition to a proposal is to vote against it.

94

Press interview statements by Chancellor Brandt of West Germany on West Germany's "non-aligned" Middle East policy⁸¹

Bonn, June 5, 1973

Q. Are you of the opinion that Germany should and can have a normal relationship with Israel as with other countries, or do you think that Germany, because of the tragic past, must still have a special relationship to Israel today and in the future?

A. The normal diplomatic, economic and cultural ties between two countries are one thing. Another matter is that these ties derive their specific nature from historic and moral reasons. I have made known that I do not favour suppressing or forgetting the past. On the other hand we must not become slaves of the past to the extent that we cannot cope with the future.

Q. Federal Chancellor, what is the German policy on the Middle East? Neutral?

A. The German Middle East policy strives for balance. It is non-aligned and actively interested in a just and lasting peace settlement.

Q. Federal Chancellor, do you feel that the Federal Government is morally and politically responsible for the security of the state of Israel and for peace in the Middle East?

A. What I have said previously on this matter still stands. But today I see above all a share in the responsibility of organizing peace—starting from the center of Europe.

Q. You have previously stated that the resumption by the Federal Government of diplomatic relations with most Arab states would not take place at the expense of Israel and German-Israeli relations. All the same, I should like to ask you again today whether this will remain the case in any circumstance?

A. It will.

Q. Is there any connection between the trip to three Arab countries which the German Foreign Minister has just made and your present visit to Israel? Do the two journeys in fact represent a kind of policy of balance on the part of the Federal Government in German Middle East policy?

A. It is a coincidence that these journeys are so close to each other in time. In other respects there is of course a connection. We want to cultivate our ties with all Middle Eastern states which are interested, and visits by leading politicians can serve to improve ties as well as to provide a useful exchange of opinions and information.

95

Statement by US Assistant Secretary of State Sisco explaining the US government's understanding of "the legitimate rights of the Palestinians"⁸²

Washington, June 6, 1973

Mr. Hamilton (Dem.): The President and Secretary Rogers have spoken from time to time about "the legitimate rights of the Palestinians." What do they mean by that? Specifically, are they talking

⁸¹ *Yediot Aharonot* (Tel Aviv), June 5, 1973; excerpted and translated from the German text, *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsmats der Bundesregierung* (Bonn), no. 68 (June 6, 1973) p. 675.

⁸² Excerpted from *New Perspectives on the Persian Gulf, Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives*; June 6, July 17, 23, 24, and November 28, 1973 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), pp. 24–25.

in terms of self-determination? Are they talking in terms of a separate state? Are they talking in terms of compensation or repatriation? Just what do they mean when they say that?

Mr. Sisco: First, as a general matter, what we mean by that statement is this: that we cannot conceive of a durable and just peace being achieved in the Middle East without the views and the interests of the Palestinians taken fully into account. That is first as a matter of general principle.

Now, to be a little more specific in response to your question, we have not, Mr. Chairman, adopted any substantive view as to how that interest should be expressed.

King Hussein, about a year ago, made a proposal calling for a Federal-type relationship between present-day Jordan and whatever part of the West Bank would be returned to him in any Arab-Israel peace agreement.⁸³ He has promised the Palestinians—and it is King Hussein in Jordan who faces the problem in its most practical sense—but he has promised the Palestinians self-determination.

But when you talk about the Palestinians, the first problem is: You can't determine who speaks for the Palestinians.

Second, there are divisions within the Palestinian movement regarding what the ultimate solution ought to be, as there are divisions within the regularly established states. You talk to one group of Palestinians and they favor an entity as a solution. You talk to another group and they see the solution in terms of return to the 1947 line. Now, you talk to another group and they see the future in some form of a link with the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan. So they have a variety of solutions and there is no one group that really speaks for Palestinians on the basis of any one solution, and that is, of course, part of the problem.

So what is meant really by these statements that have been made? Basically, we recognize that you cannot solve this problem in any durable way unless these legitimate concerns are met. How they are to be met, I think that is a matter for future sorting out primarily within the Arab world itself.

96

Statement by Foreign Minister Malecela of Tanzania calling on the UN Security Council to take steps to enforce its resolutions regarding the Arab-Israel conflict, made in a speech to the Security Council⁸⁴

New York, June 7, 1973

Fulfilling the mandate entrusted by the Tenth Summit Conference of the Organization of African Unity,⁸⁵ the Tanzanian delegation wishes to make an earnest appeal to the Council to take decisive measures to arrest and to terminate the trend of lawlessness and injustice in the Middle East. We call upon the Security Council to decide, here and now, on effective measures calculated to eliminate the consequences of the 1967 war of aggression; to restore the legitimate rights of the Palestinians who are now compelled to live in exile in conditions of squalor and utter frustration, and to establish conditions where a just and lasting peace can prevail in that region.

In this connexion, we particularly expect the Council to take all appropriate measures to enforce its decisions, and if the Council warns that it will take certain measures under the Charter we certainly expect it to take those measures instead of proliferating the warning. For the uneasy no war no peace situation that now prevails in that unhappy part of the world cannot and would not endure for long. The risk of a serious conflagration whose effects none of us can escape is too obvious to be emphasized. The patience of the victims of aggression, as well as that of the dispossessed Palestinians, is increasingly running out as the arrogance of Israeli authorities continues to assume wider dimensions. Let not history record that on such a clear issue the Security Council failed to live up to its responsibilities in support of the victims of aggression and thus paved the way for an international holocaust.

The initiative taken by the delegation of the Arab Republic of Egypt for an over-all review by the Security Council of the situation in the Middle East is a very timely and commendable

⁸⁴ Excerpted from the text of Malecela's speech in the Security Council's Middle East debate, UN doc. S/PV.1718, pp. 21-22.

⁸⁵ Cf. operative paragraph 10 of the OAU resolution printed as doc. 91 above.

one. It is a clear demonstration of that country's fervent desire that a peaceful and diplomatic solution be found to eliminate the consequences of aggression and wipe out injustices in the Middle East.

The Security Council must respond to the challenge in search of peace and justice. Failure on the part of the Council to act, and act firmly and decisively, would inevitably have far-reaching repercussions. As one of the spokesmen mandated by the African Heads of State and Government to present the position of the Organization of African Unity on the problem, Tanzania expresses its confidence that the Security Council will live up to its responsibility as the main organ of the world body responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. We dare not expect less.

97

Statement to the press by Chancellor Brandt of West Germany outlining the subjects of his talks with the Israel government⁸⁶

Jerusalem, June 8, 1973

Yesterday and today the Prime Minister and I have had talks on a wide range of subjects. As you know, other important talks have also taken place and there will be more to follow. However, I can already say the following:

First, as is customary in meetings of this kind between two heads of Government, we have considered the opportunities for our bilateral relations and the problems involved. We have noted that co-operation between the Federal Republic of Germany and the State of Israel has developed favourably in many fields and that the intensification of our exchanges and co-operation accords with our mutual interests.

The fact that the German Chancellor is speaking to you here today is not a matter of course but it speaks for itself. German-Israeli relations must be seen against the sombre background of the National Socialist reign of terror. This is what we mean when we say that our normal relations are of a special character.

Second, we have discussed a broad spectrum of questions concerning international relations in general, for instance the efforts to reduce tensions with a view to fostering co-operation between East and West. This exchange of views will be continued after this press conference when I shall be meeting Foreign Minister Abba Eban.

Third, we have of course devoted special attention to the Middle East conflict and the problems confronting this region. I appreciate the frank manner in which the Israeli viewpoint has been explained to me. As for the Federal Government, it has neither the intention nor the legitimization to take sides, whether it is asked to do so or not, thus overtaking itself. We are not called to act as an intermediary, nor are we in a position to do so. But the German interest is clear. We want to see a peaceful solution negotiated by and acceptable to those directly concerned. For the rest, we hope that the Secretary General of the United Nations and the governments who are particularly involved will succeed in creating a framework for meaningful talks and negotiations between the countries directly concerned.

Fourth, we have discussed the European Community, its perspectives, and its relationship with this region. The German Chancellor cannot speak for the Community, but he can speak as a European, and that I have done.

We have also discussed Israel's economic and political interests in connection with the European Community. In this respect, some of Israel's views are consonant with our own and we shall bear them in mind when the enlarged Community goes about the task of working out a comprehensive and balanced policy for the Mediterranean.

Fifth, the Prime Minister has accepted my invitation to make an official visit to the Federal Republic of Germany. The date will be arranged through the diplomatic channel.

Now before I answer your questions, let me say that by the time I have completed my weekend programme I shall again know something more about Israel than I knew before. You can believe a man who has long since ceased to count himself among the younger generation when he says: reading is important, talks are sometimes even more important, but in many cases there is no substitute for the personal, first-hand impression.

⁸⁶ English text supplied, on request, by the West German embassy, Beirut. Brandt was in Israel June 7-11.

98

Television interview statement by President Tito of Yugoslavia relating European security to the Middle East situation⁸⁷

Belgrade, June 13, 1973

Q. What is, in your mind, the significance of the Middle East and Mediterranean problems for European security and peace?

A. It is hard to expect success from the Conference on European Security if the situation in the Middle East and in the Mediterranean generally remains as complex and as troubled as it is. I think it would be a profound error completely to ignore the Middle East question at the European Conference. For the situation existing there now is extremely dangerous and is at the same time closely linked with the interests of Europe. It would, consequently, be mistaken to divorce the Middle East and Mediterranean from European security. There can be no European security unless that problem is solved.

It would also be erroneous to think that all problems should first be completely settled in Europe, and that the problems will then be solved there too. It is already the eleventh hour in the Middle East and something must be done to prevent a catastrophe in that part of the world.

99

Press interview statements by Defence Minister Dayan of Israel insisting on Jews' right to settle in the West Bank and rejecting a Palestinian state⁸⁸

Mid-June, 1973

Q. You have been quoted by the BBC as saying that you have expressed yourself in favour of Israel's right to

settle on the West Bank of the Jordan forever and always. Correctly quoted?

A. Add another "forever."

Q. Is that a kind of simplification? Or do your words actually mean that Israel, if she after, say, fifty years were to reach the conclusion that the security situation has become satisfactory, would then be prepared to—

A. Let me answer, for I understand your question. I differentiate between three things. At the moment I do not favour an annexation of the West Bank. I believe that the West Bank should remain in its present status until we agree with the Jordanians and the Palestinians that we should not annex it. Secondly, I think that we should have the right to settle on the West Bank, and not only now but also later when we have achieved an accord on the future of the West Bank—because the West Bank is the heart of our country to a much greater extent than Tel Aviv. Among the terms of the future treaty we should have the right to settle everywhere. That does not mean that we should settle everywhere. I would not go in for setting up a Jewish settlement in Balus. But I would insist that we must have the right to settle everywhere we are able to. And when we believe, from our point of view, that founding a settlement would be worthwhile, without forceful seizure or the expulsion of anyone, then we should have the right to settle, and no one should have the right to prevent us settling anywhere on the West Bank. The third element is security. That is a completely different question. Security means something completely different in war from what it means in peace. Military lines like the Suez Canal—there we are dealing with a most important military line—must be insisted on so long as the war lasts. But once the war is over then one does not really need that kind of military line, such tank obstacles, any more.

The West Bank is a different question. We are now sitting in Hebron. We have several settlements in the Jordan valley. And wherever we are, I believe we should not move back, we should not be expelled, we should even have the right to settle more Jews there and not only temporarily and for a limited time, since there it is after all not a question of Jews settling in the heart of their land. That has nothing to do with annexation. But I believe and I hope that once Jews have settled on the West Bank they will not move out again but remain there forever.

⁸⁷ Excerpted from the transcript of the interview conducted by Jahn Otto Johansen for Norwegian Television; transcript supplied, on request, by the Norwegian State Broadcasting Authority.

⁸⁸ Excerpted and translated from the German text of the interview conducted by Francis Ofner, *Die Welt* (Hamburg), June 16, 1973, p. 3.

Q. General, you mentioned the Palestinians. Is there a possibility of reaching an arrangement with them while they demand the creation of their own state? And with whom should one negotiate?

A. That is, of course, the question. I see the problem of the Palestinians like this: About 700,000 Palestinians lived where Israel is today, in Acre, Jaffa, Ramleh and so on. During the 1948 war they ran away from there. They fled. Approximately the same number of Jews came from the Muslim countries, from Iraq, Syria, Morocco and Yemen. More than 700,000 came to Israel. Not by intention but by circumstance there was a kind of population exchange. It started because the Arabs had something against the Jewish state, because they declared war and because they fled as a result of this war, I am convinced that history would have taken a different course if they had not waged war.

But that all happened twenty-five years ago. They ran away and their towns, their houses, their land did not remain empty, but the Jews from Arab countries—and I do not blame them for that at all; the Jews did not want all this to happen because the Arabs started the war. Now, I do not think there is any room for the Arab refugees of 1948, no more any place in the old Israel to which they might return. What has happened cannot be undone. The clock cannot be turned back. I think that the Palestinians who live on the West Bank, the Palestinians who live in Jordan, the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, Syria and the Gaza Strip should be settled. They should be rehabilitated—then they would no longer dream of returning to their old homes but could create for themselves a place in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and so on. I do not think there should be one Arab state here. And I believe that is going to happen whether or not it pleases either of them. I believe that those who are thinking of a return to Israel are not realists. Their return would be equivalent to the liquidation of Israel and I think they should get out of the habit of talking about it.

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100

Statement by the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs of the World Council of Churches expressing regret at the recent violence in Lebanon and calling for the churches' efforts towards a just solution of the Palestine problem⁸⁹

Viségrad, Hungary, mid-June, 1973

The Executive Committee of the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs of the World Council of Churches in its twenty-eighth meeting in Viségrad, Hungary, 14–19 June 1973, noted with regret the recent Israeli raids against Palestinians camps and Palestinian leaders in Lebanon and the eruption of violence between government and Palestinian forces in Lebanon. We know Lebanon to be a country where peace, brotherhood and liberty are held dear, and one where a unique experience of dialogue and co-operation among different communities is being carried out. For this and other reasons it merits our respect, and violations of its territorial integrity which disrupt this peaceful atmosphere are unacceptable. Yet against the background of recent Middle East history, this outbreak causes us to be especially concerned about the future of the Palestinian people, a large part of which resides in Lebanese territory.

We note with approval that the dialogue and unity among the Lebanese has survived this trying period and that 1) the Palestinians in Lebanon have affirmed their respect of the sovereignty of Lebanon, and 2) the Lebanese have reaffirmed their support for the Palestinians in their legitimate rights. This agreement could be an important step towards the full recognition of a Palestinian national identity having its own institutions, and thus a contribution to the establishment of a just and durable peace in the area.

The painful events which claimed both Palestinian and Lebanese lives cannot be separated from their regional context and for us are but the manifestation of the injustice of which the Palestinians have been the object in the region for the past 25 years and which has menaced their very existence.

We recall in this respect the statement adopted

⁸⁹ English text supplied, on request, by the World Council of Churches.

by the World Council of Churches' Central Committee in Canterbury, August 1969, which expressed the convictions that:

... no lasting peace is possible without respecting the legitimate rights of the Palestinian and Jewish people presently living in the area...;

and that:

... in supporting the establishment of the state of Israel without protecting the rights of Palestinians, injustice has been done to Palestinian Arabs by the great powers which should be redressed.

We also recall the statement and recommendations of the Consultation on the Palestinian Refugee Problem jointly convened in Cyprus from September to October 1969 by the member churches of the World Council of Churches in the Middle East and by the Division of Interchurch Aid, Refugee and World Service of the World Council of Churches which said:

We consider it our duty to call upon the churches of the world to use all their influence towards a just solution involving necessarily the recognition of the rights of the Palestinians from which alone a lasting peace could come to the Middle East.

Therefore the Executive Committee of the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs calls on the World Council of Churches' member churches in the Middle East and on all Christians in that region to work actively for a just solution to that conflict, so urgently needed. We realize that theirs is a difficult task, and we call upon the other member churches of the World Council of Churches, especially those in countries whose governments exercise great influence in the Middle East, to work actively in support of the efforts of Middle East churches and to urge their governments to abstain from any policy which would further menace the Palestinian people.

101

Television interview statements by US Senator Javits (Rep.) defending the Jackson amendment (excerpts)⁹⁰

Washington, June 24, 1973

Herman: Senator Javits, as you look at the hammer and sickle in the red flag floating over the White House grounds, you must have sort of thought to yourself, now who's selling whom what, who's doing what to whom? How did it turn out?

Javits: Well, I think Mr. Brezhnev is selling us primarily and I think we are demonstrating in respect to trade and the discussion held with him at luncheon by senators this week a fidelity to the principles of conscience, especially in respect to the immigration from the Soviet Union, including so importantly the immigration of Jews from the Soviet Union, which has characterized our country. You know, so many of us tend to forget our primary history. As far back as Martin Van Buren in 1840 we made the first of many declarations by successive presidents, including Nixon, against the persecution of Jews and other minorities. This is a tenet of our country, and I didn't get in the Brezhnev discussion any idea that he understood that. And he's kind of a pragmatist. We've got a lot to sell, says he, a lot of assets. You've got a lot of money and a lot of technology, we need it, so let's go, why fool around with things that trouble people's conscience, like persecution.

Childs: You were a leader in those discussions of the congressmen with Mr. Brezhnev. Do you feel he was deliberately lying to you about the small number of exit visas granted to Jews in the Soviet Union?

Javits: I don't believe he was deliberately lying. Mr. Brezhnev is a very important statesman and figure, and if he were it would be most ungracious to say so, and I don't believe he was. He was quoting their case, their figures, which is the whitewash for the Soviet Union, because he said they'd given say 60,000 visas in 1972. About 32,000 are accounted for as having gotten into Israel in that time.

⁹⁰ Interview conducted by George Herman (CBS), Marquis Childs (*St. Louis Post Dispatch*) and Bruce Morton (CBS) on CBS's "Face the Nation"; excerpted from the text as inserted by Sen. Javits, *Congressional Record* (daily), June 28, 1973, pp. S12364-12365.

So there is an order of magnitude established. He himself admitted that they had serious disputes about some 740, of whom 150 were continuing to be held in the Soviet Union for alleged security reasons. Well, everybody knows in the Soviet Union everything is state security, that a fellow who's a technician on research in pots and pans is in state security too. The answer is that it's strictly arbitrary, that thousands are scared from applying because the penalty is ostracism or imprisonment and the loss of your job and Siberia and a psychiatric ward somewhere, especially the intellectuals and the educated, because the Soviet Union, though it signed the Declaration of Human Rights, which says people have a right to leave a country, just as we did, believe that they have a right to hold on to people. That's statism, that's their whole concept, and lacks the conscience to realize you can't do it in this world, especially to a people who have lost one-third their number in the holocaust of exactly what dictatorship means in World War II.

Childs: But, Senator, if the Jackson amendment passes and you support it so ardently, as you've just made plain, doesn't this kill what you've been referred to as detente entirely?

Javits: It may not.

Childs: How do you mean, it may not?

Javits: Because nobody knows what the Russians want really and what will enable them to go forward. Now let me illustrate that. Really, most favored nations treatment doesn't mean much to them because they're not going to be selling much to the United States that's under tariffs. For example, gas is relatively unaffected by most favored nation. They want that as a matter of dignity and respectability. What they really want are large-scale credits. Well, they may find some way of doing without them if they have to. So one doesn't know really what's going to kill this deal, but I agree with you that the American people and the senators and congressmen concerned must be prepared in good conscience to assume that even if it killed the deal, it's still worth-while in terms of somehow or other letting the Russians know that you can't deal with the world and still have the cynicism, the injustice, and the persecution for which they are responsible in this case.

Morton: Senator, isn't that kind of a dangerous precedent? How do you react then if other countries tell us that we will only sell you goods if you change this policy or that policy—if the Arab states say we will only sell you oil if you change your policy towards Israel? Aren't you getting into a very swampy area?

Javits: I don't think so, Bruce, and I'll tell you why. Because every country has a right to tell us what they please, and we have a right, in accordance with our historic traditions and I've just pointed out it starts back in 1840, goes through successive presidents, Taft, and Rutherford Hayes, and Nixon and many presidents have taken—as a matter of fact, Taft cancelled a treaty with the Soviets because of persecution of Jews. But to continue—any nation has a right to tell us that about blacks or about other minorities or about U.S.-Israel relations, et cetera. We don't have to buy it. Neither do the Russians. They don't have to buy it either. That doesn't prevent a nation, which feels in conscience that this is the representation it ought to make, from making it, and that's the position of our country, and it's completely compatible with our history.

102

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the USA by General Secretary Brezhnev of the CPSU (excerpts)⁹¹

San Clemente, California, June 24, 1973

At the invitation of the President of the United States, Richard Nixon, extended during his official visit to the USSR in May 1972, and in accordance with a subsequent agreement, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. Leonid I. Brezhnev, paid an official visit to the United States from June 18 to June 25. Mr. Brezhnev was accompanied by A. A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR,

The parties expressed their deep concern with the situation in the Middle East and exchanged

⁹¹ Excerpted from the text, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIX, 1778, (July 23, 1973), pp. 130, 132.

opinions regarding ways of reaching a Middle East settlement.

Each of the parties set forth its position on this problem.

Both parties agreed to continue to exert their efforts to promote the quickest possible settlement in the Middle East. This settlement should be in accordance with the interests of all states in the area, be consistent with their independence and sovereignty and should take into due account the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people.

103

Press conference statements by US Presidential Assistant Kissinger discussing aspects of the US-Soviet joint communiqué⁹²

San Clemente, June 25, 1973

Q. Dr. Kissinger, the communique says positive trends are developing in international relations toward the relaxation of tension and the strengthening of cooperative relations in the interest of peace. I wonder if you would apply that sentence specifically to the Middle East situation and what transpired on it in the summit?

Dr. Kissinger: As you can see from the communique, the Middle East is one of the most complex areas and it is one in which one has to separate two problems, one, the local tensions—that is, the tensions between the Arab states and Israel—from the so-called great-power rivalry in that area. When this administration came into office, they were inextricably linked. In 1970 the world came close to the brink of war, closer than perhaps was realized generally at the time, over the invasion of Jordan by Syrian tanks, and at that time every conflict in the Middle East became immediately and inextricably a part of the great rivalry. Even the selection of words by White House briefers was picked up by local newspapers and became a matter of attention in the context of East-West relationships.

Now, I think it is safe to say not that the Soviet Union and we agree on the evolution of the Middle

East and how it should be resolved, as the communique makes clear, but I think both sides will make an effort not to become inextricably involved in its conflict with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The communique states that both sides recognize the importance of the solution and that both sides will make efforts to help promote it, and therefore we hope that some progress will be made over the course of the year.

Q. Is there any significance in the brief material on the Middle East to the omission of the word "security" in the phrase "be consistent with their independence and sovereignty"?

Dr. Kissinger: No, I think it is safe to say that both sides recognize that no solution is possible that does not assure the security of the countries concerned. And there is no dispute about this.

Q. Why didn't the communique then say so?

Dr. Kissinger: The truth is that I don't remember any discussion about the word "security." If somebody there thought of it, it almost certainly would have said so.

104

Statement by Foreign Minister Eban of Israel on the possibility of discussing the Palestine question with President Bourguiba of Tunisia⁹³

Jerusalem, July 4, 1973

Eban: There are no special problems between Tunisia and Israel. Our two countries have a common interest in stability in the Mediterranean. As for the Arab-Israeli conflict, it would be very useful for us to have a dialogue on the prospects for a just and lasting peace with an Arab leader who is not directly involved in the conflict, but who enjoys the confidence of millions of Arabs in different parts of the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Since Israel and Tunisia both support Security Council Resolution 242, it is obvious

⁹² Sections relevant to the Middle East excerpted from the transcript, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIX, 1778 (July 23, 1973), pp. 149, 150; for the communiqué see doc. 102 above.

⁹³ Translated from the French text of the statements made to André Scémama, *Le Monde* (Paris), July 6, 1973, p. 4.

that this document would form the basis and background to such a dialogue.

[*Scémama: Mr. Bourguiba, in his statement to Le Monde,*⁹⁴ *thinks that real security for Israel means the creation of a Palestine state, and adds that this prospect offers peace and cooperation with the Arab world, as well as security.*]

When our frontier with our eastern neighbour is fixed by an agreement, hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Arabs on both banks of the Jordan will be free to decide with Jordan on the structure of the state they wish to establish. I have heard of the idea of a federation. But it is not for Israel to decide. The main point is the fact that most Palestinians won't be under Israeli jurisdiction after the conclusion of a peace agreement because, as Israel's Prime Minister has declared, the territorial changes in a peace agreement would above all concern non-populated areas. I think that on this point there is agreement in Israel. But it is not our responsibility to determine the constitutional structure of other states. We have to deal with the Jordanians and Palestinians together as a whole. The Palestinian Arabs formed the majority of Jordanian citizens before 1967 and would still constitute the majority after a peace settlement. It is not for us to take decisions about the various forms of institutional solution affecting the Arab population of the East and West Banks. Peace will automatically bring a solution to the Palestine problem by leaving the majority of the 2,750,000 Palestinian Arabs free to fix for themselves their place in the Palestinian-Jordanian context.

What is obvious is that there can be no question of a Palestine in Israel's place, or at the expense of Israel's security and sovereignty. I must admit I don't know very well how President Bourguiba views relations between Jordan and the problem of Arab Palestine. A dialogue with him on this subject would be constructive.

Q. In what conditions would it be possible for you to accept to have discussions with Mr. Bourguiba or with another Arab leader?

A. We are ready to meet any Arab leader, including Mr. Bourguiba, to discuss an overall solution based on Security Council Resolution 242 or any possible stage on the road to final

peace. What matters is to follow the example of other continents: to replace public polemic with precise negotiations and to overcome all the inhibitions and taboos which have prevented a dialogue up till now.

105

Press interview statements by Israel Minister of Communications Peres suggesting a cantonal organization for Palestine⁹⁵

Mid-July, 1973

Peres: If you look at the map of the civilized world you will find two acceptable solutions in the event of there being two peoples in one country. These solutions consist in either dividing the country or dividing authority, that is, the federative or federal solutions; I approve of the second method. Then I shall say: Come along, let us divide the country into regions, as is the case in a large number of countries such as Canada, Belgium and Switzerland, and I mean between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean, between a point south of Rafah as far as Ras al-Naqla, as far as Mount Hermon, and from Rafah to Sharm al-Shaikh.

As regards our situation, we must think of the Canadian precedent, because Canadian federation arose more than a century ago and involves a certain kind of wisdom, so that it may well be taken as a source of inspiration. In Canada there was definite English majority amounting to two-thirds of the population and a Canadian minority that had come to the country before the English. Each party was afraid of the other; the Canadians were afraid that English immigration to Canada would decide things, while the English were afraid that the natural growth of the Canadians, who were Catholics and had large families, would lead to a change in the demographic situation unfavourable to the English.

Q. How many regions do you envisage here?

A. I envisage eight regions on our map, and

⁹⁵ Excerpted and translated from the Hebrew text of the interview conducted by Yeshiahu Ben-Vorat, *Yediot Aharonot* (Tel Aviv), July 13, 1973, p. 5.

⁹⁴ Doc. 257 below.

I envisage the division as follows: Judaea, Samaria, Jerusalem, Gaza, the Negev, Tel Aviv, Haifa and Hebron. I think that Jerusalem should be the capital, that is, it should have the status of a region, with Teddy Kollek as mayor and at the same time head of the government of the region, like Washington, D.C.

Q. What will be the method of representation in the federal government?

A. It could be, for example, representation based on population figures. If we had mixed elections—individual and regional—then the electoral regions would correspond with the governmental regions. The West Bank, for example, would send three deputies, while Tel Aviv would elect eight, in accordance with the number of inhabitants, not with the size of the area. As a general rule there would be two parliamentary systems everywhere, one of them representing regions and the other population.

Q. Do you propose doing anything like this with or without a peace treaty with the Arabs?

A. My personal inclination would be to announce that we are going to proceed with this plan in ten years, not immediately. We should say something like this to the Arab countries: Dear friends, if nothing happens between us during the next ten years, this is what will happen. Until that time I shall gradually build up all the institutions I have mentioned. I do not propose doing this immediately for two reasons: First, as long as there is a possibility of coming to an understanding with the Arabs I shall keep this possibility open, and, secondly, I do not think that it is desirable to kindle hostility between us and the great powers...

Q. Would you not make an exception for the inhabitants of Judaea, Samaria and Gaza?

A. I am in favour of doing so, but all the inhabitants of the state must be consulted. If you ask only the minority, what are you going to ask it? I know the answer. The minority will say that it wants to return to Jordan. In general I am in favour of holding a referendum of all who live between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean, if you want a referendum. You must not forget that federal government is not shared government, but government by a majority in the proper manner. It is not exercised through the strength of the army, nor through ignoring differences

of nationality, language and living patterns, but it remains majority rule.

Q. Are you not afraid of the so-called demographic factor?

A. I regard the demographic factor in quite a different way. I believe that Jews will come from Russia. I believe that Zionism will either die or be a motivation. More than ever before Jews are faced with a real choice between assimilation or Zionism. Mixed marriages and assimilation have reached levels unprecedented in our history—the rate of mass flight from Judaism is between 35 to 40 percent.

In my belief Israel is still the fundamental solution for the Jewish people. I have not relinquished the Zionist idea, but I am not upset by, nor do I dissociate myself from discussion of other views, nor do I despise those who think something else. I believe that Jews will come from Russia. I believe that we have got the better of Brezhnev to a certain extent, and we must now get the better of the problems of absorption, just as I believe that Jews will come from North and South America. I also believe, as regards the Arabs, that with the rising standard of living the natural growth rate will diminish. This is not unlikely; a slight fall in the natural growth rate of the Arabs can already be observed.

Q. From what you say it is clear that you reject the theories of Ben Aharon,⁹⁶ Sapir and Allon?

A. I definitely reject them.

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⁹⁶ Yitzhak Ben Aharon was Secretary-General of the Histadrut (Labour-Ahdot Ha'vudah); see doc. 67 above.

Joint declaration by trades unions of non-aligned countries for presentation to the Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Non-Aligned Countries (excerpt)⁹⁷

Belgrade, July 17, 1973

The situation in the Middle East is a danger to the peace. Any attempt to impose upon the Arab peoples and countries a solution which would represent a reward for aggression and usurpation of other people's territories by force, is unacceptable. In contravention of various UN resolutions and recommendations of a number of international bodies, Israel is continuing her occupation of sovereign Arab territories of Sinai, Golan and the east coast of Jordan. In these territories Israel continues to pursue the policy of occupation, expansionism and colonization.

The non-aligned countries and progressive forces throughout the world should extend their full support to the Arab countries in their just struggle for the liberation of territories occupied during Israeli aggression of 1967. There can be no definitive solution of the Middle East problem, nor can lasting peace be established in that region, unless the national rights, including the right to self-determination, are recognized for the people of Palestine, who, having been evicted from their country for more than a quarter of a century, have been waging a struggle for the restoration of their usurped homeland.

Statement by Foreign Minister Eban of Israel replying to a question in the Knesset on the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people⁹⁸

Jerusalem, July 18, 1973

The term "legitimate rights" of the Palestinian people is a vague and equivocal concept. It is open to various interpretations. And, indeed, there are, and have been, different interpretations of the term. What is the Arab interpretation? Most Arab spokesmen who use it, and especially the organizations which define themselves as Palestinians, mean one thing clearly—the absolute abolition of Israel's independence and sovereignty, and its replacement by a State with an Arab majority, which would be added to the eighteen existing Arab States. According to this concept, the Arab people throughout the world is to enjoy the right to a hundred percent self-determination and the Jewish nation to zero percent.

In many cases, when Arab leaders speak of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, their intention, in the context, is: negation of Israel's right to exist and denial of the national identity of the Jews. The literature giving expression to this notion is so prolific that it is superfluous to cite it here...

There remains, in my view, the question of the national and nationality definition of these million Arabs. That problem is not satisfactorily solved by progress in economic and social wellbeing. Its solution depends on the fixing of borders and the establishment of peace. There is no decision yet. The decision will be made in negotiations between the Arab Governments and Israel and through peace. Absence of negotiations and absence of peace are what prevent the Palestinians from defining clearly what their problem is and what are their goals.

On the other hand, in the ambit of peace, the Palestinians will constitute a majority in an Arab State and will surely be partners in determining its character, its destiny, its relations with Israel. The real problem, therefore, is not the problem of the Palestinians, but the problem of peace.

⁹⁷ Excerpted from the English text, *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXIV, 560–1 (August 5–20, 1973 . p. 21; taking part were trades union delegations from Algeria, Chile, Guyana, India, Mali, Morocco, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Zambia and Yugoslavia.

⁹⁸ Partial English translation, *Israel Digest* (Tel Aviv), XVI, 17 (August 17, 1973), p. 1.

Preservation of the independence and security of the one State of Israel is a historic, moral and international imperative of the highest order, which ranks above any claim to raise the number of the Arab States from eighteen to nineteen. The situation so far is that, between the desert and the sea, there have been two States, one Israeli and one Jordanian-Palestinian. We have no reason to commit ourselves to change this basic arrangement. What must be done is to define the border, the peace terms and the conditions of co-existence between Israel and the Arab State east of it: the destiny of that Arab State will be determined not by Members of the Knesset in Israel, but by the forces operating in Arab history, that is, by the citizens and residents of that State.

108

Statement by General Sharon of Israel expressing confidence in Israel's military strength⁹⁹

July 25, 1973

[Asked what would happen if the US refused to supply Phantom aircraft to Israel, Sharon replied:]

We should not be shocked at that. Israel is a military superpower. Nothing will happen if America stops sending Phantoms. But it is a mistake to think that America will apply sanctions against us. For the Americans there is nothing more important than a strong Israel. All the forces of European countries are weaker than we are. Israel can conquer in one week the area from Khartoum to Baghdad and Algeria. But there is no need for that.

109

Statement by Permanent UN Representative Scali of the US explaining the US veto of a Security Council draft resolution on the Middle East¹⁰⁰

New York, July 26, 1973

Mr. President, I wish to express my warm appreciation for the impartial, considerate way in which you have presided over this Council

¹⁰⁰ UN doc. S/PV.1735, pp. 57–61. The draft resolution was presented by eight non-aligned members of the Security Council and reads as follows (UN doc. S/10974 printed in *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-eighth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1973*, pp. 20–21):

The Security Council,

Having examined comprehensively the current situation in the Middle East,

Having heard in this context the statements of the participants in this debate, including the Foreign Ministers of Egypt, Algeria, Chad, Guinea, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan and the United Republic of Tanzania,

Emphasizing its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Emphasizing further that all Members of the United Nations are committed to respect the resolutions of the Security Council in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations,

Reaffirming resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967,

Conscious that the rights of the Palestinians have to be safeguarded,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General [S/10929] which includes an account of the objective and determined efforts of his Special Representative since 1967,

1. *Deeply regrets* that the Secretary-General was unable to report any significant progress by him or by his Special Representative in carrying out the terms of resolution 242 (1967), and that nearly six years after its adoption a just and lasting peace in the Middle East has still not been achieved;

2. *Strongly deplores* Israel's continuing occupation of the territories occupied as a result of the 1967 conflict, contrary to the principles of the United Nations Charter;

3. *Expresses* serious concern at Israel's lack of co-operation with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General;

4. *Supports* the initiatives of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General taken in conformity with his mandate and contained in his aide-mémoire of 8 February 1971;

5. *Expresses* its conviction that a just and peaceful solution to the problem of the Middle East can be achieved only on basis of respect for national sovereignty, territorial integrity, the rights of all States in the area and for the rights and legitimate aspirations of the Palestinians;

6. *Declares* that in the occupied territories no changes which may obstruct a peaceful and final settlement or which may adversely affect the political and other fundamental rights of all the inhabitants in these territories should be introduced or recognized;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to resume and to pursue their efforts to promote a just and peaceful solution of the Middle East problem;

⁹⁹ Excerpted and translated from the Hebrew text, *Yediot Aharonot* (Tel Aviv), July 26, 1973, p. 5. Statement made during a meeting with the youth section of the Independent Liberal Party.

during the past few difficult days. I also wish to express my admiration for your patience, your tact and the great efforts you have made to achieve a harmonious result.

The history of the Middle East problem is a history of lost opportunities. Today's action by the Council represents another opportunity missed. My delegation profoundly regrets that the Council has not achieved a result that would give impetus to realistic efforts to work towards peace and stability in the Middle East. The United States Government is committed without qualification to continue such efforts.

In my statement of 14 June before this Council I said:

My Government views this meeting of the Council as a challenge and an opportunity. It is a challenge to deal responsibly with one of the most . . . difficult . . . problems facing the world community. . . . It is an opportunity to create circumstances in which, at long last, Arab and Israeli might engage in a genuine negotiating process. (1726th meeting, p. 6)

Unhappily, the Council did not meet the challenge; it lost the opportunity.

The draft resolution before us was highly partisan and unbalanced. Its adoption could only have added another obstacle to getting serious negotiations started between the parties. It would have contributed another impractical and cosmetic result invoking the unreal rather than the real world. It is our hope that one day the choice will be made to face up to the hard reality that the job of peace in the area—the procedures and its contents—must be assumed by the parties themselves in an unprejudiced way.

Unhappily, the draft resolution put to the vote today, instead of focusing on possibilities for efforts towards agreement between the parties and trying to encourage such efforts, concerned itself with moral judgements about the past. The past is too much with us. We have been looking backward to grievances rather than forward to solutions. To put it most succinctly, if this draft resolution had been adopted it would have

changed fundamentally, it would have overturned Security Council resolution 242 (1967). It would, in other words, have undermined the one agreed basis on which a settlement in the Middle East could be constructed. That is why my Government felt compelled to veto the draft resolution.

As members of the Council are aware, my delegation did its utmost to avoid this result. We presented to the co-sponsors a series of reasonable and carefully-thought-out amendments. Had they been accepted, the Council would have taken a modest step forward rather than a confused step backward. Our suggested amendments are known to the members of the Council and I need not review them in detail here. One, however, bears special emphasis because it goes to the heart of the distortion which the draft resolution voted on today would have perpetrated if it had been accepted.

Operative paragraph 2 of that draft resolution treats in isolation the Israeli presence in territories occupied in the 1967 conflict. It speaks of "the" territories, ignoring the significance—recognized when resolution 242 (1967) was adopted—of the omission of this definite article, the word "the", from the text of resolution 242 (1967). And it takes no notice of the other fundamental and inseparable elements of that resolution, namely: that the ending of the occupation must be in the context of peace between the parties; that it must be in the context of the right of all States in the area to live within secure and recognized boundaries; and that it must be on the basis of agreement between the parties. Operative paragraph 2 bears no relationship to the provisions and principles of resolution 242 (1967). It would constitute an entirely different resolution, contrary to the entire concept of resolution 242 (1967). Our proposed amendment—one of several we offered—read as follows:

Deeply regrets the failure to reach agreement on a just and lasting peace, including Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict and secure and recognized boundaries .

8. *Decides* to afford the Secretary-General and his Special Representative all support and assistance for the discharge of their responsibilities;

9. *Calls upon* all parties concerned to extend full co-operation to the Secretary-General and his Special Representative;

10. *Decides* to remain seized of the problem and to meet again urgently whenever it becomes necessary.

If accepted, our proposed amendment would have preserved the essence and balance of resolution 242 (1967)—agreement, peace, withdrawal, and secure and recognized boundaries—which, I submit, remain the only hope if ultimately there is to be a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

To our regret, those proposals did not evoke the response, the careful consideration we believed they merited. Some argued that the proposals came too late. I understand what that implies about tactical factors in the processes of the Security Council. But, my friends, I submit that, if there is the will, it is never too late to work for peace and security. It is not too late now, and my delegation believes that, while this debate is ending, our responsibility to search for solutions to the Middle East problem continues.

The purpose of our amendments was to bring the eight-Power draft resolution into some measure of conformity with the essential provisions of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), which remains the only agreed—I repeat: agreed—basis for a peaceful solution. The draft resolution voted on today would have done irrevocable and permanent damage to that landmark resolution of this Council—a resolution which admittedly is interpreted differently by the two sides and whose constructive ambiguity can be resolved only in the caldron of negotiations between the parties, not by fiat of this Council or a group of outside Powers.

Casting a veto is never easy. It is a most serious decision—one we do not take lightly. However, the essence of statesmanship is to take a longer view, to persevere in the tough task of peacemaking, to find ways toward a lasting peace, and not to seek to score political debating points which have no lasting value.

All need not be lost. We note that the Secretary-General has the agreement of the parties to consult with them in the area. He has the continued support of the United States for this renewed effort; and, despite the differences revealed in our deliberations here today, there are no differences on this point. I believe we all agree with the Secretary-General's stated intention to engage himself in the pursuit of peace in the Middle East. He needs no new mandate. Security Council resolution 242 (1967) remains the basic framework.

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Letter sent to stockholders of Standard Oil Company of California by Chairman of the Board Miller urging a new perspective in US Middle East policy¹⁰¹

San Francisco, July 26, 1973

All of us are well aware that the United States is not producing enough oil and gas to meet the overall demands which exist today for these energy resources. We are becoming increasingly dependent on foreign oil imports.

Here in the United States we must increase our exploration efforts to find new oil fields, and do all that we can to develop all sources of energy. However, even with our strongest efforts in these directions, it is clear we must look to increased imports of foreign oil in sizable quantities.

Since 1960, the Nation's volume of petroleum imports has increased more than three-fold, and now amounts to more than 35% of our domestic requirements. The foreign oil we will need could rise to 45–50% by the end of the 1970's.

A key question certainly is, "From where is all this oil to come?" Obviously, we must look to all parts of the world, but primarily to the prolific oil fields of the Arab/Persian Gulf area which contain almost two-thirds of the Free World's oil reserves.

Standard Oil Company of California has had a long association with the Gulf area, which has become important as a basic supply source for Western Europe and Japan, and will be an important source for the United States in the years ahead. California Standard made the first oil discovery on Bahrain Island in the Gulf in 1932. A year later it concluded an historic agreement with King 'Abd al-'Aziz to explore and develop the Eastern segment of Saudi Arabia, which contains nearly one-fourth of the world's known oil reserves.

During these 40 and more years, we have maintained a continuous and cordial relationship with the Arab people. The development of their oil fields has been a story of mutual cooperation and benefit, reinforcing bonds of friendship between our two peoples that were forged decades before.

¹⁰¹ Text as published in *Near East Report* (Washington, D.C.), XVII, 32 (August 8, 1973), p. 126.

There now is a growing feeling in much of the Arab world that the United States has turned its back on the Arab people. Many are said to feel that Americans do not hold in proper regard the national interests of the Arab states, their long history of important contributions to civilization, their efforts to achieve political stability and to develop sound and modern economic structures.

All of this is occurring at a time when the Arab states—because of their vast reserves of crude oil—are becoming increasingly important to the future welfare of the Western world. The Arab states—and Iran—hold the key to the energy resources which fuel the industrialized nations of Western Europe and Japan. They represent the only major source to which the United States can look for any substantial increase in its crude oil imports to meet our needs.

It is highly important at this time that the United States should work more closely with the Arab governments to build up and enhance our relations with the Arab people. We as Americans have a long history of friendship and cooperation with Arabs. It goes back more than 100 years, long before the first oil operations, and involves cultural relationships which encompass education and religion, as well as commercial trading.

During this time, much good will has been established which must be enhanced. There must be understanding on our part of the aspirations of the Arab people, and more positive support of their efforts toward peace in the Middle East.

It is in the best interest of all of us who are citizens of the United States to urge our Government to work toward conditions of peace and stability. We must acknowledge the legitimate interests of all the peoples of the Middle East and help them to achieve security and a dependable economic future.

Looking forward to the energy needs in the years ahead, it is in our mutual interest to encourage a United States Government course which recognizes the importance of these objectives to the future of all of us—a course which above all seeks a peaceful and just settlement of conflicting viewpoints.

111

Statement by the Foreign Ministry of Norway explaining the circumstances of the arrest of two Israelis in connection with the murder of a Moroccan¹⁰²

Oslo, July 30, 1973

The Foreign Ministry considers it appropriate at the present time to publish further information regarding the arrest of two Israeli citizens in the apartment of [security] attaché Eyal in Oslo and regarding its contacts with the Israeli authorities in this case.

On the night of Wednesday (25/7) the duty officer in the Foreign Ministry was informed by the police that two persons had been arrested on that same night in the Oslo residence of the Israeli attaché Eyal.

Wednesday morning the Foreign Ministry was contacted by Israel's ambassador who, without wishing to register a formal protest against the arrest and referring to the rules of international law regarding the inviolability of embassy officials' residences, requested that the two be released immediately. The Foreign Ministry replied that it was informed of the arrests after the event since the police did not realize that it was an embassy official's residence until after they had entered the apartment. It appears from the police report of the arrests that Mr. Eyal did not protest against the arrests, while the Israeli ambassador, on the other hand, reported that Eyal had registered an oral protest referring to the rules of international law regarding the inviolability of embassy officials' residences.

During the conversation with the ambassador of Israel the Foreign Ministry also pointed out that although the arrests technically could be considered a breach of international law the circumstances were such that the arrests must be regarded as legal. It was pointed out that the police had a well-founded suspicion that at least one of those arrested was connected with the murder in Lillehammer. Finally, the ambassador was informed that the Foreign Ministry would study

¹⁰² Translated from the Norwegian text, *UD-informasjon* (Oslo), no. 24 (August 1, 1973); the Moroccan, Ahmad Boushiki, was killed in Lillehammer on July 21 by Israeli agents who mistook him for a member of the Black September organization.

the case further and would return to the matter later in the day.

After the Ministry's legal section had analyzed and evaluated the international legal aspects of the case Ambassador Keenan was called to the Foreign Ministry the same afternoon. He was informed of the following:

1. A demand for release on the basis of the rules of international law could not be met;

2. The two arrested would be brought before an examining magistrate;

3. During the enquiries in Lillehammer information had become available to the effect that the action had been perpetrated by an Israeli group to prevent a planned Black September attack against Israeli institutions in Scandinavia.

Friday morning (27/7) the acting head of the Foreign Ministry's legal section received a telephone call from the Israeli embassy and was informed that the head of the Israeli Foreign Ministry's legal section, Mr. Rosenne, had arrived in Oslo and wished to meet him. This meeting took place Friday morning.

Mr. Rosenne announced officially that the two arrested were Israeli citizens. Rosenne pointed out that the arrests had been carried out in contravention of the rules of the Vienna Convention regarding diplomatic relations and suggested that they should in consequence be released. This was turned down by Norway.

Mr. Rosenne then requested permission for a representative of the Israeli government to visit the two arrested. On Friday afternoon, after consultations with the Ministry of Justice and the prosecuting authority the Foreign Ministry informed the Israeli ambassador that such a meeting could probably be arranged.

However, the prosecuting authority has later announced that, considering the present investigations, it cannot advise that such a meeting take place. The Israeli embassy had today been notified accordingly.

112

Communiqué on the meeting of East European Communist party leaders (excerpts)¹⁰³

Crimea, July 31, 1973

I.

On July 30–31, the meeting of the leaders of the Communist and Workers' Parties of the socialist countries took place in the Crimea with the following taking part:

T. Zhivkov, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party and Chairman of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria; J. Kádár, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party; E. Honecker, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany; Y. Tsedenbal, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Mongolian People's Republic; E. Gierek, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party; N. Ceausescu, General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party and Chairman of the State Council of the Socialist Republic of Romania; L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; G. Husák, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia; as well as A. A. Gromyko, Member of the Politbureau of the CPSU Central Committee and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR; B. N. Ponomarev, Alternate Member of the Politbureau and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and K. F. Katushev, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

II.

One of the most acute problems is still the situation in the Middle East, a situation which must be settled on the basis of a complete pull-out of Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories, and respect for the independence and lawful rights of the states and peoples of that area, including the Arab people of Palestine.

¹⁰³ Excerpted from the English text, *Foreign Affairs Bulletin* (East Berlin), XIII, 24 (August 22, 1973), pp. 176, 177.

113

Letter from US Senator Cranston (Dem.) to Standard Oil of California Chairman Miller objecting to Miller's recommendation for a new perspective in US Middle East policy¹⁰⁴

Washington, August 3, 1973

Dear Otto,

I was distressed by your July 26 letter to Standard Oil of California stockholders.¹⁰⁵ It has been widely interpreted as implying that the United States government should reduce or withdraw its support of Israel because of our reliance on Arabian oil.

It is my understanding that Standard Oil is far more dependent on Arabian oil than is the United States. I can understand your desire as chairman of the board to ensure uninterrupted oil supplies for the good of Standard Oil. But I do not share your apparent inference that what is good for Standard Oil is necessarily good for the United States.

Indeed, I'm not sure that what you recommend is even good for Standard Oil. It is certainly not my view that continuing supplies can best be assured by a change in U.S. foreign policy in favor of the Arab nations against Israel.

Peace in the Middle East is the best guarantee of uninterrupted oil production. And American support of Israel is the best guarantee of peace in the Middle East. It is a stabilizing force designed to maintain a balance of power by offsetting Soviet aid to the Arab nations.

The present American policy in the Middle East is a continuation of a policy that has been carried on successfully by the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon administrations with the overwhelming bipartisan support of the Congress. It is in the best interest of the United States and, I suspect, in the best interest of Standard Oil as well.

I am determined to do all that I can to see that it is continued without diminution in any respect. The decision of the Congress, in which I joined, to proceed immediately with the trans-Alaska

pipeline is yet another indication of American determination not to become dependent on Mid-east oil.

Cordially,

Alan Cranston

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Statement by government ministers of the Israeli Labour Party on proposed policy in the occupied territories—the "Galili document"¹⁰⁶

Mid-August, 1973

Preamble: These points of agreement are not decisions endorsed by the Party and the Labour Alignment, but recommendations by the Labour Party ministers. The Prime Minister has submitted these points of agreement to the authorized organizations (the Party, the Labour Alignment and the Government) for their approval. These points will be set out as guide-lines in the electoral programme of the Labour Alignment and included in the government's general plan of action. Once the basic lines of the plans of action have been approved the projects will be worked out in practical detail, and the budgets for their implementation will be included in the government's annual budgets. The plan of action in the occupied areas for the next four years will not be conditional on any change in the political status of these areas or the civil status of the inhabitants and the refugees.

A. Principles: The next government will continue to operate in the occupied areas on the basis of the policy pursued by the present government—development, provision of employment and services, economic links, open bridges, encouragement of initiative and the renewal of municipal representation, orders from the military government, village and town settlement, improvement of the refugee camps, specific and controlled work in Israel for Arab workers from the occupied areas.

¹⁰⁴ Text as inserted by Senator Cranston, *Congressional Record* (daily), August 3, 1973, p. S15741.

¹⁰⁵ Doc. 110 above.

¹⁰⁶ Translated from the Hebrew text, *Davar* (Tel Aviv), August 16, 1973. Organization of sections from *The Jerusalem Post*, August 17, 1973, p. 3. The statement was the result of a series of meetings of ministers from the Labour Party; the largest group in the coalition government. For the ministers concerned, see Appendix F.

B. *Rehabilitation of Refugees and Economic Development in the Gaza Strip*: A four-year plan of action will be drawn up, and the necessary funds allocated for its execution, with a view to ensuring the rehabilitation of the refugees, and economic development. The main points of this plan of action will be: Changing the housing situation (establishing places of residence for the refugees near the camps, improving the camps and making the municipalities of neighbouring towns responsible for them); vocational training; improving health and educational services; creating new means of livelihood in trades and industry; encouraging the population to take the initiative in improving their standard of living.

C. *Development in the Judea and Samaria*: A four-year plan of action will be drawn up and the necessary financing for its execution ensured, with the object of ensuring the development of the economic infrastructure and improving the essential services (health, electrical, etc.); developing the water services to meet the requirements of the population; developing vocational and higher education; developing electrical communications and transport services; improving streets and roads; developing trade and industry as sources of employment for the inhabitants; improving the refugees' housing situation; and help to the municipal authorities.

D. *Financing for Judea and Samaria*: Once it is endorsed by the government, the agreement reached between the Ministries of Finance and Defence will constitute the basis of decisions as to how the plans of action in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank should be financed.

E. *International Financing*: Efforts will be made to obtain from external sources the means to finance projects for the rehabilitation of the refugees and development in the occupied areas.

F. *Encouraging Israeli Business in the Territories*: Facilities and incentives will be provided to encourage Israelis to establish industrial projects in the occupied areas (in accordance with the proposal submitted by the Minister of Trade and Industry to the Governmental Committee for Economic Affairs on August 1).

G. *Encouraging Local Residents' Initiative in Judea and Samaria*: Aid will be given for self-initiative of the inhabitants in the fields of education, religion and services, and in the field of developing democratic forms in social and municipal life.

As far as possible local persons will be appointed to high civilian posts in the [Military] Government.

H. *The Policy of Open Bridges*: The policy of open bridges will continue.

I. *Work for the Inhabitants of the Territories in Israel*: Work for the inhabitants of the occupied territories in Israel and in Jewish economic areas in the occupied territories will be subject to control as regards both numbers and the areas in which workers are allowed to work. Necessary measures will be taken to ensure working conditions and wages similar to those in Israel.

J. *Paramilitary and Civilian Settlements*: New settlements will be established and the network of settlements will be reinforced. Efforts will be made to increase their population by developing trade, industry and tourism. When the government's annual budget is drawn up from year to year it will be decided what means are necessary for the new settlements, in accordance with the recommendations of the Settlement Department, and after the approval of the Ministerial Committee on Settlement to establish new settlements in the next four years in the Rafah Approaches, the Jordan Valley and the Golan Heights. They will include a civilian-industrial settlement in the Golan Heights, a regional centre in the Jordan Valley, development of the north-east shore of the Sea of Galilee and the north-west shore of the Dead Sea and executing the planned water projects. Non-governmental organizations, both public and private will be included within the framework of the plans approved by the government for the development of sites for settlement.

K. *The Regionkl Centre in the Rafah Approaches*: The continued development of the Regional Centre in the Rafah Approaches will be ensured so that it may comprise 800 housing units by the year 1977-1978. Industrial development for settlers prepared to settle at their own expense will be encouraged.

L. *The Unification and Purchase of Land in the Territories*: 1. More intensive action to unify lands for the requirements of existing and planned settlement (purchase, state lands, abstentees' lands, exchanges of lands, arrangements with the inhabitant) will be expanded. 2. The Israel Lands Authority will be recommended to expand purchases of land and real estate in the occupied areas for the purposes of settlement, development and land exchange. 3. The Lands Authority will

lease and to companies and individuals for the execution of approved projects. 4. The Lands Authority will also try to buy lands by all effective means, in particular through companies and individuals who buy lands, in coordination with the Lands Authority and on its behalf. 5. Purchases of lands and real estate by companies and individuals will be approved only in cases where it is ascertained that the Directorate is unable to buy or not interested in buying the lands on its own account. 6. A special Cabinet Committee will be authorized to grant permits, on condition that the lands purchased are intended for constructive projects and not for speculation, and within the framework of the government's policy. 7. The Israel Lands Authority will also make a point of acquiring lands already bought by Jews.

M. *Jerusalem and Environs*: Provision of housing and industrial development in the capital and its environs will be continued with a view to consolidation beyond the original area. To achieve this goal, efforts will be made to buy additional land; the government lands in the area to the east and south of Jerusalem which the government has decided to enclose will be exploited.

N. *Nabi Samuel*: The government's decision taken on September 13, 1970, on the settlement of Nabi Samuel will be implemented.

O. *A Deep Sea Port in Southern Gaza*: In preparation for the rapid development of the Rafah Approaches studies will be carried out in the course of two or three years on the basic facts of the proposal to construct a deep sea port south of Gaza—the geographical situation, the economic viability and the political considerations. When the results have been obtained and a practical project has been submitted, the government will take a decision on the matter.

P. *An Industrial Centre in Kfar Saba*: The necessary conditions will be ensured for the establishment of an industrial centre attached to Kfar Saba beyond the Green Line, as also for the development of Israeli industry in the areas of Tulkarm and Qalqilya.

115

Press conference statements by US Secretary of State-designate Kissinger concerning his role in US Middle East policy¹⁰⁷

San Clemente, August 23, 1973

Q. *Dr. Kissinger, a question on the Middle East. For the past four years you have maintained a low profile in this particular area. Do you plan to continue that, or will you become a more public figure in pursuing settlement of the Middle East situation?*

A. The President has repeatedly stated that the Middle East is an important area and perhaps the most dangerous area, and I will pursue, under the President's direction, those policies which are considered necessary. And in the past, that has sometimes meant a less than restrained profile.

Q. *Dr. Kissinger, may I follow on to that? How do you plan to put to rest the apprehensions that have been expressed by some Arab leaders about your family heritage and how that might affect our policy in the Middle East?*

A. I am asked to conduct the foreign policy of the United States, and I will conduct the foreign policy of the United States regardless of religious and national heritage.

There is no other country in the world in which a man of my background could be even considered for an office such as the one to which I have been nominated, and that imposes on me a very grave responsibility which I will pursue in the national interest.

¹⁰⁷ Excerpted from the transcript, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIX, 1786 (September 17, 1973), pp. 372–373.

116

Communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the USSR of Executive Committee Chairman Arafat of the PLO (excerpts)¹⁰⁸

Moscow, August 24, 1973

Yasir Arafat, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) visited the Soviet Union at the invitation of the organizing committee for the World University Games....

During his stay in the USSR Y. Arafat was received by the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee and other organizations and met with representatives of the Soviet public. In the course of the talks opinions were exchanged on the Near East situation and on the struggle for the elimination of the consequences of Israeli aggression, for the guaranteeing of the legitimate rights and interests of the Arab people of Palestine, and for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in this area.

Y. Arafat told of the activities of the PLO and emphasized the Palestinian patriots' resolve to close ranks and repulse the plots of imperialism, Zionism and reaction, which are trying to suppress the struggle of the Arab people of Palestine for self-determination.

On behalf of the PLO leaders and the struggling Arab people of Palestine, Y. Arafat expressed thanks and gratitude to the Soviet Union for its firm, principled position of support for the Arab peoples subjected to Israeli aggression and for the help being given to the Arab national-liberation movement including the Palestine Resistance Movement. Y. Arafat emphasised the great significance of the foreign policy activities of the Soviet state and of L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, personally, in the cause of the peace, security and freedom of the peoples, including the Arab people of Palestine.

During the talks the Soviet peoples' invariable and firm support for the Arab peoples' just struggle against imperialism and criminal Israeli aggression was conveyed to Y. Arafat, resolute support

for the demands that Israeli troops withdraw from all occupied Arab territory was expressed, and solidarity with the Arab people of Palestine was emphasized.

117

Press conference statements by US President Nixon denying that US Middle East policy will be influenced by the oil situation¹⁰⁹

Washington, September 5, 1973

Q. Mr. President, you alluded to this a moment ago, but what exactly are you doing to meet these threats from the Arab countries to use oil as a club to force a change in the Middle East policy?

A. Mr. Cormier [Frank Cormier, Associated Press], that has been a subject of major concern; and what we are doing, some can be talked about and some cannot. Obviously, we are having discussions with some of the companies involved. Obviously, as far as some of the nations involved—for example, Libya—our relations are not that close that we could have too much influence.

With regard to Saudi Arabia, perhaps the relations which the United States has with Saudi Arabia might lead to more influence there.

What I would suggest is this: In a broader context, the answer to the problem of oil that we presently depend upon in the Mideast, we depend on it not, of course, nearly as much as Europe, but we are all in the same bag when you really come down to it. The problem that we have here is that as far as the Arab countries are concerned, the ones that are involved here, is that it is tied up with the Arab-Israeli dispute. That is why in talking to Dr. Kissinger, both before I nominated him and since, that we have put at the highest priority moving toward making some progress toward the settlement of that dispute. That is one side of it.

The other problems, of course, are the radical elements that presently seem to be on the ascendancy in various countries in the Mideast, like Libya. Those elements, of course, we are not in a

¹⁰⁸ *Pravda*, August 25, 1973, p. 5: partial English translation, *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXV, 34 (September 19, 1973), p. 14. Translation copyright 1973 by *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, published weekly at the Ohio State University by the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies; reprinted by permission of the Digest.

¹⁰⁹ Excerpted from the partial transcript, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIX, 1787 (September 24, 1973), pp. 386-387.

position to control, although we may be in a position to influence them, influence them for this reason: Oil without a market, as Mr. Mosadegh learned many, many years ago, does not do a country much good.

We and Europe are the market; and I think that the responsible Arab leaders will see to it that if they continue to up the price, if they continue to expropriate, if they do expropriate without fair compensation, the inevitable result is that they will lose their markets and other sources will be developed.

Q. Mr. President, I would like to check the Arab oil pressure, if I may again. Is it possible that the threat of limiting the supply of oil would cause a moderation in U.S. support of Israel?

A. I think that that question is one that has been understandably speculated about a great deal in the press. But obviously for the President of the United States in answer to such a question to suggest that we are going to relate our policy toward Israel, which has to do with the independence of that country to which we are dedicated, to what happens on Arab oil I think would be highly inappropriate.

I will say this, and I will put it in another context, however. Israel simply can't wait for the dust to settle, and the Arabs can't wait for the dust to settle in the Mideast. Both sides are at fault; both sides need to start negotiating. That is our position.

We are not pro-Israel and we are not pro-Arab, and we are not any more pro-Arab because they have oil and Israel hasn't. We are pro-peace. And it is in the interest of the whole area for us to get those negotiations off dead center, and that is why we will use our influence with Israel and we will use our influence, what influence we have, with the various Arab states, and a non-Arab state like Egypt, to get those negotiations off. Now, one of the dividends of having a successful negotiation will be to reduce the oil pressure.

118

Resolution adopted by the Fourth Conference of Heads of State and Government of Non-Aligned Countries on the economic consequences of Israel's aggression against the Arab states¹¹⁰

Algiers, early September, 1973

In the light of the provisions of the Declaration of the Conference in Lusaka on Non-Alignment and Economic Development and the Programme of Economic Cooperation formulated in Georgetown and emphasizing the need for a mobilization of efforts and resources with the aim of securing the best possible results in the economic growth of the non-aligned countries and the necessity of cooperation with a view to eliminating the obstacles hampering economic development within those countries, themselves, and abroad;

The Fourth Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Algiers from September 5 to 9, 1973, analysed the fatal consequences of the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East in the economic field, both in national and international frameworks.

The Conference declares that the only way of suppressing these consequences is to take prompt action to end Israel's occupation of Arab lands and to reach a just solution of the Middle East problem which would preserve the rights and freedoms of the peoples in that region, remove the menacing prospect of a renewal of the armed conflict and eliminate the causes of tension and economic decline, the only solution which would enable the Middle East countries to work together with the other countries of the world for the fulfilment of peaceful and productive aims, to develop their resources and raise the living standard of their peoples. This kind of development would necessarily improve the entire international economic situation and make it possible to reopen the Suez Canal, a vital artery of international navigation.

Furthermore, the Conference condemns any threat, explicit or implicit, directed at present or in the future against oil-producing countries with the aim of bringing pressure to bear on those countries

¹¹⁰ English translation, *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXIV, 563 (September 20, 1973), pp. 37-38.

and detracting from their legitimate right to preserve and utilize their natural resources.

The Conference demands that the Palestine people be enabled, by their natural and legitimate right, to have again a country of their own so that they may use their positive energies and thus take part together with other nations in the constructive struggle for progress.

The Conference condemns the attempts of Israel to alter the demographic and geographical situation in the regions which it occupied forcibly and unlawfully in 1967, and the declaration of Israeli leaders in which they express their decision to incorporate those regions definitively into Israel. The Conference also condemns the creation of settlements in those regions, composed to an ever-growing extent of persons who are aliens there.

This policy is being pursued by various methods of pressure on the Arab population to compel them to abandon their homes in favour of Israel and to leave their land for good. In this manner, Israel has imposed a blockade and quelled the Arab economy on occupied territories with the aim of keeping it in a state of under-development and permanent subordination to Israel. The Conference furthermore censures the exploitation of the natural resources on occupied territories on the part of Israel and proclaims all those actions null and void because they violate the valid principles of international law, the Geneva Conventions, the UN Charter and the subsequent UN resolutions and jeopardize international peace and security.

The Conference demands that measures be taken which would put an end to such actions of Israel at once and that all that has been done so far or that may be done in future be declared null and void.

Resolution adopted by the Fourth Conference of Heads of State and Government of Non-Aligned Countries on the Middle East and Palestine¹¹¹

Algiers, early September, 1973

The Fourth Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Countries assembled in Algiers from September 5 to 9, 1973:

Recalling the earlier resolutions of non-aligned countries on the difficult situation which prevails in the Middle East and which stems from the persistence of Israel in its policy of occupation of territories of three non-aligned countries and which represents a threat to the security of non-aligned countries and international security and peace;

Reaffirming the legitimacy of the struggle of the Palestine people against colonialism, Zionism and racism and for the complete restoration of its national rights, a struggle which is an inseparable part of the liberation movement in the world;

Reasserting the impermissibility of territorial conquest by means of force since that is in overt contradiction with the principles of the United Nations' Charter and represents a serious danger to peace in the world;

Highly alarmed because of Israel's policy of aggression and expansion, which represents in fact a severe assault against the sovereignty of the Arab peoples in the Middle East and a threat to their security and territorial integrity;

Considering that Israel's policy of aggression and occupation of Arab territories deprives the countries in that region of their right to exercise sovereignty over their natural resources, which is at variance with the aims of the non-aligned countries and the strategy of development of the United Nations and the resolutions of the United Nations confirming the right of states to exercise sovereignty over the natural resources located on all their territories;

Condemning Israel for having resorted since its inception to methods of the most brutal oppression and terrorism;

Recalling the Geneva Convention of 1949 on the protection of the civilian population in war-time and calling for strict application of that

¹¹¹ English translation, *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXIV, 563 (September 20, 1973), pp. 33-34.

Convention by Israeli occupying forces;

Convinced that the military, economic, political and moral support of some western powers, the United States of America in particular, has enabled Israel to pursue its policy of aggression and prolong its occupation of Arab territories:

1. *Demands* that Israeli forces withdraw at once and unconditionally from all the Arab territories which they occupied after June 1967;

2. *Reaffirms* its full and effective support for Egypt, Syria and Jordan in their struggle for recovering their occupied territories with all available means;

3. *Calls on* the non-aligned countries to extend support to the Arab people of Palestine in their struggle against colonialism, Zionist racism and settling of colonists and for the restoration of their national rights in their entirety; underlines that complete restoration of those rights represents the basic condition of a just and durable peace and declares that the Organization for the Liberation of Palestine is the legitimate representative of the Palestine people and their legitimate struggle;

4. *Demands* that all states withhold the Israelis emigration to the occupied territories;

5. *Condemns* those powers, the USA in particular, which offer Israel military, economic, political and moral aid, and demands that such assistance be stopped immediately;

6. *Requests* strict application of the Geneva Convention and considers that all the illegal measures of Israel for altering the geographical and demographic situation on the occupied territories are null and void and that they must not be acknowledged under any circumstances, whatsoever;

7. *Condemns* the violation of human rights by Israel on occupied Arab territories and its refusal to apply the Geneva Convention of 1949 on the protection of the civilian population in wartime. It also denounces Israel's policy bent on altering the nature of the occupied territories and considers that such actions represent war crimes and a challenge to humanity, as stated in a resolution of the 28th meeting of the Human Rights Commission;¹¹²

8. *Welcomes* the decision of some member-countries to break off relations with Israel and calls on the other member-countries to work for

a boycott of Israel in the diplomatic, economic, military and cultural fields and in the sphere of maritime and air traffic in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII of the United Nations' Charter;

9. *Calls on* the ministers of foreign affairs of the member-countries to set out the stand of the non-aligned countries with regard to this matter in accordance with this resolution at the next meeting of the United Nations General Assembly.

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Political declaration by the Fourth Conference of Heads of State and Government of Non-Aligned Countries (excerpts)¹¹³

Algiers, September 9, 1973

1. The Fourth Conference of Heads of State and Government of Nonaligned Countries was held in Algiers from September 5th to 9th, 1973.

14. Although substantial progress has been made in the easing of tensions between East and West, the fact that nations are faced with colonialism, domination and occupation, neocolonialism, imperialism and Zionism, remains an indispensable reality of our times.

15. Peace is not even close to being a certainty in all parts of the world as we can see in the situation obtaining in Indochina, despite the Paris Agreement and the cessation of US bombing of Cambodia; in the Middle East, where the situation continues to deteriorate; in Africa, where there has been a new outbreak of colonial wars of extermination and aggression against independent states; and in Latin America, where the colonial situation still exists and where imperialism conspires against the sovereignty and security of states.

28. The situation in the Middle East continues to give cause for great concern. Israel's obstinacy in pursuing the policy of aggression, expansion and annexation, as well as the Israeli policy of

¹¹² Doc. 18 in *International Documents on Palestine 1972*.

¹¹³ Excerpted from the English translation, *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXIV, 563 (September 20, 1973), pp. 19, 20-21.

oppressing the inhabitants of the territories which they have occupied by force, are a challenge to the international community, to the United Nations and to the universal declaration on human rights and are a threat to international peace and security.

29. Again calling attention to the inadmissibility of the forcible annexation of territories, the Conference calls upon Israel to withdraw from all occupied territories forthwith and unconditionally, and undertakes the obligation to aid Egypt, Syria and Jordan with all means in the liberation of their occupied territories.

30. In this connection, the restoration of the national right to the Palestinian people is a fundamental precondition for the establishment of an equal and lasting peace in this area. The struggle of the Palestinian people to recover their homeland which was taken from them is an integral part of the struggle of all nations against colonialism and racial discrimination, and their struggle for self-determination. The participants at the Conference call upon all states, particularly the United States of America, to refrain from supplying Israel with weapons, and from any political, economic or financial support which would enable it to continue its aggressive and expansionist policy.

31. Israel's persistence in defying the international community and the United Nations will force the nonaligned countries themselves, and within the United Nations together with member countries of this organization, to take individual and collective measures against Israel in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

32. The Conference gives firm support to and expresses solidarity with the Palestinian people in their difficult trials and great sacrifices they are suffering in order to regain their dignity and national identity.

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Statement by the Foreign Ministry of the Netherlands on Dutch policy towards the Middle East¹¹⁴

The Hague, September 18, 1973

5. The Middle East

The Jordan and Egyptian ceasefire lines have remained quiet. This situation, which in itself is gratifying to note, is not, unfortunately, a true reflection of the actual situation in the Middle East, which is still characterised by great and constant tension. This was brought home to the world only too clearly by the murder of Israeli athletes during the Olympic Games in Munich and by the murder of Western diplomats in Khartum, through which extremist groups among the Palestine liberation movements tried to focus attention on the plight of the refugees. They demanded for them, as part of the original population of the former trust territory of Palestine, the right to give a political form to a growing sense of nationalism or, at least, to have a major say in decisions determining their future. The acts of the Palestine liberation organisations meet with sympathy among large sections of the public in the Arab countries. This makes it well-nigh impossible for the governments of those countries, where internal tensions are rife, to condemn such acts of violence, let alone to take strong action against extremist organisations. Hostilities in Lebanon, which have caused great concern to the Netherlands Government, clearly illustrate the problems confronting the Arab governments, problems involving considerable risk of escalation both inside and outside the frontiers of the country in question. Israeli concern over the failure to take effective measures against acts of terrorism directed against Israeli nationals and interests outside Israeli territory and over the inability of the Arab governments to curb actions against Israel by organisations operating in their territory has resulted in the Israeli Government's decision to extend its counter-activities to centres of such organisations in other countries, thereby involving innocent victims. The Netherlands Government condemns all terrorist activities. It hopes that the

¹¹⁴ English text in Chapter V (Foreign Affairs), pp. 41-43, of the Explanatory Memorandum to the 1974 budget; supplied, on request, by the Dutch embassy, Beirut.

Arab countries from which such activities emanate will take effective measures to control them. But it also hopes that the Israeli Government will exercise great self-restraint in launching counter-activities. It is precisely this vicious circle of actions and counter-actions, in the light of which the tragic incident of the Libyan airliner should be viewed, which has again heightened tension and reduced hopes of inducing the Egyptian and Israeli Governments to adopt more flexible attitudes. Under these circumstances neither Ambassador Jarring nor the United States Government saw any possibility of resuming earlier initiatives. In the Netherlands Government's view the present deadlock is fraught with danger. Instability in the area is increasing as a result of economic depression, dissatisfaction and frustration at being powerless to change the situation. There are indications that the Arab countries will try to resolve the deadlock by exerting pressure on Europe, and on the United States in particular, using their oil, an essential source of energy to the West, as a weapon.

Another serious development is the misuse being made of international non-political fora for the submission of resolutions for the political condemnation of Israel. The Netherlands Government is of the opinion that this will only aggravate political discord and emotions, which is anything but conducive to creating a climate where a certain rapprochement between the parties might be achieved. For these reasons it is not at all enthusiastic about the annual debates on the Middle East in the General Assembly. Apart from the fact that in the opinion of the Netherlands Government the Security Council is the appropriate forum for such debates, if held at all, it believes that parallel discussions in the General Assembly have no useful effect and therefore detract from the prestige of the United Nations.

One of the chief conditions for seeking a settlement of the conflict in the Middle East is that an atmosphere of trust be created between the parties most directly involved in the conflict. Territorial changes and the establishment of security zones should therefore not come first. Since, under the present political circumstances, the Arab countries are not prepared to enter upon direct negotiations, any progress towards some form of understanding will, for the time being, be dependent on the establishment of some sort of indirect

contact between the parties. The Netherlands Government feels that any initiative which in this way could lead to the opening of genuine negotiations is deserving of active support.

The Netherlands Government maintains its view that a settlement on the basis of Security Council Resolution No. 242 (1967), agreed on in its entirety and indivisibly in consultation between the parties, would afford the best opportunities for peace in the Middle East. Israel would have to withdraw behind safe boundaries to be agreed upon, marking a territory of approximately the same area as it occupied before the Six-Day War. The state of war in the Middle East would have to end unconditionally and the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of each State in the region would have to be respected and recognised. The Netherlands Government is of the opinion that a just settlement of the refugee problem is just as essential as a satisfactory settlement of the territorial problem and is inseparably linked with it. To this end the UNRWA would have to be transformed into an effective organisation having as its main objective the improvement of the social and economic status of the Palestinian refugees in the region. In view of the present inflexible attitudes of both Israel and Egypt, however, it does not at present see any real opportunities for a European initiative which might enable Ambassador Jarring to resume his work or set the exchange of views on the Suez Canal Interim Regulations going again.

More and more stable conditions would seem to be obtaining in the area round the Persian Gulf. The great majority of the countries in that part of the world—also of paramount importance to the West because of oil supplies—are aware of the necessity of promoting political stability and economic development in the region through friendly relations and cooperation. The Netherlands Government believes that the countries round the Persian Gulf are right in thinking that it is their responsibility to do this job and that attempts at political penetration or to exert influence from outside would only hamper their efforts.

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Press interview statements by US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Akins evaluating the possible use of the oil weapon by the Arabs¹¹⁵**Late September, 1973**

Q. Mr. Ambassador, are Arab countries serious when they threaten to cut off shipments of oil to the U.S. if the Administration doesn't "harden" its policy toward Israel?

A. No one has made such a specific threat. Saudi Arabia has said—and Saudi Arabia is the only country that really counts—that it may not be able to increase production as long as the U.S. does not change its policy of one-sided support of Israel in the Middle East.¹¹⁶

In the past, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia has said that the Arabs would not use oil as a political weapon, that they would not cut off supplies. He's still saying this. But what he's also saying is: "We will not increase output to meet your needs as long as your policy is in favor of Israeli expansionism at the expense of the Arabs."

Qadhafi of Libya has said that the Arabs should use oil as a political weapon, but he's never gone into detail as to how this could be done.

Iraqi leaders, too, have said similar things at various times.

Q. What specific changes would these countries like to see in our policy toward Israel?

*A. They've generally not spelled this out very carefully. But they have at least intimated that they would be able to live with a *status quo ante bellum* situation—that is, a return to the borders of 1967. And then a peace treaty.*

Q. Could the present U.S. policy drive the Arab nations into the arms of Russia?

A. This is what Faisal says has already happened. He points to the Middle East and North Africa right after World War II when the U.S. was considered by those countries as the land of Lincoln and of Wilson—the land of freedom and of democracy and of self-determination. And he says: "You've lost all of this; one country after another has gone. And he lists them. He says that Libya

was a pro-Western monarchy; Iraq was a pro-Western monarchy; Baghdad was even in alliance with the U.S. He ascribes the changes entirely to our support of the formation of the state of Israel and subsequent support for what he calls "Israel expansionism."

Saudi Arabia cherishes its friendship with the U.S. King Faisal repeatedly says that our true interests in the Middle East are in the Arab countries and that we must recognize this sometime. He is obsessed with Communism and he's obsessed with the penetration of Communists into the Arab world, which he blames on our policy of one-sided backing of Israel.

Q. Do you agree with King Faisal's appraisal?

A. It's an oversimplification to ascribe all of our problems in the Middle East to our support of Israel alone. There are many other complex factors.

Q. Why is Saudi Arabia so important to the U.S.?

A. Because of its enormous oil reserves. Probably a third, possibly a half of the entire non-Communist world's oil reserves are in Saudi Arabia. About 150 billion barrels is the figure that's frequently given. Some estimates go up to four times that amount. But whether it's 150 billion or 600 billion, it's enormous. By comparison, our proven reserves in the U.S. are around 40 billion barrels.

Q. Do you feel that King Faisal means it when he says he won't increase production from those vast reserves?

A. Yes, I've always taken King Faisal's statements very seriously. Unless he thinks that there is some political movement by the U.S., I'm afraid he could put on production limitations. I don't know what movement would satisfy him, but if there were some movement, he could go to Sadat [Anwar Sadat, President of Egypt] and the radical Arab leaders and say: "Look, I've changed the American position, while you've failed."

I've said, too, repeatedly over the last five years that we should not allow ourselves to get into a position of becoming dependent on imports for a large proportion of our energy. We have allowed ourselves to get into that position, but fortunately now are moving ahead on the development of other sources of energy.

¹¹⁵ Excerpted from the text of the interview, *U.S. News and World Report* (Washington, D.C.), October 8, 1973, p. 94. Copyright 1973 U.S. News and World Report, Inc.

¹¹⁶ Doc. 258 below.

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Radio statement by Chancellor Kreisky of Austria announcing his government's decision to close the Schönau transit camp¹¹⁷

Vienna, September 29, 1973

In view of today's events, the government has come to the conclusion that the lives of the four people held by the two Arabs, whose nationality is still uncertain, have been in genuine danger. The two men who carried out this attack demanded that they should be allowed to leave the country by air along with three of the hostages. They refused to specify their destination, saying that they would tell the pilot which direction to fly in when they were in the air. Permission could not be granted for this since the Austrian government was not prepared to risk the lives of the three Jewish citizens of the Soviet Union. On the other hand the two men had threatened that if they were not granted the permission and the means to fly out of the country, they would blow up the whole group, including themselves. Under these circumstances, we decided that we could not bear the responsibility for any risk to the lives of those concerned—this would have meant four people, since the Austrian customs official is still in the vehicle. After long negotiations, a solution was discussed which we have accepted with great regret and which the government has approved and adopted. In view of the fact that the security of groups of Soviet citizens emigrating to Israel is threatened during their transit through Austria, the government has decided in future to discontinue the facilities which have hitherto been provided, such as accommodation in the camp at Schönau. These are the conditions on which the hostages who are at present still being held will be released and the two Arabs will leave Austria within a few hours.

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Speech by Prime Minister Meir of Israel before the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe justifying Israel's policy of immigration in the light of the Schönau incident¹¹⁸

Strasbourg, October 1, 1973

What has happened in Vienna highlights the problem of the Jewish people and highlights the position of Israel among its neighbours. We lost in the holocaust one-third of our people. Of those that remain there are three large centres—the United States, the Soviet Union and Israel. Israel has grown from a population of 650,000 in 1948 to close on 3 million.

The state of Israel was built and makes sense only if it can do one thing: become the country to which every Jew, whether he has to or wants to, can come as of right. One of the first laws we passed was the law of the return: that Israel was not the property of the 650,000 nor is it now of the close to 3 million. It belongs to every Jew in the world who wants to come to it and live in it; it belongs to every Jew in the world who has to come to it and wants to live in it, old and young and sick.

Jews have come to us from various parts of the world, from very underdeveloped countries and from highly developed countries. We have tried to integrate ourselves into one people—with some success, I believe.

Jews from the Western world can come whenever they like. But there is the problem of close to 3 million Jews in the Soviet Union. Some say that there are 3½ million and others that there are 4 million. The official census in Russia says that there are over 2½ million Jews, and it is well known that many Jews are not registered as Jews in Russia because they thought that would make their life easier.

We believe that many of those Jews want to come to Israel. They do not even say that they want to leave the Soviet Union because of its regime, because of its ideology. Over and over

¹¹⁷ Statement broadcast on Austrian radio; English text, Federal Chancellery of Austria, *The Events of September 28th and 29th 1973: A Documentary Report* (Vienna 1973), p. 82.

¹¹⁸ Council of Europe, Consultative Assembly, Official Report of the 17th sitting of the 25th Ordinary Session of the Consultative Assembly (Council of Europe doc. AS (25) CR 17), pp. 27–28.

again they say one thing, "We are Jews. Every people has a country of its own. We want to go to the country of our people. We want to help in the creation of this country. We want to be with our people in the Jewish state".

I do not have to relate to you in detail how difficult it is for them to do it. If more are coming out, I am happy to say it is probably due to a large extent to the attitude this Council has taken on the subject.

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Resolution of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe regarding the free movement of people in Europe adopted in reaction to the Schönau incident¹¹⁹

Strasbourg, October 2, 1973

The Assembly,

1. *Dismayed* by the most recent example of terrorist blackmail by which a pledge was extorted from the Austrian Government concerning the transit of Jewish emigrants from the USSR;¹²⁰

2. *Reaffirming* that the principle of freedom of movement of people ought to be the main goal of humanitarian co-operation between East and West, which is currently under examination at the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe;

3. *Recalling* that its members have on several occasions expressed gravest concern over the situation of the Jewish communities in the USSR, in Iraq and other countries, and have welcomed developments enabling the people concerned to emigrate to Israel;

4. *Further recalling* that it has solemnly condemned international terrorism and requested the member States of the Council of Europe to unite in their efforts to combat terrorist activities on the lines of its Recommendation 703, and that it has warned governments of the consequences of failing to take immediate and effective action,

5. *Insists* on the necessity for the member States of the Council of Europe to recognise that

they have a joint responsibility to firmly resist any criminal violence and intimidation purporting to extort political decisions, as long as they have not found an effective common policy on combating such terrorism;

6. *Declares* its conviction that no government can be held committed by a pledge extorted by violence, intimidation or blackmail.

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Israel Cabinet statement calling on the government of Austria to revoke its decision to close transit facilities for Soviet Jews emigrating to Israel¹²¹

Jerusalem, October 3, 1973

The Cabinet heard a report from the Prime Minister about her contacts during the Council of Europe meeting and about her conversation with the Austrian Chancellor. The Cabinet took note of the Council of Europe's resolution¹²² which, among other things, expressed the hope that no Government would feel itself bound by a pledge secured through extortion to terminate transit facilities put at the disposal of Jewish emigrants from the Soviet Union.

The Austrian Chancellor's explanation of his Cabinet's decision is not satisfactory to the Government of Israel and cannot correct the injustice. The Israeli Government's understanding is that the Austrian Government cannot absolve itself of its humanitarian obligation. The Government of Israel continues to demand that the right of Jews to free passage without any restrictions, as has been the practice so far, be maintained. There can be no cessation of the demand that the Austrian Government revoke the promise given to the terrorists under the pressure of threats and violence. This promise seriously undermines the basis and ethics and international law and is likely to encourage further acts of violence.

¹¹⁹ Resolution 557 (1973) adopted at the 19th sitting of the 25th session; text supplied, on request, by the Council of Europe.

¹²⁰ See doc. 123 above.

¹²¹ Broadcast on Israel radio in Hebrew; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4416/A/1; reprinted by permission.

¹²² Doc. 125 above.

Press interview statements by Chancellor Kreisky of Austria defending the closing of transit facilities to Soviet Jews emigrating to Israel¹²³

Vienna, October 5, 1973

I do not want to be a hero to the Arabs or to the Israelis. In short I do not want to be a hero; what I want is to do my job as Chancellor of Austria and to do my duty to Austria. As a socialist, and thus a humanitarian, I do not ask the identity of refugees but take advantage of every opportunity to prevent, as far as possible, there being reasons for people becoming refugees. As regards the Palestinian refugees, I always wonder what motives the Israelis have for not allowing them to return to their land. Why? I have been a refugee and I know how profound is the suffering. Therefore Austria receives refugees from all countries without distinction or discrimination.

The Austrian government considered this decision three times and every time agreed on it unanimously. The same applies to the Social Democratic Party; the ruling Socialist Party's Executive Committee approved the decision to close the camp. We therefore repeat to Nixon and others that there will be no reconsideration.¹²⁴

The Arab ambassadors intervened to inform the two Palestinians that they would be able to leave Austria if they released the hostages, especially as (this was where the emphasis lay) there was no guarantee that the hostages would be immediately released if they were taken to an Arab country, and the two Palestinians had shown no clear indication of where they wanted to go to on the night of September 28–29. At any rate, they certainly did not want to go to Cairo. It was thus inevitable that we should take measures to ensure that the two Palestinians left Austrian territory without the hostages.

There was absolutely no direct contact with the two Palestinians; contact was made through the Arab ambassadors. I informed the Egyptian ambassador that I was going to submit a proposal that the Schönau reception camp for Jews should be closed; I then submitted this proposal to the cabinet, which, as I have said, accepted it unanimously.¹²⁵ I informed the Egyptian Arab ambassadors of this decision and then, at 10 o'clock, that is an hour after the Egyptian ambassador had been informed, the Arab ambassadors went to the airport with the decision. Then the Egyptian ambassador in particular, and later the Libyan ambassador, were in constant telephone contact with me, and as the Palestinians insisted on taking the hostages, with the exception of the Austrian only, I decided to make the decision known. The Egyptian ambassador (Mr. Salah Gawhar) himself transmitted the state's decision at the airport by telephone. The ambassador spoke to the Palestinians, and then spoke to me.

Terrorism is one aspect of war. This is why I proposed to the European Security Conference that it should discuss this subject and that we should find collective means of adopting a unified attitude to the Middle East. Terror breeds terror. Why all this criticism of Austria? A number of European countries have acceded to demands under pressure, like the release of Laila Khalid in Britain.¹²⁶

Press interview statement by President Mobutu of Zaire explaining his decision to break off diplomatic relations with Israel¹²⁷

New York, October 5, 1973

Q. Let us touch on foreign policy. The announcement at the UN of you breaking diplomatic relations with

¹²³ Excerpted and translated from the partial Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), October 6, 1973, pp. 1, 11.

¹²⁴ US President Nixon on October 3 expressed the hope that Austria would reconsider the decision to close Schönau (*Department of State Bulletin*, LXIX, 1791 (October 22, 1973), p. 502).

¹²⁵ Doc. 123 above.

¹²⁶ See docs. 229, 241 and 249 in *International Documents on Palestine 1970*.

¹²⁷ Excerpted and translated from the French text of the interview conducted by Paul Bernetel, *Jeune Afrique* (Paris), October 20, 1973, pp. 34–35.

*Israel created a sensation.*¹²⁸ *How did Zaire, held to be a great friend of Israel in Africa, arrive at this decision?*

A. Since the beginning of our independence, Israel's friendship for Zaire has never been wanting. So as I explained to the UN, before making a decision we tried to analyse the facts objectively. What are they? First, and I deliberately repeat this, it seems to us unrealistic not to recognize an obvious truth. Israel exists and has the right to existence. Another truth: the Palestinian people also exists and has the same right as the Israeli people. It is therefore inadmissible for the state of Israel to refuse to the Palestinians what it demands for itself. Let us now see what is happening on the ground. Since 1947, Israel has twice expanded her frontiers: first in 1948, then in 1967, each time practising the policy of *fait accompli*: here I am, here I stay!

What is more, this expansionist policy has each time struck a blow to a fellow country, an African country, Egypt. By breaking with Israel, I wish to remove an ambiguity, and all the more "urgently" because the *rapprochement* between Israel and South Africa is today displayed in broad daylight. African solidarity obliges us to do our duty. We have done it without pressure of any kind, contrary to what Israel would like people to believe. Our decisions are taken in complete independence.

I will add that there is an element which can escape nobody's attention. This political act is not marked by any equivocation because, by acting in this way, we have taken a risk. Most of my officers, a crack unit of my army, and also myself, all received our military training from Israeli instructors. These instructors came to us at our expense, we lodged them, as a normal payment for services. We therefore owe nothing to Israel. As a result they have, quite naturally, sometimes established ties with the people they have trained. We know this. And the political bureau of the MPR (Revolutionary Movement), our national party, which adopted the decision in principle before I left for New York, also knew it. So if I have come to announce this decision to the world, in New York, the largest Jewish city in the world, it is because I wanted to make it solemnly known that Zaire will recoil from nothing to fulfil its

duty of African solidarity. For the rest, taking this risk has only been made possible by our policy of appealing to African authenticity. Our army units who, like all Zaire's citizens, totally support this policy, know very well where their duty as Africans lies.

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Broadcast address by Israel Prime Minister Meir denying that Israel was surprised by the Arab military offensive and expressing confidence in ultimate Israeli victory¹²⁹

Jerusalem, October 6, 1973

Shortly before 2 p.m. today, the armies of Egypt and Syria started an offensive against Israel. They launched a series of air, armoured and artillery attacks in Sinai and on the Golan Heights. The IDF has entered the fight, and is beating back the offensive. The enemy has suffered grave losses.

The rulers of Egypt and Syria have long planned this violation of the cease-fire. Contemptibly, the aggressors are now spreading the lie that it was Israel which opened fire. But the responsibility for the renewal of the fighting and for the bloodshed lies with them alone.

Our enemies had hoped to catch the citizens of Israel by surprise on Yom Kippur, when so many of our people are fasting and praying in the synagogues. Our attackers thought that on Yom Kippur we would not be prepared to hit back at them. We were not caught by surprise.

For several days now, our intelligence services had been apprised that the armies of Egypt and Syria were lining up for a joint offensive. IDF patrols discovered that large armed forces were massing in offensive deployment in the vicinity of the Suez Canal and on the Golan Heights. The findings of the patrols checked with the reports already received. Our forces were duly arrayed to meet the danger.

We have no doubt that we shall be victorious. We are also convinced, however, that this renewal of Egyptian-Syrian aggression is an act of madness.

¹²⁸ Zaire broke diplomatic relations with Israel on October 4, 1973 (*Keesing's Contemporary Archives* (Bristol), p. 26188).

¹²⁹ English text, *The Jerusalem Post*, October 7, 1973, pp. 1-2; the address was broadcast at 16.15 gmt.

It was our desire to prevent this outbreak. We appealed to a number of influential political quarters to intercede so as to frustrate the criminal initiative of the rulers of Egypt and Syria. While there was still time, we brought to the attention of friendly political quarters the information in our possession with regard to the plans for the launching of the offensive. We called upon them to act for the prevention of the war. For all that, the offensive has been launched.

As I said, the IDF is all set to repel the enemy's attack. Early this morning, a partial call-up of reserves was approved and begun.

Having regard to the gravity of the news, I was obliged to convene a meeting of the Cabinet on Yom Kippur. The offensive started while the Cabinet was still in session.

The Cabinet authorized the IDF to take such action on the battle-fronts as may be dictated by the progress of the campaign in order to assure victory. The individual Ministers were authorized to issue the necessary emergency orders.

Citizens of Israel:

Ordeal by battle has been forced upon us again. I am certain that none among us will panic. The mobilization will doubtless cause hardship and interfere in the orderly course of our life and work—but we should bear these hardships, as we have done before, in a willing spirit.

We are called upon to demonstrate responsibility and discipline in our conduct. We must all be ready to make any sacrifice which might be required for the defence of our very survival, our freedom and our independence. Let us then conduct ourselves in a manner worthy of our sons, the soldiers of Israel, who are courageously carrying out their duty—manning the planes, the tanks, the ships, the guns, in all units and services, in the outposts and in the settlements, along all the lines of fire, in all sectors.

We are fully confident that the IDF has the spirit and the power to overwhelm the enemy.

The victory of the Israel Defence Forces is the one certain guarantee of life and peace.

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Press conference statements by Israel Minister of Defence Dayan describing the situation at the outbreak of the war¹³⁰

October 6, 1973

Dayan: I suppose everyone knows by now that the Syrian and Egyptian attack started today, at ten minutes to 2 this afternoon. We had information, and we suspected such an attack. We were faced with the dilemma of whether to open fire and of course obtain a very important advantage, or not to do so, and lose this military advantage, but making sure that the picture will be known, the true one, that the Egyptians and the Syrians started the war. And this is the start of an all-out war again. So we decided to take the second course...

What happened today on both fronts is that in the North I think we lost a position, we did have some casualties, not significant ones. After the first day of fighting I think our position is well established. None of the settlements suffered in a significant way. All the women and children were evacuated. We have some forces there and eventually we shall have the mobilized reserve forces. The Syrians lost much more heavily than we did and I feel sure that their objective—to kick us out of the Golan Heights—will fail.

As for Sinai, there too we have two stages. The first when the war starts and the second when we have the complete number of our forces, after bringing up the mobilized reserves, which takes time... Then we can conduct the war the way we like... Today was their beginning, their initiative. They started. We had to stop them and mobilize the reserves, which takes time. I believe we shall manage to do it. And the sum of the first day is they haven't had any real gains in the Golan Heights.

Now, the situation in Sinai is different. It is a much bigger space, a big, big desert with the long Suez Canal. There are a lot of places where people can cross. It is not a continuous line held with numerous forces, and certainly not with small forces, so I would have been surprised if they hadn't managed to cross in some places...

¹³⁰ Partial English translation, *Israel Magazine* (Tel Aviv), VI, 1 (January, 1974), p. 9.

Q. Is it the Israeli objective to throw the Egyptians and the Syrians back to where they were before or is there some statement you would like to make about any further Israeli objective?

A. The first objective is to win this battle . . . Let me quote some figures. Suppose the Egyptians have something like a quarter of a million soldiers in this area, I don't know whether they will be able to introduce all and commit them into this battle but that is the number of soldiers they more or less have on the line. They have something like 2000 tanks, 700 airplanes, 1500 guns. So what we have to do is first stop them, and when we are in our full power, to beat them. . .

Q. The sirens went off here in Tel-Aviv 3 times today. Was that specifically in response to the threat of enemy aircraft or was there any other type of threat on the metropolitan area?

A. No, not that I know of. I think it was aircraft. Perhaps some of the planes were equipped with missiles, but it wasn't meant against missiles that would be shot, let's say, from Egyptian or Syrian territory. . . Eventually, we shall probably be able to tell more about that.

Q. Once the real war, as you call it, will be ended, do you expect that peace will come closer, and on what would this depend?

A. I hope that they will be defeated in such a way that they will think in terms of peace and not in terms of another round and another war.

Q. General, has Israel warned Jordan not to interfere?

A. I hope that Jordan will be clever enough, wise enough, not to interfere, not to join the Egyptians and the Syrians. They had their black September, I don't think they want a black October.

Q. You gave us a figure of a quarter of a million Egyptians and 2,000 tanks and 700 planes. Could you give us similar figures on the Syrian commitment?

A. Let's say between 50,000 to 100,000 Syrian soldiers that might be involved in this war, about 800 tanks and something around this figure of guns. There are many of them.

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Statement issued by the USSR government on the situation in the Middle East¹³¹

Moscow, October 7, 1973

The absence of a political settlement in the Middle East has resulted in military operations flaring up there again, involving loss of life, calamities and destruction.

The peoples of the world, who responded with feelings of relief to the process of international *détente* which had started recently, are again faced with a dangerous development of events.

It is no secret from anyone that the cause of this situation in the Middle East is the expansionist policy of Israel's ruling circles.

Enjoying the support and patronage of imperialist circles, Israel, for a number of years now, has been constantly heating up the situation in the Middle East by its senseless aggressive actions. Ignoring the demands of world public opinion and of most of the world's states and trampling on the Charter and resolutions of the United Nations and the generally-accepted standards of international law, the Israeli ruling circles have raised violence and piracy to the level of their state policy.

Frustrating all the efforts aimed at establishing a just peace in the Middle East and committing constant provocations against neighbouring Arab states, the Israeli military have gone on fanning in every way the smouldering embers of the military conflict in that area unleashed by Tel Aviv in 1967.

The endless armed provocations of the Israeli military against Egypt, Syria and Lebanon have repeatedly created critical situations in the area. In recent days Israel had concentrated considerable armed forces on the cease-fire lines with Syria and Egypt, had called up reservists and, having thereby heated up the situation to the limit, unleashed military operations.

The responsibility for the present development of events in the Middle East and for the consequences of those events rests wholly and entirely with Israel and with those external reactionary circles which have constantly encouraged Israel in its aggressive ambitions.

It is well known that the Arab states have shown

¹³¹ English text, *Soviet News* (London), no. 5708 (October 9, 1973), p. 421.

quite a lot of restraint and readiness to seek a political settlement of the conflict on a just basis. The justice of the Arab states' demands for the withdrawal of the aggressor's troops from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967 is recognised by all. These demands fully accord with the principle of the inadmissibility of acquiring territories by war, laid down in the well-known resolutions of the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly on the Middle East.

However, the efforts of the Arab countries, like those of the United Nations and all the peace-loving forces to attain a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, have invariably come up against the obstructionist position of Tel Aviv. The present events in the Middle East are a direct outcome of Israel's continuing aggression.

What is taking place now in the Middle East strongly confirms the immutable truth that it is impossible to eliminate the hotbed of constant tension and establish reliable and guaranteed peace for all the states and peoples of the area without the complete liberation of all the Arab territories occupied by Israel and without ensuring the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine.

True to its principled policy of support for the peoples striving for freedom and independence, the Soviet Union consistently comes out as a reliable friend of the Arab states.

Condemning the expansionist policy of Israel, the Soviet Union resolutely supports the legitimate demands of the Arab states for the relinquishing of all the Arab territories occupied by Israel in 1967.

If, obsessed by its expansionist ambitions, the Israeli government remains deaf to the voice of reason and goes on, as before, pursuing its annexationist policy by retaining the occupied Arab territories, ignoring the decisions of the Security Council and of the United Nations General Assembly and challenging world public opinion, this may cost the people of Israel dear. The responsibility for the consequences of such an unreasonable course will be entirely borne by the leaders of the state of Israel.

Statement supporting Arab objectives issued by the government of East Germany¹³²

East Berlin, October 7, 1973

As a result of Israel's persistently aggressive policies against Arab peoples and states the situation in the Middle East has been tense for years. For a number of years now Israel has unlawfully upheld the occupation of areas of the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Syrian Arab Republic and Jordan. At the same time, it has provocatively thwarted all efforts and initiatives undertaken by the United Nations, Arab states and all peace-loving forces of the world to bring about a political settlement in the Middle East.

In recent months the Israeli military clique, which again and again started armed provocations against Egypt, Syria and the Lebanon, has repeatedly conjured up extremely dangerous situations in the Middle East. In this connection Israel has made the use of force, the occupation of foreign territories, suppression and murder its declared government policy.

During the last few days Israel has called up reservists, stoked up the situation through various statements by leading personalities, amassed troops in considerable strength on the armistice lines with Syria and Egypt, and has finally started military operations.

Since 6 October another heavy armed conflict has been going on in the Middle East, bringing untold suffering and misery upon the people.

Thus, the full responsibility for the present dangerous situation and any consequences it may have rests with Israel and those imperialist forces that have been supporting it for years in its policy of aggression.

The demands of the Arab states for the withdrawal of the Israeli aggressor from all the Arab territories it occupied in 1967 and for a settlement of the justified demands of the Arab people of Palestine have the backing of all peace-loving forces in the world, including the GDR. These demands are in full harmony with international law which bars the acquisition of foreign territories by war.

¹³² English text, *Foreign Affairs Bulletin* (East Berlin), XIII, 28 (October 10, 1973), pp. 205-206.

In the past the Arab states have made multiple efforts to achieve the elimination of the consequences of Israeli aggression in the Middle East by peaceful means through a just political settlement. They have supported the different initiatives undertaken by the United Nations, including the mission of the UN Secretary General's Special Envoy, Gunnar Jarring, and other moves to find a just solution in the Middle East. Israel did not only reject these initiatives, but it responded with a policy of continued political and military aggression.

Lately, the peoples of the world have welcomed with great satisfaction the positive results achieved in the process of détente going on in Europe and elsewhere in the world. It is especially in view of these developments that the war in the Middle East is an indispensable necessity for securing world peace.

The Politbureau of the SED Central Committee, the State Council and the Council of Ministers of the German Democratic Republic, speaking in the name of the people of the GDR, condemn Israel's policy of war and conquest and resolutely support the justified demands of the Arab peoples and states for complete Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied in 1967 and for taking into account the legitimate demands of the Arab people of Palestine.

As always, the people of the GDR, conjointly with the peoples of the Soviet Union and the other states of the socialist community, in this situation consistently supports all states and peoples fighting for freedom and independence, and assures the Arab peoples of its firm solidarity.

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Statement supporting the Arab position in the Middle East war issued by the government of India¹³³

New Delhi, October 8, 1973

The Government of India is deeply concerned at the eruption of fighting in West Asia. The Government has consistently declared that the

cause of tension in the area is Israeli aggression and refusal to vacate the territories occupied by armed forces. This intransigence on the part of Israel is clearly the basic cause leading to the present outbreak of hostilities. Our sympathies are entirely with the Arabs, whose sufferings have reached the point of explosion. Their cause is based on justice and demands forthwith the attention of the international community. Immediate implementation by Israel of United Nations resolution 242 (1967) constitutes a solution which can arrest the tragic march of events, settling the peace of the region and of the world at large.

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Message from CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Brezhnev to President Boumedienne of Algeria urging support for Syria and Egypt¹³⁴

Moscow, October 8, 1973

The responsibility for the new military flare-up in the Middle East lies wholly and completely with the Tel Aviv leaders. While enjoying the support and protection of imperialist circles, Israel continues its aggression started in 1967 against the Arab countries, and foils every effort to establish a just peace in the Middle East and deliberately carries out provocations, including armed provocations, against Syria, Egypt and Lebanon, thus aggravating to the extreme the situation in this region.

I believe, dear comrade President, you agree that the struggle at present being waged against Israeli aggression, for the liberation of Arab territories occupied in 1967 and the safeguarding of the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine, [affects the vital interests of all the Arab countries].¹³⁵ Arab fraternal solidarity must, more than ever before, play a decisive role. Syria and Egypt must not be alone in their struggle against a treacherous enemy. There is an urgent need for the widest aid and support of the progressive regimes in these countries who, like Algeria,

¹³³ Quoted by Mr. Sen, Permanent UN Representative of India, in the Security Council's 1744th meeting on October 9; UN doc. S/PV. 1744, pp. 77-78.

¹³⁴ Text of message broadcast on Algiers radio in French; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4421/A/5-6; reprinted by permission.

¹³⁵ The text in brackets is added from *al-Shaab* (Algiers), October 10, 1973.

are the hope for progress and freedom in the Arab world.

The Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet Government are firmly convinced that the Algerian leaders, who are widely experienced in the anti-imperialist struggle, understand full well all the peculiarities of the present situation and that, guided by the ideals of fraternal solidarity, will use every means and take every step required to give their support to Syria and Egypt in the tough struggle imposed by the Israeli aggressor.

Dear comrade President, your high personal prestige in the Third World countries which in particular contributed to the great success of the fourth non-aligned conference, clearly gives you the indisputable means to act with the Arab states with a view to bringing about a united stand in the face of the common danger.

As for the Soviet Union, it gives to the friendly Arab states multilateral aid and support in their just struggle against the imperialist Israeli aggression.

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Statement by Foreign Minister Jobert of France expressing France's interest in a just Middle East settlement and denying that Arab attacks on occupied territory constitute aggression¹³⁶

Paris, October 8, 1973

Q. What, in fact, is France's position in the new Middle East war?

A. I don't see why you say "in fact." You know France's position. Firstly we support—everyone has known this for a long time, we have repeated it a hundred times, we have tried to act with this in mind—a peaceful settlement to the conflict and a negotiated solution. Moreover, as concerns the territories occupied following the 1967 conflict, everyone knows our position. At the present time, given what I know, what I can say is that the UN General Assembly will discuss this problem at about 3 o'clock this afternoon. It will probably

hear the Egyptian, Syrian and Israeli delegates, and then I think that its work on this subject will be finished. I also think that this evening around 10 or 11 o'clock, French time, the Security Council will discuss the problem.¹³⁷ We shall see at that time what position this group of nations can take, one which I hope will be effective.

To answer your question more fully, I would be tempted to ask another, and to say this: does trying to return, and go back to one's home, necessarily constitute an unforeseen aggression? And I think that this is a question that deserves to be considered by both sides in their deliberations during the next few days.

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Press conference statements by Israel Chief of Staff Elazar describing the current state of the war¹³⁸

October 8, 1973

Elazar: This is a war which broke out at the initiative of Egypt and Syria. The attacking forces—both Egyptian and Syrian—were superior in number . . . , and in the first stage made some gains. The Syrians succeeded in penetrating the Golan Heights and the Egyptians in crossing the Suez Canal. The Israeli forces contained them with a high degree of effectiveness and inflicted heavy losses. The regular army and its men fought remarkably well. . . . The first stage of Saturday and Sunday was that of the enemy advance. Meanwhile the Israeli reserves mobilized and since yesterday night have been taking part in the fighting. Yesterday night and this morning we embarked on a counterattack simultaneously on both fronts. I am happy to tell you it is succeeding. We have succeeded in repelling the Syrian army from the Golan Heights: In most places our forces have regained their former positions. . . . We are continuing to advance today. Our forces at the Canal also opened a counterattack. . . .

This war is serious, the fighting is serious, but I am happy to inform you that we are already at

¹³⁶ Translated from the French text as published in *La Politique étrangère de la France: Textes et documents*, 2nd Semester 1973 (Paris: La documentation française, 1974), p. 133. The statement was made at Jobert's arrival at the annual banquet of the Union des Français à l'étranger.

¹³⁷ Docs. 17 and 18 above.

¹³⁸ Televised press conference held at 17.30 gmt; partial English translation, *Israel Magazine* (Tel Aviv), VI, 1 (January, 1974), p. 15.

the turning point, that we are already moving forward.

Q. Can you predict when the fighting will end?

A. I will predict one thing: We will continue to attack and beat them, give them a real clobbering, but I don't want to commit myself how long it will take.

Q. Can the Chief of Staff evaluate the enemy's performance and compare it with its performance in the Six Day War?

A. This time the Syrian and Egyptian armies have equipment that is more modern. Better tanks and more weapons than in the last war, and they have these in enormous quantities.... The disparity between the Israeli warrior and the Arab warrior has not changed, and is still in our favour.

Q. General, is it true that you have crossed the West bank of the Canal?

A. Not yet.

Q. Is it true your troops are moving towards Damascus?

A. The troops are moving from our territory against the other side. We shall see in the next days the direction and the results.

Q. Some of the press, General, have begun to call this war the Yom Kippur war. What is your word for it?

A. I would say it is the War of the Day of Judgement.

Q. Have the Israeli forces as of this hour crossed the cease-fire line at any point on either front and will they do so?

A. Well, I have to remind you that the cease-fire lines are not marked on the terrain. We are moving wherever it is necessary, and we shall destroy the enemy wherever possible.

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Resolution of the US Senate deploring the outbreak of war in the Middle East¹³⁹

Washington, October 8, 1973

[*The Senate*]

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that we deplore the outbreak of the tragic hostilities in the Middle East and that we support the use of the good offices of the United States by the President and the Secretary of State to urge the participants to bring about a cease-fire and a return of the parties involved to lines and positions occupied by them prior to the outbreak of current hostilities, and, further, that the Senate expresses its hope for a more stable condition leading to peace in that region.

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Confidential briefing to Israel's newspaper editors by Israel Minister of Defence Dayan on the war situation¹⁴⁰

October 9, 1973

We want to make a supreme, productive and effective effort to get Syria out of the war. I don't know whether we can get the Syrians to ask for and sign a cease-fire. I believe and hope that we can bring Syria to a situation where it will in fact cease firing and will not have effective fire power. In order to achieve this, we want to hit them at two levels: first of all, to destroy the forces they sent here—and I think we are not far from that. To this day they are not withdrawing and it is possible that, had they withdrawn, the result would have been that this Syrian force would not be destroyed.

Destroying them costs us dearly, since destroying a tank is not like crushing a flower. They are stubborn and there is no other way. We are not far from the point where their entire force will indeed be destroyed. I cannot count the number of

¹³⁹ *Congressional Record* (daily), October 8, 1973, pp. S18753–18754. The resolution was introduced by the majority leader, Sen. Mansfield (Dem.), and the minority leader, Sen. Scott (Rep.).

¹⁴⁰ English translation, *The Jerusalem Post*, February 15, 1974, pp. 6–7.

(their) tanks that were hit and left with us. This is one part of the outcome of the war—the destruction of their forces.

The second part concerns Syria itself. They should have the disappointment of knowing that what they wanted to do to us did not work out. At the same time, the war should cost Syria so dearly that it will regret what it did. They failed to achieve what they wanted and what we can hit inside Syria, we can do only with the Air Force. You will hear from the commander of the Air Force a little bit about what happened in the past and today and about the most important thing—Damascus.

[O.C. Air Force Aluf Binyamin Peled then gave a detailed description of Israel's air attacks deep inside Syria and of the destruction of military and strategically important installations in the Damascus area. He also told the editors something about the Air Force's share in fighting off the Syrian armoured columns on the battle front.]

Before I come to the main point for which I have asked to meet you today, I would like to make a few remarks:

The radar in Lebanon, which the Air Force commander has just told you was hit today, had been tracking our planes in these operations (over Syria) and (its findings were) reported to the Syrians. This became fully clear today and the only thing left for us to do was to silence this radar station. We don't want to draw Lebanon into the conflict, but we are not prepared to let them help the Syrians. If they want to help the Syrians, we will take action against them.

The second point concerns the "Frog" ground-to-ground missiles which the Syrians put into action three times within three days. Yesterday there were seven such missiles, today six and on Sunday three. They were directed against Ramat David, but missed the target and fell in various places. One of them hit the children's house in Gvat. It was empty, as was the home of a family in Ramat David that was hit. When this was published, the Syrian spokesman hurried to announce that they were not acting against civilian targets.

This is the first time that ground-to-ground missiles have been used in the Middle East, apart from the "Kelt" missile that was downed over the sea. In all the previous wars neither the Syrians nor the Egyptians operated ground-to-ground

missiles against us. Generally, urban centres were not hit by either side. To the extent that we hit (a civilian target), it was by mistake—at Abu Zabel (in Egypt).

We view with grave concern the use of a ground-to-ground ballistic missile that has a 70-kilometre range and hits the population of Nazareth, Migdal Ha'emek or Ramat David. Tomorrow they can launch it against Kiryat Shmoneh or Tiberias.

This was one of the reasons for our action against Damascus. This was the first time we operated against military targets in Damascus. There is a specific quarter in Damascus where the government buildings are concentrated—the headquarters of the Syrian Air Force, the Defence Ministry and the presidential palace. There are no residential dwellings near these places, but I would not say that civilians were not hit there.

There were very basic considerations whether to take action against Damascus or not. We did it for the first time and I don't know what the American reaction will be like, and their reaction is very important to us at all times and especially in this situation. There were two considerations, one of which was the use of the "Frog" missile, because once the use of ground-to-ground missiles starts, then Damascus is on the list of targets. But this was not the main consideration, which is part of the topic that I want to talk about at this meeting.

I want to state from the outset that we now have two fronts—Egypt and Syria. We very much wanted to silence the Syrian front. It was first priority. First of all, because it is in Israel—"chez nous." We succeeded in silencing this front, containing and destroying this entire Syrian column. Had it remained on the Golan Heights, this force could have dominated the area and swept across the Huleh valley. This is inside Israel. All our problems with Egypt—which are very important—are insignificant, at least in the short run, as far as the State of Israel, the living body of Eretz Yisrael, itself is concerned.

This was the main reason for our decision to do away with this threat first of all, come what may. And I think that we really are on the verge of the total destruction of the armoured forces that came.

We also considered taking action against Syria proper. If there is war, then the Syrians must pay a heavy price for it. We did it today, hitting Syria itself—economic and military targets, power sta-

tions, oil installations, army camps, air fields and also civilian economic targets. If one has to hit their Air Force headquarters, army headquarters and the Defence Ministry, this means attacking Damascus.

We cannot do this every day, not because of military problems, but because of political difficulties. One can do it once, in the present situation, but it would be very difficult to make Damascus a permanent target. It was decided to do it now as part of the overall, supreme effort to get Syria out of the war. The only limitation is to avoid hitting the civilian population; apart from that, nothing is sacred. In Damascus and other places, we will hit everything we can.

Our Air Force has to face three problems when it attacks targets inside Syria: missiles, anti-aircraft guns and the Syrian Air Force. The Syrian Air Force does not pose any difficulty for our Air Force. Whenever they engage in dog fights with us they lose heavily. The missiles are a problem and some of them—if possible all of them—have to be destroyed, before we hit the target. We have to pay a price for this by the loss of planes when dealing with these missiles.

One of our successful operations was against the Syrian armoured column that invaded the Golan Heights and was well protected by anti-aircraft missiles. Today we reached the point where no missiles were put into action, either because they had been destroyed or because the Syrians ran away. This made it possible for our Air Force to attack their tanks not just by "hit-and-run" methods, but to fly up properly and drop bombs on them also along the Kuneitra-Damascus road. I hope this road will look like the Mitla Pass after the 1956 Sinai Campaign, lined with endless rows of destroyed vehicles. Their tanks will be destroyed and the road to Damascus will be a column of burnt-out tanks. This is done by the Air Force. That's our situation with regard to Syria.

The situation is different with regard to Egypt. First of all, I want to state in the clearest manner that we do not now have the strength to throw the Egyptians back across the Canal. We cannot do both these things (fighting the Syrians and the Egyptians) without exhausting our forces almost completely. Egypt has a lot of Soviet equipment. The war is now more against this Soviet equipment, than against the Egyptians. I doubt whether

there is another place in the entire world that is protected by such a dense array of modern missiles. I doubt whether there is a place in Russia or Vietnam that is equipped like the Arab front, and chiefly the Egyptian front at the Canal. They have all the modern Soviet equipment, in all its variety, which is very good and effective. There are tremendous quantities of personal anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons. They just lie on the ramparts and every tank that comes close is hit by these personal anti-tank missiles and is put out of action.

The situation is that the Egyptians have more tanks on the east bank of the Canal than we have there. In addition, their tanks are supported by artillery, missile batteries and infantry equipped with anti-tank weapons. Our superiority is in the air. What I said about the Syrian Air Force also holds for the Egyptian Air Force. It cannot measure up to our Air Force. But our planes have difficulties operating there because of the missiles.

We realized this after the first stage—bringing our forces down to the Canal area—when we tried to throw the Egyptians back to the west side of the Canal. Had we persisted in that, we would have lost our forces and left Israel without any power, because we would have been engaged in a battle for which we did not have sufficient strength.

We don't have our entire Air Force available because most of it is operating in the north and I have explained why we decided to give priority to the Syrian front. The Egyptians have lots of armour and they are strong, having concentrated tanks and missiles for six years. Therefore, we have given up at this stage the objective of throwing them back across the Canal, and our forces are along a line parallel to the Canal, a few kilometres outside effective (Egyptian) firing range.

Our forces there are deployed defensively and are putting up a line to contain the Egyptians, until the situation changes within the next few days, and we decide that we can do what we all want to do—to throw all of them back across the Canal.

This has another meaning—that the (Bar-Lev) line of strongholds has been evacuated, partly in an orderly fashion and partly not. There is no line of strongholds. I hope that most of the soldiers who manned them got out or will get out tonight. But the line as such no longer plays any role.

We cannot maintain regular contact with the line and have given it up. The line of strongholds (along the Canal) does not exist for us anymore. We don't have the strength to throw the Egyptians to the other side.

This has many implications. Two of them are obvious: It revealed to the entire world that we are not stronger than the Egyptians. The halo of superiority, the political and military principle that Israel is stronger than the Arabs and that if they dared to start a war, they would be defeated, has not been proved here. One way or the other, we will have to tell the people the truth and I have to appear on television tonight and I want to tell them the truth in a more carefully-worded style. We cannot leave this gap between us and the public. We have to live with the true facts of our life with our own people, with the American public, with the world, and with the Arabs. We won't gain anything from trying to cover up the truth.

The second implication is that if we cannot throw the Egyptians back, they will continue to assemble their forces and they have tanks on this side of the Canal and the question is what will come next. The way I see it, there are two to three stages here:

I have absolutely no doubt that if indeed the Egyptians launch an attack with their maximum forces—although I am not certain that they will—we shall have to deploy our forces along new lines, closer or further away from the Canal. I do not say that the situation will end with our not being able to throw them back and our having to redeploy along other lines. It is possible that we will have to find ourselves shorter and more convenient lines with topographical obstacles which we can hold better. These lines could be somewhere in the area between what is called the Mitla Pass and the Suez Canal.

Since the way is open for the Egyptians to cross the Canal towards the south, to Abu Rodeis, in the direction of Sharm e-Sheikh, we also have to ask ourselves what will happen should they try to go south. Where will we stop them? The commander of the Air Force spoke about the Egyptian armoured column that began to move south. He mentioned 50 vehicles, either all or part of them tanks, which the Air Force dealt with. It could operate there with more freedom, because this area is not protected by missiles. But we cannot

rely on the Air Force to prevent the Egyptians from attacking towards the south. Even if we shall have to establish new lines, I am doubtful whether our forces will be able to close the lines (against the Egyptians). These are units that are based in Sharm e-Sheikh and we will have to do the blocking in that direction.

This is the general picture, in addition to what I said earlier. What we cannot do is that we cannot throw the Egyptians back now and defeat them. I put the emphasis on *now*.

The second part concerns what we should and can do. We should deploy along other lines on this side of the Canal and also in southern Sinai. We will do this and our forces will comprise armour and infantry with air support.

We will gain a certain advantage, to the extent that we get further away from that range (from the Canal). The missiles and the (Egyptian) infantry that is dug in behind the ramparts of the Canal are not now free to be redeployed, since they face our tanks which are four-five kilometres from the Canal.

The moment our forces are beyond the range of Egyptian artillery, anti-aircraft missiles and infantry equipped with personal anti-tank missiles, the Egyptians will have to come out with their tanks and engage in armoured battle with our tanks, if they want to attack.

I don't say that this is the best line and the most convenient choice. I say that there is a substantive difference between the concentrated Egyptian might, the way they prepared their forces along the Canal, under the protection of a missile umbrella, and a situation in which we can attack their missiles with our tanks, should they try to bring them forward. I don't want to say anything "rosy" today, even less than at any other time, but if the Egyptians advance with their missiles, we shall storm them. However, none of this represents an absolute answer.

The implication of this is that Israel is faced with two questions—one concerning our defence lines and the other our military might. Both of these are components for the same result. Anything I say now is my own personal opinion and is being said on my personal responsibility, because this is my own assessment of the situation.

We are faced today with a war waged by the Arab world against the State of Israel. I don't believe that, normally, any Security Council

resolution will stop them if they consider that, militarily speaking, they are able to continue fighting. First of all, there will be no such resolution, because the Chinese and the Soviets will veto it; secondly, the Arabs will not give two hoots about a resolution which tells them to stop (the war).

We cannot count on UN resolutions. We can rely only on our own physical strength. I don't think any state would come to our aid, should we ask them to. But Morocco and Libya are sending artillery and weapons to Egypt—and I also take Jordan and Iraq into account. There are (North) Korean pilots in Egypt and Jordan has Pakistani pilots. There are various "goodwill" missions of this nature (in the neighbouring countries).

We have to build our strength in two parts. One is the (defence) lines. The second is the strengthening of our future military power as well. We do not have to start from scratch, God forbid. We are now paying daily with pilots, equipment, planes and tanks. Hundreds of tanks have been put out of action in this battle. With time, we will be able to repair and restore a considerable part of them, because they remained in our part of the battlefield. Others we won't be able to put back into action, because they remained with the Egyptians, while yet others were damaged beyond repair. But the repair and restoration will take time.

Within three days we lost 50 planes. I don't have enough words to praise the Air Force, not only because of the ability of the pilots but also because of their attitude and fighting spirit. They say to themselves: This is war, and whoever falls—falls. One has to consider first whether to attack a certain target, but once it has been decided to attack, then war is war. Whether it is the son of Benny (Binyamin Peled, O.C. Air Force) or anyone else, the attack on the target is carried out, come what may. They are excellent fighters. In all of the Arab countries there is nobody who can compete with them. They attacked bases deep inside Egypt and Syria. Thanks to them, we can sleep peacefully and they (the Egyptians and Syrians) don't dare to come here. The skies are ruled by our Air Force, but we are losing planes and pilots.

We will need many more planes and tanks. We will need people, pilots, tank crews and infantry soldiers. We will have to mobilize not only all the reserves, but also older age groups that had

been exempt from active service before. There is a wonderful volunteering of military people, key people, not to mention the Civil Defence. It is a pleasure to watch these veteran commanders, and there is a lot for them to do, not just as commanders.

It may be that things will develop in such a way that we will not have to move many kilometres from the Canal. We have a long-term account. I don't know how this war is going to end. I believe that we will finish off the Syrians and then the Jordanians will not enter the war; neither will the Iraqis. We will not merely contain the Syrians—and this will prevent Jordan and Iraq from opening an eastern front. I think that we will achieve this within a few days. Physically speaking, we are in a good position so far in this war.

This does not mean that the war will end within a few days. States with a history of wars and fighting know that sometimes they make the grave mistake of not preparing a second line during the war. Then all of a sudden there is a collapse. We have to see to it that this will not happen to us.

It is possible that within a short time opportunities will be afforded and it will be worth our while to cross the Canal, either along its entire length or at a part of it, to deal with the Egyptian forces. They have unlimited quantities of equipment which the Soviet Union has put at their disposal. It is terrible to have to fight this equipment now. It is also possible that such an opportunity will not arise and that in time we shall have to establish this or that line.

I want to reiterate that it is my personal assessment that we shall form a line somewhere between the Canal and the mountain tops in that third of Sinai, which the Egyptians will be unable to cross. Not because it is a line of natural obstacles like the Andes, but because it is a line which, manned with our forces, would be impenetrable. The same applies to the southern part of Sinai. There are questions of topography and there is an area which we may not be able to block off right away as long as our forces are still confined and pinned down at a distance.

There is the question of forming defence or war-border lines between us and Egypt. This is not the same as in the Golan Heights. The lines here would be much further away, I reckon somewhere in the western third of the Sinai Peninsula. According to the best of my evaluation, the Egyptians will not be able to cross these lines, if we will deploy

ourselves properly.

The second question represents both a short-term and a long-term problem. It is the question of our military power and the need to continue building it up. We have lost several hundred tanks and we could easily be left in a certain battle without tanks and without planes. And then to hell with the Bitter Lake and the non-bitter lake. Above everything else, we have the State of Israel to worry about and we need tanks, planes and proper lines to guard and defend it. Nevertheless, our forces are being reduced and have to be replaced. I hope that we will get planes from the Americans—we have received a positive reply for many Phantoms. I hope that we will also get tanks, but that situation is less acute. We shall have to introduce stepped-up training courses. The army will have to work with war speed in order to replace the wearing down of the forces. We need good equipment and the men to handle it, if we are not to lose the balance of the State of Israel.

This is the situation and this is our thinking. If it is merely a philosophical question of whether it is worth our while to invest efforts and throw the Egyptians back across the Canal—there could be different opinions. We could throw them back, we could make a supreme effort, but afterwards they would return.

Arik (Sharon) is there, Bren (Avraham Adam) is there, the cream of our armoured corps. I came back from there at 5 o'clock this morning. I was there with the Chief of Staff. We sat up all night. This is the situation there. There are logistical problems. We cannot throw them back now. We no longer have any real contact with the line of fortifications (along the Canal).

I asked for this meeting, so that we should not live in different worlds. I wanted to come here and give you absolutely accurate information. And this evening on television I want to tell this to the people, not everything I said here, but not to leave any gap of plastering over and non-truths.¹⁴¹

The Government knows the situation and has been given an accurate picture by the Chief of Staff. There is no need to say that the entire army and the General Staff are "zeroed in," as we say, on this concept and act accordingly. I don't think that there are any differences of opinion on

two things: on what we cannot do, and what we should and can do.

If one were to say that all this came as a "shock," there would be truth in it. But if anyone ventures to say that we showed signs of helplessness, I would not agree. The entire army and its commanders are aware of what we cannot do now, of what we can do immediately and what we can do in the long run. With this we will live.

Now I want to come back to what I said in the beginning, that we decided first of all to throw back the Syrians, to really get at them. Nobody retreats from there. We will finish with the Syrians and not withdraw. This is our approach to the Syrians now, because we want to shorten the front and because there is also the possibility that the Jordanians and the Iraqis may join the Syrian front.

As far as Egypt is concerned—the view is that we should not allow our forces to be worn down. That would be futile. We must redeploy and establish defence lines.

Dissentchik (Maariv): It is no longer true, then, as we have constantly been proclaiming since the times of Ben-Gurion, that we can stand up to all the Arab armies combined.

A. I don't know what we were proclaiming. I grew up on tanks and aeroplanes, without the mystical faith that Ben-Gurion may have had, and I believe that we can stand up to all the Arab states. I don't think that we now have to throw them across the Canal and say that is where we are going to stay put. When I had to propose policy to the Government and issue orders to the army, I said: We're not moving an inch from the Golan Heights, but in Sinai we can be more flexible—so we'll have 10 kilometres less. We can stand up to all the Arab states with their Soviet equipment, with their Korean pilots. We have to build our lines according to our convenience at any given moment. In the present situation, we can't throw them off the Canal. I'm not sure the Canal is the best line right now.

Q. If we build that sort of line, they can open up the Canal, can't they?

A. Theoretically we can stop them; in actuality—I don't know. We would like them to open it. But that is part of another constellation of things. In order to open up the Canal for the passage (of ships), they have to go over to civilian life.

¹⁴¹ After this briefing Dayan's television appearance was cancelled and Aharon Yariv appeared instead (doc. 140 below).

But I don't know, and at this moment that doesn't even concern me. What concerns me is whether they will be able to apply the same degree of pressure on us on whatever line we deploy ourselves, whether we will solve anything by a new deployment of our lines. I think we will.

Q. If we establish such a line, that will mean one-third of the Sinai Peninsula.

A. Now we are four to five kilometres back from the Canal. That is within the range of one-third. I wouldn't want to swear about artillery lines.

Q. In other words, we will have an extraordinary concentration of forces there, in case they decide to go to war again.

A. Do you mean whether I foresee a continuation of the state of war? In that case we would have to maintain a big mobilized force. In that case we will have not only a formal but also an actual state of war. But there may arise a situation in which Syria will say that she isn't achieving anything and will ask for a cease-fire. And if there is a formal cease-fire decision, I don't know whether that will mean that we have averted the renewal of the war. Deep down I feel that when this round is over, there will be quite a few years in which the Arabs will not be able to renew the war. But when you lose a round like this, it is very costly. If you lose all your armour, aircraft, etc.—I don't know whether it is likely that tomorrow you can sit dipping your feet in the waters of the Litani or in Birket Ram.

Zemer (Davar): Can there be a chain reaction from the situation in the South on the other Arab states on the other fronts? In other words, can't the success of the Egyptians have the effect of obligating the Jordanians and Iraqis?

A. I don't think so. I think that the partners of Egypt who mean business are Libya, Algeria, and to some extent the Sudan. Syria's partners are Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq, and they won't get involved if things aren't going well for Syria. I don't know anybody of significance who will get involved just so that we should not go on holding the Canal.

Schocken (Haaretz): In the light of what we have heard, shouldn't we consider that now the rest of the Arab world will follow Egypt's example as to how it is possible to hurt Israel—since we are admitting it and are drawing conclusions from what is happening on the

Egyptian front? Isn't it possible that now the Arab world will set up a similar force on the eastern frontier, on our line with Syria with whom we are now at war?

A. I have no doubt that the Arab world will be encouraged by the fact that we are not throwing—because we are unable to throw—the Egyptians back across the Canal. But I don't think that they didn't do on the Eastern Front what the Egyptians did on their front. After all, see what they did—and they can do it again: close to home, along a static line, in the course of six or five or four years, with Soviet help—help that will continue—and Saudian money, British arms, and French and American arms, setting up a line which we are unable to breach, or which we could breach, but at great cost, and charge forward with tanks. That's what the Syrians did. In this respect, they did not lag behind the Egyptians at all. They set up a line of no smaller dimensions than the Egyptian line, and one day crossed this line and joined the battle. I estimate that if the Egyptians come along with all their tanks to attack our tanks, we will be ready on the lines and they will be destroyed just as the Syrian tanks have been destroyed—especially, if we can concentrate our Air Force here. The major lesson that the Arab states can learn is that they have not succeeded in building up an air force to match ours. In this respect, they are in for a very sad lesson from what is happening to their air force and their airfields. I don't think they are capable of setting up a dynamic mobile force to conquer Israel. They can set up lines, but the moment they try to move them forward they run up against us. Syria has done no less than Egypt, and tomorrow morning there are going to be smoking embers there.

Q. If not for the Syrian front, would we have thrown the Egyptians back across the Canal?

A. Yes. But I don't think it would have been the best thing for us to cross the Canal. If not for the Syrian problem, and if all our armour were in Sinai and our Air Force available only for that, we could have hurled them back across the Canal. A Jew like me, a practical sort, a Nahalalite, would then ask: What next? We'll hurl them back and stay 150 metres across the Canal!

Q. As in 1967, when they had lost their appetite.

A. In 1967, we threw them out of Sinai. Something happened then that I foresee this time, too: when we finished throwing them out, we sat dipping

our feet in the Canal waters for three years, they launched their War of Attrition and built up their force and carried on their War of Attrition—which was not based on charging forward—till 1970. Then we bombed inside Egypt. There was never any question of hurling anyone back: we never crossed the Canal, and they didn't. Our Air Force bombed targets inside Egypt. Without going too much into an analysis of what happened, none of this contains any elements of conquering Israel.

What would the Arabs like? They would like to have a force capable of conquering Israel. That is what they tried to do in the Golan. But not on the Canal. Not that they wouldn't like to, but here they would have to travel a long distance before coming close to conquering Israel. I don't think we are confronted by a force capable of travelling the 150 kilometres to conquer Israel.

What faces us now is the problem of the Canal. We have to stabilize that line and build up our force.

Padahtzur (Davar): Will we stop fighting as soon as we have stabilized the new line? And how much time do you think we will need to push them back?

A. I don't think we can pinpoint a moment at which we will stop fighting. For one thing, we're not the only ones doing the fighting. I don't think it's a matter of days. Though on the Syrian front I don't think there will be any significance to the state of war, unlike on the Egyptian front.

Q. Does the Egyptian front open possibilities for attempts at a political settlement?

A. I don't know. I doubt whether Egypt will be more inclined towards a political settlement acceptable to us. If you think we ought to be going towards them more than we have done—I don't go along with that.

Q. How long do you think the fighting will continue?

A. I don't know.

Q. Days?

A. Perhaps because of the office I hold, I don't think it's a matter of, say, 10 days and it's all over. I think of the whole thing in terms of forces: they have the power they do and they have their ongoing desire to annihilate us. It will end when they have spent their power. We have to build lines, acquire more aircraft and build more tanks, till we achieve such a force that everything goes well for us.

Himmelfarb (Nowiny i Kurier): Do you still think that our political assessment was correct?

A. I don't want to go into that. We just dealt with that yesterday. Today, I hold the same view I held yesterday. And, whatever I say today I knew yesterday. I recommend that right now all of us worry about fighting the Arabs and stop digging into what happened.

Bareli (Davar): If we succeed in putting the Syrians out of battle, will there be any significant change in the situation in which we are unable to hurl the Egyptians back across the Canal?

A. Potentially, yes. We will be able to concentrate our whole Air Force on the Southern Front and transfer armour there. I don't know whether it is worthwhile doing that now, when we are not holding the (Bar-Lev) line of strongholds, as a result of which it would be costly for us.

Q. If there is a cease-fire order and the Egyptians agree, will we also agree, with the Egyptians sitting on our side of the Canal?

A. I don't know. I wouldn't recommend that we request a cease-fire. I don't know whether there will be a cease-fire. I don't anticipate that, if there is one, the Egyptians will observe it: they will violate it as soon as it is worthwhile for them to do so. The 1970–1973 period is over. As I see it, the question is the balance of forces and not a cease-fire decision.

Rosenblum (Yediot Aharonot): Do you think there will be any point in your repeating on television today what you have been telling us?

A. I will not say on television what I have said to you. First of all, the matter of the (Bar-Lev) strongholds will become known; another 2–3 days will pass and we will not have expelled the Egyptians. We are at war, and everybody is saying: "Well?" I want to be able to look the public in the eye; I don't want to be suspected—neither as an individual nor as Defence Minister—of deceit, of trying to gloss over things. I will try to say it all elegantly. I will also say that this isn't a situation in which we are controlling developments with our stopwatches.

I think that the gap between what we have said and the interpretations of what we have said and what we are not going to be doing in the next few days is not good. We must close this gap and regain credibility.

Shor (Al Hamishmar): I gather from what you say that we're in for a long war.

A. The mere presence of 1,000 tanks on the Egyptian front means war, as far as I am concerned—shooting or no shooting. On the Egyptian front I anticipate that they will not lay down their arms and will not lose their desire to conquer us. Whether there will always be firing on the Egyptian front—I don't know. As long as we haven't done to them what we've done to the Syrians, we will have to regard it as a front on which shooting can break out at any moment. For me that is a war front.

Schocken: If you say on television tonight what you have told us, that will be like an earthquake for the consciousness of the Israel nation, the Jewish People and the Arab nation. In such circumstances, how do you foresee our life with the Arabs of the administered area?

A. Those are wise Arabs. At our first meeting I said that we are not going to change anything in the way we're doing things in the areas. For the time being, I see that not even Jordan—and certainly not the Arabs of the areas—is thinking of joining the war against us. If things end on the Syrian front the way I anticipate, I don't think the earthquake will impel the Arabs of the areas to join in the war, or to launch active resistance—for various reasons, mainly because they are not an army; in Nablus they don't have tanks. Secondly, they are sitting with their families, with their children. People sitting with their families can't do very much. An individual can place mines, join the Fatah. If it comes to that, we'll have to deal with it. And I don't mean an iron fist.

Q. For the Arab world, won't the situation be like Carthage after the First Punic War?

A. How do you mean to apply this to our situation?

Q. The Romans decided to destroy Carthage at all costs.

A. That the Arabs will wish to annihilate us? I think they already do.

Zemer: We're attacking the Defence Minister as though he is enjoying the situation.

A. I certainly am not enjoying it. Since you have injected a personal note, then I will say this: either I would have felt helpless, in which case I would have resigned within five minutes, or else there is a problem here which I am viewing from

the inside, not from the sidelines, and which I fully believe I know how to deal with so that it will turn out well for us.

I would not have accepted it on my sole responsibility. I went to the Prime Minister, to the Government, to the General Staff—in formal and informal sessions—and I told them how I saw the situation and how I thought we ought to deal with it, from the acquisition of additional Phantoms, to moving lines—if the Canal is gone, then let's do without the Canal: I like the Canal, but after all, it isn't the Jezreel Valley; the Canal is only a line. I felt that we could do it, and I also received the confirmation of the Government, the Prime Minister and the General Staff. I am not sitting back and enjoying it, but neither have I gone into mourning. That's the situation. It isn't the way it is with the French in various places or with the Germans in various places when a line collapses. That isn't the kind of enemy we're dealing with; we're dealing with the Arabs. There is the Canal line—we will deal with it.

First of all I'm delighted with the way we've handled the Syrians. Now we're concentrating on the Egyptian business. I convened this meeting because of the Egyptian business; I wouldn't have convened it for the purpose of celebrating the fact that we've settled the Syrian affair. But I do believe we've got the Syrian thing behind us.

Q. How much longer can it still take in the North?

A. Not much. I think that unit is finished, and tomorrow will no longer be capable of fighting. But maybe it won't end. We have fighting capacity, and that border isn't taboo, and it may be that the fighting will continue at their initiative. I estimate that that unit, with its 1,000 tanks, is finished. Some have run away, and some have burned up. The Syrian expedition to the Golan Heights is over.

Bart (Letzte Nyess): If there is no formal ceasefire in the South, how and for how long will we have to go on standing there at the original second line, and how will Israel be able to stand it economically?

A. I don't know anything about the economic aspect. How long? In the War of Liberation we sat a whole year. In 1948, we faced for the first time an Arab war against the existence of the State of Israel. Today, if we have to remain mobilized for a year, then mobilized for a year we'll be. I don't know whether—I don't think—it will be

full mobilization. I don't see this as a condition for the State of Israel. If people make war against her, what is she to do? It will cost a lot of money, and the list of equipment that I have seen that we want from the Americans runs into hundreds of millions of dollars. I hope the Americans will be prepared to sell us this equipment. I hope the Jewish People, and also the Israel nation, will harness themselves to the economic effort. I don't think we're living luxuriously, but in time of war the Israel public can make a certain economic effort.

Lurie (Jerusalem Post): Yesterday, we learned that the Syrians have the latest plane, the Suchoi-20. Do the Egyptians also have this aircraft?

A. Yes.

Q. Do they have many, and are they operational?

A. I don't know exactly how many they have or whether they're operational. In action, we haven't been feeling either the Egyptian or the Syrian Air Forces. The moment their planes take off, our Air Force planes take off, and theirs disappear.

Q. Maybe we can clarify this a bit. What's the difference between the equipment which the Russians gave the Syrians who did not have the obstacle of the Canal—and I'm not referring to the Bar-Lev Line—and what they gave the Egyptians. Mr. Schocken asked for your assessment of the Bar-Lev Line and you explained a little of the advantages that this line did or did not give us. I think it was on Saturday that you spoke of the Syrians' aims and the Egyptians' aims. You explained that the Egyptians have a much more limited objective. They have the obstacle of the Canal, which the Syrians don't have. Nevertheless, we destroyed the Syrians but not the Egyptians. Perhaps you can clarify this.

A. There is one thing that didn't work the way I thought it would: our ability to prevent the Egyptians from building bridges across the Canal. We had a theory about that. In any case, I had a theory that it would take them all night to set up the bridges, and that we would be able to prevent this with armour. But it seems that with all their equipment, especially the personal anti-tank equipment—which has a range of three kilometres and is carried by thousands of soldiers, most of our tanks were hit by these missiles fired by the individual Egyptian soldiers. They lay behind embankments and prevented our tanks from passing. Here it transpired that this was no easy matter,

and our effort to bring tanks up to the Canal to prevent the erection of the bridges cost us very dear. We hadn't anticipated that.

The difference between the Syrians and the Egyptians? The Syrians launched their offensive from their line and advanced. It is true that when the fighting broke out we evacuated all the people from the Golan Heights settlements, which were 10–15 kilometres from the cease-fire line. When they left, the preparations that had been made on the line were insignificant, except that the Syrian missiles hindered our Air Force.

The Egyptians, with their limited objective of reaching the passes have not, after all, advanced more than three kilometres; we didn't succeed in preventing them from crossing the Canal. Not only have they not reached the passes, but they haven't even advanced. They're beginning to advance, and that's a problem—even though they won't have an umbrella of missiles here.

The Syrians were based on a line when they started. We had a battle with them, and in 2–3 days we destroyed them. We didn't have such a battle with the Egyptians, and we weren't able to prevent them from laying bridges.

Zayit (Viata Noastra): In 1967, there were various cease-fire proposals. The Israeli response was: with all of them (the Arab states) or with none of them.

A. No. Israel has said all along that she is ready to make peace with all of them together or with each of them separately.

Q. If Syria asks for a cease-fire now while Egypt goes on fighting, will we agree?

A. I don't know. I think that after hurling back the Syrians, we have no intention of conquering Damascus. If Syria wishes a cease-fire, we'll make a cease-fire.

Nissan (Israel TV): Is such an outcome on the Syrian front likely to affect the Egyptians' will to fight?

A. I don't think it will cause them to stop the war.

Mozes (Yediot Aharonot): Can you tell us anything about the possible reactions to our bombing of Damascus—whether this is apt to have consequences for civilian centres in Israel?

A. I don't know. It's possible, though I hope not. In any case, if that is tried by their air force, we are generally speaking, ready for them. But it could happen, they could decide to bomb Tel Aviv in retaliation for our bombing Damascus.

Rosenblum: Do the Americans know about the new situation?

A. I'm not sure they know everything. But we've kept them informed. Our policy is to keep them informed of everything, without covering up anything. I'm sure they'll know within a day or two.

Dissentchik: If we accept your description of the situation on the Egyptian front, then this will be a first round between us and the Egyptians which will end with the Egyptians conquering territory and not the reverse. This is likely to strengthen Sadat's position, and cause him to radicalize his policy.

A. I don't think it strengthens Sadat. I see that Mr. Dissentchik wishes to arrive at very negative formulations. I'll tell you my formulation: I think that if Sadat doesn't reach the passes in his present offensive, he not only will not conquer Eretz Yisrael, he will also not conquer Sinai—he won't liberate the conquered lands after six years of preparing the big war, won't achieve his limited objective of 20 kilometres. I don't think he'll have any personal victory like that.

I wouldn't say that this is the first time the Arabs have conquered territories. We are now in a situation where we may be able to hurl them back. But when we consider what it would cost and what we would gain: if it were Degania that was involved, then we would make the effort; but for the Bitter Lake—no. It isn't worthwhile wrecking ourselves in an effort to throw them back for that.

They've crossed the Canal. They'll cross another five kilometres of desert. We're not at the 11th hour, the way we were at the Green Line in 1967. A little while longer and we would have regarded every dunam of desert as though it were the heart of the country. If what is involved is not 50 kilometres that count with respect to holding the line, I can tolerate it. That is the importance of the desert—that it's all right for bombs to land in it a kilometre this way or a kilometre that way.

Lurie: What of the implications for Sharm e-Sheikh?

A. If we reach a situation where we can't hold Sharm e-Sheikh, I will consider that a very serious blow. I hope we'll manage.

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Statement by the Netherlands government concerning the outbreak of war in the Middle East¹⁴²

The Hague, October 9, 1973

The Netherlands Government is dismayed to learn of the resumption of hostilities in the Middle East.

From reports from UN observers and other sources it appears that Egypt and Syria have initiated this military action. These countries have therefore broken unilaterally the cease-fire agreement that has been maintained since August 1970.

The Government is convinced that a lasting solution to the complicated Middle East question should be sought along peaceful lines and not by means of force.

In the Government's opinion it cannot be expected that having the situation dealt with in the General Assembly at this time could make any contribution towards ending hostilities.

The Government considers that it is up to the UN Security Council, as the appropriate organ for the preservation of peace and security, to investigate in the first instance how a formula acceptable to both parties can be found for bringing about a cease-fire.

The Government deplores the fact that the Security Council debate that has meanwhile opened has not yet produced tangible results.

At the present moment it seems that a return by both parties to the cease-fire lines respected up to last Saturday would offer the best basis for a new cease-fire. The search for a political solution to the Middle East conflict could then be resumed from there.

The Government is of the opinion that a lasting solution can only be found by means of negotiations between the two sides involved in the conflict on the basis of Resolution 242 adopted by the Security Council in 1967, which was accepted by Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Lebanon.

The principal elements of the Resolution, which must be implemented as one indivisible whole, are, on the one hand, the withdrawal of Israel

¹⁴² English text of the statement handed to the Dutch parliament supplied, on request, by the Dutch embassy, Beirut.

from occupied territories, and on the other termination of the state of belligerency with recognition of the sovereignty and independence of every State in the area and their right to secure and recognised boundaries. A just settlement of the refugee problem is inextricably bound up with this.

The Netherlands will make its standpoint known in the consultations of the Nine and to other countries which may be able to contribute to its realisation.

The Government is willing to investigate in what way it can help to relieve the suffering of the war victims on both sides.

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Press conference statements by Prime Ministerial Adviser Yariv of Israel assessing the war situation¹⁴³

October 9, 1973

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Q. Who did you mean when you referred to other parties in the Middle East?

A. That is enough for intelligent listeners.

Q. How long will the war last?

A. It is difficult to estimate. It will not be a short war.

Q. Can you state directly or indirectly that there is a foreign command in the Arab High Command?

A. I am always cautious, and I shall be cautious now. There is certainly foreign advice, supervision and aid; I do not say that there is any command element. All these things, and especially equipment, have great weight.

Q. Have there been air battles and what losses have the Syrians and the Egyptians sustained?

A. There were no large-scale air battles yesterday. Our losses in the air have been small in the three days since the war began, while the Egyptians and Syrians have lost more than 150 planes, and the ratio in the air battles is in our favour.

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Q. The Egyptian radio claims that they have advanced 15 kilometres and that they have taken hundreds of prisoners. What do you think?

A. It is true that the Egyptians have prisoners but I do not know how many; we need a little time to find out the exact numbers. Yesterday I gave the Red Cross a list of possible prisoners. We also have Egyptian prisoners. In the three and a half days of the war Egyptians advance units have reached this depth, and the situation today is as I have described it.

Q. How many enemy tanks have been hit?

A. The Syrians have lost a large number of tanks.

Q. Have we abandoned the Bar-Lev Line?

A. We have abandoned most of the Bar-Lev Line.

Q. Does the enemy still have anti-aircraft missile batteries?

A. I must look into this point. I estimate they are less effective today, but I must look into it.

Q. Do you think that the Bar-Lev Line has been a disappointment, in the light of the situation?

A. I do not think so, and this is in the light of the facts we have heard and from talks with the commanders on the front. The fortifications have not disappointed us. The soldiers and the fortifications have played a very important role in a very important period.

Q. There are foreign reports to the effect that the air force has attacked the Egyptian General Staff.

A. That is not true.

Q. How many Egyptian tanks have crossed the Canal? Is the estimate of 400 correct?

A. The estimate of 400 tanks on the other side is fairly reasonable, though I do not say it is the exact number.

Q. How are the Arabs behaving in the occupied areas?

A. They are quiet.

Q. Are we attacking the Egyptians along the Canal or only repelling them?

A. The war is a mixture of repulsion and [ground] attack and further air attacks.

¹⁴³ Excerpted and translated from the Hebrew text, *Davar* (Tel Aviv), October 10, 1973, p. 2; the press conference started at 18.30 gmt.

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Television interview statements by Foreign Minister Eban of Israel asserting that the war has validated Israel's demand for "secure borders"¹⁴⁴

October 9, 1973

Q. How do you see, sir, the broader implications of this new round of war for the prospects of peace, for the future balance in the Middle East?

A. On the one hand, it points up the sterility and the futility arising from the absence of peace. On the other hand, Israel must learn two lessons: the first lesson is the total fragility of the written undertakings and of the guarantees and of signatures of our neighbors. And the second—much more substantial which will have its effects in the peace negotiations—we've learned something about the vital importance of secure boundaries. Every Israeli is asking himself this question: What, heaven forbid, would our situation have been if the Egyptian and Syrian armies had sprung at our heart and at our throat, not from the places dozens and sometimes hundreds of kilometers away from our population centers and our main cities, but from the previous armistice lines that existed on the 4th of June, 1967? I shudder in terms of all our nation's history to think what our fate would be.

Q. Will you remain within the confines of the October 5th lines?

A. Well—

Q. Or will you go beyond?

A. I want to distinguish between the ebb and flow of the military struggle. In that ebb and flow, of course, we will develop whatever momentum is essential in order to stop and repel this attack. But the governments of Egypt and Syria can get a cease-fire with us by agreeing to restore the previous cease-fire boundaries.

Q. Even if Israel does restore the lines of October 5th, the Arabs have fought better in this new round than they have before. Would you say that this gives them a stronger negotiating position?

A. Well, it remains to be discussed and analyzed how much of this advantage derives not from better military posture or talent, but from the extraordinary circumstance of surprise and initiative which they seized because of the circumstances that I have mentioned.

But as regards bargaining, well, bargaining in Latin is negotiation. Negotiation is, of course, the Israeli policy. The question is when it will become the Arab policy. The harsh lessons of this attack, and the fact that the cease-fire was breached in that way, will certainly fortify our people's conviction that we cannot simply take our future survival frivolously. We must have a secure boundary—and that means a boundary that we negotiate and that we examine with the utmost precision and care; and no formulae and no public rhetoric can possibly arrange that position. But the Israeli conviction that the boundary is important, that has been vastly strengthened by this tragic experience.

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Television address and subsequent interview statements by Israel Prime Minister Meir expressing her confidence in the course and outcome of the war¹⁴⁵

Jerusalem, October 10, 1973

Four days ago I had the task of informing you that Egypt and Syria had once again jointly attacked Israel.

I have but one prayer deep in my heart: may this be the last time.

Only four days have passed—but we have learnt by now that a day is not measured in terms of hours alone. During these four days we faced very difficult, very bitter hours—but at the same time we also had good and comforting hours. I need not tell you that. As far as a change has taken place—and there has been a change from the bitter to the comforting—it was due to the deeds of our sons.

It has already been stated by our commanders that we have no words as yet to describe these deeds and the ability and devotion that were

¹⁴⁴ Interview conducted by Richard C. Hottelet and broadcast on CBS's "Morning News" on October 10; excerpted from the transcript supplied, on request, by CBS; reprinted by permission.

¹⁴⁵ English text as published in *The Jerusalem Post*, October 12, 1973, p. 3; broadcast at 18.28 gmt.

shown. It is beyond our power to put this into words. But I am happy and joyful to tell you that today the Golan Heights are in our hands; the settlers are returning to their villages; the Syrian enemy is now back beyond the cease-fire lines and we are pushing him still further back.

There can be no comparison between the strength of the Syrian army four days ago, three days ago and, in the last few hours, even two days ago and what it is now.

In the south, too, there has been a radical change: our forces are now close to the Canal and here, too, we are pushing the enemy back.

At the same time, I have to tell every one of you this: The war is not yet over. I have no doubt that it will end with our victory: but the victory is not yet complete, and what this means is that the war has not ended.

I know that it is natural for everyone to ask when the war will end. How many days will it last? And yet we have experience of various wars. And the last big war—the Six Day War. I am not sure that this will be a war of six days. But I have no doubt that every one of us knows that the main thing is to conclude the war, and to conclude it with our victory. And this may take more than six days.

I want to stress one more point—and the question is not against whom we are fighting, but what is no less and perhaps more important to stress, against what we are fighting.

We have to know that for a period of six years and more, since the end of the Six Day War, a great power, one of the two strongest nations in the world, the Soviet Union, has been working to strengthen our enemies, incessantly supplying them with arms, arms of the most modern, most sophisticated kinds. And the limits of these supplies, we could say, have been only the capacity of Egypt and Syria to absorb them.

It is painful and difficult for me to state the fact that we still have grounds for saying that this supply of arms is continuing to flow all the time, to Syria at least. What this means is that we are fighting against the Egyptian army and the Syrian army, but the rockets, the tanks, the planes—everything that is in the hands of the Syrian and Egyptian soldier—all this comes to him from the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union, so strong and so mighty a power, considered and apparently still considers

it her task to pour this armament into the balance to the advantage of the Arabs and to the detriment of Israel. We must be aware of this and take it into account. At the same time, we have learnt one more thing from experience—namely that it is the greatest possible luxury for Jew in general and for Israel in particular to despair. Let us not abandon ourselves to this luxury, for there is no reason to despair, although we may still be facing difficult hours.

As for the outcome, I have not the shadow of a doubt what it will be. Since we are sensible, we must see things as they are, and rejoice in this festive day, the eve of Succot, on which so great a change has taken place, a change which in some ways is radical as against the situation three or four days ago. We must realize that the war has not yet ended and be confident that when it does it will end in victory.

Q. In a communique broadcast today by the Jordanian national communications media there was word of mobilization of reserves there. In your opinion does this intimate that Jordan will enter the war?

A. That, of course, I do not know. I can say only one thing: an intelligent and sensible leader, who is concerned for his people and whose memory serves him well—to me it seems that such a leader should act in the light of all these factors. All I can say is that we hope that this is what he will do. But of course such a thing is not in our hands. Once before he was asked not to enter a war, and I hope that he is sensible and responsible enough to remember this.

Q. How would you describe our position today, the fifth day of the war?

A. As I said before, the Golan Heights are in our hands. We are now pushing the enemy beyond the cease-fire lines. We want to chase them behind these lines. And the settlers are returning to their farms.

In the south, our forces—our armoured forces—have taken up positions very close to the Suez Canal, and here, too, we feel that we have gone over to the offensive at almost all points.

Q. Can it be stated at this stage more or less what our objectives are in this war that has been forced upon us?

A. I would like to stress another point—namely the tremendous amount of arms, tanks and other war material that has remained on our territory

on the Golan Heights and a lot of it also in the south. Now, as to our objectives: we want peace.

We want to smite them, to force them back across the lines and beyond, until we can be certain that these are not lines they can regroup on for a new attack.

Q. I should like to ask you a question which is now also in the public mind—and that is the price of this war. And one more question: How long will it last?

A. The price—every son who falls. That is a terrible price. I have no doubt that as in the past so too this victory which is now assured us will have a price.

We always said, when we spoke about our neighbours during the past six years: we have no fear that we will not win in any kind of war. But for victory too one must pay: and for us—the price is high. And this time too—we will have to pay the highest and the dearest price.

How long the war will last—none of us knows. It is only natural that everyone should ask this question—but it is also natural that everyone should be able to answer it for himself: the time that is needed to achieve the goals I have just mentioned.

Q. Tonight the people of Israel celebrate the feast of Succot. What would you wish this people on this particular evening?

A. My wish is the customary one tonight: a happy holiday. I dare say this in spite of everything. And the main reason for my daring to wish you 'happy holiday' in time of war, in the midst of battle, is that if this is our fate, that our neighbours still find it easier to make war than to make any effort for peace—then we are doubly blessed that such is our people, and such are its sons and their capability.

And on this evening, the eve of Succot, in the midst of war or in moments of tranquillity, since peace is still far away, I have but one prayer in my heart—that this may be the last war. I pray for this not only for ourselves but also for the sons of our neighbours and for their children's children: perhaps they will catch from us our habit of appreciating human life—the lives of all human beings. This is my prayer, and it is the prayer of our whole nation.

And here I would like to say again how heart-warming it is to see the Jewish people in the Diaspora—and, indeed, many who are not Jews—

rising up at once, without having to be told a word, in order to be with us in spirit. There are friends who have not abandoned us.

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Declaration by the heads of the UN delegations of the non-aligned countries on the Middle East war¹⁴⁶

New York, October 10, 1973

The heads of the delegations of the non-aligned countries, meeting at United Nations Headquarters on Wednesday, 10 October 1973, reviewed recent developments in the situation in the Middle East.

They condemn Israel's aggression against Egypt and Syria and express to those two countries their full support for their just struggle and their heroic efforts to liberate their occupied territories.

Recalling the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the Algiers summit conference,¹⁴⁷ they demand the withdrawal of Israel from all the occupied Arab territories as a prerequisite for any search for a solution to the Middle East crisis.

The heads of the delegations of the non-aligned countries condemn the indiscriminate bombing of Syria's civilian population by Israel, bombing which has caused the death of hundreds of innocent civilians—men, women and children—including foreign diplomats, United Nations officials and members of their families.

They denounce in particular the fact that Israel has made war on the civilian population and they condemn these barbarous acts, which give an already painful conflict a dimension of inhumanity which the international community cannot tolerate.

The heads of the delegations of the non-aligned countries have decided to maintain close contact with the representatives of Egypt and Syria with a view to determining what action they will have to take at a later stage in conformity with the policy established by their Heads of State at the Algiers Conference.

¹⁴⁶ Transmitted to the UN Secretary-General by Algeria and published in UN doc. S/11019 (A/9218), dated October 10, 1973.

¹⁴⁷ See doc. 119 above.

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Message of support from Prime Minister Chou En-lai of China to President Sadat of Egypt¹⁴⁸

Peking, October 11, 1973

On October 6, 1973, Israel once again brazenly launched armed aggression against Egypt and Syria, committing new crimes against the Arab people. The broad masses of the army-men and civilians of Egypt, Syria and Palestine, united as one and fighting heroically with hatred against their common enemy, have dealt head-on blows at the aggressors. The Chinese Government and people express high admiration for your militant spirit of defying brute force and fearing no sacrifice, and strongly condemn the Israeli aggressors for their criminal action.

Over a long time, the Israeli Zionists have occupied large tracts of Arab territory, driven more than a million Palestinians out of their homeland and brought great national calamity to the Palestinian and other Arab peoples. The fact that the Israeli aggressors have been so daring and unbridled as to repeatedly unleash wars of aggression against Arab countries is an outcome of the policy of aggression and expansion pushed by imperialism in the Middle East and is inseparable from the support and connivance of the superpowers.

The Egyptian, Palestinian and other Arab peoples are great peoples. Your struggle for the recovery of the lost territories and the restoration of national rights is a just one enjoying abundant support. It has won and will continue to enjoy the extensive sympathy and backing of the entire Third World, all the justice-upholding countries and the people the world over. The Chinese Government and people will unfailingly support your struggle and resolutely stand on your side. We are firmly convinced that, under the leadership of Your Excellency Mr. President, the Egyptian people with their glorious tradition of revolutionary struggle, acting independently and with initiative, exerting themselves incessantly and persevering in unremitting and protracted struggle, will certainly be able, together with all other

Arab peoples, to overcome any difficulties that may crop up on their road of advance and win the victory of their struggle against aggression.

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Press conference statements by US Secretary of State Kissinger summarizing US action before and after the outbreak of war, stressing the dangers to US-Soviet détente and discussing US moves concerning arms supplies and a cease-fire¹⁴⁹

Washington, October 12, 1973

Kissinger: I thought it might focus our discussion if I began by giving you a brief summary of the situation in the Middle East as we see it.

You ladies and gentlemen will understand that we are, at this moment, in a delicate phase in which our principal objective has to be to bring about a cessation of hostilities and to lay the basis for a more permanent peace in the Middle East and that therefore I will have to be somewhat guarded in some of the observations I make and in some of the answers I give to your questions. But I expect that after the conclusion of this phase to have another press conference in which I will give a fuller account than may be possible today.

Now let me talk about the situation in the Middle East in the following parts: First, the situation prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Secondly, the American efforts after hostilities started to bring about a cessation of hostilities. Third, a very brief observation on the military situation as we see it today. And, finally, where we hope to go from here.

First, with respect to what we knew prior to the outbreak of hostilities: In the week prior to the outbreak of hostilities, the United States was aware that there were additional concentrations of Syrian forces and also that the Egyptian forces were engaged on what was interpreted both by our intelligence as well as by Israeli intelligence as their regular fall maneuvers.

We asked our own intelligence, as well as Israeli intelligence, on three separate occasions

¹⁴⁸ English text, *Peking Review*, XVI, 42 (October 19, 1973), p. 6. A similar message was sent to President Assad of Syria (text, *ibid*, pp. 6-7).

¹⁴⁹ Excerpted from the transcript, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIX, 1792 (October 29, 1973), pp. 534-539.

during the week prior to the outbreak of hostilities to give us their assessment of what might happen. There was the unanimous view that hostilities were unlikely to the point of there being no chance of it happening. Nor was the possibility of hostilities raised in any of the discussions with either of the parties that took place at the United Nations during the last week.

In these circumstances, the United States had no occasion to warn any country against engaging in preemptive action. The United States, therefore, in the week prior to the outbreak of hostilities, gave no advice with respect to a contingency that we had been unanimously assured was not likely to happen—in fact was certain not to happen.

The first time the U.S. Government was informed that hostilities might be imminent was at 6 o'clock Saturday morning, when I was awakened and immediately contacted the President. From then until the time that we were informed that hostilities had in fact begun—which was around 9 o'clock on Saturday morning—we did make intensive efforts with the parties, as well as with the Soviet Union and the Secretary General of the United Nations, to attempt to prevent the outbreak of hostilities.

Obviously, given the scale of preparation that must have been made prior to the outbreak of hostilities, these efforts were unavailing.

After hostilities broke out, the United States set itself two principal objectives. One, to end the hostilities as quickly as possible. Secondly, to end the hostilities in such a manner that they would contribute to the maximum extent possible to the promotion of a more permanent, more lasting solution in the Middle East.

Therefore, the United States has sought during this period—first in the United Nations and, secondly, through a series of bilateral contacts—to create a framework in which both of these objectives could be realized. We have explored the possibilities of crystallizing a consensus within the United Nations. We have also been in touch with the parties, as well as with the permanent members of the Security Council, in order to see what bilateral efforts might bring.

We have not gratuitously sought opportunities for confrontations in public forums which might harden dividing lines and which might make it more difficult to move toward a settlement.

When this phase is over, we will give an ac-

counting of the efforts we have undertaken, and then a judgement can be made with respect to them. For now, our objective is to bring about an end of hostilities in such a manner that we will be in contact with all of the parties, as well as with the permanent members of the Security Council, after hostilities are ended, because we believe that in this manner we can make a maximum contribution to a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

Our assessment of the military situation as we see it this morning is that Israeli forces seem to have advanced some distance into Syria. Egyptian forces are holding the east side of the Suez Canal to a distance of about 6 to 10 miles. The Egyptian front—the Suez front—is reasonably stable, and the Syrian front is somewhat fluid.

As for the future, the United States will continue to make, and is now engaged in making, efforts to bring about an end to hostilities in a manner that contributes to long-term peace in the area—and I may say to long-term peace in the entire world. This is the framework of our discussions.

And now, Stewart [Stewart Hensley, United Press International], if you would like to ask the first question.

Q. What I would like to ask is in connection with bringing about a framework of stability and so forth. You said Monday that the détente between the Soviet Union and the United States could not withstand, or could not survive, irresponsibility in any area, including the Middle East.¹⁵⁰ And I am wondering whether in that connection you feel that the Russian statement urging other Arab states to join Egypt and Syria in the fight against Israël¹⁵¹ constitutes the sort of irresponsibility which jeopardizes the détente and, if it does so, whether you intend to match from the American side the war supplies which are said to be coming in to the others from the Soviet side.

A. That's at least two questions.

With respect to the first question: the behavior of the Soviet Union in the Middle East crisis and the effect of the Middle East crisis on U.S.-Soviet relations. Any assessment has to recognize that both the United States and the Soviet Union

¹⁵⁰ At the Pacem in Terris conference; text in *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIX, 1792 (October 29, 1973), pp. 525-531.

¹⁵¹ Doc. 134 above.

confront, each from their own perspective, a very complex situation in the current crisis.

Indeed, the reason why we believe that a long-term settlement in the Middle East is so important is the danger that the Middle East may become in time what the Balkans were in Europe before 1914, that is to say, an area where local rivalries that have their own momentum that will draw in the great nuclear powers into a confrontation that they did not necessarily seek or even necessarily start.

It is obvious that the United States has a traditional friendship with Israel, which it will maintain in this crisis. It is also clear that the Soviet Union has a relationship going back some years with some of the Arab states, which it also will not rupture during this crisis. The difficulty both of us face is whether, while remaining true to our principles, we can nevertheless conduct the relationships in such a manner that the larger interests of peace are served.

We did not consider the Soviet statement to the President of Algeria helpful. We did not consider the airlift of military equipment helpful. We also do not consider that Soviet actions as of now constitute the irresponsibility that on Monday evening I pointed out would threaten détente. When that point is reached, we will in this crisis, as we have in other crises, not hesitate to take a firm stand. But at this moment we are still attempting to moderate the conflict. As of this moment we have to weigh against the actions of which we disapprove—and quite strongly—the relative restraint that has been shown in public media in the Soviet Union and in the conduct of their representatives at the Security Council.

And as of this moment, our objective is, as I stated, to end hostilities on terms that are just to all without exacerbating relations to an unbearable point.

I want to repeat: When we make the judgment that actions have reached the point of irresponsibility, we will be very firm in making this clear.

Q. Mr. Secretary, back on the Middle East, do you believe, in light of the Soviet evacuation of dependents from Syria and Egypt last Thursday and Friday, that (1) they knew in advance of the plans for the attack? Do you feel that they should have informed the United States of those plans? And (2) do you feel that the Soviet Union, to any degree, encouraged the attacks?

A. It is too early to make a final judgment on all of these matters.

If the Soviet Union encouraged these attacks—which we have, as of now, have no evidence of—that would have to be treated by us as a very serious matter.

Now, if the Soviet Union learned of these attacks through its own intelligence or in some other manner and did not inform us, then this is a different problem.

In an ideal world, one would expect closer consultation, but given the particular volatility of the Middle East, it would have been a heavy responsibility to make known certain advance information. Nevertheless, we would like to stress that if either side in this relationship has certain knowledge of imminent military operations in any explosive part of the world, we would consider it consistent and indeed required—by the principles that have been signed between the United States and the Soviet Union—that an opportunity be given to both sides to calm the situation.

Q. In view of the reputation of Israeli intelligence, to what do you attribute the failure of both their and our intelligence to spot what was about to take place?

A. Nobody made any mistakes about the facts. There are always two aspects to intelligence. One is a determination of the facts; the other is the interpretation of these facts. And there is the tendency of most intelligence services—and indeed of most senior officials and indeed of some newspapermen—to fit the facts into existing preconceptions and to make them consistent with what is anticipated. And if you start from the assumption that a war is probably unlikely—if you know that there have been Egyptian maneuvers every September over the last 10 years—then there is probably a tendency to make observed facts fit your preconceived theories. This is one of the gravest dangers of all intelligence assessments. And facts are much easier to come by than intentions.

Over the years that I have been in this position, the possibility of a massive Arab attack was not considered among the most likely by any of the evaluators that I've talked to.

Q. May I follow that? Mrs. Meir said that she had advised other governments—I think she used the expression “a reasonable time in advance”—so that they could attempt to prevent it.

A. Well, it depends on your definition of a reasonable time. We were informed at 6 o'clock on Saturday morning that a war might be imminent. We were informed somewhat earlier that Israel did not intend to attack herself, but that did not indicate to us necessarily that an Arab attack was imminent.

Q. Mr Secretary, what kind of help are the Soviets giving Egypt and Syria? What kind of help are we now, or will we later, give to Israel?

A. Herb [Herbert Kaplow, ABC News], at this time I would like to stress again that our principal problem in responding to questions like this is to keep in mind that we are in a very delicate situation which can be easily inflamed by rash statements or by responding to very immediate pressures.

The Soviet airlift, at this moment, is moderate. It's more than light. It's a fairly substantial airlift. And it has to be addressed in relation to the possibility of influencing immediate military operations.

As far as we are concerned, you all know that we do have an ongoing military relationship with Israel, which we are continuing. And we are having discussions with Israel about the special situation created by recent events, but I don't think any useful purpose would be served by going into detail.

Q. In that connection, Mr. Secretary, some Arab countries are threatening to cut off Western oil supplies if the United States continues this ongoing relationship and resupplies Israel. How heavily do those threats weigh in the determination of the policy?

A. We had made a very serious effort, in this crisis, to take seriously into account Arab concerns and Arab views. On the other hand, we have to pursue what we consider to be the right course; we will take the consequences in pursuing what we consider to be the right course.

Q. Can you give us any idea, Dr. Kissinger, of the kinds of obstacles that you're running into now in this quest for ending hostilities?

A. Well, I have seen a fair amount of discussion about the desirability of some United Nations action. Now, the difficulty has been that our almost daily canvass of the consensus in New York is that the opinions are so divided and the willingness to take a position on the part of the

major—or on the part of all—the members of the Security Council is so low that our judgment that to force a formal vote on any proposition that we might put forward would only harden the dividing lines and would only serve to underline the inability to achieve a consensus.

We have therefore placed more stress on attempting to crystallize a consensus than we have in going through a battle of resolutions and counter-resolutions.

Beyond this I cannot go, except to make clear that we are in touch with the parties and with the major—with the permanent members of the Security Council—as well as, on a daily basis, with the Secretary General of the United Nations.

Murrey [Murrey Marder, Washington Post]. Let Murrey; Murrey has been overridden twice!

Q. Two questions, if I may.

A. I probably will regret recognizing him in a minute. [Laughter.]

Q. Would you give us, sir, your overall assessment of the state of attitude by the superpowers—by the three major powers, the United States, the Soviet Union, and China—in respect to the danger of any spread of these hostilities? Secondly, if I may, as Presidential National Security Adviser how do you evaluate the handling of this crisis by the State Department? [Laughter.]

A. Well, first with respect to the second question, we are very impressed, in the White House, by the leadership that the State Department has received. [Laughter.] But, on a serious level, I think that—for crisis situations, certainly—the combination of these two positions enables a more coherent policy. And with the operation of my associates in the State Department, the conduct has been outstanding and has contributed to keeping the crisis, so far, contained within its present framework.

Now, with respect to the first question, the danger of escalation as it is evaluated by, may I say, the permanent members of the Security Council, so that I am not making distinctions here:

I think everybody is aware that a war of this nature has a possibility of escalating. I think that up to now both sides, the two countries that are most capable of producing a confrontation, that is, the United States and the Soviet Union, have attempted to behave within limits that would prevent an escalation into such a war. If you compare their conduct in this crisis to their conduct

in 1967, one has to say that Soviet behavior has been less provocative, less incendiary, and less geared to military threats than in the previous crisis.

It is of course an extremely volatile situation which has potentialities for getting out of hand. And I can only emphasize once again the great importance of restraint by all of those countries who have it in their capacity to bring about an escalation and an expansion of hostilities and the expectation of the United States that all countries that have a capacity to influence events influence them on the side of restraint and moderation, as we are attempting to do.

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Press conference statements by Israel Prime Minister Meir commenting on Israel's situation in the Middle East war, involvement of the superpowers and conditions for a cease-fire and negotiations¹⁵²

Tel Aviv, October 13, 1973

Q. Does Israel intend to take Damascus, and if so, how long to occupy it?

A. You don't expect me to bring you the operative plan of what we are going to take, when, how long we stay and what will happen. I cannot do that.

Q. Would Israel agree to a cease-fire on the basis of lines that existed on the 5th of October?

A. There is no sense in speculating on what Israel will agree to or not as long as our neighbors—to this moment to the best of my knowledge, not our neighbor to the South nor our neighbor to the north has indicated any desire whatsoever to stop fighting. When we come to a proposition of a cease-fire we will consider it very, very seriously and decide, because our desire is, under possible conditions to stop the war as quickly as possible.

Q. Is it possible the super-powers are getting more involved in this war?

A. I know of one super-power that has sent in the last two days over 120 planes, carrying ammunition and I suppose rockets and I don't know what else to Syria, Iraq and to Egypt. That is rather some kind of an involvement I would say, but I don't know what else they want to do.

Q. Do you consider the fact that King Hussein is sending troops to defend Damascus as an act of war on his part?

A. Well, I don't think that King Hussein's troops have reached Damascus. They are quite a long distance away, but the fact that King Hussein has seen fit, after what happened in 1967, again to send in tanks and to have his army as he himself, or his government said today, on the Syrian front, I can only say I am sorry, because my predecessor, on the 5th of June 1967, sent a message to King Hussein through General Bull telling him that if he stays out nothing will happen to him. He did not stay out, and I am sure that the King must have the memory, rather a very unpleasant memory of what happened due to the fact that he came in. I am sorry that he has done that. But if any tank stands in our way, we cannot ask for identification whose tank it is. Any tank in our way will be hit.

Q. Have you asked for any material aid from the U.S., and can you reveal what kind?

A. If you people read the statement of Dr. Kissinger yesterday in answer to a question of this kind,¹⁵³ he said that there is an ongoing relationship between the U.S. and Israel as far as military material is concerned.

Q. Has the possibility been considered or been brought up of renewing the government of national unity in the near future?

A. I have not heard about this, and I do not know why a government should have to be changed in war time.

Q. In view of the events of last week do you consider the 1967 cease-fire lines as a viable frontier and a safe boundary for Israel?

A. The 1967 cease-fire lines are certainly the best lines that we could have. Every line can be attacked, naturally. But can you imagine what

¹⁵² Excerpted from the transcript as inserted by US Sen. Mondale (Dem.), *Congressional Record* (daily), October 16, 1973, pp. S19264–19266.

¹⁵³ Doc. 145 above.

would have happened to us had we moved back to the June 4, 1967 lines, had this attack on us took place, not when we are on the Canal but on those lines? Maybe—I hope at any rate—that people throughout the world that did not exactly go along with us when we said we will not go back to the pre-67 borders, that we must have borders that are safer, more defensible—I hope that they will now realize it is not that we wanted more sand in the Sinai desert, or more land anywhere else, but that we wanted borders that will prevent war. And even if these borders did not prevent war, how much more terrible it would have been for Israel had we consented, at the advice of some of our best friends, to go back where we came from.

Q. Do you regret not having launched a pre-emptive strike?

A. Yes and No. Yes, because had we done that, no doubt that position would have been much better and I can say frankly that probably quite a few lives would have been saved. No, because at least we don't have that argument with the world. It is a sad comment, but the truth. We took that decision with our eyes open. And we hoped to the last minute that maybe, despite what happened to us in 1967 when we tried to get people to prevent that war—we thought maybe this time it would succeed. So it isn't by chance we took this decision. We knew what we were doing. We knew even that we would have to pay for it. But I do not regret, despite all this, that we took that decision.

Q. You said that your forces had been through very bitter hours since Saturday or Sunday. Could you outline a bit more specifically exactly what the military situation is on the two fronts and what progress your forces have made during the weekend.

A. On the Syrian border, the Golan Heights is back, every inch of it, in our hands. The people of the various settlements are back in their settlements. Our forces are across the border and on the road that leads to Damascus. That is quite a change, to be on the Golan Heights or to be on the other side of the border. Of course, there is a battle going on all the time in the north. In the south, there is fighting now, and there probably will be for a few days to come. I wouldn't like to say anything more about the southern front.

Q. Can you tell us more about the implications of Hussein's decision to send his troops into Syria, the implications on your present eastern frontier, the bridges across the Jordan, are they open now? We were told early in the week there wasn't a full mobilization of Jordan coming into the war. Today anybody listening to the radio knows that more troops were mobilized. Was it for this contingency today?

A. We would have been more foolish than we are, if a neighbor so close geographically to us sends part of his troops, even if not too many, to aid a country fighting us, that we shouldn't take into account a possibility that if he does something more from across the borders we should be prepared to meet him. As far as the bridges are concerned, if King Hussein hasn't closed them yet, they are closed today because on the Sabbath they are always closed. On Yom Kippur too.

Q. Your reaction to the British decision to cut off arms to fighting nations?

A. I must say people, decent people, and decent governments, when they come to a point where, if you say it bluntly "A plague on both your houses" or when you say it more gently, "We are neutral", that is, the one that attacks and the victim of the attack are exactly in the same position. Somehow, maybe I am not sensitive enough to the feeling of justice and equality, when a government like Great Britain adopts a position of this kind—in addition to being bad for us, it is painful to think that a government can do something of that kind.

Q. Would you say that to them?

A. Maybe I will meet them someday and then I will say it to them.

Q. There is a considerable ghetto of Jews in Syria. What is your knowledge of the situation concerning these Jews, and your intentions?

A. There is no doubt that the Jews in the ghetto in Syria are treated in the most terrible, miserable way. And we certainly will see to it, try at any rate, that when the war is over and whether there is a cease-fire agreement or some other kind of agreement, we will ask these Jews be taken out the same way as we will ask for an exchange of prisoners. These Jews are prisoners that didn't even fight in the war and we will do everything in our power to see that these Jews are brought out from Syria.

Q. I know Israel's enemies have been counting on the assumption that supplies are going to run out and that Israel cannot fight a long war. I also know that Israel's friends abroad are concerned about the possibility that supplies may not be sufficient. Could you explain whether these problems are real or imagined.

A. If our neighbors dealt with realities, instead of dreams, maybe there would be peace a long time ago. Israel does not face the danger of lack of supplies. Israel is going to fight this war to the very end as long as our neighbors insist upon it. We can take everything necessary to fight this war until the war is ended with the victory of Israel. There are difficulties, difficulties in supplies, in many other things, but our people can take it. They have been tried before, they are wonderful today more than they ever were before, and we can take the difficulties and all the hardships. If our neighbors built on that then they have lost the war before they start it.

Q. Assuming a favorable outcome, is there any way you can see now to convert this fighting into the negotiated settlement or any political settlement of the dispute that eluded you in 1967?

A. I am sorry we cannot come out every day or every week with something new. That we have to repeat the same formula which I suppose sounds monotonous to many of you. Yet this is the truth. We didn't ask for the war of 1967. It was forced upon us and we won it. No sooner was the war over than the Israeli government asked the heads of Arab States: Now, let's sit down, as equals, and negotiate a peace treaty. And the answer came back from Khartoum: No recognition, no negotiations, no peace.¹⁵⁴ For six years, like parrots we have been repeating the same thing. We want to live in peace, in cooperation and in friendship. Therefore we say let's sit down, as equals, let's negotiate without any pre-conditions. We have ideas of what the borders should be, you have ideas of what the borders should be. We don't ask you to accept our ideas before we sit down to negotiate, and you can't ask us to accept your ideas before we sit down to negotiate. Now let's sit down and talk. You know what the answer was for 6 years: No negotiations, go back to the 67 borders and then maybe we will negotiate. No real cooperation and recognition of Israel, which means practically,

go back to the 67 borders then or any other borders. That, of course, we couldn't agree to. We have nothing new after this war is over. If we sit down and negotiate we can sign a treaty which will open a new era for the entire area but that depends upon them.

Q. The fact that you have been waiting for the Arab troops to attack, was that a political decision? If so, is that not in contradiction to what the Israel government earlier said that not one soldier's life would be offered for a political decision? And thirdly, will this political decision have any impact or implications on the situation internally in Israel?

A. It was a political decision, I don't think it has any relevance to what you say is the Israel government's policy not to sacrifice lives for political decisions. During a war, several times a day various political decisions have to be taken. In a war, to my great sorrow, people lose lives. Sometimes you take one decision, and you think maybe you can save lives in that way, and it turns out the other way. So there is no guarantee for political decisions to save lives. No, I don't see any implications whatsoever.

Q. Is the immigration of Soviet Jews continuing?

A. Do you mind if I don't answer that?

Q. What do you think of the project of the French mediation?

A. That is because France is very neutral, I suppose. France has even overstepped the claim for neutrality. I want to make myself clear. Mediation that we are prepared to accept and will be ready to accept at any time is either by an individual or a government that decides its aid should be limited to one thing and one thing only; which is a very important step, and that is to help the parties get together. Therefore, it is not arbitration, and no mediator who thinks he knows better than the parties what is good for them. Therefore, when this was attempted in the past, it failed. If it will be attempted in the future, it will fail. It is these two peoples whose sons met in battle over and over and over again, the governments of these two peoples must meet at the negotiating table and not have somebody from faraway whose life and independence and sovereignty are not at stake—it is these peoples in this area that have everything to win and everything to lose. Therefore it is these peoples that must do it.

¹⁵⁴ Doc. 412 in *International Documents on Palestine 1967*.

Nothing can save the leaders of the Arab countries from taking this responsibility for the fate of their people in their own hands and not to build ideas and castles in the air—someday Brezhnev can save them, the next day President Nixon before elections or after elections, before the summit meeting, after the summit meeting—all these are gimmicks that did not work in the past, will not work in the future. President Sadat, President Assad, King Hussein and all the others who have so much courage, why do they not have the courage to meet us at the negotiating table? If they are not satisfied they can always get up from the table and leave, but not even to try to sit down with us, in order to come to a peace treaty which will end all wars—that courage they are lacking, that somebody must do for them. Therefore, not France nor any other country can do that for them, and should not take it upon themselves to do it for them. Every country, every government that encourages them not to meet us at the negotiating table, everyone that encourages them in their intransigence and in their hope that somebody, somehow will solve their problems for them, is I think doing a disservice not only to Israel but to the Arabs and to peace.

Q. Do I detect a slightly different tone in your remarks about the events on the southern front? Does Israel categorically rule out a cease-fire which includes Egyptian troops on this side of the Canal?

A. I don't know what tone you have heard before. But what I said is when we hear a suggestion for a cease-fire, the government of Israel, believe me, very seriously and with great responsibility for everything that is concerned, will sit down and deal with it. So far, I don't hear anything about our neighbors being prepared for a cease-fire. We have so many problems on our hands that we don't want to think up problems. When a suggestion for a cease-fire will be a reality, believe me the government of Israel will not lose many minutes before it will be in session and deal with this problem.

Q. Would you be prepared that the Israel government agrees to return territories seized in 1967 for the price of stopping the bloodshed and for peace?

A. Somebody coming into this room from another planet would think that in 1967 Israel forced a war upon its neighbors in order to take the Sinai Desert, the Western Bank and the Golan

Heights. But since we are all from the same planet and you not only write newspapers, you also read newspapers, this wasn't exactly the description of what happened in 1967. Israel refused to go back to the borders of 1967 because these borders were washed away in blood exactly as the 1947 borders were washed away in blood by attack by our neighbors. Exactly as now, in 1967 they washed away the lines in Syria and Jordan and the others and now they have washed away borders. I don't think that will happen after this. Our neighbors cannot take a walk of this kind, with tens of thousands of men, with thousands of tanks, with bombers, kill, destroy, and then say: Well, all right, we didn't do it this time, we will try it again next time, but please give us borders that will be easier for us to cross; so good, we are not.

Q. Do you think the United States can do anything affirmative to hasten the end of this crisis?

A. I believe the United States and the policy it has adopted, for the last two or three years, saying that the U.S. is prepared to give its services to help the parties get together and find a solution for the problem ... the U.S. was prepared to aid the parties get together on the Suez arrangement. I think the U.S. has done, probably is doing also this moment, everything possible, and God Bless the U.S. for what it does not do and that is to try and force a solution upon any one of the parties. Therefore, I think the U.S. has certainly done everything for peace.

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Statement issued by the EEC governments calling for a Middle East cease-fire¹⁵⁵

October 13, 1973

The nine Governments of the European Community, deeply concerned about the resumption of fighting in the Middle East, appeal to the parties to agree to halt the hostilities. This cease-fire, which would make it possible to spare the peoples affected by the war further tragic ordeals, should at the same time pave the way for true negotiation

¹⁵⁵ Text as transmitted to the UN Secretary-General by Denmark and published in UN doc. S/11023 (A/9220); Denmark chaired the EEC Council of Ministers July-December 1973.

in an appropriate forum, permitting a settlement of the conflict in accordance with all the provisions of resolution 242 (1967) adopted by the Security Council on 22 November 1967.

148

Radio interview statements by Chancellor Brandt of West Germany commenting on the Middle East war¹⁵⁶

Bonn, October 14, 1973

Q. Federal Chancellor, the Middle East war has obviously affected the position of the Federal Republic a little. How does the Federal Chancellor view the prospects for a peaceful settlement of the Middle East fighting which has now already lasted longer than the Six Day War?

A. I cannot answer that however much I should like to. I am profoundly troubled that the conflict is spreading, that it is not yet at all possible to see when and how it can be settled. This is a situation fraught with danger; but I still hope that it is possible, in particular that it is possible for the two world powers to find common ground so that a development going beyond the region and catastrophic for the whole world does not begin.

Q. The Federal Republic, and in particular the Federal Chancellor, has an excellent relationship to Israel, and in recent years relations with the Arab states have showed a marked improvement. Would it not be natural for the Federal Republic to attempt to play an active part as mediator within the framework of the European Community, as someone who is not a participant in this conflict?

A. We would be overestimating our political power and moral position if we were to consider putting ourselves forward as mediators in such a conflict. It is true that we have tried to adopt a balanced attitude and will continue to do so. We have spoken the same language when we have met one or the other. In other words, in Cairo and the other Arab capitals Foreign Minister Scheel said nothing other than what I said in Jerusalem.

Now you asked about the European Community.

We are in that; we formulated an initial common appeal to the belligerents in the region, and I hope we manage to get some influence through the amalgamation of the influence of the European states. All the same, I say quite frankly: further developments depend finally on:

- a) what happens between the states directly involved—but they are in the middle of war, and*
- b) what happens on the part of the two world powers.*

Q. May I move this question from the field of the Federal Chancellor to that of the party chief? Through the Socialist International Golda Meir has called on the friendly social democratic parties to stand by the Israeli cause. Does that not create a conflict of interests between the position of Federal Chancellor and that of party chief which the Federal Chancellor fills?

A. The Federal Chancellor has stated that the Federal Republic of Germany is not a party to this conflict in the sense that it is not directly involved and that it also must seek to adopt a balanced attitude. That being so, it does not mean that we are taking sides when we say that it was a bad thing there and in the totality of international relations that war was started again. It does not entail neglect of national interests, on the contrary, to point out how concerned especially we Germans must be, because in all the efforts towards friendship with all participants, particularly in that area, we must never forget how tragically entwined in and with each other are German and Jewish life, the still existing and the destroyed, because of experience.

The Social Democratic Party, which is connected with the United Israel Labour Party in an international association, has made a statement and has given expression to its bond, but at the same time expressed its conviction that Israel, as other states in the area, must succeed in guaranteeing its right to life and security.

¹⁵⁶ Interview broadcast on Bayerischer Rundfunk; excerpted and translated from the German text, *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsrats der Bundesregierung* (Bonn), no. 131 (October 16, 1973), pp. 1290. 1291.

149

Statement by Prime Minister Whitlam of Australia asserting Australia's neutral attitude to the Middle East war, made in response to a parliamentary question¹⁵⁷

Canberra, October 15, 1973

Mr. Riordan [Lab.]: I address a question to the Prime Minister. Is it the intention of the Australian Government to seek United Nations intervention to halt the present military aggression against Israel? As the last Australian Labor Government played such a prominent role in the establishment of Israel as an independent democratic state, will the present Labor Government use its best efforts to obtain a ceasefire and an end to the current hostilities? Further, will the Government intensify its efforts to achieve the objective stated by the Prime Minister earlier this year in the following terms;

"We have affirmed, and we continue to believe, that the best prospect for an enduring peace in the Middle East will flow from an agreement freely arrived at between the parties. My Government will work to secure support for negotiations towards such an agreement, both in the UN and in all our diplomatic endeavours."

Mr. Whillam [Lab.]: The Australian Government's efforts are being directed to bringing about a ceasefire and an end of the hostilities in the Middle East. Australia has particular opportunity to work for this end because our distinguished ambassador to the UN, Sir Laurence McIntyre, is this month Chairman of the Security Council. It is unfortunate that the Security Council's efforts in this regard are limited to those which it can make under its own intrinsic authority.

None of the belligerents in the Middle East has sought the assistance of the Security Council. None of the Great Powers, two of whom back the conflicting parties, has moved in the Security Council. I refrain from adopting all the terms that my friend, the Honourable Member for Phillip, has used.

The Australian Government maintains a neutral and even-handed attitude to the conflict in the Middle East as did the Holt and Menzies gov-

ernments when conflict broke out there on earlier occasions. Successive Australian Governments have always been neutral and have tried to be even-handed in this longstanding dispute. I believe that there is no advantage in seeking to apportion blame.

I adopt the words which Sir Laurence McIntyre used at the last meeting of the Security Council when he said:

'We are simply wasting our time if we join in recrimination which only seeks to ascribe blame to one side or the other. We can all understand the frustrations that have increased during the past six years over the failure to build on the foundation provided by Resolution 242, frustrations which have inevitably helped to bring about the present renewal of hostilities. While we must regret lost opportunities we must look forward and not backward.'

There have been four meetings of the Security Council at the insistence of the Australian Chairman of that body. We are doing all that we can do.

We will continue to do all we can to end hostilities in the Middle East.

The Honourable Gentleman, and other Honourable Gentlemen who ask questions on this subject or may be disposed to do so, may not be entirely happy with the response that I shall give, but I wish to emphasise that I am particularly anxious to avoid any dissensions in the Australian community on this subject.

There are on one side of this House, for instance, some members of the Jewish faith who inevitably feel very much involved in this issue.

On the other side of the House there is one member, at any rate, of Arab ancestry who might feel much involved in this issue. I regret that on two occasions in recent weeks references have been made to the position of the gentleman to whom I refer.

In the last parliament references were made to Honourable Members which caused distress to them and could have caused dissension in the community.

There have been such references in this Parliament. I deplore them and shall do my best to denounce them from whatever side they come. I wish to emphasise another feature in illustration. I ask Honourable Gentlemen to understand that answers on this subject in our Parliament, which is probably the only Parliament where questions

¹⁵⁷ *Australian Foreign Affairs Record*, XLIV, 10 (October, 1973), pp. 698-699.

without notice on such subjects can ever be asked, are reported throughout the world.

I was asked a question by the Honourable Member for Hunder last week which was given wide coverage. There have been some adverse reactions to it. It was about the use of passports by Australians passing to this area of belligerency.

Mr. McLeay [Lib.]: It was a proper answer, anyway.

Mr. Whitlam: I thank the Honourable Gentleman. I believe it was. I do not believe that any person in my position would have given a different answer to the question I was asked.

Nevertheless, Reuters, in an incompetent and irresponsible fashion, embroidered the answer and thus spread dissension and misunderstanding in the world. They reported in particular my having said that the Australian Government would not try to stop Australian recruits going to the Middle East to take part in the Arab-Israeli war.

The question to me did not use the word 'recruits'. My answer did not use the word 'recruits'. My answer was reported throughout the world in the context of other statements made by some of the parties to the hostilities.

In these circumstances people associate my answer with those pronouncements by other persons.

I hope Honourable Members will appreciate that in answering questions on this issue I shall try to do three things: first, to avoid, as far as I can, dissension in this community; secondly, to do all I can to bring an end to the hostilities; and thirdly, to say nothing which will make more difficult the application of the principles of Resolution 242, which was unanimously passed by the Security Council over six years ago.

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Statement by USSR Prime Minister Kosygin expressing anger that the USSR should be blamed for a war caused by Israel¹⁵⁸

Moscow, October 15, 1973

One cannot fail to see that the opponents of detente try to use any pretext in order to revive the atmosphere of the cold war and to cause mistrust in the policy of peaceful co-existence. They are now trying with might and main to use for this purpose the fact of resumed hostilities in the Middle East, shielding the aggressor and shifting the blame onto the victims of aggression. Matters have reached such lengths that the Soviet Union's solidarity with the victims of Israeli aggression—the Arab countries—is presented as being nearly the source of tension in that region. It is hard to imagine something farther removed from reality.

It is an open secret that the reason for the obtaining situation in the Middle East is the aggressive policy of Israel's ruling quarters. These quarters, enjoying support and protection from outside, frustrated all efforts aimed at establishing a just peace in the Middle East and fanned up a hotbed of a military conflict in this area.

As for the Soviet Union, stressed recently L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, our country was and is a convinced advocate of a just and stable peace in the Middle East and a guaranteed security for all countries and peoples in this area. We are ready, as of old, to make our contribution to securing such peace.

Solidarity with the peoples of Egypt, Syria and other Arab countries, defending their lawful rights and interests in the struggle against the Israeli aggressor, and care for establishing a just peace is the essence of our position in the Middle East.

The Soviet Union does not seek anything for itself in this area. All our actions there are aimed at helping the peoples of Arab countries to liberate their territories seized by Israel, to reach a just political settlement, to strengthen their independence, to create a flourishing national economy and to develop along the way of progress. Guided by

¹⁵⁸ Made in a speech at a dinner in honour of visiting Prime Minister Jorgensen of Denmark; partial English text supplied, on request, by Novosti Press Agency, Beirut.

this, we shall consolidate in future as well our solidarity with Arab peoples in their just struggle.

The Soviet Union will do its utmost, as hitherto, for the process of international detente to go further, but, of course, not by renouncing our principles to which we are loyal and which were confirmed again by the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.¹⁵⁹ This is true also of the principle of a staunch rebuff to imperialist aggression.

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Speech to the Knesset by Prime Minister Meir of Israel describing the war situation (excerpts)¹⁶⁰

Jerusalem, October 16, 1973

Mr. Speaker, Members of the Knesset,

Since Yom Kippur, for the past eleven days, we have been engaged in a cruel war forced upon us on two fronts at one and the same time. Fierce battles have been waged, in which the Israel Defence Forces have displayed all their valour and strength. The enemy chose to carry out his aggression on the Day of Atonement... knowing that so many of our people are engaged in prayer and in the synagogues, as this is the most sacred day of the Jewish People. In his ignorance he was unaware that among Jews the saving of life takes precedence over everything else. We shall not forget the wonderful and moving sight of thousands of young men quietly leaving the synagogues wrapped in their prayer shawls, and in a short time going out to their units at the fronts, accompanied by a prayer for the welfare of all our fighters and profound faith in the victory of the Israel Defence Forces and the future of the Jewish People.

I will make not attempt at this time to give a detailed description of the situation. I will say only this: on the Syrian front we have overcome the aggressors and pushed them back across the cease-fire lines. The Syrian army has been severely mauled. An Iraqi division which took part in

the fighting has been severely hit by our forces. The IDF have struck at the strategic infrastructure of Syria. The war on the Syrian front, however, has not yet been completed.

On the southern front the war is in full swing. After the battles to block the enemy, our forces registered great achievements in defensive battles. Yesterday there were heavy armour-against-armour battles and the impetus of the Egyptian offensive was blocked. The indications are that the enemy's initiative has been curbed.

At this very moment an IDF force is also operating on the western side of the Canal. No doubt you will not expect me to give you a detailed account of the IDF's moves and plans, and I will add no more on the significance of our achievements while the battles are at their height. The greetings of the nation go out to the soldiers and officers of the IDF.

There is not need for a fertile imagination to realize what the situation of the State of Israel would have been if we had been on the June 4, 1967 lines. Anyone who finds it difficult to visualize this nightmarish picture should direct his mind and attention to what happened on the northern front—on the Golan Heights—during the first days of the war. Syrian aspirations are not limited to a piece of land but to deploying their artillery batteries once again on the Golan Heights against the Galilee settlements, to setting up missile batteries against our aircraft, so as to provide cover for the breakthrough of their armies into the heart of Israel.

Nor is a fertile imagination required to imagine the fate of the State of Israel had the Egyptian armies managed to overcome the IDF in the expanses of Sinai and to move in full force towards Israel's borders.

There is no doubt in our minds that war has been launched once more against our very existence as a state and a nation. The Arab rulers pretend that their objective is limited to reaching the lines of June 4, 1967—but we know their true objective: the total subjugation of the State of Israel. It is our duty to realize this truth; it is our duty to make it clear to all men of goodwill who tend to ignore it. We need to realize this truth, in all its gravity, so that we may continue to mobilize from among ourselves and from the Jewish people, all the forces and resources necessary to overcome

¹⁵⁹ See docs. 84 and 86 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

¹⁶⁰ Partial English text, *The Jerusalem Post*, October 17, 1973, p. 2; Meir started her speech at 14.07 gmt.

our enemies, to fight back until we have defeated our attackers.

In the U.N. and in the world press there is considerable talk on the subject of a cease-fire. I wish to say to the Knesset in the clearest possible way: up to now no proposal for a cease-fire has been made to the Israel Government by any political factor whatsoever. Accordingly, there is no need for us to discuss the subject. Moreover, the Egyptians and Syrians have seemingly not yet been beaten enough to evince any desire for a cease-fire. Here and there ridiculous statements have been made by Arab statesmen in favour of a cease-fire conditional on our withdrawal to the lines of June 4, 1967 . . . Apparently they are still under the illusion that the Syrians have not yet been repulsed and that the Egyptian tanks are still rolling forward. The time for a cease-fire will come when the enemy's strength has been broken. I am certain that, when we have succeeded in bringing our enemies to the verge of collapse, representatives of various states will not be long in "volunteering" to try and save our attackers by means of a cease-fire. And then there will be considerable activity at the United Nations' Security Council.

On the ninth day of the war it transpired that a crack Jordanian armoured brigade with 80 tanks had been transferred from Jordan to Syria and placed at the disposal of the Iraqi command.

This is a disturbing and dangerous step. We regarded it as the start of escalation. We drew the attention of international factors to the fact that developments might get out of control; for in the combat area in wartime it is not possible to distinguish one tank from another, and we shall have to treat the Jordanian force in Syria as the circumstances of the war dictate.

I think it is unnecessary to stress that we do not want a clash or a war with the Kingdom of Jordan and we are still convinced that it is in Jordan's interest not to bring about another war with Israel.

Now, as in times of danger in the past, we are witnessing the grave and disgraceful manifestation of the imposition of an embargo on shipments of arms to Israel at a time when we are fighting for our very lives.

The French embargo is still in force. Furthermore, the whole world sees how our warnings have proved true: we warned that the Mirages

which France was supplying to Libya would be used in war against Israel. And now the Mirages supplied to Libya are taking an active part in the battles in Sinai. Nor do we ignore the fact that Britain has held up deliveries essential to our war effort.

In the name of the people of Israel, I wish to express our thanks to the President of the United States and to the American people, who have followed American tradition in helping a nation struggling against aggression.

Faced with the vast quantities of arms and equipment streaming into the Arab states from the Soviet Union at an increasing pace, the United States is continuing to respond to our requests (for) arms. We have no desire that anyone should fight in our place. But we are entitled to help in defending ourselves. I am convinced that the United States will do all that is required for the deterrence of dangerous tendencies in the policy and the actions of the Soviet Union, and will render to Israel all the help needed to defend her existence and repel her attackers.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Yugoslavia of President Boumedienne of Algeria (excerpts)¹⁶¹

Belgrade, October 16, 1973

The President of the Council of the Revolution and the Council of Ministers of the Democratic People's Republic of Algeria, Houari Boumedienne, paid a working visit to Yugoslavia on October 15, 1973.

The two sides discussed the most recent developments in the Middle East from their military, political and diplomatic aspects. They acclaimed the results achieved by Egypt and Syria in their struggle to liberate Arab territories under Israeli occupation.

Both sides expressed their resolve to continue and to intensify their comprehensive assistance to

¹⁶¹ Excerpted from the English text, *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXIV, 565 (October 20, 1973), p. 14.

the Middle East countries fighting for the liberation of the territories occupied by Israel's aggression and for restoration of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. In their assessment, the support of the non-aligned countries, in the spirit of the conclusions of the Algiers summit conference, and that of all other peaceminded countries, is valuable for the attainment of the just objectives of the liberation struggle of the Arab peoples in the Middle East.

The two sides also reviewed the development of the international situation in the light of the resolution of the Fourth Conference of Non-aligned Countries in Algiers¹⁶² and observed that there was complete identity of views on all problems.

The talks were held in an atmosphere of friendship that has always been a feature of relations between Algeria and Yugoslavia.

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Declaration by the ambassadors to Egypt of states members of the OAU stating their solidarity with Egypt and the Arab cause¹⁶³

Cairo, October 17, 1973

The ambassadors of the African states express the complete solidarity of their governments and peoples with Egypt and the other Arab states engaged in the war against Israel.

The ambassadors strongly condemn the policy of the government of Israel.

The ambassadors deplore and denounce the Israeli air raids against civilians and international representatives in Syria.

The ambassadors express their anxiety over the current situation which Israel has created and which threatens international peace and security.

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Statement by Foreign Minister Moro of Italy introducing a debate on the Middle East in Italy's Chamber of Deputies (excerpt)¹⁶⁴

Rome, October 17, 1973

At this point I wish to confirm the Italian government's firm and constant position, which is that the state of Israel's right to existence is beyond dispute and that the aim to pursue is that of co-existence among the Arab states and Israel in conditions of true and reciprocal security. This includes a solution to the Palestine problem, which is not only an economic and social problem, but also a political one.

Italy has great interest in the settlement of the conflict, as much because it borders on our Mediterranean area and involves countries with whom we have, and wish to continue to have, friendly relations, as because the war being waged and the tension resulting from it constitute a considerable danger to peace and an obstacle to the process of normalization in international life, both prime objectives of our foreign policy.

In this respect I must mention our deepest apprehension of the risk that the Middle East war may rekindle the rivalry between the two great powers, by [their] defence of the contenders' positions, and the offer, first by one side then by the other, of continually renewed resources for warfare; both powers [had] seemed to be in agreement in their common desire to prevent and limit world conflicts and dangers to peace, taking into consideration their special responsibilities.

Then I wish to make clear that the allegation that the United States made use of NATO bases in Italy for getting military assistance to Israel is totally unfounded. In this respect, I recall that the use of the NATO bases is governed by precise rules of the Alliance, which are rigorously observed. As for Italy, we have always abstained, and still abstain, from any intervention, particularly that of arms supplies, which could aggravate

¹⁶² See doc. 120 above.

¹⁶³ Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Riyad* (Riyad), October 18, 1973.

¹⁶⁴ Excerpted and translated from the Italian text as published in *Relazioni Internazionali* (Milan), XXXVII, 43 (October 27, 1973), pp. 1107-1108.

the situation in areas of tension, especially as regards the Middle East.

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Remarks to the press by US President Nixon and Foreign Minister Saqqaf of Saudi Arabia after a meeting between Nixon and four Arab foreign ministers¹⁶⁵

Washington, October 17, 1973

Nixon: Ladies and gentlemen, the Foreign Ministers and I have had a very good talk discussing all of the aspects of the current situation in the Mideast. I will not go further than that except to say the conversation will continue over at the State Department with Dr. Kissinger, and any statement with regard to the nature of the conversation will be made from Dr. Kissinger.

Q. Will he tell us what was discussed?

Nixon: I doubt if there will be a statement, but what I mean is if you have any further questions, you should address them to him.

Q. Will you tell us what general areas were covered?

Saqqaf: If I have to say something, we four Foreign Ministers from the Arab world, representing 18 Arab countries, have been received well, and we had a very good exchange of views and discussions with His Excellency Mr. President Nixon. The meeting and discussions were fruitful, and we think the man who could solve the Viet-Nam war, the man who could have settled the peace all over the world, can easily play a good role in settling and having peace in our area of the Middle East.

Q. Did you discuss oil, Mr. Minister?

Nixon: It wouldn't be fair to ask him questions, because he speaks for 18; and I will simply say this in conclusion—that His Excellency the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia has been very generous in his comment with regard to our peace mission. I explained to the Foreign Ministers in our first four years we had the opening to China, we had

a new relationship with the Soviet Union, and of course, we brought an end to the war in Viet-Nam.

I told them that a major goal and an urgent goal at this time which we believe can, will, and must be achieved is a fair and just and peaceful settlement in the Mideast and we are all dedicated to that goal. Whatever differences we have are with regard to the means, with regard to, of course, certain ends as well, but the goal of a fair and just and equitable peace we all are dedicated to.

Thank you.

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Debate in the UK House of Commons on the background to the Middle East war situation and the UK arms embargo: statements by Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home and Labour Party leader Wilson (excerpts)¹⁶⁶

London, October 18, 1973

The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Sir Alec Douglas-Home): The roots of this latest Arab-Israel war reach back more than half a century. Since 1917 there has never been peace, neither during the years of dispute as to the meaning of the Balfour Declaration, nor since the time when the international community accepted the State of Israel into the United Nations.

Since the 1967 war the situation has been greatly aggravated by the inability of the parties to the dispute to come to the negotiating table. Every kind of initiative has been taken to help them into conference, but there has always been breakdown on two pre-conditions, one laid down by each side. The Arab stipulation has been that Israel must first commit herself to withdraw from the territories occupied in the 1967 war. The Israeli insistence has been that there must be substantial changes to their pre-1967 physical frontiers so that their security may be assured. That has been the essence of the deadlock all this time.

If there is total stalemate, what can anyone else

¹⁶⁵ *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIX, 1794 (November 12, 1973), pp. 595–596; the foreign ministers concerned were Bouteflika of Algeria, Sabah of Kuwait, Benhima of Morocco, and Saqqaf of Saudi Arabia.

¹⁶⁶ Excerpted from *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), Fifth series, Vol. 861 (October 16–25, 1973), cols. 419–423, 427–429, 430–431, 434–436, 440–441. The debate commenced at 15.58 gm.

do about it? Some will take sides. That is their decision. I think I state the situation correctly when I say that the attitude of successive British Governments has been to try to understand, but not to take sides.

Resolution 242 of the United Nations was an attempt to translate this attitude into practice by laying down a framework within which a peace agreement would be able to meet the two requirements—first the return of occupied territory and, second, physical safety for Israel. There was, and is, an ambiguity in the interpretation of Resolution 242, but the definition of the nature of the settlement required was sufficiently comprehensive to allow the settlement to be completed under that resolution, given the will. That, of course, is what has been absent. It was in an attempt to create that will that the Jarring mission was appointed but so far, as right hon. and hon. Members know, it has been unable to create conditions for a peace conference or to bring together the two sides mainly concerned.

There is, however, one good feature of recent years which should be marked, as it is of the first significance. On many occasions in the last three years President Sadat of Egypt has said that it is his wish to live in peace with the State of Israel and that the signature of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel will be with the State of Israel. Jordan has said the same, and I have no doubt that President Sadat and the King of Jordan would carry Syria with them.

This is a great change in the Arab attitude as hon. Members will recall it over the years, and, although it is only one factor, I believe its significance has been very much underrated. It was and is the essential key to any permanent peace between Israel and the Arab world and it has been provided.

May I now consider the Israeli situation? Taking their past experience they have considered that the life of their country may be at stake and they have decided that they should rely only on their own strength as reliance on others had proved in the past to be a broken reed.

So far, Israel takes the attitude that the only way to lead a peaceful life is to prove to the Arabs her overwhelming strength so that they will never challenge her frontiers, or if they do they will be crushed. Israel is certainly entitled to her security and she is certainly entitled to take her decisions

and this, one feels, is her decision. No one can take decisions for the State of Israel. A fact of geography is that if this is her conclusion she will then have to live in a hostile environment always unless peace is made. This is for Israel to judge. Nobody else can judge this for her.

But there is another system which would have a chance of gaining for her that permanent peace which has been so elusive, namely buffer demilitarised zones and an international force policing them, with the insistence that that international force should not be withdrawn by one side or the other to the dispute. That is a system. Otherwise I am afraid a situation will exist in which Israel will be among Arab countries which will not rest until the occupied territories are returned.

The decision for Israel is really this: is it to be her old policies or her present policy, which is the continued occupation of Arab territory so that there should be a buffer between her Arab neighbours and herself, or can that buffer be provided in any other way by international action?

Mr. Edward Short [Lab.] (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Central) *rose—*

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: I am trying to present a very careful argument. I hope the right hon. Gentleman will restrain himself until I have finished.

Even if Israel were to win a decisive victory in the present war there would only be another trial by arms sooner or later. After this long history of violence over all these years I do not believe that it profits us to try to apportion blame. [AN HON. MEMBER: "Why are you doing it?"] The last Government did not do it in 1967 and we have not done so now. The only constructive course is to put ourselves in the best position possible to try to reconcile and ensure that there is no more war between the Arab countries and the State of Israel. This is the main motive behind the embargo on arms which we have applied to both sides. The same policy is being followed by virtually all the European countries. In 1967 the Socialist Government applied an embargo but this was modified on the third day of the Six Day War when the Soviet Union would not join it. A universal embargo would still be the right answer but there is a very substantial difference between then and now.

In recent years we have been supplying Israel

and the Arab countries with arms. In doing so we have tried to maintain a balance which would give some sense of security to each country but would not tempt either to launch a war against its neighbour. I fully understand the very deep feeling among hon. Members on both sides of the House about the embargo. Our only motive in imposing it has been the belief that by so doing we would bring peace nearer.

The continued existence and prosperity of Israel as a State has been one of the cardinal points in our whole policy towards the Middle East. We are totally determined that the State of Israel shall continue to exist within secure frontiers.

At the outbreak of this war however, we were faced with a state of affairs where Egypt, Israel and Jordan had all paid for certain consignments of arms. We allowed those which were on the sea to proceed. We stopped those which were still ashore. There are, I recognise, doubts on both sides about the evenhandedness of our policy.

We do not give details of our arms supplies—no Government would do that—but I can tell the House that export licences had been approved and shipment was expected in the next few weeks of combat arms, spares and ammunition to the Arab States affected by the embargo and of far greater value in money terms than those to Israel and at least equal in terms of combat effectiveness. Furthermore, Centurion ammunition spares were in the immediate pipeline to Jordan, many more than had been intended for Israel.

It is a fact that Israel has other sources for Centurion ammunition than Britain and it is true that she manufactures Centurion ammunition for herself.

Mr. Andrew Faulds [Lab.] (Smethwick): On that point—

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: May I go on, because it is important for the House to get the whole picture.

Over the years, Israel has made extremely good use—and I hope that hon. Members on both sides of the House will not underestimate Israel's intelligence—of the contract with Britain to accumulate spare parts, and some of these she, too, can manufacture. We do not, for obvious reasons, define our arms sales, but some of the equipment ordered by Egypt and awaiting delivery now would have a very significant effect in a battle of

armour. But I will take the obvious case which is public knowledge.

It could be argued that sending to Jordan the requirements for their Centurians—the majority of their tanks are Centurions while about half of Israel's tanks are Centurions—could have the implication that it would put Israel at a disadvantage. It was and is, therefore, a choice between adding to the fire power of both sides or of withholding fire power from both sides, and the calculation is pretty well even. Israel cannot be preferred as against Jordan and Egypt, or *vice versa*. So it is a question of withholding from both sides or of giving to both sides because both have made these contracts, both have ordered the arms. Thus, those who advocate the sale to Israel must face the fact that to be consistent they are advocating the sale of Centurion ammunition and spares to Jordan on a very much greater scale than those to Israel. The Jordanian Ambassador called on the Minister of State this morning to represent to us the harsh effect which the embargo is having in his country.

Mr. Harold Wilson [Lab.]¹⁶⁷: The House today is debating a tragedy. It is a tragedy, first, in terms of the heavy casualties on both sides and, unless peace comes quickly, of the inevitability of many, many more casualties. Many of us throughout the House have friends, both Jew and Arab, suddenly torn from their families by the outbreak of fighting, many will not return, and daily each of us waits anxiously for bad news.

The uneasy security under which those families have lived, Jew and Arab, for the past six years, has been shattered. Now they have nothing to look forward to, even after the fighting stops, except further insecurity. That is the abiding reality underlying the power politics, underlying the deep feelings aroused by national loyalties, religious loyalties and by history. That is the reality underlying the world reaction. There is also underlying all our debates, the grave danger that what has already been described as a super-Power struggle by proxy could escalate into global conflict.

There is tragedy for Britain—for one family in Britain and for a wider circle. We all mourn the death yesterday in the course of duty of a

¹⁶⁷ Spoke at 16.16 gmt.

distinguished and highly respected journalist known to many of us. I know that we would all wish to express our sympathy to his wife and young family and to his editor and colleagues.

When, from our different approaches, we analyse the events which have led to this fresh outbreak of fighting, we are faced with a further tragedy—the tragedy of missed opportunities, of six years of attempts to bring the parties together, to reconcile under the wide sweep—and it is a wide sweep—of Resolution 242 what proved for so long to be irreconcilable claims and demands—on Israel's side the acknowledgement of her right to exist as a nation, her right to secure defensive frontiers, as Resolution 242 set out; on the Egyptian and Syrian side, their claim based on the resolution's denial of the right of any nation to acquire territories by force: and the problem, far older than those created by the Six-Day War, of the Palestinians who lost their homes, what they too regard as the land of their fathers, in 1948.

This is a problem that I have constantly raised. I have raised it in Israel, in private and in public, and, as many of my hon. Friends know, I have spelled it out on the record at Jewish gatherings in this country. Let there be no argument about this. The Palestinian problem must be dealt with not only in any ultimate permanent solution but even in a temporary and limited solution. Last year, in Israel, I said that, if there were to be a limited settlement on, for example, the opening of the Canal, this matter would have to be brought under it.

As the head of the Government that sponsored Resolution 242, I would be the first to concede that it has proved capable of very differing interpretations, particularly in the reference to "... withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict".

But if it had not been so wide there would never have been agreement in the United Nations Security Council in November 1967.

Apart from the question of the arms embargo, I do not want to press too many points of basic disagreement. There are disagreements, and it is absolutely fair to say that, where they occur, they occur on each side of the House. No party can claim today to put forward homogeneous views, either supporting the Foreign Secretary's policy and basic attitude or opposing them. The only

disagreement I would refer to at this point is this: there will be many of us who regret that the right hon. Gentleman, having over the past year on a number of occasions voted for and, indeed, on three occasions having sponsored, separately or with the French Government, resolutions condemning Israel for alleged military raids, should have remained silent in condemning the vastly greater act of aggression on the Day of Atonement. Whether or not right hon. and hon. Members on either side of the House like it, I did condemn that aggression and I identified it early on the following Sunday morning. I stand by what I said.

I come now to the difficult question of arms supply. Here again, the division between us is not a simple one across the Table. There are divisions on each side of the House.

Britain has been a principal supplier for the Israeli army and navy, most of all for tanks, guns mounted on tanks, ammunition for those guns, and spares. This war, like that of six years ago, is a war predominantly of tanks, anti-tank weapons and aircraft, but now with the new dimension of lethal missiles.

Successive British Governments have supplied Israel, as we have supplied Jordan, in good faith. On Tuesday, some hon. Members on both sides of the House challenged the good faith of the present Government for their action in dishonouring contractual obligations at the very moment of Israel's greatest need. One right hon. Gentleman was reported as having gone so far, outside the House, as to compare them with a dud insurance company which continued to collect premiums but failed to honour the contract when a claim had to be met. I hope that the Government would agree that where arms have been supplied on a continuing basis, only absolutely overriding considerations could justify a failure to honour the letter and the spirit of the contract.

The right hon. Gentleman's argument today is that since her Majesty's Government have sought to secure a cease-fire resolution through the Security Council, such action would be incompatible with a decision to supply ammunition or other contracted requirements to Israel, that it would affect the validity of his approach. I do not accept this argument at all. The fact that arms were being sent to Israel by the Labour Government did not prevent us in 1967 from taking the lead and

successfully sponsoring Resolution No. 242 which is still the governing resolution. We were supplying arms to the Middle East at that time. It did not stop us taking a lead in the Security Council, which the right hon. Gentleman has so far not been able to do.

Our position as arms suppliers did not prevent us taking a lead in the negotiations which began to make that resolution a reality. I want to underline this point. It did not prevent our selection by the Security Council as one of the four countries to whom the task of peace-making was delegated in those years of quadripartite discussion. We were chosen as one of those four countries not because our hands were clean of arms supplies—we were supplying arms—but because the Security Council felt that progress could best be made on the basis of the selection of four countries, two of them super-Powers and two of them middle-rank Powers, of which it could be reasonably assumed that the United States and Britain took a broadly Israel line and the USSR and France took a broadly Arab line. That is why we were in the inner circle of mediation from 1967 onwards, because it was thought that we, with the United States, would support Israel and the other two would support the Arabs.

The Foreign Secretary must ask himself—indeed, the House must ask—whether, if his aim is to win a ticket to the mediators' table, he is not just as likely to be disqualifying himself from such a rôle. I will explain this. The whole House will hope that the initiatives of the Soviet Union and the American Government lead to a speedy and honourable solution. It was not easy in 1967 when the initiative of Lord Caradon proved successful, but an infernally difficult question is now complicated by a new dimension, the dimension of China—a China which has been in a highly competitive situation with the Soviet Union in Africa, a China which I suspect aspires to similar influence with the Arab countries, and a China, in the Security Council context, with a veto.

All this makes Russia's task that much harder, and it makes the right hon. Gentleman's task that much harder as well. After Chinese claims that it had won the day in Vietnam, let none of us forget that the Soviet Union has its own domino theorem—the fear of being pushed from pillar to post, which is no less acute than the one we used to hear from the United States.

To return to the present issue, I have to say that the present Government's refusal to meet our obligations in the matter of arms supplies is symptomatic of a wider general attitude to Middle East affairs, a total change in Britain's present position since 1967.

But there is another argument in my mind and that of many of my hon. Friends. I recognise that this will have no appeal to hon. Members opposite. Perhaps they will switch off listening for the moment. It is something which concerns us more than them, and I do not apologise.

Israel is a democratic socialist country. More than that, it is a community with a national wealth as well as national burdens shared in common. It is a country which, despite her prodigious arms burden, has established a remarkable record in the social services and care for peoples, especially for her children. [An HON. MEMBER: "Palestinians?"] It is now producing better facilities for educating Arabs than they ever had before 1967. I have seen them, as other hon. Gentlemen have. By certain very difficult tests Israel's record in education, one of the social services, is the finest in the world with the exception of Canada, and I should be prepared to give my evidence for that.

Therefore I believe that something is owed by some of us to the only democratic social State in that vast region. Indeed, by any test that would apply it is the only democracy in that region, and I bitterly regret that at this time more of my fellow democratic Socialist leaders in the Socialist International have not declared where their loyalties lie. Some are corralled in the Foreign Secretary's EEC—the see-no-evil, hear-no-evil, speak-no-evil camp. But the silence has not been confined to them.

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Press interview statements by Israel's ex-ambassador to the US Rabin commenting on the circumstances and conditions of US military aid to Israel¹⁶⁸

Mid-October, 1973

Q. What is the political basis on which the United States assists Israel with important arms consignments and stands by her?

A. There was in the past, and there still is, the Nixon Doctrine. It is the line which directs United States policy in local conflicts. This doctrine is also the basis of United States policy these days. But we should define this doctrine. It consists of three elements:

a) In a local conflict the United States expects the local party with which it sympathizes and which is fighting a war, to bear the burden of the war and not request or demand American forces to intervene in the conflict.

b) The United States supplies the combatant party with which it sympathizes with the arms it requires for the war it is fighting, especially as American interests require that this party should not be allowed to fail in the fighting.

c) The United States deploys a deterrent umbrella to prevent direct military intervention by another major nuclear power—in our case the USSR—and to prevent it from intervening in the local conflict with its military forces.

This in fact is the basis on which the United States is now acting in its aid to Israel. Israel has not asked for intervention by American forces, and is bearing the heavy burden of the fighting. The United States is supplying her with what she needs to fight and deterring the USSR from intervening in the war with its forces.

Q. Is there a political price that has to be paid for military aid?

A. When the United States observed the situation that arose at the beginning of the war, and the extent of the aid and the immense support in the military field which the USSR has provided, and is still supplying, to Egypt and Syria, it felt that it had to take action to make the Arabs, and in particular the Russians, realize that the Nixon Doctrine is not merely a scrap of paper but a

practical policy, and that the United States is prepared to implement it in both theory and practice, and it really is implementing it.

Q. Will the United States ask Israel to pay a political price for the aid of this great power? That is, will the United States say, when the war is over: It is clear that without concentrated American aid at the height of the war, you would have been in a difficult situation. In this way we endangered our world interests, and so that we may not have to do the same thing again we require you to do so and so? Does this seem to you possible?

A. Not at all. I do not believe that there is a specific political price for this aid. I believe that the common goal of the United States and Israel is to act to put a rapid end not only to the old war in the Middle East but also to the present fighting in conditions leading to genuine negotiations. Therefore, in the view of the United States, the most important thing is to prevent the present fighting from ending in circumstances that encourage its eventual resumption.

Q. Does that mean that the United States is interested in our winning a decisive victory, without which circumstances are bound to lead to a resumption of the fighting after a short time?

A. I believe that the United States wanted a situation in which this war would end in circumstances that would make it impossible for it to continue and expand indefinitely. In other words: That this war should end in circumstances ensuring that the Arabs would no longer wish to resume it in either the near or the distant future.

Q. Does the United States assume or intend that the outcome of this war should be the basis for starting the process of a peaceful settlement in the Middle East?

A. I do not rule that out. The United States wants the outcome of war to lead to the parties being induced to undertake political negotiations and reach a real solution, and not on the basis of the present Egyptian Arab attitude as expressed by Sadat, the President of Egypt, in his speech this week.¹⁶⁹

Q. Can you conceive of specific special circumstances that might have induced the United States to intervene in the war, materially and directly, with the American army?

A. In view of the fact that we are not in a situation in which the existence of Israel depends on

¹⁶⁸ Excerpted and translated from the Hebrew text, *Maariv* (Tel Aviv), October 19, 1973.

¹⁶⁹ Doc. 291 below.

American military intervention, I hardly feel that I need answer this question. . . . This situation, which does not require American intervention, gives Israel greater political freedom. When there is someone who guarantees you and your existence to the extent of being prepared for direct military intervention your obligation to accept his attitude regarding a political solution, which he approves and you do not, will be greater.

Q. Does Israel alone enjoy political freedom, or do the Arabs too?

A. The two sides enjoy greater political and military freedom than ever before, as long as the USSR also acts in accordance with the Nixon Doctrine and does not cross the "Red line," which would require direct military intervention.

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Message from US President Nixon to the US Congress requesting the authorization of emergency security assistance to Israel¹⁷⁰

Washington, October 19, 1973

To the Congress of the United States:

I am today requesting that the Congress authorize emergency security assistance of \$2.2 billion for Israel and \$200 million for Cambodia. This request is necessary to permit the United States to follow a responsible course of action in areas where stability is vital if we are to build a global structure of peace.

For more than a quarter of a century, as strategic interests of the major powers have converged there, the Middle East has been a flashpoint for potential world conflict. Since war broke out again on October 6, bringing tragedy to the people of Israel and the Arab nations alike, the United States has been actively engaged in efforts to contribute to a settlement. Our actions there have reflected my belief that we must take those steps which are necessary for maintaining a balance of military capabilities and achieving stability in the area. The request I am submitting today would give us the essential flexibility to continue meeting those responsibilities.

To maintain a balance of forces and thus achieve stability, the United States Government is cur-

rently providing military material to Israel to replace combat losses. This is necessary to prevent the emergence of a substantial imbalance resulting from a large-scale resupply of Syria and Egypt by the Soviet Union.

The costs of replacing consumables and lost equipment for the Israeli Armed Forces have been extremely high. Combat activity has been intense, and losses on both sides have been large. During the first 12 days of the conflict, the United States has authorized shipments to Israel of material costing \$825 million, including transportation.

Major items now being furnished by the United States to the Israeli forces include conventional munitions of many types, air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles, artillery, crew-served and individual weapons, and a standard range of fighter aircraft ordnance. Additionally, the United States is providing replacements for tanks, aircraft, radios, and other military equipment which have been lost in action.

Thus far, Israel has attempted to obtain the necessary equipment through the use of cash and credit purchases. However, the magnitude of the current conflict coupled with the scale of Soviet supply activities has created needs which exceed Israel's capacity to continue with cash and credit purchases. The alternative to cash and credit sales of United States military materials is for us to provide Israel with grant military assistance as well.

The United States is making every effort to bring this conflict to a very swift and honorable conclusion, measured in days not weeks. But prudent planning also requires us to prepare for a longer struggle. I am therefore requesting that the Congress approve emergency assistance to Israel in the amount of \$2.2 billion. If the conflict moderates, or as we fervently hope, is brought to an end very quickly, funds not absolutely required would of course not be expended.

[The remainder of the message requested \$200 million for Cambodia.]

I am confident that the Congress and the American people will support this request for emergency assistance for these two beleaguered friends. To do less would not only create a dangerous imbalance in these particular arenas but would also endanger the entire structure of peace in the world.

Richard Nixon

¹⁷⁰ *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIX, 1794 (November 12, 1973), pp. 596-597.

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Press conference statement by President Bhutto of Pakistan outlining Pakistan's reaction to the Middle East war¹⁷¹**Islamabad, October 20, 1973**

Ladies and gentlemen, I want to speak on the Middle Eastern war and to give you the Government of Pakistan's point of view on this conflict, and I have some points and I will elucidate on them. After that if you have any questions to ask, I will be happy to try and answer them.

In the first place the way we look at the Middle Eastern conflict is that the whole of the Muslim world is on trial. This is a test not only for the Arabs but for the Islamic world, and it is a struggle for justice and equity which I shall refer later. But my first point is that this is as much our struggle, this is as much a part of our own destiny as it is of the Arabs in the Middle East. We cannot draw a distinction. Secondly, Pakistan is not a non-aligned State; Pakistan is firmly aligned to the principles of justice and international law and to a durable structure of international peace. We are aligned to principles, we are aligned to convictions, and being aligned we believe that the principles of justice and equity are on the side of the Arab States.

My third point is that the present war in the Middle East shows that an imposed solution, an unacceptable solution, which is an imposed solution, a solution which is not acceptable to the people, cannot endure. It only leads to further strife, bitterness and tension. It also shows that the great powers neither in concert nor in conflict can prevent a just war and a just struggle. We have seen that when there have been any conflicts and confrontations, we have not been able to prevent people's aspirations for a just struggle. We have also seen that when they act in concert, when they act in harmony, they have been unable to prevent the people's aspirations for the attainment of justice and equity. I repeat thirdly in this connection that Pakistan is uncompromisingly committed to the Arab cause and I would like to emphasise with all responsibility at my command that we are doing everything within our power and capacity to uphold the Arab position and to

give support—tangible support to the Arab States in their struggle to liberate Arab territories usurped by Israeli aggression. In this connection the steps taken by the Pakistan Government are as follows:

Firstly, we announced to the Arab Ambassadors to Pakistan on the 7th of October—a day after the hostilities began—in Islamabad and assured them of Pakistan's unwavering support in this crisis and in this war.

Secondly, I immediately addressed a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations stating Pakistan's position and pointing out clearly that a lasting and just peace can only come if Arab territories are vacated and a sincere effort is made to find a viable solution within the framework of the existing United Nations Resolution of November 1967. This resolution has international support and, in our opinion, it can form the basis of a durable peace.

Thirdly, we addressed letters to the Heads of Arab States assuring them of our whole-hearted support.

Fourthly, I convened a meeting and a conference of the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces of Pakistan to review the position and to see what Pakistan can do to support the Arab cause and the heroic effort of the Arabs to vindicate their position.

Fifthly, yesterday I returned from a visit of Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. My visit to these states was made with the purpose of forging a united approach to the Middle Eastern crisis. This visit to Iran and Turkey was to consult Pakistan's allies and friends in the formulation of policies in the face of fast developing events and for future course of action. I visited Saudi Arabia to hold discussions on the present Arab position with King Feisal.

It is well known to the Arab States that the Government of Pakistan is exercising its full weight and influence in their behalf and for the purpose of an honourable peace. We want to help and we cannot be helpful if our actions complicate an already complex situation. It must be remembered that a war is being waged, every minute is precious and every action has to be taken deliberately for the purpose of achieving success. It is not possible for me to make full revelation of all our efforts. I am sure you will appreciate that public interest and the critical exigencies of war cannot permit me to make full and complete revelation of our

¹⁷¹ English text as published in *Pakistan Horizon* (Karachi), XXVI, 4 (4th quarter, 1973), pp. 152–154.

efforts in a press conference. It is sufficient to state that our efforts have received universal acclaim by the Arab States and all those countries anxious to promote an honourable and peaceful settlement of the present conflict.

Ladies and gentlemen, I have a few more observations to make on this war. In the first place this conflict has shown that the state of 'No war and no peace' is highly detrimental to international order.

Secondly, it has shown that vital international disputes cannot be frozen and that a diplomatic stalemate is not an answer to the substantive issues at stake.

Thirdly, this war has broken the myth of the invincibility of Israel. Moreover, this war has shown that the Arab people are capable of a heroic struggle and are able to wrest their rights through sacrifice.

Another observation that I would like to make is that the objective situation prevailing in 1973 is entirely different from the situation which prevailed in 1956 and in 1967. In this war Israel has been isolated and the whole world has rallied round the cause of the Arab States. In Western Europe itself and in certain responsible circles of the United States it is appreciated that the unity of the Arab countries and the genuine energy crisis are factors which are relevant to the determination of the Middle Eastern crisis.

This war has shown that the Arab States can fight again and again and that they will continue to fight even after this war if justice is denied on this occasion as well. Correspondingly it has shown that Israel cannot afford to fight again and again. One defeat for the Arabs does not mean the end of the Arab struggle as has been shown by the present war but one decisive defeat of Israel would render Israel incapable of facing Arab encirclement. It is, therefore, imperative for Israel to seek peace and to withdraw from the territories she has illegally occupied and acquired by conquest from the Arab States.

Ladies and gentlemen, Pakistan is in touch not only with the Arab States but with other states as well for the purpose of finding a lasting settlement. We shall continue to make every human effort in this direction. It is well known to the people of Pakistan that I have always espoused the Arab cause and that I have vigorously upheld it in the past and will continue to do so in the future.

We know the people of Pakistan have faith in the Government and in the successful execution of this *Jehad*. We can assure the people of Pakistan that we who are completely familiar with their sentiments, that we will respect their sentiments and we will do everything in our power to uphold their aspirations.

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Decision of the Israel Cabinet to accept a ceasefire¹⁷²

Jerusalem, October 22, 1973

At its meeting this morning (Monday), the Cabinet decided unanimously to accept the proposal of the U.S. government and President Nixon, and to announce its readiness to agree to a cease-fire in accordance with the Security Council resolution¹⁷³ following the joint U.S.-Soviet draft-proposal.

Under the terms of this proposed resolution, the military forces will remain in the positions they occupy upon the coming into effect of the cease-fire. Israel will insist on an exchange of prisoners.

The implementation of the cease-fire is conditional upon reciprocity.

The Cabinet decision will be brought to the notice of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee and of the Knesset.

The proposed U.S.-Soviet resolution submitted to the Security Council reads as follows:

"The Security Council—

1) Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, not later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy.

2) Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 in all of its parts.

3) Decides that immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under the appropriate auspices

¹⁷² English text as published in *The Jerusalem Post*, October 23, 1973, p. 6.

¹⁷³ Doc. 34 above.

aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.”

With regard to paragraph 2 of the proposed resolution, the Cabinet has decided to instruct Israel's representative at the United Nations to include in his address to the Security Council a passage clarifying that Israel's agreement to this paragraph is given in the meaning defined by Israel when she decided, in August 1970, to accept the initiative of the U.S. government regarding the cease-fire as notified to the United Nations on 4 August 1970, and as announced by the Prime Minister Mrs. Golda Meir, in the Knesset on the same date.¹⁷⁴

The Minister of Defence and the Chief of Staff reported on the situation on the battlefronts.

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Speech to the Knesset by Israel Prime Minister Meir explaining the circumstances of Israel's acceptance of the ceasefire (excerpt)¹⁷⁵

Jerusalem, October 23, 1973

Honourable Knesset Speaker, honourable Knesset, first of all forgive me for being late in arriving in Jerusalem. There was an urgent meeting and I had to stop on the way.

The Government of Israel decided unanimously on 22nd October to respond to the appeal of the US Government and President Nixon and to announce its readiness to accept a ceasefire on the basis of the Security Council resolution that came in the wake of a joint US-Soviet proposal. According to this draft resolution, the military forces will remain in the positions they hold the moment the ceasefire goes into effect. The implementation of the ceasefire is conditional on reciprocity. Our decision was brought to the attention of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, and now to the attention of the Knesset.

On the basis of the US-Soviet draft resolution, the Security Council decided the following:

1. The Security Council calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision in the positions they now occupy.

2. The Security Council calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council Resolution No. 242 in all of its parts.

3. The Security Council decides that, immediately and concurrently with the ceasefire, negotiations will start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

With regard to the second clause in the draft resolution, the Government decided to instruct the Israeli representative at the United Nations to include in his speech at the Security Council a paragraph explaining that our acceptance of this clause is given with the definition made by Israel when it decided in August 1970 to respond to the initiative of the US Government regarding a ceasefire and as communicated to the United Nations on 4th August 1970 and as stated by the Prime Minister in the Knesset on the same day. This has also been conveyed to the US Government.

Israel's acceptance of a ceasefire with Egypt is conditional on Egypt's acceptance, and is not conditional on Syria's acceptance, of a ceasefire with Israel and vice versa. The Government also decided to clarify with the US Government a series of points closely connected with the substance of the Security Council resolution and the dates pertaining to it. It is our intention to clarify and ensure, among other things, that the ceasefire applies to all regular forces stationed on the territory of the country which accepts the ceasefire, including forces of a foreign country, such as the armies of Iraq and Jordan in Syria, as well as forces of other Arab states which have taken part and are taking part in the war.

The ceasefire will also apply to the activity of irregular forces operating against Israel from territories of the states which agree to observe the ceasefire. The ceasefire will ensure the prevention of a blockade and of interference with free navigation in the Strait of Bab al-Mandab for ships, including oil tankers, on their way to Eilat. It will ensure that the term "negotiation between the

¹⁷⁴ Docs. 173 and 174 in *International Documents on Palestine 1970*.

¹⁷⁵ Broadcast live on Israel radio in Hebrew at 16.25 gmt; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4433/A/2-4; reprinted by permission.

sides” means direct negotiations. It goes without saying that it is also necessary to ensure that the procedures, mapping and supervision of the ceasefire will be determined by an agreement.

Knesset members, a subject of great importance which is dear to our hearts is the release of the prisoners of war. The Government of Israel has decided to demand the mutual exchange of prisoners. We discussed this matter with the US Government, which took part in the initiative for the ceasefire. I discussed this matter yesterday with Secretary of State Dr. Kissinger. We shall insist on an immediate mutual exchange of prisoners.

On the arrival of Dr. Kissinger’s plane at Andrews Base near Washington, the State Department spokesman, Mr. McCloskey, told journalists—and I quote: “We believe the matter that should be allotted priority after the ceasefire is the exchange of prisoners, we and the Soviet Union have given an assurance that we will make efforts to ensure that this matter is implemented.”

And I stress again that this subject is one of the main tests of the ceasefire, and we [words indistinct] that the pledges of the ceasefire initiators will indeed be implemented.

Knesset members, I shall say a few words about our military position on the Syrian and Egyptian fronts on the eve of the ceasefire. The lines we occupy today on the Syrian front are better than those we held on 6th October. Not only do we now have all the area that has been under our control in the past, but our position has also been improved greatly by taking the positions on the ridge of Mount Hermon and on the frontline to the east—the line which has moved the former ceasefire line into a better position resting on the strong back of the ridges of Mount Hermon in the north.

On the Egyptian front, the Egyptians indeed achieved a military accomplishment by crossing the Canal. But in a daring IDF counterattack, our forces succeeded in taking control once again of a significant part of the eastern Canal line and in capturing a vast area west of the Canal—an area which opens up both defensive and offensive possibilities if the need arises. This deployment deprives the Egyptian Army of the ability to threaten Sinai and Israel with an offensive. It also deprives the Egyptians of the ability to hit essential installations and areas in our territory.

The IDF forces west of the Canal constitute a strong military base for the development of operative operations initiated by us if need be.

With regard to the question of the ceasefire, the US Secretary of State, Dr. Kissinger, and his aides came to Israel while on their way from Moscow to Washington. The visit was a good opportunity for a thorough clarification of issues which arise on the occasion of a ceasefire, and for an exchange of views in a friendly manner on what is about to happen and what obtains from Israel’s response to the appeal of the US Government to accept a ceasefire. During this visit, we continued and strengthened the contacts which preceded the Security Council resolution.

In all our contacts with the United States I have learned that not only does the United States not have a plan regarding borders and the other components of peace, but also that it believes that those employing their good offices should give a lead towards a situation in which the parties themselves, and themselves alone, should make proposals and plans for the future. Furthermore, I should stress that, according to authoritative information reaching me, the Moscow talks did not deal with anything other than what is included in the Security Council resolution.

Knesset members, I must declare that the Syrian Government has not yet responded to the resolution to cease fire. Fighting on this front is continuing, and the IDF will operate there in accordance with its plans.

As for the Egyptian front, the firing against our forces has not yet ceased. The IDF has been compelled to act as necessary as long as the firing continues. At this time I will only say that we are examining the behaviour of the Egyptians while maintaining military and political alertness. If Egypt continues combat activity, we will consider ourselves free to adopt any action or move the situation may call for.

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Statement by the USSR government warning Israel to abide by the Security Council's ceasefire resolution¹⁷⁶**Moscow, October 23, 1973**

The whole world received the U.N. Security Council's resolution of October 22¹⁷⁷ on a ceasefire and end to all hostilities in the Middle East with satisfaction and relief.

The Egyptian leadership stated its readiness to implement this resolution of the Security Council and stop hostilities on the Egyptian-Israeli front.¹⁷⁸ Acceptance of this resolution of the Security Council was also stated by the government of Israel.¹⁷⁹

The statement by Tel Aviv, however, proved, in fact, to be a gross lie, under cover of which the Israeli military treacherously attacked positions of the Egyptian forces, as well as peaceful populated localities of the Arab Republic of Egypt. Those actions by the Israeli government constitute a flagrant flouting of the Security Council's resolution and defiance of the peoples of the whole world. Full responsibility for these gross violations of the Security Council's resolution rests with the government of Israel.

The Soviet government and the entire Soviet people angrily protest against these treacherous actions of the Israeli government and demand that Israel should immediately cease fire and end all hostilities against the forces of the Arab states and pull back its forces to the ceasefire line of October 22, in accordance with the resolution of the Security Council of October 22, 1973.

The Soviet government warns the government of Israel of the very grave consequences which the continuation of its aggressive actions against the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Syrian Arab Republic will entail.

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Statement issued by the Foreign Ministry of Yugoslavia on the Middle East war¹⁸⁰**Belgrade, October 23, 1973**

The Arab countries have spent long years of effort to find a just political solution to the crisis in the Middle East. The resolution and unity of the Arab peoples in their armed struggle for the liberation of their occupied territories and for the recognition of the legitimate national rights of the Arab people of Palestine have earned broad international support, assistance, and increased understanding of the struggle against Israeli aggression. These factors have created the preconditions for a solution to the crisis in the Middle East in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations. The Arab peoples' willingness to persevere to the end in struggle for their just demands, and their future unity will remain the best guaranty of a just resolution of the Middle East crisis.

Because Israel has persistently opposed the implementation of the UN resolutions which provide the basis for eliminating the consequences of Israeli aggression against the Arab peoples of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Palestine, and because Israel, relying upon powerful support and assistance from abroad, has obstructed all attempts at a peaceful political resolution of the Middle East crisis, and above all because of Israel's most recent aggression against Egypt and Syria, the aggressive policies of Israel are now totally isolated in the UN and international affairs generally. The severe blows Israel has suffered at the hands of the armed forces of Egypt, Syria, and other Arab countries have destroyed the illusion that Israel can construct its security on the basis of violence, conquest, occupation, and annexation of foreign territories.

Yugoslavia has always worked for a peaceful and just solution to the Middle East crisis, taking as a point of departure the principle that no aggressor should be permitted to enjoy the fruits of his aggression and that every people has the right to wage armed struggle for its independence and freedom.

Yugoslavia believes that the establishment of

¹⁷⁶ English text, *Soviet News* (London), no. 5711 (October 30, 1973), p. 455.

¹⁷⁷ Doc. 34 above.

¹⁷⁸ Doc. 303 below.

¹⁷⁹ Doc. 160 above.

¹⁸⁰ English text, *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXIV, 566 (November 5, 1973), p. 15.

peace in the Middle East can be achieved only through the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Arab territories occupied in Israel's aggressive June War of 1967 and through the recognition of the rights of the Arab nation of Palestine. A lasting peace can be based only upon complete respect for territorial integrity, sovereignty, national identity, and security for all peoples and countries in this region. In pursuit of these goals, Yugoslavia believes that the implementation of the resolution of the Security Council of October 22nd¹⁸¹ must be carried out in the spirit of the principles and goals of the Charter of the United Nations and through the total and direct engagement of this world organization. Guided by these principles and policies, Yugoslavia voted in favour of this resolution in the Security Council and will support its full implementation.

Adhering to the policy of non-alignment and conforming to the resolutions of the Fourth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, Yugoslavia will join other non-aligned countries in extending full support and assistance to the realization of the inalienable rights of the Arab peoples and countries, convinced that in so doing it contributes to the strengthening of world peace and its own security.

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Statement by the government of Rumania on the situation in the Middle East¹⁸²

Bucharest, October 24, 1973

The Government of the Socialist Republic of Romania and the Romanian people have followed with profound concern the evolution of the military hostilities in the Middle East, which caused important losses of human lives and considerable destruction of material assets to the states involved in the fighting. Romania considers that the resumption of military operations has still more aggravated the conflict, complicating the situation in the region and spelling also serious dangers to peace all over the world. The recent hostilities have demonstrated once more that in the Middle East—the same as in any other part of the world—

a settlement of conflicts is only possible by political means, that the security of states cannot be achieved by territorial seizure, but by relations of good neighbourhood, of cooperation and friendship. Romania has stressed it more than once that continued occupation by Israel of the territories seized following the 1967 war is a permanent source of conflict and tension in that region, and that a lasting settlement necessarily asks for the withdrawal of all the Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories, the ensuring of the right to free and independent existence to all the states of the region in conditions of the observance of national security and territorial integrity, the solving of the Palestine population's question in keeping with its legitimate aspirations and interests.

Consistent with this standpoint, Romania addressed a few days ago a message to the heads of state and government calling for actions to put an end to the war by an immediate cessation of military hostilities and start of implementation of Security Council Resolution No. 242 of 1967.

We consider that the recent resolution of the Security Council¹⁸³ and acceptance of the ceasefire provision by Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Israel is an important step toward providing conditions for a political settlement of the conflict and the establishment of peace in that part of the world. We express our hope that the states directly involved in the armed conflict will observe the ceasefire commitments and thus avoid new clashes and bloodshed.

Taking into account the new situation that has come about and in order to ensuring actual implementation of the Security Council decisions, to avoiding any new military confrontations and creating a propitious atmosphere for the good unfolding of the negotiations, the Romanian Government considers necessary the immediate establishment of a zone separating the conflicting armies, which in our opinion could be at least 5 km wide. Setting out from the fact that Israel—following the 1967 war—occupies some areas of Arab territories, we think that realization of this zone first of all through the withdrawal of the Israeli troops by at least 5 km might be taken into consideration. In the opinion of the Romanian Government, to this zone, free from any military forces of the sides involved in the conflict, U.N.

¹⁸¹ Resolution 338; doc. 34 above.

¹⁸² English text, *Revue roumaine d'études internationales* (Bucharest), VIII, 1, pp. 9–10.

¹⁸³ Resolution 338, doc. 34 above.

observers or peace-keeping forces might be sent, formed of the contingents supplied by the member-states of the Organization.

The Romanian Government considers that the negotiations stipulated by the Security Council resolution of October 22, 1973 should be started without delay as well as the convening of a conference sponsored by the United Nations Organization, with the participation of the countries involved in the conflict, of the sides concerned as well as of other countries—big, medium-seized and small—that wish and can contribute to the ultimate settlement of the situation, to the establishment of a just and enduring peace in the Middle East.

The Romanian Government expresses its conviction that in the present circumstances all efforts have to be directed towards observance of the ceasefire decision, and conditions provided for the cessation of military hostilities to be of no provisional character but followed by an agreement on the withdrawal of the Israeli troops from the occupied territories, the establishment of an enduring and just peace to guarantee sovereignty and territorial integrity to all states in the region, Israel included, the solution of the question of the Palestine population in keeping with its legitimate aspirations for building a free and independent life for itself.

We are convinced that both the countries involved in the conflict and the other countries cherishing peace will appreciate the standpoint of the Government of the Socialist Republic of Romania as an expression of the Romanian people's wish to contribute to a durable settlement of the Middle East issues, to securing a just peace in the region. In this spirit we express our hope that all governments and peoples will firmly act, using all adequate political and diplomatic channels to contribute to the settlement of the conflict in the Middle East.

As far as the Romanian Government is concerned, it will do its utmost to contribute by all its means to the international effort for building a lasting peace in that region of the world—in keeping with the interests and aspirations of all peoples, for the establishment of a world-wide climate of cooperation and detente, of international peace and security.

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Statement by Pope Paul VI welcoming steps towards Middle East peace¹⁸⁴

Vatican City, October 24, 1973

Before turning Our thoughts to the most important and difficult reconciliation of life—reconciliation with God—let Us say that We were thunderstruck by the news filling all the public information media these days; We mean the news of a truce, and perhaps peace, in the Middle East. Like everyone else, We are happy and almost overwhelmed, although these feelings are accompanied by anxiety and fear owing to the shadows that still becloud the longed-for result. Yet We cannot withdraw Our attention from this hope, as one whose attention has been constantly turned there and who now feels engrossed by a keenly-felt and complex interest. It is a question of peace, the peace of a group of nations, with Israel in the center, the chain of Arab countries around it, and with obvious formidable connections with the world's great powers.

We observe this dramatic scene of living history with intent eyes, alert mind and an anxious heart. The bombshell of latent war has exploded and revealed with what deadly instruments it was endowed. In the last few years as never before, science, technology, industry, economics, military organization and politics have been silently engaged, with iron logic, in restoring blind, decisive power to weapons in the controversies of human relations, even while these relations were developing nobly in the reasonable, peaceful dialogue of modern international institutions. Then the bombshell exploded, suddenly and terribly; but—thanks be to God and praise to those who deserve credit for it—it has now been contained and halted. We hope that it is really so, and that it will not flare up in the interim with equal and perhaps more terrible power. We hope it is stopped once and for all.

¹⁸⁴ Excerpted from the English text of the Pope's address to a general audience, *The Pope Speaks* (Washington, D.C.), XVIII, 3 (Autumn 1973), pp. 200–201.

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Press statement issued by the Foreign Ministry of West Germany announcing its protest to the US over the transfer of arms to Israel from West German territory¹⁸⁵

Bonn, October 25, 1973

On October 24 the Federal Government learnt that Israeli vessels in Bremerhaven were loaded with American equipment for Israel and had departed.

Immediately after receiving this information the State Secretary of the Foreign Ministry called for the American *chargé d'affaires* in Bonn. Referring to the discussion with the American ambassador two days before, he stated that the strict neutrality of the Federal Government in the Middle East conflict demands that arms deliveries from American depots in the Federal Republic to one of the belligerent parties involving the territory of or from installations of the Federal Republic cannot be allowed.

The American *chargé d'affaires* was further informed that the Federal Government trusted that the American deliveries from and over the Federal Republic had definitely ceased.

The Federal Government is firmly determined not to let itself be dragged into the Middle East conflict. Despite the pressure of the new Middle East war it stands firm on its neutrality and the balance of its Middle East policy. It is convinced that by this attitude it can best serve the achievement of a lasting and just peace.

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Statement by President Gowon of Nigeria detailing Nigeria's attitude to the Middle East war and announcing the severance of diplomatic relations with Israel¹⁸⁶

Lagos, October 25, 1973

Since the outbreak of war in the Middle East on 6 October 1973, the Federal Military Government has maintained contact with all the parties,

including the two super-Powers, with a view to lending its support to all efforts which would re-establish peace in the region. The Federal Military Government was, therefore, particularly gratified to learn of the acceptance by the parties to the conflict of Security Council resolution 338 of 22 October 1973,¹⁸⁷ calling for a cease-fire. The Government was particularly pleased to note the magnanimous and far-sighted action of President Sadat of Egypt in readily accepting the cease-fire proposal in the interest of genuine peace in the Middle East, and with a high sense of responsibility and outstanding statesmanship. The Federal Military Government of Nigeria wishes to express its full support and solidarity with the Government and people of Egypt in this momentous decision and reaffirm its full understanding and endorsement of the recent conflict that led Egypt to take up arms in the defence of its legitimate rights.

The Nigerian Government had repeatedly stated that it could not subscribe to any policy that confirms legitimacy on the possession of territory by force of arms. It also recognizes that no people, and no nation, can tolerate in silence the occupation of territory by foreign forces. In this regard, the Nigerian Government has repeatedly called upon the Government of Israel to respect international opinion and morality, to withdraw from the territory of Egypt, a member country of the Organization of African Unity, which Israel forces occupied by their pre-emptive sudden attack upon Egypt in 1967.

Since the outbreak of the most recent hostilities, the Nigerian Government has also made it abundantly clear to the Government of Israel that Nigeria could not tolerate a situation in which the territory of a sister African country would continue to be further violated. The Israeli Government was specifically informed that, while

break relations with Israel during 1973 were Niger and Mali (see note to doc. 51 above) and Burundi (May 16), Togo (September 21), Zaïre (October 4—see doc. 128 above), Dahomey and Rwanda (October 9), Upper Volta, Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea, Tanzania (October 18), Malagasy Rep. (October 20), Central African Rep. (October 21), Ethiopia (October 23), Gambia (October 25), Zambia (October 26), Ghana and Senegal (October 28), Sierra Leone (October 29), Liberia (November 2), Ivory Coast (November 8), Botswana (November 13); relations with Israel were suspended by Gabon (October 29) and Kenya (November 1) (*Kessing's Contemporary Archives* (Bristol), pp. 25955, 26117, 26188, 26246).

¹⁸⁷ Doc. 34 above.

¹⁸⁵ Translated from the German text supplied, on request, by the West German embassy, Beirut.

¹⁸⁶ Quoted by Mr. Ogbu, Permanent UN Representative of Nigeria, in the Security Council's 1750th meeting on October 25; UN doc. S/PV.1750, pp. 76–77. Other African states to

the Nigerian Government was, for the moment, prepared to continue to maintain contact with Israel in the hope that such contact would provide opportunity for counselling, moderation and restraint, in the circumstances, Nigerian opinion would not accept a situation in which Israeli forces either attack the civilian population and urban centres in Egypt, or any further incursion on Egyptian sovereignty by an attempt to establish Israeli military presence on the west bank of the Suez.

In the last few days, confirmation has been received of the extent of Israeli incursion into the West Bank of the Suez and the occupation of a further area of nearly 500 square miles of Egyptian territory, to which Israel could not, by any stretch of imagination, claim a legitimate right. This confirmation has now necessitated an immediate review of Nigerian relations with Israel, since the action of the Israeli Government, in this regard, in further occupying large areas of Egypt and investing them with substantial military forces indicates its contempt for African and world opinion.

The Nigerian Government has made it abundantly clear that Nigeria is interested in supporting legitimate moves designed to achieve a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, provided that the legitimate rights and prerogatives of Egypt and all other Arab countries are adequately protected in the arrangement for such a lasting peace. Nigeria is convinced that the recent action of Israeli forces in crossing the West Bank of the Suez and in taking advantage of the early stages of the cease-fire to further extend and consolidate its hold on large areas of Egyptian territory is not conducive to the promotion of a peaceful and just settlement in the area and constitutes ample evidence of bad faith on the part of Israel.

Consequently, the Federal Military Government of Nigeria has decided to break diplomatic relations with the Government of Israel with immediate effect.

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Press conference statements by US Secretary of State Kissinger surveying events since the outbreak of war, outlining the US position on Middle East peace and discussing the reasons for the US military alert and the current UN debate on a draft ceasefire resolution¹⁸⁸

Washington, October 25, 1973

Kissinger: Ladies and gentlemen, I thought the most useful introduction to your questions would be a summary of events between October 6 and today so that you can evaluate our actions, the situation in which we find ourselves, and our future course.

The crisis for us started at 6 a.m. on October 6, when I was awakened with the information that another Arab-Israeli war was in progress. I mention this personal detail because it answers the question that the United States intervention prevented Israel from taking preemptive action. The United States made no demarche to either side before October 6, because all the intelligence at our disposal and all the intelligence given to us by foreign countries suggested that there was no possibility of the outbreak of a war. We had no reason to give any advice to any of the participants, because we did not believe—nor, may I say, did the Israeli Government—that an attack was imminent.

In the three hours between 6 a.m. and 9 a.m., we made major efforts to prevent the outbreak of the war by acting as an intermediary between the parties, of assuring each of them that the other one was—attempting to obtain the assurance of each side that the other one had no aggressive intention.

Before this process could be completed, however, war had broken out. And it started the process in which we are still engaged.

I do not think any useful purpose is served in reviewing every individual diplomatic move, but I thought it would be useful to indicate some of the basic principles we attempted to follow.

Throughout the crisis the President was convinced that we had two major problems: first, to end hostilities as quickly as possible—but,

¹⁸⁸ Excerpted from *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIX, 1794 (November 12, 1973), pp. 585-589, 593-594.

secondly, to end hostilities in a manner that would enable us to make a major contribution to removing the conditions that have produced four wars between Arabs and Israelis in the last 25 years.

We were aware that there were many interested parties. There were, of course, the participants in the conflict—Egypt and Syria on the Arab side, aided by many other Arab countries; Israel on the other. There was the Soviet Union. There were the other permanent members of the Security Council. And, of course, there was the United States.

It was our view that the United States could be most effective in both the tasks outlined by the President—that is, of ending hostilities, as well as of making a contribution to permanent peace in the Middle East—if we conducted ourselves so that we could remain in permanent contact with all of these elements in the equation.

Throughout the first week, we attempted to crystallize a consensus in the Security Council which would bring about a cease-fire on terms that the world community could support. We stated our basic principles on October 8. We did not submit them to a formal vote, because we realized that no majority was available and we did not want sides to be chosen prematurely. On October 10 the Soviet Union began an airlift, which began fairly moderately but which by October 12 had achieved fairly substantial levels.

Let me say a word here about our relationship with the Soviet Union throughout this crisis and what we have attempted to achieve. The United States and the Soviet Union are, of course, ideological and, to some extent, political adversaries. But the United States and the Soviet Union also have a very special responsibility. We possess—each of us—nuclear arsenals capable of annihilating humanity. We—both of us—have a special duty to see to it that confrontations are kept within bounds that do not threaten civilized life. Both of us, sooner or later, will have to come to realize that the issues that divide the world today, and foreseeable issues, do not justify the unparalleled catastrophe that a nuclear war would represent. And therefore, in all our dealings with the Soviet Union, we have attempted to keep in mind and we have attempted to move them to a position in which this overriding interest that humanity shares with us is never lost sight of.

In a speech—*Pacem in Terris*—I pointed out

that there are limits beyond which we cannot go.¹⁸⁹ I stated that we will oppose the attempt by any country to achieve a position of predominance, either globally or regionally; that we would resist any attempt to exploit a policy of détente to weaken our alliances; and that we would react if the relaxations of tensions were used as a cover to exacerbate conflicts in international trouble spots. We have followed these principles in the current situation.

It is easy to start confrontations, but in this age we have to know where we will be at the end and not only what pose to strike at the beginning.

Throughout the first week we attempted to bring about a moderation in the level of outside supplies that were introduced into the area and we attempted to work with the Soviet Union on a cease-fire resolution which would bring an end to the conflict.

This first attempt failed, on Saturday, October 13, for a variety of reasons—including, perhaps, a misassessment of the military situation by some of the participants. We were then faced with the inability to produce a Security Council resolution that would command a consensus, and the substantial introduction of arms by an outside power into the area. At this point, on Saturday, October 13, the President decided that the United States would have to start a resupply effort of its own. And the United States, from that time on, has engaged in maintaining the military balance in the Middle East in order to bring about a negotiated settlement that we had sought.

Concurrently with this, we informed the Soviet Union that our interest in working out an acceptable solution still remained very strong and that as part of this solution we were prepared to discuss a mutual limitation of arms supply into the area.

In the days that followed, the Soviet Union and we discussed various approaches to this question, the basic difficulty being how to reconcile the Arab insistence on an immediate commitment to a return to the 1967 borders with Israeli insistence on secure boundaries and a negotiated outcome.

As you all know, on October 16, Prime Minister Kosygin went to Cairo to work on this problem with the leaders of Egypt. He returned to the Soviet Union on October 19.

¹⁸⁹ Text in *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIX, 1792 (October 29, 1973), pp. 525–531.

We began exploring a new formula for ending the war that evening, though it was still unacceptable to us. And while we were still considering that formula, General Secretary Brezhnev sent an urgent request to President Nixon that I be sent to Moscow to conduct the negotiations in order to speed an end to hostilities that might be difficult to contain were they to continue.

The President agreed to Mr. Brezhnev's request, and as all of you know, I left for Moscow in the early morning of October 20.

We spent two days of very intense negotiations, and we developed a formula which we believe was acceptable to all of the parties and which we continue to believe represented a just solution to this tragic conflict.

The Security Council resolution had, as you all know, three parts.¹⁹⁰ It called for an immediate cease-fire-in-place. It called for the immediate implementation of Security Council Resolution 242, which was adopted in November 1967 and which states certain general principles on the basis of which peace should be achieved in the Middle East. And, thirdly, it called for negotiations between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices to bring about a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

This third point was the first international commitment to negotiations between the parties in the Middle East conflict. The United States and the Soviet Union were prepared to offer their auspices, if this proved to be acceptable to the parties, to bring about and then to speed the process of negotiations. The United States continues to be ready to carry out this understanding. This, then, was the situation when I returned from Moscow and Tel Aviv on Monday evening.

Since then, events have taken the following turn. On the first day—that is, Tuesday—of the implementation of the cease-fire, there was a breakdown of the cease-fire which led to certain Israeli territorial gains. The United States supported a resolution which called on the participants to observe the cease-fire, to return to the places from which the fighting started, and to invite United Nations observers to observe the implementation of the cease-fire.¹⁹¹ This seemed to us a fair resolution.

In the last two days, the discussion in the Security Council and the communications that have been associated with it have taken a turn that seemed to us worrisome. We were increasingly confronted with a cascade of charges which were difficult to verify in the absence of United Nations observers and a demand for action that it was not within our power to take. There was a proposal, for example, that joint U.S. and Soviet military forces be introduced into the Middle East to bring about an observance of the cease-fire.

I would like to state on behalf of the President the United States position on this matter very clearly. The United States does not favor and will not approve the sending of a joint Soviet-United States force into the Middle East. The United States believes that what is needed in the Middle East above all is a determination of the facts, a determination where the lines are, and a determination of who is doing the shooting, so that the Security Council can take appropriate action. It is inconceivable that the forces of the great powers should be introduced in the numbers that would be necessary to overpower both of the participants. It is inconceivable that we should transplant the great-power rivalry into the Middle East, or alternatively, that we should impose a military condominium by the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States is even more opposed to the unilateral introduction by any great power, especially by any nuclear power, of military forces into the Middle East in whatever guise those forces should be introduced. And it is the ambiguity of some of the actions and communications and certain readiness measures that were observed that caused the President at a special meeting of the National Security Council last night, at 3 a.m., to order certain precautionary measures to be taken by the United States.

The United States position with respect to peace in the Middle East is as follows: The United States stands for a strict observance of the cease-fire as defined in the United Nations Security Council Resolution 338, adopted on October 22. The United States will support and give all assistance and is willing to supply some personnel to a United Nations observer force whose responsibility it is to report to the Security Council about the violations of the cease-fire and which would have the responsibility, in addition, of aiding the parties in taking care of

¹⁹⁰ Doc. 34 above.

¹⁹¹ Doc. 35 above.

humanitarian and other concerns that are produced by the fact that on the Egyptian-Israeli front a series of enclaves exist in which demarcation is extremely difficult.

If the Security Council wishes, the United States is prepared to agree to an international force, provided it does not include any participants from the permanent members of the Security Council, to be introduced into the area as an additional guarantee of the cease-fire.

The United States is prepared to make a major effort to help speed a political solution which is just to all sides.

The United States recognizes that the conditions that produced the war on October 6 cannot be permitted to continue, and the United States, both bilaterally and unilaterally, is prepared to lend its diplomatic weight to a serious effort in the negotiating process foreseen by paragraph 3 of Security Council Resolution 338.

We are therefore at a rather crucial point.

From many points of view, the chances for peace in the Middle East are quite promising.

Israel has experienced once more the trauma of war and has been given an opportunity for the negotiations it has sought for all of its existence, and it must be ready for the just and durable peace that the Security Council asks for.

The Arab nations have demonstrated their concern and have received international assurances that other countries will take an interest in these negotiations.

The Soviet Union is not threatened in any of its legitimate positions in the Middle East. The principles I mentioned earlier of the special responsibility of the great nuclear powers to strike a balance between their local interests and their global interest and their humane obligations remain.

And, seen in this perspective, none of the issues that are involved in the observance of the cease-fire would warrant unilateral action.

As for the United States, the President has stated repeatedly that this administration has no higher goal than to leave to its successors a world that is safer and more secure than the one we found. It is an obligation that any President, of whatever party, will have to discharge, and it is a responsibility which must be solved—if mankind is to survive—by the great nuclear countries at some point, before it is too late.

But we have always stated that it must be a peace with justice. The terms that have been agreed to in the United Nations provide an opportunity for the people of the Middle East to determine their own fate in consultation and negotiation—for the first time in 25 years.

This is an opportunity we are prepared to foster. It is an opportunity which is essential for this ravaged area and which is equally essential for the peace of the world. And it is an opportunity that the great powers have no right to be permitted to miss.

Now I'll be glad to answer questions.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, could you go into a little more detail on the Soviet threat that caused the alerting of U.S. military elements last night? And also, if you could tell us if Ambassador Dobrynin delivered you a brutal note, as described by Senator Jackson, on the Middle East situation?

A. Senator Jackson is a good friend of mine, but he does not participate in our deliberations.

I will not discuss the details of individual communications.

We became aware of the alerting of certain Soviet units, and we were puzzled by the behavior of some Soviet representatives in the discussions that took place.

We do not consider ourselves in a confrontation with the Soviet Union. We do not believe it is necessary, at this moment, to have a confrontation. In fact, we are prepared to work cooperatively toward the realization of the objectives which we have set ourselves.

But cooperative action precludes unilateral action, and the President decided that it was essential that we make clear our attitude toward unilateral steps.

Q. Mr. Secretary, when you were, early on, talking about the special responsibility of the two nuclear superpowers to avoid anything which would eliminate or incinerate humanity, you went on to say that there are limits beyond which we can't go. And among those, you said we would resist any attempt to exploit the détente in a manner to weaken others or weaken our allies—I didn't get that exactly, but you recall what you said.

And what I want to know—what I wanted to ask you is whether you believe that the action of the Russians so far, particularly in departing from what you thought was an agreement, has gone to the point where it threatens exploitation of the détente to an adverse extent.

A. We are not yet prepared to make this judgment. We have to realize, of course, as I pointed out in my remarks, that the Soviet Union and we are in a very unique relationship. We are at one and the same time adversaries and partners in the preservation of peace.

As adversaries, we often find ourselves drawn into potential confrontations and each of us has friends that let themselves pursue objectives that may not be sought fully by either of us.

When we took the precautionary steps of which you are all aware, we did so because we thought there might be a possibility that matters might go beyond the limits which I have described. But we are not yet prepared to say that they have gone beyond these limits, and we believe that the possibility of moving in the direction that the Security Council had established earlier this week is still very real. And if the Security Council today were to pass a resolution that permitted the introduction of United Nations forces except those of the permanent members, the United States would feel that we are back on the road that had been charted earlier this week.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us whether the United States received a specific warning from the Soviet Union that it would send its forces unilaterally into the Middle East? Do you have intelligence that the Russians are preparing for such an action? The reason I raise these questions—as you know, there has been some line of speculation this morning that the American alert might have been prompted as much perhaps by American domestic requirements as by the real requirements of diplomacy in the Middle East. And I wonder if you could provide some additional information on that.

A. Marvin [Marvin Kalb, CBS News], we are attempting to conduct the foreign policy of the United States with regard for what we owe not just to the electorate but to future generations. And it is a symptom of what is happening to our country that it could even be suggested that the United States would alert its forces for domestic reasons.

We do not think it is wise at this moment to go into the details of the diplomatic exchanges that prompted this decision. Upon the conclusion of the present diplomatic efforts, one way or the other, we will make the record available, and we will be able to go into greater detail. And I am absolutely confident that it will be seen that the President had no other choice as a responsible national leader.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, would you say, sir, why the United States feels that the permanent members of the Security Council should not send forces, although there is a chapter in the UN. Charter, I believe, that calls upon all members of the UN. to provide forces if called upon to do so.

A. We believe that the particular provision of the charter which you mentioned should be seen in the light of the particular circumstances. When you have a situation in which several of the permanent members may have conflicting interests, and when the presence of the forces of the permanent members may themselves contribute to the tension in the area, it seems to us the only possible course is to exclude the members—the forces of all permanent members.

It would be a disaster if the Middle East, already so torn by local rivalries, would now become, as a result of a U.N. decision, a legitimized theater for the competition of the military forces of the great nuclear powers.

And therefore it seemed to us that the political purposes would be best served if any international force that were introduced were composed of countries that have no possibility of themselves being drawn into rivalry as a result of being—

Q. Dr. Kissinger, the chief problem in the Middle East at the moment seems to be the concern by the Egyptians for the safety of its 3rd Army on the east bank of the canal. Are there any steps being taken to possibly ameliorate their situation? And secondly, could you give us some more details about the results of your conversations as to forthcoming talks? About 12 hours ago everybody was waiting for talks to begin. Can you tell us in which direction we can anticipate that will go?

A. We believe that the particular problems that are raised by a cease-fire in which the forces are deployed in such a curious fashion—each army having units behind the lines of the other—that these conditions first of all produce, especially in the initial phases, many difficulties. We also are absolutely convinced that with the presence of observers, with good will on all sides, and with the active participation of the United States and the Soviet Union, that the difficulties can be substantially eased and eventually removed.

It is my understanding, for example, that some humanitarian supplies reached the 3rd Army today.

And we would certainly be prepared to lend our good offices to an effort in which neither side gained a decisive advantage as a result of the

deployment of their forces.

I therefore am convinced that the particular conditions of the cease-fire, difficult as they are, can be dealt with and can be ameliorated with statesmanship on all sides.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have surely told Dobrynin and others what you have told us and perhaps even more. Can you give us any indication of what effect this had on these people?

A. We are at this moment in the Security Council debating the resolution that we are supporting.¹⁹² If that resolution is accepted and carried out, we believe that it will lead to an immediate easing of the situation and to a restoration of the conditions as we observed them at noon yesterday.

May I say also that this press conference was scheduled at a time before this latest event was known or suspected. And I went through with it in order to be able to put into perspective the evolution that brought us here and as much of the reasoning as I could, given the delicacy of the situation.

Q. You didn't answer the second half of my question, Dr. Kissinger—

A. What was the second half?

Q. About negotiations, where they were going to go.

A. We believe that negotiations can and should begin in a matter of a very few weeks.

Q. How?

A. How?

Q. Yes. You said we were discussing participation and forum. I wondered if you could give us more details.

A. I think we should wait until the parties are prepared to announce this.

Q. Mr. Secretary, have you any indication of how the Soviet Union will vote in the resolution today?

A. I think the debate is still in process. And once we know the result of that vote—

Q. Is there any indication of how they might vote?

A. We are hopeful that the Soviet Union will vote for the resolution.

Q. If the resolution is passed, Dr. Kissinger, do you expect the alert would be taken off?

A. The alert will not last one minute longer than we believe is necessary.

Q. Dr. Kissinger—

A. And it would be taken off as soon as any danger of unilateral action is removed.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, concerning the role that the United States may play in obtaining conditions for an enduring peace, several months ago you were reported as saying that you were supportive of an American policy that supports Israel but not Israeli conquests. What is your view on that now?

A. I think I was quoted to that effect four and a half years ago before I understood the special nomenclature that is attached to the various ground rules.

Our position is, as I have stated publicly, that the conditions that produced this war were clearly intolerable to the Arab nations and that in a process of negotiations it will be necessary to make substantial concessions.

The problem will be to relate the Arab concern for the sovereignty over territories to the Israeli concern for secure boundaries.

We believe that the process of negotiations between the parties is an essential component of this. And as the President has stated to the four Arab Foreign Ministers, and as we have stated repeatedly, we will make a major effort to bring about a solution that is considered just by all parties. But I think no purpose would be served by my trying to delimit the exact nature of all of these provisions.

The press: Mr. Secretary, thank you very much.

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Declaration of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of France urging the withdrawal of Israeli forces to pre-1967 lines as the only sound basis for a permanent settlement¹⁹³

Paris, October 26, 1973

The situation in the Middle East arouses the gravest fears.

On the ground, hostilities are still going on. A dangerous world tension has again arisen.

The responsibility for this alarming situation falls on Israel's reactionary and militaristic leaders.

¹⁹³ Translated from the French text, *L'Humanité* (Paris), October 27, 1973.

¹⁹² See doc. 22 above.

Showing a downright duplicity their armed forces are, in short, making use of the ceasefire to try to reach the objectives which they could not win during the open fighting and to pursue the policy of *fait accompli* practised by the Israeli rulers for years.

The responsibility also falls on the US government. By placing American nuclear forces on a state of alert yesterday to facilitate the violation of the ceasefire by the Israeli generals, Nixon embarked on an escalation which heavily threatens world peace.

The French Communist Party strongly denounces this adventurist policy which gravely damages the interests of all the peoples of the Middle East, as well as the peace of the whole world. The dramatic events which have taken place over these past weeks undeniably confirm that there is only one basis for a lasting political solution to the Middle East crisis: the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the territories occupied in June 1967, recognition of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the states in this area of the world, and respect for the rights of the Arab people of Palestine.

This just solution answers the well understood interests of the Israeli as well as Arab peoples. It is also the condition for peace in the Middle East and in the world.

It is to bring about the triumph of this solution that—contrary to the travesty of facts which government propaganda gives out on this subject—the Soviet Union is using all its efforts in the highest spirit of responsibility.

The Communist Party calls workers, democrats and all French men and women to increased vigilance and further action to bring their contribution for establishing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

It calls on them to demand from the French government that instead of abstaining in such a serious situation (as it did yesterday in the Security Council)¹⁹⁴ it should take all initiatives aimed at imposing strict and immediate respect by Israel and the US of the Security Council's decisions: the ceasefire and implementation in all their clauses of the resolutions of November 22, 1967 and October 22, 1973 which, in particular, call

for the evacuation of the territories occupied by the Israeli armed forces.

All peoples should be able to live in a peaceful world which ensures for every man his sovereignty, security and dignity.

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Press conference statement by US President Nixon discussing the Middle East war in the light of US-Soviet détente, surveying the current situation and remarking on the influence of oil and domestic problems on US policy¹⁹⁵

Washington, October 26, 1973

Ladies and gentlemen: Before going to your questions, I have a statement with regard to the Mideast which I think will anticipate some of the questions because this will update the information which is breaking rather fast in that area, as you know, for the past two days.

The cease-fire is holding. There have been some violations, but generally speaking, it can be said that it is holding at this time. As you know, as a result of the U.N. resolution which was agreed to yesterday by a vote of 14 to 0, a peacekeeping force will go to the Mideast,¹⁹⁶ and this force, however, will not include any forces from the major powers, including, of course, the United States and the Soviet Union.

The question, however, has arisen as to whether observers from major powers could go to the Mideast. My up-to-the-minute report on that—and I just talked to Dr. Kissinger five minutes before coming down—is this: We will send observers to the Mideast if requested by the Secretary General of the United Nations, and we have reason to expect that we will receive such a request.

With regard to the peacekeeping force, I think it is important for all of you ladies and gentlemen, and particularly for those listening on radio and television, to know why the United States has insisted that major powers not be part of the peacekeeping force and that major powers not introduce military forces into the Mideast. A

¹⁹⁴ France abstained in the vote on paragraph 3 of Resolution 340; see doc. 36 above.

¹⁹⁵ Excerpted from the partial transcript, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIX, 1794 (November 12, 1973) pp. 581–582.

¹⁹⁶ Doc. 36 above.

very significant and potentially explosive crisis developed on Wednesday of this week. We obtained information which led us to believe that the Soviet Union was planning to send a very substantial force into the Mideast, a military force.

When I received that information, I ordered, shortly after midnight on Thursday morning, an alert for all American forces around the world. This was a precautionary alert. The purpose of that was to indicate to the Soviet Union that we could not accept any unilateral move on their part to move military forces into the Mideast.

At the same time, in the early morning hours, I also proceeded on the diplomatic front. In a message to Mr. Brezhnev, an urgent message, I indicated to him our reasoning and I urged that we not proceed along that course and that, instead, that we join in the United Nations in supporting a resolution which would exclude any major powers from participating in a peacekeeping force.

As a result of that communication and the return that I received from Mr. Brezhnev—we had several exchanges, I should say—we reached the conclusion that we would jointly support the resolution which was adopted in the United Nations.

We now come, of course, to the critical time in terms of the future of the Mideast. And here the outlook is far more hopeful than what we have been through this past week. I think I could safely say that the chances for not just a cease-fire, which we presently have and which, of course, we have had in the Mideast for some time, but the outlook for a permanent peace is the best that it has been in 20 years.

The reason for this is that the two major powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, have agreed—this was one of the results of Dr. Kissinger's trip to Moscow—have agreed that we would participate in trying to expedite the talks between the parties involved. That does not mean that the two major powers will impose a settlement. It does mean, however, that we will use our influence with the nations in the area to expedite a settlement.

The reason we feel this is important is that first, from the standpoint of the nations in the Mideast, none of them—Israel, Egypt, Syria—none of them can or should go through the agony of another war.

The losses in this war on both sides have been

very, very high. And the tragedy must not occur again. There have been four of these wars, as you ladies and gentlemen know, over the past 20 years. But beyond that, it is vitally important to the peace of the world that this potential trouble spot, which is really one of the most potentially explosive areas in the world, that it not become an area in which the major powers come together in confrontation.

What the developments of this week should indicate to all of us is that the United States and the Soviet Union, who admittedly have very different objectives in the Mideast, have now agreed that it is not in their interest to have a confrontation there, a confrontation which might lead to a nuclear confrontation—and neither of the two major powers wants that.

We have agreed also that if we are to avoid that, it is necessary for us to use our influence more than we have in the past to get the negotiating track moving again, but this time moving to a conclusion, not simply a temporary truce but a permanent peace.

I do not mean to suggest that it is going to come quickly, because the parties involved are still rather far apart. But I do say that now there are greater incentives within the area to find a peaceful solution and there are enormous incentives as far as the United States is concerned, and the Soviet Union and other major powers, to find such a solution.

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Press conference statements by US Defence Secretary Schlesinger explaining the US military alert, the moves leading to it and its implications, detailing the state of arms supplies to Israel and reflecting on relations with the NATO countries¹⁹⁷

Washington, October 26, 1973

Schlesinger: I thought that it was possible that you might have some questions that you would like to raise this morning, and I'm prepared to take them.

¹⁹⁷ Excerpted from *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIX, 1795 (November 19, 1973), pp. 617–618, 623–624, 625–626.

Q. Most of our NATO allies have apparently taken the position that they're not going to allow the United States to use their airspaces or their facilities for our effort to resupply Israel, and we can understand the individual reasons for doing that—it's not a NATO operation. Can you comment on reports that some of our NATO allies, particularly Turkey, have allowed overflights of Soviet aircraft to resupply the Arabs?

A. I won't comment on the particular issue that you indicate.

Q. Can you repeat that. There is microphone trouble.

A. I think we have had a demonstration in recent days of the importance of readiness. I wish that it were reflected better in this room.

The question referred to the suggestion that Turkey had permitted overflights by the Soviet Union. My response was that I would not comment on that particular allegation, but we will investigate all aspects of the responsiveness of various countries in this crisis and will take them into consideration in the future.

Q. Can you tell us what steps the Soviet Union was taking that led us to a military alert?

A. I'll mention a number of them, but there were a plethora of indicators. We were aware that the Soviets had alerted comprehensively their airborne forces. In addition, the Soviet air was stood down, I believe, starting on Monday, and diminished to zero flights on Tuesday. The standing down, along with the alerting of airborne units, plus certain ambiguous developments to which Dr. Kissinger referred yesterday, suggested the possibility of a movement that was unilateral on the part of the Soviet Union, and we took the normal precautions under those circumstances, adjusting our DEFCON [defence condition] status.

Q. You said that we took the normal circumstances—normal adjustments. It has been suggested, and I wonder if you'd comment, that in fact we took extra-firm, extra-quick reaction in order to leave no misunderstanding or no possibility of misunderstanding on the part of the Soviets that the President is still able to act despite his domestic difficulties. Would you comment on that?

A. I would say that our reaction was timely; that it was not extra-quick. Given the indicators that existed, the reaction was taken at the appropriate time. On the question of comprehensiveness or firmness, opinions may differ with regard to that. I think that it's quibbling about details, however. I think that it was important in view of

the circumstances that have raised a question or may have raised a question about the ability of the United States to react appropriately, firmly, and quickly, that this certainly scotched whatever myths may have developed with regard to that possibility.

Q. Can you tell us how long the alert is going to go on—U.S. alert?

A. We have begun to phase down the alert. CINCSOUTH—the Southern Command—and the Alaskan Command went back to normal DEFCON status at 12 o'clock midnight last night. We will be making other adjustments as the circumstances warrant, as the President directs. I would expect that there may be some adjustments in the near term, but it will depend on the circumstances and the views of the President.

Q. We've had a situation over the past two weeks where our client state got into trouble. We sent in nearly a billion dollars' worth of military equipment to help it out. We then got a cease-fire; our client state took advantage of the cease-fire to strengthen its position on the west bank, to encircle the 3rd Army. It plunged us into a one-day crisis with our major adversary. What does this all say about our future relations with Israel, and specifically, what are we telling Israel now as to what it should do on that 3rd Army?

A. I think that the answer to your final question will be eminently satisfactory, but I cannot give it to you now. With regard to our posture in general, I would not use the term "client state," particularly in an exclusive sense. Our purpose has been to restore peace to the area and to maintain a balance so that there can be some stabilization in an area which over the past 25 years has had a notably tragic history. I think that it is evident that in order to have a long-term settlement, the relationship between Israel and her neighbors must be based on something far broader than a military preponderance by the State of Israel. In the working out of that relationship, which we hope has been fostered by the total resolution of the United Nations, the agreement of the parties to negotiate one with another for the first time in many years—for the first time since 1948 in effect—will be instrumental in bringing about the kinds of stable relationships, or increased stability in those relationships. The United States desires stability in the area, equity for all parties in the

area, protection of the security of all parties; and consequently, I would tend to adapt the assumptions that underlay your question. The United States has sought to achieve a degree of balance—sometimes the phrase “evenhandedness” is employed—with regard to the countries in the area.

Longrun stability, however, would not have been achieved if Israel had been inundated after the war started on October 6. The United States delayed, deliberately delayed, the start of its resupply operations hoping that a cease-fire could be implemented quickly. Soviet resupply operations started on the 10th of October, if I remember correctly. We hoped that we could discourage that activity on the part of the Soviets and that once again we could bring an immediate cease-fire. By the morning of the 13th, it was evident, I think, that without resupply there would be extreme difficulty in maintaining a balance. There were some who believed that the existence of the State of Israel was seriously compromised and therefore in order to achieve what is our objective—a longrun settlement with equity for all parties—that that action was necessitated on the part of the United States. But the United States, I think, seeks to have in the Middle East a condition of stability and a condition in which the rights of all parties are respected. I hope that many of the nations in the Middle East, without regarding themselves as our clients, regard themselves to a high degree friends and partners of the United States.

Q. How much equipment have we sent to Israel and how much will we send?

A. At the present time, I think we have delivered approximately 10,000 tons directly.

Q. What is that in terms of dollars?

A. About \$850 million at this stage.

Q. You mean we stopped since last Friday? The White House said it was \$825 million then.

A. You can get the precise number; I think it's about \$850 million.

Q. How much will we deliver in terms of dollars before we stop the resupply?

A. There is a tendency in these kinds of deliveries for high-value items to be delivered at an earlier point in time so that the value per ton tends to decline with the passage of time. I'm sorry I

did not answer your full question. What was the rest of the question?

Q. What will be the total value?

A. The President has asked for a supplemental of \$2.2 billion.¹⁹⁸ We do not know whether that is the precise requirement.

Q. I gather from what you said in answer to your first question that we are disappointed with the behavior or the action of most of our NATO allies and that this may influence us in things like military aid, et cetera, in the future. Is that a correct interpretation? You said we would take this into account in planning our future actions.

A. I think that obviously that the circumstances force one—any new set of circumstances forces one—to consider established notions, established doctrine. We maintain our forces in Germany, to cite one example, because it provides us with enhanced readiness. The reactions of the Foreign Ministry of Germany¹⁹⁹ raised some questions about whether they view readiness in the same way that we view readiness, and consequently we will have to reflect on that matter.

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Resolution of the Inter-Parliamentary Union calling on Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories and to desist from policies of expansion²⁰⁰

Geneva, late October, 1973

The Inter-Parliamentary Union,

Recalling the numerous Resolutions adopted by the United Nations and the Inter-Parliamentary Union appealing for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East and calling for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from all Arab territories acquired by force,

Reaffirming the inherent right of every country to recover its occupied territories by all available means,

Expressing its deep belief that a durable solution of the Middle East conflicts can be achieved only

¹⁹⁸ Doc. 158 above.

¹⁹⁹ Doc. 166 above.

²⁰⁰ English text as published in *Arab Palestinian Resistance*, VI, 1 (January, 1974), pp. 93–94; the Union met October 22–26.

on the basis of respect for the national sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and for the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine,

Considering that the complete withdrawal of all Israeli forces from all the Arab territories occupied since June 1967 constitutes the basis for negotiating a lasting and just peace in the area,

1. *Calls upon* all Governments to refrain from acts enabling the prolongation of the occupation of the Arab territories and thereby impeding the quest for a peaceful and just settlement;

2. *Calls upon* all Parliaments and Governments actively to support the strict implementation of the Security Council's Resolution of October 22, 1973, particularly the provision relating to the withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces from all the Arab territories occupied since June 1967, so to enable the start of the negotiations immediately and concurrently.

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Statement issued by the USSR news agency TASS rejecting the reasons given by the US for its military alert²⁰¹

Moscow, October 27, 1973

In connection with the events in the Near East, announcements have been made in Washington concerning the placing on precautionary alert of US armed forces in some areas, including Europe.

In trying to justify this step, officials referred to some actions of the Soviet Union that allegedly gave reason for concern.

Tass is authorized to state that such explanations are absurd, inasmuch as the Soviet Union's actions are aimed strictly at facilitating the fulfilment of the Security Council's decisions on a cease fire and the restoration of peace in the Near East.

This step by the USA, which is in no way conducive to the easing of international tension, was evidently taken in an attempt to intimidate the

Soviet Union. However, it would be appropriate to tell its initiators that they have chosen the wrong address for such a purpose.

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Television interview statements by Prime Minister Meir discussing Israel's increased dependence on the US for arms supplies²⁰²

Tel Aviv, October 28, 1973

Q. Mrs. Meir, before the war Israel seemed to be moving towards greater independence from the US in terms of arms, was moving towards self-sufficiency. In view of what has happened now do you think this is a realistic goal in the next few years?

A. I don't think this is exactly true. It is true that we have been becoming more and more self-sufficient in arms but it would not be true to say that we are self-sufficient. And we got a lot of help from the US in allowing us to buy arms from the US even before. But now I think we will have to do two things. We will have to produce more on our own and probably ask our friends to sell us more even in the future, as long as there is not a realistic hope for peace. Because I think—I don't know whether it was necessary for additional proof to the world of what our situation is—supposing that we do not have the arms that we have—supposing that our men were not as they are—what would have happened to us?

Q. As you possibly move into negotiations, are you concerned about this great dependency on the US?

A. Maybe it is semantics, but instead of calling it dependency I would like to see it rather in the relationship of friendship. Friendship between, you know, two equals, the US and Israel—[not] as far as size is concerned and so on—but seriously speaking I would like to see it as a question of, as a matter of friendship, and the understanding of the largest power in the world that a small nation, no matter how small, should not be at the mercy of anybody that waits to bully it—

²⁰¹ *Pravda* (Moscow), October 28, 1973, p. 4; English translation, *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXV, 43 (November 21, 1972), p. 7. Translation copyright 1973 by *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, published weekly at the Ohio State University by the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies; reprinted by permission of the Digest.

²⁰² Interview conducted by Terence Smith, George Herman and Tom Fenton for CBS's "Face the Nation"; excerpted and transcribed from videotape at US Information Service, Beirut.

Q. Mrs. Meir, the—

A. —and I think it is as important for the US as it is for Israel. It certainly is as important for the world if Israel can be bullied by others and everybody else standing aside. That has happened in history before. Czechoslovakia was offered—

Q. But you had a speech in the Knesset in which you outlined three dangerous things. You said that a ceasefire arranged by the super-powers and, I believe you said, mainly in their own interests, is a dangerous thing, a world in which Israel has lost most of its former enthusiastic friends is a dangerous thing, and you were referring to other nations besides, not the US, but other nations, and then of course enemies who possess most of the world's oil is a dangerous thing. Now these first two dangerous things are the ones we are interested in—one in which you talk about a ceasefire arranged not by you but by the super-powers for their interests.

A. Look, I don't equate the two super-powers. It does not mean that we do not from time to time have differences of opinion, sometimes rather painful ones, with the US. I don't want to paint this as an idealistic picture. The US has its interests, we have ours. I think in most phases of interests, as far as peace is concerned and so on, we are at one. But these are two different nations, so I would not want to equate the Soviet Union, for instance, with the US. That would be absolutely unfair and I think not truthful. But it would be much better if the Egyptians and we had arranged it.

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Press interview statements by Prime Minister Ecevit of Turkey expressing reservations about giving full support to the Arabs²⁰³

Ankara, late October, 1973

Q. What do you think of the Arab-Israeli conflict and what attitude do you expect to take on this subject?

A. Given the geographical situation of Turkey in the Middle East and its historic ties with the countries of this area, we obviously follow this

conflict with the greatest interest. But we are above all concerned not to get involved in it, as then we should lose all our influence to facilitate the settling of this question. In this respect, we have had an unfortunate experience, the Baghdad pact, and we shall not repeat it.

It is very difficult for a Middle Eastern country like ours to declare itself in favour of the Arabs. First of all, what Arabs? There are so many differences among them. On the other hand, we owe them a constructive approach, were it only for humanitarian reasons. We can, for example, improve our economic relations with them and maintain closer cultural links.

But it is vital in the present situation that we should take care not to become the instrument of the great powers. Given this condition, Turkey can play a truly useful role by helping in bringing together not only Arabs and Israelis but also the Arabs amongst themselves. However it belongs primarily to the great powers to extract from the Middle East conflict a realizable formula for a solution.

The great difficulty to overcome in the Arab-Israeli conflict lies in the deep suspicion which opposes the parties in question. The Arabs are ready to accept Israel's existence, and on their side the Israelis are prepared to limit their security demands, but they don't have confidence in each other, or in the long-term intentions of the great powers.

If the great powers realize that the present ceasefire formula doesn't work, in other words that it is not applied in all senses, it will be necessary to envisage an effective system of guarantees for the final solution. Turkey will then be able to play a more concrete role in the form and function of this guarantee.

Q. Is it only the great powers' responsibility to formulate the conditions for ending the Middle East conflict? Hasn't the U.N a role to play in restoring peace to this area?

A. Of course. The United Nations should even play a major role. We attach great importance to it and we know the part it played in the Cyprus situation. But they will only be capable of assuming this role in the matter of guaranteeing the agreements to be carried out. Only the great powers have

²⁰³ Excerpted and translated from the French text of the interview conducted by Jean Schwoebel, *Le Monde* (Paris), October 31, 1973, p. 6.

the means to make themselves heard by the belligerents and to bring them to negotiate. Which in no way excludes the other powers from equally having a role to play. At the very least they should be consulted on everything concerning them. But, I repeat, our main concern is not to be involved in a conflict of this kind. Our attitude could be described as positive neutrality.

Q. Doesn't this conflict endanger détente between East and West and, as a result, the future of the Conference of European Security and Cooperation (CESC) in which Turkey participates?

A. Détente has not been endangered by the Middle East conflict. On the contrary this conflict acts as an excellent test of the soundness of *détente*, since it has brought the great powers to agreement on the urgency of a ceasefire and on its conditions. But of course, nothing is yet settled. The strength of *détente* will equally be proved if the US and the USSR are capable of ending their arms race in the Mediterranean and in the Middle East, which constitutes a great danger.

Turkey cannot but favour the progress of the CESC. It is not enough, in order to increase security in Europe and in the World, for the great powers to continue the SALT talks. It is important that the other powers, great and small, have the feeling that they are not being overlooked in solving problems which concern them in one way or another. There shouldn't be any frustrated countries, otherwise the solutions agreed on and the agreements concluded will not work.

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Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the World Congress of Peace Forces²⁰⁴

Moscow, late October, 1973

The events in the Middle East of October 1973 have sharply underlined the great danger which any conflict in this area constitutes for world peace.

The World Congress of Peace Forces, meeting in Moscow from October 25 to 31, 1973, calls on all the peace forces, on all political parties, mass

movements and public organizations in all countries to mobilize public opinion on the biggest possible scale, to ensure the immediate implementation of the Security Council resolutions of October 22 and 23, 1973.²⁰⁵

The situation today demands swift and effective action, and it is the duty of all peace forces, national and international, to participate actively in this work, which is so necessary for the peoples of the Middle East and for the cause of world peace.

177

Statement by Prime Minister Chou En-lai blaming the US and the USSR for the continued tension in the Middle East²⁰⁶

Peking, October 31, 1973

The essence of the Middle East issue is the contention of the superpowers for hegemony over this region. The superpowers are now trying hard to impose the solution they have concocted on the Arab people, including the Palestinian people. Even if they may appear to succeed for a time, they are doomed to failure. Tensions and turbulence will continually recur in the Middle East. The actions of the superpowers will only serve to further expose their true features as expansionists pursuing power politics. The efforts to deceive, betray and divide the Arab people, including the Palestinian people, will surely arouse them to awaken further, strengthen their unity and carry forward their struggle against aggression and expansionism. The great Arab people, including the Palestinian people, will certainly not allow their destiny to be wilfully manipulated by others.

²⁰⁵ Resolutions 338 and 339; docs. 34 and 35 above.

²⁰⁶ Made in a speech at a dinner in honour of visiting Prime Minister Whitlam of Australia; excerpted from the partial English text, *Peking Review*, XVI, 45 (November 9, 1973), p. 4.

²⁰⁴ English text, *Moscow News*, supplement to no. 45 (November 10, 1973), p. 16.

178

Letter from Permanent UN Representative Panayotacos of Greece to UN Secretary-General Waldheim conveying Greece's attitude to the Middle East situation²⁰⁷

New York, October 31, 1973

Subsequent to our meeting on 29 October 1973, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a personal message from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Greece, Mr. Christian Xanthopoulos-Palamas, concerning the position of the Greek Government on the situation in the Middle East.

1. Greece, which has followed the development of the armed conflict in the Middle East closely and with growing anxiety, notes with deep regret that, despite a precarious cease-fire, no positive progress has been made towards the re-establishment of lasting peace.

2. In fact, the Arab territories are still occupied and the State of Israel still expresses the fear that its very existence is at stake.

3. In view of this situation, the Greek Government feels that it is incumbent upon our Organization, and more particularly upon those Members that are endowed with special prerogatives under the Charter, to continue to explore and encourage new diplomatic initiatives with a view to the implementation of recent Security Council resolutions 338 (1973), 339 (1973), 340 (1973) and 341 (1973), and ultimately the full implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). In our view the latter still provides the best basis for a just, viable and equitable settlement of the problem facing us.

4. Greece, which is, above all, a Mediterranean country and a peace-loving country, firmly attached to the principles of the Charter, has repeatedly had occasion to state that the prolongation of a state of belligerency, whether active or inactive, benefits neither the Arab countries nor Israel but, on the contrary, is detrimental to international peace and security.

5. In view of the above, the Greek Government reiterates its desire to make a positive contribution to all appropriate efforts in the search for a just and lasting peace. To that end, Greece declares that it is ready to make peace-keeping observers available immediately, or to provide a military

contingent for the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East. In addition, following the precedent set in 1948, the Greek Government would willingly act as host for peace negotiations, and would provide any assistance that might be deemed necessary for the prompt restoration of stability and security in the region of the Eastern Mediterranean.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this message circulated as a document of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

179

Message from President Leone of Italy to President Boumedienne of Algeria outlining Italy's attitude to the Arab-Israel conflict²⁰⁸

Rome, November 2, 1973

Mr. President, I thank you for the message that you sent me, in your double capacity as President of the Democratic and People's Republic of Algeria and as President of the Fourth Conference of Non-Aligned Countries.²⁰⁹ The Conference of Heads of State and Government of Non-Aligned Countries, which took place in Algiers last September, was followed by us with the greatest attention and with those feelings of friendship which inspire the Italian government's policy of cooperation in its meetings with countries of the Third World.

We too, long before the resumption of hostilities, expressed our pre-occupation with the Middle East question. We therefore have not spared our warnings on the gravity of the situation, nor our efforts to contribute to a solution to a conflict which has befallen an area near to us spiritually as well as politically. The resumption of hostilities therefore deeply worried us, affecting our feelings of peace and solidarity. Then we became happy again at the halt to the fighting. But past experience—with its disillusionment at the long and futile attempts to reach a solution—has taught us not to be content by a partial result such as this one.

The ceasefire indeed could not alone solve the basic problems of the conflict. Because the truce

²⁰⁸ Translated from the Italian text as published in *Relazioni Internazionali* (Milan), XXXVII, 45 (November 10, 1973), p. 1161.

²⁰⁹ Doc. 302 below.

²⁰⁷ UN doc. S/11064 (A/9268).

is turning into peace—as Your Excellency has rightly pointed out—a political solution is necessary. We hope all the more deeply for negotiations which will reach this objective, because the Middle East crisis—and Your Excellency has opportunely recalled this—has repercussions on security and collaboration in the Mediterranean, where our two countries, with a long tradition and so many common interests, lie.

As a result, Italy is directly interested in a solution to the Middle East conflict which can assure lasting peace, based on justice, and which guarantees, in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242, the sovereignty, independence and security of every country in the area, taking equally into account the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinians.

Your Excellency can be sure that Italy, inspired by these principles, will not fail to contribute all it can to a solution of the Middle East problem, and will collaborate with the member countries of the European Community, in the hope of uniting its own efforts to those of all friendly, peace-loving states.

180

Press interview statement by UK Prime Minister Heath explaining the place of a coordinated EEC foreign policy in Europe's relations with the Middle East²¹⁰

London, November 2, 1973

Q. You attach much importance to foreign policy co-ordination between the EEC countries. Yet, during the Middle East crisis, there has been a notable absence of any attempt to take a joint initiative. Do you have any proposals for a European role in the diplomatic moves that will follow the cease-fire?

A. I am sure the long term aim should be a common foreign policy for the Community. That will enable Western Europe to have a major influence for good in world affairs. Of course this will take time to achieve. But we have already had important successes in agreeing common

positions. For example, in the past few months the Nine have been acting together in the conference on security and cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and in the handling of diplomatic relationships between Western Europe and the United States. We should concentrate in this way on joint action on questions where this action is likely to be effective.

On the Middle East, we have kept in close touch with our partners. We issued a statement of our common position on October 13²¹¹ and our policies on supply of arms to the Middle East are also in line. I think there could be a role for Europe now in the urgent search for a lasting settlement and also in helping to ensure that the settlement, if we can achieve one, endures. This may be a matter for concerted private diplomacy rather than public initiatives.

181

Press interview statements by Secretariat official Sagladin of the CPSU discussing the Soviet attitude to the Arab oil embargo²¹²

Hamburg, early November, 1973

Q. The interests of your Arab friends for the time being consist in the use of oil as a boycott weapon. If we conclude an energy agreement with the Soviet Union which guarantees us 10% or even 20% of our oil requirements then in the next Middle East war either we or you will have big problems.

A. You presumably wish to play the interests of our country against those of the Arab countries?

Q. No, we want to be assured that the interests of the Federal Republic will not be played against those of the Arab countries.

A. The Arab countries have for a long time restrained themselves from using oil as a political

²¹¹ Doc. 147 above.

²¹² Interview conducted by Dieter Wild, Fritjof Meyer, Dolmetscher Zwilling and Klaus Reinhardt; excerpted and translated from the German text, *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), November 12, 1973, pp. 148–150. Vadim Sagladin was Deputy Section Chief for international affairs of the CPSU Central Committee.

²¹⁰ Excerpted from the text of the interview conducted by Hella Pick, *The Guardian Weekly*, November 10, 1973, p. 10.

weapon. When they adopted such means it was under the pressure of imperialist policy in the Middle East. I am convinced that the problems currently besetting the Middle East can be arranged. We are optimistic.

Q. You do not think that the Soviet Union can be faced with having to decide whether the Libyan or the Persian Gulf oil princes are closer to Russian hearts than the Germans?

A. Our country will always show solidarity with the Arab peoples in their struggle for their rights. That is: return by Israel of all Arab territories, the restoration of peace, recognition of the rights of all peoples and states existing there, including the state of Israel, and the restoration of and respect for the rights of the Arabs of Palestine. At the same time the Soviet Union has always, when it has concluded agreements or treaties, strictly kept such agreements and treaties. It will continue to do so.

182

Statement by UK Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home outlining UK involvement in the search for a Middle East ceasefire²¹³

London, November 5, 1973

I think it right to clarify beyond doubt the part that the British Government played in seeking a ceasefire.

When hostilities broke out on Saturday 6 October we at once instructed Sir Donald Maitland, our representative at the United Nations, to work for an immediate meeting of the Security Council in order to get agreement on a call for a ceasefire. It was not possible to convene a meeting until Monday eight October. At this meeting Sir Donald Maitland said, and I quote: "The first objective for the Council must be to secure the earliest possible end to the fighting. That is the first concern of my government."²¹⁴

Throughout the period of the fighting, our

diplomatic activity was wholly directed towards the achievement of an end to the fighting and a just and lasting peace. A week after the fighting started the Americans suggested that we should table a resolution calling for a ceasefire. For their own reasons they were not prepared to do so themselves. We immediately undertook consultations and found that such a resolution would not have got support from all of the parties engaged in the fighting and would not have commanded enough support in the Security Council to ensure its passage. We informed the Americans of our finding and they subsequently accepted that our assessment had been right.

It was not until ten days later that a consensus was reached and a resolution passed through the Council by fourteen votes to none. We have stated again and again that we are totally committed to the existence of the state of Israel within secure frontiers and any suggestion to the contrary is totally without foundation. The two ingredients of a lasting peace are Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territories and secure and recognised boundaries for Israel.

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Statement by Secretary Kirilenko of the CPSU Central Committee insisting that peace depends on Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories²¹⁵

Moscow, November 6, 1973

Comrades, international detente is not a straightforward process without obstacles. In some areas, owing to the aggressive policy of reactionary quarters, there are still seats of dangerous conflicts and, what is more, military clashes take place. Last month, through the fault of the Israeli aggressors who are impudently occupying Arab territories, war again broke out in the Middle East.

The development of the situation in that area, and specifically recent events, prove irrefutably the validity of the proposition upon which we have

²¹³ Issued by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office; text in London Press Service, Verbatim Service 227/73; supplied, on request, by the British embassy, Beirut.

²¹⁴ Doc. 18 above.

²¹⁵ Excerpted from the English text of the speech made at a meeting celebrating the 56th anniversary of the October Revolution, *Moscow News*, supplement to no. 45 (November 10, 1973), pp. 3-4.

insisted all these years, and which we are also stressing now: lasting peace in the Middle East can be achieved only on the basis of the liberation of all territories occupied by Israel, and of ensuring the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine. This is the core, the crux of the problem.

Now, after yet another military explosion in the Middle East, this should be understood, at long last, both by the leaders of Israel, and by those who support them. Then, and then only, will the road to the real solution of the problem be open.

Events have shown the firm determination of Arab countries to put a stop to the occupation of their territories. This determination has found reflection in the increased consolidation of the Arab World, and also in a much higher combat spirit among Arab armies.

Our country, true to the principles of solidarity with the struggle against aggression, for independence and the rights of nations, has rendered, and will continue to render, the necessary aid and support to Arab states, victims of Israeli aggression in their righteous cause. Working in contact and concord with the friendly Arab states, the Soviet Union took an active part in diplomatic measures directed toward the earliest termination of the war and settlement of the conflict.

At present, when representatives of Egypt and Israel, with UN representatives in attendance, are meeting on the question of the reinstatement of the situation which existed on October 22, an urgent necessity, and the first step toward the settlement of the conflict as a whole, is the withdrawal of Israel's troops to the positions they occupied when the cease-fire according to the decision of the UN Security Council, came into force. It is common knowledge that Israel crassly and treacherously violated this decision of the Security Council as well, and continued hostilities. To tell the truth, this alone makes Israel deserving of the strictest sanctions provided for in such cases by the UN Charter.

Therefore, the prime and necessary step for the transition to a fundamental political settlement of the conflict should be the withdrawal of Israel's troops to the October 22 cease-fire line. Nobody can doubt the correctness of this approach, based on the Security Council's decisions, which have been supported by peace forces throughout the world.

While understanding the entire complexity

of the situation in the Middle East, it may be noted nevertheless that the conditions for a just and lasting settlement of the crisis in that area are more favourable now than they have ever been before.

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Statement by the Foreign Ministers of the EEC outlining a common European attitude to the Middle East conflict²¹⁶

Brussels, November 6, 1973

The nine Governments of the European Community have continued their exchange of views on the situation in the Middle East. While emphasizing that the views set out below are only an initial contribution on their part to the search for a comprehensive solution to the problem, they have agreed on the following:

1. They strongly urge that the forces of both parties to the Middle East conflict should return immediately to the positions that they occupied on 22 October, in accordance with Security Council resolutions 339 (1973) and 340 (1973). They believe that a return to these positions will facilitate a solution to other pressing problems concerning prisoners of war and the Egyptian Third Army.

2. They firmly hope that, following the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October, it will at last be possible to begin negotiations for the restoration of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East through the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in its entirety. They declare themselves ready to do all in their power to contribute to that peace. They believe that these negotiations must take place within the framework of the United Nations. They recall that the Charter has entrusted to the Security Council primary responsibility for international peace and security. The Council and the Secretary-General have a special role to play in the establishment and maintenance of peace through the implementation of Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973).

3. They consider that a peace agreement should

²¹⁶ Text as transmitted to the UN by Denmark; UN doc. S/11081 (A/9288).

be based, *inter alia*, on the following points:

(i) The inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force;

(ii) The need for Israel to put an end to the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the 1967 conflict;

(iii) Respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of every State in the area and its right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries;

(iv) Recognition that the legitimate rights of the Palestinians must be taken into account in the establishment of a just and lasting peace.

4. They recall, that, in accordance with resolution 242 (1967), the peace settlement must be the subject of international guarantees. In their view, such guarantees would be reinforced, *inter alia*, by the dispatch of peace-keeping forces to the demilitarized zones provided for in paragraph 2 (c) of resolution 242 (1967). They are agreed that these guarantees are of primary importance in settling the over-all situation in the Middle East in accordance with resolution 242 (1967), to which the Council refers in resolution 338 (1967). They reserve the right to make proposals regarding this matter.

5. They recall on this occasion the ties of all kinds which have long linked them to the countries of the southern and eastern Mediterranean. In this connexion, they reaffirm the terms of the declaration of the Paris summit of 21 October 1972 and recall that the Community is determined to negotiate agreements with these countries within the framework of a balanced over-all approach.

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Statement issued by Prime Minister Jorgensen of Denmark expressing support for the EEC statement on the Middle East²¹⁷

Copenhagen, November 6, 1973

The declaration, on which the nine foreign ministers have agreed, is a precise expression of the principles for a solution of the Middle East

conflict, principles which the Danish Government feels should be fundamental. It is consonant with the resolutions of the Security Council. There is reason to be satisfied that the nine countries in this way have been able to agree upon a common attitude to this conflict whose solution is of vital importance not least to the European countries. All efforts should be concentrated on finding ways and means for providing a just and durable peace in the Middle East, guaranteeing the existence of the individual states in the area.

It would not be equitable to let any one of the parties alone carry the responsibility for the unhappy development in the Middle East over the past 25 years. It is a very complex situation. The primary goal must be to look for the durable peace settlement which alone can provide the basis for a new course.

186

Joint US-Egypt announcement of the imminent resumption of diplomatic relations²¹⁸

Cairo and Washington, November 7, 1973

The Governments of the United States and of Egypt have agreed in principle to resume diplomatic relations at an early date. The two Governments have also agreed that in the meantime the respective interests sections of the two countries will be raised immediately to the Ambassadorial level. The Government of Egypt has named Ambassador Ashraf Ghorbal. The United States has designated Ambassador Hermann Eilts. They will take up their posts promptly.

²¹⁷ English text supplied, on request, by the Danish Embassy, Beirut; the statement was issued as a correction to a statement

made the previous day to a political meeting in which Jorgensen was reported to have said, "My assessment of the latest war is that it was the Arab states which started it, and I can go along with Israel's aggression a good deal of the way—since in reality those states want her moved into the Mediterranean" (*Berlingske Tidende* (Copenhagen), September 8, 1974, p. 8).

²¹⁸ *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIX, 1798 (December 10, 1973), p. 712.

187

Press interview statements by Chancellor Brandt of West Germany reacting to reports of Arab misgivings on West Germany's attitude and commenting on the role of the Palestinians in a settlement²¹⁹**Bonn, November 9, 1973**

Q. The socialist-liberal government has managed, Federal Chancellor, to realize a normalization of relations with nearly all Arab states. But recently, in Arab opinion, the relationship with the Federal Republic has again suffered some tensions. Disregarding the American arms deliveries to Israel from German territory there still remain Arab reservations, such as the statement in your speech to the United Nations which was interpreted as a call for direct talks between Israel and the Arab states,²²⁰ or the one-sided statements by the acting SPD chairman Heinz Kühn and likewise by the mayor of Berlin, Klaus Schütz.

How do you evaluate these Arab misgivings, Federal Chancellor?

A. Allow me first to make a general remark regarding the events in the Middle East. You will have noticed that the outbreak of the new war was followed by the German public with a great sense of involvement and dismay. The Second World War has not yet been forgotten in Germany, and we know what interminable pain a war brings to the peoples suffering under it.

Our attitude to the Middle East conflict is therefore primarily guided by the wish that a peace settlement may soon be found also for this crisis centre, a peace which will be considered just by all parties. Only a just peace will have any prospect of permanency.

The achievement of such a peace settlement will, of course, only be possible when all the parties

have the desire for peace and when the international community of states is prepared to contribute constructively. The basic elements for a Middle East peace settlement are, as you know, combined in Security Council Resolution 242 of November 1967.

Minister Scheel and myself expressed these thoughts during our visits in the first half of the year. I said and meant nothing else in my speech before the United Nations. I believe that the Security Council in its Resolution 338 of October 22²²¹ was guided by the same conception when it linked its appeal for a ceasefire with a call for the immediate initiation of negotiations under the appropriate auspices for the implementation of Resolution 242. The Federal Government assumes that all states heed Security Council resolutions.

The German personalities mentioned by you are likewise—this should not be doubted—guided by the desire that a Middle East peace might soon be achieved.

Q. Israel's right to exist as a state has not been questioned in statements by moderate Arab quarters during the latest Middle East conflict. In the Federal Parliament on October 26 you, Federal Chancellor, expressly stated that the basis for a Middle East peace settlement must be "the right of all states to existence and security." You further stressed your government's "vital interest" in bringing about a peace "which all the peoples of this area can accept and even recognize as being just."²²²

Does that mean, Federal Chancellor, that you were also thinking of the Palestinian people?

A. Nobody can seriously doubt that it is impossible to achieve a peace settlement in the Middle East without including the Palestinian people. The Federal Government has repeatedly made this clear in the past. I therefore welcomed it when President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev in the final communiqué after their talks in June this year expressly stated that the interests of the Palestinian people should be taken into due account.²²³

On the other hand I wish to stress the significance I see in the fact that moderate Arab quarters are no longer questioning Israel's right to exist as a

²¹⁹ Interview conducted for Agence France Presse; excerpted and translated from the German text, *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamts der Bundesregierung* (Bonn), no. 145 (November 13, 1973), pp. 1438–1439.

²²⁰ On September 26, 1973, before the General Assembly, Brandt said: "I wish to stress our interest in a peaceful settlement of the conflict in the Middle East. That is the interest of the Federal Republic of Germany. My government shares the hope that the international community will not relinquish the possibilities of mediation. My government also feels that it is primarily direct peace talks between the Arab countries concerned and Israel that will best secure a balance of the elementary interests of both sides." (UN doc. A/PV.2128, p. 22.)

²²¹ Doc. 34 above.

²²² Statement made introducing the budget debate; full German text, *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamts der Bundesregierung* (Bonn), no. 140 (October 30, 1973), pp. 1389–1390.

²²³ Doc. 102 above.

state. Because of recent German history, from which we neither can nor wish to escape, this is of special importance to us.

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Message from US Secretary of State Kissinger to UN Secretary-General Waldheim transmitting the text of the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Egypt²²⁴

November 9, 1973

Dear Mr. Secretary-General:

I have the honor to inform you that the Governments of Egypt and Israel are prepared to accept the following agreement which implements paragraph 1 of the United Nations Security Council resolution 338 (1973) and paragraph 1 of United Nations Security Council resolution 339 (1973).

The text of this agreement is as follows:

A. Egypt and Israel agree to observe scrupulously the ceasefire called for by the United Nations Security Council.

B. Both sides agree that discussions between them will begin immediately to settle the question of the return to the October 22 positions in the framework of agreement on the disengagement and separation of forces under the auspices of the United Nations.

C. The town of Suez will receive daily supplies of food, water and medicine. All wounded civilians in the town of Suez will be evacuated.

D. There shall be no impediment to the movement of non-military supplies to the East Bank.

E. The Israeli checkpoints on the Cairo-Suez Road will be replaced by United Nations checkpoints. At the Suez end of the road, Israeli officers can participate with the United Nations to supervise the non-military nature of the cargo at the bank of the Canal.

F. As soon as the United Nations checkpoints are established on the Cairo-Suez Road, there will be an exchange of all prisoners of war, including wounded.

It has also been agreed by the two parties

that they will hold a meeting under the auspices of the United Nations Commander at the usual place (kilometre 109 on the Suez-Cairo Road) to sign this agreement and to provide for its implementation. I would be most grateful if you would take the appropriate steps to insure that a meeting is held on Saturday, 10 November 1973, or at such other time as may be mutually convenient, of representatives of the parties to take the appropriate steps.

We intend to make public this letter at noon, New York time, 7 p.m. Cairo and Tel Aviv time, on Friday, 9 November 1973.

Best regards,
Henry A. Kissinger

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Press interview statements by US Secretary of State Kissinger commenting on possible developments after the signing of the ceasefire agreement and explaining continued US support for Israel despite the oil embargo²²⁵

Peking, November 12, 1973

Q. On the Middle East, when and how will the peace conference proceed?

A. We have had from the beginning two objectives: One is to stabilize the cease-fire, and then once the cease-fire was stabilized, we move from there to a peace conference. As you know, Israel and Egypt yesterday signed the cease-fire stabilization arrangement that was worked out last week.²²⁶ They have to negotiate some of the implementation of modalities of this. When that is completed, which we hope will be soon, we will move into setting up the peace conference. Our expectation is that this should not be more than a matter of weeks.

Q. Mr. Secretary, isn't it inherently dangerous for the superpowers, the United States and Russia, to become concessions that will be necessary for a fair settlement? Middle East?

²²⁴ UN doc. S/11091; the agreement was signed at 1300 gmt (1500 local time), November 11, 1973 at kilometer 101 on the Cairo-Suez road.

²²⁵ Excerpted from the text of the interview conducted by the correspondents for ABC, CBS and NBC, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIX, 1798 (December 10, 1973), pp. 713-715.

²²⁶ Doc. 188 above.

A. So far, Marvin [Marvin Kalb, CBS News], there has not been any precise discussion of guarantees. What we have done up to now is not guarantee any particular settlement but try to be helpful to the parties in narrowing the difference between them. The Arab nations and Israel have been fighting each other for nearly a generation, and many issues are fraught with tremendous emotion with them. Therefore, if we can strip away some of the emotion and present it in a way that is more acceptable to both sides, we can make some progress as was made last week.

We have not yet given any particular guarantees. However, I would assume that if the peace negotiations succeed, there will be a very serious problem, especially for Israel, of how its security can be assured under conditions when the final borders will certainly be different from the cease-fire lines and when withdrawals are involved as Security Council Resolution 242 provides.

At this point the question of guarantees will arise, and we have to then ask the question: What sort of guarantees—unilateral, several countries, and so forth? Second, moreover, the great powers are already involved to some extent in the Middle East. What we have to do is to try to prevent every crisis from turning into a clash of the superpowers. In that respect I agree with you.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how much pressure is the United States willing to apply to get Israel to make the kind of concessions that will be necessary for a fair settlement?

A. First, you are assuming something that will still remain to be revealed through the process of negotiation. Israel has always agreed that the final borders will not be the cease-fire lines either of 1967 or 1973, and we have every hope that through the process of negotiation a mutually acceptable settlement will be achieved. The United States stated during the conflict and has stated since that it would make a major effort to bring the parties together. That will be our intention. We don't expect that it will require major pressure on either of the sides.

Q. Are you satisfied that the major powers in sponsoring this peace conference will not try to use it in the future to gain a major edge in the Middle East?

A. The temptation is always there to exploit a situation to the advantage of one or the other of the superpowers. However, if the superpowers understand their own interests and the world

interests, they ought to realize that the other side can always match them in terms of military equipment and that the attempt to turn this into a superpower confrontation must lead to a constantly increasing danger of war. The effort may be made. When it is made, we will resist it as we have in the past. We hope, and that will certainly be our attitude, that the Soviet Union will approach these negotiations with the same spirit we shall; namely, that a settlement just to all parties is in the interest of everybody. If they do not, then we will have to see what else can be done.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Soviet Union has direct bilateral arrangements with Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and a number of other Arab countries. Senator Fulbright in the past has called for the establishment of a bilateral treaty between the United States and Israel. Would the administration support that?

A. It has been a constant American policy supported in every administration and carrying wide bipartisan support that the existence of Israel will be supported by the United States. This has been our policy in the absence of any formal arrangement, and it has never been challenged no matter which administration was in office. The question, then, is where are the borders and what are the security arrangements, and this is what is going to be negotiated in the next phase in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242. Whether the security guarantees should be expressed in some formal document or in some other way, I think we should wait until the negotiations are completed; but it is one of the ideas that is under consideration.

Q. In that connection, Mr. Secretary, given the oil situation, the number of people and territory involved, the new relationship with the Soviet Union, why is it in the American national interest to support Israel so strongly? I ask that within the context of guaranteeing the existence of Israel.

A. The United States in the entire postwar period has supported the concept that international conflict should not be settled by force. It has, moreover, supported the concept that nations should not be eliminated simply by the superior numbers or in any manner of their neighbors. The United States has supported Israel because of the emotional ties that have existed, because of the democratic tradition of Israel, because of the fact that it is a going concern in this area,

and because, as I have said, about our opposition to the domination of one nation by force to others. The oil situation will continue for the indefinite future, and while we are highly respectful of the views of the Arab world it is not possible for us to be swayed in the major orientation of our policy by the monopoly position, or the temporary monopoly position, enjoyed by a few nations.

Q. Do you get no indication from King Faisal or others in your recent journey that the oil restrictions might be changed?

A. We had very extensive talks with King Faisal and with his advisers, and it is a problem that has many complexities both for us as well as for King Faisal. I think that both sides are studying its adaption in the light of the developing situation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, as you get into the formal negotiations now, is it safe to assume that arms deliveries by the United States to Israel, the Soviet Union to the Arabs, will continue, or do you have some kind of arrangement already with the Soviet Union that when you reach a point in the negotiations both of the superpowers will knock down the flow of arms?

A. No such arrangement exists as of now, but the United States has always held the view that it was prepared to discuss limitation of the flow of armaments into the Middle East in order to avoid the present situation of the piling up of armaments on both sides. If there is a limitation of the flow of armaments, it has, however, to include all those countries which might transfer their arms to one or more of the combatants and not just the parties in the last war.

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Statement by Foreign Minister Jobert of France blaming the US and the USSR for the Middle East crisis²²⁷

Paris, November 12, 1973

As for the Middle East crisis, how can one not say that it has confirmed, and each day confirms,

our uncertainties as to the function and effect of the system of consultation between the US and the USSR. First, on the solution to the conflict: this agreement²²⁸ has been unable to anticipate war, or even to guess—or establish—that an attack was being prepared. Certainly, the two superpowers were able to impose the ceasefire, although time and recourse to two formulas were needed before reaching it. The conflict, previously fed by them with numerous powerful weapons, was kept up by each of them with massive deliveries, until, after bloody confrontations, a situation on the ground was reached which allowed each belligerent to feel an illusory satisfaction.

Only then did these two powers come to an agreement which they made the Security Council sanction—as were the resolutions which followed. Until then the Council had remained powerless to assume the functions assigned to it by the Charter; such powerlessness was welcomed by the belligerents, each wanting to gain a victory, and tacitly organized by two powers who intended to settle this affair between them. To do this, they had to use pressures or threats not only against the belligerents themselves, friend or foe, but also against each other, as was seen on October 25—at the risk of coming into direct confrontation or starting a dangerous escalation of alerts and threats.

Nevertheless, the conflict is far from being settled: Resolutions 338, 339, 340 and 341, the fragility of the newly-formed emergency force, the increase in the number of UN observers—all these things have barely been able to draw the fighting to a precarious halt.

Where is the implementation of Resolution 242, which is so essential? Where are the discussions which should lead up to it? What about methods of procedure, what about guarantees? We are still many weeks from them. Yet the Big Powers insist on retaining their exclusive rights—the consequences are clear for all to see.

The consequences of what may truly be called a condominium affect, first of all, the international community, by striking it a blow which renders it helpless. Between October 6—when hostilities resumed—and October 22, when Resolution 338 was voted on at the instigation of the USA and the

²²⁷ Excerpted and translated from the French text as published in *La Politique étrangère de la France: Textes et documents*, 2nd Semester, 1973 (Paris: la documentation française, 1974),

pp. 179–180; the statement was made in a speech during the budget debate in the National Assembly.

²²⁸ Jobert is referring to the US-USSR agreement of June 22, 1973, on the prevention of nuclear warfare.

USSR (co-authors for the first time of a resolution on the Middle East) neither the UN nor its Security Council were able to take action, for lack of a decisive agreement between them. On October 22, the international community was asked to sanction the agreement reached the day before, by inviting it to participate in its implementation; France, Great Britain and China were even deliberately excluded from participating by the clauses of Resolution 340. In the same way the international community will tomorrow be called upon to bless a painfully brought-about settlement, or so one hopes. For if this blessing is not sought, or is rejected, one can imagine how precarious such an agreement would be, rejected in the first place by many of the Arab or African states, and which the parties themselves would for this reason be unable to sustain for long.

Such a situation would affect the belligerents themselves, now directly dependent on their protectors; their freedom is narrowly limited, even if one side uses the oil weapon—by proxy, since it has no direct control—and the other side tries political pressure through American institutions. One may hope that in this way a solution will be reached which conforms to right and justice—a solution such as France has been attempting to bring about since 1967.

It is a matter of achieving the implementation of Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967 in all its parts, that is, of obtaining on the one hand the return of the territories occupied during the 1967 war and on the other an end to the state of belligerency and recognition of the right of each state in the area to enjoy in peace its full sovereignty and the inviolability of its territory. Moreover, freedom of navigation in international waterways—the Suez Canal, the Gulf of Aqaba—must be assured.

It is a matter of seeing that such a settlement has a permanent character. With this aim, it should depend on a system of international guarantees, which will include in particular the creation of demilitarized zones—which are, by the way, already envisaged in Resolution 242—where UN peacekeeping forces will be stationed, under the authority of the Security Council. These forces should, in our view, include contingents from the permanent members of the Security Council, whose presence would further strengthen the efficacy of the guarantees.

Finally, it is a matter of acting in such a way that the settlement takes account of the rights of the Palestinians. No solution will be durable if these rights are not taken into consideration in a spirit conforming to present political realities.

I repeat that only the international community, by means of the rights and duties assigned to the Security Council by the Charter, is able, thanks to the establishment of a firm body of reciprocal peace undertakings and precise international guarantees, to give to all—Israel and the Arab states—the secure and recognized boundaries provided for in Resolution 242.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Libya of President Makarios of Cyprus (excerpts)²²⁹

Tripoli, November 13, 1973

At the invitation of the President of the Revolutionary Command Council Archbishop Makarios, President of the Republic of Cyprus, paid an official visit to the Arab Republic of Libya from Shawwal 15, 1393 (November 9, 1973), to Shawwal 19, 1393 (November 13, 1973) at the head of a delegation of Cypriot officials.

The two sides studied with great concern the dangerous situation in the Arab region resulting from the occupation by force of Arab land. In this connection Archbishop Makarios expressed his full support for the Arab people in its struggle to liberate all the occupied Arab territories and in its determination to reassert the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.

On the subject of the security of the Mediterranean area the two sides reviewed ways of preserving the security and peace of the countries on its eastern and southern shores.

The two sides agreed that the assembling of foreign navies in the Mediterranean is not conducive to the security and independence of the area and may constitute a threat to the peace and independence of the area as well as to world peace.

²²⁹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Fajr al-Jadid* (Tripoli), November 14, 1973.

Speech to the House of Commons by Secretary of State for External Affairs Sharp of Canada announcing Canadian participation in the UN Emergency Force (excerpts)²³⁰

Ottawa, November 14, 1973

The mounting fury of the fight was possibly the only reason why it so abruptly ceased. The great powers who were supplying arms in increasing quantity to each side fortunately realized that they were being drawn into a dangerous confrontation, with the Soviet Union talking of unilateral intervention on the scene, while the United States placed its own forces on an increased state of alert. It was at this crucial stage that the United Nations Security Council agreed to the establishment and dispatch of an emergency force to supervise a cease-fire and separate efforts to prevent a recurrence of the fighting.²³¹

Given the circumstances as I have just recalled them, there could be no doubt in anyone's mind that never had an emergency measure of this nature been so evidently and urgently necessary. While Canada did not seek participation in the emergency force, we were determined that, once we were invited, it would be a success, and I am sure this is a point of view that would be supported by all parties in the House. We were asked at an early stage by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to contribute in a vitally important role. Just two and a half hours ago the Secretary-General of the United Nations was on the telephone to me urging the importance of Canada's participation and urging our participation in certain of these vital functions upon which the whole of UNEF depends.

After due consideration, the Government decided to accept the request and communicated this decision to Parliament. In accordance with the practice followed in the past when a Canadian contingent has been contributed to a peacekeeping force, as opposed to the sending of peace observers, we are asking Parliament to approve the Government's decision. Leaders of all parties represented here indicated, in response to my announcement

of October 30, that they supported a Canadian contribution to peacekeeping under the United Nations in the Middle East if it appeared there was a useful role for us to play. Spokesmen for all parties took the same view as I did, that no one could say no to such a request.

The conception of peacekeeping or peace-observation forces under the United Nations, which owes so much of its development to a great Canadian, our former Prime Minister and a Member of this House, the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, is firmly supported by this Government, as it has been by previous Canadian Governments of all political stripes. We did not, however, accept the call to join a new UNEF without careful consideration. Experience over the years, some of it rather disappointing, has led us to look for certain criteria that, in our judgment, should be met if a peacekeeping operation is to be effective and if Canadian participation in it is to be worth while. We have no illusions that, in this imperfect world, the criteria for an ideal peacekeeping operation will ever be met in full. These criteria must, however, be constantly reiterated and promoted if peace-keeping is to be made a more effective instrument rather than a source of disillusionment to a world community hungry for peace.

The criteria Canada seeks to apply when considering participation in a peacekeeping operation include certain points of a political nature, as well as others of a more technical kind. A fundamental point is the existence of a threat to international peace and security. There is no doubt of that in this case. Ideally, peacekeeping should be directly linked to agreement on a political settlement among the parties to the conflict. At least there should be reasonable expectations that the parties will negotiate a settlement. The peacekeeping force must be responsible to a political authority, and preferably that authority should be the United Nations. The sponsoring authority should receive reports and have adequate power to supervise the mandate of the force. The parties to the conflict must accept the peacekeeping force and Canadian participation in it must be acceptable to all concerned. Further considerations are that the peacekeeping force must have a clear mandate, including such things as freedom of movement, and that there must be an agreed and equitable method of financing the operation.

²³⁰ Excerpted from the text, Department of External Affairs (Canada), *Statements and Speeches*, no. 73/23.

²³¹ Resolution 340, doc. 36 above.

The original request from the Secretary-General for Canadian participation on October 27 was in terms of Canada supplying the logistic component of the force. That role has been assigned to us precisely because of the effective way in which Canada discharged it from 1956 to 1967, and the skills that our troops demonstrated in doing their job. Two aspects of our previous experience are relevant to the new task assigned to Canada in the same area. First, the way in which UNEF had to terminate its peacekeeping function in 1967 and evacuate the Middle East gave rise to a great deal of discussion, both at the United Nations and in Canada. From that unhappy episode certain lessons have been drawn.

There is no point in participating in a peace-keeping operation unless our participation is acceptable to all, and especially to the sovereign state upon whose soil the force is to be deployed. I can assure the House that we did not accept this task until the Secretary-General had given us formal assurance that the presence of a Canadian contingent would be acceptable to all parties, and especially to Egypt, since UNEF will be deployed on Egyptian territory. In addition, I confirmed the Egyptian agreement personally with the Foreign Minister of Egypt when I met him a few days ago in Washington.

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Press interview statements by former Minister of Justice Shapiro of Israel discussing the "Galili document" and calling for Defence Minister Dayan's resignation²³²

Mid-November, 1973

Q. In view of the increasingly grave differences that have developed in security and political questions between you and the Alignment leadership, do you think that the leadership can lead the people to peace?

A. No one thinks that the triumvirate which has been leading the Alignment and the state in questions of foreign affairs and security—I mean Golda Meir and Ministers Dayan and Galili—

is really a peace party. No, I do not think so. It is clear to me that the Alignment as a whole is maintaining the tradition of seeking to achieve the possible, even if it dreams of the desirable. The Alignment, and not only the Alignment, realizes that it is only possible to achieve peace through a realistic view of the [occupied] areas, and no view is realistic unless there is a possibility of its also being accepted by the other party to the Middle East conflict. The matter will not be settled without mutual concessions. The bitter truth is that we are more interested in peace than the Arabs are. The Alignment must wake up—and it seems to me that it has woken up to some extent—from its specious dreams of "time is on our side." But I doubt very much if this awakening applies to the triumvirate that leads the Alignment. It is true that this leadership has never said "not a single inch," but it has acted, or tried to act, as if it had said so.

Q. How did this emerge? Mrs. Golda Meir, and also Ministers Dayan and Galili, have said on many occasions that they do not think that the peace frontiers can be the 1967 cease-fire frontiers. By this they surely meant that the Arabs can get greater territorial concessions through negotiations than they can through violence and war.

A. If they did say this, there is a great gap between words and deeds. The desire to act within the framework of "not a single inch" has often been expressed by the Alignment leadership. Ideas to the effect that the Arabs of the areas should remain under our rule while retaining Jordanian citizenship or nationality were a pure and frank expression of the development of "not a single inch" trends. Moreover, the whole of the Galili document is an expression of the hope that we may solve the problem of the [occupied] areas with the passage of time. If it is not solved completely at least it can be solved to a great extent, in such a way that the areas remain annexed to, merged with or united with the state of Israel. In this connection there is tradition that has been observed for many years by the parties that form the Alignment; to the effect that it is not the form that is important, but the aim that these parties try to achieve and promote and give prospects of success by their actions. Therefore I very much doubt if these people can bring about the necessary change for reaching peace.

²³² Translated from the Hebrew text, *Maariv* (Tel Aviv), November 16, 1973. For the text of the Galili document see doc. 114 above.

Q. Do you think that these doubts of yours lead to the conclusion that the tripartite leadership should resign?

A. I do not say that, except for the case of the Minister of Defence who, because of what happened on Yom Kippur, bears the direct responsibility for the great shortcoming, so that he should resign immediately. As for the Prime Minister and Minister Galili, in view of the policy they have pursued in recent years, the question is, are they capable of steering Israel to the shores of peace?

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Statement by UK Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home calling for a change in Israel's policy towards the Arabs and rejecting charges of UK submission to the Arab oil embargo²³³

Comrie, Scotland, November 16, 1973

For many years the tension in the Middle East between Israel and her Arab neighbours has represented a danger to world peace. The first necessity before any sort of reconciliation could be started was to persuade the Arab countries to be prepared to accept the continued existence of the state of Israel. It took a long time before they were convinced, but since 1971 President Sadat of Egypt and other Arab leaders have been stating unequivocally that they will include recognition of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Israel as part of a final peace settlement.

The second need was to persuade Israel that her physical security could no longer be guaranteed by the continued occupation of Arab lands and that some alternative way of ensuring the life of the state of Israel must be found. That has not happened yet but the recent war underlined this conclusion. So far Israel has been able to defend herself but only at a very high cost in men and materials. As weapons become more and more accurate and powerful her chances of successful defence through the occupation of her neighbours' territories become much reduced.

The third essential was that Russia should be made to understand that massive military intervention in that area could be fatal to world peace and that the only hope of avoiding a confrontation with the US in an area of battle was in joining with the Americans and others to limit arms and to construct a peace settlement. There is hope that they may now see the truth of this for the warning has been plain.

What has been Britain's attitude to these basic problems in the three years since the Conservative government took office?

It has not varied. We sought to persuade the Arab leaders to adopt in public the policy of recognition of Israel as an independent nation. We had it in mind too to prove to the Arabs that they had friends and that the Russians were not the only people on whom they could rely for justice.

In 1970 I made a speech at Harrogate²³⁴ which indicated clearly to the Israelis that if they valued their life as a country they must accept a system for their security different from that which relied upon occupied Arab territories for their defence. The oil question had not then arisen. That speech was unpopular with the Israelis but it is sometimes the role of a friend to tell the truth. Now I believe that nearly all the countries of Europe and indeed most of the countries in the world have arrived at this point of view. Everyone understands Israel's anxieties. After her history who would not do so? None can impose a settlement on her. She will have to come to this conclusion herself or face yet again the dreadful and dangerous repetition of the tension and wars of recent years.'

There has been a great deal of talk recently about submission to Arab blackmail. This is nonsense. Blackmail is a process by which some one demands a price from someone else on the threat of doing something unpleasant if the victim fails to pay up. The Arabs have made no demand on us and we have offered no price. It is simply not true that we have lurching in an Arab direction during the recent war and because of the threat of oil as a possible political weapon.

As I have pointed out, our Middle East policy was laid down in detail in 1970 before anyone started thinking about the oil shortage at all. We formulated this policy because we believed

²³³ Made in a speech before the Kinross and West Perthshire Conservative Association; partial advance text, London Press Service, Verbatim Service 243/73; supplied, on request, by the British embassy, Beirut.

²³⁴ Doc. 272 in *International Documents on Palestine 1970*.

that it was right and that occupied territories were no basis for peace. We still believe it to be right and all our statements and positions have been consistent: consistent with each other and consistent with Resolution 242 of the United Nations. We have not moved one iota, but others including the members of the European Community have now adopted a united position very close to the views which we have been advancing for three years.

What then can be done to assure for Israel and for her Arab neighbours the necessary physical security?

In order to create the confidence on which peace can rest I believe that there will need to be:

a) Buffer zones between the Israeli and the Arab armies.

b) An international military force, which cannot be removed at the behest of either side, stationed in these buffer zones.

c) International guarantees for the agreed frontiers.

In these processes of peace-making the permanent members of the Security Council must be ready to help if they are required.

There are many problems ahead. Arms from the great powers for defensive purposes will have to be controlled and there will be many other difficulties. But Dr. Kissinger has by great skill created conditions for a transition from ceasefire to permanent peace. Now a start has been made—now the dangers of failure to make peace are beginning to be understood. Now is the time for policies consistent with a lasting settlement to come into their own.

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Press interview statements by Shah Reza Pahlavi of Iran clarifying his position regarding the Middle East conflict and his attitude to the oil weapon²³⁵

Teheran, mid-November, 1973

Q. Do you mean to say that your decision to enter the recent war beside the Arabs—as Evans [Rowland Evans,

Washington Post] reported—*was in harmony with your previous attitude to the Arab-Israel conflict?*

A. The war has stopped now, and there is no longer any point in talking about such attitudes. In fact I did not tell Evans that I had decided to enter the war beside the Arabs. All I said was that Iran was prepared to intervene to assist in securing the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242, for what is the use of United Nations resolutions if the nations that adopted them make no effort to secure their implementation?

Q. And what about the Iranian military planes that carried out clearly defined tasks in the fighting?

A. We placed some of our planes at the disposal of Saudi Arabia, and these planes did what they were told to do. This is all I can say.

Q. But was this in harmony with your economic openness to Israel?

A. There is no contradiction. We do not believe in negative attitudes, and I do not see that it would do us or you any good if the Israeli economic office in Teheran were closed. We must be frank; it is no good deceiving. The world cannot be ruled by emotions. We think with cool heads. We have our national policy and we cannot agree to follow others blindly. We believe that we are pursuing a wise policy. Do you want me to fight the world with words, as some people have done?

What I want to say is that I am not the sort of person who substitutes words for deeds. We have given all that has been asked of us and more. We have stood by Palestinian rights from the start. Why do you forget this fact? Do we have to repeat it every day? Is behaving stupidly better than adopting wise attitudes? When the Arab world has gone mad we have preferred not to join it in that kind of madness. But when you have pursued a wise policy we have always been with you, at the United Nations and elsewhere, and my attitude at the Rabat conference is well known. Why do you forget Iran's positive attitudes?

Q. Your Majesty, your friends in the Arab world are not content that Iran should play the role of a friend like Yugoslavia or the Ivory Coast. They want Iran to play the role of an ally, as happened in the last war,

²³⁵ Excerpted and translated from the partial text of the interview

conducted by Salim Lawzi, *al-Hawadith* (Beirut), November 23, 1973, pp. 19, 20.

The Palestine problem is not only an Arab responsibility—it is also an Islamic responsibility. Closing the Israeli economic office in Tehran, for example, is an executive measure.

A. I have said, and I repeat, that I do not believe in negative attitudes, which do no good, nor in evading facts which cannot be changed. Our relations with Israel are based on the fact that she exists: Out of solidarity with the Islamic world, we have not established diplomatic relations with her, although all your major friends have good relations with Israel. Why do you not ask them to sever those relations. The majority of the Arabs are Sunnis—why do you not ask that Sunni state, Turkey, to close the Israeli economic office there? Why do you criticize Iran only? In the evacuation treaty he signed in 1954, Abdel Nasser did not object to British forces being allowed to return to the Suez Canal should Turkey be subjected to aggression. But he did not mention Iran. Why?

Q. Could you form a picture of the future of the Middle East since your meeting with Henry Kissinger?

A. I think that we are heading for peace. A settlement must be reached in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242.

Q. And the rights of the Palestinians?

A. If the problem of the Palestinians is not solved it will be impossible to have real peace in the area; the Palestinians themselves must decide their own future.

Q. And Jerusalem? Did you raise the problem of Jerusalem with Kissinger?

A. I told him frankly, "It is unacceptable that the Islamic holy places should remain in non-Islamic hands." This has been our attitude since 1967; it is not a new attitude.

Q. How do you explain America's sudden discovery that it is in a position to impose peace on Israel, whereas it used to claim that it was unable to force her to do anything?

A. America has realized the danger of the situation in the area continuing. It has realized that it must move at once. For this thanks must be expressed to President Sadat for the courageous and decisive step he has taken. He has proved that he knows what he wants. His policy is intelligent, discerning and flexible, and it is that

policy which has brought us to where we are.

Q. Is not rather incongruous that hardly had the Arabs discovered the importance of the oil weapon in war, than this weapon should lead them into a world of peace? What is your idea of the Arab world in time of peace?

A. If the Arab world gets a just peace it will certainly enter a new era of strength, prosperity, stability and progress. The war has shown them the importance of oil, and peace will show them a greater importance. Oil is a source of strength, and when the Arab world is able to use that strength it will be able to use the money it receives from oil revenues . . . and instead of squandering it on worthless objects the Arabs will share in building an important part of the world and will not be content to deposit their money in banks and invest it.

Q. Oil is a weapon common to the Arabs and Iran. . . . It was a factor for estrangement between you in war; will it be a factor for rapprochement in peace?

A. There is no disagreement between us and the Arabs on the subject of oil.

Q. You said in one of your recent statements that you do not believe in using oil as a weapon.

A. That is true, because I did not fight.

Q. During your talk with the Arab ambassadors at the 'Id al-Fitr you remarked that Iran intends to link her security to European security. . . . This is a new turn in your policy.

A. I did not say that. I said that the security of Europe cannot be separated from the security of Iran, meaning that if Europe needs one-third of the energy from our natural gas—that is to say about forty billion cubic metres of gas per annum, our security in Iran is important to Europe. . . the maintenance of their security depends on our security being maintained. This was what I meant when I said that Iran's security is part of European security.

Q. Does this apply to Arab oil too?

A. Certainly. I have views on your continuing to pursue a policy of cutting off oil supplies and reducing production which will probably not please some people in your countries, but they should discuss them quietly. You have played

the oil card successfully in time of war, and you must play it in time of peace.

Q. For example?

A. There is no need for examples. War policy is bound to be different from peace policy. If you accepted the cease-fire on behalf of a peaceful settlement, why do you continue to cut off oil supplies and reduce production? Oil is like bread; it is impermissible to cut it off in peacetime, why do you wish to appear to want to starve the world out? Why punish those who stood beside you in Europe? What has Japan done to deserve having her national product reduced by 20 per cent?

Q. If the negotiations do not lead to the just peace you have mentioned?

A. Then you once more use all your weapons, including the oil weapon.

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Note from Foreign Minister van der Stoep of the Netherlands to the Estates-General reiterating the Netherlands' policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict (excerpt)²³⁶

The Hague, November 19, 1973

In numerous contacts with representatives of the Arab countries, the government has stressed the balanced nature of its policy, a policy which remains based on the complete implementation of resolution 242. On each occasion it has pointed out that its attitude is certainly also evidence of an understanding of Arab attitudes and interests. Finally, during its contacts it has refuted the accusations regarding alleged Dutch activities. Ambassador Renardel de Lavalette, sent on a special mission by the government to the Persian Gulf and Iraq, also outlined the context and significance of the Dutch attitude during his contacts with those countries. The special mission of ex-minister van Roijen to H.M. King Faisal of Saudi Arabia is of the same character. I consider it to be of the greatest importance that such missions maintain the dialogue with the Arab countries

and ease the understanding of the respective points of view.

The government is convinced that the statement on the Middle East²³⁷ published on November 6 by the governments of the Nine will also contribute towards an understanding of the Dutch point of view. The Netherlands were able to sign this declaration because it conforms to resolution 242 which they have always supported.

Since the commencement of hostilities on October 6 the government has on various occasions expressed its concern and has stressed that, in its opinion, a genuine solution to the conflict could only be found if the opposing parties would proceed to negotiations on the basis of a complete implementation of resolution 242. The statement of the Nine does, however, on certain points expand on and detail the concepts expressed in this resolution in the light of the new situation.

I should like to make a few observations on certain points in the statement of the Nine. It refers to Security Council Resolutions 338, 339 and 340.²³⁸ The question of a return to the positions of October 22, 1973, has since been dealt with in Secretary Kissinger's formula for a disengagement of forces.²³⁹

Part 2 of the statement of the Nine insists once again on the necessity of the implementation of resolution 242 in all its parts. In this connection it is particularly important that resolution 242 mentions the principle of freedom of navigation on the international waterways of the region.

As I have already indicated during the recent debate on the situation as regards oil, the Palestine question has a political dimension besides its humanitarian dimension. This idea is to be found in that section of the statement which deals with the rights of the Palestinians. Now that a genuine prospect of peace negotiations is apparent it is appropriate to realize the political aspirations of the Palestinians in one form or another. Negotiations should determine in which direction this political solution should be sought. It is not appropriate that the Dutch government by suggesting means should prejudge a solution acceptable to all the parties. Nevertheless, it must be established that the realization of the rights of the Palestinians cannot compromise the right, equally

²³⁷ Doc. 184 above.

²³⁸ Docs. 34, 35 and 36 above.

²³⁹ Doc. 188 above.

²³⁶ Excerpted and translated from the French text supplied, on request, by the Dutch embassy, Beirut.

guaranteed by resolution 242, of Israel and all the other states of the region to have secure and recognized boundaries free from threats of acts of force.

The clause "The need for Israel to put an end to the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the 1967 conflict" is a formulation which corresponds perfectly to the Dutch point of view as it was last expressed in the explanation accompanying the 1974 budget²⁴⁰ and in the government statement of October 23 last.²⁴¹ The clause affirming "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force" is borrowed directly from the preamble of resolution 242.

As evidenced by the offer to send a contingent of troops the government supports the creation of an effective peace force for the Middle East, and it expresses its satisfaction at the partly successful attempts made to this end. I believe that such a peace force will be able to play an essential role in the framework of guarantees specified in resolution 242. A peace force, whose status and notably the conditions under which its task can be ended will be decided in a suitable fashion, will help to enable the parties to feel less obliged to reckon with and be prepared for an immediate military conflict during the period when they will not yet have sufficient mutual confidence or intrinsically secure boundaries. The military confrontation has not in 1967 or 1973 led to a genuine solution to a problem which has now existed for 25 years; a new military confrontation will only mean more human suffering and material loss for all the parties concerned.

Finally, I wish to stress once more the balanced nature of the Dutch point of view. As in the past the government today wishes that justice be done to the legitimate interests of all the parties concerned. It is to be hoped that the European countries which mean to contribute within the bounds of the possible to the search for an acceptable, lasting and equitable solution are not hindered in this by the measures directed at them. A balanced policy, such as the one adopted by the Netherlands government with respect to the present situation of the conflict, can be maintained only if it is not put too much to the test.

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Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the OAU expressing full support for the Arab and Palestinian cause and calling for a total embargo against Israel, Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia²⁴²

Addis Ababa, November 21, 1973

The Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity meeting in its eighth extraordinary session in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in the period November 19-21, 1973,

Having reviewed at length the situation in the Middle East and its consequences as they affect the continent of Africa and the international situation;

Having heard the statement of His Excellency the Foreign Minister of the Arab Republic of Egypt concerning the present situation in the Middle East;

Referring to all the resolutions of the Organization of African Unity on this matter, in particular to paragraph 7 of resolution no. 70²⁴³ which stated that the Israeli attitude might lead the states members of the Organization of African Unity to adopt political and economic measures separately and jointly on the African level in accordance with the Charters of the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations;

Referring also to resolution no. 2 concerning the situation in the Middle East and the Palestine problem adopted by the fourth conference of non-aligned nations held in Algiers, September 5-9, 1973;²⁴⁴

Expressing regret that, despite the numerous resolutions of the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations calling on Israel to withdraw from all the occupied Arab territories, Israel remains persistent in its refusal to implement these resolutions and continues to follow her policy of aggression;

Expressing its deep concern over the extensive military aid granted Israel by the United States of America which is considered as encouragement of her aggression and which increases international tension;

²⁴⁰ Doc. 121 above.

²⁴¹ This referred to the relevant passage of the budget explanation.

²⁴² Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Shaab* (Algiers), November 23, 1973.

²⁴³ See doc. 91 above.

²⁴⁴ See doc. 119 above.

Realizing that Israel's occupation of Arab territory and her recent attitude towards the implementation of the Security Council resolutions regarding a ceasefire are new evidence of her obstinate policy;

Criticizing the manoeuvres which Portugal recently adopted to obtain new military and financial aid from the United States in return for her full support of Israel;

Realizing fully the collusion between Pretoria, Lisbon and Tel Aviv reflected in the recent Israeli aggression of October 6, 1973, which constitutes a new threat to the security of the continent of Africa and consequently to the security of the world;

Noting that the collusion between Portuguese imperialism and the regimes of racial discrimination and Zionism which is reflected in the political, military and financial aid afforded by both Portugal and South Africa with the aim of encouraging aggression and supporting the policy of annexation of the Arab territories, harms not only Egypt and the other Arab states but also all of Africa;

Expressing its conviction that the evil effect of imperialism and the regimes of racial separation and discrimination in the south of the continent and likewise the aggressive expansionist policy of Israel are part of an overall political plan to encircle and dominate the whole continent;

Reaffirming the impermissibility of the acquisition of territory by force in clear violation of the Charters of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity;

Believing in the absolute right of all the Arab states which were exposed to Israeli aggression to struggle with all means to defend the integrity of their national territory;

Reaffirming the inviolable national rights of the Palestinian people and the legitimacy of its struggle against imperialism as well as its right to self determination in accordance with the Charter and the resolutions of the United Nations in this respect;

Considering that the settlement of the Palestine problem is a basic condition for a just and lasting peace;

Expressing its conviction that African solidarity with Egypt and the other Arab states is a positive stand in the struggle against colonialism and imperialism and in the preservation of the principles laid down in the Charter and resolutions of the Organization of African Unity;

Sensing encouragement as a result of the strong desire of the African and Arab peoples to work together for the complete liberation of their lands:

1. *Takes* note of the statement of His Excellency the Foreign Minister of the Arab Republic of Egypt.

2. *Greets* the heroic struggle of the Arab people of Egypt and the other Arab countries and the Palestinian people against the aggressive Israeli forces.

3. *Notes* with satisfaction the gains realized by Egypt during the October war of liberation against Israel.

4. *Recommends* the states members of the Organization of African Unity to retain the breach in relations with Israel until she has restored to the Palestinian people all its legitimate national rights.

5. *Strongly condemns* Israel for her latest aggression of October 6, 1973, and for her continued rejection of all efforts made to implement all the relevant resolutions of the Organization of African Unity and the Security Council, especially resolutions 338 and 339.

6. *Affirms* that the ceasefire called for by the resolutions of the Security Council is closely linked to the immediate initiation of the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 which calls on Israel to withdraw from all the occupied Arab territories.

7. *Demands* the complete and unconditional withdrawal of Israel from all the Arab territories occupied by her.

8. *Reaffirms*, in accordance with paragraph 2, section (c), of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity and in the name of African solidarity, its full and positive support for the Arab Republic of Egypt in its legitimate struggle to reassert the full integrity of its territory by all means.

9. *Notes* with satisfaction the peace proposal made by President Sadat on October 16, 1973,²⁴⁵ with the purpose of achieving a just and lasting peace in the Middle East taking into account the necessity of Israel's withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories and the restitution of the national rights of the people of Palestine.

10. *Reaffirms* that the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from all the occupied Arab territories and the reinstatement of the people of Palestine to their inalienable national rights is a precondition

²⁴⁵ See doc. 292 below.

for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

11. *Recognizes* the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of Palestine to regain its national rights by all means available to it.

12. *Reaffirms* its full and active support for the just cause of the people of Palestine and for its legitimate national rights, and reaffirms its strong support for Egypt and the other Arab countries which have fallen victim to Israeli aggression.

13. *Rejects* any change in the status of Jerusalem and considers that the measures of annexation to which the Holy City has been exposed are null and void in accordance with Security Council Resolution 252 (1968)²⁴⁶ and United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2253 of July 4, 1967 and Resolution 2254 of July 14, 1967.²⁴⁷

14. *Declares* that all illegal measures taken by Israel with regard to the occupied territories aiming at changing the geographical and demographical characteristics are null and void as it condemns the violation by Israel of human rights and her refusal to implement the Geneva Convention of 1949 relative to the protection of the civilian population in time of war.

15. *Strongly condemns* the bombing of civilians and the destruction of civilian targets and property carried out by Israel during the war in breach of the Geneva Conventions and the rule of international law.

16. *Directs* the attention of world public opinion to the danger inherent in the preventive war being waged by Israel and racist regimes in the south of the continent.

17. *Calls* on the member states to promote, individually and jointly, measures aimed at ensuring the isolation of Israel politically, economically, militarily and culturally until a just and lasting settlement of the Middle East problem is realized.

18. *Deplores* the agreement between the United States and Portugal regarding the Azores and calls on the United States government not to renew the agreement when it expires on February 3, 1974.

19. *Recommends* that the African states implement all the necessary measures to put a stop to Israel's defiance of the international community both individually or jointly through the Organiza-

tion of African Unity and the other international organizations in accordance with Chapter 7 of the Charter of the United Nations.

20. *Calls* on all the states members of the Organization of African Unity and appeals to friendly states to impose a complete embargo, and in particular an oil embargo against Israel, Portugal, South Africa and the racist minority government in Southern Rhodesia.

21. *Requests* the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity to follow the development of the situation in the Middle East and to present his report to the twenty-third session of the Council of Ministers.

22. *Decides* to retain the question of the situation in the Middle East on the agenda of its meetings as a basic item.

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Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the OAU calling for greater cooperation between the Arab and the African states²⁴⁸

Addis Ababa, November 21, 1973

The Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity meeting in its eighth extraordinary session in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, November 19-21, 1973,

Considering that the current situation in the Middle East has confirmed the unity of the goals of the African and Arab peoples;

Considering also the special summit conference of the Arab countries on the Middle East question to be held soon;

Conscious of the necessity for the African and Arab states to frustrate the attempts of certain western oil companies to harm African economic interests;

Believing in the necessity of increasing cooperation between the African and Arab peoples so as to liberate lands completely and speed up their economic development;

1. *Decides* to form a committee of seven states members of the Organization of African Unity to contact the Arab countries through the Arab League with the purpose of

²⁴⁶ Doc. 238 in *International Documents on Palestine 1968*.

²⁴⁷ Docs. 254 and 255 in *International Documents on Palestine 1967*.

²⁴⁸ Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Shaab* (Algiers), November 23, 1973.

a) studying the effects of the oil embargo on the African states,

b) carrying on deliberations with the Arab oil producing countries with the purpose of finding the best ways of softening the effects of the embargo on the African countries.

2. *Recommends* extensive economic cooperation between the states of the Arab League and the states members of the Organization of African Unity and requests the administrative Secretary-General in cooperation with the Secretary-General of the Arab League to set up necessary organisms for such cooperation.

3. *Recommends* the organization of regular consultations on all levels between the Arab League and the Organization of African Unity to ensure the continuation of the cooperation so as to consolidate the unity of goal and action between them.

4. *Calls* on the Arab countries who have not as yet done so, as well as the other oil producing countries, to extend the oil embargo to include South Africa, Portugal and Southern Rhodesia until they abide by the United Nations General Assembly resolution regarding the liquidation of colonialism.

5. *Requests* the administrative General Secretary to communicate a copy of this resolution to the General Secretary of the Arab League.

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Press conference statements by US Secretary of State Kissinger commenting on the current moves towards a peace conference, stressing that US policy will not be influenced by internal or external pressures and outlining the UN role in negotiations²⁴⁹

Washington, November 21, 1973

Kissinger: Ladies and gentlemen, I will just make a very few brief observations about where we stand in the Middle East, where we expect to go, then say a word about our attitude toward the various oil pressures.

First, with respect to the situation in the Middle East. As I have pointed out before, our objective

was to solidify the cease-fire so that we could move forward, together with the other interested parties, toward peace negotiations.

Now, in the complex situation that exists on the Egyptian-Israeli front, sufficient progress has been made on the cease-fire, in the cease-fire negotiations, so that we can look forward with some confidence to the beginning of peace negotiations.

Our effort will be to create the appropriate auspices called for in Security Council Resolution 338²⁵⁰ and under the auspices of the United Nations, to begin a negotiating process—hopefully, during the month of December—that we believe and that we expect and hope will lead toward the just and lasting peace that all parties have pledged themselves to attempt to negotiate.

The United States has committed itself, in Security Council Resolution 338, to support the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 in all of its parts.

We will make a major effort to narrow the differences between the parties, to help the parties move toward the peace that all the peoples in the area need and that the peace of the world requires.

Now, this will be our policy in the Middle East.

We stated this policy to the Arab Foreign Ministers at the United Nations prior to the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli war. And I lay stress on this because the United States policy is determined not by the pressures that this or that nation may attempt to generate, but by the American conception of the national interest and of the interest of general peace.

Now, the United States has full understanding for actions that may have been taken when the war was going on, by which the parties and their friends attempted to demonstrate how seriously they took the situation.

But as the United States has committed itself to a peaceful process, as the United States has pledged that it would make major efforts to bring about the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242, those countries who are engaging in economic pressures against the United States should consider whether it is appropriate to engage in such steps while peace negotiations are being prepared and, even more, while negotiations are being conducted.

²⁴⁹ Excerpted from the transcript, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIX, 1798 (December 10, 1973), pp. 701-702, 705-706, 708-709.

²⁵⁰ Doc. 34 above.

I would like to state for the United States Government that our course will not be influenced by such pressures, that we have stated our policy, that we have expressed our commitments, and that we will adhere to those and will not be pushed beyond this point by any pressures.

Now, this is all I will say on the Middle East. But of course I will be delighted to answer your questions.

There is one matter that I wanted to raise with you ladies and gentlemen, growing out of my last press conference, in which I promised, within a week, to supply the material or the evidence on which our decision to go on alert was based. It was a statement that, quite frankly, I regretted having made in terms of the short deadline immediately afterward. The reason is that as we are now moving toward peace negotiations, which we expect to conduct with the cooperation of the Soviet Union, I do not believe any useful purpose would be served if the United States recited confidential communications that had taken place and tried to re-create an episode of confrontation that, hopefully, has been transcended.

As time goes on and as the spirit of cooperation which we are attempting to foster in the Middle East takes hold, as things can be seen in fuller perspective, we still expect to fulfill what I have stated.

I am also glad to note that whatever the formal cooperation of the government, reportorial enterprise and the reluctance of associates to admit anything less than full knowledge of participation in events have both combined to produce journalistic efforts that have given a fuller picture of events than those that were available on the morning of my last press conference.

So with these two observations, I will turn to your questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your exposition on the situation in the Middle East, you said the United States will not be influenced by the pressures—I assume you are talking economic or otherwise. And I wanted to ask you whether the opposite side of that coin has any validity. In other words, Mr. [George S.] Vest, your spokesman, early this week ruled out any retaliatory economic measures against what he called the Arab blackmail. I don't know whether he used the term "blackmail." I shouldn't say that. But anyway he ruled out retaliatory economic measures. Then last night Under Secretary [for Political Affairs William J.] Porter in a speech indicated what

some people thought was a possibility of economic retaliation by the United States when he said that this sort of thing was a "two-edged sword." And then a number of eminent economists from your former neighbourhood called upon the government to resist Arab blackmail and to consider taking countermeasures. Now, that is a long question, but what I want to know is, are you going to slap back at them in some way?

A. The principal objective in the Middle East now is to try to move the contestants toward a spirit of greater conciliation and toward a greater understanding that the requirements of world peace simply do not permit the constant warfare that has been characteristic of the past 20 years. We still hope that some of the steps that were taken when certain assumptions were made about the principal American objective in that area will be changed when it becomes apparent that we are attempting to bring about a just peace.

However, it is clear that if pressures continue unreasonably and indefinitely, then the United States will have to consider what countermeasures it may have to take. We would do this with enormous reluctance, and we are still hopeful that matters will not reach this point.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in one of your answers before, you left open the possibility that the first option available to Arab leaders, which is the preferable one from your point of view, wouldn't occur until after peace negotiations had begun. If we are talking about next month, talking about some movement in those peace negotiations, implicitly you are not holding out any hope for an end to the embargo before the beginning of the year. Is that fair?

A. No. I don't want to set a deadline to decisions that are not of our own making. I would have thought that the most constructive course would be to give the negotiating process a chance now that the point has been made and to permit the countries concerned to make their efforts. What the appropriate timing for their decision is I think should be left in the first instance to the leaders who have to make that decision. I didn't want to give a deadline.

Marvin [Marvin Kalb, CBS News].

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us how you envisage this peace conference? On the Israeli side there is one state; on the Arab side several. Is a veto to be implied? How do you see this developing?

A. Well, of course the conference, to be effective,

would have to be left to a considerable extent to the decision of the participants. For example, there are many ways it could be conducted. It could operate through plenary sessions that then break up into a series of bilateral negotiations. It could address some issues of common concern in plenary sessions and then some issues of bilateral concern in separate meetings. I think the procedural possibilities are fairly wide and should be explored in the first instance by the parties concerned.

Obviously no agreement can be made, and certainly no agreement can last, unless it has the willing participation and agreement of all the parties at the conference.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Prime Minister Meir, addressing some Israeli troops today in the Sinai, said that the United States will put pressure on Israel to make some concessions. Could you now elaborate on what concessions you would expect Israel to make?

A. What the United States will do will depend on the process of negotiations. It is obvious that the conditions that produced the war that started on October 6 will have to be changed. And it is obvious, and it has always been understood, that a peace settlement will not ratify the cease-fire lines as they existed on October 6.

Therefore a peace settlement will have to have a number of elements. It will have to have an element of withdrawals. It will have to have an element of security arrangements between the parties concerned. And it may have to have an element of outside guarantees. In addition, there are such issues as the Palestinians and the future of Jerusalem. It will undoubtedly have to be discussed in some form or another at a peace conference.

We hope that Israel, as well as the Arab countries, will recognize that one of the clear consequences of recent events is that a purely military solution to the problems of the Middle East is impossible and that all countries therefore have the problem of the right balance between their security needs and the needs of legitimacy, acceptance, or whatever you want to call it.

We do not consider it axiomatic that this can only be achieved by pressure on Israel by the United States to make concessions. We expect to have full consultations with Israel, as we expect to have discussions with the Arab participants;

and the positions we will take as the negotiations develop depend on the positions the various parties take during the course of the negotiations and cannot be assumed ahead of time.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what role do you foresee for the Palestinians at the peace conference?

A. This is a very difficult question that affects Israel, the other Arab states, and among the other Arab states, Jordan in particular. And it is a question which sometime in the course of the negotiation will require explicit discussion. Whether it is necessary to address it in the very first phases of the negotiations, when probably the military issues will loom largest, remains to be seen; and I would doubt it. But the Palestinian issue is of course one of the key questions that will come up.

Q. Mr. Secretary, during your confirmation hearings, you said that the United Nations could not, or would not, be able to play a useful political role because of the veto that the superpowers, or the major powers, have in the Security Council. In the event, during this Middle East crisis, it looks as if the United Nations was able to play a useful role. First, have you changed your opinion, and second, what does this forecast for the U.S. use of the United Nations in the future?

A. I must say that the United Nations played a more effective role in this crisis than could have been deduced from my theoretical statements as a professor or from my statements during my confirmation hearings.

It proved to be an extremely effective sounding board, the most rapid means of communication among the parties, and when the chief participants had decided on a settlement, the most effective way by which the settlement could be achieved. Finally, it performed the absolutely essential role of providing the buffer that prevented the confrontation that could have occurred without it.

So we believe that the United Nations played a very useful role, and we will take very serious account of that in the solution of other problems.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of the evident and considerable advantage to Russia inherent in the reopening of the Suez Canal, granting their large Mediterranean Fleet access to the Indian Ocean, to the Persian Gulf, and so on, can you tell us why, as I think is the case, the United States so strongly favors the reopening of the Suez?

A. The United States has not favored the reopening of the Suez Canal in the abstract; the United States has favored the evolution of the Middle East policy of such a nature that some reasonable prospect toward a final settlement was opened up to the chief participants.

If anything has become clear in recent years, it is that the situation as it existed prior to October 6 was simply unacceptable to enough of the Arab countries and to the Middle East so that it would constantly produce the danger of renewed warfare—and of a kind of warfare that, as the war has made clear, is not in the long-term interest of Israel either. Therefore the opening of the Suez Canal ought to be seen not in the context of the strategic movements of the Soviet Fleet, but in the context of world peace in general.

Now, with respect to the greater ease of movement of the Soviet Fleet from the Mediterranean into the Indian Ocean, there is a great danger of looking at the developments in this area in terms of a strategy that is more appropriate to the previous century than now.

Soviet influence in the Indian Ocean will not depend primarily on the number of ships it can deploy into the Indian Ocean. And I am confident that to the degree that power becomes the principal factor in the Indian Ocean, we will be able to generate a fleet of sufficient size in that area so that we could counterbalance anything that the Soviet Union might put into the Indian Ocean, as the recent visit of the *Hancock* in that area has demonstrated.

Q. Are you favoring a permanent U.S. Indian Ocean Fleet, or inferring that?

A. I am saying that the future of the Middle East should not be deduced from the steaming time of the Soviet Fleet from the Black Sea into the Indian Ocean and whether adding 10 days to it, or cutting 10 days off it, will not be the determining factor.

Therefore the United States attitude toward the opening of the Suez Canal and to the military disengagement of forces in that area will be determined primarily, first, by the contribution this would make toward the general peace in the area and, secondly, by the possibilities it gives to reduce the influence of outside powers in general by focusing matters on Middle East concerns. That is the principal issue, and this is the best way to reduce Soviet influence and, for that matter,

any outside influence in that area.

Q. Mr. Secretary, a three-part question. In your opening statement, you referred to the peace talks under U.N. auspices; I think at your last press conference, you talked about Soviet-American auspices. Is this a slight change? And secondly, after your appearance before the Foreign Relations Committee yesterday you said you had no plan but certain principles that you would like to see in an agreement. Chairman Fulbright, in his talk with newsmen yesterday, went through certain principles, including which he said he favored the Rogers plan of Israeli pullbacks to the old boundaries with insubstantial changes. I wondered how you felt on that question.

A. With respect to the procedural issue, we still believe that the appropriate auspices foreseen in Security Council Resolution 338 could best be provided by the United States and the Soviet Union. We believe, however, also, that these auspices should be generally blessed by the United Nations, and we would have no objection—in fact, we would welcome some participation by the Secretary General of the United Nations to symbolize this United Nations aegis.

With respect to the specifics of an American position, our attitude—I have stated the general principles with respect to Security Council Resolution 242 and some of the elements that we believe are likely to be contained in such a negotiation.

We do not believe it is effective for the United States to put forward a proposal in all its details which then will enable both parties, or will tempt both parties, to start shooting at the American proposal rather than to concentrate on what it is that they should accomplish.

We believe that the process that was followed in bringing about the six-point agreement solidifying the cease-fire may be more effective—in which the parties assume responsibility for their own positions. And once they put their positions on the table, then the United States can attempt to bring about a closing of the gap and perhaps inject its own ideas where those appear to be useful.

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Statement by the government of Japan expressing its view of the principles to govern a Middle East peace settlement²⁵¹

Tokyo, November 22, 1973

1. The Government of Japan has consistently hoped that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East will be achieved through the prompt and complete implementation of Security Council Resolution 242, and has continued to request the efforts of the parties and countries concerned. It has been prompt in supporting the United Nations General Assembly Resolution concerning the rights of the Palestinian people for self-determination.²⁵²

2. The Government of Japan is of the view that the following principles should be adhered to in achieving a peace settlement.

(1) The inadmissibility of acquisition and occupation of any territories by use of force;

(2) The withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the territories occupied in the 1967 war;

(3) The respect for the integrity and security of the territories of all countries in the area and the need of guarantees to that end; and

(4) The recognition of and respect for the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations in bringing about a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

3. The Government of Japan urges that every possible effort be made to achieve a just and lasting peace in the Middle East in compliance with the above-mentioned principles. Needless to say, it is the intention of the Government of Japan to make as much contribution as possible towards that end.

The Government of Japan, deploring Israel's continued occupation of Arab territories, urges Israel to comply with those principles. The Government of Japan will continue to observe the situation in the Middle East with grave concern and, depending on future developments, may have to reconsider its policy towards Israel.

²⁵¹ English text supplied, on request, by the Japanese embassy, Beirut.

²⁵² Resolution 2963 E, printed as doc. 11 in *International Documents on Palestine 1972*.

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Press interview statements by Portugal's Ambassador to Lebanon Silva regarding US use of bases in Portuguese territory to supply Israel with arms²⁵³

Beirut, late November, 1973

Silva: Since 1948 when the conflict between the Arabs and Jews started my country has taken the line of neutrality as its method of dealing with both parties; it has never supported the Israelis against the Arabs and has never supported the Arabs against the Israelis.

Q. But during the fourth war, you did provide the United States with landing facilities for the airlift, enabling it to transport to Israel advanced weapons and supplies which changed the balance of forces and which was a principal reason for President Sadat's accepting the cease-fire resolution. If the provision of these landing facilities was not an act of alignment with our enemy, what is?

A. The Arabs usually forget that Portugal is a member of NATO. They also forget that there was a security treaty between my country and the United States signed at the beginning of the 'fifties, under which Washington leased an air base which it uses when it needs to. The Arabs also overlook the fact that these landing facilities were also used in the fourth war to transport arms to Morocco, Jordan and Saudi Arabia!

Q. But Turkey and Greece, which are members of NATO, did not allow American planes to use their bases for the purpose of supporting Israel.

A. The governments of Turkey, Greece and West Germany did not allow the Americans to use the NATO bases in their countries, which are normally only used in the event of a war that threatens the security of the fourteen member states of NATO. But we have no authority over our bases which are leased to America.

Q. What are your relations with Israel?

A. There are no relations between us and Israel. We have no embassy in Tel Aviv, she has

²⁵³ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the interview conducted by Ghasan Zakariya, *al-Siyasa* (Kuwait), November 26, 1973, p. 9.

no embassy in Lisbon. There are no loans and no financial support, no trade, no tourism and no exchange of missions. There are only individual relations between individual Jews in Portugal and Israel; my government has no relations with her.

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Communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the USSR of Executive Committee Chairman Arafat of the PLO (excerpts)²⁵⁴

Moscow, November 26, 1973

At the invitation of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, a Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) delegation headed by Yasir Arafat, Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee, visited the Soviet Union.

The PLO delegation held meetings and talks in the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee and in other public organizations. There was an exchange of opinions on the Near East situation and on the Arab peoples' struggle against imperialism and Israeli aggression and for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in this area.

Y. Arafat reported on the current stage of the aims and tasks of the Palestinian resistance movement and on the PLO's cooperation in the struggle for a just peace in the Near East with all Arab countries favouring the elimination of the consequences of Israeli aggression, the political settlement of the Near East conflict and the satisfaction of the legitimate national rights of the Arab people of Palestine.

The Palestinian delegation expressed gratitude to the Soviet Union for its help in the Arab peoples' struggle against Israeli aggression, and for national independence and social progress. The delegation declared that the Soviet Union's consistently friendly position encourages the Arab peoples and inspires them with faith in the success of the struggle for their national rights and interests

and for a just and lasting peace in the Near East.

During the talks note was made of the great significance of the growing solidarity of the Arab countries and the strengthened co-ordination of their actions in the struggle for the elimination of the consequences of Israeli aggression.

Representatives of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, expressing the views of the broad mass of Soviet public opinion, decisively condemned the expansionist strivings of the Israeli aggressors and reaffirmed the Soviet peoples' solidarity with the anti-imperialist liberation movement of the Arab peoples. The Soviet side emphasized its firm resolve to render further aid and support to the struggle of the Arab people of Palestine for their legitimate national rights.

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Message from President Podgorny and Prime Minister Kosygin of the USSR to the Arab summit conference in Algiers²⁵⁵

Moscow, November 26, 1973

On behalf of the Presidium of the USSR, Supreme Soviet and the Soviet government, we greet the leaders of the Arab states who have gathered in Algiers for a high-level meeting and, in their person, the Arab peoples friendly to the Soviet Union.

Your meeting is being held under conditions in which the Arab peoples and all peace-loving forces are faced with an urgent task—to put an end to Israel's imperialist aggression and to establish a lasting peace in the Near East.

The recent course of events in the Near East again affirms that the establishment of a lasting peace and security for all peoples in this area is impossible without the liberation of all Arab territory occupied by Israel and the guarantee of the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine.

²⁵⁴ *Pravda* (Moscow), November 27, 1973, p. 5; partial English translation, *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXV, 48 (December 26, 1973), p. 20. Translation copyright 1973 by *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, published weekly at the Ohio State University by the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies; reprinted by permission of the Digest.

²⁵⁵ *Pravda* (Moscow), November 27, 1973, p. 2.; English translation, *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXV, 48 (December 26, 1973), pp. 19–20. Translation copyright 1973 by *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, published weekly at the Ohio State University by the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies; reprinted by permission of the Digest.

In the difficult and courageous struggle, the peoples of Egypt and Syria have shown a significant enhancement of their armed forces' fighting capability and a firm resolve to restore their legitimate rights and to succeed in liberating their territory. During the recent military conflict with Israel all Arab countries demonstrated increased solidarity and a desire to unite forces for the struggle against Israeli aggression.

Now, at a time when the process of international détente is gathering strength, when the isolation of Israel and those imperialistic circles supporting it has grown in the international arena and when peace-loving forces are providing ever growing support for the Arab peoples' liberation struggle, more favourable conditions for the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the Near East have been created.

The generally recognized foundation for this development is the well known UN Security Council resolution providing for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab territory occupied in 1967.

In its Near East policy, which is being implemented in accordance with the Peace Program set forth by the 24th CPSU Congress,²⁵⁶ the Soviet Union is guided by Leninist principles of giving all-round support to the peoples' liberation struggle. It has rendered and will continue to render all-round aid and support to the Arab states—the victims of Israeli aggression.

We remain convinced advocates of a just and lasting peace in the Near East. We are ready to do our part to create those conditions in which a genuine peace, founded upon justice, can be established in the Near East.

At the present time the matter of regulating the Near East conflict is entering a practical and very crucial stage. Now, as never before, the fate of peace in the Near East is largely dependent on the co-ordinated policy of the Arab states and on the further strengthening of their solidarity and unity of action with other peace-loving forces.

We sincerely wish the conference participants success in resolving the tasks facing them.

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Press interview statement by President Senghor of Senegal explaining the rupture of relations between Israel and the African states²⁵⁷

November 26, 1973

Q. For Israel, the breaking off of diplomatic relations with a certain number of African countries constitutes a question of morality or integrity rather than a political question. To tell the truth, one has the impression that the decision was not taken in complete independence by some countries. Did the Algiers conference play an important role in this?

A. Certainly, but I cannot speak for others. I speak to you in the name of black Africa. It is above all a political decision. We created the Organization of African Unity, and as members of this organization we feel solidarity with each other. I repeat that it consists on our part of a decision of a political and not a moral nature. You know that I presided over the subcommittee of the Committee of Ten. I went twice to Jerusalem and twice to Cairo. We therefore were solely concerned with relations between Egypt and Israel. There is obviously the Arab problem, but for us it is above all an African problem. I had been charged, as head of this subcommittee, with creating the necessary conditions for opening negotiations which could lead to a just and lasting peace.

When I went to Cairo, I remember, President Sadat offered a banquet for some 400 guests in my honour. At the end of this banquet, the Egyptian president pronounced a toast and I replied to it. I should say that when I got up to speak, I saw my Foreign Minister watching me with his eyes popping out of his head, at the thought of the speech I had prepared. Then I said that I considered this war between Jews and Arabs as a fratricidal war, since both form the two branches of the Semitic family which has brought irreplaceable messages to the world. I can tell you that when I sat down, President Sadat said to me: "Thank you, you always look at problems from a distance."

²⁵⁷ Excerpted and translated from the French text of the interview conducted by Victor Malka, *L'Arche* (Paris), no. 201 (November 26–December 25, 1973), pp. 47–48. Details of the breaking of relations between Israel and African states are in note to doc. 167 above.

²⁵⁶ See docs. 84 and 86 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

So we are still faithful to the thought that this war is fratricidal. I recently said that what upset me most is that the Israelis were recovering their identity and sense of unity against the Arabs and that the Arabs were in turn recovering the sense of their identity and unity against the Jews.

Why did we break off diplomatic relations with Israel? I think that this war could have been done without. I recall that we were near to reaching and obtaining success since all that remained for negotiations to get started was a public statement in which the Israeli government would declare its intention of non-annexation. Now the Israeli government did not wish to make this declaration. I think that Israel's mistake is to believe only in force.

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Revised policy statement adopted by the Israel Labour Party concerning security requirements in the occupied territories and terms for a peace agreement following the October War²⁵⁸

November 28, 1973

A. Preamble

1. Elections to the eighth Knesset will take place after the Yom Kippur War, at the height of the political struggle for peace and in circumstances in which it is necessary to be constantly prepared to confront the danger of a resumption of fighting on the initiative of the Arab countries. All parts and section of the Alignment's programme for the eighth Knesset must reflect the lessons arising from the circumstances of the war and its consequences and the readiness of the people and society to achieve peace as a central objective.

B. Security

2. The Centre (the Party Centre) commends the Israel Defence Army for its capacity to hold

out and for the victory it won over the enemy's armies, thanks to the strength and heroism of its combatants. The Israel Defence Army vanquished its enemies in spite of their superiority in numbers and in arms and equipment supplied to them by the USSR.

3. The Centre hereby declares that it shares in the grief of the bereaved and stands by the prisoners, the wounded and their families.

4. The requirements of security must be the main concern of the state and we must spare no effort to ensure support for the Israel Defence Army and its potential. The strength of the Israel Defence Army is a fundamental condition for the reinforcement of security and the achievement of peace.

C. The Search for Peace

5. Israel's central objective is to make peace with the neighbouring countries and to establish relations of cooperation with the peoples of the area. Since its establishment Israel has been striving to achieve this objective, but it has not been achieved because of the policy of hostility and the state of war and boycott pursued by the Arab governments throughout this period.

6. Today, also, just after the war started by Egypt and Syria, with the participation of other Arab countries, Israel is resolved to make even greater efforts to achieve peace, and it is in this spirit that the government has taken a number of decisions since the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War:

a) To respond to the ceasefire initiative and to implement the ceasefire on a mutual basis.

b) To sign the Six Point Agreement with Egypt, to strive to reach an agreement on the disengagement of forces and to consolidate the ceasefire.

c) To express its readiness to attend the peace conference to be held in December 1973.

7. The peace conference that is to be held in December is an extremely important event in the history of the area, involving as it does the possibility of a great change in Israel's relations with the Arab countries. Israel hopes and anticipates that the negotiations at the conference between Israel and her neighbours will lead to the desired peace.

8. Israel will strive, at the peace conference and within the system of her international relations, for a peace agreement attained by negotiations without preconditions. These negotiations must

²⁵⁸ Translated from the Hebrew text, *Davar* (Tel Aviv), November 29, 1973. It remains unclear whether this document took the place of the "Galili document" (doc. above) of mid-August; Sapir said that it did, Dayan that it did not. The Party's General Secretary, Yadlin, said that the two documents were complementary (*New Outlook* (Tel Aviv), XVI, 9 (December, 1973) p. 45).

be carried on without pressure or attempts of imposition by any quarter.

9. Israel will strive for a peace agreement involving:

a) The termination of all manifestations of hostility, blockade and boycott.

b) Defensible frontiers which will ensure Israel the possibility of effectively defending herself against military attack or blockade, based on a compromise territorial solution. Peace frontiers will take the place of the ceasefire lines. Israel will not return to the frontiers of June 4, 1973, which were a temptation to aggression.

c) The maintenance of the Jewish character of the state of Israel to ensure the achievement of its Zionist goals and its tasks as regards immigration and the ingathering of the Diaspora.

d) A start on a new stage of normal relations between Israel and the neighbouring countries in the political, economic, social and cultural fields.

10. The peace agreement with Jordan will be based on the existence of two independent states: Israel, with its capital Jerusalem, unified, and an Arab state to the east of it. In the neighbouring Jordanian-Palestinian state it will be possible for the identity of the Palestinian and Jordanian Arabs to express itself through peace and good neighbourly relations with Israel. Israel rejects the establishment of an additional separate Palestinian state west of the river Jordan.

11. Any peace agreement shall be signed with the knowledge of the government and the Knesset.

12. Until such time as there is a peace agreement Israel shall keep the ceasefire and also such interim settlements as may be agreed upon between her and her neighbours as temporary settlements on the way to peace.

In the event of there being no peace treaty or interim settlements Israel will continue to maintain the situation as determined by the ceasefire in its entirety.

Every effort will be made to continue and consolidate settlement and to build settlements in accordance with such decisions as the government of Israel may take from time to time, with priority being given to state security considerations.

D. Relations with the United States

13. Israel appreciates the special relations between herself and the United States and the great

help she receives from it. Israel will strive to strengthen these relations in the future.

E. Appeal to World Jewry

14. Israel has the highest appreciation of the solidarity of the Jewish people in the whole of the Diaspora and of their stand beside the state of Israel. She appeals to them to continue to stand beside her in her struggle for peace and security, to maintain their efforts to increase her moral and material strength, and to continue wide-scale immigration to Israel.

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Statement by General Secretary Brezhnev of the CPSU attributing the successful containment of the Arab-Israel war to the détente between the US and the USSR²⁵⁹

New Delhi, November 29, 1973

A striking example of the complexity of present-day international relations was provided by the events of the recent weeks in the Middle East which became a focal point of the interaction of many of the opposing forces in the world today.

Now, after some relatively brief but violent fighting, calm has set in there. The hostilities have been stopped. But the ruins are still smouldering, the graves of thousands of victims are still fresh, the hostile armies are confronting each other with their arms held in readiness. It is clear that urgent measures must be taken to prevent new bloodshed and to establish a stable peace. But, for this to be done, the lessons of the past should be learnt.

What conclusions can be drawn from the recent events in the Middle East and around it?

First of all, the new war has shown with all clarity, the impermissibility of the further continuation of the explosive situation in the Middle East, the impermissibility of the further presence of the aggressor on the lands he seized by force. Unless an early peace settlement is reached, unless all the consequences of Israeli aggression are eliminated, a new and even more dangerous

²⁵⁹ Made in a speech before the Indian Parliament; excerpted from the English text supplied, on request, by Novosti Press Agency, Beirut.

military explosion may occur in the Middle East at any moment.

The hostilities have made it crystal clear that the Arab world today is not what it was six years ago. They have shown the increased strength of the Arab states, the victims of aggression, and they have dispelled the myth of the invincibility of Israel's armed forces. At the same time, the world has witnessed the effective solidarity of the states of the Arab world, which was evident both in the military sphere and in the implementation of political and economic measures to defend common interests in the international arena.

Practical proof was also provided of the high effectiveness of the solidarity and friendly assistance given to the Arab peoples in their just struggle by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and by many states in Asia, Africa and other continents. The political and diplomatic isolation of Israel resulting from its aggressive policies has become especially obvious these days.

At the same time, the events of the past weeks have given us yet another proof of the usefulness for universal peace, of the work already done in recent years to normalise international relations and to ease international tensions, in the first place, in the relations between the biggest states with different social systems.

I trust that the distinguished Members of Parliament will agree with me that without this factor of detente in the world, which emerged in the last 2 or 3 years, the state of affairs would have been quite different. Were the present conflict to break out in an atmosphere of general international tension and of exacerbated relations, say, between the United States and the Soviet Union, the clash in the Middle East could have been considerably more dangerous, it could have acquired dimensions threatening universal peace.

And it can be said with certainty that in such a case there would have been no possibility of a joint initiative by the USSR and the USA which was supported by other states and which led to the well-known decisions of the Security Council on the Middle East and made the cease-fire possible.

The main task today is to secure, at long last, a stable peace settlement in the Middle East in the course of the forthcoming negotiations. This requires that the lands seized by Israel be returned to their legitimate owners, that justice with regard

to the Arab people of Palestine be ensured and that a foundation be laid on this basis for durable peaceful coexistence and good-neighbourly relations between the Arab states and the state of Israel. Otherwise there will be neither peace, nor tranquillity in the area.

Historic responsibility rests on the participants in the forthcoming negotiations.

As regards the Soviet Union, it has no selfish interests in the Middle East whatsoever. Our only profound desire is to see that a genuinely stable peace, a just peace, is finally established in that part of the world, situated in proximity to the borders of the Soviet Union. And the Soviet Union, for its part, will do everything to actively facilitate this.

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Press interview statements by Prime Minister Meir of Israel commenting on the effects of the war on Israel's internal politics²⁶⁰

December 1, 1973

Q. Had we followed another policy perhaps the Arabs might not have started the war?

A. Well, what have the Arabs demanded since the end of the six-day war—a return to the 1967 borders as a precondition and the “no’s” [of the Khartoum conference].²⁶¹ Later, when they did not insist on the no’s and said they were prepared to reach some arrangement, they first of all insisted that it be on the basis of the 1967 borders...

Q. The question is whether there is no middle ground between the stand you have just mentioned and the Government's concept?

A. No. I shall tell you why. This Government has never accepted the concept of “not a single inch”, and we have said: not the 1967 borders but a border between the post-1967 cease-fire lines and the borders of 1967, but never “not a single inch”. This is what the Government has said. Within

²⁶⁰ Interview conducted by Gideon Rafael and broadcast by Israel radio in Hebrew; excerpted from the partial English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4467/A/6-7; reprinted by permission.

²⁶¹ Doc. 412 in *International Documents on Palestine 1967*.

the Government, as it is now, there are perhaps differences of opinion, but not over all the borders. On certain borders there definitely are no differences while on others there definitely are. We have never put this to a vote because we have said that when we have to go to peace negotiations we will do so [i.e. vote]. Anyway, the Government's policy was never "not a single inch", and the Government's concept is that between the Mediterranean and the borders of Iraq there can only be two states—the state of Israel, and Jordan. The Palestine issue should be solved within the area east of the state of Israel when a border is established between Israel and Jordan. There they can express whatever they want because the largest Palestinian population has always been in Jordan and perhaps the majority is Palestinian.

Q. Mrs. Meir, it seems as though there has never been so much bewilderment and hesitation, and so many second thoughts among the public as there is today...

A. ...It is natural for there to be questions and reconsiderations. There are questions regarding what has happened, why there was no full mobilization, why the mobilization was ordered when it was and not a day or 48 hours before; there are questions perhaps about the conduct of the war, and about many other important details. All this will be investigated and answers will definitely be forthcoming. Everything will become clear and open if it does not affect security... There is no danger in this as long as we discuss things objectively. Furthermore, in a democratic regime, it is possible to say we want a change. Fortunately, we are now going into elections.

Q. Is that fortunate?

A. Yes, I say it is fortunate. Why? Because this is the best and simplest way to solve the problem... Every one of us and every political body is now standing trial before the people. The people will judge... I think the majority of the people know that it is impossible to blame ourselves for the fact that peace has not come...

Q. Some very strong words were used in the Labour Party meeting on Wednesday, but finally a compromise formula was found that satisfies everyone.²⁶² Thus the wolf emerged full and the lamb safe. The main thing is to find a face-saving formula.

A. First of all, the subject discussed was not the

political plan. That will take place on Monday. It is no secret that there are factions and people who hold different views within the Labour Party... We have never been a homogeneous party in which one says something and everyone else agrees. There have always been differences of opinion and all sorts of problems... The Party has always been like that—with different views—and the slogan has always been: freedom of argument, freedom of expression and unity of action. We have always reached a decision in the end...

Q. ...In whose name will the Labour Party come to the people in another 30 days to ask for a vote of confidence, in the name of Moshe Dayan or Arye Ehav, in the name of Abba Eban or Shimon Peres?

A. In the name of the programme to be adopted by the party and everyone who agrees to carry out this programme.

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Message from President Franco of Spain to President Boumedienne of Algeria expressing support for the Arab cause²⁶³

Madrid, December 4, 1973

You know perfectly the traditional friendship of the Spanish people in regard to the Arab peoples. The support of Spain for their just cause has been steadfast and unconditional. Spain has always considered that a conflict in the Middle East may have very grave consequences for security in the Mediterranean, and she is entirely willing to lend her assistance to mitigate the consequences of this conflict. Spain followed with deep concern the events that took place recently in the Middle East, and thought that these events, as Your Excellency well emphasized it, incurred the risks of a serious international crisis. Spain's constant attitude has been to deny the use of force as the means of territorial expansion. For this reason, and guided also by our fraternal feelings towards the Arab nation, we have always maintained the true interpretation of resolution 242 as the basic element, as well as respect for the rights of the Palestinian people, in order to establish a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

²⁶³ Translated from the partial French translation, *Le Monde* (Paris), December 6, 1973, p. 5.

²⁶² Doc. 205 above.

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Press conference statements by US Secretary of State Kissinger commenting on renewed Middle East tension and on prospects for the pending peace conference, discussing US policy in the light of the oil crisis, referring the question of a Palestinian role to the peace conference, and considering the role of the US and the USSR in guaranteeing any settlement²⁶⁴

Washington, December 6, 1973

Now let me turn to substance. Let me make a few comments on the Middle East and on my forthcoming trip, and then let me answer your questions.

On the Middle East, the last time I met with this group I indicated that we might be able to make a formal announcement as to the time and place of the conference in a relatively brief period of time. I seem to have an obsession with weeks, and I think I indicated that it would be done in a week.

The fact is that we consider it extremely probable that the conference will begin on December 18 in Geneva. There are some technical details to be worked out as to the form of invitation, as to the nature of the invitations, and matters of this kind. We believe them to be relatively easily soluble, and we're in touch with the parties now as well as with the Soviet Union and the [U.N.] Secretary General to work out the appropriate procedure. But we have no reason at this point to doubt that the conference will take place in the manner in which I have indicated.

We believe that once the conference starts, a negotiating process will be underway which, dealing first with issues of a military nature and then turning to the overall settlement, will bring about a settlement in accordance with Resolution 242. And the United States, as I have stated repeatedly, will use its influence to bring about such a settlement.

With respect to my trip to the NATO meeting, obviously there has been some disagreement. Equally clearly, the Atlantic alliance remains the cornerstone of our foreign policy, and I'm going there with the attitude that the need for starting

and for giving a new impetus of Atlantic relationship remains and that the United States will spare no effort to inject new vitality, creativity, and hope into the Atlantic relationship. I'm not going in an attitude of confrontation and acrimony.

I'll be glad to answer questions.

Q. In light of the breakoff of kilometer 101 talks, the Israeli forces being in a high state of alert, the continued oil squeeze, what reasons, as specifically as you can be, do you have for expecting a constructive peace conference in Geneva?

A. The kilometer 101 talks concerned the implementation of the cease-fire agreement. And while we regret that they have been broken off, we believe that the issues that were raised at this conference are soluble and can be dealt with particularly when other countries can play a more active role in relation to them.

The high state of alert of both sides is, to a considerable extent, produced by the military dispositions that now exist. Both sides have their forces in the rear of the other. And both sides are in danger of imminent encirclement if military operations resume. Therefore the penalty for being surprised is extremely serious. This calls attention to the fact that there is a need of a separation of forces that reduces this danger. And I believe that the experience of the last two months will have brought this home to both of the parties.

With respect to the oil embargo, I have stated our position at the last press conference, which is that we understand the Arab point of view. The United States prior to October 6 perhaps did not see the situation with the same degree of urgency as some of the Arab countries. And we can understand also the decisions that were made during military operations.

Now that the United States is taking an active part in the negotiations and has affirmed that it will work for an implementation of Security Council Resolution 242, we continue to believe that discriminatory measures against the United States and pressures are no longer appropriate, and we are talking in that sense to those Arab nations with which we are in contact.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you've spoken with regard to your NATO visit, the obvious disagreements which exist there. Of course you've got the biggest piece of real estate pulled out of there some time ago, as far as the military went, France. Now you've had the damage—if such is the right

²⁶⁴ Excerpted from the transcript, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIX, 1800 (December 24, 1973), pp. 755–757, 758, 760, 761.

word—damage done by the different view some of the NATO countries took of the Middle East situation than we did.

My question is, how easy—and this is difficult to say, I know—but how easy do you think that this can be repaired? And how much will it depend not on what you do at NATO now but what you do at Geneva later?

A. First, it is clear, as I pointed out last time, that there are a number of significant disagreements in the alliance—some of them produced by style, some of them produced by the fact that some of our allies have been absorbed with bringing about European unity while we have naturally put more emphasis on Atlantic unity, and some of them produced by a different view with respect to Middle East policy.

I believe that we will be able in the discussions—taking the last point first—on the Middle East to make clear that this was not a difference in tactics but perhaps a different assessment as to what was at stake—the relationship between what was at stake to the energy crisis, and the possibilities that existed for individual action.

I believe that the discussions that may take place at NATO can contribute to clarifying the points of view. In any event, whatever happens at the NATO meeting can only be the beginning of a process; it cannot bring about a final resolution.

Now, obviously what happens in the Middle East—even more importantly, the perceptions of the two sides about the relationship of what happens in the Middle East to their energy problem—will greatly affect the vitality of the relationship in the long term. We believe that the energy problem is accentuated by the Arab-Israeli conflict but that it has much deeper sources, the most important of which is that demand has outrun the incentives for supply and that it is an aspect of the rapid industrialization of the developed nations.

Q. Mr. Secretary, we were told earlier this week that the 101 talks might be resumed by week's end. Now probably something has happened to change your estimate of that; and we hear that the Israeli Defense Minister may be delayed in getting to Washington to talk to you. And we hear about reports today of Israeli and Egyptian planes being shot down. What has happened, and do you think it now likely that the cease-fire could come apart and jeopardize the holding of that conference?

A. In a situation in which the forces are as closely mixed as they are and in which we of course do not control the decisions of either side, any

prediction is somewhat hazardous. We do not believe that the cease-fire will come apart and that the conference will be jeopardized. But I must repeat: I must add the caveat that we do not of course control the decisions.

As for the delay of the arrival of the Israeli Defense Minister, all I have is the news ticker. I don't know what caused it. We have not been officially informed that he is in fact delaying his arrival; and I expect to get some official notification, if there is a delay in his meeting with me, which was scheduled for tomorrow, later in the day.

The resumption of the 101 talks really depends on the assessment both sides make of what should be done in the 101 talks and what should be done later at the conference. This is no conclusive indication of the difficulty of making progress; it may simply be a decision as to the venue at which some of these issues will be discussed.

Q. Sir, do you expect the 101 talks to resume before December 18, or do you think that whole operation will be transferred to Geneva?

A. I am not sure whether they will be resumed. It is one of the issues we want to discuss. At any rate, the subject matter of those talks—if the talks are not resumed before Geneva—will of course require the most urgent consideration at Geneva.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, I would like to get back, if I could, for a moment to the oil situation, which is such a vital concern of the American people. There have been a number of reports in the last day or so that there may be consideration of a phased return of oil supplies to the United States in return for a phased Israeli withdrawal. Now, you yourself are reported to have indicated to Egyptian President Sadat on your last trip that any Middle East settlement is likely to take a fairly long period of time, perhaps as long as a year or two. In view of that, is the phased-withdrawal idea the best hope that the American people have of getting a return of these vital oil supplies?

A. First of all, when I saw President Sadat, we were alone. And what you are referring to is a conversation at a dinner party with an Egyptian editor of a somewhat enthusiastic frame of mind. You cannot conclude from that that this is necessarily the discussion I had with President Sadat.

We have not engaged in a public discussion as to the methods by which the oil embargo might be mitigated, because we recognize that this is also a difficult problem for the Arab countries that have to make the decision.

Our basic philosophy was stated in the last press conference here, which is that we do not think it is helpful for us to negotiate, prior to a conference which will address these questions, a separate agreement relating oil to particular issues at the conference table. And I have stated our general philosophy earlier.

Q. Mr. Secretary, have you detected any change in the Arab policy on oil?

A. I think we will have to let events speak for themselves. You all heard Minister Yamani when he appeared yesterday. And while we are in the process of engaging in these discussions, before my trip I don't think I want to speculate on that.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you perceive is going to be the role of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in the conference? Do you expect them to participate from the start of the conference, or do you leave this to the parties to decide?

A. The question of the Palestinians has at least three aspects. One is, who speaks for the Palestinians in general? Secondly, what is their relationship at the conference to Jordan, to Israel, and the other parties? And thirdly, what are the concrete terms that are going to be advanced for the solution of the Palestinian question?

Our view is, with respect to the participation of the Palestinians and the role they might play at the conference, that this would best be settled by the parties at the conference. With respect to the specific terms, this of course also will have to be discussed at the conference. Some relationship will have to be found between the rights of Palestinians, to which the United States has made reference in several international documents, and the limitations of absorption in the mandated territory of Palestine.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, yesterday we were told in response to a question at the daily briefing that you might, in the end, find mutually acceptable the notion that the ultimate guarantee of a peace agreement might be a joint Soviet-American peacekeeping force in the Middle East, and making the distinction that—

A. He was running some sort of shop there that I didn't know about—

Q. But making the distinction that we are talking about a new arrangement after a peace agreement—not the

UNEF or UNTSO—is it possible that in the end, a joint US-Soviet peace force might occur to you to be a mutually—or acceptable from your side?

A. I don't want to undermine the self-confidence of Mr. Vest [George S. Vest, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Press Relations], but I haven't actually read the text of that particular remark.

We are prepared to consider the question of guarantees in its broadest sense, and we are willing to examine any idea that any of the parties might put forward as to what would constitute adequate guarantees.

We believe, however, that the issue of guarantees can be faced in detail only after a settlement has been reached, and on security arrangements between the parties; that is to say, such issues as demilitarized zones, joint inspection teams, and so forth, that might constitute the body of the security arrangements between the parties. Then we will know what it is that outside countries should guarantee.

Now the question of U.S. and Soviet guarantees, or anybody else's guarantee, has two aspects: one, the formal guarantee; second, the force that might be used to implement it.

We are prepared to consider—I said to “consider,” not necessarily to agree—either individual or joint guarantees.

As to the permanent stationing of U.S. and Soviet forces in the Middle East, we are somewhat dubious. We do not rule it out totally, but we are reluctant to get into this, and our position there was expressed at the Security Council discussions that formed the UNEF. But I think we can make a more reasonable decision on the nature of guarantees after the other elements of the settlement are in place.

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Communiqué issued at the conclusion of the North Atlantic Council ministerial meeting (excerpts)²⁶⁵

Brussels, December 11, 1973

1. The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial session in Brussels on 10th and 11th December, 1973.

²⁶⁵ Excerpted from the English text, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIX, 1801 (December 31, 1973), p. 785.

5. Ministers reviewed events in the Middle East. They welcomed the establishment of a UN Emergency Force and noted with satisfaction progress towards the holding of a peace conference. They reaffirmed the support of all their Governments for the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council and they expressed their over-riding concern to see a just and lasting settlement in the Middle East. Ministers further took note of the report by the Council in permanent session on the situation in the Mediterranean prepared on their instructions given at their previous meeting. Ministers invited the Council in permanent session to continue to keep the situation under review and to report further.

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Statement by US Secretary of State Kissinger discussing the relationship between the Middle East war and the oil crisis²⁶⁶

London, December 12, 1973

The Middle East crisis illustrates the importance of distinguishing the long-range from the ephemeral. The differences of recent months resulted not so much from lack of consultation as from a different perception of three key issues: Was the war primarily a local conflict, or did it have wider significance? Has the energy crisis been caused primarily by the war, or does it have deeper causes? Can our common energy crisis be solved by anything but collective action?

As for the nature of the Middle East conflict, it is fair to state—as many Europeans including your Foreign Secretary have—that the United States did not do all that it might have done before the war to promote a permanent settlement in the Middle East. Once the war began, the United States demonstrated great restraint until the Soviet effort reached the point of massive intervention. Once that happened, it became a question of whether the West would retain any influence to help shape the political future of an

area upon which Europe is even more vitally dependent than the United States. We involved ourselves in a resupply effort not to take sides in the conflict but to protect the possibility of pursuing after the war the objective of a just, permanent settlement which some of our allies have urged on us ever since 1967.

At the same time, we must bear in mind the deeper causes of the energy crisis: It is not simply a product of the Arab-Israeli war; it is the inevitable consequence of the explosive growth of worldwide demand out-running the incentives for supply. The Middle East war made a chronic crisis acute, but a crisis was coming in any event. Even when prewar production levels are resumed, the problem of matching the level of oil that the world produces to the level which it consumes will remain.

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Communiqué issued by the EEC at the conclusion of its summit meeting (excerpts)²⁶⁷

Copenhagen, December 15, 1973

The heads of state and government and the foreign ministers of the member states of the European Economic Community met in Copenhagen December 14 and 15, 1973 at the invitation of the Prime Minister of Denmark. The president of the Commission participated actively in their work on matters concerning the Communities. They agreed on the following:

6. The heads of state and government welcome the convening of a peace conference in Geneva and appeal to the participants to spare no effort to achieve in the near future a just and durable settlement [in the Middle East]. The nine governments are prepared to offer their good offices in the search for peace and in guaranteeing a settlement. They will inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations accordingly.

²⁶⁶ Excerpted from the text of an address made before the Pilgrim Society, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIX, 1801 (December 31, 1973), pp. 780–781.

²⁶⁷ Excerpted and translated from the German text, *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamts der Bundesregierung* (Bonn), no. 165 (December 18, 1973), pp. 1649, 1650; compared with the French text, *Politique étrangère de la France: Textes et documents*, 2nd semester 1973 (Paris: La documentation française, 1974), pp. 254, 255.

The heads of state and government reaffirm the common attitude of their governments towards the Middle East question as expressed in the declaration of November 6, 1973.²⁶⁸ Recent events have strengthened their conviction that the security of all states in the region, be it Israel or her Arab neighbours, depends on the full implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 in all its parts taking into account also the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.

The heads of state and government are convinced that the requirements of sovereignty and security can be met by the conclusion of peace treaties which include among their stipulations arrangements for international guarantees and the establishment of demilitarized zones.

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Radio interview statements by Israel Deputy Prime Minister Allon discussing Israel's aims at the Geneva peace conference²⁶⁹

December 17, 1973

Q. Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Alon, on what principles, in your opinion, should the negotiations in Geneva be based?

A. Considerable time in the negotiations will apparently have to be devoted to realization of a separation of forces in order to ensure that the cease-fire will be stable and will not be violated during the course of the negotiations. To our regret, we could not reach agreement on this matter in the Kilometre 101 talks—although I attached great importance to them—and, therefore, we will have to do that in Geneva.

Then we are interested in having meetings with each neighbouring country separately, because there are different problems with each state. Apart from the joint ceremonial opening session in which all the states can take part—if the Syrians have submitted a list of Israeli prisoners to the International Red Cross by then—it is necessary to hold the concrete discussions with each state separately, perhaps by setting up subcommittees.

Furthermore, this is the first opportunity for 25 years to clarify with our neighbours not only the problem of the peace map—which, in my view, should perhaps be the last topic in the negotiations, or at least not the first or one of the first topics—but also the nature of peace.

Today peace is composed of a long list of conditions. For example, it is almost certain that demilitarized zones will constitute part of the effective security arrangements. What will be the status of a demilitarized zone? How will its credibility be guaranteed? What will be the status of the forces that will supervise violations of the demilitarization, and so forth. We shall want to ensure freedom of navigation in international waterways that are relatively far from the boundaries of Israel.

What will be the nature of the relations that will prevail between us and the Arab states after the signing of the peace agreement? In other words, how shall we ensure that peace will lead to true normalization and not just to the signing of a treaty.

Q. Have operational plans been prepared in these directions?

A. All these matters are now in the advanced stages of study by teams set up by the Ministries concerned. Consultations are also being held with elements outside the Government which display an interest in these matters. I have no doubt that when we get to the negotiating table we shall have proposals of our own to make. We shall, of course, have to respond to their proposals. We shall be prepared in such a way that, if their proposals are different from ours, they will get speedy study and the necessary position will be taken.

Q. Are we inclined today towards compromises which perhaps we were not inclined towards before the Yom Kippur war?

A. No, I would not say so, because the Israeli Government, as I have known it for several years, was prepared for territorial compromise within the context of a peace treaty long before the Yom Kippur war. But, so far at least, the idea of territorial compromise has been rejected by the Arab side. That is to say, it has not been the Israeli Government but the Arab Governments which have maintained an inflexible attitude of “not one inch” for all this time.

Regrettably, there have been Israeli circles,

²⁶⁸ Doc. 184 above.

²⁶⁹ Broadcast on Israel radio in Hebrew; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4480/A/2-3; reprinted by permission.

including very important ones that are well represented in the Knesset, which have adopted a policy of "not one inch", and although they have not been in the Government in recent years they have in this way made the Arab's political struggle easier. However, the Government has been prepared for a compromise which will ensure defensible borders for Israel and effective security arrangements within the framework of a peace treaty and which will, to a great extent, also respond to the interests of the Arabs.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Egypt of Deputy Prime Minister Miki of Japan (excerpt)²⁷⁰

Cairo, December 18, 1973

1. His Excellency Takeo Miki, Deputy Prime Minister, Special Envoy of the Government of Japan, visited Cairo, the Arab Republic of Egypt, from December 14 to 18, 1973, during which he was received in audience by His Excellency Anwar el-Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt. His Excellency Takeo Miki, Deputy Prime Minister, Special Envoy of the Government of Japan, had discussions with His Excellency Dr. Abdel Kader Hatem, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Information. Through these discussions, the Japanese and Egyptian sides agreed that a further promotion of the friendly relations between the two countries will be of a great benefit for their peoples.

2. With respect to the Middle East problem, the Egyptian side stated the position of the Government of Egypt that the nucleus of the solution are the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the territories occupied in the 1967 war and the restoration of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and expressed a strong determination towards settling the problem.

Mr. Miki, Special Envoy, explained that the inadmissibility of acquisition and occupation of any territory by use of force is a basic principle of the foreign policy of the Government of Japan and that he feels responsible for the fact that Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967 adopted

at the time when Mr. Miki was the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan has not been as yet implemented. Mr. Miki stated that to bring about a just and lasting peace in the Middle East Israeli forces should withdraw from all the territories occupied in the 1967 war as well as that the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people should be recognized and respected in accordance with the resolutions and the Charter of the United Nations. He stated that a peace and a prosperity of the world cannot be realized without a peace attained in the Middle East and expressed the determination of the Government of Japan to make what contributions it can towards that end.

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Letter from the governments of the USSR and the USA to UN Secretary-General Waldheim informing him of arrangements for a Middle East peace conference²⁷¹

December 18, 1973

Dear Mr. Secretary-General:

On October 22, 1973, the Security Council adopted resolution 338 (1973), jointly sponsored by the Soviet Union and the United States, which calls for negotiations to start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices, aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.²⁷² The Soviet Union and the United States have now been informed by the parties concerned of their readiness to participate in the Peace Conference which will begin in Geneva on December 21. The Conference should be convened under the auspices of the United Nations.

The parties have agreed that the Conference should be under the co-chairmanship of the Soviet Union and the United States. The parties have also agreed that the question of other participants from the Middle East area will be discussed during the first stage of the Conference.

It is our hope that you will find it possible to

²⁷¹ Text as published in UN doc. S/11161, which includes the English text of the letter from Secretary of State Kissinger and an English translation of the Russian text of the Soviet letter. The text used here is that of Kissinger's letter; the minor variations in the English version of the Soviet letter are attributable to the process of translation.

²⁷² Doc. 34 above.

²⁷⁰ Excerpted from the English text supplied, on request, by the Japanese embassy, Beirut.

participate in the opening phase of the Conference at which it is expected that the Governments concerned will be represented by their respective Foreign Ministers and, later, by their specially appointed representatives with ambassadorial rank. We also hope that you can make available a representative who would keep you fully informed as the Conference proceeds. Finally, we would also appreciate it if the United Nations could make appropriate arrangements for the necessary conference facilities.

If as we hope you find it possible to participate, as co-chairmen the Soviet Union and the United States would appreciate it if you would agree to serve as convener of the Conference and preside in the opening phase.

We request that you circulate this letter to members of the Security Council for their information. We believe it would be appropriate for the President of the Security Council to consult informally with the membership with a view to securing a favorable consensus of the Council.

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Speech by Foreign Minister Gromyko of the USSR made at the opening session of the Middle East Peace Conference²⁷³

Geneva, December 21, 1973

Mr. Secretary-General,
Esteemed colleagues,

The convocation of this Conference has been met with profound satisfaction in the Soviet Union. An initial but important step has been made along the road of a political solution to one of the most acute international problems. For a quarter of a century now it has been a constant source of tension not only in the Middle East, but far beyond its confines.

From time to time, as we all have witnessed, the tension in that part of the world overflows into open armed clashes. And each time it does, the destiny of universal peace is threatened. That is how it was six years ago. That is how it was quite recently, last October, when hostilities were marked by special fierceness, although they lasted for a comparatively short time.

There is hardly any doubt that new bloody armed clashes in the Middle East will continue, if the basic causes of tension there are not removed. Anyone who has at least some notion of the actual state of affairs there and who takes an objective view of the situation will inevitably arrive at this conclusion.

The intolerable situation in the Middle East, which has arisen because of Israel's policy, cannot be allowed to persist any longer. We should like to hope that the participants in the given Conference are aware of this, and that they have arrived here with resolute determination to lay a beginning to a just peaceful settlement.

Such a settlement has no other alternative which might be acceptable to the peoples of this area, to the peoples of the whole world. This is irrefutably proven by the entire course of events, recent developments included.

Now it is obvious to all that the Arab states will never put up with the loss of the lands taken from them in the summer of 1967. The Soviet Union approaches their position with full understanding and supports it. In their just struggle the Arab countries lean on the support of the overwhelming majority of the world's states. They have on their side the growing solidarity of the Arab world.

The gamble on keeping the occupied territories by force lacks any prospects. The need for a different, realistic approach to the problems of war and peace in the Middle East, of which the Soviet Union has always spoken, is becoming urgent.

The overwhelming majority of the world's states have quite definitely shown, in some form or other, that they do not want to put up with the perpetuation of a hotbed of tension in the Middle East. To disregard this means to oppose the clearly expressed will of the peoples.

A reliable settlement in the Middle East is facilitated by positive changes towards detente in the world at large, which were achieved in many parts of the globe over the past few years. A number of complex international problems, including those which seemed beyond solution, have been settled. Suffice it to recall the termination of the Vietnam war or the settlement of acute and vital postwar issues in Europe, and the important turn towards the normalization and improvement of relations between states with different social systems on the basis of peaceful

²⁷³ English text, *Moscow News*, supplement to no. 52 (December 29, 1973), pp. 7-9; for the speeches of other delegates see docs. 16, 217, 218, 342 and 343 elsewhere in this volume.

coexistence, through the conclusion of international treaties and agreements.

The initiative of the Soviet Union and the United States of America, which found its expression in the well-known resolutions of the UN Security Council, has served as a real indicator of the said positive changes as applied to the Middle East. In the light of all this the Middle East conflict, which continues even though hostilities have been stopped, seems an impermissible anomaly.

I should not like to repeat who is responsible for this. We know it and, we think, not we alone. Now that the matter of the settlement has moved out of a blind spot it is more important to determine what needs to be done to establish such a peace in the Middle East which would be durable and just for all the states and peoples of that area.

Above all, according to the Soviet Union's firm conviction, it is necessary to unswervingly implement a fundamental principle of international life—the principle of the impermissibility of acquiring territories through war.

Therein lies the key to the whole problem. If the participants in the Conference really want to deliver the Middle East from the threat of new conflicts, it is necessary to remove the prime cause of the crisis—the continued occupation of Arab lands, now in its seventh year. These lands must be returned in their entirety to their lawful owners. It is our conviction that as long as Israeli troops are stationed on these territories, there will be no peace in the Middle East.

Any document to be adopted by the present Conference must contain clear-cut and unambiguous obligations to withdraw Israeli troops from all territories occupied in 1967.

Without the sides reaching an agreement on this cardinal issue, we do not see any way of ensuring a settlement which would meet the interests of Arab states, Israel and the interests of international security. On the other hand, if an agreement is reached on the said basis, many other aspects of the settlement would be much simpler to solve.

At the same time, it is necessary to ensure the respect for, and recognition of, the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all the states of the Middle East, their right to live in peace. This applies to Israel as well. Our position is clear and consistent from beginning

to end—peace and security for all peoples of this area. Naturally, this presupposes that justice will be guaranteed as regards the Arab people of Palestine. Their lawful rights must be protected. It goes without saying that the Palestinian problem cannot be considered and solved without the participation of the representatives of the Arab people of Palestine.

It is well known that perhaps the main argument in favour of the occupation of another country's territory is the thesis that Israel is allegedly denied its right to existence. This argument holds no water whatsoever. This right was recognized for Israel by the very fact of the creation of this state by a decision of the United Nations. It was confirmed at that time by the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel by many states, including the Soviet Union. Israel's Arab neighbours declared their readiness to reach agreement on a settlement on the basis of the well-known resolutions of the Security Council, which clearly formulate the principle that all the states involved in the conflict have the right to existence.

However, this right cannot be unilateral. It is unthinkable without respect for the sovereign rights of other states and peoples. It is impermissible to exercise one's right to existence to the detriment of the interests of others. Only commitments which bear a mutual and equal character, and a readiness to strictly abide by them, can ensure the normal development of interstate relations in the Middle East.

This fully applies to the principle of the inviolability of borders. As in other parts of the world, reliable borders are, first of all, peaceful borders rendering assurance that they will not be violated. It is naive to think that the country's borders can be secured by seizing foreign territories. Only a legitimate border, recognized by those situated on either side, is really secure. In the concrete Middle East situation, these are the lines of demarcation which existed on June 4, 1967.

Such is the Soviet Union's stand on the most cardinal aspect of the Middle East settlement. It conforms completely to the spirit and letter of the decisions adopted by the United Nations since 1967. I refer primarily to the well-known Security Council Resolution No. 242 of November 22, 1967.

Firmly adhering to the line of a radical improvement of the situation in the Middle East, the Soviet Union has not swayed from this position, and does not intend to do so.

We are certain that the above-mentioned resolution of the Security Council, adopted in 1967, preserves all its significance to this day as a realistic and well-grounded approach to problems existing in the Middle East and to their settlement.

This conviction is not only ours. It is shared by practically all the member states of the United Nations which have repeatedly expressed their will to this effect, both in and outside the United Nations.

Of course, it is one thing to recognize resolutions in words. It is something else to fulfil their propositions. If this had been done, the problem of a Middle East settlement would long ago have been removed from the agenda. However, the smell of gunpowder and burning still hangs heavy over Sinai and the Golan Heights, and the pain of bloody wounds does not abate in the hearts of thousands of Arabs, and Israelis too.

The practical task of the Conference lies in working out a concrete and realistic programme for implementing the said resolution of the Security Council in all its parts.

This is made obligatory directly by the Security Council resolutions adopted during recent military operations, in which the cease-fire in the Middle East was connected with the beginning of immediate negotiations aimed at a reliable solution of the Middle East problem.

The way we see it, the agreements the interested parties will reach regarding such a settlement will be sealed at the Conference in corresponding documents. The important thing is that these be weighty documents, and that they have a character binding on all their signatories. In other words, they must have the force of law.

This would lay a firm foundation for peaceful coexistence and good-neighbourly relations between all states and peoples of the Middle East.

Commitments undertaken by the sides in accordance with international law would serve as the best guarantee of their mutual security which can be achieved only on the basis of confidence and cooperation between states, and their strict observance of the agreements and treaties signed, not by the seizure of foreign territories.

Should the need arise to impart additional

backing to the agreements, the Soviet Union, taking due account of the wishes of the interested parties, is prepared to undertake the appropriate pledges together with other powers. Here the UN Security Council can have its weighty say. The main thing is that the political settlement in the Middle East be really durable.

Certain other measures in the same direction are also feasible. What is meant, in particular, is the question of establishing demilitarized zones in certain sections, on the basis of reciprocity and of temporarily stationing international personnel in certain areas. It is understood that in each case all this must be specially agreed upon and, what is most essential, decided on a basis mutually acceptable to the interested parties.

It seems that given an agreement on the main problem, as we have already said, such questions, in our opinion, will not stand in the way of a general settlement.

The Middle East problem, with all its difficulties, is soluble. We have said so before, and we affirm this from the platform of the present Conference. But we have given a warning about another thing—the flames of war threaten to break loose in the Middle East at any time. A dangerous situation also exists there now. Further procrastination of a peaceful settlement is fraught with great danger. We hope that all those present in this hall take all this into full account.

The Conference participants bear a great responsibility, and their joint efforts can and must bring reliable peace to the peoples of the Middle East.

Our country has set itself the task of facilitating the liquidation of the Middle East hotbed of tension as one of our priorities. We have been, and still are, supporting the Arab peoples in their efforts towards a durable and just peace in the Middle East. At the given Conference we shall promote the necessary agreements in every way, so that such peace should become reality.

The Soviet Union bears no malice against the state of Israel as such. The policy of annexation, trampling upon the norms of international law and UN decisions—this is what evoked the condemnation of Israel by all, our country included. Israel has even come to this Conference without fulfilling Security Council resolutions 338 and 339.²⁷⁴ The situation may change when

²⁷⁴ Docs. 34 and 35 above.

Israel confirms by deeds its readiness for an honest and mutually acceptable settlement.

Now the urgent task of prime importance is to solve the problem of effectively disengaging the troops.

The establishment of genuine peace meets the vital interests of all Middle East states. Employing the advantages of peaceful life, the peoples could rechannel their efforts from antagonism, a mutual waste of human and material energy into the solution of the problems of social and economic progress.

This would benefit many other states and peoples which, because of certain consequences, suffer from the negative consequences of the Middle East conflict. These are having a telling effect now, and most tangibly so, on both the countries situated in the immediate proximity of the Middle East and on those many thousands of kilometres away. International economic co-operation, trade and navigation—if we take only these aspects of the matter—would find themselves in much more favourable conditions.

One can easily imagine how much healthier the entire international atmosphere would become, and how far ahead the process of detente would advance as a result of liquidating the Middle East conflict. This would have a most beneficial effect on the situation throughout the Mediterranean, Europe, Asia and elsewhere in the world.

The peoples of the Middle East, and all over the world, for that matter, expect practical measures aimed at a firm peaceful settlement in that part of the world. The Soviet Union will do its utmost so that the work of the Conference may proceed precisely in this direction, and so that it may be of a businesslike and constructive character.

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Speech by US Secretary of State Kissinger made at the opening session of the Middle East Peace Conference²⁷⁵

Geneva, December 21, 1973

Mr. Secretary General, distinguished Foreign Ministers, delegates: As one of the co-chairmen

of this conference, let me express my gratitude to the United Nations and to you personally for providing such excellent facilities for the conference, for convening it, and for doing us all the honor of presiding at this historic moment.

We are convened here at a moment of historic opportunity for the cause of peace in the Middle East and for the cause of peace in the world. For the first time in a generation the peoples of the Middle East are sitting together to turn their talents to the challenge of a lasting peace.

All of us must have the wisdom to grasp this moment—to break the shackles of the past and to create at last a new hope for the future.

Two months ago what we now refer to as the fourth Arab-Israeli war was coming to an end. Today there is the respite of an imperfect cease-fire, but the shadow of war still hangs over the Middle East. Either we begin today the process of correcting the conditions which produced that conflict, or we doom untold tens of thousands to travail, sorrow, and further inconclusive bloodshed.

When the history of our era is written, it will speak not of a series of Arab-Israeli wars but of one war broken by periods of uneasy armistices and temporary cease-fires. That war has already lasted 25 years. Whether future histories will call this the era of the 25-year Arab-Israeli war, or the 30-year war, or the 50-year war, rests in large measure in our hands. And above all, it rests in the hands of the Israeli and Arab governments, not only those whose distinguished representatives are seated around this table but also those who are absent and who we all hope will join us soon.

We are challenged by emotions so deeply felt —by causes so passionately believed and pursued—that the tragic march from cataclysm to cataclysm, each more costly and indecisive than the last, sometimes seems preordained. Yet our presence here today, in itself a momentous accomplishment, is a symbol of rejection of this fatalistic view. Respect for the forces of history does not mean blind submission to those forces.

There is an Arab saying, *Ellī Fat Mat*, which means that the past is dead. Let us resolve here today that we will overcome the legacy of hatred and suffering. Let us overcome old myths with new hope. Let us make the Middle East worthy of the messages of hope and reconciliation that have been carried forward from its stark soil by three great religions.

²⁷⁵ *Department of State Bulletin*, LXX, 1803 (January 14, 1974), pp. 21–24; for the speeches of other delegates see docs. 16, 216, 218, 342 and 343 elsewhere in this volume.

Today there is hope for the future, for the conflict is no longer looked upon entirely in terms of irreconcilable absolutes. The passionate ideologies of the past have, in part at least, been replaced by a recognition that all the peoples concerned have earned, by their sacrifice, a long period of peace.

From two recent trips through the Middle East I have the impression that people on both sides have had enough of bloodshed. No further proof of heroism is necessary; no military point remains to be made. The Middle East—so often the source of mankind's inspiration—is challenged to another act of hope and reconciliation, significant not only for its own peoples but for all mankind.

What does each side seek? Both answer with a single word: peace. But peace has of course a concrete meaning for each. One side seeks the recovery of sovereignty and the redress of grievances suffered by a displaced people. The other seeks security and recognition of its legitimacy as a nation. The common goal of peace must surely be broad enough to embrace all these aspirations.

For the United States, our objective is such a peace.

I cannot promise success, but I can promise dedication. I cannot guarantee a smooth journey toward our goal. I can assure you of an unswerving quest for justice.

The United States will make a determined and unflagging effort.

President Nixon has sent me here because for five years he has endeavored to build a new structure of international peace in which ties with old friends are strengthened and new and constructive relationships replace distrust and confrontation with adversaries.

But world peace remains tenuous and incomplete so long as the Middle East is in perpetual crisis. Its turmoil is a threat to the hopes of all of us in this room.

It is time to end it.

The question is not whether there must be peace. The question is: How do we achieve it? What can we do here to launch new beginnings?

First, this conference must speak with a clear and unequivocal voice: The cease-fire called for by the Security Council must be scrupulously adhered to by all concerned. Prior to last October, the United States did all it could to prevent a new outbreak of fighting. But we failed because

frustration could no longer be contained.

After the fighting began, we, in concert with the Soviet Union, helped bring an end to the hostilities by sponsoring a number of resolutions in the Security Council. The six-point agreement of November 11 consolidated the cease-fire. It helped create the minimal conditions necessary for carrying forward our efforts here. All these resolutions and agreements must be strictly implemented.

But regardless of these steps, we recognize that the cease-fire remains fragile and tentative. The United States is concerned over the evidence of increased military preparedness in recent days. A renewal of hostilities would be both foolhardy and dangerous. We urge all concerned to refrain from the use of force and to give our efforts here the chance they deserve.

Second, we must understand what can realistically be accomplished at any given moment.

The separation of military forces is certainly the most immediate problem. Disengagement of military forces would help to reduce the danger of a new military outbreak; it would begin the process of building confidence between the two sides.

Based on intensive consultations with the leaders of the Middle East, including many in this room today, I believe that the first work of this conference should be to achieve early agreement on the separation of military forces and that such an agreement is possible.

Serious discussions have already taken place between the military representatives of Egypt and Israel at kilometer 101. It is important to build promptly on the progress achieved there. And on the Jordanian and Syrian fronts, a comparable base for the lessening of tensions and the negotiation of further steps toward peace must be found. Progress toward peace should include all the parties concerned.

Third, the disengagement of forces is an essential first step—a consolidation of the cease-fire and a bridge to the "peaceful and accepted settlement" called for in Security Council Resolution 242. Our final objective is the implementation in all its parts of Resolution 242. This goal has the full support of the United States.

Peace must bring a new relationship among the nations of the Middle East—a relationship that will not only put an end to the state of war

which has persisted for the last quarter of a century but will also permit the peoples of the Middle East to live together in harmony and safety. It must replace the reality of mistrust with a new reality of promise and hope. It must include concrete measures that make war less likely.

A peace agreement must include these elements, among others: withdrawals, recognized frontiers, security arrangements, guarantees, a settlement of the legitimate interests of the Palestinians, and a recognition that Jerusalem contains places considered holy by three great religions.

Peace will require that we relate the imperative of withdrawals to the necessities of security, the requirement of guarantees to the sovereignty of the parties, the hopes of the displaced to the realities now existing.

Fourth, we believe there must be realistic negotiations between the parties. Resolution 338 provides just such a process. It is on the parties that the primary responsibility rests. The United States intends to help facilitate these talks in every feasible way, to encourage moderation and the spirit of accommodation. We are prepared to make concrete suggestions to either side if this will help promote practical progress. But we must always remember that while a Middle East settlement is in the interest of us all, it is the people of the area that must live with the results. It must, in the final analysis, be acceptable to them.

Peace, in short, cannot last unless it rests on the consent of the parties concerned. The wisest of realists are those who understand the power of a moral consensus. There is a measure of safety in power to prevent aggression, but there is greater security still in arrangements considered so just that no one wishes to overthrow them.

As we open this conference we take a momentous step. We are challenging a history of missed opportunities, of mutual fear and bottomless distrust. Our backdrop is a war that has brought anguish and pain, death and destruction; a war that has been costly to both sides; that has brought neither victory nor defeat; that reflected the failure of all our past efforts at peaceful solutions.

Mr. Secretary General, fellow delegates, President Nixon has sent me here with the purpose of affirming America's commitment to a just and lasting peace.

We do not embark on this task with false expecta-

tions. We do not pretend that there are easy answers. A problem that has defied solution for a generation does not yield to simple remedies.

In all efforts for peace the overriding problem is to relate the sense of individual justice to the common good. The great tragedies of history occur not when right confronts wrong, but when two rights face each other.

The problems of the Middle East today have such a character. There is justice on all sides, but there is a greater justice still in finding a truth which merges all aspirations in the realization of a common humanity. It was a Jewish sage who, speaking for all mankind, expressed this problem well: "If I am not for myself who is for me, but if I am for myself alone who am I?"

Fellow delegates, in the months ahead we will examine many problems. We will discuss many expedients. We will know success—and I daresay we shall experience deadlock and despair.

But let us always keep in mind our final goal:

We can exhaust ourselves in maneuvers, or we can remember that this is the first real chance for peace the Middle East has had in three decades.

We can concentrate on our resentments, or we can be motivated by the consciousness that this opportunity, once past, will not return.

We can emphasize the very real causes of distrust, or we can remember that if we succeed our children will thank us for what they have been spared.

We can make propaganda, or we can try to make progress.

The American attitude is clear. We know we are starting on a journey whose outcome is uncertain and whose progress will be painful. We are conscious that we need wisdom and patience and good will. But we know, too, that the agony of three decades must be overcome and that somehow we have to muster the insight and courage to put an end to the conflict between peoples who have so often ennobled mankind.

So we are here to spare no effort in the quest of a lasting peace in the Middle East, a task which is as worthy as it may be agonizing. In the words of the poet:

Pain that cannot forget
falls drop by drop
upon the heart
until in our despair
there comes wisdom

through the awful
grace of God.

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Speech by Foreign Minister Eban of Israel made at the opening of the Middle East Peace Conference²⁷⁶

Geneva, December 21, 1973

Mr. Secretary-General, distinguished prime ministers, foreign ministers, gentlemen: There has never been an Arab-Israel peace conference before. Instead, there have been many wars for which the price has been paid in thousands of lives and in a [word indistinct] long agony. Today, at last, a new opportunity is born. No wonder that this conference opens under the burden of an immense expectation. Millions of people across the world are hoping that we shall somehow succeed to break the [word indistinct] of violence, to give a new purpose and direction to Middle Eastern history; and to bring a halt to the spreading contention of force. We have no way of knowing whether this opportunity will be fulfilled or wasted. The answer lies in the intentions of many governments and people in the Middle East and beyond. Israel, for its part, is resolved to seize the chance.

Now the agreed purpose of this conference is to negotiate peace between states whose relations until now have been scarred by a fierce enmity which has exploded again and again into war. The [word indistinct] launched against us by Egyptian and Syrian armies on 6 October was only the most recent link in a chain of violence extending with tragic results across the entire life of Israel as a modern state. To achieve its aims, therefore, this conference must reverse the whole tide of recent history. It is not going to be an easy task, nor at best can its fulfillment be [word indistinct].

We shall have to reconcile a sense of urgency with a capacity for patience. And yet, when all the calculations of prudence and caution and realism are duly made, our heart and imagination inspire a positive hope. We cannot ignore experience, but nor are we committed to its endless reiteration. So Israel comes to Geneva in the conviction that there is room for innovation,

initiative and choice.

We must be well aware of the particular complexity of our tasks. There is nothing in any degree similar to the Arab-Israel conflict. The crisis of the Middle East has many consequences, but only one cause: Israel's right to peace, security, sovereignty, commerce, international friendship, economic development, maritime freedom—indeed its very right to live—has been forcibly denied and constantly attacked. All the other elements of the conflict are consequences of this single cause. In no other dispute has there ever been such a total denial not only of the sovereign rights of a state, but even of its legitimate personality. And the emotional assault on Israel has gone much beyond the political context. It sweeps all human solidarity [words indistinct]. It is nourished by a copious literature with official endorsement that gives support to Nazi anti-Jewish myths. It nourished a conspiratorial theory of Jewish history. It explodes into the mutilation of Israeli soldiers in the field, the murder and torture of Israeli prisoners, and it has culminated most recently in Syria's sadistic refusal to carry out the Geneva Convention on the treatment of prisoners of war.

Out of this kind of ferocious hatred springs the kind of assault on human values that was (? climaxed) in Munich last year, in Rome airport 5 days ago and with (? every) regularity in other places—between, before and since. When athletes in the shelter of the Olympic flag are bound hand and foot and calmly shot in the head one by one, when passengers on the civil airlines are methodically blown and burnt to fragments, do we not come face to face with a mentality and ideology which produced the gas chambers and the gallows of Auschwitz?

It is from this (? perdition) that we must seek to break away. The prospect for this conference to succeed depends, in the last analysis, on whether the Arab nations and Israel want to reach an objective understanding of each other. Now we have no trouble or reluctance in understanding what Arab nationalism is all about. It is the moving story of a people's liberation from external servitude. It is an effort to build a bridge between past glories and future hopes. The success of the Arabs' national [word indistinct] is reflected in the existence of 19 states, of [word indistinct] 12 million square miles—square kilometers—in which a hundred million Arabs live, under their sovereign

²⁷⁶ Broadcast live by Israel radio; transcript supplied, on request, by the US Embassy, Beirut. For the speeches of other delegates see docs. 16, 216, 217, 342 and 343 elsewhere in this volume.

flags, in command of vast resources. The world, including Israel, has come to terms with Arab nationalism. The (? unfilled) question is whether Arab nationalism will frankly come to terms with the modest rights of another Middle Eastern nation to live securely in its original and only home.

For this to happen, it will, I suggest, be necessary for political and intellectual leaders in the Arab world to retract the fallacy that Israel is alien to the Middle East. Israel is not alien to the Middle East. It is an organic part of its texture and memory. Take Israel and all that has flowed from Israel out of Middle Eastern history, and you (? evacuate) that history of its central experiences. Israel's historic, religious, national roots in the land of Israel are a primary element of mankind's cultural history. Nothing, not even dispersion, exile, martyrdom, long separation, has ever disrupted this connection. Modern Israel is the resumption of a primary current in the flow of universal history. We ask our neighbors to believe that it is an authentic reality from which most of the other elements in [words indistinct] history take their birth. It is no more or less. Israel is no more or less than the Jewish people's resolve to be itself, and to live within its own frame of values, and thus to contribute its particular shape of mind to the universal human legacy.

That is what Israel is all about. And all this is much too deep and old and strong to be swept away. I ask Arab leaders and thinkers when they reflect on Israel to ponder a French historian's definition of nationhood. A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle, a sharing of common glory in the past, a commonweal in the present, that have done great things together, to want to do them again. These are the essential conditions of being a nation. When to all this memory you add the special tragedy of Jewish homelessness, you will understand why Israel faces the other Middle Eastern nations in perfect consciousness of its own legitimacy, why it will neither disappear nor apologize for itself, nor compromise its sovereign destiny, nor surrender its name and image, nor be swallowed up in something else. Within the framework of its own legitimate existence, it seeks reconciliation and peace. It seems to me that the effort to resist the essential truth about Israel as inseparable from Middle Eastern destiny lies at the root of this or other discourse. We ought to remember that the war against Israel is a

little older than the state of Israel itself. If you want to know the authentic answer to the question "how did it all begin" we could go to the library downstairs and look up the documents and find the report of the United Nations' partition commission of 20 April 1947.

I quote: "Arab opposition to the plan of the General Assembly has taken the form of organized efforts by strong Arab elements both inside and outside Palestine to prevent its implementation and thwart its objectives by threats and acts of violence. Powerful Arab interests both inside and outside Palestine are defying the resolution of the General Assembly and are engaged in [word indistinct] effort to [word indistinct] by force a settlement in [words indistinct]." That is the report.

Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, how little has changed since then. Can we not describe today's condition in these sentences without changing many words? The pendulum of military advantage swings this way and that. The tide of political struggle ebbs and flows. One thing alone has been constant: The volcanic atmosphere in which the Middle East lives, with only a few years between each eruption and each succeeding [word indistinct].

And so in the 26th year, as in the first, we woke up one morning to find Arab forces moving against us from south and north. Nobody believes that if those massive armored thrusts had gone forward as their commanders wished they would have come to a voluntary halt at any particular line. The distinguished Egyptian writer Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal has put it very clearly in *al-Ahram* on 19 October: "If the Arabs succeeded by force of arms in liberating the lands conquered in June 1967, what is to prevent them," says Mr. Haykal, "what is to prevent them in the next stage from liberating the whole of Palestine itself by force of arms?" What indeed? And so in October 1973, as in May 1948, the issue for Israel became no less than the survival of life and home, of national future, of personal destiny, of all that had been built and cherished and defended in common action for 25 years. And yet with all the similarity between 1948 and 1973, there has been one ominous transformation. All of us around these tables must be aware of it. Small Middle Eastern countries can now use arms in such quantities and of such destructive force as would have been available only to the greatest military powers

one generation ago. And therefore the Golan and Sinai are strewn with young bodies of Israelis and Arabs, and the burned-out (hulls) of armored vehicles and trucks. Two thousand tanks were destroyed in one single month of October. For the price of them, the countries of the Middle East could have had 20,000 tractors to bring fertility to their lands.

It may be that one thing has changed for the better, namely, that a mutual understanding of the sterility of war and the sterility of political deadlock has become sufficiently alive to bring all of us here to Geneva—Israel, Egypt and Jordan. We come with a mandate from our government to seek peace. We also have a common mandate from bereaved mothers and widows and orphans to bring 25 years of insanity to an end. [Words indistinct] peace conference would have been convened 6 years ago after the 1967 war, or indeed at any time since the 1948 war ended with the 1949 armistice agreement. A peace negotiation is what Israel has been proposing all the time. We could have had this moment without all those graves, without all that blood.

The question now, Mr. Chairman, is whether we can break out of past deadlocks into a new vision and a new hope. Will and a common interest in bringing the war to an end has already brought Egypt and Israel together in three agreements.

We have accepted a cease-fire in pursuance of the Security Council's resolution no. 338 of 22 October.²⁷⁷ On 11 November, we signed a six-point agreement for stabilizing the cease-fire.²⁷⁸ The Egyptian and Israeli senior officers who concluded that agreement met face to face and pursued their discourse in a civilized atmosphere at Kilometer 101 until 10 December. Now Egypt and Israel, together with Jordan, have agreed on the procedure and terms of reference for a peace conference.

These three decisions are the bridge across which we wish to make a transition from belligerency to peace. It is especially vital that the cease-fire continue to be observed by land and air and sea. I propose that Egypt and Israel pledge themselves at this conference to observe the cease-fire on the basis of reciprocity. I give that pledge

on Israel's behalf. Surely the maintenance of the cease-fire is an indispensable condition before any useful negotiations.

Beyond these transitional steps, we shall have a clear conception of our objective. Israel's aim at this conference is a peace treaty defining the terms of our coexistence in future years. Since the purpose of this conference is peace, we must have an understanding of what that term involves. Peace is not a mere cease-fire or armistice. Its meaning is not exhausted by the absence of war. It commits us all to positive obligations which neighboring states owe to each other by virtue of their proximity and their common membership in the international community.

Above all, a durable peace must create a new human reality. It does not rest on the cold formalism of documents alone. Nations of peace are not separated from each other by hermetically sealed boundaries drafted by international police forces. Indeed, the emphasis on the interposition of peace units in so much of the public debate on the Middle East is a confession that the peace that is envisaged is not authentic, or stable, or real. The utmost guarantee of a peace agreement lies in the creation of common, regional interests in such degree of intensity, in such multiplicity of interaction, in such entanglement of reciprocal advantage, in such mutual human accessibility as to put the possibility of future war beyond any rational contingency.

Let us all atone for 25 years of separation by working towards a cooperative relationship similar to that which European states created after centuries of conflict and war. It may take time to achieve that full objective. But does not every serious architect design a vision of the finished structure before anybody begins to face the prosaic difficulties of construction. At any rate, our vision must be one of sovereign states, the Arab states and Israel, each pursuing its national life within its own particularity, while cooperating with its neighbors in a broader regional devotion.

The peace treaties that we want to negotiate and conclude provide for a permanent elimination of all forms of hostility, boycott and blockade. The peace settlement must be the product of mutual agreements and not of external pressure, or of intimidation of one party by the other. It is only by freely accepting national and international responsibility for the peace that the signatory governments can insure its stability. Our peace

²⁷⁷ Doc. 34 above.

²⁷⁸ Doc. 188 above.

agreement should, of course, provide for the renunciation of the use of force in our relations with each other. They should contain specific and unequivocal recognition of each other's political independence, integrity and sovereignty.

They should prohibit any hostile action, including terrorist action, conducted from the territory of one of the signatories against the territory and population of the other. They should formally proclaim the term of the end of the conflict and the renunciation of all clashes or acts arising from belligerency. They should insure that all international conventions which each of the signatories have signed should be applicable to the other signatory, without any reservations entered by the Arab governments in the past into such international obligations.

Nations at peace with each other do not seek to impede the movements of each others' ships or aircraft or forbid them the normal civilities of air transit and maritime transit. Governments establishing peaceful relations after long years of conflict invariably define their intentions with respect to former relations with each other in the economic, commercial, cultural and political domains. With the establishment of peace it will become normal for Israel and the Arab states to take their places jointly in regional development organizations.

There is also need of attitudinal change. Bertrand Russell wrote that all wars originate in classrooms. Long years of conflict have given successive generations of our people a distorted vision of each other. The transition to peace should have its effect in educational systems expelling all the images and stereotypes which nations at war invoke both as causes and consequences of their hostility. The peace settlement should unlock the arteries of our regions' communications.

Now these aims may seem very remote and visionary today. But they do not go beyond what governments have usually accomplished in their transitions from hostility to peace. In fact, I have never come across any peace agreement which did not include everything that I have listed here. The three governments represented at this conference all accepted these aims when they endorsed Security Council Resolution 242, of which the main provisions are the establishment of a just and lasting peace, the mutual acknowledgement

by all states in the area of each other's sovereignty, integrity, independence and right to security. Another provision of that resolution is the elimination of all forms of belligerency, agreement on secure and recognized boundaries to which forces would be withdrawn in the context of a peace settlement.

Israel adheres to what it said on the subject in its communication to you, Mr. Secretary-General, in August 1970. We shall seek to know from the Arab participants in this conference whether they share our understanding of the obligations, rights and prohibitions involved in the peace agreement. If we can reach a harmonious understanding on this point, we shall still face many complexities, but there will be a stronger probability than otherwise of agreement and compromise. Of course, the peace treaty to be negotiated with each neighboring state should contain an agreement on boundaries. The decisive test for Israel will be the defensibility of its new boundaries against the contingency of attacks and blockades such as those threatened and carried out in 1967 and 1973.

The experience of October 1973 confirmed our view that the permanent boundaries must be negotiated with the utmost precision and care. If those armed thrusts had begun from Al-Arish, or northern Gaza, or from the Golan Heights itself, then the first assault might well have been the last.

Peacemakers do not reconstruct vulnerable, inflammatory situations, they try to correct them. Therefore they cannot be returned to the former armistice lines of 1949 and 1967 which proved to be inherently fragile and which served as a temptation to an aggressive design of encirclement and blockade, from which Israel broke out in 1967 after weeks of solitude and peril. But we are ready for a territorial compromise which would serve the legitimate interests of all signatory states. In this matter, as in others, there must be a basic readiness of all sides to make such concessions as do not threaten vital security interests.

Israel does not seek acceptance of any of its positions as a prior condition of negotiations, just as we should not be asked to seek acceptance of any prior conditions as a condition of negotiations. Having heard Arab positions and stated our own, we should at an appropriate stage seek to bring our policies into compromise. Security arrangements and demilitarized areas can supple-

ment the negotiated boundary agreement without, of course, replacing it.

But for Israel, the overriding theme in the peace discussions is that of security. It is true that we have again come out successfully from a military assault, this time with every conceivable advantage on the other side, advantage in numbers, in quantity of weapons, in initiative and total surprise. But despite this success, the mood in Israel is somber for coming up again and again against the predicament of human vulnerability. The losses sustained in 1973 compound the sacrifices of 1948 and 1956 and 1967, and all the attritions and infiltrations in between. And Israel always contemplates these losses against the cruel background of the European holocaust which took millions of kinsmen away to their deaths. Now there is no other national experience even remotely similar to this. Too much of Jewish history is occupied by the simple ambition of being Jewish and yet staying alive, and usually this reconciliation has not been achieved—the only people to suffer such massive annihilation of its human resources and the only sovereign state to live for 25 years without a single month of peace. How does anyone expect such a people and such a state not to claim respect for a particularly intense concern for individual and collective survival. The attainment of peace will make it possible to resolve the problem of refugees by cooperative regional action with international aid. We find it astonishing that states whose revenues from oil export surpass \$15 billion a year were not able to solve this problem in the spirit of kinship and human solidarity. In the very years when the Arab refugee problem was created by the assault on Israel in 1947 and 1948, 700,00 Jewish refugees from Arab and Moslem lands and from the debris of Hitler's Europe were received by Israel and integrated in full citizenship and economic dignity.

There have been other such solutions in Europe, in the Indian Subcontinent, in Africa. The Arab refugee problem is not basically intractable. It has been perpetuated by a conscious decision to perpetuate it. But surely a peace settlement will remove any political incentive which has prevented a solution in the past. At the appropriate stages Israel will define its contribution to an international and regional effort for refugee resettlement. We shall propose compensation for abandoned lands in the context of a general discussion

on property abandoned by those who have left countries in the Middle East to seek a new life.

I presume there are negotiations with Jordan. I believe that it will define the agreed boundaries and other conditions of coexistence between two states occupying the original area of the Palestine mandate, Israel and the neighboring Arab states. The specific identity of the Palestinian and Jordanian Arabs will be able to find expression in the neighboring state, I hope in peaceful cooperation with Israel. We declare our opposition to any explosive fragmentation of the area between three states in the region between the desert and the sea where there are, after all, only two nations, two languages, two cultures and not three.

Today the bridges on the borders are open. The Arabs of west and east Jordan, indeed from all over the Arab world, move freely in and out of Israel, back and forth into every part of the region. In a peace settlement with agreed boundaries, we should try to preserve and develop these conditions of human contact and accessibility. Equal political sovereignties need not rule out a large measure of economic and social cooperation. We aspire to a community of sovereign states in the Middle East with open frontiers and regional institutions for cooperation.

We are deeply aware that Israel's capital, Jerusalem—now united forever—is the cradle of two other religious traditions, and the home of their holy places. Israel does not wish to exercise exclusive jurisdiction or unilateral responsibility in the holy places of Christendom and Islam, holy places which should be under the administration of those who hold them sacred. We would be willing to discuss ways of giving expression to this principle, as well as the working out of agreements on free access and pilgrimage.

Mr. Chairman, Israel will support a proposal to discuss a disengagement agreement with Egypt as first priority when the conference meets after the inaugural phase. On other possible agenda items, we shall give our views at a later stage. I shall only refer to some urgent issues of which the solution is compelling, both on humane grounds and in the interests of the conference itself.

The absence of Syria from the opening session is regrettable, but frankness and indignation compel me to state that Syria, in our judgement, has not yet qualified for partition [as heard] in a peace conference because it continues to inflict

a perverse injury on prisoners of war and the agonized and distraught families in contravention of the Geneva Convention. Now this violation of human decencies continues unchecked. Syria is not to be trusted in the honorable treatment of prisoners of war, and there are precedents much too harrowing for me to narrate. But we know that helpless POW's are shackled and then murdered in cold blood—we have reported 42 such cases to the International Commission of the Red Cross. We know that prisoners are tortured and maimed, beaten and dishonored. By withholding lists and refusing Red Cross visits, the Syrian Government creates wide circles of anguish and uncertainty among hundreds of families and thousands of citizens. Lists of Syrian prisoners have been presented by Israel to Red Cross committees, and Red Cross visits do proceed regularly. The obligations of states under the [word indistinct] Geneva Convention are unconditional and may not be made dependent on any other claim or request.

Nevertheless, Israel has agreed, simultaneously with prisoner release, to the return of thousands of Syrian civilians to the territory east of Golan captured in the October war, and even to handing over to the United Nations Emergency Force of two positions occupied between October the 22nd and the 24th.

We would also emphasize the urgency for Egyptian action in reply to our queries on additional missing prisoners and on the repatriation of the bodies of soldiers fallen in action.

In general, whenever we talk of this issue at Christmas, surely the time has come to banish the savageness which has marked the treatment of Israelis in Arab hands and to adapt the life of our region to the principles of international civility. We want to substitute the idea of international civility for the present atmosphere of Middle Eastern life today. Too much of international life is lived under the hijackers' philosophy. The slogan of the hijacker is "do what I tell you, or else." This is said by terrorists to pilots of aircraft, by some oil-producing states to European and other governments, by some Arab governments to states whose relations with Israel they wish to weaken, by boycott committees to commercial companies. Now this slogan—do what I tell you, or else—is not the best prescription for Middle Eastern stability. It gets some immediate results,

but it is bound in the last resort to encounter resistance. What we seek is a transformation of all the concepts and attitudes which govern international relations in our region.

For many years, Mr. Chairman, the Middle Eastern conflict has been a constant theme of public debate. The eyes of the world are upon this meeting, but I do hope that in the next stages of its work the conference will develop compact, [word indistinct] procedures to discuss each component of the dispute. We do not rule out agreed stages of progress toward the final settlement, but the conference should not be satisfied as an ultimate result with anything less than a permanent, overall peace.

The distinction between a public debate in the General Assembly and the peace conference is crucial. In the case of a public debate, there is an attempt to solve problems by adjudication, in a peace conference, by agreement. We hope for restraint by governments outside the area who may think that they know the exact point of balance at which the interests of the parties should be reconciled. Our free agreement is essential, because in the last resort nobody outside Israel is called upon or is ever likely to risk any life or blood for Israel's survival. Whenever there is that kind of sacrifice, we shall have to face it alone. We ask for our judgement of what the basic, minimal conditions for Israel's security and survival are. We intend to preserve that domain of ultimate decision with traditional tenacity. This issue is especially sensitive. We have accepted the joint initiative of both co-chairman as a reflection of the real balance of forces at work. We understood from Foreign Minister Gromyko's speech that, in his view, Israel's legitimacy and right for security are not under any doubt. As we read the Algiers declaration,²⁷⁹ however, that declaration puts both of those things in doubt. The word peace does not exist in their declaration [word indistinct] nor does the word Israel, and there is anonymous reference to the enemy. That is why the Algiers declaration is really not the sort of declaration that can guide a peace conference.

But while we have accepted the joint initiative of both co-Chairmen, we cannot ignore that one of them identifies himself exclusively with our adversaries [word indistinct] no balancing necessity to concern itself with Israel's welfare or destiny.

²⁷⁹ Doc. 333 below.

And this has been the case in the arms race as well. There is, therefore, no symmetry here, even if the imbalance is less marked than in the broader, multilateral arena. The true remedy then is to allow maximum opportunity for the parties themselves to achieve dialogue and to come to agreed solutions.

In conclusion, Mr. Secretary-General, while the components of the problem are complex, everything comes back in simple terms to the intentions that we bring with us to this table. Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and in the final resort, all of these should be participants are relatively new as sovereign states. But Arabs and Jews are very old as people. Both of us have always had the gift of memory. Neither of us has ever been very good at forgetting. In this generation we have been made more aware of our divisions than of our common humanity. But there are some ideas and recollections that are common to us both. There is one cave at Makhpela in which our common ancestors, the patriarchs and the matriarchs, are laid to rest. Our common ancestor, Abraham, shocked all his contemporaries by breaking the idols and suggesting something new. That is what we now have to do—to smash the idolatries of war and hate and suspicion, to break the adoration that men give to their traditional attitudes, and above all to their traditional slogans, to strike out toward their horizons, uncertain, but better than the terrible certainties that face us if we stay behind.

Our holy book puts it simply: [Hebrew omitted] “Nations shall not lift the sword against nations, nor shall they learn any war.”²⁸⁰ But is put with equal simplicity in your holy book: “And if they incline to peace, do thou incline to it; and put thy trust in God.”²⁸¹ [passage from Koran given in Arabic only]

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Press conference statements by US Secretary of State Kissinger expressing impatience with the continuing oil embargo of the US and discussing aspects of the current state of negotiations²⁸²

Washington, December 27, 1973

Q. Mr. Secretary, now that the Arab states have lifted their oil embargo against Europe and Japan²⁸³ and have restored some of the production cutbacks, when do you expect them to start supplying the United States with oil again?

A. I don't want to speculate on when the Arab countries will restore—will lift the boycott against the United States. As I have pointed out at several previous press conferences, the United States could understand certain actions by Arab countries at a time when the United States seemed to be—was supplying military equipment to one of the sides in a war. Now that the United States has publicly declared its commitment to bring about a just settlement, now that much of the progress that has been made toward a settlement can be traced to American actions, discriminatory measures against the United States become increasingly difficult to understand.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how much knowledge did you have, either before you left Washington or after you left Saudi Arabia, that the Arab nations were about to make a change in their oil-export policy to take Europe and Japan off the hook?

A. Well, I had no knowledge of this before I left Washington. And I had no precise knowledge of specific measures when I left Saudi Arabia, except that I knew that certain measures were under consideration.

Now, in analyzing the supply of oil, one has to consider that there are two problems involved. One is the problem of the embargo; the second is the problem of production. Lifting the embargo without increasing the production does not help a great deal, because it means that more nations would compete for an inadequate supply. So both of these measures have to go hand in hand. And on the whole, we consider it a positive step that production has been increased.

²⁸⁰ *Old Testament*, Isaiah, 2:4.

²⁸¹ *Koran*, 8:61.

²⁸² Excerpted from the transcript, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXX, 1804 (January 21, 1974), pp. 51–52, 55–56.

²⁸³ Docs. 326 and 345 below.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you seem to be expressing an increasing sense of irritation with the fact that Saudi Arabia, principally, has not lifted the oil embargo against the United States, though it has taken these other actions toward Europe and Japan. Was there some action that you expected to happen by now from the Saudi Arabians that did not? Do you link a possible action to the disengagement talks in Geneva?

A. I do not express an increasing sense of irritation. I am expressing the view that the United States has consistently taken and which I have expressed at every previous press conference; namely, that discriminatory action against the United States becomes increasingly inappropriate when the United States is the principal country engaging itself in the search for a just and durable peace in the Middle East. This is a position that has been taken by this administration from the beginning. It is not said in any spirit of irritation, but it is a statement of reality.

I do not want to say what I expected. But the view that I have expressed here is not caused by any disappointment about what I had been led to believe.

Q. Is there a link as well with the disengagement talks?

A. The U.S. position with respect to the oil embargo has been that we cannot discuss specific peace terms in relation to the lifting of the oil embargo, that we can express our commitment to bring about a just and durable peace—or to help bring it about—based on Security Council Resolution 242. But as I have explained many times before, we cannot bargain individually with oil-producing countries and then enter into a peace conference in which the parties have to negotiate this process all over again.

Q. First of all, what can you tell us of the fate of the Israeli POW's in Syria? And, secondly, what concessions do you expect Israel to make in the Geneva talks?

A. With respect to the Israeli prisoners in Syria, the United States has of course strongly supported their release and the provision at least of lists to the Israelis.

It is not correct—as has been pointed out—that we promised this as a condition of the cease-fire, though we did indicate that we had been given to understand that a major effort would be made after Israel had already accepted the cease-fire.

Nevertheless, the United States supports the fact that the lists should be produced and that the prisoners should be released as rapidly as possible.

Q. Are they still alive?

A. We have no independent information. We have no information that would indicate that they are not alive, but we have really no information of any kind—that is, of an independent source.

What was the second one?

Q. What do you expect the Israelis to do?

A. We are not approaching the problem of negotiations by drawing up a list of concessions that either side should make. What we have attempted to do is discover, as honestly as we could, on these trips through the Middle East, what the minimum requirements of each side were and then attempt to bring these into some relation to each other.

To the extent that the parties have talked to each other, as the Egyptians and Israelis have on kilometer 101, some rapprochement has developed out of the process of negotiation; but we are not starting with an abstract list of concessions which we are then asking any country to make.

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Section of the Annual Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross relating to the Middle East conflict in 1973²⁸⁴

Geneva, 1973

Middle East

CONFLICT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ARAB COUNTRIES

In 1973, the ICRC continued the action started during the 1967 war for prisoners of war, civilian internees and detainees, and other civilian victims of the Israel-Arab conflict. It maintained delegations in Israel and the occupied territories, in the Arab Republic of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic. In the field it had twenty-five delegates and a large locally recruited staff.

In October the resumption of hostilities compelled the ICRC to increase its activities considerably. These are described on pp. 10 ff.

²⁸⁴ Excerpted from International Committee of the Red Cross, *Annual Report 1973* (Geneva, 1974), pp. 5–15.

PRISONERS OF WAR

The ICRC continued to render assistance to prisoners of war in Israel, Egypt, Syria and Jordan.

ICRC delegates made regular visits, on average twice a month, to prisoners with whom they were able to talk privately. In Syria, however, they did not have access to places of detention despite the approaches made and the provisions of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949.

During the visits, the delegates provided prisoners with books, games, food and cigarettes. They inquired about their personal needs and transmitted family mail.

The ICRC reminded the governments concerned that, in accordance with the spirit and the letter of the Third Geneva Convention, all the prisoners of war—some of whom had been held for months or even years—must be repatriated.

On 2 April and 31 May, under Articles 109 and 110 of the Third Convention, the Israeli authorities allowed two Egyptian prisoners of war to be repatriated owing to their state of health.

The ICRC repeatedly approached the Egyptian Government regarding the repatriation of an Israeli prisoner of war who had not fully recovered from wounds received in action when captured in December 1969. He was finally repatriated in November.

The ICRC efforts since June 1972 for the repatriation of Syrian and Lebanese prisoners of war in Israel and Israeli prisoners of war in Syria were successful; on 3 June 1973 all were repatriated under the auspices of the ICRC.

Egyptian prisoners of war in Israel and Israeli prisoners of war in Egypt, who had been captured during the war of attrition on the banks of the Suez Canal, were repatriated in November 1973 under ICRC auspices.

ICRC ACTION IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

Despite further ICRC approaches, the Israeli authorities maintained their stand that the question of the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 in occupied territories should be left open, allowing the ICRC to exercise its activities on an empirical basis.

The ICRC therefore tried to ensure, from one case to another, as thorough an implementation as possible of the provisions of the Fourth Convention. Thus in various fields facilities granted by the Israeli authorities enabled the delegates, as

in the past, to aid the victims of the conflict.

In other cases, however, owing to Israel's stand, the ICRC failed to obtain satisfaction. The ICRC can only deplore a situation which deprives the victims of full protection and of their rights under the Fourth Convention.

Civilian detainees and internees

Civilian detainees from occupied territories and Arab countries: ICRC delegates continued to visit some 2,700 Arab civilian detainees in fourteen places of detention in Israel and occupied territories. Once a month they visited six places of detention in the occupied territories, and every other month eight places of detention in Israel. The visits were covered by reports which the ICRC sent to the Detaining Power and to the detainees' own government.

Although the Israeli authorities, owing to their stand in the matter of the applicability of the Fourth Convention, did not consider themselves bound by the provisions of that Convention, they nevertheless agreed to inform the ICRC of the names of the nationals of Arab countries or occupied territories who had been detained by the army or the police for eighteen days pending their investigation.

At the end of the period of interrogation, limited in principle to one month from the date of arrest, such prisoners—whether security or penal law cases, whether in preventive custody, charged or sentenced—were seen and interviewed by ICRC delegates without witnesses.

The delegates approached the Israeli authorities regarding various matters connected with detention conditions.

In the medical field, they supplied dentures, artificial limbs, spectacles, etc.

They recommended more workshops and study courses in places of detention, and continued to provide the requisite books (more than 4,000), copy-books and pens.

The Israeli authorities complied to a large extent with the ICRC's recommendations.

The ICRC delegates continued their monthly distribution of parcels to those detainees who had received no family visits. The number of parcels totalled approximately 6,000.

As it had done in the past, the ICRC made transport arrangements to enable families to visit prisons. It organized and to a large extent financed

more than 600 bus trips for about 25,000 relatives of detainees.

The ICRC delegates organized the repatriation of a number of civilian detainees to neighbouring Arab countries after making sure that they were, in fact, returning of their own free will.

Reuniting of families

The ICRC delegates continued their endeavours to reunite families separated by the 1967 war.

Arab Republic of Egypt and Gaza-Sinai: In 1973, eight family reuniting operations between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the occupied territories of Gaza and Sinai were organized under the auspices of the ICRC, enabling 338 persons from Egypt to join their families in the Gaza Strip and Sinai, and 397 from the Gaza Strip and Sinai to join their people in Egypt.

These operations also allowed 616 persons in the Gaza Strip and Sinai to visit their folk in Egypt and to return to Gaza and Sinai, and 612 in Egypt to go to the Gaza Strip and Sinai and to return to Egypt.

Lebanon and occupied territories: In 1973, the ICRC made arrangements for the transfer via Beirut of forty-four persons from the Gaza Strip who wanted to join their families in an Arab country not adjacent to Israel.

Syria and the Golan Heights: In 1973, three persons were able to join their families on the occupied Golan Heights, in the course of two operations at Quneitra (Ahmedia) conducted under the auspices of the ICRC.

Jordan and the West Bank: As in previous years, the ICRC's action was confined to endorsing, on humanitarian grounds, applications which the Israeli authorities had not approved under the normal procedure. During 1973, thirty-five families benefited under the "hardship" procedure. As the proportion of acceptances remained low (41.7 per cent), the ICRC made several appeals to the competent authorities in view of the precarious position of the families concerned.

Student travel

Arab Republic of Egypt and Gaza Strip: Students attending Egyptian universities and who had permission to join their families in Gaza during the holidays or on completing their studies crossed the canal under the auspices of the ICRC. From 16 to 31 July, in seven operations via El Qantara,

2,542 students returned to Gaza for the summer holidays. From 5 September to 3 October, five operations allowed 1,336 of these students to return to Egypt. The October hostilities prevented the departure of the others.

Expulsions

Although no expulsion measures had been reported to the ICRC since July 1972, the Israeli authorities on 10 December 1973 ordered the expulsion of eight persons from the West Bank. These persons talked to ICRC delegates in Jordan. The ICRC delegation in Israel approached the authorities with a view to securing permission for them to return to their families in occupied territory.

Destruction of houses

The plight of those victimized by the Israel army's destruction of houses in occupied territory was a matter of continued concern for the ICRC, which regards the practice as being contrary to the provisions of Articles 33 and 53 of the Fourth Convention.

A number of houses were destroyed in 1973, leaving many people homeless in the Gaza Strip and on the West Bank of the Jordan.

ICRC delegates approached the Israeli authorities in an effort to persuade them to refrain from such action; they also rendered aid to the victims.

RELIEF OPERATIONS FOR THE CIVILIAN POPULATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND FOR DISPLACED PERSONS IN ARAB COUNTRIES

Under its relief programmes, the ICRC shipped 2,000 tons of flour at the end of December 1972, and 30 tons of powdered milk in February 1973, for distribution to the needy population of the West Bank.

The supplies which the ICRC sent for displaced persons in Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon are shown on pages 59 and 60 of this report.

Jordan: With 20,000 Jordan dinars left over from the 1970 Jordan relief action, the ICRC delegation at Amman, in agreement with the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of the Interior, drew up a programme for the construction of an annex to the Jordan Rehabilitation Centre for amputees. Work started at the beginning of the year and ended in December.

LIBYAN AIRCRAFT BROUGHT DOWN IN THE SINAI

On 21 February 1973, a Libyan Airlines plane

was brought down in the Sinai by Israeli military aircraft.

At the official request of the Libyan Government, the ICRC delegation offered the Government of Israel its services as a neutral intermediary.

In the course of several operations over the Suez Canal, under the auspices of the ICRC, the mortal remains of 102 victims were transferred to the Arab Republic of Egypt. Objects found in the wreckage were also transferred to Egypt.

ICRC delegates and doctor-delegates made several visits to the survivors in the Beersheba and Jerusalem hospitals in Israel. Their report was transmitted simultaneously to the Libyan and Israeli authorities, and they transferred two survivors to Egypt and one to Jordan.

EVENTS IN LEBANON

The fighting which broke out on 2 May 1973 between Lebanese armed forces and Palestinian resistance movements created a situation which called for ICRC action to ensure protection and assistance for the victims. Two delegates therefore proceeded to Beirut to strengthen the ICRC delegation in Lebanon.

On 3 May, after contacting both parties, the ICRC delegates secured a two-hour ceasefire, which enabled them to enter a Palestinian refugee camp and evacuate the seriously wounded, in a convoy of Lebanese Red Cross and "Palestinian Red Crescent" ambulances. The operations were repeated on the following days.

On 18 May, the ICRC sent a doctor-delegate to Beirut to assess medical conditions in Palestinian refugee camps.

ICRC ACTIVITIES DURING AND FOLLOWING THE OCTOBER 1973 WAR

On the resumption of hostilities, the ICRC called upon the parties to the conflict to remember their obligations under the four Geneva Conventions of 1949.

The ICRC being already well represented on the spot, and active on behalf of the victims of the 1967 conflict, in occupied territory in particular, it was able immediately to extend its action to further victims.

Having noted and deplored the fact that the parties to the conflict sometimes failed to apply the Geneva Conventions completely, the ICRC solemnly reminded them on several occasions of their obligation to do so. That failure, whether

it was in the form of reprisals or in a resolve to link humanitarian problems with political and military considerations, deprived wounded men or prisoners of the basic protection and assistance afforded by the Conventions, which were not subject to any condition of reciprocity.

Besides its urgent appeals, owing to the gravity of the situation the ICRC was compelled to adopt various measures.

In view of the highly disturbing reports of fighting and its effect on the civilian population, the ICRC asked the parties, on 11 October 1973, to give effect to three articles of the draft Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions on the protection of victims of international armed conflicts, in anticipation of their adoption by the Diplomatic Conference in February 1974. Two governments—that of the Syrian Arab Republic on 12 October and that of Iraq on 16 October—made favourable response. In a reply dated 18 October, the Arab Republic of Egypt agreed provided there was reciprocity. Lastly, on 19 October, Israel sent a reply which the ICRC considered negative.

In view of the numerous allegations by all parties to the conflict of violations of the Conventions, the ICRC proposed that joint commissions of inquiry should be established—in accordance with Article 52 of the First Convention, Article 53 of the Second, Article 132 of the Third, and Article 149 of the Fourth—in order that the facts might be ascertained and further violations prevented. The proposal was published in a press release issued on 13 December. By 31 December no answer had been received. Despite serious difficulties, the ICRC did all it could to ensure that its action should extend to the largest possible number of victims.

Action for the wounded and the sick

As the armed forces on both sides sustained heavy casualties, the ICRC carried out several operations to afford relief.

On 26 October, it transported 200 litres of blood plasma and 200 litres of fresh blood to the field hospital of an Egyptian unit which had none. The operation was repeated on 28 October.

The ICRC subsequently supplied the Suez hospital several times with medicaments, oxygen cylinders, medical equipment, blankets and clothing.

In the course of three operations—which were

delayed owing to the obstacles raised by the Israeli authorities who linked the problem of the Suez wounded with the problem of Israeli prisoners of war in Egypt—the ICRC evacuated to Cairo more than 1,600 wounded and sick who could not be given care in the Suez hospital.

Action for prisoners of war

From the beginning of hostilities, the ICRC urged all parties to the conflict to send in prisoner-of-war capture cards within the shortest possible time, and to allow it to visit places of detention in accordance with the provisions laid down in the Third Convention.

On 10 October, preliminary lists of prisoners of war in Israeli hands reached the ICRC delegation. The delegates made thirteen visits to all able-bodied Arab prisoners of war held in three places of detention and to all the wounded receiving care in three different hospitals.

The first notifications regarding Israeli prisoners of war in Egyptian hands, including fifty-one wounded men visited by ICRC delegates, reached the ICRC between 15 October and 4 November 1973. The full list of Israeli prisoners of war held by the Egyptians was supplied on 14 November 1973. All prisoners were seen shortly before repatriation, which started on 15 November.

An agreement was, in fact, concluded between Israel and Egypt on 14 November for the repatriation of all prisoners of war on both sides. Under the auspices of the ICRC, repatriation operations by means of four aircraft provided by the Swiss Government were carried out from 15 to 22 November, enabling 8,300 Egyptian prisoners of war, including 440 wounded, and three Iraqi prisoners of war, to go to Egypt, and 241 Israeli prisoners of war, including forty-seven wounded, to return to Israel. Seventy-one flights were necessary for the transport of prisoners of war from Tel Aviv to Cairo and from Cairo to Tel Aviv.

The capture of two Israeli pilots by the Lebanese armed forces was notified on 12 October 1973. The ICRC delegate in Beirut visited them three times.

The Syrian authorities had, by 31 December 1973, sent no notification regarding Israeli prisoners of war, nor had they allowed the ICRC delegates to start visits, despite treaty provisions and all the approaches made by the ICRC. The ICRC deplors the fact that its delegates did not

have access to those prisoners of war, whose number it did not know. Owing to this situation, the ICRC had no assurance as to whether the prisoners had the benefit of the protection and the rights provided under the Third Convention.

On 31 December, Israel held 384 Syrian prisoners of war, ten Iraqi prisoners of war, six Moroccan prisoners of war, and sixty-seven Egyptian prisoners of war, captured after the end of the repatriation operations. In Syria there was an undetermined number of Israeli prisoners of war.

Activities of the Central Tracing Agency

With the outbreak of hostilities in October 1973, the Agency's bureaux, which had for several years been operating in the Cairo, Tel Aviv and Amman delegations, assumed their traditional function of transmitting to the Agency in Geneva lists of prisoners of war and repatriates, registering and relaying inquiries about civilians and soldiers missing during or following the conflict (approximately 1,200), exchanging messages (approximately 15,000) and reuniting families.

At the outset of the conflict, the Agency opened a bureau at Damascus, directed by a delegate sent from Agency headquarters, but by the end of 1973 it had been able to do no more than register inquiries.

Action in newly occupied territories

Through its representative in the United Nations, the Government of Israel, on 26 October, pledged itself to comply with the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention in occupied territories. That position was confirmed to the head of the ICRC delegation in Israel by representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

By 31 December 1973, however, the Israeli authorities had not yet authorized the ICRC delegates to proceed to the newly occupied Syrian territory on the Golan Heights, where they were to start work. Thus they were unable to verify whether the population of that territory had the benefit of the provisions of the Fourth Convention.

On the other hand, they were able to go into occupied Egyptian territory on the west bank of the Suez Canal, where they freely moved about and talked with the inhabitants.

The delegates made sure that there was a regular supply of food and drinking water. On their second visit they were accompanied by a doctor-

delegate, who ascertained the health conditions prevailing in the territory.

The various operations described above were carried out after numerous approaches had been made by the ICRC, both through diplomatic missions in Geneva and through its delegates in the field.

The ICRC delegate to international organizations, who was in New York, regularly informed the Secretary-General of the United Nations and other officials of the work done by the ICRC.

He was asked to make numerous approaches to the representatives of the belligerent States in support of those made in Geneva. He frequently informed the members of the Security Council of the action carried out by the ICRC, and headquarters of the decisions of the Security Council.

Relief action in the countries parties to the conflict

When hostilities were resumed in October 1973, the ICRC received many requests for assistance from the States involved in the conflict. A relief operation was promptly organized and an appeal to National Societies and Governments launched. In response to its various appeals, the ICRC received approximately three million Swiss francs' worth of donations in kind, mainly in the form of medicaments, surgical instruments and equipment, tents, blankets, ambulances and other items.

The donations in kind to the ICRC were either supplied direct to the delegations concerned or to Geneva, from where they were sent to the Middle East in aircraft provided by the Swiss Government.

To cope with the increased treaty duties which it had already had to carry out before the resumption of hostilities, plus the further duties laid upon it by the more recent conflict, the ICRC made the following arrangements to strengthen its personnel.

Opening of an ICRC delegation at Nicosia (advanced base) with: one head of delegation responsible

for co-ordinating action in the different operational areas; one relief/administration delegate; one radio operator.

Strengthening of existing delegations by assigning:

- (a) to Cairo, two delegates for treaty duties, one doctor-delegate, one radio operator;
- (b) to Damascus, one delegate for treaty duties, one relief delegate, one delegate of the Central Tracing Agency, one radio operator;
- (c) to Beirut, one relief delegate, one radio operator, two technicians and one nurse for the possible setting up of the field hospital in stock at Beirut.

Operation for the repatriation of prisoners of war between the Arab Republic of Egypt and Israel:

The operation called for the following supplementary personnel: two doctor-delegates and four nurses (on board aircraft for the repatriation of wounded prisoners of war), one aircraft co-ordinator based at Tel Aviv, and four aircraft: one DC 6, one DC 9 and two DC 8 with their respective crews (namely about seventy-five persons). In seventy-one flights between Cairo and Tel Aviv, 8,541 prisoners of war, including 487 wounded, were repatriated in eight days.

Strengthening of personnel at Headquarters:

One officer responsible for liaison with Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, one officer responsible for the recruiting of personnel, one delegate for treaty duties, one relief/logistics delegate, three secretaries.

In putting this supplementary structure into service, the ICRC had co-operation from the Finnish Red Cross (one doctor and one nurse); the Danish Red Cross (two technicians), and the Netherlands Red Cross (one Red Cross and Red Crescent liaison officer).

To cover Middle East operational costs and in response to a general appeal launched on 20 October, the ICRC received cash contributions amounting to approximately 6 million Swiss francs.

Arab World

Resolution of the Kuwait National Assembly calling for preparations for the use of oil as a weapon against Israel¹

Kuwait, January 6, 1973

The Israeli enemy and world Zionism are confident of the support of the great powers in their constant aggression against the Arab countries and their odious violation of the rights of the people of Palestine who are struggling for their freedom and their right to self-determination. They are also supported by these powers in their attempt to establish themselves more firmly on the Arab soil occupied by Israeli forces in the war of June 1967. They could not have continued so obstinately in their oppression and aggression without the military, material and technological aid of those great powers; this aid could never have been supplied with such disregard for Arab feelings and such lack of fear for the great economic and oil interests of these countries in the Arab world had they been sure that these interests would be ruined by the pursuit of this policy and that oil would inevitably be used in the battle if they continued to make light of Arab rights and to provide unlimited support to Israeli-Zionist aggression, which has disregarded every international law and custom with a zeal and a contempt for world public opinion unsurpassed by Nazism and Fascism.

Therefore, and in view of the fact that a major conflict can be expected to break out at any moment between the forces of Israeli-Zionist aggression and the mainstay of the Arab forces—the Arab Republic of Egypt—we propose that the government should unambiguously recommend that as soon as the fighting breaks out, if not before, all our oil resources be immediately brought into the battle, by suspending our links with the Western oil countries the moment fighting starts, and preparing the necessary legislation or resolutions to that end, accompanied by such material and technical preparations as may be required before the clash occurs and as a precaution against it.

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Siyasa* (Kuwait), January 29, 1973.

Memorandum from the Foreign Ministry of Syria to the foreign missions to Syria regarding Israeli raids on Syrian installations²

Damascus, January 9, 1973

On the morning of January 8, 1973, Israeli forces attacked military positions on the ceasefire line in Syria. Israeli air forces several times bombed economic installations and defenceless villages, causing great material damage and resulting in the death of many civilians—women, children and old people. Land forces on both sides of the ceasefire line took part in these engagements, as did tanks and artillery.

This cowardly Zionist aggression, which was not preceded by any Syrian military activity, is a clear indication that the aim of the occupation authorities and the imperialist forces that protect them is to break the Syrian will to resist, which is the main obstacle in the way of the expansionist plan of the Zionist state. Similarly the bombing of civilian targets, such as the port stores and tobacco stores in Lattakia, all of which are situated in the residential part of the town, is also an indication that the target of the occupation authorities is not only the military capacity of the Syrian armed forces, but also the country's economic capacity and the civilian population.

By doing this they hope to create an atmosphere of terror, weariness and military ennui as was the case, although on a smaller scale, in the American raids on democratic Vietnam, December 18–20.

The enemy planes also tried to bomb economic installations in the port of Tartus, but they were turned back by anti-aircraft artillery.

The deliberate bombing of economic installations in Syria is a clear indication of the escalation of the Zionist policy of aggression which may well expand and develop until it assumes extremely dangerous dimensions that could lead to an all-out war involving the whole area.

The Syrian Arab people and their leaders are well aware of these Zionist manoeuvres. They are more than ever determined to frustrate these manoeuvres by all the means at their disposal

² Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), January 10, 1973.

and whatever the sacrifices involved. The Syrian armed forces will reply to every enemy attack and will never allow any cowardly and treacherous aggression to go unpunished.

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Political programme for the PLO as approved by the Palestine National Council³

Cairo, mid-January, 1973

Prologue

Throughout its struggle for liberation, democracy and unity, our Arab people has been persistently subject to conspiracies from the colonialist and imperialist forces and their lackey local reactionaries. These colonialist and imperialist forces see in our Arab homeland ample opportunity for imperialist plunder of its unlimited natural resources. They regard it, also, as an important strategic take-off point, owing to its unique central position amidst the three continents of Asia, Africa and Europe, and to its control over vital air and sea routes, especially the Mediterranean Sea, the Suez Canal, the Red Sea, the Arabian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. They also view it as a center of gravity for whoever dominates it in international politics.

In their invasion of our Arab homeland, the colonialist and imperialist powers feared that the rising patriotic and national struggle would stand in the way of their schemes. Neither were they confident of the ability of their local reactionary mainstays to hold out against the rising national tide. Hence, using the world Zionist movement, they plotted the usurpation of Palestine, intending to create therein a colonialist racist entity which would constitute both an outpost for the protection of colonialist and Zionist domination over our Arab homeland and a heavy club to be raised by world imperialism in the face of the ever-growing Arab struggle for liberation.

In collusion with the reactionary forces which ruled the whole area—except Syria where a nationalist regime existed—the colonialist and imperialist forces succeeded in planting the colonialist Zionist entity in Palestine arbitrarily and forcibly.

They also succeeded in uprooting the Palestinians from their land. The Palestinian Arab people, however, did not submit. On the basis of its right to defend its homeland and its existence, and in view of the responsibility it bears as a forward defense line against the imperialist-Zionist assault on the Arab nation, the Palestinian Arab people, for thirty years, put up a heroic and relentless struggle. In each of its revolutionary uprisings, which culminated in the 1936 and 1947 revolts, the reactionary and lackey forces played a role in undermining the Palestinian struggle and bolstering the position of its enemies and the enemies of the Arab nation.

This was the situation on January 1, 1965, when the vanguard of our Palestinian people initiated the contemporary armed national revolution against the Zionist entity, which exists on Palestinian soil through aggression and the force of arms, and which has never desisted from using violence to expel our people and to finalize the realization of its schemes for the usurpation of the whole of our land. In this revolution, which erupted on that glorious first day of 1965, the vanguard of our people embodied the noble revolutionary traditions of our people and of our Arab nation. They also raised anew the flag of the struggle for liberation against imperialism and Zionism, the flag in whose defense tens of thousands of martyrs have fallen everywhere in the Arab homeland.

This vanguard (with it the Palestinian people, the Arab masses and the free of the world) believed that armed struggle is the correct, the inevitable and the main method of liberating Palestine. For such an antagonistic contradiction with the Zionist enemy cannot be resolved except through revolutionary violence.

When the Palestinian revolutionary vanguard resorted to armed struggle, it aroused the Palestinian and Arab masses, filling them with the will to fight. This led to a violent transformation of Arab realities in the direction of insistence upon rejecting the defeat and determination to take the offensive against the Zionist enemy and to defeat the American imperialist plots. Consequently, Jordan became a base for armed struggle and a take-off point for both the escalation of armed struggle and its protection on Palestinian soil. In addition, extended battle fronts were opened against the enemy which included the Suez Canal and the whole of the Palestinian frontier with

³ Adopted at the eleventh session of the Palestine National Council meeting, held January 6–12; English text, *Arab Palestinian Resistance* (Damascus), V, 6 (June, 1973), pp. 73–94.

Transjordan, Lebanon and Syria. Armed popular resistance was escalated in the West Bank and in the Palestinian territory occupied prior to June 1967. The Gaza Strip witnessed heroic deeds of armed struggle to the point where semi-liberated neighbourhoods in Gaza itself were created.

The Palestinian revolution moved from one victory to another and grew quickly, in spite of all the imperialist and Zionist plots and notwithstanding all difficulties. It was able to emerge victorious from all the battles in which it confronted imperialist conspiracies and counter-revolutionary forces in Jordan and Lebanon from November 1968 up to June 1970. The Zionist enemy, too, failed in the extermination campaigns which it conducted against the bases of the revolution. The revolution was able to turn these campaigns of the enemy into victories, as witnessed at Al-Karameh and Al-Arkoub.

However, the revolution began to face an extremely difficult situation due to the American initiatives and the plans they spawned (such as the Rogers Plan). These initiatives were accompanied by large scale encirclement of the revolution and the spread of the spirit of defeatism. This situation provided the counter-revolutionary forces in Jordan with a valuable opportunity to exploit some of the negative features that characterized the course of the revolution in order to implement the American-Zionist-Hashemite schemes. These schemes aimed at administering a harsh blow to the Palestinian revolution as a preliminary step towards its elimination and towards the liquidation of the Palestine problem. The Palestinian revolution and the Palestinian-Jordanian masses fought gloriously in Jordan in September 1970, in defense of the principle of armed struggle and for the Palestinian and Arab cause. Their battle shall forever remain an epic of incredible heroism and historic resistance under the harshest of conditions. But in July 1971, the lackey Jordanian regime eliminated the public presence of the Palestinian revolution in Jordan and began to follow policies which carried the threat of (a) an official capitulation to the enemy concerning the West Bank and Jerusalem, (b) the liquidation of the unity of the Palestinian presence, (c) the encouragement of dissension among the ranks of the Palestinian people and of divisions between Palestinian and Jordanian, between soldier and fidai, (d) the conversion of the East Bank into a buffer favoring the Zionist entity

and into a military, political and economic sphere of influence for Israel, which means transforming it into an American, West German and British backyard where imperialist influence dominates, (e) the repression, pillage and impoverishment of the Jordanian masses, the suppression of their democratic freedoms, in addition to the wrecking of the national economy. It is no secret that the American schemes aim at rebuilding the Jordanian army so it can be directed against Syria and Iraq also. These circumstances presented the Zionist enemy with the golden opportunity for making its occupation more secure by concentrating its efforts on trying to wipe out the armed resistance in the Gaza Strip and pacify the situation in the occupied territories. Thus the Gaza Strip was subjected to the harshest forms of repression and population expulsions; while in the West Bank local municipal elections were imposed to create favorable conditions for the occupation, divide the Palestinian people and attempt at promoting phony political leaders to substitute for the Palestinian revolutionary leadership. This went simultaneously with King Hussein's plan for the establishment of a so-called United Arab Kingdom⁴ with goals identical to those of the Zionist plot.

On the other hand, American imperialism intensified its assault according to a broad plan to securely contain and liquidate both the Palestinian revolution and the Arab liberation movement. For this purpose, American imperialism resorted to numerous manoeuvres and plots under such signboards as the so-called American initiatives, peace proposals, interim settlements and United Nations Security Council resolutions. In this they were abetted by active defeatist forces, bound by strong economic and political ties to the imperialists.

The blow that was administered to the Palestinian revolution in Amman in mid-1971, the intensification of the American and Zionist imperialist assault against the Palestinian revolution and the Palestinian masses in the occupied territories and outside, and finally the growing deterioration in the official Arab situation in favor of capitulation, have all continued to generate a crisis for the Palestinian revolution and the Palestinian and Arab masses. This general crisis has, on the one hand, captivated the whole Arab nation throughout the greater Arab homeland and, on the other, produced a series of

⁴ Announced in a speech on March 15, 1972; doc. 188 in *International Documents on Palestine 1972*.

conspiratorial schemes aiming at the liquidation of the Palestinian revolution, of the Palestinian people's unified national existence and of its patriotic cause. These conspiracies have taken such forms as the Allon Plan, the proposed Palestinian state on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, annexation, judaization, as well as the absorption and assimilation of the Palestinians in the societies where they live in the diaspora.

In this atmosphere of crisis, we find our Palestinian Arab people moving with firmness and determination to defend its armed revolution, its unified national existence and its right to liberate its entire homeland. Our people will allow neither the liquidation of its just cause, nor of its revolution, both of which constitute a central point from which militancy and revolution radiate onto an area over which the imperialists and the Zionists want to extend their full domination.

We also find the constituency of the revolution, its fighters and its mass organizations pushing forcefully and decisively in the direction of national unity, the intensification of armed struggle against the Zionist enemy, the liberation of Jordan, the construction of an Arab front to participate in the struggle with Palestinian revolution and the establishment of close ties with the world liberation movement and the progressive anti-imperialist forces in the world.

The strong orientation towards national unity among the ranks of the Palestinian revolution does not in itself mean success in overcoming the crisis, but it means creating the necessary conditions for such a step.

Escalating the armed struggle against the Zionist enemy, mobilizing the masses and organizing them, stimulating the various forms of armed and non-armed mass struggle (military, political, economic and cultural) all lead to recapturing the initiative and assuming the offensive, in readiness for overcoming the crisis.

For the Palestinian revolution and for the cause of the liberation of Palestine, Jordan stands out as something special in comparison to any other Arab country. The Palestinians form a majority in Jordan; this majority has national rights there in addition to its other general rights. It constitutes a principal segment of the Palestinian people without which it is pointless to discuss armed struggle against the enemy. In addition, its struggle has been linked to that of the Transjordanian people

and organically linked with contemporary history, especially during the past 25 years. Furthermore the Transjordanian borders with the Zionist enemy are the longest and the closest to its transportation network and to its military, economic and demographic strategic points. From here arise the dangers of the collusion of King Hussein's regime with imperialism and Zionism. This collusion has produced the massacres perpetrated against the Palestinian revolution, the prohibition of its presence in Jordan, the opposition of any activity against either the Zionist enemy or imperialism, and finally the transformation of Jordan into a protective military buffer for the Zionist entity and a route via which Zionist policies and influence in all fields could penetrate. These facts have made the liberation of Jordan (toppling the lackey regime) a decisive factor in overcoming the crisis and a strategic necessity in the process of liberating Palestine.

The creation of an Arab front to participate in the struggle with the Palestinian revolution rests basically upon the belief that no success for our cause is possible except within the framework of a general victory for the national, patriotic and liberating struggle of our Arab nation. This belief will contribute to the protection of the Palestinian revolution, will ensure the continuation and escalation of the armed struggle, will help also in the struggle to topple the lackey regime in Jordan and will generally aid in overcoming the crisis in question.

Strengthening the ties of solidarity and common struggle between the Palestinian revolution and the Arab militant forces on the one hand, and the world liberation movement and the progressive anti-imperialist forces throughout the world on the other, will contribute to the support of our revolutionary struggle and its intensification, as well as to the common struggle of all peoples against imperialism, Zionism, racism and reaction. This strengthening of ties is based on the belief that the Palestinian revolution and the Arab struggle constitute a part of the world struggle for liberation.

In these new and critical circumstances and in the face of the responsibilities which the Palestinian revolution bears, the Palestine Liberation Organization, with all its groups and forces, has agreed to an interim political program based on four principal strategic axes:

1. The continuation of the mobilization and

organization of all our people's potentials, both within and without the homeland, for a protracted people's war in pursuit of total liberation, and the creation of a democratic state in accordance with the aspirations of the Arab nation for comprehensive unity and national liberation.

2. The tight linking of our people's struggle with that of our brothers the Jordanian people in a Jordanian-Palestinian liberation front to be entrusted (in addition to its tasks in Palestine) with the conduct of the struggle for the liberation of Jordan from the lackey reactionary royalist regime, which acts both to mask actual Zionist domination over the East Bank and to guard fiercely the said Zionist occupation of Palestine.

3. The linking of the Palestinian struggle with the overall Arab struggle via a front of all the national and progressive forces hostile to imperialism, Zionism and neo-colonialism.

4. Solidarity with the world struggle against imperialism, Zionism and reaction, and for national liberation.

The Palestine Liberation Organization defines its tasks as follows:

First: On the Palestine Scene

1. To continue the struggle, particularly armed struggle, for the liberation of the entire Palestine national territory and of the establishment of a Palestinian democratic society which guarantees the right to work and to a decent life for all citizens so they can live in equality, justice and fraternity, a democratic society opposed to all forms of prejudice due to race, color or creed.

This society will guarantee the freedoms of thought, expression and assembly, freedom to demonstrate, strike and form national political and labor organizations, freedom of worship for all creeds; such that this democratic Palestinian society will constitute a part of the entire united Arab democratic society.

2. To militate against the compromising mentality and the plans it spawns which are either contrary to our people's cause of national liberation, or aim to liquidate this cause through "proposed Palestinian entities" or through a Palestinian state on part of the Palestinian national soil. Also to oppose these plans through armed struggle and political struggle of the masses connected to it.

3. To reinforce the bonds of national unity and joint struggle between our compatriots in the territory occupied in 1948 and those in the West

Bank, the Gaza Strip and beyond the occupied homeland.

4. To oppose the policy of clearing the occupied territory of its Arab inhabitants. To confront with violence the erection of colonies and the judaization of parts of the occupied homeland.

5. To mobilize the masses in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the entire occupied Palestinian land; also to arm them for the purpose of continuing the struggle and raising their militancy against Zionist settler-colonialism.

6. To direct attention to the organization of our masses in the occupied territory and help mass organizations oppose the Histadrut efforts at drawing Arab workers into its membership. To reinforce and support the Palestinian and Jordanian labor unions' endeavors in realizing the above aim. To oppose the attempts of Zionist political parties at establishing Arab branches in the occupied territory.

7. To support the peasant masses and develop the national economic and cultural institutions in the occupied homeland, in order to strengthen the attachment of citizens there to the land and put an end to the process of emigration. In addition, to oppose the Zionist economic and cultural invasion.

8. To direct attention to the conditions of our citizens in the territory occupied in 1948. To support their struggle for the retention of their Arab national identity. To adopt their problems and help them participate in the struggle for liberation.

9. To direct attention to the welfare of the working masses of our people in the various parts of the Arab homeland by obtaining for them economic and legal rights equal to those of the citizens of Arab societies, considering that their productive potentials are invested in the service of these societies. Particular attention is to be paid to matters pertaining to their right to work, remunerations and compensations, to freedom of political and cultural Palestinian action, and freedom of travel and movement, all this within a framework preservative of the Palestinian identity.

10. To promote and develop the role of the Palestinian woman, socially, culturally and economically, in the national struggle and to seek her participation in all aspects of the struggle.

11. To direct attention to the conditions of our citizens in the camps; to seek to raise their level economically, socially and culturally; to train

them in the administration of their own affairs.

12. To encourage workers on Arab farmland and in Arab concerns to remain steadfast in their positions; to undertake to guard them from the lures of employment in enemy projects; to encourage and develop local productivity so as to absorb workers employed by the enemy; to oppose enemy attempts at taking over national productive enterprises and ruining them.

13. To consider every collaborator, or person negligent of the historic natural right of the Palestinian people in their homeland, a target of the revolution, be it in his person or his possessions. So, too, every conspirator against any of our people's rights, primarily its right to oppose the occupation and its right to national independence.

14. To direct attention to our emigrant masses in foreign countries and to act to link them to their cause and to the Palestinian revolution.

15. The Palestine Liberation Organization shall use its official Arab relations for the protection of the Palestinian citizens' interests in the Arab homeland and for the expression of the Palestinian people's political will. (The Palestinian revolution shall continue to represent the legitimate political leadership of the Palestinian people and to be its sole spokesman in all fateful matters.) Hence the organs of leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization shall be formed from all the organizations of the armed Palestinian revolution, the organizations of the Palestinian masses (trade-union and cultural organizations) and from patriotic groups and personalities who uphold armed struggle as a principal and fundamental means for the liberation of Palestine and are committed to the Palestinian National Charter.⁵

Second: On the Jordanian-Palestinian Scene

The Jordanian-Palestinian national front is called upon to direct the struggle of the two peoples towards the following strategic aims:

A. The establishment of a national democratic regime in Jordan which shall:

Create the appropriate atmosphere for the continuation of the struggle for the liberation of the whole of Palestine;

Guarantee the national sovereignty of both Jordanian and Palestinian peoples;

Guarantee the renewal of the union of the two banks on the correct basis of the complete national

equality between the two peoples, so that the full historical national rights of the Palestinian people and the present national rights of the two peoples are safeguarded;

Ensure common national development economically, socially and culturally;

Strengthen the ties of brotherhood and equality between the two peoples by means of equal legal, constitutional, cultural and economic rights and by means of placing the human and economic resources of each people in the service of their common development.

B. The consolidation of the struggles of both the Palestinian and Jordanian peoples with that of the Arab nation so as to:

Complete national liberation;

Oppose imperialist plans aiming at imposing solutions and conditions in the Arab homeland that mean surrender to the enemy;

Eradicate all forms of Zionist and imperialist presence (economic, military and cultural), as well as all the forces connected with them which act as mediators for neo-colonialism and its policies.

In order for this Jordanian-Palestinian national front to actually emerge on the Jordanian scene, and to grow and gain strength, all forms of day to day mass struggle must be immediately activated, so that the agitation of the masses for both their daily and general demands leads to the rise of an organized leadership and organizations expressive of the interests of the various segments of the masses, i.e. the kind of leadership and organizations that have been absent from the day-to-day fights of the masses over the past years.

The realization of the general goals of the Palestinian-Jordanian national front requires a long and hard struggle. Through day-to-day struggle and partial battles, the masses surmount all social obstacles of a parochial nature and fuse in common struggle showing their militant national features and exposing the lackey royalist regime. The royalist regime depends fundamentally upon the exploitation of tribal relations and upon the provocation of parochial fanaticism in order to hide its collaboration with Zionism and imperialism (also to divert the attention of the masses from their contradiction with the regime.) The Palestine Liberation Organization presents the program of action for Jordan to engage the militant organizations in Jordan in a serious fraternal debate with the purpose of building the Palestinian-Jordanian

⁵ Doc. 360 in *International Documents on Palestine 1968*.

national front. This front must apply itself to the following tasks:

1. Mobilizing and organizing the masses for the establishment of a national democratic regime in Jordan which believes in the Palestinian revolution, supports it and provides the climate necessary for all modes of mass struggle.

2. Bringing the Jordanians to participate in the armed struggle against the Zionist enemy inasmuch as this is a patriotic and national goal as well as a necessity for the protection of the East Bank of Jordan.

3. Struggling:

to establish the Palestinian revolution's freedom of action in and from Jordan and the formation of bases on its soil,

to expose the conspiracies of the lackey regime and its falsehoods in this respect,

to ensure mass protection of the fighters moving off westward beyond the river.

4. Acting to consolidate the national and anti-imperialist forces throughout the Arab homeland in one militant front and to deepen militant ties between the Palestinian-Jordanian national struggle and the world revolutionary forces.

Third: Relations with the Arab Revolutionary Forces

The Arab revolution is now passing through the phase of implementing the democratic national revolution which militates:

A. To realize complete political and economic independence and eradicate all forms of division and dependence upon colonialism and imperialism.

B. To liquidate all forms of imperialist presence such as political influence, military bases, economic investments, cultural institutions, and the defeat of all the local forces connected with it.

C. To liberate Palestine from the Zionist-imperialist entity which not only usurped the Palestinian land and expelled its indigenous population, but has also proved to be, throughout its existence, a main imperialist tool for undermining the Arab revolution and protecting the imperialist presence in the area. The liberation of Palestine is not only a Palestinian patriotic duty. It is also a national necessity. The struggle for the realization of the Arab national democratic revolution will be neither unified nor deepened, nor will it broaden and succeed in achieving its purposes, except by liquidating the Zionist imperialist base which aims at its very foundations.

D. To safeguard the freedom of the Arab

masses so they can exercise their role in political life and constitute a solid basis for a firmly established democratic Arab unity.

E. To place the material and human resources of the Arab nation at the service of economic, social and cultural development with the purpose of reinforcing political and economic independence, realizing Arab economic and cultural integration and eradicating all forms of backwardness and division.

The unity of the Palestinian revolution and the Palestinian-Jordanian national struggle constitutes an integral part of the Arab democratic national revolution and one of its main axes.

Hence, the task of the Palestinian revolution, and its leadership, and that of the Jordanian national front is:

To seek to join with all the militant Arab national democratic organizations wherever they exist;

To prepare, through struggle, a militant atmosphere conducive to the rise of such forces;

To open its ranks to Arab militants, for the struggle in the Palestinian arena against the imperialist Zionist enemy is a main strategic struggle of the entire Arab revolution.

The Arab progressive national forces must combine in an Arab national front with the following demands:

1. To reinforce the positive support of the Palestinian national revolution and of the Jordanian-Palestinian national democratic struggle.

2. To struggle against all liquidationist plans or interim settlements, not only because they consecrate Zionist usurpation and lead to the elimination of the Palestinian national cause, but also because they have proved to be preparations for imperialist and allied reactionary manoeuvres and conspiracies for tearing assunder the unity of the Arab national forces, for eradicating the Arab national revolution and for imposing complete imperialist domination over the area.

3. To struggle for the elimination of the present forms of imperialist presence in the Arab homeland (political influence, military bases, investments and cultural institutions and activities). To struggle against the domination of an imperialist economy over the Arab national economy. To struggle against the reactionary forces which propagandize for this domination and stimulate it. The continuation of American interests in the Arab homeland and their organic relations requires

the confrontation and liquidation of these American-imperialist interests.

4. To encourage and support all institutions and activities which (a) seek to revive or protect the Arab national heritage; (b) diffuse national and revolutionary values and virtues; (c) undertake the task of opposing the Zionist-imperialist cultural invasion and the decadent and base values it propagates.

5. Solidarity with Arab patriotic and progressive militants against any persecution which touches their means of livelihood or touches them either physically, politically or intellectually.

Fourth: Relation with the Forces of Liberation in the World

The Palestinian national struggle and the Arab national democratic struggle are an integral part of the militant movement against imperialism and racism and for national liberation throughout the world. Mutual solidarity and support between the Arab national and the world revolutionary struggle are a necessity and an objective condition for the success of our Arab struggle.

The Arab national and progressive forces base the ties of world solidarity on the following principles:

1. The Arab Palestinian national struggle is decisively and firmly on the side of the unity of all world revolutionary forces.

2. The contribution of the Arab national struggle towards resolving any disagreements within the world revolutionary movement consists in its effective and successful treatment of its own problems and the challenges which it faces.

3. The goals and methods of the Arab struggle, (which take account of the general rules of revolution which, in turn, are the gist of the experiences of the world national liberation movements) concern the Arab national and progressive forces. This does not mean neglect or disregard of the observations and advice of friends.

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Statement issued by the Palestine National Council after its eleventh session⁶

Cairo, January 12, 1973

In the light of the present situation, in which the Palestine problem is a matter of decisively

confronting Zionist imperialism and appreciating the importance of the present stage, and on a basis of absolute faith in the goal of the liberation of all usurped Palestinian and Arab territory, the Palestine National Council met in its eleventh session from January 6 to 12. In the course of the session all the problems that confront the Palestine revolution were discussed in a spirit inspired by the highest democratic principles. This was exemplified by the objective way in which all problems were discussed, out of loyalty to the martyrs who have lost their lives on behalf of the cause and out of commitment to the line of struggle for which they laid down their lives, thereby raising a blazing torch to light the way to liberation and victory.

At the end of this session the Palestine National Council reaffirmed all the goals to which it is committed, all comprising armed struggle until liberation.

The Council saluted with pride and admiration our people in the occupied territories for the way in which they have held out and rejected all projects for liquidation and assimilation which the usurping authorities have tried to implement, sometimes by terror, sometimes by inducements.

The Council stresses the need for unity among all the sections of the resistance, unity now desired by all the masses of our Arab nation forming, as it does, the basis of their hopes for victory over the usurping enemy.

The Council also praised the role played by the Arab masses, who are the real mainstay of the revolution and who provide the backing which enables it to continue the march of liberation and struggle, which gives it moral and material assistance and builds around it a wall which protects it from aggressors and those who sow doubt.

In concluding this session the Palestine National Council promises all the Arab masses that it will remain loyal to the martyrs who have laid down their lives and committed to pursuing their course and following them on the road to martyrdom and liberation.

The Council salutes with pride and admiration our masses in the occupied territories who have always constituted the citadel of brave defiance on which all the conspiracies of the usurping enemy have been smashed.

It salutes with pride the thousands of prisoners in our occupied territory and in the prisons of Jordan, who are being subjected to every kind of torture and mistreatment.

⁶ Translated from the Arabic text, *Filastin al-Thawra* (Beirut), January 17, 1973, p.7.

The Council accepted the resignation of the previous Executive Committee and thanked it for its work in the preceding period, elected a new committee⁷ and formed a Central Council of its members to follow up the resolutions of the Council and to assist in implementing them.

The Council calls on the Palestinian people and the masses of our Arab nation to give the newly elected Executive Committee their full support so that it may make every effort to achieve the goals of our people and of the struggling Arab nation.

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Statement by Prime Minister Sidky of Egypt declaring that the country is ready for battle⁸

Cairo, January 18, 1973

IV. Preparation for the battle

In fact, this is not a matter about which there should be publicity. It would have been quite easy for me to stand up every day and say: We have done such and such, we have imported such and such, and in such and such a place we have done so and so. But the nature of these problems is such that this was not what was wanted. What I want to say is that the real preparation for battle is completed. A plan has been drawn up for the preparation of the country for the battle—and this is not just empty talk. There are joint plans covering the armed forces, precise plans. What about electricity? How much is required of industry? What is to be done about the protection of the various installations? It is a plan with every detail worked out. What is being done about provisioning? What about the storage of strategic materials?

A full plan has been made for all these problems. If a power plant is hit, where will the grid be transferred to, so that there may be an alternative plan? If a bridge is hit, what alternative road will be used? If there is a raid on such and such an area, what equipment will be needed to cope with the situation? There is an emergency plan for hospitals, should there be an incident in such

and such a place—drugs, credits for provisions and oil. I am telling you today what this 95 million pounds has been used for. I am in a position to tell you what resources we have, fire engines, ambulances, credits for strategic materials. Alternative plans for alternative stands, and so on. All this has increased not once or twice or three times, but perhaps many times what was available when this government came to power. So when I say that the country has been prepared for battle we are telling the truth, although, of course, there is really no end to what we call the preparation of the country for the battle. But what I can say is that there is a committee⁹ headed by a senior officer, to supervise the preparation of the country, and he has been asked a direct question. I said to him: Do you think that we have prepared the country for the battle? And he said: Yes. I cannot say more than this. But all that was in the fourth section of my speech has been achieved.

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Appeal to the USSR transmitted by the Chamber of Deputies Speaker Urayqat of Jordan to stop the immigration of Soviet Jews to Israel⁹

Amman, January 21, 1973

I wish to inform you of the following unanimous decision of the Jordanian Chamber of Deputies at its sixth session held on 21 January 1973. The Jordanian Chamber of Deputies unanimously decided to appeal to the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Nationalities to stop the immigration of Soviet Jews to Israel because this immigration constitutes a great danger to the Palestine issue, the Arab nation and the Palestinian Arabs. This immigration may lead to the deterioration of strong Soviet-Arab relations and the close friendship binding the Arab peoples with the Soviet people. Therefore the Jordanian Chamber of Deputies appeals to your eminent council to intervene to stop the immigration of Soviet Jews to Israel.

⁷ For the composition of the old and the new PLO Executive Committees see Appendix E.

⁸ Made in a speech to the nation on the first anniversary of the appointment of his government; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), January 19, 1973.

⁹ English text as published in *USSR and Third World* (London), III, 2 (January 15–February 18, 1973), p. 100.

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Speech by PLO Executive Committee member Najjar (Abu Yusuf) demanding revisions in Jordan's Palestine policy prior to PLO submission to a unified Arab command (excerpt)¹⁰

Cairo, late January, 1973

Mr. President and Ministers, I hope that you will allow me to speak to you frankly and clearly in view of the fact that, I am sorry to say, observers of current events have noticed that an attempt is being made to suppress an issue that has occupied the thoughts of our masses since the bloody incidents in Jordan in September 1970.

The Palestinian delegation therefore feels itself obliged to clarify the following issues in reply to certain questions that have been asked and in elucidation of issues that we cannot allow to be suppressed or misrepresented.

1. Commando action started as a rejection of an Arab situation which had become oblivious to the rights of our people and, indeed, was fettering our people before the revolution broke out.

2. When our masses started to lay down their lives for their cause—and the numbers of these in the occupied territory and in Arab territory have, I regret to say, been many times greater than those who have laid down their lives in the Arab nation since 1967—we observed that attempts were made to discount what these men had done for the struggle of our Palestinian people. Attempts were made to make out that they had been acting frivolously and that it was not in defence of this nation against Zionist aggression that they had laid down their lives.

3. When the Palestine revolution broke out in 1965 it did not ask permission from anyone. It refused to submit to the orders of the unified Arab command which, established at the Alexandria summit conference in 1964, called on the Arab countries to prevent the Palestinians from taking action to fight the Zionist enemy in the occupied territory. We have documents in our possession to prove this. This decision was taken on the pretext that Palestinian activity

would prevent the Arab armies from preparing for the battle.

4. We do not want the unity of the Palestinian arena to be made a screen for the attacks of the revolution or a pretext for failing to meet responsibilities. We are entitled to ask why there is no Arab unity among you who are meeting here today; in our case there are good reasons why the desired unity of the Palestinian arena has not been achieved, among them being your irresponsible conduct and interference in Palestinian affairs. This interference has prevented Palestinian unity from being achieved and, indeed, has fragmented it, for it is the Palestine Liberation Organization which, because it comprises all sections of the resistance that have agreed on a clear and well-defined programme for political action, represents the unity of Palestinian ranks.

In view of our people's situation this is the best we can hope to attain in the light of the factors we have already mentioned. Then, what harm can it do to the Arab countries, I mean what direct harm, if there are a number of Palestinian groups in the arena? In Vietnam, which has fought for twenty years, there are a number of organizations making up a front.

5. Some people are saying that the Palestine revolution has lost its way and that such and such a country alone is supporting it. In reply to this I want to stress that it was the will of our people that led to the outbreak of revolution and to its continuance until now. And this will is the guarantee for the continued existence of the revolution in the present and the future.

6. The Palestine revolution supports providing aid to any Arab country that holds out against the Zionist challenge, but we are amazed at the way our brothers have forgotten the stand of the Palestine revolution and the material and moral sacrifices it has made. When we ask for aid and support it is as if we are crying in the wilderness and saying something reprehensible when we ask if those who make sacrifices are not entitled to hope for as much aid and support as others.

7. The military plan that has been drawn up is at our disposal if we really want to put it into effect so that it might bear fruit. We should take a serious look at those of our brothers who are at the ready in Gaza and the West Bank and also in the Triangle and Galilee, and provide them with aid and support so that they may assist us when

¹⁰ Yusuf Najjar spoke before the Joint Arab Defence Council meeting, held January 27–30, as head of the PLO delegation; translated from the Arabic text, *Filastin al-Thawra* (Beirut), August 22, 1973, p. 7.

zero hour comes for striking at the usurping enemy. It should also be recalled that resolutions were adopted at Rabat in 1969 voting sums for the support of resistance. But we have received no part of these sums so far.

8. As regards Jordan and the Eastern Front, we agree with the report of the Commander-in-Chief, but we shall not commit ourselves to co-ordinating or to joining forces with the unified command as long as the decision to fight has not been taken.

As free men we are following the strategic course we have pursued since the outbreak of our revolution. There is no objection to coordination with quarters we trust. But where is the Eastern Front about which so much has been heard, even quite recently? Senior Jordanian authorities, headed by their King, used to say that any battle fought by the Arab nation would be a losing battle and treason to the Arab nation, as it would result in disaster. Does the mere fact that the Jordanian regime's Foreign Minister has now said that Jordan is committed to the Arab line mean that it is relieved of all its responsibilities and forgiven all its mistakes and all the action it has taken against our people since September 1970?

Brothers, I want to make myself clear to you: we are not asking this assembly to allow us to return to Jordan; we regard it as a right, because our people and our land are there, and the future of our cause and our sons. But how will it come about? There are binding agreements which we cannot abrogate or renounce, agreements made with the approval of your heads of state and bearing their signatures.

9. While we support every attempt to achieve Arab concord for the battle, we cannot allow it to be achieved at the expense of our people and our cause.

10. If some of our Arab brothers want this agreement without rallying around the fundamental issue and without standing by the Palestine revolution, let me tell them quite frankly that they will have to bear the responsibility for that vis-à-vis their people and the Palestinian people. We, for our part, will have nothing to do with any settlement made to serve the interests of a specific country. Palestinian commitment is possible only to the total.

In any case we refuse to be a party to the game of the Arab regimes that want partial or surrenderist

solutions.

Therefore we cannot agree that Jordan should be given any Arab aid as long as it does not undertake to allow Palestinian action to return to act freely on the Eastern Front, which is the basis of our action and our struggle, in accordance with what has previously been agreed on and adhered to in the presence of the Arab countries.

11. Finally, brothers, you may be sure that our people, having lost their land and their official identity, have nothing more to lose but their life, and even that is cheap to them.

12. The other question I want to raise is the subject of Arab aid. When the Defence Council votes a certain sum, but excludes the Palestine revolution and decides to give Jordan part of that aid, disregarding all the offences and crimes committed by the Jordanian regime against our people, merely because its Foreign Minister says that he recognizes the Eastern Front and that he is ready to participate in it, does this mean, according to your way of thinking, that God has forgiven the past and that this regime has been pardoned? We have reservations about the payment of any sums to Jordan or the resumption of any aid to it as long as it does not meet its Arab obligations to the Palestine revolution and open up to it the Eastern Front so that it may take action from it.

If you think otherwise, say so frankly in the presence of your people.

13. Our people, gentlemen, cannot accept returning to the logic of Arab tutelage since they have their own identity, which you were the first to recognize and which has since been recognized by free men throughout the world.

The problem cannot be solved as simply as you suggest; otherwise how would you explain the fact that our revolution has continued for eight years during which thousands of our men have laid down their lives, and thousands more have been interned and taken prisoner, both inside and outside [the occupied territories].

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Speech by King Hussein of Jordan to the nation reviewing the current Arab situation (excerpts)¹¹**Amman, February 3, 1973**

It seems obvious that the Arab strategic objective for this phase has been defined as the recovery of all the Arab territory occupied in June 1967. In view of this local, Arab and international reality, I wish to affirm that in my coming contacts and discussions I shall not speak officially in the name of any Arab country or any brother Arab leader. Officially I speak in my name and in the name of the government and the one people of Jordan. I speak in the name of those for whom I consider myself responsible and whom I will not abandon. I will stand at their side as I always have with all my strength and resources. I will speak in the name of the kinsmen in occupied Palestine, in all the precious land which was occupied in 1967. I will not speak in the name of the remaining brothers in the great homeland except on matters which serve our common aims and the real interest of our cause, and in defence of our nation and our obvious rights in this world.

We had four definite and clear views which we should have preferred not to present in detail publicly had they not been exposed to distortion by the others.

1. Unity of the command of the armies of the confrontation countries.

We long ago approved the establishment of one military command which would command the front-line armed forces through the three local supreme military commands of the front-line states which constitute the three fronts. We also agreed that this command would enjoy full powers and authority to carry out its duties. We shall place our armed forces under its command when the supreme political leaderships responsible in the front-line states meet to reach understanding and full and comprehensive co-ordination between them in all fields, to define and clarify the responsibilities and powers of the military command, and to define the requirements of this command

as well as the requirements of the three fronts and the conditions for their operation. We adhere to previous Arab resolutions stipulating that all the Arab forces, regardless of their source of formation, which are present on the territory of any front-line state should be placed under the direct, full and absolute command of the supreme military command in each of the three states constituting the three fronts.

We also insist that sufficient material resources should be secured for us and that our Arab sisters should at least fulfill all the frozen instalments of the support to which they committed themselves at the summit conference and that they continue this so that we can achieve the armament and preparedness we seek for our armed forces and so that these forces may be fully able to receive any shock. This is a fundamental condition which must be secured before any thought is given to the presence of any new fraternal Arab military forces in the Jordanian arena, should such forces be available and should it be found that there is no means of recovering the right except through fighting and only after every effort is exhausted before such a conviction is reached and after acceptable chances of success are made available through common studies, unified conviction and sound planning.

2. The Palestine Resistance

We absolutely believe that the Palestinians have the right to play a full part in any Arab military action within an Arab strategy approved by the political leaderships responsible for the destiny of the front-line states and within the plan drawn up by the C-in-C of the armed forces of these states. But we must state the facts by affirming that our situation in Jordan, the country of both the Jordanians and the Palestinians, differs fundamentally from the situation of any fraternal Arab country. The Palestinians here constitute not less than one half of the members of the armed forces. They and their brothers, the sons of Transjordan, constitute the members of one family who are equal in everything, in rights and duties. We, therefore, opposed in all the previous stages and until 4th June 1967 the presence of any so-called Palestinian units or formations which came from abroad and did not belong to our formations, organizations and units because we feared that sensitivities would be created, loyalties would be multiplied, and national unity would be exposed

¹¹ Broadcast by Amman radio in Arabic; excerpted from the English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4212/A/3,4,5-6; reprinted by permission.

to division and disintegration. It is also known that we had insisted that the Palestinians had the right to enlist in the ranks of the other Arab armies or to form special Palestinian units in the other fraternal countries with the knowledge and under the supervision of these countries.

3. *Partial and separate solutions*

We fully agree that any partial or separate solution is a fatal stab to the Arab struggle and to the national interest. We also believe that consolidating the Arab capability and the opportunities of reaching a just, honourable and acceptable solution must be found in the required Arab co-ordination and in the effective mobilization of all the resources and capabilities.

The main problem is here. As for the West Bank, Jerusalem and other occupied Palestine territory, without true support, organization and studied action by us all, then recovery and liberation seems impossible. However, the size of the problem will not prevent us from doing our duty for their liberation. Every partial or separate solution is a deadly stab to the Arab struggle and the national Arab interest.

However, leaving the matter as it is and abandoning all our brothers in the occupied territory, as happened to the Arabs in the occupied territory in 1948, and renouncing Jordan, which cannot forsake them and its responsibility to them—Jordan which is their country which is standing along the longest confrontation lines—and depriving Jordan of all that can strengthen its capability for steadfastness and movement, is also a deadly stab to Arab honour, Arab struggle and the pan-Arab interest.

4. *The United Arab Kingdom plan*¹²

The United Arab Kingdom plan is a domestic organization of the state. It was drafted with the participation of Palestinians. It cannot be implemented under the occupation. However, it aims at providing our relatives in our occupied territory with whatever can help them in resisting the occupationist and opposing his pretexts and plans. It also aims at strengthening them in the face of the factors of despair and causes of loss.

It is also aimed at killing the idea of establishing a substitute homeland for Palestinians east of the Jordan and at preserving the [Palestinian] person-

ality and at deepening the feeling in the world that the question is that of the Palestinians' right in the Palestinian territory and nowhere else. Israel continues to claim that there is no people called the Palestinian people.

There are foreign forces which still consider that the solution and liquidation of the problem can be achieved by enabling certain people to establish a substitute homeland on the debris of the east of Jordan. We have much proof and evidence of that.

This is our firm policy which will never change because it is founded on reality and derived from the long bitter experience which we, as a family, lived through for many years.

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Press interview statements by General Secretary Riyadh of the Arab League outlining the conclusions of the latest meeting of the Joint Arab Defence Council¹³

Cairo, February 5, 1973

Q. What did the Defence Council achieve?

A. The conference was convened to establish joint Arab action and a joint Arab plan. The conference was not convened for any other reason nor for any other material aims nor to eliminate all Arab differences, in view of the fact that there was a strong desire to eliminate these differences before the conference was convened. I can assure you that the conference achieved the aim for which we met—establishing joint Arab action and a joint Arab plan. We succeeded in this, and we must go on to achieve what was agreed on.

Q. Since eighteen Arab countries, as represented by their Foreign and Defence Ministers or their delegates—for a number of Arab Defence Ministers did not attend—met at the Arab League, and since the question of the Palestine resistance and Jordan was one of the most important obstacles to achieving joint Arab action, and since a Jordanian delegation came to Cairo and took part in the conference, and a Palestinian delegation also took part

¹³ Interview conducted by Fuad Matar; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), February 21, 1973; the Joint Arab Defence Council met in Cairo, January 27–30, 1973.

¹² Doc. 187 in *International Documents on Palestine 1972*.

—since all this happened, why was a reconciliation not brought about between the resistance and Jordan without the matter being referred to a committee, when we all know that it is the accepted principle that if a problem has to be shelved it is referred to a committee?

A. The main purpose of the Defence Council was to establish joint action and a joint Arab line, and the resistance's differences with Jordan was one of the obstacles that had to be surmounted if joint action was to be established; the surmounting of obstacles must not be at the expense of joint action and the joint line for which we must mobilize all our forces. The important thing is the liberation of the occupied territories, and we all know that one country alone cannot assume this burden. During the meeting of the Defence Council all expressed the desire to put an end to the present difference between the Palestine resistance and Jordan and to the differences between Jordan and certain Arab regimes that have arisen from it. During discussion of this it became clear that further efforts were needed. When the resistance put forward its idea of the nature of the relations there should be between it and Jordan, and when it was observed that the Jordanian delegation did not take part in the discussion of this view, certain persons proposed that a committee should be formed to go to Amman in the hope of putting an end to all the differences between the resistance and Jordan.

Q. When will the committee start work?

A. When King Hussein returns from his visit to the United States.¹⁴

Q. How can the committee succeed when King Hussein stated very clearly on the eve of his departure to Washington that he would never allow the resistance to return?

A. The resistance gave its views and King Hussein gave his views in reply. There is still hope that the two sides may be persuaded that the first enemy is Israel and that all efforts must be devoted to resisting Israel. This can only be achieved through cooperation. If we look at things in this way we may hope that it may be possible to achieve a minimum of understanding for the sake of cooperation on behalf of the crucial question. It is the committee's job to help our Jordanian and Palestinian brothers, to make them understand how dangerous the situation is and to find the

means to achieve at least a minimum of cooperation.

Q. Did all the Arab countries approve the report of Lieutenant-General Ahmad Ismail submitted to the Joint Arab Defence Council?

A. Yes, they all did.

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Speech by Prime Minister Sidky of Egypt presenting the war budget to the National Assembly (excerpt)¹⁵

Cairo, February 11, 1973

President Anwar Sadat has announced that we have adopted the battle decision and that we have to prepare ourselves for it. He has also asked the government to prepare a budget for the battle. In my last statement before your honourable assembly I said that we had prepared a budget for the battle and we shall apply it when necessary. Undoubtedly the explosive situation which we are facing stipulates that we should immediately begin mobilizing our entire economy for the battle, which requires additional burdens that we must provide for. These burdens include: (1) financing increasing requirements of the armed forces made necessary by the battle, (2) providing for national security requirements, (3) financing the situation that arises as a result of the state of war—these may be medical requirements, emigration requirements, increasing transport burdens, pressure on telecommunications, increasing supplies for armed forces, because of the state of war and the organization of the people's consumption.

As a result of all these, a full review of the following policies should be made: (1) production policy and its development to suit the battle requirements, (2) the policy governing the control of consumption to suit the state of war, (3) the policy governing the export-import plan in the light of probable circumstances and the possible adjustment of foreign currency and its effect on the balance of payments.

The transformation of the ordinary budget into a battle budget is tied to the phases and developments of the battle. It has become clear from the

¹⁴ King Hussein visited the US February 3-8.

¹⁵ Broadcast by Cairo radio in Arabic; excerpted from the English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4219/A/9-10; reprinted by permission.

preliminary assessments of the preparation of the state for the battle and in providing for the national security requirements that a special budget to include the additional allocations needed for the battle is necessary. This budget is basically represented as follows:

1. Preparing additional allocations for the armed forces. The detailed requirements have been prepared with the help of the War Ministry.

2. Preparing supplementary allotments for enterprises relating to the battle. Additional allotments must be prepared for these enterprises to face the burdens that may be stipulated by the developments of the battle, such as: allocations for security, health, electricity, emigration, transport, roads and communications.

3. Emergency reserve. No matter how the developments and requirements of the battle may be precisely imagined, a general reserve must be prepared to face any emergency that may arise during the battle.

4. When considering the accounts of the revenue in the budget, the likelihood of a deficit in the state's general revenue as a result of the battle, the decrease in the surplus of certain sectors, and the increase of aid to supply the deficit in certain units which will be affected by the battle, must be taken into consideration.

To meet these requirements, regardless of the general state revenues, services and economic income provided in the state budget and the investment fund, which must be maintained and controlled to prevent any reduction in them, the 1973 State Budget and the investment plan in it must be reconsidered with the aim of reducing current expenditure and investment and providing additional income. It should be noted that a reduction of investment expenditure requires a review of the situation of goods following the freezing of investment allocations and commodity requirements and the possible use of these allocations to reorganize the goods requirements, whether for the battle or for national security. To achieve this purpose, a number of measures must be taken in accordance with developments in the battle. These measures are as follows: (1) reducing the investments figure, (2) postponing and rescheduling of certain commitments which are due to be met in 1973, (3) guiding current expenditure, (4) taking measures to secure more revenue.

With respect to the reduction of the public

sector's investments, the following points have been taken into consideration: (1) maintaining investments in the services sector at the level of the last fiscal year, (2) delaying the implementation of long-term projects which will not produce any income in 1973, (3) partially or totally suspending certain new projects which have no direct effect on the battle, (4) leaving untouched investments in nearly completed projects which will speed up production and which will serve the battle, such as transport and public utilities.

With respect to the industry sector, it has been considered necessary to maintain investments for completed or semi-completed phases of production in order to speed up production to serve the battle on the domestic front. New projects or supplementary projects which will take a long time to be productive will be suspended.

As for agriculture and irrigation, it was considered necessary that only projects which will have a minimum effect on production should be suspended, but wages, periodic expenses and local benefits accruing from them will not be suspended. It has been decided to reduce services investments in respect of projects which have not been implemented. As a result of this reduction, in addition to the reduced allocations, the main commodities needed for building and reconstruction will be reduced by about a half million tons of cement, about 75,000 tons of iron building reinforcement, and about 50,000 cu.m. of wood and other commodities according to a general calculation. This saving is expected to be employed for war requirements.

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Law of Egypt granting the President emergency budgetary powers¹⁶

Cairo, February 13, 1973

Article I

The President of the Republic is empowered, in accordance with the requirements of the exceptional circumstances arising from the demands and burdens of the battle, to take decisions, which shall have the power of law, to transfer funds from

¹⁶ Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), February 14, 1973.

any heading of the general budget and the investment fund budget to the emergency fund budget, and to make the necessary changes in the allocations and revenues of these budgets.

Article II

The President of the Republic is empowered, should fighting break out, to issue decisions which shall have the force of law with regard to the imposition of increase in taxes or dues to strengthen the war effort.

They must be submitted to the Assembly during its current session as soon as they have come into effect or, if not, at the first meeting of the first sessions it holds, and if the Assembly does not endorse them they shall lose the force of law but remain effective for the foregoing period.

Article III

The provisions of this law shall remain in force until the end of the present budget year or until the consequences of the aggression have been eliminated, whichever is the earlier, and the decisions shall be submitted to the National Assembly in the form of laws issued by the President of the Republic in accordance with the provisions of present law at its first session after the delegation of authority has come to an end.

Article IV

This law shall be published in the Official Gazette and take effect from the date of its publication.

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Policy statement presented by Prime Minister Ayyubi of Syria to the Syrian National Assembly (excerpt)¹⁷

Damascus, February 18, 1973

Arab policy

Our political activities in the Arab field have achieved important results which played an effective role in our fundamental conflict with the enemy. In the field of Arab policy we have been and continue to follow several principles, the most important of which are:

1. We believe in Arab unity as one of our people's major objectives. It is an objective for whose sake our masses have struggled throughout their history. Arab unity is a basic condition for completing the liberation of our homeland and building our united Arab socialist society and for our contribution to building human civilization. The Federation of Arab Republics has been a step towards realizing comprehensive Arab unity. The Government undertakes to exert efforts and provide resources in order to strengthen the Federation and complete the establishment of its various institutes.

2. Our belief in Arab unity prompts us to support any unity action between two or more Arab States on the grounds that it represents a step towards unity on the one hand, and an achievement towards a greater Arab convention serving our basic battle on the other.

3. The chief enemy of the Arab people at this stage is the Zionist enemy. Any difference between the Arab countries remains of secondary importance in the face of the main danger threatening the existence and future of the Arab nation.

4. Confrontation with the Zionist enemy necessitates a united Arab action through which the unlimited resources of the Arabs should be co-ordinated.

5. The mobilization of all Arab resources and potentials is necessary for the confrontation of Zionist invasion, strengthening the steadfastness of our Arab people, and fighting the battle of liberation. Our relations with any Arab country will be strengthened in accordance with that country's attitude to the question of liberation and its serious participation in it.

6. The Palestine Resistance is an indivisible part of the Arab revolution movement. Its role in the struggle will be determined in accordance with the strategy of the Arab struggle. The Government will provide it with the necessary support and backing.

International Policy

In international policy the Government will abide by the following principles:

1. The Arab Liberation Movement is a part of the world liberation movement, affects its struggle and is affected by its successes. It also co-operates with it in order to stand against world Zionism, imperialism and colonialism.

2. Our relations with any country are deter-

¹⁷ Broadcast by Damascus radio in Arabic; excerpted from the English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4226/A/5-6; reprinted by permission.

mined in accordance with the attitude of that country to our just cause and the Zionist aggression against the Arab nation.

3. Strengthening co-operation with the socialist countries, at the forefront of which is the friendly Soviet Union, and consolidating relations with them on the basis of mutual respect and joint struggle against world imperialism and colonialism.

4. Entrenching co-operation with the friendly states which understand the nature of the Zionist aggression taking place on our land and which stand at our side in the struggle we are waging, and working to improve the attitude of the other countries to our just cause.

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Statement to the people by King Hasan of Morocco announcing that volunteer forces from the Royal Armed Forces will be sent to Syria (excerpts)¹⁸

Rabat, February 22, 1973

When the war broke out in 1967, we would have liked the blood of the Moroccan people to be the first to be shed on that sacred soil, from which God sent forth his seed to humanity—the soil which is the meeting place of the world's revealed religions. But our wish was not destined to be fulfilled, and God ordained that our Royal Armed Forces should remain, their hearts full of sadness and regret, on the soil of our sister Libya, watching from that Arab homeland the afflictions of our sisters Egypt, Syria and Jordan.

Since then we have given constant encouragement, aid, advice, and political and material support; but the circumstances in which we are living today, the circumstances in which the Arab world is living, along with the appraisals we have made personally—which could be wrong but may very well be correct—all have made us decide to take stronger action than we have taken in the past.

We have decided to send mechanized units and personnel of our Royal Armed Forces to Syria as from the beginning of next month.

Very well. Everyone is entitled to ask, first of all: Why now and not before?

And a second question: Why does Morocco, which has always advocated peace, want to rekindle the flames of war, at a time when all observers seem to expect that within the next few weeks or months there will be signs that may result in peace, or negotiations that may lead to peace?

Let me answer the first question: Why now? Because we believe that the years through which the Arab world has lived in a state of no peace and no war, without liberating its soil or cultivating its land—this painful, sterile and negative period—is almost at an end. It will not be ended by the stroke of a pen, but only after another and final battle. But before the enemy submits to peace, before he chooses peace, he will want to inflict cruel blows on one of the Arab countries in confrontation with him.

In the context of this question, we may ask: Why Syria?

My reply is that I stood on the Golan Heights when I was Crown Prince in 1959, when I made a tour which took me from Egypt to Syria and then on to Riyadh, where I performed my first little pilgrimage. On the Golan Heights I was able to appreciate their strategic importance; I felt that the first blow to be struck at an Arab country would be directed first and foremost on the Golan Heights because of their extreme strategic importance, because strategically—I do not say politically or economically—but strategically, after the Canal, I believe that the Golan and its Heights is the most important springboard for the enemy's forces.

That is why, according to my assessments, I decided to send our forces to Syria, because I was convinced that the enemy's last attempt will be directed against our Syrian brothers.

Now for the second question: At a time when Morocco herself declares that the first harbingers of peace have appeared over the horizon, why does Morocco, which has always advocated peace, want to rekindle the flames of war when the war is almost at an end?

My reply is that Morocco has always been and will continue to be an advocate of peace. But what kind of peace do we want and what price are we willing to pay for it?

Above all we want an honourable peace, peace with honour, peace with justice, that will give

¹⁸ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Anba'* (Rabat), February 22, 1973.

everyone his rights, that will ensure that the Arabs recover their self-respect and the Palestinians their homeland, their soil and their birthplace. We want a peace which no one, either today or in generations to come, will regret, a peace which will ensure that that part of the world, which has experienced such tragedy, may live in permanent peace for centuries to come.

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Statement by President Assad of Syria reaffirming Syria's support for the Palestine revolution¹⁹

Damascus, March 8, 1973

Brothers, our struggle against Zionism and imperialism is intensifying and escalating. It is a struggle of destiny in which we represent what is right and just. In order to be able to determine the outcome of the struggle, we must deepen our faith in our cause, have more determination, make preparations with precision and accuracy, and realize that it is a long-term struggle which basically requires patience and perseverance. Our occupied territory will not be restored without force and the rights of the Palestinian people will not be restored without force. Otherwise, the enemy will continue to deny even the existence of the Palestinian people.

Since we have resolved to reject surrender and to regain our territory and the rights of our Palestinian Arab people, we must provide all the ingredients of strength. Among the most important of these ingredients are the unity of our people at home, the preservation of the atmosphere of freedom, continuous building of the material base in defence and the economy, the achievement of what is possible on the path of Arab unity, the pooling and mobilizing of the Arab resources, and gaining more friends who understand our cause and support our rights in the world. This is why we are making headway in our building at home, and this is why we have achieved a major

step with the creation of the Federation of Arab Republics.

This is why we continue to strengthen this Federation, and struggle for comprehensive unity. This is also why our efforts at the Arab level have been directed toward establishing better relations with all the fraternal states out of our sincere faith in the pan-Arabism of the battle and because we believe that all the available Arab resources should be mobilized to achieve victory in the battle.

Our view always has been, and still is, that all the other contradictions should be set aside for the sake of dealing with the major contradiction, the contradiction with Zionism and imperialism. We have never hesitated to support and to back the Palestinian revolution under all circumstances or whatever the sacrifice, out of our conviction that it is part of the Arab revolution, that the struggle of the Palestine revolution is part of the struggle of the Arab people and that it has a part to play in the strategy of the Arab struggle against Israel and imperialism.

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Statement issued by South Yemen warning the Arab countries of US and Israeli ambitions in the Red Sea area²⁰

Beirut, March 16, 1973

With the opening of the Suez Canal, the discovery of oil deposits and the increase in oil production and consumption the strategic importance of the Red Sea as the connecting link between Europe and the Indian Ocean increased. In view of the importance of this seaway, and to safeguard the lines of maritime communication through it, many countries have tried to obtain control over its northern and southern entries. The importance of the Red Sea to the forces of imperialism and Zionism has also increased since the war of June 5, 1967.

If the Suez Canal is the main entry to the Red Sea in the north, Bab al-Mandab is its southern entry. This is why the forces of imperialism and Zionism are casting envious eyes on this strait with a view to imposing their control on it. This

¹⁹ Made in a speech at Damascus University to celebrate the March 8 revolution. Broadcast on Damascus radio in Arabic; excerpted from the partial English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4241/A/8-9; reprinted by permission.

²⁰ Translated from the Arabic text supplied, on request, by the South Yemen Embassy in Beirut.

is clearly shown by the schemes and conspiracies that the imperialist countries and Israel have resorted to with a view to consolidating their presence and their influence in the Red Sea and on its shores. Since the June defeat, increasing moves have been made by America, Britain and Israel to establish a suitable situation in the Red Sea. They have exploited the circumstances of that defeat and the weakness of Arab resources and potentials. These countries, in collusion with Ethiopia and other countries, have carried out their planned strategy aimed at implementing their schemes in the Red Sea. The danger of the steps that imperialism and Zionism have taken to implement their schemes in the Red Sea can be clearly seen if we review the measures taken by these countries to impose their influence on the area.

Britain, which was routed from the area by the people of Democratic Yemen after a people's war of armed liberation lasting more than four years, had, before independence, handed over to Ethiopia certain Yemeni islands including the lighthouses.

Similarly America and Israel have made and are still making great efforts to establish military striking bases on the coast and islands of Ethiopia. Again, imperialism and reaction are realizing more and more that it is in their common interests to impose a situation favourable to them so that they may strike at the forces engaged in liberation struggle throughout the Peninsula and the Gulf. *Imperialist and Israeli Penetration in the Gulf*

The United States and Israel are concentrating their attention on developing their relations with Ethiopia with a view to obtaining extensive facilities on the Ethiopian coast and islands south of the Red Sea. This trend has been increasing in the last few years, for America and Israel, not content with the already existing American military presence in certain areas of Ethiopia, have recently made efforts to consolidate their presence and to penetrate the coast and islands of Eritrea.

It is well known that America already has a military base at Asmara and subsidiary bases in other areas. But the moves of the United States and Israel to secure further military strongpoints on the coast and islands of Ethiopia indicate the dangers that await the southern part of the Red Sea and its southern entries.

The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen has already raised the question of these dangers, drawn the attention of certain Arab countries to them and assisted in providing information disclosing the hostile intentions and actions of imperialism and Zionism in the Red Sea. This information includes the following:

1. In April 1970 Israel leased the Eritrean island of Haleb for the establishment of a military base in the place of the former Italian base.

2. General Haim Bar-Lev, Chief of Staff of the Israeli army, visited Asmara on September 12, 1971, and together with his escorts he also made a rapid visit by military helicopter to the town of Keren, accompanied by General Telhon. They then made a similar visit to Agordat and Tessenei in Eritrea. He and his escorts also flew over the Red Sea coast and inspected the islands of Dahlak and Haleb on which a military airport may well have been built since they were leased in April 1970.

3. The American base in Asmara maintains radio contact and reports and observes movements in the eastern hemisphere. It has radar which covers the eastern part of Africa and the Red Sea, the base acting as liaison between the Far East and America through a branch in Frankfurt. There are in the base about 7000 officers, men, engineers, technicians and doctors. It has its own radio station and television transmitting station with a range of 100 kilometres round Asmara. The base has a military airfield at Gura, southeast of Asmara, fuel stores in Jabal Hamid between Tessenei and Umm Hagar, and rest camps in Keren and Massawa. When the American forces were evacuated from the Wheelus Air Base, they took with them to the Kaino base in Asmara huge cases containing apparatus and arms which no one can investigate because they are being kept in underground stores. Only a few Americans, and no one else, are allowed to approach.

4. Israeli fishing vessels cruise in the Dahlak Archipelago area. On board are Israeli experts who are probably drawing maps and making studies of these islands.

It is being said that Israel intends to establish a radar base on the Dahlak Islands. This will enable her to investigate ships entering the Red Sea from Bab al-Mandab so as to safeguard the sea for her ships and for Ethiopia, which has been

provided with coastguard launches to prevent the infiltration of arms through the Red Sea.

On December 4, 1970 Israel concluded an agreement with Ethiopia by which the latter leased Ras Sintian [Ras Dumeira] on the Eritrean coast opposite Bab al-Mandab to Israel for 25 years. As a matter of interest, Ras Sintian is not more than twenty miles from the island of Perim, which belongs to Democratic Yemen.

Through this base Israel intends to achieve the following:

1. To establish an Israeli air and marine base.
2. To extend her influence over the countries of southern Africa.
3. To develop Israeli shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Red Sea and also the land route linking the port of Ascalon on the Mediterranean with the port of Eilat on the Gulf of Aqaba, and thus minimize the importance of the Suez Canal.
4. To settle Ethiopian Jews known as the Falasha and to train them in agriculture and the use of arms. The gravity of the situation lies in the great influence this base will be able to exert on the central and southern parts of the Arabian peninsula and the threat it will constitute to Arab shipping between Europe and the Arab countries.

In general the strategy of Israeli imperialism in the Red Sea is aimed at achieving the following points:

1. To establish an Israeli presence as a striking force in the area.
2. To ensure the protection of Israel's and the West's trade with the countries of the Third World in general and with the African countries in particular.
3. To safeguard navigation by oil tankers and to establish ports and oil unloading facilities in Israel.
4. To occupy certain Yemeni islands with the assistance of Ethiopia with a view to achieving a future settlement to safeguard the freedom of Israeli navigation.
5. To ensure the permanent presence of the United States of America in the Red Sea by exploiting claims and allegations of a so-called Soviet presence in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean.
6. To break the Arab political blockade of Israel which prevents her from acquiring an outlet to the countries of Africa, South Asia and the Far East.

This dangerous penetration by Israel cannot be seen in isolation from American colonialist policy which has assigned to Iran the role of occupying islands in the Arabian Gulf in order to control the Straits of Hormuz. It is now trying to achieve a similar objective in the Red Sea, aiming to strengthen the hold of its monopolies on Arab oil at a time when its need for Arab oil is increasing. It also wants to safeguard its interests in all ways, from so-called participation agreements to supporting the reactionary regimes in the area. At the same time the military capacity of Iran and Israel is increasing and the Israeli occupation of Arab territories is becoming more firmly established, with all that this involves in the way of continuous plotting against the Arab liberation movement, including the revolution of People's Democratic Yemen.

In spite of the constant efforts of People's Democratic Yemen on behalf of joint Arab action to prevent Israel from reaching the southern entries of the Red Sea, a so-called conference of the Red Sea countries held in Jidda last July excluded People's Yemen and allowed a non-Arab country, Ethiopia, to attend and for purposes other than those that the Arab countries on the Red Sea could have tried to ensure, namely an advanced Arab defence policy to confront these developments and the affirmation that these islands belong to Yemen.

The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen believes that in these circumstances no one Arab country alone can assume the responsibility for confronting this new threat. It therefore believes that the national interest requires that all resources be called on for the achievement of this goal and that, first and foremost, the energies of the Arab countries on the Red Sea, including those of People's Democratic Yemen should be put to good use, instead of being exhausted in the confrontation of the reactionary conspiracy against them, so that they are thereby playing an effective part in efforts to achieve this end.

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Statements by Vice Chairman Hussein of the Iraq Revolutionary Command Council describing Iraq's positive relations with the USSR²¹

Baghdad, March 17, 1973

The Soviets are our friends; there is the strongest friendship and affection between us. They are not Arabs, but they are friends who cooperate with us on the road of the common struggle against imperialism and Zionism and on behalf of progress. It would not be honourable for us to ask them to fight instead of us, and it would neither be manly nor honourable for us to accept that the Soviets should fight instead of us even if they offered to do so. It would be contrary to the meaning of the revolution. The Arab can liberate his own territory, if he is given the chance. We must ask others only for support.

The Soviets can defend themselves, but we are defending the truth. Some people give America, West Germany and Britain every chance and attack the Soviets. Why the attack? Why do we not initiate a positive dialogue?

We must keep the loyalty of the revolutionaries and cooperate honourably and without ambiguity, and we must discuss the point we are coming to in accordance with the formulas of friendship. We must talk as Arabs, as an independent entity, and from an independent viewpoint and approach our friends so as to solve our problems through cooperation.

Certain people organize opinion polls in the press on relations with the USSR. We wish to draw attention to the dangers of this procedure. Discussing the subject in this manner distracts attention from imperialism.

Is it right that things should come to such a pass that we ask the Soviets how much aid they have given? Why do we not ask certain Arab reactionaries how much they have contributed to the Palestine cause?

Certain Arab officials are saying that we do not want either Soviet or American influence. It is true that we reject any kind of colonialist influence,

from whatever foreign country it comes. But why raise the point?

Even babes and sucklings in our country know that America is an enemy, and the object of raising this point is to do harm to the USSR, not to America. They use the name of America in this context as a cover and the aim is to harm the USSR.

Those who are proud of their principles can come closer with their principles inviolate and their higher policy unprejudiced, clearly and straightforwardly and make the other side understand their point of view and their principles.

The Soviets are in favour of implementing Security Council Resolution 242; we advocate a different way of solving the Palestine problem. But in spite of this the Soviets remain our friends, respecting our opinions just as we respect theirs. They have their views and we have ours. We do not dictate our views to them and they do not dictate their views to us in our private affairs.

The Soviets provide us with aid and we bear the responsibility for finding the right formula on the road of common action against imperialism and Zionism. They have never hesitated to provide us with any benefit we have asked of them. The Soviets have their own views, and each side has its own detailed formulas for assessing its interests.

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Speech by President Sadat of Egypt to the National Assembly discussing recent Middle East developments (excerpts)²²

Cairo, March 26, 1973

Today, I want to review matters with you—and I say that we stand before a prominent landmark of the struggle. I can describe this landmark as one to which all of us must be committed. The stage which we are beginning with your decision today is one of all-out confrontation. All of us believe in the work which has been going on abroad and at home that I am going to explain and cite for you. After we see the extent of all this, we must enter this stage—the stage of all-out confrontation—believing in our destiny, so that

²¹ Made in a speech on the occasion of Arab Students' Week; excerpted and translated from the partial Arabic text, *al-Thawra* (Baghdad), March 19, 1973.

²² Broadcast by Cairo radio in Arabic; excerpted from the English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4256/A/3–9; reprinted by permission.

we shall not go astray or hesitate as some did in the previous period.

The stage is a stage of all-out confrontation with all its burdens. Why? During the previous period and since the aggression, and in the past five and a half years, we entered many stages. We entered the stage of steadfastness, we entered the stage of the war of attrition; we made a diplomatic effort in all directions. We took initiatives. We accepted initiatives. We have done everything that can be done in the previous stage, but like our commitment on the first day, we have to commit ourselves to two principles: first, not ceding an inch of land; second, not bargaining over the rights of the Palestinian people.

In all the stages, up to this moment, this commitment continues to stand. It is a specific commitment on which we agreed and on which we have decided because it stems from the conscience and will of our people.

What happened in the previous stage? I begin with the foreign situation, because, as you have seen, we have carried out and continue to carry out intensive diplomatic activities with the five major powers, with Western Europe, with Asia, with our friends in the non-aligned states, with the entire world and with the United Nations.

As I have told you, in the previous stage we were following two parallel lines: military preparations and intensive and continued diplomatic activity. Of course, all this—military preparations and the diplomatic activity—falls within the socialist building to which we are committed in our Charter, in the March 30 statement,²³ and in the national action programme.

We now come to a review of the outcome of diplomatic activity completed so far.

First let me review the Arab situation. I would like to say, as we all can see, that unfortunately there are many negative aspects in the Arab situation. But there are also positive ones. It is true that we did not hold a summit conference. Perhaps it is not the time now to hold a summit conference. In my estimation and in my opinion, holding an Arab summit conference now without preparation would be a shock and this would not be at all in the interests of the battle. A campaign of doubts and vicious psychological warfare started against us at the beginning of 1972, and

I drew attention to it then.

On the first day of 1972—that is January 1, 1972, the US Secretary of State stood up and said that despite Israel's supremacy, it would give it more weapons and increase its supremacy. After this date, for several weeks, reports were leaked every now and then. One was about warships. Another was about the industrialization agreement, which they announced had been concluded between the USA and Israel in November 1971, for the manufacture of US arms in Israel.

The purpose of this psychological war is to strike at our domestic fronts. Israel won a military battle in 1967, but did not achieve any political victory. The problem became even more complicated than before. The aim since the beginning of 1972 has been to strike at our domestic fronts by means of vicious psychological warfare telling the Arabs: It is no use. We shall keep Israel superior and make it even more superior. In other words, you have no choice but to accept the US and Israeli terms.

I have drawn attention to this campaign throughout 1972.

As a result of this vicious campaign—the vicious psychological campaign—a credibility gap was created in the Arab world. They [the Arabs] no longer believe that anybody is going to fight a battle or has the capability to wage a battle. For this reason I say that the call for an Arab summit should come only after the credibility gap is removed. Although no Arab summit conference was held, there are bilateral contacts. For example, the state of the Federation of Arab Republics exists and is composed of Egypt, Syria and Libya. It is moving in slow steps but on firm ground, and it forms a real nucleus of unified Arab work. I take this opportunity before you to greet Syria's people and the Syrian Armed Forces on the northern front. They, as you know, represent a part of the front and of the unified command between Egypt and Syria. I also take this opportunity to greet the Libyan people and their leaders who are participating with us in our battle and who are truly standing by us to face the destiny with us.

There are bilateral contacts and there are indeed positive results stemming from them. It is not the right time yet to disclose these positive results. It is better if we keep them going and if none of our enemies knows anything about them

²³ Doc. 389 in *International Documents on Palestine 1969*.

because what ultimately concerns us is the battle, the battle which is before and above everything else.

There are bilateral contacts and there are positive aspects in the Arab situation despite the negative aspects which we see, such as the situations which have developed recently between Kuwait and Iraq or Jordan's attitude to the resistance and other such attitudes. All these are negative aspects of the Arab situation, but, as I said, there are positive aspects which have really begun to bear fruit so far as the battle is concerned.

Having discussed the Arab situation, I now shift to the Big Five. When we began the campaign of intensive diplomatic contacts—which I talked to you about and which we have been talking about throughout the past period and which are continuing even now—we said we would begin with the Big Five who have the veto right in the Security Council and who have a commitment to peace, the world's peace as a whole regardless of the inclinations of any of these powers.

Hafiz Ismail, the national security adviser, began with a visit to the Soviet Union.²⁴ Here I am interested in telling you that through this visit and then through the visit of General Ahmad Ismail²⁵—which were both made in February—I can report to you that through these two visits we have put our cordial relations with the Soviet Union in their proper perspective and straightened them out completely. This, as you remember, was one of our aims with the Soviet Union. After two long sessions between Secretary Brezhnev and Hafiz Ismail and between Secretary Brezhnev and Ahmad Ismail, I can say that we have put our relations in a proper perspective which is satisfactory to all of us. This, as I said, is one of our aims.

Later, Hafiz Ismail left for London and met with officials there—the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary. Britain said to him, through its Prime Minister and its Foreign Secretary, that it is committed to the position it adopted at Harrogate²⁶ on the Security Council resolution and on the issue. There is nothing new in Britain's position.

Then Hafiz Ismail left for Washington to com-

plete his contact with the five big powers. There was much talk about Hafiz Ismail's visit to Washington because at that time King Hussein had already visited Washington and Golda Meir was about to visit Washington. We had announced our plan long before all this. We said we would make a move and begin with the five major powers.

In order that we may be clear, Hafiz Ismail did not leave from here with an initiative from us, nor did he go to listen to an initiative from them. Hafiz Ismail went to Washington because the US is one of the five big powers which have the right of veto. We wanted to know what went on in the mind of this great power with all its relations with Israel and its influence on our cause. I say this so that matters will be clear. We did not go with an initiative and we did not go to receive an initiative. We went—our contacts were with the big powers which have a responsibility for peace, particularly the USA. Inevitably we had to explore its views and learn what goes on in their minds there in the USA because, as I said, they are a basic party in this issue.

Here there was a pause for a while. Hafiz Ismail met with President Nixon, with Rogers and with Kissinger. It is important to state our position which Hafiz Ismail took with him so that things will be clear. Our position which Hafiz Ismail put before them all—President Nixon, Rogers and Kissinger—is the principled position to which we are committed before our people, the position to which we are committed because it is the only position acceptable to us and to our people. He told them: We have no initiatives. We will not cede an inch of land and will not bargain over the rights of the Palestinian people. This is our position which was presented to President Nixon, Rogers and Kissinger. He [Ismail] explored and we sat and listened to the US position.

I am sorry to tell you that all these contacts indicate one thing: that we must make concessions so that the cause may get moving not [so that it may] be solved. We must make concessions in many and declared forms so that the cause can get moving. The second thing [which the contacts indicate is] that the USA cannot exert pressure on Israel. It is true there was a positive position by President Nixon when he told Hafiz Ismail that the problem is one of how to reconcile complete Egyptian sovereignty over Egyptian territory with the needs of Israeli security.

²⁴ See doc. 57 above.

²⁵ See doc. 64 above.

²⁶ Doc. 272 in *International Documents on Palestine 1970*.

On the face of it, this is a positive statement. When we analyze it we find in it the thinking of the Americans—which is Abba Eban's recent remark: The United States is co-ordinating fully with Israel. The USA has not denied this statement. It was the USA which deliberately leaked the news about the recent arms deal after Golda Meir's visit so as to deter the Arabs. Israel is in agreement with the USA on this and the USA has not denied it.

We would ask: How can Egyptian sovereignty over Egyptian territory be reconciled with the requirements of Israeli security? The points which Hafiz Ismail made plain to them were: we will not cede an inch of land; we will not bargain over the Palestinian people's rights; we will not accept a partial solution; we will not accept a separate settlement.

All the American talk is centred on the requirements of Israeli security. Many, many, many things are being demanded under the phrase "Israeli security"—these are the concessions I told you about. The demilitarization of Sinai is rejected. Giving Israel any right on our land in any form or under the guise of superficial sovereignty is unacceptable. No, we mean what we say. We will not cede an inch of land. Egypt's sovereignty over its territory must be full. Moreover, we will not agree to a solution separately from our Arab brothers, nor will we give up any Arab land or bargain over the Palestinian people's rights.

The gist of the US position is that open concessions must be made to Israel so that it will be satisfied and so that the issue will get moving. The USA does not have the power or the ability to bring pressure on Israel. At the State Department—with Mr. Rogers—there is only the interim solution: the reopening of the Suez Canal and solving the problem by stages. We have given our answer to this. It is totally rejected.

Unfortunately, the essence of the US position is that we are asked to make concessions openly in order to get the questions moving, not to solve it. Open concessions are asked for so that the question may move. In the meantime, we should note that the USA is unable to bring pressure on Israel.

All this was made clear recently by their attitude following Golda Meir's visit to the USA and the deliberate announcement of the USA about the arms deal. I state before you that this matter constitutes a danger which the USA will eventually feel.

The US behaviour, its announcement about the deal, and its supply to Israel of more arms and aid for the colonization and occupation of Arab land constitute an extremely grave situation. What makes it even more grave is that Abba Eban comes out and says that the USA, in agreement with Israel, deliberately made this announcement so as to deter the Arabs. It is an extremely grave situation for which the USA should be held fully responsible. In the meantime, our Arab brothers must review this situation together and make the correct calculations.

On his return, Hafiz Ismail met the West German Chancellor. The West German position is between the two sides. They adhere to some sort of neutrality between the two sides. But if they could possibly play some role—if they were in a position to play some role—they would attempt to do so. However, they adhere to a neutral position between the two sides.

France was occupied with the elections. Contacts will be made with France after the elections, God willing. We all know the true position of France. However, for further clarification, in its capacity as one of the big powers, we must contact France and acquaint it with the latest position, and learn their latest position and everything that is going on in their mind as we are doing with the five big powers.

As for China, I have received a report from Dr. Zayyat who has just concluded his visit to China. China's position is a principled one and is unchanged in its full support for us.

Contacts were not confined to the five big powers, however. As you have seen, it was an intensive diplomatic campaign. Contacts were also held with the non-aligned leaders of Yugoslavia and India and with the Eastern bloc. The First Secretary of the ASU Central Committee, Sayyid Marei, visited the Eastern [socialist] bloc and returned recently from a long trip lasting over 20 days. During this trip he visited five countries of the Eastern bloc. Dr. Zayyat continues his trip to Asia. After he visited China, as we said, he visited India, Pakistan and Iran within the framework of our contacts with the non-aligned leaders, and now he is in Bangladesh.

I have, therefore, covered the positive and negative aspects of the Arab position, our contacts with the five big powers, the current intensive contacts with the East and the West and with the non-aligned states in all directions.

The purpose of this intensive diplomatic activity, as I said, is not to present initiatives nor to expect initiatives to be presented to us or promised to us. We must acquaint the whole world with the stage the battle has reached, with the present phase, and with the way in which the situation has become explosive and liable to erupt at any moment. This was contained in the text of the messages I addressed to the five big powers. I said that the situation is about to explode and that every responsible man in the world should assume his responsibility to world peace; our question can no longer tolerate any more than that which we have already endured.

As I told you, we were proceeding and continue to proceed along two parallel lines: activities related to military rebuilding and preparation by every possible means and intensive diplomatic activity.

We are now emerging from this phase or from this part of our activity in the previous phase. Diplomatic activity was carried out in the previous phase and will continue in the coming phase because political and diplomatic activity and action never ceases, before, during or after the battle. It is a continuous activity which assumes various forms.

It must be borne in mind that there will be political and diplomatic activity before the battle, during the battle and after the battle. With what do we emerge from this stage? The USSR supports our position. It fully understands it. The USSR stands with us. As I said, our relations with the USSR have recovered and we have put them in their proper framework. We have always been eager to place these relations in that framework.

After all that I have said, I think it is quite clear that the USA wants us to surrender by stages or on the basis of a partial solution or separate solution or through concessions which will make us lose everything. All end in surrender, in one stage, or by stages. The United States also insists on another thing: negotiations between us and Israel. It is important to me that I make the decision in front of you because this decision springs from our people. The decision is that it [negotiations with Israel] is rejected in form and substance.

The United States is giving Israel aid and it announced that it will maintain Israel's superiority. It announced and leaked out this information

deliberately in order to deter us, the Arabs, psychologically, with aid and the continuation of aid to Israel in the coming stage. It is a psychological war against our domestic front, against us internally. There is one point or sign which is as clear as day. This is the United States' position. This is a basic element in the battle we are living in.

Today, the United States is escalating the situation in agreement with Israel to shake our domestic front. They defeated our armed forces in 1967. We rebuilt these forces. This time they want to defeat the willpower of our people. They want to make us shatter internally, to shatter us as a people. Obviously the armed forces will not be able to play their role, if we, as a people, are shattered and fragmented. If we disagree, if we are influenced by suspicions, disputes, divisions, ideologies and other things which some wanted to circulate; if this takes place, the United States or Israel will not need a battle because we will collapse internally and then the issue will come to an end and they will not need to wage a battle.

They said it in Western Europe while we were talking with them. They said that unless the world feels your presence and feels that you have a cause, it will not pay attention to you or feel that you are there. Only you can make the world feel your presence. Neither the United States nor the USSR, only you and your move can achieve this. The upshot of the situation concerning the diplomatic contacts is that we must assume full responsibility for telling the world, like Vietnam and others have done, that we have a cause. We should do this on the basis of a move on our part, an earnest military move, an earnest political move and a move in every direction. Unless this happens the world will not feel our presence. The cause will continue to languish. The maximum they will offer will be the partial solution, the interim solution and the other talk we have been hearing.

My meeting with you today to discuss this stage, which I call a landmark and a stage of all-out confrontation, was due to take place in November. This meeting was supposed to take place in November in accordance with the summer calculations. You remember that at the opening of the People's Assembly in October, I said that I summoned the War Minister, the Prime Minister and the ASU Secretary in August and I gave them my views on the coming stage. In August, I believed that we were about to enter this stage which I am discussing

with you today, in order to approve it and the commitments and sacrifices it requires—in order that we have a clear vision. This meeting with you was due to take place in November. But in view of conditions, which, as I once said, it was not the right time yet to disclose, the meeting was postponed. Today, we are meeting in order to enter this stage.

I mean to say that this stage was calculated and has been taken into account since last summer by all the top officials of the state. The planning for this was in force. This means we are proceeding in accordance with a plan and a strategy. Questions do not arise just because certain events occur and influence us or changes take place and make us deviate from our aim or battle.

The useful lesson which we learnt clearly is that in order for the world to feel your presence, life must throb in you first and you must tell the world: I am alive and I can change situations militarily and politically.

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Speech to the nation by President Sadat of Egypt explaining his assumption of the Prime Minister's office²⁷

Cairo, March 26, 1973

In the name of God, brothers and sisters, members of the Egyptian people,

I decided that it was incumbent on me to come to you myself to acquaint you with a decision we took today, after profitable discussion and deliberation, at a joint meeting of the Central Committee of the ASU and the National Assembly, to the effect that I myself should assume the office of Prime Minister in addition to the responsibilities which, as you know, I already bear.

In order that you may be aware of the broad outlines of what we have been thinking and on which we have decided, I think it right that I should set before you certain considerations and request you to think about them and turn them over in your minds with me for a time.

Firstly, when I assumed constitutional responsibility and took the oath before the National

Assembly in November 1970, I realized that I was faced with three main commitments:

1. The Charter as a way to social change and as a means of ensuring that such change continues.

2. The Statement of March 30 as an affirmation of democratic practice and a safeguard for its principles.

3. Insistence on liberating the occupied Arab territories and insistence on our right to freedom and, indeed, to life.

These commitments I have borne as a sacred trust, relying on God and on you, in difficult circumstances which you are the first to appreciate.

Secondly, you and I together lived through the experience of May 15, 1971, aware that certain negative aspects of our great experience were only awaiting the opportunity to strike at the experience itself and liquidate its achievements and positive aspects.

It was our stand together on that day that upheld the framework of that great experience of the Revolution of July 23 and banished from it the nightmare that had threatened it.

Thirdly, there can be no doubt that great work was achieved throughout the nearly thirty months during which we were confronted with so many tasks and challenges, but I will not conceal from you the fact that there were certain shortcomings in our work and that sometimes action has not been up to the level of promises.

For this there have been many reasons, among them being certain remnants of the past that have affected the present, even in the manner of thinking. As a result certain of our organizations have been occupied with side battles that have no connection with the goals of the general struggle.

Another reason is the fact that our internal front has been the object of frantic efforts by those who do not want this people to exercise its right and responsibilities and who are upset and offended that Egypt should be strong through our Arab nation and that our Arab nation should be strong through Egypt—an Egypt that is capable of opening up the road of comprehensive progress and attaining its great human goals.

Another reason is the difficult circumstances that have been so harsh for so many of us, and the fact that some people could not understand the extent of their roles or the best way to perform them.

In addition to all this there have been conspiracies which have today been disclosed to the

²⁷ Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), March 27, 1973.

Central Committee and the National Assembly. These conspiracies have failed to achieve their goals, but they have posed problems we could have done without, which have been exploited abroad against our homeland and its image.

Brothers and sisters, from all this I reached a situation in which I found myself obliged to reconcile a variety of considerations that will eventually achieve for us that which we under no other circumstances could ever forget.

I was faced with two considerations:

The first was that there are tasks which must be done on the home front, and done without delay, because they constitute, or could constitute, a danger to our strength.

The second was that there is constant and escalating confrontation between us and the enemy and we cannot disengage; on the contrary, we must engage more intensely.

The only course open to us was to unify the responsibility entirely at this stage. I did not want to come to this decision, for one of the things I am proud of is the fact that I have always striven to ensure that power in our homeland should belong to state institutions representing the working forces of the people and expressing their will.

I had to choose between two possible solutions:

Either to wait until our internal situation was fully organized, or continue as we were, confronting situations that I regarded as inadequate.

As far as I was concerned, the first—that we should wait until the internal situation was fully organized—was unacceptable, and the second—that we should confront our battle in our present situation—involved risks that were better avoided.

This was why we agreed that it was necessary to unify responsibilities at this stage, without this prejudicing the basic philosophy of a state of institutions. So as to provide stronger safeguards for these, we agreed on the following:

Firstly, that this arrangement should last only for a specific period and until a specific task was completed.

Secondly, that to achieve the greatest possible participation in the direction of the coming stage of the struggle of destiny, the joint conference of the Central Committee and the National Assembly should cooperate in organized activity throughout the period which made the decisions we had taken necessary, that all policies should be submitted to the joint conference, and that their decisions

and their follow-up should conform to what was decided during the debates.

In this way, while deciding to unify responsibility, we should have expanded the sphere of participation to the greatest possible extent.

Brothers and sisters, I know what your aspirations are, and if I pray Almighty God for anything it is that He may grant that any of us who bears responsibility, whatever his position, may succeed in giving true expression to your hopes and be devoted to the achievement of his goal.

May God Almighty grant you success; He is the Strong, the Omnipotent, the Wise.

May His favour be a guide and true support. God's mercy and peace be on you.

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Press interview statements by President Sadat of Egypt expressing disappointment in US Middle East policy and warning of the inevitability of war²⁸

Cairo, March 29, 1973

Q. You said this week that the U.S. wanted you to make "public concessions" in order to get things moving again. What exactly happened between Hafez Ismail [Mr. Sadat's national security adviser], Nixon, Kissinger and Rogers. What sort of concessions was Washington talking about?

A. The theory in Washington's mind about public concessions was so astonishing that I think if Hafez Ismail had conducted these talks with Golda Meir the results would have been less ridiculous. They asked for a declaration about the legitimate position of the Israeli case. Also for one-sided commitments for the benefit of Israel. For the demilitarization of Sinai, they have not and will not exert any pressure on Israel. Quite the contrary. For the first time we see total and complete agreement between the U.S. and Israel on Middle Eastern policy. Eban confirmed it. And no one in Washington denied it. And on the heels of Hafez Ismail's mission, Washington released the details of the new Phantom deal and aid for the development of Israel's new homelands

²⁸ Interview conducted by Arnaud de Borchgrave, *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), April 2, 1973, pp. 1-2; a slightly abridged version appeared in *Newsweek* (New York-International edition), April 9, 1973, pp. 10-11. Copyright *International Herald Tribune* 1973.

fighter-bomber. Everything was discouraging. Complete failure and despair sums it up.

Q. Are you still prepared, as you were two years ago, to sign a final peace agreement with Israel in return for withdrawal?

A. Before I agreed to send Hafez Ismail to the U.S. I sent four questions to Washington. 1) From Nixon on down, I wrote, everyone says there are special relations between the U.S. and Israel, so please tell me what are the dimensions of this relationship and the repercussions it will have on any talks we have together. 2) Is it really in the benefit of our talks to give Israel this flood of economic and military aid which can only result in making Israel more obstinate and how can this help us reach a peaceful solution. 3) When I made my initiative in February, 1971,²⁹ (final peace agreement, recognition of the state of Israel, freedom of navigation, etc. in return for withdrawal) I was genuine and told you it was a test of peace. Rogers told me it was now up to Israel. But Israel told you it was just the beginning of Egyptian concessions. In view of your complete retreat since then, I asked Washington, what will be the results of our talks. 4) Before we begin our talks it must be clearly understood there can be no question of ceding any part of our occupied territory.

Washington's answer was not agreeable. It even used Israeli terminology, I replied that Hafez Ismail could not go under these circumstances. Forty-eight hours later came another answer that was agreeable. So I agreed to send him. Why did I put these points across?

As I told Nixon I wanted a successful effort with the U.S. for an overall settlement. I made it very clear—let's take the occupation of our land out of the debate and begin to look at a complete solution and a vision of the future for the area for decades to come. So my intentions were quite clear. Yes, I want a final peace agreement with Israel. But there was no response from the U.S. or Israel—except to supply Israel with more Phantoms.

Q. Has Washington indicated there will be another U.S. initiative after Brezhnev's visit to Washington in June?

A. No sign of anything. My main difficulty with the United States ever since my first correspondence with Nixon Dec. 24, 1970, has been to

get the administration to take a position in the conflict and put it on paper. To this day there is no solid position paper on the whole problem. Rogers has said that your commitment to Israel does not extend to the occupation of our land. But that never became official policy. All we see is retrogression—to the point where Eban now states your policy for you.

Q. You gave your ministers two months to find solutions for various internal problems. A statement after your first cabinet meeting this week spoke of "a new era." Does this mean that Sadat has a plan for peace?

A. All my plans, all my work is for peace. But more concessions after everything we have offered is simply not on. I told my ministers yesterday that we had suffered a very humiliating defeat in 1967 but then so had the Soviet Union. When the Germans got to within 15 kilometers of Moscow. They, too, were a backward nation then. After 30 years they have become a superpower. Let us, too, take our defeat for building a new state.

Q. Wouldn't the advantage go to the side that takes a positive diplomatic initiative to break the deadlock? Isn't diplomacy your most effective weapon for moving the problem off a dead center?

A. I have just completed contacts with all of the big five, including China, with West and East Europeans and the non-aligned countries. There is only one conclusion—if we don't take our case in our own hands there will be no movement, especially given Washington's ridiculous ideas evidenced by Hafez Ismail's trip. I'm not begging. There is no sense turning the clock back. Everything I've done leads to pressure for more concessions. I was even told by Rogers that my initiative for a final peace agreement with Israel was very courageous and had transformed the situation. Every door I have opened has been slammed in my face by Israel—with your blessings.

Q. Couldn't you add a fresh dimension to Israel's forthcoming electoral battle by giving Israelis a more generous vision of the future than the present semi-permanent occupation of Arab lands? Why not encourage the doves in Israel, rather than the hawks?

A. There are no doves or hawks on the other side—only Israelis. They have convinced themselves that they are quite happy where they are. It's hopeless to change it. Everything we have offered hasn't made the slightest difference in their

²⁹ Doc. 274 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

outlook. The fact that we want a new era of peace with Israel after they give up their occupation hasn't made a dent. And when the Libyan airliner was shot down with 108 civilians killed, every paper in Israel backed this barbarian act. So how can I change their thinking? The situation is hopeless, and—make no mistake—highly explosive.

Q. What incentive does the U.S. have to pressure Israel? How can you persuade the major powers that a change in the status quo would be better for all parties concerned? Some geopoliticians are now arguing that with the Soviets out of Egypt and the Arab oil producers not openly hostile to the U.S. (because of the fortunes they are making), there is no pressing reason for change.

A. From one aspect that is correct. But the U.S. will be committing the gravest error in its history if it continues to believe we are crippled and can't take action. The situation here will—mark my words—be much worse than Vietnam. Because here your vital interests are at stake. You Americans always use computers to solve geopolitical equations and they always mislead you. McNamara warned Johnson that by feeding the wrong data into the computers he was getting all the wrong answers. Well, McNamara was right and Johnson was wrong—and compelled to abdicate. You simply forgot to feed Vietnamese psychology into the computer. I told Muskie at this very table you have overlooked one factor—Arab psychology. I am quite ready to entertain a happy rosy future in the area for all parties if we have peace based on justice. Otherwise this will be the nightmare to end all nightmares—and everybody will be losers.

Q. What would it take to break the deadlock at this juncture?

A. I've done my best. I've run out of ideas.

Q. Last July, after the withdrawal of Soviet military advisers from Egypt, you told me Nixon would be in for a long hot autumn? What did you mean?

A. I had my plans at that time, but they were changed for many reasons. I gave my word that I would await the American elections before moving. I waited and again my plans were interrupted.

Q. To whom did you give your word and by whom were the plans interrupted?

A. Many circles. But now the time has come for a decision. After all our contacts, the situation

has become very clear. The time has come for a shock. Diplomacy will continue before, during and after the battle.

Q. You mentioned in your speech this week that some European friends told you nothing would happen unless you did something to show you cared about your cause. Who are they and what did they mean?

A. All West Europeans are telling us the same thing. And what's more they are right. Everyone has fallen asleep over the Mideast crisis. But they will soon wake up to the fact that Americans have left us no other way out.

Q. I can only conclude from what you say that a resumption of hostilities is the way out?

A. You are quite right. Everything in this country is now being mobilized in earnest for the resumption of the battle.

Q. Washington would like to conciliate Israel security requirements with your own sovereignty over occupied territory. Why should the two needs be incompatible?

A. If you are talking about real sovereignty, they are not incompatible. But Washington is talking about nominal Egyptian sovereignty over Sinai. Let me be frank, this issue of Israeli security is a catch-all. We, too, need security. They are occupying territories in three Arab countries. The U.S. is giving them the most up-to-date weaponry. They are striking deeper and deeper into Lebanon. Backed by the United States they are trying to impose their will in the area. Hitler couldn't do it. And they won't succeed either.

Q. Why would a demilitarized Sinai be an infringement on Egyptian security?

A. Because they can come back anytime they want in a few hours. In 1956, when Golda Meir was foreign minister during the Suez War, she declared the annexation of Sinai, remember? They are after land and expansion.

Q. But is the present situation better than a demilitarized Sinai?

A. Let's see if they can stay like this. I say they can't and you will soon see who was right.

Q. Golda Meir has indicated that Israel's only security interest in Sinai is Sharm el-sheikh. Isn't this worth exploring anew? Why do you consider compromise so shameful? Enemies are compromising their differences

all over the world these days and, as a result, becoming former enemies. Why should you be so different?

A. We will agree to anything for Sharm and to guarantee freedom of navigation except Israeli occupation. We will turn it over to the international community under any formula they think desirable—the Big Five of the Security Council, including China, with their troops, or neutral forces, under their guarantee. What more can you ask of me? But to have Israeli troops come and go as they please into Sharm is out of the question.

Q. *In the light of the Khartoum incident, would you agree that an organization like Black September has now developed a power of veto over anything they disagree with on the diplomatic front?*

A. Anything can happen when people are that desperate. You can't ignore them in any future settlement. In Vietnam you sat down with all sides. Why not in the Mideast?

Q. *You mean it might behoove Kissinger to sit down with Arafat?*

A. (In an aside to presidential adviser Ashraf Ghorbal)—That's an intelligent question (and then turning to me) but it's up to them to decide. Perhaps it's a new approach.

Q. *How can you be better prepared today than before the Soviets withdrew?*

A. They never had a political role here. In my four summit meetings with them I always mentioned two principles—1) We are not in need of a single Soviet soldier and 2) We do not intend to provoke a confrontation between the superpowers to help us liberate our land.

Q. *What about equipment?*

A. They are providing us now with everything that's possible for them to supply. And I am now quite satisfied.

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Political report of the General Secretariat of the Arab Front Participating in the Palestine Revolution (excerpts)³⁰

Beirut, March 31, 1973

The meeting of the General Secretariat heard a political report submitted by the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization. This report and the tasks set out in it met with the approval of all parties attending the meeting, and in the light of it the General Secretariat came up with the following observations and resolutions:

4. The General Secretariat has studied all the attempts made by the Israeli enemy, through his repeated aggressions against a number of confrontation countries and against the Palestinian camps, to intimidate these countries into curbing and checking the Palestine resistance. In the light of this study it believes that the principal task facing the nationalist forces and regimes, if they are to affirm their solidarity with the resistance, is to ensure its freedom of action and to challenge the Israeli policy of intimidation by granting the resistance full rights as regards political, mass and armed action.

If we are to cut the ground under the feet of the enemies of our nation and follow the course of liberation, it is essential that the resistance should enjoy freedom of action; also that the Arab masses and all their nationalist and progressive forces, and their most prominent commands, should obtain their full democratic freedoms, and that repression of them should be checked. For they are the principal forces that have an interest in progress and social change, and in repelling the

³⁰ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Anba'* (Beirut), April 6, 1973; the Secretariat met March 30–31, 1973, under the Chairmanship of the Front's General Secretary Kamal Junblat and with representatives from the Arab Socialist Union of Libya, the Arab Socialist Union of Egypt, the Algerian National Front Party, the National Command of the Baath Party, the Sudanese Communist Party, the National Front of the Democratic Republic of Yemen, the National Movement of the Arab Gulf, the International Confederation of Arab Trades Unions, the Nationalist and Progressive Parties and Forces of Lebanon (the Lebanese Communist Party, the Baath Party Organization, the Baath Party, the Lebanese Movement for the Support of Fatah, the Organization for Communist Action, the Arab Socialist Labour Party and the Progressive Socialist Party).

imperialist Zionist attack so that the Palestine revolution may be supported.

5. The General Secretariat welcomes the positive steps taken along the road towards the strengthening of cooperation and unity between the various sections of the Palestine resistance.

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Statement issued by the PLO Executive Committee accusing the CIA of planning and executing Israel's Beirut raid (excerpt)³¹

Beirut, April 10, 1973

Masses of our great people,
Arab masses everywhere,

The attack that took place in Beirut at 1:00 a.m. today, April 10, 1973, was directed against a number of the leaders of the Palestinian revolution—Muhammad Yusuf Najjar (Abu Yusuf), Kamal Nasir and Kamal Udwan—as well as against a number of the revolution's positions. This attack has clearly and decisively disclosed not only the plans and goals of the American-Zionist conspiracy but also its practical implementation.

All the facts known to the revolution indicate that the operation was planned and executed by American intelligence and its agents in Beirut, the Zionist enemy's role in it being restricted to providing information cover and misleading military action in the form of an attack on a garage in Sidon and moves by gunboats and helicopters near Beirut to create the impression that it was an external, not an internal operation. This is made clear by the conflicting reports concerning this operation broadcast by the enemy radio and by the fact that a number of the killers took refuge in the American embassy.

What happened in Beirut today was part of a plan for all-out liquidation which the enemies of our revolution and our nation are trying to carry out in order to push through the treacherous liquidation solutions that are starting to appear on the Arab horizon. All of us must therefore increase our vigilance, caution and preparedness to confront the comprehensive campaign aimed at

destroying the revolution and that will to reject, defy and fight throughout the Arab homeland, which was embodied by these martyred heroes.

The American imperialist camp, which has for so long been making such an uproar about terrorism and terrorists, has by this operation disclosed its ugly face and left all ten fingerprints as irrefutable evidence of the bloody terrorist activities engaged in by the American CIA, the Zionist enemy and their agents in the area. All struggling forces in the Arab homeland must reply with the most relentless forms of revolutionary violence against all kinds of imperialist presence in our territory.

Masses of our people,

The Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization promises our masses to make all the facts available to them and undertakes to proceed with the march of armed struggle until victory is won. It will see to it that the blood of the martyrs was not shed in vain, for the revolution is capable of replying with violence and force to any aggression.

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Statement by Progressive Socialist Party leader Junblat of Lebanon accusing the government of Lebanon of laxity in responding to Israel's raid in Beirut and suggesting corrective measures (excerpts)³²

Beirut, April 13, 1973

Brothers,

Recent events have disclosed the following:

1. That the established authorities have no intention, in any circumstances whatsoever, of replying to any Israeli aggression, great or small, against the territory of Lebanon and the lives and possessions of her people, and that, on the rare occasions it has done so, on the southern borders, the intention has been to deceive and cover up.

³¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), April 10, 1973, p. 5.

³² Statement read at a press conference on behalf of the Lebanese nationalist and progressive parties; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Muharrir* (Beirut), April 14, 1973.

2. That the Lebanese authorities are not prepared to defend the sections and commands of the Palestine revolution against Israeli raids even if these raids are on the capital and its suburbs. They watch and wait and do not intervene. There has been collusion, both in principle and in practice, between the ruling authorities and the leaders of Israel in their attempts to destroy the Palestine revolution everywhere in Arab territory that the Palestinians have taken refuge.

The facts that have been disclosed about the recent Israeli commando raid in Beirut prove that the authorities did not order the Lebanese army to oppose the Israeli landing, although every army in the world—including the Lebanese army—has contingency plans for immediate resistance to any aggression against Lebanese territory, without referring to the political leadership, only later informing it of the action taken and asking for further orders from the political command, since the duty of self-defence and the urgent requirements of defence demand rapid action and automatic resistance. Nor did the Prime Minister, Minister of the Interior,³³ order the security forces, who were only fifty metres away from the site of the assassinations, to proceed there, although in the mobile gendarmerie barracks there were hundreds of officers and men and dozens of armoured cars. Thus, if only a hundred men and one officer had gone into action with three armoured cars they could have stopped the infiltration of the thirty Israelis into the heart of the city and its suburbs, surrounded them and taken them prisoners and frustrated their criminal plan in the area mentioned.

From these observations and basic facts it is clear that it is now the duty of every loyal and patriotic Lebanese who fears molestation by Israel in one form or another, to take steps to ensure his own defence. It is also clear that the reasoning of the authorities, their criminal pretexts and scandalous slackness mean that our Palestinian brothers must not rely on the Lebanese authorities to protect their lives. They did rely on them to protect the homes of the late Kamal Nasir, Abu Yusuf [Muhammad Najjar] and Kamal Udwan, but they

did nothing. On previous occasions these authorities have given orders neither to the security forces nor to the army to intervene against Israeli aggression against the camps of our Palestinian brothers and the leaders of the Palestinian people in Tyre, Sidon, Sarafand, al-Badawi near Tripoli or other parts of Lebanon.

In the view of the parties and the National Committee the proper policy for the defence of Lebanon should be based on the following obvious points:

1. Securing air defence by ground-to-air missile batteries, especially around the principal towns, the capital and strategic points, and to protect the South from incursions into its air space by Israeli aircraft.

2. Securing the defence of the coasts of Lebanon by the purchase of a number of swift vessels armed with torpedoes and guided missiles in the manner of Soviet and other craft.

3. Securing greater quantities of anti-armour equipment and shells and establishing an electronic reconnaissance network.

4. Forming a national guard which would automatically be alerted in every village or area to oppose Israeli raids or infiltration by commandos.

5. Implementing the project for compulsory military service and compulsory popular social development service. Meanwhile, until such time as the authorities abandon their attitude of slackness as regards the defence of the Lebanese and the Palestine revolution and its leadership, and a sound practical plan genuinely aimed at the protection of the existence and independence of Lebanon is drawn up, it is quite clearly the legitimate right and duty of the Palestine resistance to take such steps as it deems necessary to ensure its safety from Israeli raids and the security of its leaders.

³³ Lebanese Prime Minister Saib Salam was also Minister of the Interior.

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Statement by the Arab Front Participating in the Palestine Revolution criticizing Lebanon's policy regarding the recent Israeli raid in Beirut (excerpts)³⁴

Beirut, April 16, 1973

The General Secretariat of the Arab Front Participating in the Palestine Revolution held an extraordinary meeting on Saturday, April 14, 1973, during which it discussed the two reports submitted by representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Lebanese Nationalist Movement on the recent Israeli aggression against the Lebanese capital: the events that led up to it and the actual events that took place, and its consequences and implications. Discussion of the subject convinced the General Secretariat of the Arab Front Participating in the Palestine Revolution of the following main points:

3. The incidents surrounding the recent raid disclosed that the Lebanese authorities are still pursuing a policy of absolute refusal to take any measures to resist Israeli attacks, whatever their extent and however far they penetrate into Lebanese territory. This policy has enabled Israel to launch her attacks and strike her blows when and where she likes. These have included: repeated destructive raids on South Lebanon, which have become a normal daily occurrence, entering villages, destroying houses and killing citizens on the pretext of pursuing commandos; setting up road blocks in Lebanese territory; searching passers-by and checking their identity cards; building roads and setting up permanent control and guard posts; assassinating individuals; bombing the camps from the air; operating, not only in the South, but in all parts of Lebanon, including the heart of the capital. It is this official policy of surrender which has eventually made it possible for Israeli aggression to become a police force for internal repression which carries out its operations in absolute freedom with no need to fear that its forces will sustain any losses.

If the recent Israeli raid disclosed the extent of official negligence in this field, it also disclosed the truth about the policy pursued vis-à-vis the

resistance movement. While Israel is waging an all-out war against the Palestine revolution throughout the world, openly affirming her determination to liquidate its principal bases, the Lebanese authorities are tightening the stranglehold on the resistance, preventing it from controlling the centres of possible Israeli infiltration and landing and from establishing advanced guard posts which could at least give warning of the start of an attack, restricting its freedom of movement and of transferring combatants from one place to another, preventing them from bearing arms, even if they are not visible, and in general making it an extremely difficult and complicated task to guard the revolution's commands against Zionist terrorism. Similarly, not content with standing idly by in the face of aggression that is a flagrant violation of the integrity of Lebanese territory, the Lebanese authorities also pursue a restrictive policy vis-à-vis the Palestine resistance, aiming eventually to deprive it of its ability to defend itself. The results of this policy were disclosed in a flagrant manner during the night of the latest raid on Beirut.

After every Israeli aggression the authorities have imposed further restrictions on the freedoms of the Palestinian people and their national rights. In the last few days the leaders of Lebanese reaction have started to advocate this course openly, this time demanding not only that the activities of the armed resistance be restricted but that the whole of the Palestinian people be isolated and deprived of their capacity for movement once and for all.

4. Official Lebanese policy, the policy of turning a blind eye to repeated Israeli aggressions and increasingly restricting the activities of the resistance movement, tries to justify itself on the basis of the increasingly serious concessions that are such a prominent feature of the Arab situation at the official level. We therefore cannot distinguish between what is going on in Lebanon at present, the silence of the Arab fronts and the growth of surrenderist trends vis-à-vis American inflexibility and Israeli pressure, and the consequent subjection of the Palestine resistance movement and the masses who are in solidarity with it in more than one Arab country to increasing restriction, blockade and repression of their democratic and national freedoms.

In the light of the above the General Secretariat of the Arab Front Participating in the Palestine

³⁴ The statement was read by the Front's General Secretary Kamal Junblat at a news conference; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Muharrir* (Beirut), April 17, 1973.

Revolution has decided to adopt the following resolutions:

1. Absolute support for the Palestine resistance movement in Lebanon in its struggle to establish its legitimate rights and its duty to take all measures it deems necessary to ensure its safety against Israeli raids, to ensure the security of its leaders and to have the means to resist the Zionist enemy and to warn against any interference with the national rights of the Palestinian people under any pretext whatsoever.

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Statement by President Assad of Syria calling for greater determination in the face of the US-Zionist alliance³⁵

Damascus, April 16, 1973

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Our enemy is treacherous and vicious. He now publicly speaks about his ambitions after previously concealing them. He has no scruples in adopting any criminal method in order to implement his plan. The most obvious example of this is the ugly crime he committed in sisterly Lebanon. Now Israeli leaders are daily asserting, and in public, that their crimes will continue in an even more violent manner.

What happened in Beirut recently indicates how far the enemy can go in his crimes. It also proves that the enemy does not differentiate between one Arab country and another, except in so far as this serves his unchanging strategy, which is aimed eventually at building a greater Israel and at the political and economic domination of the Arab homeland in the interest of Zionism and imperialism.

Also, Israel's crime in Beirut and the subsequent debate at the Security Council increasingly clarify the fact that the United States is a ferocious and rancorous enemy of our Arab nation. It also increases our people's conviction concerning the futility of expecting any useful action by the world organization.

Our people's will and the firmness of our masses, our armed forces' readiness, and our nation's capabilities are the things we rely on in our fight against Zionism and imperialism.

To belittle the strength of the foe is a grave mistake and to despair concerning our ability to confront and overpower him is an even greater mistake. This makes it incumbent upon us not to relax our preparations for the confrontation at the right time. We must realize in this regard that Israel has benefited from the Arab nation's mistakes more than it has benefited from its own strength. Israel has never really confronted a united Arab force. It has only confronted divided and dispersed forces. This is our fatal weakness.

The Arab masses, which are angered and pained, wonder how long our Arab forces will remain idle and only our nation's weaknesses projected. These masses have a right to ask, because every delay in using Arab resources and capabilities means increasing the pains of the Arab masses. It also means the expansion and spread of the Zionist danger to include more Arab countries.

Every effort made at the opportune time and every capability utilized in the right place and time will alleviate these pains and bring the day of victory nearer. We must realize that if the enemy is in control of our land, then money and wealth will be of no use and our future generations, on whose shoulders will fall the onus of the battle, will not forgive our generation for its failure.

Brother citizens, the danger and ambitions of Zionism threaten the entire Arab homeland. The leaders of Zionism themselves daily reveal these dangers and ambitions. The danger is menacing every Arab man and everything that is Arab. This danger can be repelled only by a complete national Arab effort. The way to achieve this effort is to build a strong domestic front in every country and to mobilize resources on the level of the Arab homeland. Then our nation will find at its disposal vast resources capable of tipping the balance of power in the struggle against Zionism and imperialism and sufficient to achieve victory against Israel and those who back it.

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³⁵ Made in a speech to mark Evacuation Day, April 17; broadcast by Damascus radio in Arabic; partial English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4274/A/1-2; reprinted by permission.

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Policy statement of the government of Egypt (excerpts)³⁶**Cairo, April 21, 1973**

The Government believes that it must put before the masses and their representatives the truth which we have deduced from our past political moves in all clarity and determination. This truth makes this stage a crucial one and one of life and death. There is no alternative for us but to carry arms to defend right and the responsibilities which are dictated by our duty towards our homeland and all Arab territory.

The Government's programme for the battle is one of total and complete mobilization of all material and human resources that ensure the waging of the battle of dignity and duty. All the material and human resources in the land of Egypt are in the service of the battle in order to achieve victory, God willing.

All of us, Government and people, appreciate with all pride the exhausting effort which our armed forces are exerting to rebuild themselves and their hard training to grasp the use of modern weapons. Our armed forces are also preparing their theatre of operations according to the most up-to-date methods.

In the process of preparation for the battle of liberation, our armed forces have set up complete co-ordination with all the fronts which will wage the battle of destiny with us, including the Palestine Resistance.

On this occasion, all of us greet the valiant soldiers of Egypt who are facing the forces of evil and aggression. It pleases me to declare from this platform, which represents the voice of the people, our appreciation for their historic stand and the great hope which we pin on them and on what they stand for as far as the dignity of this land and the future of this great nation are concerned.

We will continue to conduct the battle of building for the future with the same determination and hope which the Government plans for the stage of total confrontation. We will continue building

a strong Egypt, an Egypt of the future which will possess the material and spiritual prerequisites that ensure a degree of dignity in life for each of its sons and that enables it to perform its historic and humane role, a role which it has performed through the various historic stages. We cannot delay the battle until building is completed and we cannot afford to delay building until the battle is finished.

With this alone we can transcend the defeat and make of it an incentive for our homeland's material and spiritual building that will ensure protection, security and a dignified life for it in the future.

The fact that the battles of liberation and construction which our people will wage are historic and decisive battles leads us to define the method of action to which the government will adhere. It is a method which is based on basic principles derived from our glorious revolution, the Charter, the 30th March statement, the national action programme and the Constitution and which safeguards and strengthens the revolution's achievements. These principles are:

1. Full adherence to our proclaimed principle that not one inch of Arab territory will be ceded and that the rights of the Palestinian people will not be squandered.

2. Sincerity and frankness are a basic element to which the Government commits itself before the people. They are the only methods for guaranteeing that the people will vigilantly, ably and faithfully participate in everything which the Government intends to do.

These resolutions will follow our review of the broad lines of the policies of the various ministries. Briefly, these policies are as follows:

Foreign policy: the Government will continue its concentrated political and diplomatic efforts to liberate the Arab land and secure the rights of the Palestinian people.

The efforts exerted by Egypt since the beginning of this year in the field of foreign affairs have included wide-ranging contacts aimed at acquainting the world with the facts of the situation in the Middle East and its serious consequences for the future of world peace.

These contacts have covered the five big powers in view of their special responsibility for peace. These contacts have also covered the non-aligned

³⁶ Statement read by Minister of Information Muhammad Hatim to the National Assembly and broadcast by Cairo radio in Arabic; excerpted from the English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4277/A/6-7, 8-9; reprinted by permission.

and European states. The escalation of our political efforts has been coupled with tension on the military front. Through this tension, Israel has tried to thwart the aims of our efforts and to consolidate its political and military advantages over the frontline states.

Israel has been encouraged to continue its defiance of all peace attempts by the continuous political, military and economic support it receives from the United States. The United States, as the Chairman of the US Senate's Foreign Relations Committee said, shoulders a major responsibility for the maintenance of the state of war in the Middle East.

The recent Israeli attack on Lebanon was a new link in the chain of criminal operations which the Israeli Government has been conducting for the past 25 years as part of its planned policy. Israel has adopted a new imperialist role for itself in the area, a role which it is implementing by force, terrorism and threats with the aim of consolidating its foothold in the occupied territory and destroying the Palestinian identity.

In the face of the escalating Israeli challenges, the Government decided to send its Foreign Minister to New York to participate in the UN Security Council debate for the purpose of trying to ensure that the world organization adopts practical measures against the Israeli aggression against Lebanon, and for the purpose of submitting the whole Middle East question to the Council through a complete and thorough study of all UN resolutions since June 1967 till the present.

That the Middle East question is moving to this new stage necessitates a wide-scale mobilization of Arab and international support.

Egypt's diplomatic round during February and March once more affirmed the following:

1. That the attitudes of friendship and support adopted by the peoples and Governments of the USSR, the socialist countries and the non-aligned states in Africa, Asia and Latin America have continued and deepened.

2. That the attitudes of the Western European states whose interests and security are linked with peace in the Middle East and who see in it a creative force capable of making a positive contribution to world prosperity and progress have developed independently.

3. That the US Government sympathizes with Israeli policy and continues to bolster its capabilities

while reluctantly recognizing our rights of sovereignty over our territory.

Therefore, the US Government is requested today to shoulder its responsibilities as a major power by halting the escalation of its support for Israel in all spheres so that the series of Israeli crimes will stop and so that peace based on securing the peoples' legitimate rights will be established.

Arab solidarity has always been a basic principle in Egypt's foreign policy. Today we appreciate the extreme importance of stressing this solidarity throughout the Arab land in order to face an aggression which is not directed against the frontline states alone but rather aims at making the Arab will submit to the objectives of imperialism and world Zionism.

The Arab world is called upon today to strengthen its solidarity with and step up its pressures in support of the Palestinian people in their honest struggle to regain their rights and in support of the peoples of our countries who are standing fast in the face of aggression to defend themselves and the heritage and interests of all the Arab peoples.

The fraternal Lebanese people's firm solidarity with the Palestinian people, despite all the difficulties the two peoples face and despite all the hostile campaigns of suspicion and disintegration, is an attitude to which Egypt pays tribute and which Egypt will do all it can to consolidate and preserve. Egypt also works with complete sincerity to ensure that secondary incidents and local clashes will not destroy the solidarity of our peoples and will not keep us from consolidating our efforts to face the primary danger.

The success of Egypt's policy in the Arab field is becoming more and more obvious every day. Arab support in the various fields is developing along positive lines and is doubling our capabilities for the battle of destiny. The day will come when we will place before our people in Egypt and before the Arab peoples examples of this effective support which reflects the confidence of all peoples in themselves and their faith in the unity of their destinies.

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Statement issued by the PLO Executive Committee regarding the clashes in Lebanon³⁷

Beirut, May 5, 1973

The Palestine resistance movement never expected that events in Lebanon would come to the pass they have reached in the last three days, when Palestinians and Lebanese in the camps and the surrounding areas have been subjected to violent bombardment by all sorts of weapons, light and heavy. Nor did it expect that planes would bomb peaceable residential areas and that Lebanese and Palestinians, and the resistance movement in particular, should be the object of an iniquitous campaign, now accusing them of resisting the army, now of breaking duly concluded agreements, now of lack of respect for the sovereignty of Lebanon. About half a million Palestinians have lived in this country for a quarter of a century. They have appreciated its situation and circumstances; they have been a basic factor in the building up of its economy and prosperity; they have respected its national sovereignty, believing that the security and stability of Lebanon will assist them in the performance of their basic task, which is action to secure the liberation of their occupied homeland and the recovery of their occupied territory. They have shown this on various occasions and during the trials through which their cause has passed in all these long years. But for some time, most regrettably, we have observed constant attempts to deprive the resistance movement of its ability to take action, to paralyze its effectiveness and to invalidate the agreements governing relations between the Lebanese authorities and the resistance movement. There follows a list, which is by no means exhaustive, of such infringements:

1. Many commandos have been arrested, tried and arbitrarily sentenced to imprisonment.

2. The arms carried by commandos during their transfer from one base to another have been confiscated; those carrying arms have been brought to trial before military court although they have been in possession of licences permitting them to bear arms and engaged in tasks in specified

localities.

3. The houses of Lebanese supporters of the Palestine revolution have been attacked, their arms have been confiscated and they have been brought to summary trials.

From its appreciation of the situation of Lebanon the resistance movement agreed to impose a temporary ban on its combat operations over the Lebanese frontier, although this meant suspending a basic part of its task and depriving itself of the justification for its existence. But in spite of this, pretexts have always been found for submitting it to increasing provocation and tightening the stranglehold on it.

On the morning of May 2 the Palestinians were amazed to find that the camps and residential areas had been surrounded by armoured cars, tanks and troop carriers which were heading for the entries to the camps and areas on the pretext of recovering two persons who had been detained in those areas, although this was previously done by a normal telephone communication between the local liaison officers.

In spite of this the resistance movement and the camps of those Palestinians whose places of residence had been surrounded, whose houses had been attacked and whose men had been killed, maintained an attitude of self-defence throughout the three days, and there was no indication of any attempt on their part to attack the forces surrounding them. If this had not been the case how does one explain the reports of observers that clashes were restricted to the localities blockaded by the army in Sabra, Shatila, Burj al-Barajna, Tal al-Zaatar and Dabiya, although Palestinians are to be found throughout the whole of Lebanon. But for their appreciation of the situation of Lebanon, they could have carried the confrontation into other areas.

We are therefore amazed that the Palestinian presence in Lebanese territory should be described as an army of occupation. For while we feel the profoundest concern for the sovereignty of Lebanon, we insist that the Palestinian presence in Lebanon, with all its resources, should continue to carry out its basic task, make full preparations and engage in unflagging activity to liberate the territory and recover the usurped homeland.

Where does the Palestinian people exercise this imagined occupation? Does its adherence

³⁷ Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Muharrir* (Beirut), May 6, 1973

to the provisions of the Cairo Agreement³⁸ and its insistence on its right to defend its existence and dignity in the camp make it an army of occupation? Is this an infringement of Lebanese sovereignty?

Why is the American embassy allowed to bring in American troops on the pretext of defending it, although it is on Lebanese territory?

How can the Palestinian armed presence in the camps of the Palestinians, the object of which is to defend them, be an infringement of Lebanese sovereignty if the American armed presence, with all that this involves in the way of conspiracies against the Lebanese masses and the Arab nation, is not an infringement of that sovereignty?

The most convincing proof of our concern for Lebanese sovereignty and our adherence to the agreements that have been concluded is that we did not release the hundreds of Palestinians detained in the al-Raml prison, which is situated in the area that was encircled, though we could have done so if we had wished.

If we had had any intention of infringing the provisions of the agreements, instead of restricting ourselves to defence in the localities where the army had attacked us, we should have transferred the arena of conflict to other areas throughout the country. We should not have been so concerned from the very first moment to stop the conflict and maintain contact with the authorities so that things might return to normal.

In general, the discipline of the resistance movement, its real appreciation of the situation of Lebanon and its sovereignty and independence have made it behave with the greatest wisdom, moderation and responsibility throughout the last three days, in spite of the tragedies that have befallen it.

All the resistance movement asks is to be given the chance to perform its national role and to take action to liberate its occupied territories. All it asks is that no obstacles be placed in its way and that only it should not be drawn into secondary conflicts that are of benefit only to the Zionist enemy.

Recent events with all the bitterness and sacrifices involved in them, the most prominent example being the savage bombardment and the crimes committed against our peaceable people in the

camps of Dabiya and Burj al-Barajna, will only increase our faith in the justice of our cause and our confidence in the Lebanese people and their honourable nationalist forces. But at the same time these events have made us more vigilant and cautious as regards evil elements who play fast and loose with the destiny of Lebanon in an attempt to spark off sectarian strife and to sow the seeds of discord between the Palestinians and the Lebanese.

The Israeli attacks on the Palestinian camps at al-Badawi and Nahr al-Barid in North Lebanon and the attack on the heart of the Lebanese capital, have made the Palestinians determined to keep their arms to defend themselves, their cause and their legitimate existence.

The escalation of the bombing of the commando positions in the eastern sector and Hasbaya throughout two consecutive days, in spite of the fact that a ceasefire agreement has been concluded and that the causes of tension have been eliminated, have made us regard the situation with greater alarm.

We are more concerned than anyone else for the security and stability of Lebanon, and if we are to ensure that this country enjoys security and peace, we must all make a point of insuring:

1. That both sides implement the agreements concluded between them.
2. That the joint committees formed to ensure that [peace-keeping] activities continue and that the agreements are implemented, be reconstituted.
3. That the combatants detained in prison be released so that they may continue to perform their national duty, and that confiscated arms be restored.

4. That all problems be dealt with in a spirit of brotherhood and magnanimity and by the adoption of friendly and legitimate methods.

Brothers and fellow citizens,

The Palestine revolution is entitled to expect all the Arab masses to show understanding of its circumstances, protect its existence, defend its right to exist, continue its armed struggle and prevent any aggression against it from any quarter.

³⁸ For the unofficial text of the Cairo Agreement see doc. 449 in *International Documents on Palestine 1969*.

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Speech by President Boumedienne of Algeria criticizing the Arabs for their weak stand against Israel and her allies (excerpts)³⁹

Algiers, May 8, 1973

We also have another duty, a sacred duty vis-à-vis the Arab cause and the Palestinian people who have been evicted from their land and are hunted down wherever they stop, people who have been assailed by Arabs and Zionists alike.

It is not only the Zionists who are massacring the Palestinians today, but the Zionists and the Arabs together.

To tell the bitter truth, what the people of Palestine are suffering from the Arabs is worse than they have suffered at the hands of the Zionists. It is a brand of shame on the brow of the Arab nation that the people of Palestine should be slaughtered by Arabs on the pretext of maintaining national sovereignty or internal security.

When the Zionists attack an Arab country on the pretext that the Palestine resistance has exercised its legitimate right, the reaction is not against the Zionist enemy but against the Palestinian people, and Arab planes, which otherwise only fly for display purposes, take off to bomb the refugee camps.

The army of Hussein, whose courage has been praised by the foreign press, makes a display of its heroism not against the usurping enemy but against the Palestinian people.

Brothers,

What is happening in the Arab East today is a brand of shame on the brow of the Arab nation, and Almighty God in His unfathomable wisdom has sent down His curse on these people who are imbruing their hands morning and evening with the blood of those who have been driven from their homes—the blood of free Palestinians who have been expelled by the enemy from their land in the sight of the whole world, a world which looks on at the tragedy and not only does not condemn it, but defends the aggressor and accuses those who try to expose the aggression of being anti-Semitic or anti-Jewish.

But what really cuts us to the heart is not the attitude of foreigners but that of the Arabs.

Israel has been victorious thanks not to unusual strength but to the state of chaos which exists in the Arab world, at the level of the Arab armies and governments; Israel's real strength lies in the weakness of the Arabs in all fields.

The Arab homeland has immense resources; the Arabs have immense wealth; what they do not yet possess is level-headedness and the ability to take wise decisions.

We believe that the victory of the Palestinian people is inevitable; we believe that the generation of combatants that experienced the war of liberation in their flesh and blood will, like the generations that raise the banner of revolution after it, continue to believe that the victory of the Palestinian people is inevitable, however long it takes them to win it, just as the Algerian people were victorious in the past after more than a century and a quarter of trials and calamities.

This is how we see things; this is our view of the Palestine problem. Let those who will, trade in the Palestinian cause; we shall have no part in any kind of political trading in this sacred cause.

Some may use it as a means to rise to power over the dead bodies of those who have given their lives for the Palestinian cause; the leadership in our country emanated from real struggle against French colonialism.

Our policy will never be influenced or changed by whatever excuses or allegations we may hear, whether in the name of collective Arab action or of protecting that weak Lebanon whose existence is based on Muslim and Christian sects, or in the name of keeping what is left of the territory of Syria, Egypt or Jordan.

We accept none of this. The only thing we accept and will have anything to do with is that all should enter the field of the real battle for the recovery of the dignity of the Arabs.

This is the one honourable solution of the Arab problem. The honourable solution will not come from the outside but has to spring from Arab resources themselves.

It has always been the point of difference between us and some of our brothers.

If we have sometimes been harsh in our judgments, this has arisen from the political line derived

³⁹ Made at the opening of the Fourth National Conference of Veteran Fighters; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Shaab* (Algiers), May 9, 1973.

from our Algerian experience, a line that events have proved right and sound.

A few days before the 1967 defeat we said that it was impossible that we should fight Zionism and at the same time be allies of its allies.⁴⁰ Perhaps certain Arab leaders did not share this view of ours. Even after the defeat there were those who advocated the conclusion of a truce with the Hashimite regime so as not to weaken our ranks and so that Jordan might be a weapon in the battle against the Zionist enemy.

But the results were regrettable, and the Hashimite Kingdom became a wall protecting Israel against the blows of the Palestine resistance.

We said that hopes pinned on solutions from outside the Arab homeland were false hopes which could lead to nothing.

Today, after six years, we find that Israel is still doing just what she wants in the occupied territories, in Sinai, in Golan and in the West Bank, and is turning our Islamic holy places in Jerusalem into synagogues, thereby confirming the racist character and the religious and racist fanaticism of the Hebrew state.

Furthermore, Israel can betake herself to an Arab capital with the greatest ease; thus the Israelis entered Beirut the other day like a man who goes shopping with nothing worse to fear than a thief or a robber. They entered Beirut and killed and wounded whom they liked and then went back to where they had come from.

At the time we heard nothing of Mirages, Hunters or Phantoms going in.

Brothers,

This is the regrettable situation in which the Arab nation finds itself. Logically only one of two courses is open to it:

The course of surrender, if we have lost the will to struggle and to recover our honour and dignity. Here the price will not only be that we lose the Arab territories, but the sacrifice of the Palestine cause and the termination of our existence as a nation.

The other course is the course of honour and self-respect. It demands an exorbitant price in sacrifices, but it is the one solution open to the Arab nation.

We say with all faith and conviction that Israel is not a terrible bogey that no one can conquer, and

we repeat that Israel's strength lies in the weakness of the Arabs and in the anarchy that prevails in their ranks.

If the Arabs could exploit the immense resources of the Arab nation which are being exploited by the West, they could change the face of the area and make it a veritable paradise.

Hence our policy for the recovery of our national wealth, because we have always been aware of the importance of exploiting these resources on behalf of the development and strengthening of the Arab homeland and the creation of the new Arab individual.

But unfortunately the Arabs' wealth is still being exploited in the interest of non-Arabs. It is distributed among foreign capitals, and every one except the Arabs themselves benefits from it.

Brothers,

I have concentrated on the problem of the Arab East because it is today the one hot area in the world, now that the Vietnam problem is on the way to being solved, although the fighting has not yet stopped once and for all.

The Arab East is the hot area in the world for two main reasons: the Palestine problem and the energy problem.

Israel is casting herself in the role of protector of the oil of the international companies and the capitalist countries which, in turn, have assumed the role of protecting Israel.

The Western countries in general, both America and the rest, believe that they have one friend and real ally in the area—the state of Israel.

As for other countries in the area, whether they are called progressive or reactionary, they are to the Europeans simply a means of gaining time, no more, no less. You will not find in their ranks a genuine ally to stand by them against Zionist settler colonialism.

You can see for yourselves the immense support Israel enjoys in all fields—financial, technical and informational. This confirms that Israel is the advance base of capitalism and imperialism in the area, safeguarding their interests and receiving protection and support from them, and creating a state of tension which saps the energies of the Arab countries and involves them in bewildering problems.

If we have talked at length about this problem it is because it has extremely grave dimensions

⁴⁰ Doc. 337 in *International Documents on Palestine 1967*.

as far as the Arab nation and world peace are involved, and we hope that the authorities throughout the Arab world appreciate this.

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Statement by King Faisal of Saudi Arabia paying tribute to France and calling for the restoration of Palestinian rights⁴¹

Paris, May 14, 1973

In the situation now prevailing in the Arab countries, Your Excellency, our Arab brothers are complaining of the pressures and aggressions to which their territories and peoples are being subjected, and we certainly greatly appreciate the attitudes of your Excellency and that of His Excellency the late President de Gaulle in your determination to maintain right and justice and to prevent aggression by one country against another. I cannot forget the interest Your Excellency and His Excellency General de Gaulle displayed during my meetings with you in the establishment of right and justice and the restoration of every right to those it belongs to. As Your Excellency is aware, all we ask today is the elimination of the effects of aggression on the Arab countries and the restoration to the Palestinian people of their legitimate rights. Your Excellency is aware of the tragedy of our Palestinian brothers: how they have been persecuted and evicted from their homes for more than twenty-five years and are now living in tents and subject to every kind of calamity; how they are prevented from returning to their land and their homeland, while people who are not Palestinians are brought into Palestine. Your Excellency is also aware of the resolutions adopted by the United Nations to the effect that the Arab territories are to be liberated from occupation and that the Palestinian people are to recover their right to return to their land. But unfortunately, these resolutions have not so far been implemented. We as Muslims—our religion requires of us that we do not attack anyone, but it is our duty to defend ourselves against those who attack us. We there-

fore hope that all who share Your Excellency's views and reasonable opinions will cooperate to establish right and justice and to restore all rights to those to whom they belong.

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Memorandum adopted by the Beirut Maqasid Graduates Association on Lebanon's commitment to the Palestine cause (excerpts)⁴²

Beirut, May 19, 1973

3. *The Palestinian Presence*

We regard the Palestinian presence not as a fait accompli but as a national fact.

The Palestinians are our brothers. Their cause is ours and their destiny is ours. If we regard Palestine as an integral part of our great homeland, readiness to liberate this usurped part of the homeland is the responsibility of all Arabs. If it is the Palestinian inhabitants of the camps who have been the first to provide themselves with arms and to make preparations for the day of liberation, it is our duty to support and assist them and to join their ranks.

The whole of the Arab homeland is threatened by the Zionist peril. There is no longer anyone in Lebanon who denies Israel's designs on her land and water. The Palestine revolution is an Arab revolution; its arms, which we hope will increase, will only be aimed at the enemy, and any action aimed at attacking and resisting the enemy supports Lebanon and wards off the danger from her.

It is out of the question to regard the armed Palestinians as an "army of occupation" in Lebanon.

The Lebanese are agreed on the principle of the liberation of Palestine and on their responsibility to bear their share in the battle of liberation. The agreement made with the resistance is an expression of the Lebanese adherence to this

⁴¹ Made in a speech at a dinner given in his honour; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Bilad* (Jidda), May 15, 1973. King Faisal visited France for five days from May 14.

⁴² This is an association of graduates from high schools run by the Maqasid, a Muslim charity devoted to health, education and welfare projects; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text as published in *al-Muharrir* (Beirut), May 28, 1973.

principle and of their pride in this responsibility. The extent of this responsibility and of their participation in the battle of liberation are commensurate with the preeminent role played by Lebanon as a country with an advanced civilization, a country of culture, science and universities.

There can be no loyalty to Palestine if dealings with the resistance are on a false basis. Written formulas and agreements are only of value to the extent that they are in harmony with this goal and true to the common Arab interest of liberation which unites the Palestinian with the Lebanese, as it unites all Arabs.

Lebanon is a small country which can only be protected by its adherence to principles and values. Any remissness as regards principles and values in dealings at the Lebanese, all-Arab and international levels does a grave national injury to Lebanon, her constituent elements, her existence and her frontiers, and is a threat to her essentially Lebanese and Arab character.

These facts are an integral part of the national conscience; they are the criteria for the condemnation of all the deviations and all the political practices that have been responsible for bringing Lebanon to the brink of national suicide on more than one occasion.

Public activity in Lebanon, whether it is the responsibility of the government or of the social, cultural and political leadership, depends on belief in these facts which have been disclosed by the repeated grave crises Lebanon has undergone. For these facts alone can be of assistance in liberating the homeland and the citizen and establishing a democratic national entity which is internally cohesive and capable of performing its role at the Arab and international levels.

The most important thing about these facts is that, as a result of the developing political consciousness at this stage in Lebanon's history, they are now the property of all citizens and have become part of their total awareness of the problems of their country and the crises which afflict it, and no one active in the public field can ignore this. We must all be more profoundly conscious of the consequences of these facts and base our actions on them with all sincerity and honesty.

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Press interview statements by President Bourguiba of Tunisia discussing the possibilities of talks with the Israelis as part of the search for peace in the Middle East⁴³

Tunis, May 22, 1973

Q. If you were in Sadat's place, what would you do?

A. I should do the same as he's doing. I would prepare for a new war, but at the same time I would rely on diplomatic means in order to have peace without making war.

Q. So you don't think the diplomatic possibilities are exhausted?

A. They are not at an end. He [Sadat] has done much for peace. I have met him: he would be prepared to recognize Israel, to cooperate with Israel, to allow Israeli shipping to pass through Suez.

Q. Do you think that the Egyptians are ready to have discussions/talks with the Israelis?

A. Yes, they can talk with the Israelis. Whether they talk directly or through an intermediary, American or Swedish, it's the same thing.

Q. Do you believe in the possibility of secret talks?

A. For my part, I would have no difficulty in meeting an Israeli, an Israeli Jew, who understands the necessity for peace.

Q. Would you feel up to acting as a mediator?

A. I wouldn't want to, because there is a risk of being badly judged by both sides. But on the practical level, if it's a matter of meeting this or that person in Rome, Athens, Malta or elsewhere, one can easily talk and come to agreement. The main thing is to be ready to use the language of reason.

Q. Which Arab leader do you consider comes closest today to your position?

A. I think that President Sadat comes closest.

⁴³ Excerpted and translated from the Italian text of the interview conducted by Dino Frescobaldi, *Corriere della Sera* (Milan), May 23, 1973, p.2. An official Tunisian communiqué issued on May 24 denied that President Bourguiba had offered to mediate and stated that his remarks had been wrongly interpreted (*Le Monde*, May 26, 1973, p. 8).

Q. And do you also consider Arafat (the Chairman of the PLO has been to Tunisia at least four times in recent months) a possible interlocutor?

A. He is without a doubt a very valid interlocutor.

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Law of Jordan prohibiting the sale of real estate to the "enemy"⁴⁴

Amman, June 4, 1973

Article 1

This law shall be called "Law prohibiting the sale of real estate to the enemy, 1973" and shall take effect as from the date of its publication in the Official Gazette.

Article 2

[Definitions]

Article 3

a) The sale of any real estate to:

1) the enemy directly or through an intermediary;

2) a foreigner without the prior approval of the Council of Ministers;

shall be null and void.

b) In such cases the ownership of the real estate shall revert to the Treasury.

Article 4

a) The sale of real estate in infringement of this law shall be a crime against the safety and security of the state, the penalty for which shall be death and the confiscation of all moveable and immoveable property.

b) Should a judicial person be found guilty of this crime the penalties shall be applicable to the natural person or persons who committed the crime on behalf of the judicial person; the judicial person shall be sentenced to be removed from the register.

c) The property of the accused shall be administered by the government and he shall not be allowed to dispose of it until such time as the sentence is final.

Article 5

a) A special court shall be constituted which will

sit at a place and time to be decided by the Minister of Justice to try crimes committed in infringement of the provisions of this law. This court shall consist of three judges appointed by the Council of Ministers on the nomination of the Minister of Justice, and its sentences shall be passed by a unanimous or a majority vote.

b) The duties of the public prosecutor shall be performed by a person or persons appointed by the Council of Ministers on the nomination of the Minister of Justice.

Article 6

Contrary to the provisions of the Law of Settlement or any other law, proof of such crimes may be established by any kind of evidence, and in its judicial procedure the court need not be bound by the Law of Basic Principles of Criminal Prosecution.

Article 7

The sentences passed shall be subject to confirmation by the Council of Ministers which may confirm the sentence or reduce the penalty, and the decision of the Council of Ministers shall be final.

Article 8

It is the responsibility of the Prime Minister and the Ministers to enforce the provisions of this law.

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Statement by Foreign Minister Zayyat of Egypt discussing Israeli withdrawal and secure borders, made in a speech to the UN Security Council⁴⁵

New York, June 6, 1973

The Security Council resolution of November 1967 called for the withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the lands they had occupied in what the Council then referred to as "the recent conflict". The Council stressed the right of all nations of the area to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries. The suggestion that omission of "the" means that acquisition of the entire territory of a Member State is not permissible but the acquisition of small amounts of its territory is permissible does not really warrant any comment here. Most obviously, the Council did not resolve, and could

⁴⁴ Translated from the text supplied, on request, by the Jordanian embassy, Beirut. The law was passed by Parliament on May 25, signed into law by King Hussein on June 4 and published in the *Official Gazette* on July 11.

⁴⁵ Excerpted from the text of Zayyat's speech in the Security Council's Middle East debate, UN doc. S/PV.1717, pp. 37-42.

not have resolved, that secure boundaries for Israel be established inside Egypt or inside Syria. The Israel borders that the Council wished to be fixed and recognized could exist only within the geographical area of Palestine which the 1947 General Assembly partition resolution had dealt with. Any other proposition would evoke such questions—not very serious questions—as the following.

Did the Security Council decide, could the Security Council have decided, is it in the power of the Security Council to decide to partition Egypt among its Egyptian inhabitants and those of the Jewish State to which the 1947 General Assembly resolution allotted a part of Palestine under the British Mandate? Did the Security Council decide, could the Security Council decide now to partition Syria, or any other country, among its inhabitants and those of the Jewish State to which the General Assembly allotted a part of Palestine under the British Mandate? Placing the borders inside Egypt or placing the borders inside Syria, placing the borders outside the international boundary of Palestine under the British Mandate would indeed be a new partition of Egypt and a new partition of Syria, and a new partition of any other Arab country—or of any country at all.

My coming here, the meeting of this Council, the time which has generously been given to me, and the time of the Council itself will have no relevance unless we hear the aforementioned questions answered loudly and clearly and without any ambiguity, constructive or otherwise.

If indeed it was not and could not have been the Council's intention to partition Egypt or any other Arab country, then the Council's decision and resolution would have to demand the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the Israeli forces of occupation from all the territories they now occupy, and to affirm the sanctity of international borders. Furthermore, it would have to resolve that all the rights and aspirations of the Palestinian nation be respected, including their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries in their homeland of Palestine as it was before the partition, as it was under the Mandate. They should have been there, and in that land they should have recognized and secure boundaries, the same right accorded to the Jewish State and to all the people of the area by the Security Council resolution of November 1967.

Around this table sit representatives of many countries that have recognized Israel. We ask them: did they recognize the State of Israel in any place except within the territory of Palestine under the British Mandate? Has any State represented at this table that has recognized Israel recognized Israel outside the territory of Palestine under the British Mandate? There can be only one answer: it is clear that the boundaries that have been recognized for Israel must be in Palestine. Thus, those boundaries will have to be between Israel and the Palestine nation envisaged in the partition laid down in General Assembly resolution 181 (II) of 1947. Those boundaries can never be outside the international boundary of Palestine and, more precisely, they cannot be and they will not be inside Egypt.

We have been subjected to force at various periods of our history of thousands of years, and we have always managed to shake ourselves free. Egypt does not now concede the right of anyone to encroach on its sovereignty or territorial integrity, which even in the darkest hours of its history was left intact. Our territorial integrity and sovereignty will not be touched no matter how strong the forces which the aggressor has in its hands. Syria and Jordan will certainly declare this same conviction.

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Statement by Permanent UN Representative Kilani of Syria calling for immediate Israeli withdrawal to the pre-June 1967 lines, made in a speech to the UN Security Council⁴⁶

New York, June 7, 1973

I have repeatedly stated the position of my Government. It is based on the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, on the rules of international law and on the tenets of justice and equity. At this stage I should like to sum up what my Government and people expect from the Security Council.

An end must be put to Israeli aggression. The consequences of that aggression must be liquidated,

⁴⁶ Excerpted from the translation of Mr. Kilani's speech in the Security Council's Middle East debate, UN doc. S/PV.1718, pp. 53–57.

beginning with the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Israeli forces from all the occupied territories. The right of the Palestinian people to their land, to their country, and to the free exercise of their right to self-determination must be recognized. This could lead to constructive results; it could create a climate conducive to progress towards a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

As long as the Arab peoples of Palestine and their inalienable rights are not recognized by Israel, we shall never set our face towards peace; we shall never do anything but follow a mirage. But we will reject any conditions or any resolution based upon an invasion. We urge you, gentlemen, to liquidate all sources and all traces of the aggression. Any solution that might perpetuate the occupation of our country must be categorically rejected by us, because we consider that such a solution would only spell one thing, namely, the yielding to the logic of force and conquest, and that is a course that we firmly refuse to follow.

The United Nations must confront a situation of a historic and dangerous nature. But the problem is not only an Arab problem. The problem touches any individual of the international community whose country might, one day or another, become the victim of an invasion. To do away with the results of aggression, to punish the aggressors, spells a victory for the international Organization, for the principles of the United Nations and for all the great and noble human values.

The moment of truth has arrived. What will the Security Council do regarding this grave and explosive situation now confronting it? First of all, it must be admitted and recognized that the territories of three Members of the United Nations have been deliberately violated, with premeditation, by another State represented here. The troops of this last State today stand on the soil of those first three countries. Therefore, the aggressor must immediately be obliged to withdraw to the lines it occupied before the 5 June attack. To allow Israel to preserve what it conquered will be tantamount to allowing the aggressor to make use and to enjoy the fruits of its aggression as a bargaining means in order to achieve its objectives for which it unleashed the war in the first place. It would be immoral and it is intolerable. Another type of political blackmail is that so long as Israel remains in possession of

these lands it will continue its aggression.

We are here to express our trust and reliance on the international conscience and awareness as represented by this Security Council, the United Nations organ primarily responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. Our Arab people, together with all small peace-loving peoples all over the world, consider these meetings as spelling our last hope to see right, reason and justice triumph over the law of the jungle, the law of conquest, and the logic of force.

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Policy statement by Jordan's new Prime Minister Rifai (excerpt)⁴⁷

Amman, June 9, 1973

Mr. President, honourable deputies,

Inasmuch as all the very foundations of government are connected with our sacred cause and linked to it by the closest ties;

Inasmuch as the tragedy of the Palestinian people is primarily the tragedy of Jordan and its people;

Inasmuch as the enemy is still occupying our territory and grabbing parts of it in various manners; and inasmuch as the splendid way our people are holding out against him is not only a source of pride to us but also constitutes an attitude that we should support and strengthen by all the means at our disposal; and inasmuch as the occupation has repercussions on all aspects of our life, political, social and economic, the occupied territory and the goal of liberating it are the pivot of our policy, the central point of our concern and the basis of our efforts to serve the cause.

Mr. President,

Honourable deputies,

Arab cooperation and joint Arab action are inevitable; they are demanded both by the nature of our cause and by the fact that Jordan is an indivisible part of the Arab nation. The government is therefore resolved to continue constructive cooperation with our Arab brothers with the awareness that will steer us clear of the stumbling blocks of improvisation and with the truth and

⁴⁷ Delivered to Jordan's parliament; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Dustur* (Amman), June 10, 1973.

sincerity that derive from our national and civilizational heritage. For Jordan always has been and always will be open to all its brothers, welcoming all sincere and constructive dialogue that ensures the higher national interests, dialogue that, strong in argument and logic, is not inconsistent with the truth and is essentially realistic and rational.

The government affirms that efforts to reach a settlement that will put an end to the crisis must be based on the concept of unified Arab action and decisive rejection of partial and individual solutions. It also declares its commitment to Security Council Resolution 242 as being a true expression of the will of the international community and a sound and acceptable basis for the establishment of a just and permanent peace in the Middle East.

Inasmuch as the hoped-for solution of our problem can only come about through comprehensive Arab agreement, the government will spare no effort to establish the foundations of joint Arab action on unambiguous foundations with the aim of achieving the integration of all Arab energies and resources for the benefit of our cause, our country and our nation.

The government believes that if the Arab League is supported, if its organs are developed and its role in this field is strengthened it will be qualified to become the national framework within which unity of ranks, action and goals at the most extensive Arab level, can be crystallized and organized.

In this connection we feel it our duty to praise the positive attitudes adopted by certain Arab countries. First and foremost, praise is due to the King, government and people of Saudi Arabia, for the noble and fraternal role it has played in supporting our resistance and its effective participation, in the form of stationing its armed forces in our territory side by side with ours in confronting aggression. We must also mention our relations with Saudi Arabia as a pattern of what relations among all Arabs should be and a positive model for the translation of unity of goal into unity of method and action on behalf of the higher national interest.

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Statement by President Assad of Syria regarding the recent fighting in Lebanon⁴⁸

Damascus, June 9, 1973

The needs created by the battle also determine our outlook on the Palestine Resistance and our attitude towards it. We look upon it as an important element of Arab strength necessary for liberation; we support it and back it.

Therefore, when the recent crisis broke out in Lebanon we took the initiative in exerting efforts and seeking to end it. For this purpose, we contacted the authorities in Lebanon and the command of the Resistance because of our concern for the interests and safety of Lebanon and for the Palestine Resistance and its existence. When the efforts and good offices failed, we had to resort to the measure which it was assumed would help in restoring the situation to normal. Before and after we took this measure we were subjected to acts of incitement and provocation. However, we shall always try to prevent acts of incitement and provocation from having any impact on the direction of our steps. We know what we want and proceed towards it at a firm pace on a basis of conviction and adherence to national interest.

Israel exploited the Lebanese crisis and went on making repeated threats to use its military strength against this country in the event of a Syrian military intervention in Lebanon, as Israel claims. We paid no attention to such threats in the past and will not do so in the future. Such threats have not prevented and will not prevent us from continuing to struggle in all ways to recover our rights in full. I affirm what I have previously emphasized: that this country will remain a haven and support for the Palestine Resistance, supplying it with all kinds of support and providing the Palestinian Arab people with the requirements of their legitimate struggle for their rights. This is our firm stand, which is not subject to substitution or change.

⁴⁸ Made during a speech to the newly elected National Assembly and broadcast by Damascus radio in Arabic; excerpted from the partial English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4318/A/6; reprinted by permission.

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Statements by President Qadhafi of Libya announcing the nationalization of the Libyan oil interests of Bunker Hunt and discussing the situation in Lebanon⁴⁹

Tripoli, June 11, 1973

Brothers,

The time has come for the Arab peoples to confront America. The time has come for American interests in the area to be seriously and gravely threatened, whatever the cost. America's haughtiness and colonialist arrogance is manifested in these defiances of the Arab nation—in the way she defies us with aircraft carriers and with spy planes. We are building our country and want to protect our freedom, but America defies this will of ours and again and again comes and threatens Libyan territorial waters. This is an attitude of brazen defiance on the part of this malign colonialist power. America still makes light of the Arab nation, attaches no importance to Arab rights, and continues to support Israel with the most modern armaments to enable her to humiliate the Arab nation, to subjugate its will or to stay in the occupied Arab territories—through injustice and aggression. American colonialism is also to be seen today in the attitude of the oil companies that have no intention of yielding or submitting to those who enjoy sovereign powers—the peoples who own the wealth, the peoples who own the oil and have the right of sovereignty over the way the oil is used and have the final word. In the negotiations with the American monopolies we meet with American arrogance and the colonialist spirit which does not yield to truth or submit to logic. But the time is coming—if it has not already come—for a serious and grave confrontation—the cost of which we shall have to bear—with the oil companies and with American colonialism as a whole.

In this connection the Libyan Revolutionary Command Council has decided to nationalize the American oil company Bunker Hunt.

Brothers; while we are making the real revolution in Libyan territory we cannot disregard our national role in the Arab area. The massacre to which your brothers, the Palestinian commandos, are being subjected in Lebanon is not absent from your minds, your feelings and your emotions, in spite of the fact that you are wholeheartedly dedicated to the popular revolution. From the start the Libyan Arab Republic has supplied the commandos with arms, and is still supplying them to this day; wherever the commandos may be, Libyan arms will reach them. While making the revolution in their own land, the Libyan people are also doing their duty to the Arab nation. We are entitled today to draw aside the screen, remove the veil and disclose the truth about Lebanon, because it is no longer a diplomatic situation that requires courtesy, silence or civility. What is happening in Lebanon is a danger to the Palestine cause, because it is a colonialist plan in which the traitor regimes are cooperating with Israel and colonialism in the East and West to put an end to something called the Palestine resistance so as to put an end to all demands for this freedom. King Hussein conspired with Israel and colonialism to put an end to the Palestine resistance, and now the conspiracy is going on in Lebanon, and what may happen in the future may do the greatest harm to the Palestine resistance. What we can see now is that there is a popular force in Lebanon which is in accord with the Palestine resistance and which has opened their hearts and homes to it. There is also another force in Lebanon that seeks to frustrate the Palestine resistance; in this it is in accord with Israel and colonialism in their desire to put an end to it. Quite frankly, as we speak here in Tripoli, we know that at this moment the Arab nation is hearing the voice of the free Libyan people that the fact resounds with truth, loud and clear, and that we will have to assume a national, leading and military role here in the Libyan Republic towards this arena and this region.

The situation in Lebanon is reminiscent of that when the Crusaders dominated the Holy Land. There are the Muslim masses who live as third-class citizens in Lebanon, although they are model citizens, and it is they who are opening their homes and their hearts to the Palestine resistance which is the heart of the Arab nation.

There is a Lebanese Maronite community

⁴⁹ Made in a speech on the third anniversary of the US evacuation of Wheelus air base; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), June 12, 1973.

which dominates the other Arab Christian communities in Lebanon and makes the other non-Maronite Christian communities second-class citizens. This, then, is the situation in Lebanon that the Libyan people must understand, a situation that has come to have an influence on the Arab arena and to be influenced by what is going on in it: There are third-class citizens in Lebanon, and they are the Muslims. There are first-class citizens who are the masters and the rulers, and they are the Maronite community in Lebanon with the well-known exception of a few of them who are liberals, who constitute Nasserite unionist movements in Lebanon.

We did not create this situation and we do not want to arouse any confessional agitation. But this fact is imposed by the Lebanese situation, and this fact influences the Arab destiny. Therefore the Libyan Arab Republic will, at the moral and material levels, abide by this classification in Lebanon. We cannot stand idly by and watch the Palestine resistance being massacred. We cannot see Muslim brothers in Lebanon being persecuted and asking help from the Libyan people and the revolution of September 1. We cannot overlook this or be remiss in our duties. Nor can we see brothers in Arabism, non-Maronite Christians, living as second-class citizens and looking to the revolution of September 1 to stand by them.

We cannot see this and be remiss in our national duties. Therefore the Libyan Arab Republic has a national and pan-Arab attitude, which is based on facts. These facts must be clear and unambiguous, so that there may be no ambiguity in the attitude of the Libyan Arab Republic, and so as to close the door to those who try to fish in troubled waters. This situation was created by Lebanon, it was created by colonialism in Lebanon. This situation must be dealt with because it affects us and we are influenced by it, in spite of the fact that we did not create it and we do not want it to exist.

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Press interview statements by President Bourguiba of Tunisia defending his call for Israel to withdraw to the borders of the 1947 UN partition plan⁵⁰

Divonne-les-Bains, France, June 28, 1973

Q. In fact you are asking the Israelis to content themselves with the territory granted them by the UN in 1947, whereas today they won't even agree to return to the pre-six day war borders. Isn't that rather unrealistic?

A. Not at all, because above all it's a question of making them admit the principle of dividing up Palestine. Then one could arrange the 1947 borders in the course of negotiations. But these borders, fixed by the UN, have at least a certain legality.

Why won't the Israelis agree to evacuating the occupied territories? For security reasons, they say. Now I personally think that on the contrary, they will never have security as long as they occupy Arab territories. And I say to them: Security? We offer it to you, with the addition of peace and cooperation with the Arab countries! One must not be deceived: the Arab countries will never make peace with Israel unless the Palestinians agree to it. Therefore, a Palestinian state must be created.

Having said that, this time it didn't work. I think that my proposal failed. But I also think that time is on the side of my idea. If today it is rejected, the day will come when the Israelis will realize that I was right. It's like the Arabs, who wanted to lynch me in 1965 because I told them unpleasant truths. Well today, they recognize that I was right! You see, the Israelis, who will always be a minority, will end up by realizing that the best solution is to get along with this tide of Arabs who will still be there in a thousand years, and who will be still more numerous!

Q. Neither the front-line Arab states nor the Palestine organizations have reacted publicly to your initiative. Should one conclude that they are sceptical or reserved?

A. I notice above all that these haven't reacted negatively, as they did in 1965, when I spoke about the existence of the state of Israel; this proves that they have changed a lot. Their silence in fact con-

⁵⁰ Excerpted and translated from the French text, *Le Monde* (Paris), June 30, 1973, pp. 1, 6.

stitutes important progress. But what mattered most to me was the opinion of the Palestinians, whom I in fact ask to give up a part of Palestine. Now their organizations have not protested! What is more, they have said; "Let Bourguiba carry on, what he is doing is in the Arabs' interests."

Nobody entrusted me with taking an initiative in this business, but if I had had an encouraging sign from Jerusalem, then I would have called an Arab summit with the Palestinians.

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Television interview statements by King Faisal of Saudi Arabia warning that Saudi Arabia cannot guarantee oil supplies to the US if the US continues its pro-Israel policy⁵¹

Jidda, July 16, 1973

Faisal: As a friend of the United States we are deeply concerned that if the United States does not change its policy in the Middle East and continues to side with Zionism, then I'm afraid such course of action will affect our relations with our American friends because it will place us in an untenable position in the Arab world and vis-à-vis the countries which Zionism seeks to destroy.

Q. If I am correct, His Majesty at one time said that oil and politics did not mix. Has something occurred in the last several months to change your thinking on these lines?

A. Undoubtedly, we are now under attack from the Arabs themselves because of our friendship with the United States and we are accused of being in collusion with Zionism and American imperialism against the Arabs.

Q. Your Majesty's remarks on this subject in the past have been interpreted to mean that Saudi Arabia might restrict its shipments of oil, particularly to the United States. Is that a correct interpretation?

A. We do not wish to place any restrictions on our oil export to the United States but as I mentioned, America's complete support of Zionism against the Arabs makes it extremely difficult for us to continue to supply the United States' petro-

leum needs and to even maintain our friendly relations with the United States.

Q. Since Britain withdrew its forces from the Arab Gulf, Your Majesty, several countries around the Gulf including your own have shown an interest in buying more modern weapons. Would you comment on that please?

A. It is to protect themselves against the dangers of Communism and Zionism that the Arab countries have been forced to strive to acquire such weapons and military preparedness as to be able to defend their stability, their homeland and their independence.

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Charter of National Action adopted by the National and Regional Progressive Front of Iraq (excerpts)⁵²

Baghdad, July 17, 1973

The Palestine resistance is one of the principal instruments of our people's armed struggle; it is also a force of political struggle representing the will of the Palestinian Arab people to struggle against imperialism and Zionism and their local allies. To be in alliance with the Palestine resistance and to provide it with material and moral support in its legitimate struggle are a national duty and a basic condition for the successful confrontation of the Zionist enemy.

Therefore one of the tasks of any alliance of the national and progressive forces is to condemn all kinds of manoeuvring and outflanking movement aimed at encircling the Palestine resistance, disarming it and taming it in conformity with the plans of colonialism, Zionism and reaction, to struggle resolutely against such attempts and to expose and resist any attempt to liquidate the Palestine problem, either by establishing an artificial statelet in part of the territory of Palestine or by setting aside the historical, political and juridical aspect of the Palestine problem and representing it as being no more than a problem of refugees deserving of sympathy and aid.

Among the principal aims of Arab struggle at

⁵¹ Interview conducted by Richard Hunt and broadcast on NBC's programme "The Energy Crisis" on September 4, 1973; excerpted from the transcript supplied, on request, by NBC.

⁵² Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Thawra* (Baghdad), August 26, 1973; the Front comprised the Baath Party and the Communist Party of Iraq.

the level of the Arab nation must be struggle against Zionism as an aggressive racist movement, as an aggressive racist expansionist settler regime and as a reactionary fascist ideology, and efforts to enable the struggling Palestinian people to return to their homeland and decide their own destiny in their liberated territory.

Alliance on a strategic basis between the liberated and progressive Arab regimes and the nationalist movements in the Arab homeland on the one hand, and the forces of world revolution headed by the socialist camp on the other, is of great importance. There must be every concern to achieve the closest cooperation, solidarity and mutual understanding between them, on the basis of the belief that the Arab revolutionary movement and the world revolutionary movement have the same general objectives and a common destiny.

Policy at the Arab level is formed in the light of the Front's determination to participate fully and effectively in the Arab liberation movement which aims at liquidating imperialism in all its manifestations and combating Zionism and reaction, for social progress and complete liberation, Arab unity and the mobilization of all national and popular resources so that they may be directed into the Arab battle of liberation. In expressing this policy and with a view to achieving its aims the Charter stipulates:

1. To struggle resolutely and fully by all available means against imperialism, its influence, its interests and its supporters, to liberate from imperialism every part of Arab territory and violently to resist attempts to infiltrate the Arab homeland, either directly or indirectly.

2. To resist resolutely any foreign attempt to usurp any part of the Arab homeland, to impose hegemony on it or to separate it and, in particular, to struggle to protect the Arab Gulf from the conspiracies of the settler incursion and other plans, and to liberate those parts of it that have been usurped.

3. To struggle by all available means to achieve comprehensive Arab unity on a liberationist, democratic and popular basis in which the masses are the effective instrument for the execution of the historical action of unity.

4. To struggle against Zionism as an aggressive racist movement, as an aggressive racist expansionist settler regime and as a reactionary fascist

ideology, to enable the struggling Arab people to return to their homeland and decide their own destiny in their own land, and to condemn all solutions and projects aimed at liquidating and blunting the edge of the Palestine problem by partial solutions.

5. To support the Palestine resistance in various ways and to provide the aid necessary for it to achieve the unity of its different sections and to ensure its existence and freedom of action on behalf of the objectives of the Palestinian people.

6. To achieve unity of common action among all progressive revolutionary and nationalist forces at both the official and popular levels, both in the Arab homeland and in each of its regions, so as to ensure that as many resources as possible are made available, in the most effective manner, to the struggle against imperialism, Zionism and reaction.

7. To support revolutionary changes in the Arab regions and progressive liberationist and nationalist movements with a view to reinforcing the objectives of Arab struggle and strengthening its historical march.

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Press conference statements by Vice Chairman Hussein of the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council explaining Iraq's attitude to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the use of oil as a political weapon (excerpts)⁵³

Baghdad, July 18, 1973

[In reply to questions by journalists on the Palestine problem, the solutions that have been proposed and recent statements on the Palestinian state and the attitude of the Iraqi region to them, Saddam Hussein said:]

Before going into detail we must first indicate the attitude of the Iraqi region, as a matter of principle and policy, to the question of the Arab-Zionist conflict; this is, of course, the attitude of the Baath Party. We do not regard the conflict between the Arabs and the Zionists that has arisen in Palestine, with foreign support, as a religious conflict as far as the Arabs' view of it is concerned.

⁵³ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Jumhuriya*, (Baghdad), July 20, 1973.

As for the view of the Palestinian Arabs themselves to this conflict: there are other, non-Arab quarters that view the conflict on this basis; it is a question of their view. The conflict between the Arabs and the Zionists, whether it is between the Arabs as a whole and the Zionists or between the Arabs of Palestine and the Zionists, does not rest on the basis indicated by one of you in his question. To sum up, this conflict lies in the desire of the Zionists to establish an artificial entity in our Arab territory in Palestine and at the expense of our people in that area. These ideas have received real support from imperialism and from Britain, America and the other Western countries.

This is the basis of the conflict, and we do not want to assert that there is a conflict based on religious concepts—a conflict between Muslims and Jews, as some people imagine, because in fact there is no such thing.

The Arabs and the Muslims have been well known throughout history for the tolerance they have displayed in their relations with others—Arabs and non-Arabs—belonging to other religions. Thus the essential basis of the conflict, as we understand it, is as follows: a people who want to live peaceably in their land, and other people, supported by imperialism and world Zionism, who plan and really exhaust themselves in their efforts to expel them from their land and occupy their land by force.

As to our view of the statements, both those made previously and those attributed to the Algerian Foreign Minister or President Bourguiba on the question of the Palestinian state or the question of direct negotiations, whether by non-Palestinian representatives of the Palestinians or representatives of the Palestinians drawn from the resistance or other quarters, from the start we reject the idea that the thief should be allowed to keep part of what he has stolen in return for giving back some of it to its rightful owner. This is the basic foundation of our policy and our principles as regards all the solutions proposed for the so-called problem between the Zionists and the Arabs.

We believe that the usurpation started before June 5, 1967—usurpation by armed force supported by imperialism—and the aggression of June 1967 was an extension of the usurpation that started before 1948 and ended in 1948 in Palestinian territory. Why is Security Council Resolution

242 of November 22, 1967 rejected by Iraq? It is absolutely rejected on the basis of the facts that we have mentioned, because resolution 242 of 1967 is essentially based on recognition of the thief's right to retain the greater part of what he stole, after giving back part of it to its rightful owner. This may be acceptable to some quarters, but it is not acceptable to us.

As for what we think is the appropriate formula for relations between the resistance and Lebanon, and also for relations between the resistance and all the regimes in whose territory the resistance operates, we regard the resistance as consisting of men of our people engaged in struggle. We believe that on this basis we must give them all possible opportunities of resisting imperialism and Zionism and provide them with all they require for this struggle of theirs. We are doing our duty to the best of our ability.

[In reply to questions on the eastern front and Iraq's attitude to the attempts to reconstitute it, he said:]

Iraq's attitude to this matter is quite clear; it has often been declared and statements have been made about it on many occasions. If we are to link things as they are at present with their recent history, we must make it clear that the eastern front existed when the Iraqi army was in Jordanian and Syrian territory, and the eastern front was dissolved at the decision of its commander-in-chief when the Iraqi army was there. That was after some of our brothers in the Arab countries recognized the Rogers Plan, seeing it as a possible solution of the Palestine problem.

On this basis orders were given for our army to withdraw from the front—that is, after the eastern front had been dissolved by a decision, orders were given for the Iraqi army to withdraw to Iraq.

The other point is that we must make it quite clear that what is meant by the eastern front from the territorial point of view is both the Jordanian and the Syrian territories that are in confrontation with the Zionist enemy; the eastern front does not consist of territory in Syria only.

I failed to mention that at the time the eastern front was dissolved by the decision of the commander-in-chief, at whose decision the Iraqi army had been placed under the orders of the Jordanian authorities, and in this connection there are facts

that must be mentioned if we are to give a right answer.

Every army in the world must be part of its political system; that is to say, it is impossible that an army should fight when the political command has decided that there should be no fighting. The other fact is that the eastern front had an important role in the field of military mobilization, but the eastern front, established within the framework of military reckonings, is not alone sufficient to liberate the usurped Arab territory. Therefore the question will be more correct and accurate if it is reframed as follows: What is required for liberation? Then, if we discuss what is required for liberation and come to the military aspect of these requirements, we are bound to insist on the importance of reconstituting the eastern front.

As regards using oil as a weapon in the battle, we are capable of using oil as a weapon in the national battle, and we are ready to be the first Arab countries that agree, in accordance with a central plan for liberation, to use oil as a weapon in the battle.

Speaking of the connection between the energy crisis and these activities, it must be said that there is an energy crisis in the world. But we must also expose the nature of the fuss which America has been creating lately over the energy crisis.

We all know that there was a great deal of talk about the energy crisis after the operations of the Iraq Petroleum Company were nationalized. In making all this fuss, America has military and political objectives; she wants to prepare people's minds at the level of the American people and their constitutional institutions, and at the level of certain Western peoples and their countries, so that they may accept and collaborate with the criminal plans that America intends to implement in this area behind this screen. We must therefore be aware of these facts and we must show up America's intentions in this connection. America is hinting at occupation of the oil wells.

America can occupy some of the oil wells but she cannot occupy them all. She can occupy some of them for a time, but she cannot continue to occupy them for as long as she requires energy from this area. Therefore, all the talk about using force to ensure supplies of energy for the West, which America is trying to make so much of through

statements by American officials, is futile and cannot be of any use.

Therefore we, and all countries who are interested in ensuring continued supplies of energy, must seek a new course. This new course is to respect the will of the peoples of this area and to recognize their independence and sovereignty, and not to seek to occupy the oil wells by military means.

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Policy statement by Prime Minister Solh of Lebanon on the Palestine cause (excerpt)⁵⁴

Beirut, July 25, 1973

Since the inception of the Palestine problem Lebanon has given it, with silent persistence, much of its resources; it has spared nothing in serving it. Lebanon plays this role faithfully and clings to it out of its realization of the connection between the Palestine problem and every Arab country. Lebanon, which cares for its sovereignty and safety and is confident about its security, will continue to work hard and to give generously until the Palestinian people are able to achieve their aspirations for an entity based on right and justice. The Palestine problem is Lebanon's problem. Lebanon's higher interests—the safety of its border, entity, sovereignty, and regime—are also the interests of all the Arabs, particularly the Palestinians, who will find in Lebanon an example for winning world sympathy for their cause.

The recent regrettable incidents which took place between some of our Palestinian brothers and the Lebanese security forces have, God willing, ended once and for all, thanks to the measures taken by the authorities, Arab co-operation, and the wisdom of Palestinian officials. Lebanon, which acts out of its eagerness to preserve its sovereignty and to enforce its laws within its territory, will continue to adhere to the policy it has adopted for itself and to play its role within a general Arab plan. By so doing, we will create a brotherly atmosphere in which trust and confidence

⁵⁴ Broadcast by Lebanon radio in Arabic; excerpted from the partial English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4357/A/6; reprinted by permission.

will replace fear and caution. The Government is endeavouring to create the necessary atmosphere that will enable our armed forces, backed by all the people, to defend with all their resources Lebanon's borders, territory, sovereignty and dignity.

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Press interview statements by King Hussein of Jordan commenting on President Bourguiba of Tunisia's advocacy of an alternative Palestinian state (excerpts)⁵⁵

Amman, late July, 1973

On the subject of President Bourguiba's statements I have nothing to add to what I said in the words I addressed last Thursday to our family in both banks, to our people in the occupied territory and to the great Arab homeland. Certainly we greatly regretted this attitude, which came as such a surprise to us; on the other hand, we were not surprised, because we had known for a long time that serious and unceasing attempts were being made to turn the Palestine problem from the problem of a people's right to their homeland and their occupied territory into an attempt to entirely change the picture by creating the idea of an alternative Palestinian homeland in Jordan. The Palestinian in Jordan is living in his homeland as a full and genuine citizen, and it has never been a question of anything but his right to his occupied territory in Palestine.

What is so regrettable in this is that this attitude to Jordan should have been adopted by a man who has an honourable history, has done great services and fought for liberation, and for whom I feel affection and respect—President Habib Bourguiba. This is the reason for our pain and regret. However, the attempts to slander this country may continue, there can be no doubt that they will continue, but the response to these attempts, and whatever quarter is working for their implementation, will be given by every Jordanian and Palestinian, every member of this one family of ours which we represent in our land, both here

to the east of the river and there in our land to the west of it. The response will be given by the single Palestinian-Jordanian family through its awareness of what it has experienced and its determination to frustrate all schemes aimed at slandering its determination and endurance and at attacking its legitimate rights.

This is all I have to say in comment on this matter.

Q. Something like Arab and foreign unanimity on the establishment of a Palestinian entity is appearing on the horizon. Has Jordan any intentions in this direction? Why does Jordan insist that she represents the Palestinians? Why does she not declare that they are represented by the Palestine Liberation Organization?

A. . . . If it is a question of representation, the great majority of our Palestinian brethren live here, in the East Bank, and the occupied West Bank of Jordan. If we so much as considered the possibility of withdrawing from the picture, we should no longer have any problem, but become like any other Arab country, and our people in the occupied territory would be in the greatest danger and despair.

When the problem of Palestinian representation is raised, there are many people who may decide that they have the right to make themselves heard on this subject, and they may well have sound reasons. For example, those who have stood firm in their land against the occupation may decide that they have a better right than anyone else to discuss the subject of Palestinian representation, and the result of all this will be not only differences, divisions and weakness under occupation, but the total loss of the Palestinian cause.

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Press interview statements by PFLP General Secretary Habash discussing the current problems of the Palestine revolution⁵⁶

August 4, 1973

Q. What can you tell us about the present situation of the resistance, and the mass struggles and increasing military operations in the occupied territories? What is your appraisal of the steps taken towards achieving national

⁵⁵ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), July 28, 1973; for President Bourguiba's statement see doc. 257 above.

⁵⁶ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Akhbar* (Beirut), August 4, 1973.

unity between the different organizations within the resistance movement?

A. I think that the first question that has been asked is the natural and fundamental question, and the right way to start on a discussion of the principal problems.

After the June [1967] defeat the Palestine revolution existed as a specific phenomenon which had an effect on the movement of the Arab masses in general. With the September [1970] massacres in Amman the Palestine resistance started on a new stage of its life. In September the resistance movement was subjected to a most ferocious imperialist attack as a result of which it sustained terrible losses. Of course, before September imperialism had been making continuous moves against the resistance, through its instruments: Israel and the subservient regime in Jordan. Before September there had already been four or five attempts to destroy the resistance, but the climax was the September attack. After the September attack the enemy tried to apply the following principle: If your enemy retreats, pursue him. Imperialism and its instruments in the area tried to crush the resistance materially and to overthrow it politically.

We must admit that the Palestinian resistance sustained a blow to its size and effectiveness as a result of this attack, and it is not too much to say that the Palestine resistance is now in a state of siege. But I appreciate your view of the positive aspect that has made its appearance in the Palestine resistance. This positive aspect is not completely visible to the masses. The aim of imperialism, as we can observe every day, is to take advantage of what has happened, so that they may say affirmatively that the resistance has ended, and there can be no doubt that a section of our masses are not unaffected by this. Imperialism is trying to give the Arab masses the idea that the new revolutionary birth which gave them such hopes is ended. Imperialism is doing all it can to spread despair among the masses, to make us lose our confidence in ourselves and to make our bases lose confidence in their revolution. This is the most dangerous aspect of the affair. That is why I say: This is not true; it is one aspect of the picture. It is one thing for us to admit the organizational, political and intellectual weakness of the structure of the resistance movement as regards holding out in the face of this attack, for us to

engage in self-criticism; for us to lose our confidence in ourselves is something else.

The fact is that if we can continue to hold out and stand firm in the face of this immense, ferocious and continuous attack, which takes advantage of the change in the balance of power that has taken place at the level of the Arab area, we shall have achieved a positive aim. I mean holding on to the strategy of the Palestine revolution. I mean not withdrawing from the people's war of liberation, which is the one way of opposing this attack. I mean that we must hold out at both theoretical and practical levels, and it is on this basis that allied forces in the world must judge us.

We say to our masses and to all forces of the international revolution that the resistance movement will not be got out of this situation by the touch of a magic wand. Our allies and our masses must not expect miracles of us. The only way out of this predicament is the way of action and continuous day-to-day struggle. This continuous day-to-day struggle will lead to the accumulation of minor victories which, in turn, will lead to a gradual change in the balance of power in favour of the Palestinian revolution.

I say this because our masses have lived through an emotional stage in which they imagined that the Palestine revolution was going to work miracles. What is essential now is that their view should become more objective; thus there is no place for miracles and there is no one action which we can complete in a day to enable us to advance from one state to another. I repeat: The one solution is continuous and unremitting day-to-day struggle.

It is also important that this day-to-day struggle should emphasize a group of fundamental and central problems or links in the chain, so that there may be a really scientific struggle with guaranteed results. It is not enough that there should be a state of moral determination to carry on the struggle; it is not enough that there should be honesty and sincerity as regards the strategic goals of the revolution. This honesty and sincerity must be clearly linked to the tasks that have to be performed. On the basis of this conscious link it will be possible for the required change to take place.

This brings us to the central problems that the leadership of the revolution must concentrate on.

One of the first central problems that we must always bear in mind, although it is not one that can be dealt with immediately, or that can be

solved in days, weeks, or even years is the problem of the revolutionary party, the Marxist-Leninist party, to lead the Palestine revolution. From now on national action must not be flabby. Experience has shown that Marxist-Leninist theory is not a mere theory hanging in the air: a whole series of laws have been formulated through which revolutionary change can be achieved. At present the Palestine revolution has no Marxist-Leninist party responsible for leading the revolution. If, from time to time, radical national organizations have succeeded in leading national democratic revolutions, this is not applicable to the Palestine revolution, because of the character of the enemy it is confronting. Victory can only be won through a revolution led by a revolutionary party committed to Marxist-Leninist thinking.

At present the Marxist-Leninist party does not exist in the Palestinian theatre. There are organizations which have aspirations to be the Marxist-Leninist party. We regarded the rise of the *Ansar* organization⁵⁷ as something extremely important, and we accorded it great historical value, but in practice it has not fulfilled its promise at this stage.

The second central link that we must continue to insist upon is the task of achieving national unity or, to put it more precisely and scientifically, the united Palestine national front. In the light of Marxist-Leninist theory, the premise of the national front is a basic condition for victory—it may be said to constitute the first condition.

Certainly the appraisal that maintains that the national front has made progress is correct. The front has been established on progressive foundations and on a scientific understanding of the relations that there must be between the political organizations existing in the Palestinian theatre—I mean relations based on a front—this is a great achievement.

There have been idealistic conceptions of national unity. There have been ideas for the complete amalgamation of all the organizations. If we take the Vietnamese revolution we find that the most successful task it has undertaken is that of the national front. Was that front established on a basis of amalgamation? I think not. In a word we can say that all the Palestinian organizations are now convinced that relations will have to be

on the basis of a front.

This is something we can place on record. But we must also place on record that the promise of the Palestine national front is still at the beginning of the road and that, like the revolutionary party, it requires genuine struggle. This unity is not going to come down from heaven: it requires effort. It is [a matter of] continuous construction and continuous struggle—ideological, political and organizational struggle. And this effort must be made not only by the commands, but also by the cadres and bases of the organizations, by all parties concerned with the Palestine revolution and its continuation.

In your question you referred to the third task which, too, must form the principal link: the premise of the masses and participation by the masses, the premise that the revolution must be supported by the politicized masses. I say this because this premise has not yet become a self-evident truth. I therefore consider that the achievement of this premise must be a goal of daily struggle. I also say this lest the national front should be understood as a formula for meetings between the organizations. These organizations still represent only an insignificant proportion of the Palestinian masses. The front is not an end in itself, it is only a start on the road.

The fourth central task is to put these three lines into practice in occupied Palestine. We fear that the political existence of the Palestine resistance movement outside occupied Palestine may have negative repercussions among the masses of the occupied territory. We must not forget that at least 50 per cent of our people are still in the occupied territory. I cannot imagine a Palestinian revolution in isolation from the masses in the occupied territory. The value of this does not lie in numbers and proportions; the real value lies in the fact that it is this section of the masses that is daily suffering national and class persecution. This is why the question of the national front in occupied Palestine is so important—a front comprising all the forces hostile to imperialism, Israel and reaction. This is the way in which the Palestine revolution can recover its tangible material existence, the way in which a decisive answer can be given to the claims of imperialism that the Palestine revolution has failed. This requires of us that we understand the enemy's policy. This needs an extremely mature national movement that is capable of

⁵⁷ The *Ansar* is the resistance organization of the Arab communist parties.

overcoming all the attempts of softening up made by the enemy.

To perform this task we must refer back to all our past experiences. Our previous struggles were vanguard military struggles. These struggles must be turned into day-to-day political and mass struggle against the occupation. These tasks are the basis of the unremitting day-to-day struggle to build a revolutionary party to lead the revolution.

Q. What is your appraisal of the incidents that took place in Lebanon in May [1973]? What fundamental conclusions have you reached about them? What is your appraisal of the role of the Lebanese national movement?

A. We now come to a central task of no less importance at this stage—the existence of the resistance movement in the Lebanese theatre. This leads us to ask about the May incidents in Lebanon.

At present, more than ever, we accord a special value to the existence, continuation and growth of the resistance movement in the Lebanese theatre. There are several reasons for this:

1. Because it is an indication that the Palestine revolution is still in existence.

2. Because it means that the strategy of the just people's war is still continuing, and has not failed, as colonialism claims.

3. Because it means that the resistance movement is able to address the Palestinian, Arab and world masses every day. It means that we are not letting our people in the occupied territory struggle without support.

We believe that the basis of the protection of the Palestine resistance movement, and the basis of replying to the attack, and the force that is scientifically capable of confronting this attack, is the Lebanese national movement. In our view this arises from our scientific analysis of the objective situation. Perhaps this is a suitable occasion for us to tell the revolutionary forces that we hold the national movement in Lebanon responsible before all other quarters for confronting the conspiracies that are being prepared to strike down the resistance. Our task is to defend ourselves in the light of a plan in whose drawing up the Lebanese nationalist movement plays a fundamental role. If we want to take advantage of what happened in Jordan, this is the basic lesson we must learn.

Since the Battle of Jerash the resistance in Lebanon has been hunted down and persecuted. At present we are enjoying a period of peace and quiet but, like others, I feel that trouble is going to break out again. The Lebanese national movement is now confronted with the same situation as confronted the resistance in Jordan in September. By vigilance and unremitting day-to-day activity, by supporting the alliance of all the progressive forces, by its Arab and international alliances, and by strengthening its integration with the resistance movement, the Lebanese national movement can ensure that it survives and continues to grow. The role played by the nationalist movement when it came out into the streets under arms took the authorities by surprise, and was a basic factor in the frustration of the attempt.

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Programme of the Palestine National Front in the Occupied Territory⁵⁸

Mid-August, 1973

Masses of our people in our occupied territory,

At the present time all of our Palestinian people, both within and outside the occupied territory, are faced with an escalation of the conspiracies and Zionist colonialist attacks directed against them with a view to striking at their national movement, obliterating their identity and finally liquidating their just cause, keeping them a prey to dispersion, fragmentation, enslavement and frustration.

The Zionist occupiers are giving a free rein to acts of robbery, plunder and judaization in our occupied territory. They are confiscating vast areas of Arab land, properties and buildings. They are evicting their owners and demolishing them, erecting on their ruins new Zionist quarters and settlements. They are taking a series of measures to join our economy to theirs and to make it the appendage of Zionist companies which reap vast profits by exploiting our people, turning them into a band of servants and hired labourers and exhausting them with exorbitant taxes and an excessively high cost of living.

⁵⁸ Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Hadaf* (Beirut), September 29, 1973.

These occupying invaders do not hesitate to violate the sanctity of our holy places or to make every effort to destroy them and take possession of them. They combat our Arab culture, humiliate our national dignity and deprive us of the most fundamental provisions of the Declaration of Human Rights.

While preventing hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees, whether they left their homes after the 1948 or the 1967 aggression, from returning to their land and their homes and rejoining their families and relatives, they open the doors wide to welcome Jewish newcomers from all parts of the world and settle them throughout Palestine.

In pursuing this course the Zionists are supported by the bayonets of invasion and occupation and by the use of the most odious forms of terrorism reminiscent of the savagery of the Nazis. They unleash bloody campaigns of repression against our Palestinian Arab people and their national movement within and outside the occupied territory, encouraged by unlimited American political, economic and military support. They promote the forces of surrender and defeatism in anticipation of an American solution concocted in Washington with the aim of serving and protecting the piratical interests of colonialism in the Arab homeland and realizing the expansionist ambitions of Zionism at the expense of our Palestinian Arab people and their sacred rights.

But these conspiracies and attacks, ferocious and dangerous though they are, have not succeeded in subduing our struggling Palestinian people, in spite of the huge sacrifices they have made and the miseries and harsh conditions to which they are exposed; they have not succeeded in effacing our people's identity or liquidating their cause. On the contrary, this fearless people are still in the field, raising high the banners of struggle. They are performing an outstanding role in the general Arab struggle against Zionist imperialist aggression and standing up to the waves of aggression and conspiracy, whether these are initiated by the Zionists or the colonialists and the subservient reactionary forces which are their agents. By their heroic struggle they have succeeded in giving prominence to the Palestinian identity, reviving the Palestine cause and winning greater recognition and support. This is evidenced by the numerous resolutions adopted by the United Nations and the statements issued by international conferences and

meetings, all of which affirm that the only way to reach a solution of the Middle East problem and to establish peace in the area is to safeguard the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arab people, first and foremost their right to self-determination and return.

Our Palestinian people in the occupied territory are aware of the gravity of the situation because they are living face to face with the Zionist schemes for expansion and judaization which are being implemented at the expense of their land and their very existence. This has led them to resist these schemes and to strive to unify their forces so as to stem the Zionist flood which threatens to sweep everything in its course.

This is why a number of members of our people in the occupied territory have come together to face up to these dangers. After discussion and exchange of viewpoints, they have decided to form the Palestine National Front in the Occupied Territory. Experience has shown that this is the way to mobilize and unify our people's energies for the struggle; this move is also in response to a call from the Palestine National Council which met in Cairo at the beginning of this year.

Thus the Palestine National Front is an integral part of the Palestine national movement as represented by the Palestine Liberation Organization which, in turn, is part of the Arab liberation movement.

The Palestine National Front in the Occupied Territory has adopted the following programme:

1. To resist the Zionist occupation and to struggle for the liberation of our occupied Arab territory;
2. To safeguard the legitimate rights of our Palestinian Arab people, first and foremost of which is their right to self-determination in their own land and to return to their homes;
3. To reject all conspiracies aimed at liquidating the cause of our Palestinian Arab people and renouncing their rights, whether they are Zionist plans such as the Palestinian entity, the civil administration, autonomy and the Allon plan or King Hussein's plan, the American solutions or similar settlements involving liquidation and surrender;
4. To defend Arab lands and properties against attempts to confiscate or judaize them or close them down;
5. To protect our Arab economy and to defend

Arab agricultural, industrial and commercial projects and institutions against attempts by the occupiers to destroy them and attach them to Zionist companies;

6. To protect our Arab culture and history from Zionist manipulation and distortion, especially in the field of school curricula;

7. To defend our holy places against the insolence of the Zionists and their efforts to destroy and take possession of them;

8. To revivify our popular heritage and the literature of the resistance as being an embodiment of our people's attachment to their land and their heroic struggle to defend it;

9. To do everything possible for the welfare of our strugglers, male and female, who are languishing in the prisons of the Zionists; to make every effort to ensure that they are better treated and released, and that their families, wives, children and relations are cared for.

10. To support mass organizations, such as trades unions, students and women's federations, religious and social clubs and associations, in their efforts to defend the interests of the groups they represent, to mobilize their energies for the struggle against occupation and to cooperate with them with a view toward protecting them against the attempts of the Zionists to penetrate them, and to resist the efforts of the occupiers to fragment and disunite our youth by sapping their patriotism;

11. The Front affirms the unity of the Palestinian and Jordanian peoples and declares that Jordan must be made a powerful base for Arab and Palestinian struggle against Zionist imperialist aggression;

12. The Front affirms that the national movement of our Palestinian people within and outside the occupied territory is a part of the Arab liberation movement, and that continued Zionist occupation and aggression constitute a threat not only to the rights and interests of the Palestinian people but also to the rights and the very existence of the other Arab peoples.

13. The Front will struggle to strengthen the links of friendship and cooperation with all progressive and revolutionary forces in the world, headed by the socialist countries and will make every effort to win more friends and supporters for our just cause in the international field.

Masses of the Palestinian people,

The establishment of the Palestine National

Front in the Occupied Territory as a rallying point for our masses is an important step that will strengthen our people's self-confidence, raise the level of their struggle against the occupation and refute allegations that there is a vacuum in the occupied territory. It will reinforce struggle of our Palestinian people everywhere, both within and outside occupied Palestinian territory. We call on all classes and groups of our Palestinian people in our occupied territory—farmers, workers, merchants, students, intellectuals, craftsmen, men of religion and owners of national industries—to rally round the banner of the Palestine National Front. We call on every man to whom the land of his fathers and grandfathers, our national honour and the sanctity of our holy places are precious, to rally round the Front.

The malevolent aim of our enemy is to tear us up by the roots. If he is to be resisted successfully the whole of our people must play their part in resisting him. Resistance must not be restricted to one field only but must cover all fields; every citizen must take his proper place and play his proper part in it, whether man or woman.

This is the age of the liberation of peoples, the victory of the forces of liberation and progress and the defeat of the forces of colonialism, invasion, aggression and racialism. Every people, if it is resolute, unifies its efforts and follows the course of undiverted struggle, can win its freedom and its right to self-determination, however strong its enemies and however far they go in their repression and brutal terrorism.

It was in this way that the peoples of Algeria and South Yemen were victorious after long and bitter struggles involving so many sacrifices. It is in this way that the world is today witnessing the victory of the people of Vietnam over the most arrogant force of colonialism represented by the imperialists and the Americans, the masters and protectors of the Zionists. If our people follow the same course victory will inevitably be theirs.

Long live our Arab nation. Long live our Palestinian Arab people, and victory to their just struggle.

Defeat and humiliation to the Zionist invaders and their imperialist masters.

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Press interview statements by King Faisal of Saudi Arabia relating oil to the Middle East conflict⁵⁹

Jidda, late August, 1973

Q. Your Majesty, in recent weeks Saudi Arabia has indicated that the United States' energy needs and the Middle Eastern political situation can no longer be considered separately. What is Saudi Arabian oil policy in relation to America's need for guaranteed long-term oil supplies?

A. Logic requires that our oil production does not exceed the limits that can be absorbed by our economy. Should we decide to exceed that limit in response to the needs of the United States and the West, two conditions must first be satisfied. First, the United States and the West must effectively assist the kingdom of Saudi Arabia in industrializing itself in order to create an alternative source of income to oil, the depletion of which we shall be accelerating by increasing production—and also so that we can absorb the excess income resulting from production at such a level. Secondly, the suitable political atmosphere, hitherto disturbed by the Middle East crisis and Zionist expansionist ambitions, must be present.

Q. Only a year ago you stated that Saudi Arabian oil would never be used politically—I believe you called the notion “dangerous.” What changed your mind?

A. We have not changed our mind. We still believe that our oil should continue to flow to its traditional markets within the limits I mentioned earlier, which conform with the needs of our domestic economy. As for the question of increasing production to a level which conflicts with our economic interests, this is a political matter for which a suitable political atmosphere must be prepared. Also, solutions must be found for its economically undesirable effects.

Q. Have you seen any indication that Washington has heard you or that the United States is willing to modify its Middle East policy?

A. Washington has undoubtedly heard us and knows our true position which emanates from our traditional friendship with the American people. As for the second part of the question, we feel it should be addressed to Washington,

which we hope will cooperate with us in preserving the interests of the American nation and the whole free world.

Q. What kind of American action would you consider an adequate response?

A. Abstaining from adopting biased attitudes and from giving unlimited aid to Israel, which has increased Israel's arrogance and led it to reject peace and to insist on the retention of its war gains. America is, to a large extent, responsible for rectifying this situation.

Q. If no U.S. response is forthcoming, what exactly will happen? Are we talking about a freeze in Saudi Arabian oil production, or perhaps a significant reduction in the rate of expansion?

A. If no American response is forthcoming, one of the conditions for increasing our production will not have been satisfied. We shall then view the matter exclusively from the viewpoint of our self-interest. In this case the resultant rise in prices may lead to an increase of income which would necessitate a cutback in production. The two issues are interlinked, as a cutback in production would lead to a sudden and substantial rise in price.

Q. At the moment, for example, the production agreed upon last year between your government and the American-Arabian Oil Company [Aramco] is still awaiting final clearance. Will that schedule be revised or your decision left pending until you see positive results from Washington?

A. The production schedules have not been agreed upon with our government. As for determining the level of production, whether this entails an increase, a reduction or a freeze, this is a function exercised by the state by virtue of its sovereignty. It is not a matter for which agreement is needed with the companies operating on its territory.

Q. If Saudi Arabia is forced to penalize the United States, will the nations of Western Europe or Japan also be included—or will each be judged on its own attitude toward the Middle East crisis?

A. We do not think with a punitive mentality. The United States, Japan and the nations of Western Europe are all our friends and we desire sincere cooperation with them. However, such cooperation requires action on both sides: not sacrifices on one side and negative, if not hostile, attitudes on the other side.

⁵⁹ Excerpted from the interview conducted by Nicholas Proffitt, *Newsweek* (New York-International edition), September 10, 1973, p. 12.

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Speech by President Sadat of Egypt calling on the non-aligned countries for active support in the confrontation with Israel (excerpt)⁶⁰**Algiers, September 6, 1973**

Mr. Chairman, Your Excellencies,

Our political and economic battles are complementary and inseparable. The Middle East area, which lies in the heart of our non-aligned world, is today engaged in a terrible conflict which is the living expression of the challenges imposed on our non-aligned countries and of our endurance in the face of these challenges.

The outcome of this conflict will to a great extent determine not only the destiny of our area but also that of our organization. Our success will strengthen our philosophy and our role as non-aligned states, while the effects of our failure—and God forbid that we should fail—will be reflected in a serious deterioration of the position of all our countries.

Therefore the problem of the Middle East is the most serious problem facing the non-aligned world today. The area is suffering anxiety and tension as a result of the continuous occupation which has oppressed Arab territories for a quarter of a century and which, a few years ago, once more burst out of its bases to strengthen its grip. It is now clear that, in addition to this, attempts are being made to consolidate foreign control over the wealth of the peoples of the area and to deprive them of their independence to achieve growth and development.

To confront this two-fold challenge, whose scope and extent are now so familiar to us, and to confront also the objectives of world Zionism and imperialism that lie behind it, we are doing all we can to consolidate the solidarity of our countries and people in defence of our rights and our legitimate interests and in defence of all those values, concepts and aspirations which we have come here to affirm our own and our peoples' faith in and respect for.

In addition to these values, concepts and aspirations, we have brought here with us a firm confidence in the continued expansion of the front

of support for our struggle throughout our non-aligned world which has adopted our just cause because it is its own cause. It has struggled and is still struggling with us, at the political and diplomatic levels, in all fields of action, to rout the forces that support aggression, domination and exploitation.

The attitude of your countries adopted at Georgetown⁶¹ was an excellent expression of the will of the non-aligned countries. Similarly, the countries which represent you in the Security Council adopted another attitude, which they expressed in July. Yet again, the voices of fourteen of the countries in the [Security] Council of fifteen countries were raised in clear and frank condemnation of Israel's colonialist attitudes and Zionist racist policy.⁶²

As I address this gathering it gives me pleasure to recall with appreciation how a number of the prominent Foreign Ministers present at this meeting made the most praise-worthy efforts at the United Nations and how the African group decided at the request of one of our fellow-Presidents to continue this political effort in the General Assembly.⁶³

Mr. Chairman,

Our aim is to achieve a just peace in our area and to ensure its progress and prosperity so that we contribute to the peace and prosperity of the non-aligned world and the world as a whole.

The only basis for peace is the complete withdrawal of the forces of Israeli aggression from all the Arab territories and the guarantee of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people who aspire to exercise their legitimate right to self-determination. There can be no stability or progress without recognition of our peoples' rights to control their resources and to use them in the service of economic and social development in conformity with their wishes and their free will. We are confident that our non-aligned countries will not confine themselves to condemning Israel's Zionist policy and the policy of the forces that support her, but will go on to translate their words into action. This is the call we advocate in all the problems with which we have to deal on the way to the achievement of just and permanent peace.

⁶⁰ President Sadat's speech was made at the Fourth Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, September 5-9; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), September 7, 1973.

⁶¹ Doc. 119 in *International Documents on Palestine 1972*.

⁶² Reference to the UN Security Council draft resolution vetoed by the US, see doc. 109 above.

⁶³ See para. 10 of the OAU resolution, doc. 91 above.

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Statement by President Qadhafi of Libya calling on the non-aligned countries to sever all relations with Israel (excerpt)⁶⁴

Algiers, September 6, 1973

I want to make an observation that perhaps will be similar to the last one—there is no difference between South Africa and the Zionist entity; indeed, the Zionist entity is more dangerous than South Africa, because certainly a large number of the Africans of South Africa now live in their land, but under the racist regime; as for Palestine, the Zionists only occupied it after driving out its people who are still living in tents provided by the United Nations.

You are going to make a distinction, gentlemen, especially those of you from Africa, between the Zionist entity and South Africa. Can we accept that any one of us should establish relations with or recognize South Africa? If it happened we should regard it as treason, but it is happening between some of you and the Zionist entity. My country has forbidden any aircraft to use its airspace on the way to South Africa, and my country has forbidden Portuguese aircraft to use its airspace wherever they are going—all this in defence of the freedom of Africa. But unfortunately some of us recognize the Zionist entity and have relations with it.

I do not ask this conference to join us in liberating Palestine or the territories that were occupied in 1967. That is out of the question. It is on us that the burden of fighting rests. But what this conference can do is to boycott our enemy. Can't you boycott our enemy? This is not impossible. My country will place its resources at the disposal of any country that is injured by boycotting our enemy; be sure that all free men are in solidarity with us to this end.

If anyone asks you to liberate these territories or to destroy the Zionist enemy—that is unsound reasoning, it is out of the question. The request must be clear when we recall Palestine and the Zionist entity—territories occupied in 1967; the request must be clear—it is that you boycott our enemy at least. What is required is not unanimity but an independent political decision from the

head of each state. Anyone who severs his relations with the enemy will be proving that he is a free man with free will. Those who know that this is true and their duty, but cannot do it, then they are proving that they are not free.

Those who have severed their relations with the Zionist entity have proved that they have free will, that they are free men in their own countries, that they are free to make their own choices and capable of understanding the current international situation. Those who have not done so are either ignorant of the nature of the situation, and this I find is more probable, or they are not free in their own countries, and this I think most unlikely in the case of many of our countries.

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Statement by the PLO Executive Committee regarding developments in Jordan and Lebanon⁶⁵

September 22, 1973

The Palestine Liberation Organization Executive Committee held an expanded meeting on 19th and 20th September under PLO Executive Committee Chairman and C-in-C of the Palestine Revolution Forces brother Abu Ammar. During the meeting the Executive Committee studied the current Palestinian and Arab situations. The meeting arrived at the following results:

1. The Executive Committee discussed the current developments on the eastern front. It noted that the Palestine resistance has always called for the establishment of a fighting eastern front on national bases which guarantee that it will achieve effective confrontation against the enemy. The PLO announced this attitude in the meetings of the Arab Foreign Ministers and Defence Ministers in Kuwait and Cairo. The Executive Committee has stated that the conditions which should be provided for the establishment of this eastern front should include: (a) the return of the Palestine resistance to Jordan as an indisputable national right which guarantees for its liberty to carry out the struggle against the occupying enemy; (b) the

⁶⁴ Made in a speech at the Fourth Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, September 5-9; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Fajr al-Jadid* (Tripoli), September 8, 1973.

⁶⁵ Broadcast by Voice of Palestine (Cairo) in Arabic; English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4406/A/5-7; reprinted by permission.

effective and principal participation of forces from Syria and Iraq in the eastern front, which must be placed under a trustworthy national command; (c) the guaranteeing of the freedoms and basic rights of our people in Jordan to ensure their participation in the struggle against the enemy.

The Executive Committee again stresses the necessity of safeguarding the sacred right of the resistance to operate from all the confrontation lines with the enemy, especially from the Jordanian front whose historic and demographic fate has been connected with the fate of our people and their national cause. Several developments have taken place recently at the level of relations between the Jordan authorities and some nationalist Arab countries in an attempt to reactivate the eastern front. The Jordanian authorities have aimed, through these developments, to break that country's isolation by the Arabs and to alleviate its internal crisis without adhering to conditions which guarantee Jordan's effective participation in a truly fighting eastern front. One of the aims of the Jordanian authorities was to encourage differences and splits and to isolate the resistance from the nationalist confrontation states which are its natural allies.

The Executive Committee, while warning of the results of this reactionary manoeuvre, stresses the importance of preserving the joint national stand between the resistance and the nationalist confrontation states. Any difference in viewpoints and transitory events should not result in the division of the national Arab rank and in the principal conflict with the imperialist and Zionist enemy being forgotten. The Palestinian people, whose struggle has historically been tied to the struggle of the two fraternal peoples in Syria and Egypt, is very anxious to strengthen and preserve this connection.

2. The Executive Committee noted that the reactionary and imperialist quarters which have been working for a long time to divide the Palestinian ranks have recently intensified their attempts in this direction.

Hostile forces, including the Jordanian regime, are again trying to break up the co-ordination existing in the resistance movement and discriminate between its establishments and groups. The Executive Committee stressed that the eagerness of all the revolution's groups to strengthen and safeguard their national unity is above all con-

siderations. The Executive Committee said that all the resistance groups had adopted a unified political stand on recent developments. The eastern front and the national guarantees demanded for its establishment, particularly the demands connected with the return of the resistance to Jordan, the formula under which the resistance will return and its size must be determined by the PLO Political Command in its capacity as the representative of all the revolution's groups and our Palestinian people.

3. The Executive Committee considers that the success of the struggle of our people in achieving their demand for the release of hundreds of strugglers who were detained in the prisons of the Jordanian regime is the result of the steadfastness of our strugglers, the determination of our people, and the honourable solidarity of our fraternal Arab peoples and world progressive forces. This led to the isolation of the regime at home and abroad, compelling it to yield to this demand of the masses in an attempt to ease its isolation.

This measure is a right for our strugglers who will continue to adhere to the cause of their people in Jordan. Jordan is their homeland, and the people in Jordan are their people. The achievement of this demand requires the continuation of the struggle for the release of all the nationalist strugglers who are still in the prisons under various pretexts, the granting of democratic freedoms to our people and their being given complete liberty in resisting the Zionist occupation.

4. The Executive Committee debated the situation vis-à-vis recent plans which are claimed to be an attempt to find a solution to the problem of the Palestinian people under the current balance of power. The committee concluded that, under the present conditions, these plans will only lead to misunderstanding and confusion in the ranks of our people and the Arab nation, and cannot achieve any of the rights of the Palestinian people.

The hostile forces have publicized these plans for the purpose of misleading the Palestinian people, sowing division in the ranks of the revolution and distracting it from its direct duties.

The deliverance of the Palestinian people from the yoke of the treacherous aggression, and the exaction of their right to determine their future can only be achieved by continuing the masses' armed struggle, which is the only course for changing the balance of power.

5. The Executive Committee emphasizes that the increasing national and revolutionary upsurge, particularly in recent months, in the occupied territories is another proof that the enemy's policy is daily clashing sharply with the vital interests of our people. The enemy's actions represented in the usurpation and confiscation of land; the encouragement of Zionist settlement in the Arab lands; the continuation of the policy of annexation, usurpation and economic merger; the destruction of the foundations of national economy; the blotting out of the special national identity of our people, the undermining of their national culture and desecration of their religious sanctities and national heritage, conflict with the national ambition and the main interests of all sections of our people.

The Executive Committee stressed that the present duty is to act to lead or organize this upsurge within the framework of a national union front which would unite the struggle of the masses of our people against the policy and plots of the occupier and to foil all his plans.

6. The Executive Committee reviewed the development in the relations with all the forces in the Lebanese arena and affirmed the need to continue to solve any transient problem in the spirit of positive dialogue. The Committee affirms its eagerness to maintain stability, calm and the positive relations to ensure the consolidation of the confidence between the fraternal Lebanese people and the Palestinian masses. It also affirms its eagerness to develop the means of co-operation and cohesion between the resistance and the Lebanese national forces.

7. The Committee has noted with satisfaction that the Palestine resistance, despite all the attempts to impose a seige upon it and plot against its unity, has successfully forged ahead on the international level. It has also successfully strengthened the relations of solidarity and alliance with the forces struggling for freedom and progress and to strengthen the respect of peoples of the world for the heroic struggle being waged by our Palestinian people. This was prominently displayed during the Berlin world festival, which represented a huge demonstration of solidarity with the Palestinian people. It was also prominently expressed at the non-aligned conference in Algiers, during which the Palestine resistance played a prominent role as a representative of the national liberation move-

ments. It obtained recognition as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and their struggle as stipulated by the conference resolutions.

These successes constitute a definite support for the Palestinian people's struggle, strengthen their position among the struggling people and strengthen their determination to struggle until victory.

8. After having studied the internal situations of the PLO, the Executive Committee stressed the need to develop these methods of front-level action and collective leadership in its institutions. The Committee noted that the development of the methods of the democratic dialogue within the framework of the organization and its organs is adequate to solve any transient matters faced by the national action.

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Statement issued after a meeting of Arab Communist parties outlining future tasks (excerpts)⁶⁶

Late September, 1973

A meeting of the representatives of the Communist Parties of the Arab countries held in September 1973 was attended by delegations from the Jordanian Communist Party, the Algerian Vanguard Party, the Sudanese Communist Party, the Syrian Communist Party, the Iraqi Communist Party and the Lebanese Communist Party.

The meeting studied the situation in the Arab countries and conducted an analysis of the new phenomena that have arisen in them and of the urgent tasks that face the Arab liberation movement. It devoted special attention to the present world situation and the world communist movement. Those attending the meeting reached unanimous agreement on this situation and the tasks in struggle that lie ahead of their parties in the national movement, in each Arab region and in the Arab homeland, and on the role of all the progressive and anti-imperialist forces in the Arab countries.

All sectors of the Arab liberation movement have realized the great importance of establishing relations in struggle between themselves and the

⁶⁶ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nida'* (Beirut), November 5, 1973.

USSR, and especially between the USSR and the liberated Arab countries; they have also realized the importance of economic and cultural relations between the Arab countries and the USSR and the countries of the socialist camp.

The signing by Egypt and Iraq of treaties of friendship and cooperation with the USSR⁶⁷ is something new in the development of these relations which is beneficial to the interests of the Arab liberation movement. It is also a logical consequence of these relations with the USSR and of its policy of solidarity with our Arab peoples in their struggle to maintain their independence and the gains they have achieved. These treaties are a reflection of the close links between the world socialist revolution and the national liberation movement, and also a reflection of the fact that the liberation movement has changed from being a struggle not only against imperialism, but also against capitalism.

The Soviet-Arab alliance is the property of the Arab people and is something they have achieved thanks to their struggle. It is an achievement which no force or group can relinquish or withdraw from without resorting to rightist and reactionary measures which would do immense harm to our liberation movement and which are, and will continue to be, opposed by all honourable forces in our countries.

In spite of the imperialist-Israeli attacks on the Palestine resistance movement with the object of paralyzing its power of movement and liquidating it totally, this movement has held out and succeeded in repelling these attacks, thanks to its fearless struggle and the escalation of its operations within the occupied territories, and thanks to the support of the progressive forces in all the Arab regions and all progressive forces in the world, headed by the USSR and the socialist countries. Through its advance in struggle, the Palestine resistance movement has established that it is an active section of the Arab and world national liberation movements, a section which, through the Palestine Liberation Organization, represents the Palestinian Arab people and their national liberation movement and fights for their right to return to their homeland and to self-determination

in their own land.

Our Parties believe that one of their first tasks is to struggle, along with all the nationalist and progressive forces, to support the Palestine resistance movement and to provide it with all possible help, and in particular to struggle for its right to exist and to freedom of action in all the Arab countries.

The Arab national liberation movement is faced with a series of immediate tasks; their achievement is necessary for subsequent development of the advance in struggle to achieve the goals of the national democratic revolution. In placing the following tasks before the masses and all nationalist progressive forces in the world, our Communist Parties hereby declare their resolution and determination to struggle united, and with the utmost devotion and self-sacrifice for their achievement, alongside these forces.

1. Struggle against the attacks which imperialism and its instruments, Zionism and reaction, are directing against the Arab national liberation movement as a whole, and in particular the progressive regimes, with the object of sweeping them away, especially in Iraq, Syria and Democratic Yemen, and action by all means to consolidate these regimes.

2. Vigorous struggle by all sectors of the Arab national liberation movement, relying on the support of the largest possible numbers of the masses, employing all appropriate means of struggle and in effective cooperation with the USSR and all socialist and progressive forces in the world, to eliminate the consequences of Israeli aggression, to expel the occupying invaders and to recover the occupied Arab territories. Effective resistance to all Israeli schemes aimed at establishing Zionist settlements in them. Struggle to ensure that the Palestinian people return to their homes and exercise their right to self-determination in their own land. Resistance, with a view to frustrating them, to all American surrenderist solutions which are intended to be imposed on the Arab liberation movement.

3. Efforts to establish and strengthen the internal fronts of the nationalist and progressive forces and to develop these fronts so that they may become effective instruments of struggle for all the popular masses and their progressive forces.

⁶⁷ The USSR signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Egypt on May 27, 1971 (doc. 125 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*), and with Iraq on April 9, 1972 (doc. 72 in *International Documents on Palestine 1972*).

The meeting calls on the Kurdistan Democratic Party to join the national front of Iraq; this is a matter of special importance and will play a major role in completing the solution of the Kurdish problem on the basis of the statement of March 1970 and in strengthening the role played by Iraq in the forces of confrontation of aggression.

4. Firm support for the Palestine resistance movement and cooperation with it in drafting a programme for its political and military activities, based on: its unification and the development of its struggle in all its forms especially in the occupied territories, rejection of adventurism and isolationism, firm links with the national movement of the Jordanian people and consolidation of its relations with the forces of progress and socialism.

5. Efforts to mobilize all Arab energies and to achieve solidarity in Arab struggle between the liberated Arab countries, especially between Iraq, Syria and Egypt, for the confrontation of aggression and the liberation from the Zionists of the occupied Arab territories. Support for all measures aimed at strengthening combat capacity, including the establishment of the Eastern Front on the basis of Arab forces entering Jordan and being placed under a national Arab command, the return of the Palestine resistance movement within the framework of the Cairo Agreement,⁶⁸ and the granting of democratic freedoms.

6. Struggle to promote steps and initiatives taken towards the unification of the struggle of the progressive nationalist parties and movements throughout the Arab world and efforts to strengthen and develop the Arab Front Participating in the Palestine Revolution.

7. Struggle to provide all the requirements needed to mobilize and activate the energies of the popular masses in every Arab country and at the level of all the Arab countries, in particular the granting of democratic and political rights to progressive and mass parties and organizations; resistance to all attempts at repression and intimidation to which these forces may be subjected, and the launching of campaigns of solidarity with them.

8. Struggle to strengthen and develop Arab-Soviet friendship and resistance to campaigns aimed at destroying it.

9. Resolute struggle to lay bare, disclose and resist rightist moves.

10. Struggle to strike at the economic, political and strategic interests of imperialism, starting with the use of oil as a weapon in the battle against imperialism and aggression and to ensure that progressive economic and social changes continue and are reinforced.

11. Support for the struggle of the Arab people in the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf under the leadership of their nationalist and progressive organizations, against the remnants of colonialist domination and the reactionary regimes that are subservient to the colonialists, and against the territorial ambitions of Iranian reaction.

12. Struggle to achieve Arab unity on a sound and clear-cut political and social basis, the mainstays of which are:

a) Hostility to imperialism, Zionism and reaction.

b) Friendship, cooperation and alliance with the USSR and the countries of the socialist camp.

c) The pursuit of a progressive policy in the economic and social fields.

d) The granting of democratic freedoms to the masses, including the right of the working class to political organization.

e) Respect for the national rights of the Kurdish people in Iraq and the rights of the national minorities in the Arab world.

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Statement by Phalangist Party leader Gemayyel of Lebanon commenting on the conflict between the Lebanese government and the Palestine resistance (excerpts)⁶⁹

Broumana, Lebanon, September 28, 1973

Arab unity! Arab unity! This dream is still a dream only because action to realize it always starts where it ought to end—at the wrong end.

If, as seems to be the case at present, its aim is to achieve the requisite strength to catch up with Israeli superiority, the Arabs will never become strong in this way. So what use is it going to do the Arabs if they look to such a state to achieve progress for them?

⁶⁹ Pierre Gemayyel was speaking at the opening of the sixteenth Phalangist Party Conference; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Amal* (Beirut), September 29, 1973.

⁶⁸ Doc. 504 in *International Documents on Palestine 1970*.

A greater Arab state, built with reference to the slogan of "Arab nationalism," will result in greater backwardness, disintegration and division; it will not be a way to progress and to mobilize energies.

The state of nationalism, or the nationalist state, is an old formula that time has left behind, that has been left behind by the requirements of developed man and the constantly changing circumstances of life. We all know the difficulties and shocks suffered by such a state and how it is torn to pieces and deprived of prosperity, happiness and stability by secessionist trends.

Comrades,

This long review of mine of the "world of Arabism" and the various problems of participation, was necessary as a prelude to dealing with the major problem of the moment, a problem which has, in turn, raised the problems of participation and revived the controversy about Lebanon's identity, role and mission. This problem is, of course, the Palestinian presence in Lebanon and Lebanon's relation with the Palestine resistance.

There is no need to say that this problem would not have existed but for Lebanon's internal tragedy. This is emphasized by the fact that all the Arab countries—except Lebanon—have resolved their differences with the Palestine resistance in the way that they, and not the Palestine resistance, wanted.

The cause of Palestine, as I have so often said, is the most just cause of our time; its righteousness is as clear as the light of day.

A whole people has been evicted from their land to live as vagrants throughout the world, robbed of self-respect, solely in order that another group of human beings, united by religious fanaticism and racism and also seeking a homeland, can settle. What rational mind can accept this reasoning, this tragedy?

If it is a human duty that the Jews should be fairly treated, if the Jews are a group of human beings who are entitled to be fairly treated like other people, it is not just that they should be fairly treated at the expense of another people being evicted and deprived of their identity and their self-respect—and sometimes even of life.

But this injustice has happened, and the Palestinian people lost their rights—or nearly lost—but for their revolt against this injustice and their determination to survive.

If our brethren have the right to dispose of their own interests as they wish, they do not have the right to dispose of our interests.

And in fact they have taken military action against us amounting to war in the full sense of the word, a war which was untimely and which the whole Arab world was not equal to, let alone Lebanon by herself.

There is no need to describe the consequences of this abuse of commando action, for they can be seen by all and are impressed on every mind.

What did they expect of us? That we should keep quiet about this situation to prove our love for them and our support for their struggle? Or that we should at least defend ourselves against charges of injustice, accusations and slander?

The fact is that choosing between providing this proof of love that should need no proof and defending ourselves, our existence, and the real interests of the Palestinians, we chose the second course. And we did well to do so. For if we had been slack, had let things slide and had fallen into the trap of overbidding, this abuse of commando action would have met with no opposition or resistance, it would not have led them to come to their senses and no attempt would have been made to stop frivolous military action, at least over our frontiers.

On this basis are we to be the most loyal of the loyal to commando action, while the others, those who cast doubts, are the most hostile to it?

I emphasize intentions, because our Palestinian brethren are living in fear of liquidation—indeed, any objection, any remark, any opposition displayed by us to the excesses of some of them, they explain as being the start of an attempt to liquidate them.

We thoroughly understand the motives behind this wariness, the motives of this poor opinion of us; there are many reasons for it. But it is also necessary that they in turn should understand our caution and misgivings for which we too have our justifications. Here let me ask: Why should the Phalangist militia and its camps, for example, be intended for the liquidation of the Palestine resistance, while the resistance's "militia" and its camps, which have become ammunition stockpiles, not be intended for the liquidation of Lebanon, or its regime?

If we are excessively wary, so is the resistance, and indeed they have been the first to be such.

If the government with all its institutions, the Phalangists, the National Liberals, and so on, really want to liquidate the resistance, it surely means, more or less, that the resistance is established and is operating in enemy territory, so that it is an occupation force and not a resistance!

Yes, indeed, in the final analysis, the logic of alleged "liquidation" leads us to this conclusion. But do we accept it?

We reject this way of thinking and its consequences, because from the start it is false.

I want to affirm to the leaders of the resistance, and to every Palestinian, that the government and all its members and the army and all its members are innocent of the intentions attributed to them. The reasons for the dispute between the government and the resistance are the same as those which alienated us. In this respect we are one hundred percent with the government, with the state; their attitude is ours, and their intentions are ours.

It is unjust that this agreement should be interpreted as being biased in our favour. The government sees itself as being the government of a sovereign independent state, and has to act as such. That is to say, it must act in accordance with the logic of the Constitution which regards Lebanon as an "independent nation," and in accordance with no other logic.

Therefore the conflict between the state and the resistance is substantially the same as the difference of opinion between us and the resistance. It is a difference of opinion as regards the role Lebanon is required to perform in supporting the Palestine struggle and its cause.

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Manifesto issued by the "Eagles of the Palestinian Revolution" during the group's involvement in the Schönau incident⁷⁰

September 28, 1973

By the name of The Palestinian Martyrs who had been martyred in struggling to return back, and by the name of the Palestinian Revolution.

We, The Eagles of the Palestinian Revolution, declare our responsibility about this operation. We have done this mission, because of feeling that the immigration of the Soviet Union Jew form a great danger on our cause.

We haven't done this mission because we are murderers by nature, but because of the crimes of Zionists who bombed our camps, killing our infants and children, women and olds, or when they murder our leaders my meagre methods and because they had declared that they will fight and destroy our people any where will be found. We have done it because we have rights, have the will of determination and decission to fight the Zionist wherever can be found, as ever as they are recruits to the enemy. It is not our first strike, it will not be the last, and nothing we will accept, but liberating our land by force.

And to those who are acting to let us think and imagine the peaceful projects as a way to give us our rights, let them know that we refuse any project exceptliberating our whole land from the Zionists.

The Eagles of the Palestinian Revolution

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Military communiqués issued by Egypt regarding the outbreak of war⁷¹

Cairo, October 6, 1973

Communiqué no. 1 (Broadcast at 12.15 gmt)

At 1.30 pm [11.30 gmt] today the enemy attacked our forces in the al-Zaafarana and al-Sukna areas in the Gulf of Suez with several formations of air forces; some of the enemy's gunboats were approaching the western coast of the Gulf. Our forces are now resisting the raiding forces.

* * *

Communiqué no. 2 (Broadcast at 12.33 gmt)

In reply to the treacherous aggression launched by the enemy against our forces in Egypt and Syria, some of our air formations are at present bombing enemy bases and military targets in the occupied territories.

* * *

⁷⁰ Issued in English; text as published in Federal Chancellery of Austria, *The Events of September 28th and 29th 1973: A Documentary Report* (Vienna, 1973), p. 80.

⁷¹ Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), October 7, 1973. The times of all communiqués and the text of no. 8 are from BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4418/A/1-2; reprinted by permission.

Communiqué no. 3 (Broadcast at 13.05 gmt)

Further to Communiqué no. 2, our air forces have successfully carried out their tasks, scoring direct hits on enemy positions, and all our planes except one have returned safely to their bases.

* * *

Communiqué no. 4 (Broadcast at 13.22 gmt)

Enemy forces tried to capture part of our territory west of the Canal. Our land forces resisted them and carried out a successful counter-attack after heavy bombardment of enemy strong-points by our artillery. Some of our forces then crossed the Suez Canal in pursuit of the enemy in some areas on the East Bank. The engagement is continuing on the East Bank of the Suez Canal.

* * *

Communiqué no. 5 (Broadcast at 14.07 gmt)

Our forces succeeded in crossing the Suez Canal in several sectors, overtaking enemy strongholds and raising the Egyptian flag on the East Bank of the Canal. Syrian armed forces penetrated enemy positions opposite them and achieved similar successes in various sectors.

* * *

Communiqué no. 6 (Broadcast at 14.59 gmt)

As a result of our forces' successful crossing of the Suez Canal the enemy sent in his air forces in large numbers but were resisted by our fighters. As a result of the violent air battles eleven enemy planes were destroyed; our forces lost ten planes.

* * *

Communiqué no. 7 (Broadcast at 17.38 gmt)

Our forces have succeeded in crossing the Suez Canal all along the front and taken most of the East Bank of the Canal. At present our forces are continuing to fight the enemy with success.

Our naval forces have protected the left wing of our forces on the Mediterranean coast.

They have attacked important enemy targets on the north coast of Sinai, scoring direct hits.

* * *

Communiqué no. 8 (Broadcast at 22.41 gmt)

At dusk today, the enemy launched counter-attacks with tanks and mechanized infantry against our forces which had crossed the Suez Canal at various points. Our forces repulsed all these attacks and inflicted heavy losses in life and equipment on the enemy. Our forces are still fighting successfully from their positions on the east bank of the Canal.

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Military communiqués issued by Syria regarding the outbreak of war⁷²

Damascus, October 6, 1973

At 14.00 hours today enemy forces started to attack our advance positions along the ceasefire line. Our forces are at present replying to the sources of fire and silencing them. Groups of enemy aircraft also tried to penetrate our airspace in the northern sector of the front. Our fighters resisted them and an air battle is now in progress between our planes and the enemy aircraft.

* * *

Our forces have succeeded in halting the enemy's attack on our positions and have gone over to the counterattack. Our forces have liberated certain positions, including Mount Hermon. Fighting is now going on to the west of the ceasefire line.

* * *

Our forces have succeeded in penetrating the enemy's defence points, advance fortifications and other obstacles erected by them and have occupied several fortified points in his defences in the occupied Golan Heights and our formations are still advancing. Our air defences have shot down three enemy planes.

* * *

After fierce fighting with tanks and all kinds of arms in which the enemy sustained heavy losses, our forces have succeeded in liberating a number of positions and villages in the occupied Golan Heights, and our forces have taken prisoner a number of enemy troops.

⁷² Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Thawra* (Damascus), October 7, 1973. Syrian military communiqués were not numbered. According to the BBC Monitoring Service (*Summary of Broadcasts*, ME/4418/A/4-5) the four communiqués were broadcast at 12.20, 14.20, 18.27 and 20.19 gmt respectively.

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Radio and television address by President Assad of Syria regarding the outbreak of war (excerpts)⁷³

Damascus, October 6, 1973

For a week or so the enemy has been concentrating and preparing, believing that he could deal us a treacherous blow. We were alert and vigilant, watching the enemy's movements and activities. We were getting ready to repel his new, awaited aggression. We said we would not allow him to take us by surprise.

Our armed forces have moved to give him the proper answer. Our brothers in Egypt also did not allow the enemy to take them by surprise. Egypt's great army has moved to defend the dignity of Egypt and the dignity of the Arab nation. Greetings to our people and army. Greetings to the Egyptian Army and the great Egyptian Arab people.

In these critical moments, I must address my heartfelt greetings to the brave soldiers who have come to our country from fraternal Morocco to participate in the battle of dignity and honour and generously to sacrifice their blood alongside their brothers in Syria and Egypt, thereby embodying the unity of the nation and destiny and the sanctity of the objective.

Today we are waging the battle of honour and dignity in defence of our dear land, our glorious history and the heritage of our fathers and forefathers. We are waging the battle with faith in God and in ourselves and with firm will and absolute determination to achieve victory.

Israel has been despotic and arrogant. Pride dominated the heads of its officials. They persisted in crime and indulged in aggression. Their hearts are filled with black hatred for our people and mankind. They are thirsty for bloodshed. Their steps show disregard for human principles. They also show disregard for high ideals and for international laws and UN resolutions. They resemble other warmongers who have preceded them. They do not stop at a limit and they do not care unless they are deterred by peoples believing in their rights and struggling for their freedom and existence.

⁷³ Broadcast on Damascus radio in Arabic at 19.17 gmt; excerpted from the English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4418/A/5-6; reprinted by permission.

As we are doing our duty in defending our land and the honour of our nation, we are ready to make every sacrifice and accept every hardship so that right and principles may triumph and a just peace prevail.

We are not fond of killing and destruction. We are defending ourselves against death and destruction. We are not aggressors and have never been so. But we have been and still are defending ourselves against aggression. We do not desire anyone's death, but are defending our people against death. We love freedom and wish it for ourselves as well as for others. Today we are defending ourselves so that our people will enjoy their freedom. We are advocates of peace and are working for peace for our people and all the world's peoples. Today we are defending ourselves in order to live in peace.

Proceed with God's blessing. When God supports you, none can defeat you. Peace be with you.

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Telegram from King Faisal of Saudi Arabia in reply to US Secretary of State Kissinger's message which intimated that Israel started the war⁷⁴

Riyad, October 6, 1973

Your Excellency Secretary of State of the USA Henry Kissinger, I have received the message sent by Your Excellency which says that, on the strength of a report emanating from Israel to the effect that Egyptian and Syrian forces had been planning to launch a co-ordinated attack on the Israeli forces, Your Excellency became certain when land and air clashes actually took place between the Egyptian and Syrian forces on the one hand and the Israeli forces on the other, that it was Israel which started the attack on the Egyptians and Syrians.

I believe that this attack is a link in the chain of Israeli policy designed to implement the expansionist plan laid down for carrying out her aggressive policy against the Arab countries. The

⁷⁴ Text of King Faisal's telegram broadcast on Riyad radio in Arabic at 20.00 gmt; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4418/A/1; reprinted by permission.

Arabs have never committed any aggression against Israel since her establishment; it has always been Israel which started the aggression to win every time a particular area of land, in accordance with her overt aims.

If the USA does not act to deter Israel from continuing her aggression and wrong-doing, the volcano which has so far been quiet in the Middle East will be active again and its holocaust will not be confined to this region alone but will develop into an all-out Third World war from which all countries in the world would suffer, in spite of the provisions of the agreements of non-confrontation between big powers.

Israel, therefore, bears the major responsibility for this current conflict in the region. The USA should force Israel to withdraw from the Arab territories and to grant the Palestinian people their rights in their territory and homeland.

Faysal

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Statement by Prime Minister Solh of Lebanon regarding the outbreak of war⁷⁵

Beirut, October 6, 1973

At the extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers we discussed the military situation arising from the Israeli attack on Egypt and Syria. The Council of Ministers took note of the contacts we have made with the authorities of both these countries. I am confident that at this critical time citizens will do their duty by maintaining unity of ranks to confront the events that are taking place in the area. God willing, our home front will be firm in its support for our armed forces who will perform their natural rôle of defending the homeland. I am also confident that, in the present circumstances, our Palestinian brethren will provide a model of discipline and harmony in conformity with the interests of the cause for which we are all struggling. In view of the gravity of the present situation the Council of Ministers has decided to remain in open session.

⁷⁵ Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), October 7, 1973.

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Statement by King Hasan of Morocco announcing the creation of a second Moroccan force to fight on the Syrian front⁷⁶

Rabat, October 6, 1973

We have already sent a first expeditionary force of volunteers from our armed forces to the line of confrontation, in performance of our duty to defend the Arab nation; they have been in the Golan Heights on the Syrian front for four months. From our desire to maintain our presence on the front alongside our brethren we have decided to form a second detachment, as we announced in our speech on Thursday, February 22, 1973.⁷⁷

In response to the insistent wishes expressed by our loyal subjects to take part in the battle of liberation, we have decided to allow such of our subjects as have completed their military service to volunteer, as well as the officers and men of our armed forces.

We have given our orders to all the civil and military authorities in our kingdom to start registering volunteers. We are sure that our people, holding fast to the traditions of generosity and courage, which they have inherited from their ancestors, and to their pride in belonging to the Arab nation will, by standing by their brothers, affirm their resolute determination to play an effective role in the battle of destiny against the common enemy and their firm adherence to their undying slogan: God, country and King.

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Statement by Iraq's Revolutionary Command Council announcing the nationalization of oil companies as part of the war effort⁷⁸

Baghdad, October 7, 1973

Great Iraqi people, masses of our glorious Arab nation: The Zionist aggression against our Arab homeland and nation was basically for the purpose of protecting the imperialist interests. U.S. imperialism supports the Zionist entity with arms,

⁷⁶ Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Anba'* (Rabat), October 7, 1973.

⁷⁷ Doc. 233 above.

⁷⁸ Broadcast by Baghdad radio in Arabic at 07.25 gmt; English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4419/A/1; reprinted by permission.

funds; it gave it political backing, so that it could guard its interests in the area and maintain a lever of aggression against the revolution forces and the Arab forces struggling to liquidate these interests.

The revolution in Iraq affirmed on all occasions that there is a strong link between the imperialist interests and the Zionist enemy's ability to continue the aggression. It called for the use of all effective Arab weapons in the struggle against the imperialist Zionist enemy, especially the oil weapon as an effective strategic weapon in (?paralyzing) the capability of the imperialist Zionist enemies.

The revolution's immortal decision on June 1, 1972 was a practical and revolutionary confirmation of this view and a revolutionary and effective application of the slogan calling for use of the oil weapon in the national battle.

Today, as the American-Zionist aggression escalates against the Arab nation, and because of the fact that the revolution in Iraq is committed to using oil as a weapon in addition to all available military resources against the Zionist and US imperialist aggression, the Revolution Command Council has decided to promulgate Law No.70 for the year 1973, nationalizing the shares of the American Standard Oil companies of the New Jersey Exxon company and the Mobil Oil Corporation in the Basra Petroleum Company, Ltd.

Compatriots, masses of our valiant nation, now that the imperialist and Zionist aggression has reached a serious stage in its escalation, and since our Arab forces on the Syrian and Egyptian fronts are fighting the Zionist enemy, the catspaw of US imperialism and its tool in the plotting and aggression against our nation, we call on all the Arab countries and the courageous masses of our nation, and the forces of the Arab revolution everywhere in the homeland, to hit and liquidate US interests completely and to nationalize US oil interests in particular as a punishment for those who support the Zionist enemy's aggression and as an effective support for the national battle. We also call on all the Arab countries to stop exporting oil to the United States and on every other country supporting the Zionist enemy. We call on the Arab masses and their revolutionary struggling forces to confront firmly anyone who provides the imperialist American enemy with the capacity for aggression and means of survival. March on forward.

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Statement issued by the Iraq Revolutionary Command Council announcing the establishment of diplomatic relations with Iran⁷⁹

Baghdad, October 7, 1973

The battle which the Arab nation is fighting today against the imperialist-Zionist enemy is the most honourable of battles. It is the most important cause which, from all that it implies as regards liberation, takes precedence over all other considerations at the present stage. Since Iraq bears a great national responsibility to participate effectively in this battle with all her resources, she calls on her neighbour, Iran, to restore relations of good neighbourliness and cooperation and to solve existing problems in a neighbourly spirit and in the spirit of the Islamic links that unite the Iraqi and Iranian peoples and their future interests.

Iraq had a clear and principled attitude to the problems that arose with her neighbour, Iran, in particular circumstances.

In light of this, Iraq condemned the stand [of Iran] and its implications on the basis of the principles of sovereignty and international relations.

Iraq explained and affirmed her attitude to the Iranian authorities in direct meetings and on all other occasions.

The situation through which the Arab nation is passing today and the great tasks that fall to Iraq require that every possible positive effort be exerted with a view to solving the problems between her and her neighbour, Iran, so that all attention may be devoted to mobilizing all Iraq's energies and channelling them into the great national battle.

With a view to achieving these national goals, in the spirit of the historical relations between our Iraqi and Arab people and the Iranian people, and in light of the close Islamic ties that link them, the Revolutionary Command Council has decided:

1. To re-establish diplomatic relations with the government of Iran as an expression of good will and of desire to reach an early solution of the problems that exist between the two countries.

⁷⁹ Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Thawra* (Baghdad), October 8, 1973. Broadcast by Baghdad radio at 12.07 gmt. (BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4419/A/2).

2. To call on the Iranian government to negotiate on the problems that exist between Iraq and Iran with a view to safeguarding the interests, rights and sovereignty of the two neighbour Islamic countries and strengthening the good neighbourly relations between them, in harmony with their close historical links. To this end, the Iraqi government is ready to send a delegation representing it to Tehran; it is also ready to receive an Iranian delegation in Baghdad.

We have every confidence that our neighbour, Iran, will make an early response to this fraternal initiative. We also call on the Arab countries and the Islamic countries, especially those which are the neighbours of Iraq and Iran, and friendly countries, to use their good offices to this end.

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Speech by President Bourguiba of Tunisia informing the Tunisian people of the latest contacts between Tunisia and the Arab confrontation states⁸⁰

Tunis, October 7, 1973

You have undoubtedly learnt from the radio and the press that fighting is at the moment going on in the Middle East between on the one side Egyptian forces and Israeli forces, and on the other Syrian forces and Israeli forces. As you no doubt know from reports in the press and on the radio, the Egyptian Army has succeeded in landing on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal and establishing a bridgehead there. Fierce air battles have also taken place. On their side, the Syrian Army has recovered positions in part of their territory occupied by Israel.

Naturally, we cannot be but pleased by this success. But you know how I always look far ahead, and I do not hide from you the fact that the consequences of this war for the Egyptians, the Syrians and all Arabs cause me the gravest concern. I know that Israel is strong and that its leaders are Machiavellian. They have always strived to convince international opinion that Israel is legitimately defending itself, that it is attacked by the Arabs and that it is only repelling their aggression.

This is the attitude which they adopted in 1967 to ensure the sympathy of world opinion when President Nasir withdrew the Blue Helmets. They had spread rumours to make people believe that an Israeli attack against Syria was imminent. This was only a poisoning manoeuvre designed to change things. You know the rest.

Today, the Arab military successes are evident in this stage of the fighting. But I am not convinced about the events to come. A back-fire is always possible, and the Arabs are not safe from another defeat, like the defeat of 1967. However, I hope that my apprehensions will not be justified and that victory will be achieved by the Arab armies. If I have expressed my fears as to the outcome of the fighting, it is only for the sake of history.

This morning, I spoke over the telephone to President Hafiz al-Asad, the President of the Syrian Republic; Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi, Chairman of the Revolution Command Council of the Libyan Arab Republic; President Hawwari Bumadyan, President of the Council of the Revolution of the Algerian Republic; and President Anwar as-Sadat, President of the Egyptian Republic. I wanted to speak first of all to the Egyptian President but I was told that he was resting and it was only an hour ago more or less that I was able to get hold of him. I told them once again that we were giving our unfailing support to the Arab countries fighting Zionist colonialism, and that Tunisia expects to take part in the fighting, in a small way. Tunisian troops will be sent to the front as soon as possible, as happened in 1967, to take part in this war upon which depends the future of all Arabs.

I remarked to President Qadhafi, while informing him of my decision to send to the Middle East Tunisian troops, who, with their heavy armaments, will not be in a position to act for a few days, that during the parade held in Tripoli on the occasion of the third anniversary of the 1st September revolution, a parade which I attended, I noted that the Libyan armed forces had some Mirages. Well, these which are faster than Tunisian armoured vehicles, can reach the front in a few hours. Libya also has tanks equipped with ground-to-air rockets which would not take long to reach the battle areas.

Other Arab states, in particular Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, have planes and heavy armaments acquired from the USA, and their troops can reach

⁸⁰ Text of speech broadcast by the Tunisian press agency in French; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4419/A/4-5; reprinted by permission.

the front before the Tunisian troops. I informed President Sadat of all this, and I think that all the resources of the Arab states should be mobilized to support this war which affects the whole future of the Arab world. The Tunisian Government is therefore fulfilling its duty, and my listeners paid tribute to Tunisia.

But I do not want Tunisia to be the scene of street demonstrations expressing our solidarity with our Arab brothers and directed against Jews in Tunisia. These are my instructions and this is Tunisia's interest. In this war, the enemy is not in Tunisia, but in Israel where the battles are now taking place. I do not want the demonstrations of 5th June 1967 to happen again. Then, although ill, I had to leave my bed to address the people and put an end to the disturbances. Tunisia must at all costs avoid giving the world the impression that it is a racist or anti-Semitic country. No Jew in Tunisia must suffer physical or material harm. No hair of any Jew will be touched. This instruction is official.

If unfortunately any subversive elements try to profit by the situation to create disturbances on the pretext of calling for a Holy War while we are carrying out our duty, the Government, which has at its disposal sufficient forces—the police, the national guard, the BOP [Public Order Brigade]—and will if necessary resort to the army, will not hesitate to strike at all those who try to harm Tunisia's good reputation, and tarnish its image. Our country is policed. It will ensure respect for the right of people and the individual liberty of all those who live on Tunisian soil, by every possible means.

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Statement by the PLO Executive Committee urging general mobilization of Arab resources⁸¹

Baghdad, October 7, 1973

Masses of our great Arab nation, in these fateful moments our Arab nation is facing a treacherous new Israeli aggression to achieve further expansion and impose capitulation. The forces of Egypt and

Syria, together with the forces of the Palestine Revolution, are confronting this new Zionist expansionist adventure with matchless courage.

Masses of our people in the occupied lands, the most valiant fighters of the Arab nation are now waging the most violent battles to liberate the oil of the dear homeland, defeat the Zionist occupation and put the invaders to rout.

Workers, peasants, students, officials, merchants and everyone who holds the soil of his homeland dear, for the sake of your land and your sacred right to determine your own future, we call on you to declare immediately a general strike and civil disobedience against the occupiers, their farms and establishments. Go down to the streets, paralyze the movement of their forces, do not work in their factories, farms and establishments. Turn their life in your land into a hell. The soil and the homeland are calling you, the people of Palestine. Do not fail to respond.

Our great people in Jordan, we call on you to struggle and work for a general national mobilization against the occupiers. Carry arms. The right of every citizen, every Palestinian and Jordanian, to carry arms to liberate the land and defend beloved Jordan against the enemy's invasion and colonization is indisputable. Let all our people in Jordan unite. Let us carry arms. These are grave moments. The people will show no mercy to any defaulters.

Palestinian fighters, stand alongside the soldiers of the Arab nation. We will triumph regardless of the sacrifices and how difficult our path is.

Peoples of our Arab nation, let us stand alongside the heroes of the Arab nation on the firing lines in the Golan Heights and Sinai. All the Arab forces must emphasize their national and fateful commitment to the question of the homeland and the nation. Let all Arab soldiers and rifles move towards the front. These are the historic moments for putting oil in the service of the battle. Let the oil flow be stopped immediately. Let the pumping be stopped. The wealth of the Arab nation is now supplying the arteries of the enemy's forces. Arab oil must become a weapon for the Arabs. The Arab countries on the Red Sea are dutybound to stop and prevent all the oil tankers and ships proceeding to Israel.

Long live free and Arab Palestine.

⁸¹ Text of statement broadcast by Voice of Palestine (Baghdad) in Arabic at 19.07 gmt; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4419/A/2-3; reprinted by permission.

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Message from President Boumedienne of Algeria to the heads of state and government of the great powers reiterating the Middle East policy of the non-aligned countries⁸²**Algiers, October 7, 1973**

The events that are now taking place in the Middle East, which are the logical consequence of Israeli aggression, prompt me to stress the gravity of the situation.

As the current chairman of the group of non-aligned countries it is my duty to call your attention to the resolutions adopted by the fourth summit conference on the situation in the Middle East.⁸³ These resolutions stress in particular that Israel's continued defiance of the international community and the United Nations will lead the non-aligned countries of the United Nations to take either individual or collective political and economic measures against Israel, in cooperation with each other or with the members of the United Nations, in conformity with Article Seven of the United Nations Charter.

At the same time, and in addition to pointing out the illegality of occupying territories by force and the necessity of acknowledging the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, the fourth summit conference called on all countries, and in particular the United States of America, to stop giving Israel political and economic support of all kinds which allows her to continue in her policy of aggression and expansion.

The Conference also demanded the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israel from all the occupied territories and undertook to help Egypt, Syria and Jordan, with all available resources, to liberate their occupied territories.

We are convinced that your governments will make every effort to give due consideration to the attitude of the non-aligned countries. This attitude was adopted at the highest levels from the realization of the extreme gravity and complexity of the

situation which constitutes so great a danger to world peace and security.

I have no doubt that the attitude you adopt will play an important part in solving this grave crisis within the framework of justice and in conformity with the profoundest aspirations of the peoples of the world and the basic principles of the United Nations Charter.

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Cable from President Boumedienne of Algeria to the heads of state of the non-aligned and socialist countries regarding the outbreak of war⁸⁴**Algiers, October 7, 1973**

The time has most certainly come for the whole world to shoulder its responsibility as regards the Middle East problem. Israel's repeated aggressions against the Arab countries can no longer be tolerated. The non-aligned countries in particular, who took the opportunity offered by the convening of their fourth conference to express their solidarity with the Arab peoples, will certainly not fail to give their political, moral and material support on this occasion. In this Middle East problem, to which is linked the destiny of the Arab world and Africa, we shall not stand idly by; every one of us feels that he is directly concerned, for it is a matter of defending justice, freedom and peace.

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Speech by President Qadhafi of Libya defining Libya's attitude to the war and exhorting Jordan to open a third front against Israel (excerpts)⁸⁵**Tripoli, October 7, 1973**

I want to say quite clearly a few words that entail the adoption of a specific attitude regardless of the fact that we still disagree about the plan and the objective. We call for the liberation of

⁸² Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Shaab* (Algiers), October 8, 1973. The message was sent to President Pompidou of France, Prime Minister Chou En-lai of China, UK Prime Minister Heath, US President Nixon, Prime Minister Kosygin and President Podgorny of the USSR, and CPSU General Secretary Brezhnev. Broadcast by Algiers radio at 20.00 gmt (BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4419/A/3).

⁸³ Docs. 118 and 119 above.

⁸⁴ Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Shaab* (Algiers), October 8, 1973.

⁸⁵ Made on the anniversary of the Italian evacuation of Libya; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Fajr al-Jadid* (Tripoli), October 8, 1973. Broadcast by Tripoli radio at 22.20 gmt (BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4420/A/4).

Palestine and for the battle to be carried into the territory of Palestine from the very first, following a plan different from that which the fighting is now following. But in spite of this disagreement about the plan which is clear to all, the fighting has started and the battle is now going on, so it would do no good to go back to the difference in points of view between Libya and the confrontation countries on the plan and the objective. The important thing now is to liberate as much as possible of Arab territory; the important thing is to be victorious over the enemy.

For our part we have decided that we shall provide Egypt and Syria with the necessary money. We have decided to contribute oil to the battle; it will be at the service of the battle. This must be understood by the world that is now fishing in troubled waters and looking for justifications for expressing its concealed, historical resentment against the Arabs, against the Arab nation. The world must understand that what we—Libya and Algeria—are giving to the battle is little indeed compared with what the greatest country in the world—America—is giving to Israel, and what the rich people of the world and the Jews who are scattered in every country of the world are giving to Israel. I want to make it clear that Israel too is not fighting Egypt and Syria on their own.

This must be clear to the peoples of the world. Israel could not fight the Arabs, could not fight Egypt and Syria were it not for American arms, American experts and American pilots, were it not for the money from Jews of various nationalities in the different countries of the world. This means that the rich citizens of most countries in the world are providing Israel with powerful support, and all the world knows this.

The enemies of the Arab nation are trying to exploit this situation because there are several Arab countries fighting Israel, but the world must understand that the Arabs are fighting the greatest country in the world—America—and that the rich people of the world and the Jews are fighting with her although they are citizens of countries other than Israel. We shall provide Egypt and Syria with oil and financial support as long as the fighting lasts.

Through the broadcasts of the people's revolution of Libya the Libyan people are continually calling

on the Jordanian people and the fearless Jordanian army to wipe away the shame into which Jordan has fallen under the leadership of Hussein and which is not worthy of the Jordanian people and the fearless Jordanian army which has been forced to take this cowardly attitude. But the Jordanian army and the Jordanian people must efface this brand of shame and rescue their honour which has today been compromised by the cowardly attitude adopted by King Hussein. For if there is fighting on the Jordanian front it will have a great effect on the enemy; the Jordanian army and the Jordanian people will not consent to remain passive on the Jordanian front which is the most dangerous front for the enemy. While violent fighting is going on and the Syrian people, the Syrian army, the Egyptian people and the Egyptian army are offering their lives, the Jordanian people and the Jordanian army are forced to take this cowardly attitude.

On this basis, we are performing our role today, and we make it clear that we are doing so. We are preparing to bear our responsibility because we are neither fearful nor hesitant. Our morale is high and we are aware of our value in deciding the destiny of our nation. We know that we shall stand firm because we are on the right road and because we are doing our duty, as we must. All this gives us strength, resolution and high morale, which can neither be shaken or weakened, whatever the consequences of our doing our duty, however bad they are.

Therefore, last night Libya informed certain friendly countries in Europe of the fact that before they become involved, they should realize that the Arabs are defending their homes, their women and their children and are fighting to deliver their fellow-countrymen from Israeli military occupation. Libya is continuing to play its role effectively in the international political field and undertakes to take action on one of the fronts. Besides its practical contribution to the battle it will take action on the fronts because the cause is our cause and we are not entitled to expect any reward of gratitude for doing so.

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Message from President Sadat of Egypt to OAU General Secretary Ekangaki (excerpt)⁸⁶**Cairo, early October, 1973**

The Israeli enemy has launched an attack against our forces. Israel prepared for her aggression against Egypt and Syria by air operations against Syria on September 13. The new Israeli aggression is only a continuation of Israel's military policy aimed at annexing Jerusalem, consolidating her occupation of the Arab territories and destroying the will of the Arab peoples.

For six years Israel has been pursuing a policy of constant defiance of world public opinion. She has mocked all agreements and all moral values and ignored all the resolutions adopted by international organizations. She has frustrated all initiatives and all efforts aimed at achieving peace in conformity with the Security Council resolution [242] adopted on November 22, 1967. She has ignored the mission of Ambassador Jarring and all the sincere efforts made by the heads of the African states. This Israeli attitude has been condemned by all the forces that work for peace in the Organization for African Unity and at the conferences of the non-aligned countries.

The African countries, both in the Organization for African Unity and in the United Nations, have constantly expressed their dissatisfaction with Israel's intransigent attitude. This dissatisfaction has been reflected in the attitudes of those African countries that have severed their relations with Israel.

In these extremely grave circumstances, I want to inform Your Excellency of my profound anxiety about the present situation and of my conviction that the cause which Egypt and the Arab countries are defending will be victorious, with God's help and the effective solidarity of the member states of the Organization for African Unity. I have no doubt that in these critical hours the heads of the African states will respond positively to the requests of our Arab brothers in accordance with the spirit and the letter of so many of the resolutions adopted by the Organization's conferences.

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Speech by President Numairi of Sudan expressing support for the Arab war effort (excerpts)⁸⁷**Khartoum, October 8, 1973**

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate. Free citizens, masses of our fighting people, I address you today when the decisive inevitable battle with the Zionist enemy has erupted. Our valiant Arab armed forces are fighting with ferocity and faith in the sands of Sinai and in the Golan Heights and in the heart of the occupied land. . . .

There is no alternative before us other than to confront aggression and to fight it with all that we possess and in every arena; no alternative but to adopt a stand that is dictated to us by honour, duty and destiny. This is the fate of the Arab nation, and it is our fate. It is inevitable that we should face it with firm hearts and unflinching certainty and preparedness, inexhaustible in sacrifice.

Free citizens, I have placed in your name the land of Sudan, its sky, sea and coasts in the hour of the battle and the battlefield as an inseparable part of it and towards the depth, extension and steadfastness [as heard]. Our harbours, airports and communications have been placed at the peak of preparedness to serve the Arab war effort. We have made full preparations to provide supply lines to the blazing front from the depth of our territories and skies.

The armed forces of our people, which have always been at the maximum and most complete state of alert to wage war in every arena determined by the battle, have been ordered in your name to take their natural place, that which has been agreed, beside your brothers in the land of the battle. I have also decided, in your name, to provide our fighting Arab forces with all that they need, namely men, weapons, equipment, ammunition, provisions and medical materials, as soon as possible.

I have contacted the brothers Muhammad Anwar as-Sadat, Hafiz al-Asad and Yasir Arafat and assured them, in your name, that Sudan as a whole people, revolution, government and army,

⁸⁶ Translated from the partial Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), October 10, 1973; the OAU General Secretary was requested to forward this message to all OAU member states.

⁸⁷ Broadcast by Omdurman radio in Arabic; partial English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4420/A/1; reprinted by permission.

are under battle orders and that the Sudanese people's armed forces which are now heading to the front are to be put under the command of the fighting Arab forces.

Masses of our people, I have decided in your name to put your potential and capabilities into a battle which is your battle and make a pledge which is your pledge—a pledge to fight. I do not mind sacrifice and I do not retreat. I am absolutely certain that this is your destiny, one which you cannot escape. The Zionist enemy did not leave us with any choice except war. He has continued waging war throughout a quarter of century. . . . Masses of our loyal people, I call upon you to rush into the battle of destiny and to sacrifice wealth and what is precious. . . . I call upon you to mobilize yourselves, your resources, in order to consolidate the Arab war efforts.

In your name I also call upon the African peoples and governments, the peoples and the countries of the non-aligned world and the liberal forces of the world to rush to support the Arab rights, in fulfilment of the commitments of the joint struggle against colonialism, racism and Zionism.

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Military communiqué issued by Iraq regarding its early participation in the war⁸⁸

Baghdad, October 10, 1973

Since the fighting started our fearless air force has been effectively engaged on the Western and Northern Fronts along with the Arab forces. They have achieved brilliant successes against vital enemy targets.

Because of our undertaking to play an effective part in the battle of liberation of the usurped Arab territories, and on the basis of the principles of our national revolution, we regard our Iraqi air force as being an Arab air force. This has been affirmed by the Arab information media and by the authorities of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Syrian Arab Republic, who have emphasized the importance of our role in the battle of destiny. Israel

has also recognized the strenuous efforts made by our air force on both fronts.

In view of the conditions and importance of the fighting we shall inform the Arab masses of the activities of our forces on both fronts in the form of communiqués issued from time to time in which we shall give no details, the publication of these being left to the military effort of the Arab forces on the Western and Northern Fronts.

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Statement issued by the PLO Executive Committee criticizing Jordan's inaction during the war (excerpts)⁸⁹

October 12, 1973

Masses of the Arab people in Jordan,
Masses of our Arab nation,

Although our honourable Arab war with the enemy is now in its seventh day, the 600 kilometre-long Jordanian front—the longest front of confrontation with the enemy—remains abjectly and suspiciously silent.

Contrary to all the claims made by the rulers of Jordan of coordination and understanding with Syria and of Jordan being about to enter the battle, the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, after extensive contacts with the quarters concerned, affirms that these claims are baseless, fraudulent and false, and have now been exposed on the widest scale. All the evidence indicates that if there is effective co-ordination and real understanding, it is between Jordan and the enemy, whose plan is to deal with the different Arab fronts one at a time.

We made all the necessary contacts with the regime after the outbreak of the fighting so that the forces of the Palestine revolution might be brought in to perform their duty of fighting the Zionist enemy and building bridges with our people in the occupied territory to enable them to play an effective part in the fighting and open a front behind the enemy's lines. But the Jordanian authorities refused to respond to the call of national duty. We therefore advanced combat groups towards the occupied territories, but the Jordanian

⁸⁸ Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Thawra* (Baghdad), October 11, 1973. According to the BBC Monitoring Service (*Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4421/A/6) the communiqué was first broadcast at 09.01 gmt.

⁸⁹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), October 12, 1973, fourth bulletin, p. 1.

authorities moved to prevent them from fighting against the enemy and compelled them to return across the borders.

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Communiqué issued by the government of Jordan announcing mobilization and deployment of the Jordanian armed forces (excerpt)⁹⁰

Amman, October 13, 1973

With the sudden outbreak of the war, all the resources and potentials of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan in all fields have been mobilized with speed and precision under the direct supervision of His Majesty King Hussein, the supreme commander of the armed forces.

Military formations were deployed in their positions under the supervision of His Majesty, who started contacts for the purpose of following up the situation and coordinating with both President Anwar el-Sadat of the sisterly Arab Republic of Egypt and with President Hafez al-Assad of the sisterly Republic of Syria.

All that has been done, and is being done, does not stem only from the considerations of Arab brotherhood and common interest, but because the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan is the heart of the cause related to it with the deepest and strongest ties, Jordan is the homeland of the cause and its family and people just as it is the forefront of confrontation along the longest and most dangerous lines.

The Jordanian armed forces started since they suddenly knew of the outbreak of war with securing the following grave military duties:

First, protecting the cause of the Syrian front and preventing the enemy from carrying out the anticipated most dangerous operation of occupying the heights adjacent to that front and the Syrian heights in the Golan, thereby forming a forward axis that threatens all those in that front with an encircling move. Such an operation will also threaten in the back all Jordanian positions and defences and the whole Jordanian strategic position.

Second, with their intensive presence along the whole confrontation line, our armed forces have effected the stationing of the biggest volume of enemy formations against our lines in order to alleviate the pressure on the sister front. Our forces began then to make ready to face all probabilities and to have an eye on them and to do their duty in all the circumstances. Because of the happenings and the development of the situation on the front of sisterly Syria, and in light of its requirements and in memory of the martyrs of the first generation who sped to defend the Holy Land, and for its freedom and unity and the integrity of its lands and in consecration of the unity of Arab blood, a faith in the joint destiny and in fulfillment of its duty, the supreme command began taking an additional duty in moving a detachment of its best military formations to the dear Syrian lands to perform their military duty in the coming battle in defence of that land.

Our armed forces will fight to death with all capabilities to defend all our pure sacred soil and the long line they hold. The supreme command realizes the graveness of this historic moment and that by doing this, it does not only defend itself, but it forms the forefront protective shielding for the heart of the Arab homeland and the most sacred of Islamic shrines.

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Statement of the Defence Ministry of Saudi Arabia regarding the participation of Saudi forces in the war (excerpt)⁹¹

Riyad, October 14, 1973

Out of the awareness on the part of His Majesty King Faysal, the Supreme Commander of the Arab Forces, on the day the recent battles erupted that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has a national duty and a primary role to take part with sisterly Egypt and Syria, His Majesty hastened to send personal messages to His Majesty King Husayn of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan; His Excellency President Muhammad Anwar as-Sadat, President of the sisterly Arab Republic of Egypt;

⁹⁰ English text as published by the Jordanian news agency and printed in *The New York Times*, October 14, 1973, p. 24. Broadcast by Amman radio at 12.00 gmt (BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4424/A/3).

⁹¹ Broadcast by Riyad radio in Arabic at 19.00 gmt; excerpted from the English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4425/A/1; reprinted by permission.

and His Excellency President Hafiz al-Asad, President of the sisterly Syrian Arab Republic; with the aim of inquiring about the situation and informing them of the readiness of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to participate in the battle. After consulting the views of his brothers, His Majesty ordered that all Saudi Arab forces be placed in a state of maximum preparedness in order to take part in the major battle of the Arab nation.

Despite the presence of a large part of our armed forces on the confrontation line with the enemy on the sisterly Jordanian front within the Arab plan and out of His Majesty's belief that the Saudi armed forces must take part on all battle fronts, His Majesty ordered support for the Syrian Arab Republic by dispatching more forces in order to fulfil the sacred duty in the current battle there, so that Saudi Arab blood can mingle with other Arab blood in the defence of honour and dignity and in order to recover the land and and liberate the Islamic sanctities.

These forces have actually begun arriving at the battleground on the Syrian front. In addition to actual participation in the battle, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia places all its capabilities and resources in the service of the battle. We pray that God may give our struggling Islamic Arab nation victory and success.

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Address to the nation by President Assad of Syria on the progress of the war (excerpts)⁹²

Damascus, October 15, 1973

In those 10 glorious days of ferocious battles waged by our armed forces with all their arms and with extreme manhood, bravery and unshakable faith in victory—in those days of magnificent, heroic steadfastness of our people we corrected many erroneous ideas which had almost become established abroad about our nation. We have restored self-confidence to the Arab individual after dressing his wounded dignity and proving to the enemy and all the world that our people are not an easy prey that the enemy thought it could

easily swallow. We have proved that certain death awaits anyone who tries to humiliate our people or debase an inch of our land.

You have revived the traditions of our glorious nation, of the fathers and the forefathers. You have pleased God, the homeland and your conscience. With chaste blood you have charted on the map of Arab struggle a road which will never change after today. It is a road to victory.

You have been supporting the cause of your nation and therefore your nation rose to support your steadfastness. You have been with the cause of freedom and therefore the free men in the world rushed to express their support for your giant stand. They have expressed it in various ways.

You have won the respect, appreciation and admiration of everyone. The reason for all this was our steadfastness, both by civilians and military, in our readiness to meet hardship with selflessness and in our insistence on proceeding steadily towards the goal, regardless of how costly the sacrifice or however long the road.

Brothers, you may have questions on your mind which you would probably expect me to answer. Or perhaps you wish me to talk about national and international activities related to the battle, whether these were of a positive or negative nature. But you realize that war has its conditions and requirements which make it incumbent upon us to avoid discussing any matter that would not benefit the war effort.

Nevertheless, in this regard I am anxious to point out that our steadfastness in the war of liberation has begun to give the slogan, "pan-Arabism of the battle", a practical and real meaning. In this regard I would like to express, on your behalf, the greatest appreciation for the role of the sisterly Iraqi forces whose men fought heroically against the enemy and whose blood was mixed with that of their brothers in the Syrian and the Moroccan forces. Their participation in the battle has been a true expression of the pan-Arabism of the battle. Greetings to the Iraqi Army and to our people in sisterly Iraq.

The day will come when the Saudi forces and the Jordanian forces will also take part in the battle and play their role in the national battle. Also, the two sisterly states Algeria and Libya, from the first moment [of the battle] took the initiative to give practical backing and actual

⁹² Broadcast by Damascus radio in Arabic at 21.15 gmt; excerpted from the English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4426/A/2,3,4; reprinted by permission.

support with various forms. The United Arab Emirates and the state of Qatar also extended a helping hand.

Our heroes have transformed Israel's aggression, since 6th October, to a retreat of the enemy forces. As I told you on that day,⁹³ our forces rushed to repulse the aggression, forcing the occupation forces to withdraw before them. They continued their advance and expelled the enemy forces from Mount Hermon, Qunaytirah, Jibbin, Khushniyah, Jukhadar, el-Aal, Tall al-Faras and Rafid and other villages and positions in the Golan. They inflicted on the enemy losses which deeply shook the Zionist entity. At that time, while the enemy was hiding his losses and defeats from the people of Israel and from the outside world—a method which he is still following—we in turn kept quiet about the victories of our forces and postponed announcing them.

While the enemy's reports and statements exposed themselves day after day and uncovered more contradictions, we preferred to wait before announcing what we had achieved and until the repelling of the enemy forces is final and the liberation of the land is complete, although we could have announced the liberation of the greater part of the Golan on the fourth day of the battle.

We also preferred to wait before announcing, because we knew that the ultimate aim of the battle might require us to move from one position to another, and that this movement might be forward or backward, according to the strategic necessity which the ultimate aim of the battle imposes. And this is what actually happened. We moved from some of these positions backward as the battle necessitated, and this will be clarified to you after liberation. But we will return to these and other positions and villages of the Golan in the near future.⁹⁴

On our part, we have not anticipated an easy victory or that the enemy would accept his expulsion from our land without ferocious resistance. We know the enemy's expansionist ambitions and know that there are forces encouraging these ambitions and supporting the attempts to achieve these ambitions. In the aftermath of his losses and

defeats in the first days of fighting, the enemy hastened to enlist the help of these forces, asking them for assistance and large numbers of foreigners to offset his losses in men in the various corps, particularly the air force as well as new weapons to offset his losses in weapons. With the quick supplies he received and which were added to the mobilized reserve forces, the enemy heavily concentrated on one sector of our front and began to exert pressure with the larger part of his forces, tanks and planes and was able to achieve a limited penetration of our lines. Nevertheless, our forces initiated a quick reply and waged, from new positions, fierce fighting in which every member of our forces fought most valiantly and repulsed the enemy counter-offensive and inflicted heavy losses on his tanks and planes and forced him to retreat.

Our forces continue to pursue the enemy and strike at him and will continue to strike at enemy forces until we regain our positions in our occupied land and continue then until we liberate the whole land.

We know that our enemy has a source to supply him and offset his losses in men and weapons. However, we are confident of the resources of our people and nation and the sources of our support. I say to those who are supporting the falsehood and aggression of Israel that they should consider and think of the consequences that their hostile aggressive attitudes will have on their many interests in the Arab homeland. By gaining the animosity of the masses of our nation, they are arousing the anger of these masses. And when peoples become angry, no force can stand in their way.

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Speech by President Sadat of Egypt to the National Assembly assessing the effects of the war and outlining peace terms (excerpts)⁹⁵

Cairo, October 16, 1973

In the name of God, brothers and sisters, I would have liked to have come to you before today and

⁹³ Doc. 274 above.

⁹⁴ This paragraph is missing from the BBC translation; translated from the Arabic text, *al-Thawra* (Damascus), October 16, 1973.

⁹⁵ Broadcast by Cairo radio in Arabic at 11.00 gmt; excerpted from the English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4426/A/16, 17–20 and ME/4427/A/7–9; reprinted by permission.

meet you and the masses of our people and nation, but I was preoccupied with what you know about and in the way you want. I am confident that you will understand and excuse me.

However, I felt your presence and that of our people and nation with me in every opinion. I felt your presence and that of our people and nation with me in every decision. You were all with me in the matter that I have shouldered as an expression of the will of the nation and of the destiny of a people.

Then I found it suitable to come to you today to speak to you and to the masses of our people and the peoples of our Arab nation as well as to a world that is interested in what is happening in our land because it is closely related to humanity's gravest issues, the issue of war and peace. This is because we do not consider our patriotic and national struggle as a local or regional phenomenon since the area in which we live has its strategic and cultural role at the heart of the world and the centre of its movement. And since the events are important and the developments were successive and the decisions were decisions of destiny, I would like to begin straight away with what I would like to talk to you about. I shall concentrate on two points: war and peace.

I say without pretence that history will record for this nation that its setback was not a downfall but a passing stumble, and that its movement was not an outburst but a lofty rise. Our people have exerted unlimited efforts, made unlimited sacrifices and shown unlimited maturity. More important than all that—the efforts, sacrifices and maturity—the people have maintained unlimited faith. This was the dividing line between the setback and failure.

I have felt that from the first day I assumed responsibility and willingly accepted the burdens God placed on my shoulders, I knew that the people's faith was the foundation. If the foundation were as sound, then we could regain everything that we lost and once again return to the place we retreated from. Despite many manifestations, some of which were natural and others fabricated owing to the psychological warfare waged against us, the question facing me and others every succeeding day was: is the foundation sound? I was confident that no psychological warfare, no matter how fierce, could affect the firmness of this foundation.

So long as the foundation was all right, then everything else should be all right. The rest was nothing but a storm in a teacup, as they say.

I do not deny that we faced many real problems, problems in the services, supply, and production and also in political work. I knew the truth, but I was not in a position to explain it. I knew that we had to make life bearable for the people and at the same time take precautions for what was expected. I was certain that the day would come when the truth would be known to others as it was clear to me. When the truth is known, the people will know and appreciate it. I thank God.

3. There were clear indications that the entire Arab nation was in a state of rupture. I thought this was natural because of social and cultural reasons that were aggravated by the bitterness of the setback. Some asked me and asked themselves as well: Will the nation be able to face its terrible trial while in this state of rupture? I used to say: In addition to its natural causes, this rupture reflects the contrast between reality and hope. There is no advantage in this. I even believed that there would be no cure or rest from what the nation's conscience was suffering from, except when the nation would face the moment of challenge. At certain times I was not prepared to enter into futile discussions: Should we deal with the rupture before facing the challenge, or accept the challenge despite the presence of indications of rupture? My opinion has been that nations can discover themselves or their mettle only through engaging in struggle. The greater the challenge is, the greater will be the awakening of the nation and its discovery of its capabilities.

I do not deny the existence of social and cultural differences, for this is the course of history. But at the same time I realize that great nations, when faced with great challenges, are capable of clearly determining the priorities for themselves in a way that leaves no room for doubt. I have believed in the soundness and firmness of the call of Arab nationalism. I have been aware of the various interactions which motivate the progress of the one nation. But I have also been confident that unity of action would impose itself on all the powers, quarters and currents because they would all realize that the present condition is not one for competition between various interpretations, but one of struggle involving the life or death of an entire nation.

4. I have been aware of the quality of our armed force. When I spoke about them I was not predicting the future or speculating. I have come up from the ranks of these armed forces and personally lived according to their traditions. I had the honour of serving in their ranks and under their banners. The record of these forces is bright, but our enemies—old and new imperialism and world Zionism—concentrated against this record in a terrible manner because they wanted to make the nation doubt its shield and its sword. I had no doubt whatsoever that these armed forces were the victim but never the cause of the 1967 setback.

In 1967 these forces would have been able to fight with the same valour and courage with which they are fighting today had their military command not lost its nerve after the strike against which Abd an-Nasir had warned, or had the command not issued an order at that time for a general retreat from Sinai without Abd an-Nasir's knowledge as well. These forces were not given the chance to fight in defence of the nation, its honour and its soil. They were not defeated by the enemy but were exhausted by the conditions, which did not give them a chance to fight. I participated with Jamal Abd an-Nasir in the rebuilding of the armed forces. Then destiny decreed that I should bear the responsibility of completing the rebuilding operation as well as of being their supreme commander.

The Egyptian armed forces have achieved a miracle by any military standard. They have fully devoted themselves to their duty. They have efficiently absorbed all the weapons and methods of training of the modern age, as well as its sciences.

When I gave them the order to reply to the enemy's provocation and to check his deceit, they proved themselves. After the orders were given them, these forces took the initiative, surprised the enemy and threw him off balance with their quick movement. I shall not be exaggerating to say that military history will make a long pause to study and examine the operation carried out on 6th October 1973 when the Egyptian armed forces were able to storm the difficult barrier of the Suez Canal which was armed with the fortified Bar Lev Line to establish bridgeheads on the east bank of the Canal after they had, as I said, thrown the enemy off balance in six hours.

The risk was great and the sacrifices were big. However, the results achieved in the first six hours

of the battle in our war were huge. The arrogant enemy lost its equilibrium at this moment. The wounded nation restored its honour.

The Middle East political map has changed. While we say so out of pride, as some of the pride is faith, we are duty bound to record here, on behalf of the people and this nation, our absolute confidence in our armed forces; confidence in their command, which drew up the plan, confidence in the officers and men who have implemented the plan with fire and blood. We record our confidence in the armed forces' faith and knowledge, our confidence in the armed forces' arms and in their capability of absorbing the arms. I say in brief that this homeland can be assured and feel secure, after fear, that it now has a shield and a sword.

From here I want to draw your attention with me to the northern front, where the great Syrian army is fighting one of the most glorious battles of the Arab nation under the loyal and resolute command of brother President Hafiz al-Asad.

I want to tell our brothers on the northern front: You made a promise and you were faithful to the promise. You made a friendship and you have turned out to be the most honest friends. You have fought and you have proved to be the most courageous fighters. You have fought like men and stood fast like heroes. We could not have found more reassuring and praiseworthy men in this comradeship in which we had to fight together against a common enemy, the enemy of the whole Arab nation.

We have been the vanguards of the battle. Together we have borne its brunt and paid most dearly with our blood and resources. We shall continue the fighting and defy danger. We shall continue, backed by our brothers who have sincerely and faithfully joined the battle, to pay the price in sweat and blood until we reach an objective acceptable to us and to our nation in this serious stage of its continuous struggle.

That was about war and now what about peace. When we speak about peace we must remember and not forget—just as others also must not pretend to forget—the real reasons for our war. You will allow me specifically and categorically to put some of these reasons to you.

1. We have fought for the sake of peace, the only peace that really deserves to be called peace—peace based on justice. Our enemy sometimes speaks about peace. But there is a vast difference

between the peace of aggression and the peace of justice. David Ben Gurion was the one who formulated for Israel the theory of imposing peace. Peace cannot be imposed. The talk about imposing peace means a threat to wage war or actually waging it.

The great mistake our enemy has made is that he thought the force of terror could guarantee security. But the futility of this theory has been proved in practice on the battlefield. It has been proved that if this theory did work at one time, due to the weakness of the opposite side, it does not work if these people rally their forces every day. I do not know what David Ben Gurion would think if he were in command in Israel today. Would he have been able to understand the nature of history or would he be like the Israeli command today—in opposition to history?

Peace cannot be imposed. The peace of a fait accompli cannot exist and cannot last. There can only be peace through justice alone. Peace cannot be established through terror however oppressive and whatever illusions the arrogance of power or the stupidity of power might give. Our enemy has persisted in this arrogance and stupidity not only over the past six years, but throughout the past 25 years—that is, since the Zionist state usurped Palestine.

We might ask the Israeli leaders today: Where has the theory of Israeli security gone? They have tried to establish this theory once by violence and once by force in 25 years. It has been broken and destroyed. Our military power today challenges their military power. They are now in a long protracted war. They are facing a war of attrition which we can tolerate more and better than they can. Their hinterland is exposed if they think they can frighten us by threatening the Arab hinterland. I add, so they may hear in Israel: We are not advocates of annihilation, as they claim.

Our Zafir-type trans-Sinai (Arabic: Abirat Sinai) Egyptian Arab rockets (Arabic: sawarikh) are now in their bases ready to be launched at the first signal to the deepest depth in Israel.

We could have given the signal and the order from the very first moment of the battle, particularly as the Israelis' haughtiness and vicious pride gave them the illusion that they could bear greater consequences than they really could sustain. But we are aware of the responsibility of using certain types of arms, and we of ourselves restrain

ourselves from using them. The Israelis should remember what I once said and still say: an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth and depth for depth.

2. We do not fight to attack the territory of others, but we fought and will continue to fight for two objectives: (a) to restore our territory which was occupied in 1967; and (b) to find ways and means to restore and obtain respect for the legitimate rights of the people of Palestine.

These are our objectives in accepting the risks of the fighting. We have accepted them in reply to unbearable provocations. We were not the first to begin these, but we acted in self-defence to defend our land and our right to freedom and life.

Our war was not for aggression, but against aggression. In our war we did not depart from the values and laws of international society as stipulated in the UN Charter, which the free nations have written with their blood after their victory over Fascism and Nazism.

We may say that our war is a continuation of humanity's war against Fascism and Nazism; for, by its racist claims and its reasoning of expansion through brute force, Zionism is nothing but a feeble replica of Facism and Nazism which is contemptible rather than frightening and calls for disdain more than for hatred.

In our war we have behaved in accordance with the provisions and spirit of the UN Charter, and not vice versa. In addition, we have behaved out of respect for the UN resolutions, both those of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

Brothers and sisters, the entire world has supported our rights and praised our courage in defending these rights. The world has realized that we were not the first to attack, but that we immediately responded to the duty of self-defence. We are not against but are for the values and laws of the international community. We are not warmongers but seekers of peace. The world has realized all this, and in the light of it sympathizes with our cause.

Today, the world sympathizes with us more out of its respect for our determination to defend this cause. We were sure of world sympathy, and now we are proud of its respect for us. I tell you in all sincerity and honesty that I prefer world respect, even without sympathy, to world sympathy that is without respect. I thank God.

Brothers and sisters, a single state has differed from the whole world—not just from us, but from

the whole world, as I said. This state is the United States. The United States claims it was shocked because we tried to repulse the aggression. We do not understand how or why the United States was shocked. This state, it said, was not only shocked but has recovered from the shock without coming to its senses.

It is regrettable and sad that this should be the attitude of one of the two superpowers in this age. We were expecting, or perhaps wishing, despite all the indications and experiences, that the United States would recover from the surprise and come to its senses. But this did not happen. We have seen the United States recovering from the surprise and turning towards manoeuvres. Its first offer is to stop the fighting and bring a return to the lines that existed before 6th October. We could have been angered by this inverse logic, but we were not. This is because, on the one hand, we are confident of ourselves, and, on the other, we really do want to contribute to world peace.

The world is entering an era of detente between the two superpowers. Now we do not oppose the policy of detente. We had one reservation about this policy and this reservation still exists. If we want the world, after a world war has become impossible, to enter an era of peace, then peace is not an abstract or absolute meaning. Peace has one single meaning: that all the peoples of the world should feel that it is peace for them and not peace imposed on them.

I would like to say before you and to all the world that we want the policy of detente to succeed and to be consolidated. We are prepared to contribute to its success and consolidation. But we rightly believe that this cannot happen while aggression is being committed against an entire Arab nation, which lies strategically in the heart of the world and possesses its most important economic resources. Any disregard of this logical fact is not only disregard but also an insult, which we do not accept, either for ourselves or for the world, which is aware of the importance and value of this area in which we live. Therefore, the world must realize now that this area can give and can withhold.

Brothers and sisters, the United States, after a manoeuvre we refused even to discuss—especially after we had forged the path of right with the force of arms—has resorted to a policy that neither we nor our Arab nation can keep silent about. It has

established a quick bridge to transport military aid to Israel. The United States was not content with the fact that it was its arms that enabled Israel to obstruct all attempts for a peaceful solution of the Middle East question. It has now involved itself in something with more serious and more dangerous consequences.

While we are fighting aggression and are trying to remove its nightmare from over our occupied territories, the United States rushes to the aid of the aggressor to compensate him for his losses and to supply him with what he did not have before.

The United States has established a sea and air bridge along which new tanks, new aircraft, new guns, new rockets and new electronics [equipment] pour into Israel. We tell them: This will not frighten us. We tell them: This will not frighten us. But before matters reach the point of no return, you and we must understand: What is this leading to, and for how long? Where [are you going] to, when we and not Israel shape the map of the Middle East? Where to, when your entire interests are with us and not with Israel? Where to and for how long?

Brothers and sisters, I have thought of sending President Richard Nixon a letter in which I would clearly define our position. But I hesitated lest this might be misinterpreted. For this reason, I have decided instead to address an open message to him from here. This is a message dictated not by fear but by confidence. It is a message that emanates not from weakness but from a genuine desire to protect peace and bolster detente. I wish to tell him clearly that our aim in the war is well known and there is no need for us to explain it again. If you want to know our terms for peace, then here is our peace plan:

1. We have fought and will fight to liberate our territories which the Israeli occupation seized in 1967 and to find a means to retrieve and secure respect for the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. In this respect, we uphold our commitment to the UN resolutions, [those of] the General Assembly and the Security Council.

2. We are prepared to accept a cease-fire on the basis of the immediate withdrawal of the Israeli forces from all the occupied territories, under international supervision, to the pre-5th June 1967 lines.

3. We are prepared, as soon as the withdrawal from all these territories has been completed, to

attend an international peace conference at the United Nations, which I will try my best to persuade my comrades, the Arab leaders directly responsible for running our conflict with the enemy [to accept]. I will also do my best to convince the Palestine people's representatives about this so that they may participate with us and with the assembled states in laying down rules and regulations for a peace in the area based on the respect of the legitimate rights of all the peoples of the area.

4. We are ready at this hour—indeed at this very moment—to begin clearing the Suez Canal and to open it for world navigation so that it may resume its role in serving world prosperity and welfare. I have actually issued an order to the head of the Suez Canal Authority to begin this operation on the day following the liberation of the eastern bank of the Canal. Preliminary preparations for this operation have already begun.

5. In all this, we are not prepared to accept any ambiguous promises or loose words which can be given all sorts of interpretations and only waste time in useless things and put our cause back to the state of inaction, which we no longer accept whatever reasons the others may have or whatever sacrifices we have to make. What we want now is clarity: clarity of aims and clarity of means.

Brothers and sisters, we have said our word. I pray to God Almighty that all will understand it within its true framework and will see it squarely and will assess matters rightly. The present hours demand the courage and the minds of men.

For our part, we are facing these hours with the humility of those who are true to God, to themselves, to their nation and to mankind. The biggest battles ever fought with conventional weapons, even in the wars between the giants, are taking place during these hours. Destinies are being shaped and relations are being determined during these hours. The relations that are being determined will impose themselves on the future and are asserting themselves by right.

During these hours heroes are marching forward. During these hours martyrs are falling or, rather, rising up. Conflicting feelings are felt during these hours, hours during which the feelings of happiness are mixed with other deep feelings. This is because we wanted and still want right and not war. But we wanted and still want right even if war was imposed on us. When the elation of victory filled

all hearts, I—between myself and my God—was aware of all the sufferings we are undergoing for the sake of victory. I have been following the news of our victory with humility because I know the truth. The dear Almighty has taught us: You have been destined to fight although it is hateful to you.

Brothers and sisters, these are the moments in which we know ourselves and know our friends and our foes. We have known ourselves; we have known our friends. They have been the most sincere and loyal friends that we could ask for. We have always known our enemy. We do not wish to increase the number of our enemies. On the contrary, we have given one message after another, one notification after another and one warning after another so as to give everyone an opportunity to make revisions [of their attitudes], hoping they would retreat. However, we are, God willing, capable, after saying the word and giving notification and warning, of dealing one blow after another. We shall know when, where and how to do so if they want to escalate what they are doing now.

The entire Arab nation, on whose behalf I take the liberty to speak, has not forgotten the positions taken up during these hours. The Arab nation will not forget the friends of these hours who stand with it. It will not forget the enemies of these hours who stand with its enemy.

God, be our support and guide. God, bless our people and our nation. God, you have promised and your promise is truth. If you support God He will support you and guide your steps. Peace be upon you.

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Resolution adopted by the conference of Arab Oil Ministers deciding to reduce oil production gradually until Israel withdraws from all territory occupied in 1967⁹⁶

Kuwait, October 17, 1973

The Oil Ministers of the member States of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) held a meeting in the city of Kuwait on the 21st of Ramadan 1393 A.H.,

⁹⁶ English text as published in *Middle East Economic Survey* (Beirut), XVII, 4 (November 16, 1973), p. iii. Iraq did not sign the resolution.

corresponding to the 17th of October, 1973 A.D., to consider employing oil in the battle currently raging between the Arabs and Israel. Following a thorough discussion of this question the Oil Ministers,

Considering that the direct goal of the current battle is the liberation of the Arab territories occupied in the June 1967 war and the recovery of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people in accordance with the United Nations resolutions;

Considering that the United States is the principal and foremost source of the Israeli power which has resulted in the present Israeli arrogance and enabled the Israelis to continue to occupy our territories;

Recalling that the big industrial nations help, in one way or another, to perpetuate the status quo, though they bear a common responsibility for implementing the United Nations resolutions;

Considering that the economic situation of many Arab oil producing countries does not justify raising oil production, though they are ready to make such an increase in production to meet the requirements of major consumer industrial nations that commit themselves to cooperation with us for the purpose of liberating our territories;

Decided that each Arab oil exporting country immediately cuts its oil production by a recurrent monthly rate of no less than 5% to be initially counted on the virtual production of September, and thenceforth on the last production figure until such a time as the international community compels Israel to relinquish our occupied territories or until the production of every individual country reaches the point where its economy does not permit of any further reduction without detriment to its national and Arab obligations.

Nevertheless, the countries that support the Arabs actively and effectively or that take important measures against Israel to compel its withdrawal shall not be prejudiced by this production cut and shall continue to receive the same oil supplies that they used to receive prior to the reduction. Though the cut rate will be uniform in respect of every individual oil exporting country, the decrease in the supplies provided to the various consuming countries may well be aggravated proportionately with their support to and cooperation with the Israeli enemy.

The participants also recommend the countries party to this resolution that the United States be

subjected to the most severe cut proportionally with the quantities of crude oil, oil derivatives and hydrocarbons that it imports from every exporting country.

The participants also recommended that this progressive reduction leads to the total halt of oil supplies to the United States from every individual country party to the resolution.

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Communiqué issued by the conference of Arab Oil Ministers announcing a gradual reduction of oil production until Israel withdraws from all territory occupied in 1967⁹⁷

Kuwait, October 17, 1973

The Arab oil exporting countries contribute to the prosperity of the world and the growth of its economy through their exports of this wasting natural resource. And in spite of the fact that the production of many of these countries has exceeded the levels required by their domestic economies and the energy and revenue needs of their future generations, they have continued to increase their production, sacrificing their own interests in the service of international cooperation and the interests of the consumers.

It is known that huge portions of the territories of three Arab states were forcibly occupied by Israel in the June 1967 war, and it has continued to occupy them in defiance of UN resolutions and various calls for peace from the Arab countries and peace-loving nations.

And although the international community is under an obligation to implement UN resolutions and to prevent the aggressor from reaping the fruits of his aggression and occupation of the territories of others by force, most of the major industrialized countries which are consumers of Arab oil have failed to take measures or to act in such a way as might indicate their awareness of this public international obligation. Indeed, the actions of some countries have tended to support and reinforce the occupation.

⁹⁷ English text as published in *Middle East Economic Survey* (Beirut), XVI, 52 (October 19, 1973), pp. iii-iv. The communiqué was signed by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, Algeria, Egypt, Syria, Abu Dhabi, Bahrain and Qatar. Issued at approx. 18.30 gmt.

Before and during the present war, the United States has been active in supplying Israel with all the means of power which have served to exacerbate its arrogance and enable it to challenge the legitimate rights of others and the unequivocal principles of the public international law.

In 1967, Israel was instrumental in closing the Suez Canal and burdening the European economy with the consequences of this action. In the current war, it hit East Mediterranean oil export terminals, causing Europe another shortfall in supplies. This is the third such occurrence resulting from Israel's disregard of our legitimate rights with US backing and support. The Arabs have therefore been induced to take a decision to discontinue their economic sacrifices in producing quantities of their wasting oil assets in excess of what would be justified by domestic economic considerations, unless the international community hastens to rectify matters by compelling Israel to withdraw from our occupied territory, as well as letting the US know the heavy price which the big industrial countries are having to pay as a result of America's blind and unlimited support for Israel.

Therefore, the Arab Oil Ministers meeting in Kuwait today have decided to reduce their oil production forthwith by not less than 5 percent of the September (1973) level of output in each Arab oil exporting country, with a similar reduction to be applied each successive month, computed on the basis of the previous month's production, until such time as total evacuation of Israeli forces from all Arab territory occupied during the June 1967 war is completed, and the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people are restored.

The conferees took care to ensure that reductions in output should not affect any friendly state which has extended or may in the future extend effective concrete assistance to the Arabs. Oil supplies to any such state will be maintained in the same quantities as it was receiving before the reduction. The same exceptional treatment will be extended to any state which takes a significant measure against Israel with a view to obliging it to end its occupation of usurped Arab territories.

The Arab Ministers appeal to all the peoples of the world, and particularly the American people, to support the Arab nation in its struggle against imperialism and Israeli occupation. They reaffirm to them the sincere desire of the Arab nation to cooperate fully with all the peoples of the world

and their readiness to supply the world with its oil needs in spite of all sacrifices as soon as the world shows its sympathy with us and denounces the aggression against us.

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Press statement by King Hussein of Jordan outlining Jordan's efforts toward maintaining a position of military defence during the war⁹⁸

Amman, October 17, 1973

Our stand in Jordan is more than a mere close tie with the Palestine cause, because this cause is our cause and its people are our people. We have made several attempts throughout the past years to provide a just and lasting peace. Our policy has always been established on the basis that if this is not achieved, then we must do all we can to protect our rights and defend them with all our force and potential.

When the war broke out in this part of the world, we took measures quickly. We estimated the possibility of Israel's embarking on an attempt to again change its positions in its favour so that it could impose a new fait accompli which would invalidate UN Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967, and thus talk would begin about some other new thing. We also realized the need and inevitability of an Arab move to recover the land and to fight for just rights.

In the light of that, we immediately proclaimed a general mobilization on all levels and in all domains in Jordan. Our forces were immediately returned from training areas to their positions along the longest confrontation line. The duty of our armed forces has been and still is to watch all developments in the area in order to safeguard the land on which they stand against any threat and to eliminate any opportunity of a possible Israeli penetration operation against the northern front. The success of such an operation would endanger not only Jordan, but also fraternal Syria and other parts of the Arab homeland.

This has been our immediate and principal

⁹⁸ Broadcast by Amman radio in Arabic at 18.00 gmt; excerpted from the English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4428/A/7; reprinted by permission.

concern at this very stage. It is known that while we were building this country in all domains, we have also done everything we could to build up and strengthen our armed forces with every means available to us. There were circumstances which prevented us from achieving more than we have done so far. Despite this, we have done everything we could and we are still doing so now to build up our forces.

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Statement issued by Oil Minister Utaiba of Abu Dhabi announcing a total oil embargo against the US and any other country "hostile" to the Arab cause⁹⁹

Kuwait, October 18, 1973

At this decisive stage when the Arab nation is engaged in the battle of honour and destiny against the Zionist enemy and against the forces supporting him which provide him with the means of sustenance, my government—in view of this situation—cannot but announce that it has placed all its capabilities in the service of the battle and that it believes that the employment of the oil weapon will certainly succeed if all the Arabs make use of it. Thus, the Government of Abu Dhabi must determine its relations with other countries in the light of their stand vis-à-vis the present battle. In effect, this means that we should encourage our friends and those states which have adopted a neutral position in order to bring them to our side, and that we should also punish those states which have openly announced their hostile stand towards us and which supply our enemy, Israel, with arms, money and men. We believe that at this juncture the Arabs must make use of all the weapons at their disposal to tip the balance in favor of the Arab side. The Arabs cannot sustain losses greater than in the past, and they must win this war no matter how great the sacrifices.

On the basis of this principle, the Government of Abu Dhabi has decided to cut off oil supplies to the US until it changes its hostile stand towards the Arab nation. This measure will apply to any

state which adopts the same hostile attitude towards the Arab nation in its battle of destiny. The Government of Abu Dhabi, however, will not reduce oil supplies to states which have taken a moderate stand towards our cause because we believe that we should punish the aggressor alone and reward our friends so as not to use the same yardstick for foe and friend alike. The Government of Abu Dhabi is prepared to go further than this measure to help the Arab nation win its battle, since those who are fighting on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts are fighting for all Arabs.

The decision of the Government of Abu Dhabi will not be changed until the US Government changes its stand in respect of the Arab cause. Abu Dhabi realizes the implications of its measure and is prepared to face all the consequences; nothing can be worse than the bombing and killing of Arab citizens in the Egyptian and Syrian cities. Abu Dhabi will also resort to other measures which will be disclosed at the appropriate time in the event that the US does not put an end to its open support for Israel. We hope that the other Arab countries will follow Abu Dhabi's lead in halting oil supplies to the US.

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Statement issued by the government of Saudi Arabia announcing a reduction in oil production and warning of a total oil embargo against the US unless its pro-Israel policy is modified¹⁰⁰

Riyad, October 18, 1973

The Arab Oil Ministers decided at their meeting held in Kuwait yesterday to reduce oil production by not less than 5 percent monthly. In accordance with the said decision, the Government of His Majesty King Faisal has decided to reduce its production immediately beginning today and until the end of November by 10 percent. Thereafter, the reduction will continue month after month at a rate to be determined at the time in accordance with the aforementioned decision. His Majesty's Government is now undertaking

⁹⁹ *Al-Siyasa* (Kuwait), October 18, 1973; English translation in *Middle East Economic Survey* (Beirut), XVI, 52 (October 19, 1973), pp. iv-v.

¹⁰⁰ English text as published in *Middle East Economic Survey* (Beirut), XVI, 52 (October 19, 1973), p. iv. Broadcast by Riyadh radio at 16.00 gmt (BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4429/A/1).

efforts to get the United States Government to modify its present stand vis-à-vis the war currently in progress between the Arab nation and Israel and the military assistance it is supplying the latter. If these efforts do not produce tangible results then the Kingdom will stop oil exports to the United States.

298

Statement issued by the government of Saudi Arabia announcing a total oil embargo against the US for its increased military assistance to Israel¹⁰¹

Riyad, October 20, 1973

In accordance with the statement issued by the Royal Cabinet on 22 Ramadan 1393 (corresponding to 18 October 1973) whereby His Majesty's Government announced an immediate reduction in its oil production by 10 percent and that it would continue to review developments in the situation, and in view of the increase in American military aid to Israel, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has decided to halt oil exports to the United States of America for taking this position.

299

Statement issued by the government of Kuwait announcing a total oil embargo against the US and any other country supporting Israel¹⁰²

Kuwait, October 21, 1973

In accordance with the attitude of Kuwait as expressed in its previous statements, the Council of Ministers has decided as follows:¹⁰³

1. Exports of crude oil and products to the United States shall be halted.

2. An immediate 10 percent cut in production shall begin forthwith, to be followed by progressive cuts in accordance with the decision of the Kuwait meeting.

3. It shall be left to the Minister of Finance and Oil and the Minister of Foreign Affairs to determine the countries which are in league with Israel so that they will be subjected to the embargo on oil exports.

4. The Minister of Finance and Oil shall prepare as soon as possible a study showing what further role the economy, and in particular oil, can play in the battle.

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Decision of the Iraq Revolutionary Command Council to nationalize the Netherlands' share in the Basra Petroleum Company (excerpt)¹⁰⁴

Baghdad, October 21, 1973

In affirmation of our basic national commitment to the revolution of July 17, and of our repeated declarations never to permit any quarter which continues to support the Zionist enemy's tyranny and usurpation of our rights to benefit from the resources of this nation; and inasmuch as we have penalized the United States of America for its flagrantly hostile attitude by nationalizing its share in the Basra Petroleum Company; and in view of the flagrantly hostile attitude adopted by the Netherlands to the Arab nation and her persistent support of our usurping enemy, thereby making light of the aspirations and legitimate rights of our people and the principles of justice and freedom in the world; the Revolutionary Command Council has decided to nationalize the Netherlands' share in the Basra Petroleum Company to penalize her for her hostile attitude to our nation and the struggle of our people.

¹⁰¹ English text as published in *Middle East Economic Survey* (Beirut), XVII, 1 (October 26, 1973), p. 3. Broadcast by Riyadh radio at 20.00 gmt (BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4430/A/6).

¹⁰² English text as published in *Middle East Economic Survey* (Beirut), XVII, 1 (October 26, 1973), p. 5; broadcast by Kuwait radio at 10.00 gmt (BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4431/A/7). Two days later a total embargo of oil exports to the Netherlands was announced.

¹⁰³ Introduction added from the Arabic text, *al-Siyasa* (Kuwait), October 22, 1973.

¹⁰⁴ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Thawra* (Baghdad), October 22, 1973. Broadcast by Baghdad radio at 20.18 gmt (BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4431/A/8).

301

Cable sent by President Boumedienne of Algeria to heads of state in Africa who had not severed relations with Israel, urging them to do so¹⁰⁵

Algiers, October 21, 1973

The close links between our peoples and the fraternal relations that exist between our countries allow me to inform you of the great concern we feel at the situation developing in the Middle East, which is continuing to grow more serious as a result of the encouragement and extensive aid of all kinds that certain great powers, in particular the United States of America, are giving Israel to enable her to continue her aggression against Egypt and Syria.

These two countries are entitled to expect all the aid and support required by their just cause, the supply of which is dictated by their membership in the same political groupings. They are entitled to expect this from all justice- and freedom-loving countries, headed by the African countries, to ensure the triumph of their just struggle to liberate their occupied territories.

I am convinced—for I know the noble anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist traditions of your people and your firm adherence to the Charter of the Organization for African Unity and the principles of the policy of non-alignment—in view of the escalation of the conflict, which has assumed the most dangerous dimensions, especially as regards the security of our continent, that you will not hesitate once again to express your country's solidarity with Egypt and Syria.

The battle which Egypt and Syria are fighting against colonialism and Zionism in the Middle East and Africa in no way differs from the battle which our brothers are fighting in Guinea Bissau and South Africa against Portugal and the minority racist regimes in Pretoria and Salisbury which are supported by the same imperialist forces.

African solidarity requires that we take a positive attitude against Israel who has attacked a founder member state of our Organization; this attitude must not differ from that unanimously

adopted by the African countries against the other enemies of our continent. In this connection do I need to recall the unceasing commitment both of Egypt and Syria and their support of the national liberation movement in Africa, or their positive and unambiguous attitude to Portugal and the racist regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa, with whom they have no relations.

The cause of freedom, which is one and indivisible, must never be put at risk, especially in these dangerous hours. You are in agreement with me in holding this view toward any difference of attitudes to aggressors against our continent, whoever they may be.

By expressing their effective solidarity with the Arab nation, the African countries will be playing a great part in strengthening the natural ties that link them, and in helping to establish a just and permanent peace in the area and to bring about cooperation which will bring increasing benefits to our peoples. In this way Africa will once again be able to show the world an imposing picture of her unity and to be loyal to herself and her traditions.

I take this opportunity to once again express my esteem and friendship and offer my sincerest wishes for the happiness and prosperity of your people.

302

Letter from President Boumedienne of Algeria to the states of Western Europe calling for a change in their Middle East policies¹⁰⁶

Algiers, October 21, 1973

The Middle East issue was in the forefront of the deliberations of the fourth conference of the heads of state and government of the non-aligned countries which was held in September—that is, before the present conflict. Thus discussion of that issue has been added to the agenda of successive meetings since 1967 whether on the level of the

¹⁰⁵ Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Shaab* (Algiers), October 23, 1973. The cable was sent to: Botswana, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Swaziland and Zambia; cf. note to doc. 167 above.

¹⁰⁶ Broadcast by Algiers radio in Arabic at 23.00 gmt; English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4431/A/11–12; reprinted by permission. The letter was sent to: France, Britain, Ireland, Iceland, Belgium, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, Switzerland, West Germany, Greece, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark and Austria.

United Nations or of other regional organizations. The good offices and endeavours of all those organizations aimed at finding a peaceful solution of the problem all met with Israel's rejection and the tricks of the forces which support it. That attitude was accompanied by Israel's policy of reinforcing the new invasion boundaries, the establishment of Zionist settlements, and the moving of the capital [of Israel] to Jerusalem, together with the successive terrorist operations against Arab countries. Such a measure was apt to lead, on the level of facts and law at the same time, to the impasse behind which Israel wanted to perpetuate the de facto situation by means of successive aggression.

Israel's responsibility for the deterioration of the situation has raised a wave of general condemnation which was embodied particularly in the severance of relations with Israel by a large number of countries, especially African countries. Yet there are those who like to escape such responsibilities, evade the heart of the problem, and twist the discussion so that it can be presented on a mere formal, organizational basis in the end, to seek to discover who resumed fighting, in the hope of a cease-fire only and without any prospects for a comprehensive political settlement.

What concerns the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Syrian Arab Republic in the first place is the liberation of their territories. Consequently, the matter relates to a sacred duty which is naturally commensurate with the rules of the UN Charter, to which the non-aligned group has given strength and firmness.

In view of these considerations, I find myself [obliged] to point out the necessity of presenting the Middle East problem—the problem that engulfs the perils of a world crisis—from the angle of respecting the countries' independence and sovereignty, the right of the Palestinian people to a national existence, and the maintenance of security in the entire area.

As I refer to the resolutions of the non-aligned countries, I find it my duty to draw your attention to the serious dimensions which the conflict may assume on account of the political encouragement and the various forms of aid given by some countries to Israel so that it can continue its aggression and retain the fruits of it.

It has become notorious, indeed, that the resumption of fighting resulted in the mobilization

of all Zionist forces on the international level, and the placing of NATO airfields and bases at the disposal of Israel so that the USA might use them as staging posts for the transport of military equipment [to Israel], besides the movement of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean within the framework of NATO. Therefore the involvement of countries which are not fighting Israel, manifests itself in the official declaration of a probable military intervention by the USA.

The present course of events causes (?concern) not only to the countries directly involved in the conflict, but also to all the non-aligned countries which are interested in the victory of the objectives of a peace based on rights and justice in that area which borders the developing world and the Third World which is able to present a framework for an ideal international co-operation in view of its geographical location, political [importance] and its wealth of energy resources.

I am sure that in these critical circumstances—when the escalation of the Middle East conflict threatens security in the Mediterranean—your country, which is linked with the area through interests and traditional relations, will spare no effort in the elimination of that conflict. In fact, since the heads of state and government of the non-aligned countries pointed out that it was everybody's duty to help Arab countries to liberate their territories by every means, support for the aggressor and acceptance of the taking over of lands by force should be eliminated.

When your country works in that direction and takes into consideration the point of view expressed by the heads of state and government of the non-aligned countries, it not only responds to the duty of justice and solidarity to establish peace in accordance with civilized values, but it will also be participating in eliminating all the obstacles which hinder an advance towards reconciliation and towards achieving wide-scale international co-operation.

303

Statement issued by the government of Egypt announcing Egypt's acceptance of UN Security Council Resolution 338 (1973) calling for a ceasefire¹⁰⁷

Cairo, October 22, 1973

President Muhammad Anwar Sadat has studied with the closest attention the resolution adopted by the Security Council this morning calling for a ceasefire within twelve hours for the immediate and total implementation of the resolution adopted by the Security Council on November 22, 1967 and for peace talks, to be attended by all the parties concerned and interested, within the framework and with the effective participation of the Security Council.

President Anwar Sadat has also studied with the closest attention the details of the discussions of the Security Council, observing the following:

1. That the draft resolution put before the Security Council was submitted by the two great powers, the USSR and the United States, after intense contact between them at the highest levels and because of their special responsibility for the current international situation.

2. That the Security Council approved the draft resolution without any of its members raising objections.

3. That the discussions which took place at the Security Council were of the greatest importance and threw necessary light on the implications.

In this connection, the observations of France and India were of importance.

4. The Egyptian interpretation of the Security Council resolution is entirely clear except as regards withdrawal from the occupied territories and the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. In the course of this study a number of important points were taken into consideration including:

a) The peace proposal submitted by President Anwar Sadat to the nation and the world in his speech to the People's Assembly and the Central Committee on October 16,¹⁰⁸ in which he made full withdrawal the unquestionable basis for any political action.

b) The talks between him and the Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin, who visited him in Cairo from October 16–19 during which period they were able to hold five working sessions.

c) The assurances received by President Anwar Sadat from the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, which were handed to him by the Soviet ambassador in Cairo in a private letter received by the President on the evening of October 21.

d) The contacts made with a number of Arab capitals directly concerned with the battle.

President Anwar Sadat believes that the firm principle which has changed the nature and the circumstances of the Middle East crisis was underlined and strengthened by the great and glorious action which the Arab armed forces have been taking and are still taking, thereby demonstrating their courage, capacity and readiness for self-sacrifice on the field of battle. For this great and glorious action alone broke the deadlock of the crisis, altered the status quo, changed the whole political map of the Middle East and put an end forever to the vainglory and folly of force that the Zionist enemy has been indulging in for twenty-five years.

On the basis of the above, President Sadat, in his capacity as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, has given orders to the High Command to impose a ceasefire at the time fixed by the Security Council resolution on condition that the enemy starts to observe the Security Council resolution at the same moment.

In making this decision on his historical responsibility, President Sadat believes that the greatest credit, in this first stage of a decisive period of national struggle, is due to the unyielding courage of the whole Arab nation, to the profound awareness of its peoples and, above all, to the heroism of the men who accepted the challenge of fire and blood on the field of battle, where God's victory was surely theirs.

¹⁰⁷ Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), October 23, 1973. Broadcast by Cairo radio at 12.30 gmt (BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4431/A/22).

¹⁰⁸ Doc. 291 above.

304

Statement issued by the Regional Command of the Iraq Baath Party rejecting the UN ceasefire resolution¹⁰⁹

Baghdad, October 22, 1973

1. Iraq was not a party to the 1948 Armistice Agreements nor did she accept the 1967 ceasefire resolution. Therefore, and in conformity with the policy of our party, the Socialist Baath Party, which is to reject negotiations and reconciliation with the usurping Zionist entity and to refuse recognition of it, we do not consider ourselves a party to any resolution, measure or arrangement of this kind that has been taken or may be taken in the future.

2. We declare that Iraq was not a party to the consultations that took place before the ceasefire resolution was adopted, only learning of it after its adoption. We therefore have decided that interest requires that immediate contacts be made with our brothers in certain Arab countries so that we may learn in detail their real attitudes to this matter and study the situation with a view to serving the interests of our just struggle of national liberation against the Zionist entity, and also to making similar contacts with the USSR. However, we reserve the right to explain in detail our views and attitude to the masses of our Arab nation at the appropriate time—our view that is fundamentally based on absolute belief in the right of our Arab people in Syria and Egypt to their land and the right of our Palestinian Arab people to their land.

We have affirmed this belief of ours through our comprehensive and unrestricted participation in the battle that the Arabs have been fighting against the Zionist imperialist enemy, since October 6, 1973, in conformity with our national principle and for the attainment of a goal that is dear to our nation—the cleansing of Arab territory by liberating it from Zionist and imperialist occupation. We shall show our loyalty to our principles and our people by declaring the truth in full detail regardless of the views of others.

305

Statement by the PLO Executive Committee stressing the lack of relevance of the UN ceasefire resolution to the Palestine revolution¹¹⁰

Beirut, October 22, 1973

The Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization held a meeting on October 22, 1973 and discussed the Security Council resolution adopted the same morning.

The Executive Committee announces to our Palestinian people, to the Arab masses and to forces throughout the world that are friendly to our struggle:

That this resolution does not concern the Palestine revolution which started at the beginning of 1965 and which declares that it will continue armed mass struggle against the Zionist entity for the liberation of the homeland and the right of the people to self-determination in their territory.

Immediately after the war of national liberation broke out on October 6, 1973, the Palestine revolution, which was started for the total liberation of the soil of the Palestine homeland in the darkest hours through which the Palestine cause and the Arab nation have passed, took up its combat positions on all the battlefronts in our occupied homeland and on the Arab battlefronts, thereby continuing the armed struggle against the Zionist enemy, alongside the forces of our Arab nation, to achieve the unconditional liberation of all the occupied territories.

The Palestine revolution will continue its armed mass struggle on the road towards the achievement of the goals of the people of Palestine; namely, liberation and the right to self-determination.

¹⁰⁹ Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Thawra* (Baghdad), October 23, 1973; the resolution is printed as doc. 34 above.

¹¹⁰ Translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), October 22, 1973. Broadcast by Voice of Palestine radio at 18.23 gm (BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4432/A/8).

306

Statement issued by the government of Kuwait rejecting the UN ceasefire resolution and urging continued Arab oil measures¹¹¹

Kuwait, October 23, 1973

Kuwait, which previously rejected the UN Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967, finds nothing in the new resolution of the Security Council to justify changing its former policy. In the meantime it will not oppose any fraternal country which finds it in its own interest and that of its people to adopt a decision differing from Kuwait's attitude. The unity of Arab ranks at this stage is considered essential to uphold our cause. Therefore, any side issues should not be allowed to distract us from the main cause whatever the situation may be.

On the other hand the backing of the confrontation countries which participated in the battle should continue in order that those countries may recover their full capacity to act as a precaution against future possibilities. Furthermore, the application of unified Arab economic measures is an important factor that should continue and grow until the objectives at which those measures are directed are achieved.

307

Statement issued by the government of Saudi Arabia emphasizing that the Middle East ceasefire has not changed the political objectives of the oil embargo¹¹²

Riyad, October 23, 1973

The attitude of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, namely the evacuation of Israeli forces from all occupied Arab territories, including Jerusalem, and the restoration of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, has not changed. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will maintain its armed forces on the Syrian front under orders of the Syrian command and will abide by the decisions which it has taken or will be taking in support of the Arab cause.

308

Cable from Foreign Minister Khaddam of Syria to the Syrian delegation at the UN expressing Syria's conditional acceptance of Security Council Resolution 338 (1973)¹¹³

Damascus, October 23, 1973

With reference to your cable dated 22 October 1973 transmitting Security Council resolution 338 (1973), adopted on 22 October at the 1747th meeting, I should be grateful if you would note and inform the Security Council that the Syrian Government has accepted that resolution and states that it has understood the resolution to be based on:

1. The complete withdrawal of Israel from all the Arab territories which were occupied in June 1967 and subsequently;
2. The safeguarding of the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations.

The Syrian Government's acceptance of the resolution is conditional upon the other party's undertaking to implement the resolution.

Abdul Halim Khaddam
Deputy Prime Minister
Minister for Foreign Affairs

309

Statement issued by the government of Egypt commenting on Israel Prime Minister Meir's Knesset statement of October 23 and accusing Israel of violating the UN ceasefire resolution¹¹⁴

Cairo, October 23, 1973

From Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir's statement before the Knesset in this particular situation when she is fully aware that the Israeli forces have intentionally violated the unanimous Security Council cease-fire resolution [words indistinct] and what she alleged to be embodied in the resolution or what she claims to be an interpretation of some of the provisions in this resolution, it is

¹¹¹ Broadcast by Kuwait, radio in Arabic at 10.00 gmt; English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4432/A/9-10; reprinted by permission.

¹¹² English text as published in *Middle East Economic Survey* (Beirut), XVII, 1 (October 26, 1973), p. 3.

¹¹³ Text as transmitted to the UN Secretary-General in UN doc. S/11040 (A/9250) and Corr. 1.

¹¹⁴ Broadcast by Cairo radio in Arabic at 21.15 gmt; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4433/A/7-8; reprinted by permission. Meir's statement is printed as doc. 161 above.

evident that the violation of the cease-fire by the Israeli side was intentional and took place on the clear instructions of the Israeli Government, which should bear the consequences before the world for this act.

An analysis of Golda Meir's statement shows that while she says that she had agreed to the cease-fire resolution, she did not mention one single word about Israel's adherence to or actual implementation of this resolution. This *ipso facto* is definite proof that Israel has not implemented the Security Council resolution. Indeed it has intentionally violated it after we, on our part, had implemented it in compliance with the unanimous will of the Security Council.

The United States submitted this resolution to the Security Council after agreeing on it with the USSR. This places on them a special responsibility to guarantee the implementation of the resolution and to adopt the measures provided by the UN charter through the Security Council to make Israel comply with the Council's resolution.

Everyone is aware that Israel's violation of the cease-fire resolution and the large scale offensive operations by its forces, including the use of its Air Force in more than one area, proves that Israel's action was intentional and the result of a plan and a decision at the highest level. It intended to improve its military position knowing the adverse effects this would have on the international efforts which had been made to move this area from a state of war to a state of peace.

The link Golda Meir established between the Israeli attitude and US support for it in the past few days, and her claim that this support, which comprises offensive and other weapons, amounted to only \$825,000,000 puts it on record for the whole world to see that the main cause for Israel's continuous aggression and disrespect for the Security Council resolution on the cease-fire is the support it has received from the United States, the very state which submitted the cease-fire resolution to the Security Council. Accordingly, the responsibility for this aggression and for the violation of the cease-fire is a joint responsibility.

We were hoping that the Israeli Prime Minister would wait and would not resort to the usual untrustworthy and deceptive methods in her statements, particularly since she knows very well that the valiant Egyptian forces will not remain idle towards the new Israeli aggression but will

deal two blows for every one and will defend the dear Egyptian soil to purge it of the aggressor. In order that the world may judge Israel's behaviour and in order that the Security Council may shoulder its responsibility, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union, Egypt has asked the Security Council to convene an urgent session to consider Israel's violation of the Council's resolution and to take executive measures to make Israel respect the cease-fire.

As regards Israel, knowing that it is the aggressor and knowing that it is responsible for the violation of the cease-fire, it would not have been logical for it to go to the Security Council, out of fear that the Council might take measures that would frustrate its expansionist plans. It does not escape our notice that Israel through its Prime Minister had resorted again to deception and diversion to create a tense psychological and political atmosphere. It is observed that she deliberately referred to interpretations of the provisions of the Security Council resolution that are in line with the Israeli point of view. She then attributed these interpretations to sources which she alleges are of the highest level, at a time when she knows very well that these claims are not true. It is clear that the Israeli Prime Minister and the Israeli military establishment need such statements for home consumption, particularly since the date of the Israeli elections is near.

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Statement by the National and Regional Commands of the Baath Party and the Iraq Revolutionary Command Council regarding Iraq's attitude toward the war effort and the ceasefire (excerpts)¹¹⁵

Baghdad, October 29, 1973

Citizens,

Masses of the Arab nation,

On October 6, 1973, we heard over the radio that fighting had broken out against the Zionist enemy, and immediately the National and Regional Commands of the Baath Party held a joint meeting with the Revolutionary Command Council. There was also an emergency meeting of the Higher

¹¹⁵ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Thawra* (Baghdad), October 30, 1973.

Committee of the Iraqi and All-Arab Progressive Front and the Council of Ministers where it was decided to take part in the battle with all of Iraq's military, economic and political resources.

When we made the decision to take part in the battle with all our resources we were not unmindful of the careful appraisals that we had made and announced both to the masses and at official Arab meetings. Our decision was based on the assumption that regardless of our estimates of what events were likely to precede the battle, and of the dimensions it was likely to assume, the outbreak of fighting against the enemy would make Iraq's active and comprehensive participation in it inevitable. Nor were we unmindful at the time of the fact that certain Arab and international quarters were striving to reach a so-called "peaceful solution" of some kind; on the contrary, we took this possibility into account and decided to enter the battle in the hope of ensuring, to the best of our ability, that it become a battle for national liberation—the goal for which our nation has struggled for more than a quarter of a century and for which it has offered so many martyrs and made such great sacrifices.

During the heat of the fighting, we stressed that the battle for Arab liberation was bound to be long, difficult and immensely costly. We stressed that it would require the mobilization and organization of all the energies of the Arab nation, the adoption of radical attitudes to imperialism and its interests, the sound construction of the internal fronts in every Arab region and unified Arab action directed towards the goal of Arab unity.

While the battle was being fought we hoped that it would follow this radical course of total national liberation. We were not unmindful of the objective facts of the conflict between us and the enemy or of the facts and potentialities of the international situation. But we were quite certain that the masses had taken the battle to their hearts and were supporting it with all their immense resources. Moreover, the battle had brought to the fore new prospects and forces, deriving both from the masses and their liberationist forces, and from popular pressure on the regimes. There was also the fact that the battle was continuing. All this, we were absolutely confident, could greatly change the situation and provide unlimited possibilities of the continuation of the battle as a battle for national liberation and of a decisive victory over

the Zionist enemy and his master, imperialism, headed by American imperialism. These estimates were not based on hopes alone, but on the tangible realities disclosed by the battle from its first days. There has been a rapid and all-embracing upsurge throughout the whole area, resources previously not reckoned with had been poured into the battle, and the masses and the courageous Arab combatants had displayed the patience, endurance and readiness for sacrifice that made it certain that they were capable of holding out and continuing to fight until final victory.

It was in this spirit and in the light of this conviction that we entered the battle. But, just as it was over the radio that we heard that the fighting had started, so it was over the radio that we heard that it had stopped.

Now that the governments of Egypt and Syria have accepted the Security Council ceasefire resolution—which we have rejected because, in our estimate, it does not safeguard the rights of our nation to its usurped territory and in particular the rights of the Palestinian Arab people to their territory—we consider that the task of our armed forces which were sent to the Northern and Western Fronts has come to an end. They no longer have a national duty to perform by continuing to fight, quite apart from the delicate and serious security problems posed by the presence of our armed forces there. It has therefore been decided to withdraw our armed forces, presently stationed on the two fronts, so that they may once more perform their national duty of protecting the independence of the homeland, of building the new revolutionary society and of preparing to perform their national duty once again when circumstances are favourable.

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Speech by President Assad of Syria explaining Syria's acceptance of the UN ceasefire resolution and describing the resulting political situation (excerpts)¹¹⁶

Damascus, October 29, 1973

While the armed forces were consolidating their positions day after day and great heroes were emerging from their ranks and were scoring more successes in their firm and determined progress towards eliminating any territorial gains by the enemy and while our people were consolidating their steadfastness and confirming, by their behaviour and daily positive action, their determination to uphold the policy of endurance, the world has been following the development of the struggle in our area and watching the growth of our capabilities and the escalation of our great steadfastness. The world viewed these in various ways ranging from admiration, appreciation and support, on the one hand, to caution and concern on the other.

At the same time, the world watched the defeat of our enemy's arrogance and illusions and the collapse of our enemy's dreams to subdue the will-power of our people, based on the rock of our strength. Those who have adopted hostile attitudes towards our nation have felt the danger to their interests in all parts of the Arab homeland. The world awareness of the reality of Israel and its hostile character is increasing daily. One after another the African states have been breaking off relations with Israel, condemning its aggression and denouncing its challenge to world opinion.

At the same time, the factors for division between the US Government and its allies in Western Europe were interacting and attempts were being made by those concerned to avoid it from erupting while the fighting was in progress in this area. The factors for division were also in progress within Israeli society, threatening an eruption that the enemy's society could not sustain. Above all, our cause was shaking the world's conscience.

It was in this world atmosphere, and mainly under the influence of the mighty Arab steadfastness, that the Security Council adopted its

ceasefire resolution. The two super-Powers—the Soviet Union and the United States of America—approved the resolution and submitted it jointly to the Security Council, which adopted it without opposition from any of its members.

The issuing of this resolution was a surprise to us. We became aware of the existence of the draft resolution and the invitation to the Security Council to convene only after the radio stations and news agencies reported the fact. This placed new conditions before us, which had to be taken into consideration. The resolution was addressed to all the warring parties, and we are a main party. It was, therefore, essential that we should study the resolution and the new conditions resulting from it and define our attitude to them. This is what has happened.

It was with a deep sense of responsibility that we studied the Security Council's resolution on the basis of national interests and commitment to the principles and aims we have fought for. It was for this purpose that we held lengthy meetings on Monday and Tuesday—that is, from the morning of 22nd October to the end of 23rd October—of the national and regional commands of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party and the central command of the Progressive National Front.

We made contacts and exchanged views with the Kings and Presidents of the Arab states. We also made contact with the Soviet Union. All these contacts were taken into account at the meetings we devoted to studying the Security Council resolution.

In our contacts with the fraternal Arab Republic of Egypt and the Soviet Union, we sought to have a clear picture of all aspects of the situation vis-à-vis this resolution. It was then that brother President Anwar as-Sadat assured me that he had received the Soviet leaders' guarantees that Israel would withdraw completely from all the occupied Arab territories. The Soviet Union assured us as well that its attitude on this whole issue corresponded to and was in harmony with our attitude and interests, and the legitimate aspirations of our people, and that when drafting the Security Council's resolution it was guided by our stress on Israel's complete withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories and the restoration of the rights of the Palestinian people.

As a result of our contacts, particularly with the fraternal Arab Republic of Egypt and with the

¹¹⁶ Broadcast by Damascus radio in Arabic; excerpted from the English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4438/A/8–11; reprinted by permission.

Soviet Union, on the basis that it was one of the two co-author States of the draft resolution, we understood the Security Council's resolution to mean Israel's complete withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories. We also understood it to mean that no harm would befall the rights of the Palestinian people, who alone would have the first and last opinion and would make the final decision when their issue was discussed.

On the basis of this understanding of the Security Council resolution and after its approval by the Arab Republic of Egypt, in the light of the convictions formed by brother President Anwar as-Sadat, we adopted a decision at the central command of the Progressive National Front to accept the Security Council resolution.

Orders were issued to the armed forces to cease firing, provided that the enemy abided by the cease-fire and provided that our armed forces remained fully prepared to resume the fighting, if that became necessary.

Brothers, the victories we scored during this war are illustrious victories that our history will proudly record. They deserve appreciation and admiration from all of us. They have added to our nation's glorious history illustrious pages. They are among the most brilliant achievements made by our people during their struggle of this age.

What do these victories mean? Do they mean that we have liberated the territories occupied by the enemy? No, we have not yet liberated the territories. In fact, some of the land in the penetrated area is still in enemy hands, because the cease-fire came as a surprise to us and contrary to the picture we had about the course of the battle. We had in mind a long-term battle. In such a case, our moves take different directions and are characterized by great flexibility to serve the ultimate objective of the battle. Within this picture, too, it might not be harmful but could be useful to us if the enemy had been here or there, in a near or distant area, for a period of time which could be brief or long. All that and other things would be done in the light of a clear-cut guide—the ultimate objective of the war.

Undoubtedly, the fraternal citizens now listening to me would wish for more explanation of this particular point. More explanation and details, however, could benefit the enemy. I, too, would like to talk more about this point but I am prevented

from doing so by the possible benefit to the enemy. Hence, I say again that we have not yet liberated the territories, that the Security Council resolution took us by surprise and was contrary to our course and to the picture we had in mind.

What then are our victories? They are great. We have not liberated the territories but we have liberated the essential thing leading to that—things which had to be liberated first. We have liberated our will from all fetters. We have liberated our will to fight for an honourable and dignified life. We have liberated our spirits from fear, hesitation and indifference. We have freed our souls from the complex of guilt and failure, since in the past and ever since the establishment of Israel we never fought as we should have fought.

Brothers, although the Security Council resolution came contrary to our visualization, this should not conceal from us the fact that the resolution was a result of our steadfastness. Therefore, it certainly represents one of the aspects of our victories.

Compatriots, these words may be subject to argument but we have a clear proof before us. In 1967, when we were unable to stand fast, such a resolution was not issued. The resolution passed at the time was a brief one calling for a cease-fire. There was then no resolution embodying the visualization [for a solution]. Whether such a visualization was or was not just and right, no resolution was passed representing a visualization for a solution of the problem in this area. The resolution, then, was for a cease-fire only.

However, Resolution 242, which provides a visualization for solving the problem in this area was passed six months after the 1967 war. The resolution passed during the war was that calling for a cease-fire only. This is because at the time we were unable to stand fast. At present it is our steadfastness that prompted the issuing of a resolution embodying a complete visualization for a solution to the problem in this area. The visualization as we understand it is that the resolution includes a solution to the problem in our area on the basis of Israel's withdrawal from the occupied Arab territory and of guaranteeing the rights of the Palestinian Arab people.

The only factor that prompted the issuing of the resolution in this way was our steadfastness. We, therefore, should consider the resolution as reflecting and certainly representing one aspect of our

victories. We accepted the resolution from a position of strength while maintaining our combat ability and our pan-Arab pride and from a position of self-confidence and of the capability of our people and the power of their arms.

The positive change that took place in the international sphere regarding the Arab cause was due to the Arab forces' bravery in the battlefield and their valiant stands in all fierce battles against the enemy and the constant and escalating attrition of the enemy's forces and his equipment. All this and the effective support by our Arab nation strengthen the admirable steadfastness of our people in a solid domestic front and within the framework of an impregnable national unity.

Brothers, we now begin a new stage of struggle. We must begin it with determination and self-confidence in the way we began the armed struggle on the battlefield. Just as there is no place for hesitation in military battles, there is also absolutely no place for it in political battles. In no forms or in no analysis must our political battle be separated from our military battle, because the former came as a result of the latter. Our political battle runs parallel with and depends on the military battle.

Through our steadfastness in the military battle, we have achieved glorious results, which have destroyed all the myths spun by the enemy. We are also capable, through steadfastness, of self-confidence, strong cohesion on the internal front and, through our solidarity with our Arab nation, of achieving success in the political battle, and our success in this battle can be achieved either by achieving the aims we fought for or by our saying "No" proudly if we see deception, manoeuvring or evasion from implementing the Security Council resolution according to our understanding of it. Hence, we have to wage the new stage of struggle with the same valour, confidence and high efficiency with which we waged the armed struggle in the past days.

If our struggle during this stage does not achieve our just aspirations—a matter we have taken into account and a possibility we do not exclude—we shall return to the armed struggle to resume the fighting with all our power until we achieve our aim. Perhaps many sons of our people wish that armed struggle would continue now. Despite my personal feelings, I appreciate their feelings. They proudly see hundreds of heroes appearing every day in the ranks of our armed forces and the

news of their heroics are spreading, a fact that will increase the enthusiasm of the citizens and make them have more faith in victory.

I, however, would like to repeat that as long as the battles of heroism we have waged so far are the ones that imposed this development, we have to face the new stage and its requirements with valour and high efficiency. Therefore, our general preparedness must remain high and our general readiness complete.

Brothers, in the last few days the enemy has escalated his campaign against our internal front. He aimed his arrows of hatred and meanness at our national unity, but all his arrows were broken and our internal front remained strong, and this is the strong basis for our victories in the military battles just as in the political and construction battles. If our enemies fear the strength of our internal front and make desperate attempts to split it we have to be more eager to strengthen it continuously. If our front is split, that would be the only factor that would definitely affect the atmosphere which results from these positive gains and would be capable of cancelling these gains which we are achieving day after day.

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Statement issued by the Foreign Ministry of Libya announcing an oil embargo against the Netherlands¹¹⁷

Tripoli, October 29, 1973

In the light of the definite reports received by the Foreign Ministry to the effect that the Dutch government's attitude is biased towards the Zionist enemy in the conflict now in progress in the Middle East;

On Ramadan 23, 1393 AH (October 19, 1973) the Ministry called in the Dutch Chargé d'Affaires and requested him to contact his government immediately to ask it to define clearly its attitude to the battle now raging between the Arabs and the Zionist enemy, and to deliver the reply within a week; if not, the Libyan Arab Republic would take such deterrent measures as it considered appropriate.

¹¹⁷ Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Fajr al-Jadid* (Tripoli), October 30, 1973.

In the course of the specified period the Libyan government received the Dutch government's reply, which was negative and unsatisfactory. This has led the Libyan Arab Republic to take the decision to cut off supplies of oil to the Netherlands completely as from Shawwal 5, 1393 AH (October 30, 1973).

The Libyan government also warns any state which re-exports oil to the Netherlands that it too is liable to have its supplies cut off.

The Libyan Arab Republic also affirms that it will take the same measures against any state that adopts a hostile attitude to the Arab nation in its just struggle against the Zionist enemy.

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Press conference statement by President Sadat of Egypt reviewing the current military and political situation (excerpt)¹¹⁸

Cairo, October 31, 1973

As you know, operations to check the aggression began on 6th October. Briefly, and as you have followed the situation here, our forces, through a heroic and unique military operation to which all have attested, crossed the Canal—the most dangerous water barrier in history—and stormed the Bar Lev line. In the first three days of the military battle, by Israel's own admission, they lost, apart from their other losses, 500 tanks on the Egyptian front alone and large numbers of aircraft, as reported in our official communiques. The battle raged on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts for 11 days. There was talk that the battle would end in a day, in two hours, or six hours. There was also talk about an invincible force. The battle lasted 11 days, during which there were scores of counterattacks with hundreds of tanks. All this is in the annals and records of the war which will be issued.

After 11 days—as the Israeli Defence Minister said yesterday in the Knesset when he was asked why he did not attack to take back the prisoners—they did not have enough ammunition to continue the fight. Our evaluation—an evaluation that has proved to be sound in accordance with the

words of the Israeli Defence Minister—was that Israel had [ammunition] for 14 days. During that period they could continue to fight with the same intensity and violence with which we had faced them. Eleven of the 14 days had passed and only three days remained, after which their ammunition would have been exhausted for certain. Here the United States intervened.

The United States intervened not only with ammunition. The United States did not hide. The United States promised Israel that it would maintain the military balance. The US interpretation of balance is that Israel should be superior to all the Arabs put together.

I had officially informed President Nixon and the United States earlier that we reject this theory and such talks. This was evident in the fact that we confronted Israel for 11 days. Israel had three days left before its ammunition would actually be exhausted. This was admitted by its Defence Minister.

As I said, the United States intervened not with just ammunition. No. In the first three days Israel lost 500 tanks. Later this figure exceeded 800 tanks. Then we were surprised by a number of new tanks. This was not surprising [as heard] and we dealt with it. But we were also surprised by modern US weapons, which the US army had not yet used. The United States opened its arsenal [to Israel]. This is not an allegation, this was made public. The television-guided bomb was officially announced. Nothing was hidden. And so were the new anti-tank shells. All the modern weapons that the US army had not yet used—US arms depots were wide open.

Then the two super-powers, the United States and Russia, submitted a draft cease-fire resolution. I accepted the draft cease-fire resolution for two reasons. The first reason is that the draft resolution provides, with the two super-powers as guarantors, for the cessation of firing along the lines that existed on 22nd October. The second clause provides for the immediate implementation of Resolution 242. The first thing that this resolution provides for is the inadmissibility of occupying the territory of others by force. In other words, this means withdrawal by Israel. This was the first reason.

As I said, the first reason was that the two super-powers have guaranteed the resolution calling for the cessation of firing and the immediate

¹¹⁸ Broadcast by Cairo radio in Arabic; excerpted from the English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4439/A/7-12; reprinted by permission.

implementation of Resolution 242 which, first of all, provides for withdrawal. They have guaranteed this. They have guaranteed the cease-fire and the initiation of talks at the peace conference to implement Resolution 242—Resolution 242—which is clear; its first clause provides for withdrawal.

The second reason for accepting the cease-fire, in addition to the two super-powers' guarantees of this cease-fire and the immediate implementation of the resolution, is that frankly I do not fight against America. I fought Israel for 11 days. As the Israeli Defence Minister said yesterday, his ammunition would have run out in three days. This was also my assessment. But I am not prepared to fight America.

There was reaction to the cease-fire in this country, in the Arab nation and within our armed forces. But these are the reasons just as I am giving them. It is for these two reasons that I accepted the cease-fire.

In the military situation, there was this question of the wedge in the Deversoir area. In those 11 days everything was taking place in the east, then the new weapons arrived.

This operation reminds me of a similar one which took place about the end of the second world war. The attack was called the Ardennes attack. The Allies had closed in on Germany. Then one day the weather forecast said the weather would not be good for flying. The Germans launched a suicidal operation and drove a huge wedge between the allied forces. It was a huge, suicidal operation. Acting on that famous Goebbels formula, the Germans wove a big story. Actually, Germany's fate was decided before that attack. Germany was finished, but it still carried out that desperate attack.

This was what happened. The Deversoir operation was exactly the same operation. It was a desperate operation. They came to the west bank for the purpose of causing confusion in the German fashion, as I told you. We noticed that Israel had adopted the Nazi mentality in all its actions, even in regard to the Bar Lev line they had set up to face us and the other lines behind it. It was exactly like the so-called Atlantic Wall. The Bar Lev line was the first wall followed by three other lines behind it. It was exactly like the situation in Normandy. They borrowed German methods and Goebbels's propaganda methods as well.

They created the Deversoir gap. It was a suicidal operation like that of the Ardennes attack. It was, in fact, a small affair. We do not deny that there were errors on our part. The main purpose and aim of all this was for it to be a psychological and political operation rather than a military operation so that they could weave the big story that they have been weaving in the past five or six days. They created a major uproar in Europe saying that they were about 50 kilometres or miles from Cairo, that they were on the west side and so forth. It was a huge psychological warfare operation to draw the attention of the whole world to the Israeli military.

The Israeli militarists themselves know better than anyone else that the wedge existing today, the pocket existing today on the west bank, is no more than a pocket. As a result the Israeli militarists exploited the cease-fire. They violated the cease-fire after we had accepted it and advanced so that they could say: We are about 50 miles from Cairo. We are on the west bank and are occupying so many square miles. We have seized a town, etc., etc., so they can make up for the Egyptian crossing and the storming of the Bar Lev line.

Our forces in the east, whether in the Second or Third Armies, are standing firm. The Israeli operation was no more than a psychological warfare operation. They tried to create a military victory out of it. It was a desperate operation, the aims of the operation are no more than psychological and political ones.

Now they say that they have cut off Third Army's lines of communication and that they have encircled Third Army. Just for your information, Third Army is not only on the east [bank]. Third Army hold a sector in the east and a larger sector in the west. They know what part of Third Army is facing them in the west. The positions are intermingled. In the east there is Third Army. So they came behind in the west. Behind them directly is the rest of Third Army, or the major part of it. The positions are intermingled, but they wanted to claim: We have taken the west bank and encircled Third Army.

The story of Third Army has been exploited in the Goebbels manner. As I have told you, Third Army has occupied positions and stands as firm as a rock on the east bank—that is, a part of Third Army. The major part is in the west

behind the Israelis. They know this, but they carried out the operation after the cease-fire and put me in a dilemma. Because, with the major part of Third Army behind them in the west, I could storm my way through and finish off all these people between the east and the west, between the two flanks of the army, but we had committed ourselves to the cease-fire and were embarking on a new affair.

Let me show why this happened. Four or five days ago, they woke me up. There was a message from Brezhnev, the Secretary of the USSR Communist Party, who is a friend. The message was from the British Prime Minister, Mr. Heath, to be conveyed to me through Comrade Brezhnev. The message was indeed conveyed to me. The message said in effect: You [the Egyptians] are blocking Bab al-Mandab and the Red Sea. Abandon this, and we will leave for you what is behind Third Army or the eastern [as heard] flank of Third Army, and we want the release of the prisoners and wounded, and we will leave Third Army's rear.

My military men are urging me and putting fierce pressure on me, because, as I have said, a part of Third Army, the bridgehead in the east, is standing perfectly fast. But it is not the major part. The major part is in the west, and the Israelis are between the two in a thin strip. The Israelis know this and they hear me now. It is a thin strip which can be easily eliminated and wiped out. My military men are urging me on. I do not want to break the cease-fire because I do not want more war or bloodshed. This enables us to understand the scheme for the entire Deversoir operation, the Ardennes operation. [They wanted to say] we are standing here so leave us Bab al-Mandab and the Red Sea and give us the prisoners and then we will leave.

In fact, I replied to Mr. Heath and said that first of all the cease-fire must be observed along the 22nd October line and then I will be prepared for an exchange of wounded and prisoners between us. However, when it comes to Bab al-Mandab, we will talk about it when we talk about steps towards the disengagement of the combatant forces, which we call disengagement. This is if we want to talk about peace. However, if the question is one of you let go and I let go and then each side will seek to improve his position, then by God, the military are putting pressure on me and it is possible that they might put an end to this situation.

I sent to President Nixon and to President [as heard] Brezhnev about this. I told them that the situation could not be tolerated and I cannot sit with my hands folded. Why? Because ending all this is easy for my military personnel and it is in their hands. I have told you that the purpose behind this process is politics.

Discussions on this matter are now taking place in Washington. They asked me in Washington, that is President Nixon asked me, for more time so that we would not lose the cease-fire, so that the issue could be resolved peacefully, and so that Israel would return to the 22nd October line.

Well, now they say it is not known where the 22nd October line is. This matter is simple. On the day of the cease-fire two statements were issued, one by Mrs. Meir and one by us. Mrs. Meir said: We now occupy 70 sq. km. on the west bank. We issued a statement in which we said Israel is indeed on the west bank in certain areas and we are on the east bank in certain areas. We were specific. These two statements were issued on 22nd [October]. The statements were issued at that time.

Well, these are the boundaries of the 22nd. Mrs. Meir says 70 sq. km. on the west bank. No. I give her 10 more. Let her take another 10 sq.km. from me above what she said. This is no problem. This is an enclave. It is doomed and this is known in military circles. But is the objective to talk about the 22nd October line, about prisoners who were taken on 22nd October or before or after that, about Bab al-Mandab, about what we should leave for you, or do we want peace?

If peace is what is required, then we want peace. I am putting pressure on and restraining my military personnel with great difficulty, because they want to settle this matter and this entire problem. Settling it is easy and the Israelis know this. They know that settling it is easy. I reveal what the Israelis said. This is exposed and verbatim so that I will tell them, and they hear me now [as heard]. They told each other that their position, verbatim, is fragile. They hear me now.

My military personnel are asking me [to continue to fight] but I say let us not break the cease-fire. Let us not have more war. We want to proceed towards solving [the issue]. This is the reason for Isma'il Fahmi's visit to Washington. Presidents Brezhnev and Nixon are aware of all the details of this, minute by minute.

This is the military situation. There is one more

point about the military situation. They went to Suez. The Goebbels of Tel Aviv announced that they had occupied Suez. They also took a picture of Mrs. Meir near one of the oil tanks in Suez. For three days they tried to occupy Suez but could not.

The UNEF commander entered Suez. He announced that there was nobody at all in Suez, that it has not been occupied, and that Suez is in Egyptian hands. They wanted to occupy one of the canal towns, particularly Suez because the Canal is named after it. [They tried] for three days. Suez town's resistance and the number of tanks it destroyed merits great praise. The resistance prevented the Israelis from occupying an inch of Suez town.

The Israelis stayed out near Zaytiah. They brought Mrs. Meir and took her picture near one of the Zaytiah oil tanks. This was a psychological operation aimed at shaking us. This would enable them to claim that Suez is finished and that they are marching towards Cairo. This is Goebbel's method of propaganda. This is psychological warfare. No, we will not be affected. Our nerves are very strong. If this situation continues for 10 years, then we will carry on for 10 years because we are asking only for our rights, our land and peace based on justice. We are not asking for anything that belongs to others. We are asking for our land and our rights.

This is the military situation. This was the first point, the military situation. I am sorry for having discussed it at some length. However I have explained to you the cease-fire; or rather first I discussed the battle and then the cease-fire, the reason why I accepted it, the question of the Deversoir enclave, and finally what we have ended up with just now.

The political situation. The second point is the political situation. As you all know, regarding the political situation, the Soviet Premier, Mr. Kosygin, visited me here and talked to me. He talked to me about American and Russian guarantees for the cease-fire decision. He also discussed American and Russian guarantees as regards the need for immediate implementation of Security Council Resolution No. 242. Today you heard about Mr. Kissinger's visit. This was agreed upon between us and the United States four days ago. He will, God willing, arrive on 6th [November]. He will spend one day with us and leave on 7th.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Kuznetsov, arrived here yesterday. We held a long meeting with him in the evening. At the same time, Minister Isma'il Fahmi held a four-hour meeting with the US Secretary of State, Dr. Kissinger, yesterday. Today he will meet President Nixon and will hold another meeting with Dr. Kissinger.

Very soon I will send presidential adviser [as heard] Dr. Zayyat to see President Pompidou of France. I will also send a high-level emissary to President Tito and to Mr. Heath.

As you can see, political action is going on along with all other actions, whether in Washington, Cairo or Western Europe. During the past period I acquainted all my Arab brothers with all the developments that occurred. This has been done through envoys who visited the Arab countries.

This is the political situation. But before I finish talking about the political situation I can say that the USSR, as a friend and as a super-power responsible for world peace, is carrying out its commitments.

I can also say that the United States, despite its intervention after the 11th day and its supply [of weapons] to Israel of what the American army had not yet used, that up to this moment, the US attitude in regard to working for peace is a constructive one. It is so up to this moment.

I am waiting for Mr. Kissinger's visit so that we may lay down the basic principles (Arabic: lamsat) concerning the situation.

Now I will speak of the third point, which is the situation as it is now and its possible development. We understand that Mrs. Meir has left for Washington today. As far as we are concerned, I have told President Nixon and leader Brezhnev that we cannot accept the situation in regard to the pocket in our country as continued under the pretext of the cease-fire. Not in any way. Since we are implementing the cease-fire resolution, which provides for a halt at the line of 22nd October, then by God any measure we take to get to that line would be in implementation of the Security Council Resolution and with the authority of the Security Council.

As I have already said, I am in this respect under pressure from the military. But I have prevented my military from doing anything pending the outcome of events in Washington and Mr. Kissinger's visit. However, I have sent a warning

that should anything happen to my sons on the east bank, I shall not sit on the fence. I shall take the necessary measures called for by the situation.

As I have already said, the situation today is as follows: Mrs. Meir is in Washington. Minister Isma'il Fahmi will meet President Nixon today. He met Mr. Kissinger yesterday and will be meeting him again today. As I have said, the Deputy USSR Foreign Minister, Mr. Kuznetsov, was with me yesterday. All these make up a complete picture, the features of which will become evident within the next few days. As I have accustomed my people and you yourselves [to expect], we will put the whole picture before all to see.

One point remains. Regarding the Arab nation, I wish to say to the world press—as you see, the entire Arab nation stands today to defend its inviolability. It is the right of the whole nation to participate in making its peace—a genuine peace; an unimposed peace; a peace not imposed by force of arms, expansion or by squandering the rights of peoples. Arrogance had gone so far as to ignore the very existence of these peoples.

When I talk about peace I want to make it clear that this peace does not mean a partial or separate solution affecting Egypt alone. No. Quite clearly it means [restoration of] the Egyptian territory, Syrian territory, and the Palestinian people's rights, including their right to self-determination. This is our interpretation of peace.

Please explain to your peoples the attitude of the Arab nation as it uses the energy weapon, oil. It is not in any way directed against any one of your people, nor even against individual Americans whose Government has supplied Israel with modern equipment not yet used even by the United States. The Arab nation is saying: No, I want my right to live. We are saying that we want to make the means of life and peace easier for the whole world, provided we get our rights in this life and peace so that life and peace will not belong to one side only and not to the other. The Arab nation does not wreak vengeance on peoples, on your peoples, nor on individuals. The Arab nation is only demanding its right to live.

I conclude by saying once again that I leave out all the details. If peace is really desired, then we indeed want peace. If there is a true desire for peace, let the Security Council Resolution of 22nd October be respected and completely implemented.

We are prepared to honour all our commitments under it immediately. Let us direct ourselves to the stage of separating the forces, of disengagement [Sadat uses the English word here] so that things will be taken seriously and in order to proceed towards peace. I have said that during this stage we will immediately begin clearing the Suez Canal and I have given my instructions to the [Suez Canal] Authority director to have it ready for international navigation within a period not exceeding four months to make life easier for our brothers in Western Europe and everywhere else, and to open the road for world trade and prosperity.

I thank you. I am prepared to answer your questions.

314

Statement by the PFLP-GC rejecting "surrenderist" settlement proposals put forth after the ceasefire (excerpt)¹¹⁹

November 2, 1973

Struggling masses,

The proposals that have been put forward since the ceasefire was accepted are proposals for a settlement involving surrender, which mean recognition of Israel through direct negotiations with her. They also mean safeguarding the "rights of the Palestinian people" through a statelet intended to control and completely repress the movements of the masses. In this way imperialism and Zionism are preparing an atmosphere favourable to the realization of all their objectives.

Struggling masses,

All the moves that are being made amount to a conspiracy against action by the masses and their progressive forces and against the continued activity of the Arab revolutionary movement.

The regimes' agreement to negotiations will permanently sanction the presence of the Zionist enemy, will consolidate the positions of imperialism and pave the way for a comprehensive change in the area in favour of the political and economic influence of imperialism and Zionism.

¹¹⁹ Translated and excerpted from the Arabic text, *Ila al-Amam* (Beirut), November 9, 1973, p. 10.

The agreement by the opportunist and liquidationist trend in the resistance movement to attend the surrenderist conference is a natural result of the nature of its structure and the character of the bourgeois leaderships. It can only result in the movement of our masses being given the *coup de grace* and their liberation being impeded.

Struggling masses,

Bases of the whole of the resistance,

The attitude of the left in the resistance movement has been clear from the start. It has more than once drawn attention to the conspiracy and has rightly affirmed the necessity of continuing armed struggle and exposing the opportunists and liquidationists; these constant affirmations on behalf of which the revolutionary forces have struggled have been proved true by the suspect moves of certain quarters.

Masses and struggling bases,

We of the Popular Front General Command, in defining our position, take as our basis the goals of the vast masses and the bases of the resistance, with whom and for whom we are struggling.

No! to the ceasefire and acceptance of resolutions 242 and 338.

No! to treasonable negotiations for surrender.

Yes! to continued armed struggle and people's war.

No! to liquidationist solutions and the Palestinian statelet.

Let us struggle against the treacherous opportunists and liquidationists.

Let us reinforce the movement of the masses, the movement of the Arab revolution.

315

Policy statement issued by Fatah rejecting current reassessments of the Palestine question¹²⁰

November 4, 1973

The Fatah movement has held a series of meetings at various organizational levels. These meetings are still in progress and are to study the current situation and its developments at the Palestinian, Arab and international levels. Although the

movement's consultations and meetings within these circles have not yet ended, Fatah wishes to explain the following facts:

1. The Palestine revolution was proclaimed in order to achieve a basic strategic goal, namely the liberation of our usurped homeland and the establishment of a democratic state of Palestine on all our occupied soil. This is the goal for which our people and fighters have struggled and will struggle. They will not abandon this principle, whatever the sacrifices.

2. We in Fatah consider that the current circumstances and the dangers therein require us to study the current issues objectively and to continue our contacts and consultations with all our people within and outside the occupied homeland as well as with our Arab brothers and our friends in the world, so that our decision may be in harmony and agreement with the outcome of these contacts and consultations and so that everybody will bear his historic responsibilities in the present serious circumstances.

3. Among the established facts which the movement can visualize is that there are nationalist Arab regimes which have entered a battle against the Zionist enemy and that there are positive results which must be taken into consideration as a result of this battle. There are also other results which have not yet been determined. Regardless of the current situation of the battle, there are developments that may take place in the situation and require the mobilization of all Arab and Palestinian official and popular efforts to face them. Therefore, we do not approve the issuing of unilateral statements not based on a true and responsible appraisal of the seriousness of the current situation.

4. In this world there are forces friendly to our revolution. We must not oppose them at all. On our part we are proud of the combat relations binding us to them.

5. Fatah asserts that any decision issued by it will be based on the following principled unchanging attitude: (a) the decision should emanate from the national interest of the Palestinian Arab people and the preservation of their legitimate and historic rights; (b) the assertion of the continuation of the development of our people's combat and political presence and the perpetuation of our armed struggle; (c) the preservation of our people's revolutionary achievements and gains

¹²⁰ Broadcast by Voice of Palestine (Cairo); English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4443/A/1; reprinted by permission.

which they have accomplished throughout their long national struggle and their sacrifices of caravans of martyrs; (d) the preservation of the unity of ranks of the Palestine resistance and people internally and abroad and the maintenance of the Palestinian unified attitude.

316

Communiqué issued after a meeting of Arab Oil Ministers announcing a reduction of 25 percent in oil production¹²¹

Kuwait, November 5, 1973

The Arab Oil Ministers met for the second time in the city of Kuwait on 4–5 November 1973 and studied the method of implementation of their first decision and its effects. They took decisions, among them that the reduction in oil production in each Arab country which is a party to the first decision shall be 25 percent of the September production, including quantities deducted as a result of the embargo on oil supplies to the US and the Dutch market. A further reduction amounting to 5 percent of the November output will follow in December provided that such reduction shall not affect the share that any friendly state was importing from any Arab exporting country during the first nine months of 1973.

It was also decided to send the Algerian Minister of Energy and the Saudi Arabian Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources to Western capitals to explain the Arab point of view regarding the two meetings held by the Arab Ministers of Oil.

It was further decided that meetings will be held from time to time in future, as the need arises, to follow up on the implementation of the decisions and their effects.

317

Telegram from King Faisal of Saudi Arabia to President Podgorny of the USSR on the occasion of the 56th anniversary of the Russian revolution¹²²

Riyad, November 7, 1973

On the occasion of your national celebration it gives me pleasure on behalf of the people and government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and of myself to send you our congratulations. With best wishes for Your Excellency's health and happiness and for the progress and success of the Soviet people.

318

Statement issued by the Central Committee of the PDFLP urging solidarity with the Palestine resistance and rejecting any settlement compromising the rights of the Palestinian people (excerpt)¹²³

Early November, 1973

5. The consequences of the October war now pose in an acute form the question of safeguarding the persisting national rights and the vital interests of the Palestinian people in the face of attempts by the imperialists, Zionists and reactionaries to counterfeit these rights and to procure suspect parties claiming the right to self-determination. Imperialism and Zionism, with strong support from Jordanian reaction, are now making frantic attempts to push through a liquidationist settlement at the expense of the Palestinian people's right to self-determination in their own land. They are trying to isolate and destroy the Palestine resistance as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and the national command of their struggle. The nationalist and progressive Palestinian forces are aware that the success of such attempts, for which their enemies are planning,

¹²¹ English text as published in *Middle East Economic Survey* (Beirut), supplement to XVII, 2 (November 2, 1973), pp. 4–5.

¹²² Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Siyasa* (Kuwait), November 8, 1973. This notes the first occasion on which Saudi Arabia sent greetings to the USSR on the anniversary of its revolution. The telegram was sent to coincide with the first day of Secretary of State Kissinger's Middle East tour.

¹²³ This statement was issued on the proceedings of the expanded meeting of the Central Committee of the PDFLP; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Hurriya* (Beirut), November 12, 1973, p. 3.

would lead to the liquidation for many years to come of the nationalist movement of our people and their struggle for their current national rights. It would mean the obliteration of their independent national identity, and also their right to recover their land and build a democratic state in the whole of their national territory.

If this goal is to be kept in view and the Palestinian people's right to fight for it is to be maintained, then we are faced at the present juncture with an urgent task. We must establish the right of the Palestine resistance to be the sole legitimate representative of our oppressed people. We must enjoin continued recognition of it as being such at the practical level. We must frustrate all attempts by imperialism and Jordanian reaction to procure suspect quarters that arrogate to themselves this right and make every effort to deprive our people of their right to self-determination.

Our people and all the peoples of the Arab nation will strenuously resist any settlement made at the expense of the national rights of our people to liberate their land and to self-determination in that land in full freedom. The Palestine resistance movement, which has constantly affirmed its determination to continue the struggle for our people's historical right to the whole of their land, now bears the responsibility for leading the struggle of our Palestinian masses in the occupied territories to their urgent right to end the occupation, to safeguard their freedom to decide their destiny and to impose their national sovereignty, as a full and undiminished nation, in their land.

All Arab and friendly forces are called on to resolutely support these national rights of our people, to support the struggle of the Palestine resistance to recover them and to frustrate all hostile conspiracies aimed at disregarding or liquidating them.

It is the duty of the Palestine resistance movement and its nationalist and progressive forces, at this decisive stage in the history of our people, to rise to this historic responsibility, to reinforce their national unity and close their ranks. This action will ensure that the national rights of our people are recovered, that their national interests are complied with, and that the manoeuvres and conspiracies of reactionary and suspect forces against these rights and interests are frustrated.

The right of the Palestinian people to self-

determination and the right of the Palestine resistance to represent the national will of our people must be set above all differences.

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Cable from President Assad of Syria to the OAU Council of Ministers expressing gratitude for the OAU's support against Israel¹²⁴

Damascus, November 11, 1973

To the President of the Council of Ministers of the Organization for African Unity, Addis Ababa,

On the occasion of the Council of Ministers of the Organization for African Unity's meeting in its first session since the Arab war of liberation, it gives me pleasure to send to you, and through you to the friendly African countries, my sincerest greetings and truest wishes for your success.

I also take this opportunity of expressing, on behalf of the Syrian Arab Republic, profuse thanks and the profound appreciation of the honourable attitude adopted by the countries of Africa in support of the Arab cause. This attitude was an indication of how thoroughly the African countries understand our just cause and realize that the conflict between our nation and Israel is a conflict between good and evil, between justice and injustice, between freedom and oppression, and that the victory of the Arab cause in this conflict is a victory for the principles in which the countries of Africa believe and for which they are struggling.

We also believed this when our forces entered the battle on October 6 to repel the aggression, to liberate the occupied Arab territory and to recover the usurped rights of the Palestinian people, for we believe that our struggle is a common one with the peoples of Africa and that the enemies of the African peoples are our enemies, too.

Security Council Resolution 338 stopped the fighting and outlined the way to a solution, but it did not put an end to the war because Israel is still trying, by craft and deception, to continue her occupation of Arab territory, to defy world public opinion and the United Nations' resolutions and in

¹²⁴ Translated from the text, *al-Thawra* (Damascus), November 20, 1973.

this way to cover up the defeats she has sustained on the field of battle.

Although we abide by the Security Council resolutions we are in a state of preparedness and alert to continue the struggle by all means for the achievement of our just aims, confident of the continued support of our African brothers.

I reiterate my best wishes for success in your endeavours.

Hafiz Assad

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Memorandum from the PFLP to the PLO Executive Committee opposing PLO participation in a Middle East peace conference based on Security Council Resolution 242 (excerpt)¹²⁵

Mid-November, 1973

Therefore any participation by the Palestine Liberation Organization in a conference based on resolution 242 would obviously mean that the Palestine Liberation Organization was prepared to take part in a conference one of whose aims was to ensure the continued existence of Israel within secure frontiers.

To the extent that resolution 242 puts an end to the 1967 aggression, or part of it, it establishes the international legality of the 1948 aggression. It is also clear, in the light of the present balance of forces, that Israel and imperialism will never withdraw from the territories occupied in the June 5 war in return for a piece of paper that can be torn up at any moment. To believe this is mere wishful thinking. Far from being content with a piece of paper, imperialism will, as resolution 242 stipulates, insist on a series of material and immaterial measures: demilitarized zones, an international presence, recognition, economic interchange, and so on, on the basis of an unambiguous passage in resolution 242—the legality of Israel's existence and her right to live, and the need to take action to achieve a permanent and guaranteed peace in the area.

On this basis any participation by the Liberation Organization in a conference based on resolution 242 cannot be regarded as an attempt to win a

tactical victory that would help us to win a strategic victory. On the contrary, the result of our participation, as has happened on certain occasions in the history of certain political forces, would be the winning of a partial victory in return for the actual and total relinquishment of the strategic goal.

On this basis, too, calls for realism, tactics, wisdom, deliberation, prudence, and other such veiled expressions, clearly mean surrender.

321

Statement by the Arab Front Participating in the Palestine Revolution expressing suspicion of US policy, calling for continued struggle and rejecting any partial settlement¹²⁶

Beirut, November 15, 1973

The nationalist war fought by the Arab armies and the forces of the Palestine resistance, which enjoy the most extensive support on the part of the Arab masses, has opened the way to an effective Arab confrontation of the Zionist enemy and American imperialism which, if it is able to continue the mobilization of all forces and resources, is capable of making the Israeli-American alliance retreat and of inflicting further defeats on it.

In this connection it must be emphasized that Israel and her ally, the United States of America, are now trying to implement a plan aimed at outflanking the gains achieved by the October war by promoting proposals and partial liquidation solutions whose object is to impose surrender on the Arab peoples.

The Secretariat-General of the Arab Front Participating in the Palestine Revolution has the highest opinion of the resources available to the Arab nation in its confrontation of the Israeli-American alliance, and is aware that the Arab and world situation have never been more favourable than they are today for resolute and long-term struggle against Zionist usurpation and imperialist domination. But it also sees clearly that the battle has not yet ended and that the Israeli-American attack which is continuing in all its forms calls for a higher degree of vigilance, preparedness

¹²⁵ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Hadaf* (Beirut), November 17, 1973, p. 3.

¹²⁶ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Anba'* (Beirut), November 16, 1973.

and mobilization of forces for the frustration of attempts to perpetuate the consequences of Zionist aggression, to liquidate the national rights of the Palestinian Arab people and to subject the area to the influence and the hegemony of the forces of the Israeli-American alliance.

America is trying to call out all the forces linked to it in the Arab area with the object of pushing through these projects, and in this sphere the reactionary Jordanian regime is playing the role of the spearhead aimed at the breast of the Palestinian people and all the Arab peoples. Kissinger's announcement of the leading role which Jordan is to play in solving the Middle East problem is but one of the many indications of the deal that the Jordanian regime is preparing to conclude as an American-Israeli tool that is being used to liquidate the national rights of the Palestinian people, to obliterate their national identity and to strike a blow at their national march towards liberation.

In the light of its appreciation of all these facts, the Secretariat-General resolves the following:

1. That continuation of the struggle by all available means and in all fields—military and economic—is the right and most advantageous way to repel the continuing American-Israeli attack and to frustrate projects aimed at coercing the Arab peoples once more. This requires continued and increased mobilization of forces and resources for the liberation of the occupied Arab territories and the protection of the national rights of the Palestinian people.

2. To reject all settlements involving the liquidation of the national rights of the Palestinian people or aimed at invalidating their right to continue their armed, political and mass struggle, for the full liberation of the soil of their homeland.

3. To resist all attempts to deprive the Palestinian people of their right to self-determination and to return to their homeland either by imposing tutelage on them or by manufacturing bogus sources which claim to speak on their behalf; to affirm that the Palestine Liberation Organization is the sole legitimate representative of the just Palestinian people and to call on nationalist forces and regimes and all the Arab masses to play an effective role in preventing the implementation of the American-Israeli plan in which the Jordanian royalist regime is playing a leading role, and whose object is the total liquidation of the

Palestine problem.

4. To continue the struggle for the more thorough organization of the use of Arab oil as an effective weapon in the battle and to escalate the measures being taken within this framework towards the nationalization of all American oil interests in the Arab area.

5. To support the Conference of the International Federation of Arab Trade Unions as regards the economic and political boycott of the United States and states hostile to the nationalist battle of the Arabs, and to withdraw Arab credits from American banks.

6. To emphasize the unity of all Arab forces engaged in the struggle as the only basis for ensuring the maintenance of an atmosphere favourable to the mobilization and concentration of forces and Arab solidarity which ensures the employment of all energies in the battle, and to stress the importance and necessity of full Arab participation in all problems and matters of destiny.

7. To salute all friendly forces throughout the world, and in particular the USSR and the other socialist countries which have stood beside the Arab people in the battle of destiny, and to commend the attitude of the African countries who lost no time in severing their relations with Israel within the framework of support for the Arab struggle.

8. The Secretariat-General of the Arab Front Participating in the Palestine Revolution calls on all branches of the Front and all member organizations to organize an extensive campaign of mass activity of all kinds: to raise the level of awareness, preparedness and mobilization in the ranks of the Arab masses and to escalate support for the Palestine resistance movement in its struggle of destiny at this decisive stage.

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Statement by Foreign Minister Naffaa of Lebanon outlining Lebanon's attitude to the Arab-Israeli conflict (excerpt)¹²⁷

Beirut, November 15, 1973

1. I do not need to reaffirm that Lebanon is in complete solidarity with the Arab bloc as regards the Arab-Israeli conflict. We are part of that bloc; what is good for it is good for us, and what is bad for it is bad for us. The principle of Arab solidarity is one of the foundations on which our foreign policy has been based since the dawn of independence; we have never departed from it nor shall we ever depart from it. The visits and contacts that are being arranged in present circumstances are a manifestation of this solidarity whose goal is the coordination of our attitudes with those of our brothers.

2. When the fighting started on October 6 the government decided that it had two duties to perform. The first was to protect the southern frontier so as to maintain the integrity of our territory and to prevent Israel from making any military attempt to encircle the rear of the Syrian army fighting in Golan. Measures were taken to this end and constant contact with the Syrians was ensured.

The second duty was that we should give Syria all possible support. This we did silently and without publicity. We deserve no credit of thanks for this; what we gave was trivial as compared with what our brothers have given and suffered.

3. At the Arab level, there are three principal goals we are striving to achieve in cooperation with the other Arab countries: first, the complete evacuation of Israeli forces from all the occupied Arab territories, second, to see that everything necessary is done to guarantee the Palestinian people the exercise of their political and national rights and, third, to restore Arab Jerusalem to Arab sovereignty.

4. Here I want to make it clear that it is not for Lebanon to have definitive views on the course to be followed in solving the problem of the Palestinian people, nor on the details of such a solution; it is for the Palestinian people themselves to decide. All we desire for them—and in this we are resolved

to support them—is that this solution may be a just one and that the Palestinians may be content with it and have confidence in it. For we believe that the problem of the Palestinian people is the basis of the present conflict in the Middle East and that it is no good solving the other aspects of this conflict as long as the problem of the Palestinian people is not completely solved.

5. At the purely Lebanese level, our first aim in the present situation is to maintain the integrity of our territories. We all know that Israel has designs on our land and our water. We believe that our frontiers are definitive international frontiers over which there can be neither discussion nor negotiation and that our waters are internal waters which are no concern to anyone else. I am pleased to announce here that the great powers share this view of ours and support us in this attitude.

6. The only document regulating our position vis-a-vis Israel is the 1949 Armistice Agreement. We shall continue to abide by it, making sure that our actions and our attitudes conform to its provisions. If there are in fact general negotiations in which all parties concerned take part, and if the aim of such negotiations, as is to be expected, is to regulate the affairs of the area and establish its security and stability on firm foundations, the government, in conformity with the provisions of the armistice—which is, as is well known, a temporary arrangement—and in observance of the country's higher interests, believes that duty requires of it to make Lebanon's voice heard, to defend her rights and to support the attitudes of the other Arab countries.

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Message from President Qadhafi of Libya to President Sadat of Egypt criticizing the latter's policy on the war¹²⁸

Tripoli, November 15, 1973

Greetings, Mr. President: You were great when you assumed Abd an-Nasir's burden. You addressed us in those sad hours and said: The Arab

¹²⁷ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), November 16, 1973.

¹²⁸ Broadcast by Tripoli radio in Arabic; English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4453/A/1-2; reprinted by permission.

nation needs a courageous stand to achieve victory. You were also great when you assumed responsibility and issued the decision to attack to liberate the land.

All this was not strange to me personally because I had studied closely the story of the pioneer 23rd July revolution and found that you were a courageous soldier of that revolution. I also recall your patriotic adventure with the German spies (?Edler) and (?Tan), your patriotic adventure with the German aircraft and Aziz al-Masri and also the car incident. I also recall your patriotic adventure with Hasan al-Banna, the attempt to assassinate Aminah Uthman, your dismissal from the army in the month of Ramadan while you were serving in the Western Desert, your imprisonment in the foreigners' prison, and finally your escape from prison disguised as a masked lorry driver to continue the struggle by every means.

Mr. President, you are confident of yourself and you have led an eventful life. All your decisions and initiatives, including the 1973 war and the 1973 peace, were made by you in full confidence, although these decisions violated Article 14 paragraph B of the Constitution of the Federation of Arab Republics, which was approved in a referendum by 40,000,000 citizens.

I am also confident, Mr. President, that you can handle the situations facing you immediately. But since I do not have the legal power to participate in Egypt's and Syria's political affairs except through the Constitution of the Federation of Arab Republics and the Federation's Presidential Council, and whereas this Constitution and all the jurisdictions of the Federation were absolutely ignored except by the Libyan Arab Republic, and whereas the decisions of war and peace were made contrary to this Constitution and in the absence of the above Council, I feel in such circumstances that I am addressing you as an Arab citizen from North Africa.

I am expressing the feelings of the millions of Arab citizens when I say: The crossing of the Canal and the storming of the Bar Lev line in the north and the south honoured the Arab nation before it honoured Egypt. The storming of the Golan at the beginning of the fighting was a firm assurance of the ability and courage of the Arab soldier in confronting his enemy, although this enemy was armed with the staff of Moses on the left and the bombs of Nixon on the right. This did

not need confirmation and the war did not break out to prove it. The war broke out to liberate the land occupied in 1967.

Mr. President, we lost new land in this war on both fronts but we inflicted heavy losses in life and damage to equipment on the enemy. We made the decision to attack for the first time and we fought bravely. We also accepted the cease-fire and thus gave the enemy the opportunity to make up for his losses in arms and manpower. We recognized Israel in principle and accepted direct negotiations. Thus we will naturally conclude peace (Arabic: *sulh*) with Israel. These things have become clear to the whole world. It has become an accomplished and understood fact, although it is not comprehended by the Arabs.

Mr. President, although we fought to regain the land which was occupied in 1967, we then accepted the cease-fire without liberating it. And although we only fought to restore dignity, we then accepted this dignity humiliated at Kilometre 101.

We would like to know the value of all this, Mr. President, the value of the war decision and the thousands of martyrs, the value of the whole Arab nation's participation in the battle, the value of victory, the value of arms, the value of men, and finally, the value of life itself.

Mr. President, I will be the last to lose confidence in you when others doubt you, I and your people in the Libyan Arab Republic will be the last to desert you when you are deserted by others. But I will be the first to expose you when others believe in you, I will do so acting on the tradition of the Prophet—may the peace and blessings of God be upon him—who said: Support your brother whether he is just or unjust. When the Prophet was asked: How could this be? He said: If he is unjust forbid him, and if he is just vindicate him. The Prophet—may the peace and blessings of God be upon him—also said: Your brother is the one who is honest with you, not the one who believes you.

Mr. President, I disagree with those who denounce your free political activities and who disapprove of the resumption of relations with the United States and others, and of Kissinger's visit, because I do not even distinguish between the names Kissinger and Kosygin, I do not lose my nerve when the enemy seizes the west bank of the Canal and even if Cairo were to fall or when the enemy occupies more land on the Golan. I have

studied history and I know that this is possible. Such things were no disgrace to nations which continued the struggle to achieve their rights.

But I strongly and in an unprecedented manner denounce the cessation of the fighting, which should have continued even if it developed into hand-to-hand fighting. The fighting was stopped to achieve one of two things—either capitulation to the enemy, giving him all the lands he occupied from 1948 to 1967, or conditional and partial withdrawal. Both of these things, Mr. President, have become an established fact although you certainly do not accept them. You do not accept either of them, but they have become an established fact.

I denounce, Mr. President, in fact I am very indignant at what is taking place at Kilometre 101. I cannot sleep, Mr. President, while all these things are taking place at Kilometre 101. I may sleep but it is a disturbed sleep. Every value has been violated at Kilometre 101. But every value can be revived at this very point. I do not mean the land, of course, but the incident.

You would be even greater, Mr. President, if you had fought the war even with swords and if we lived in the mountains, forests and the desert without oil, electricity, towns, shelters and politics, but with dignity, chivalry, religion and Arabism. The whole land and buildings might fall but not our honour. The dialogue will be continued.

Your brother, Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi

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Press interview statements by War Minister Ismail of Egypt discussing aspects of the war in Sinai¹²⁹

Cairo, mid-November, 1973

Q. I want to ask you—and I hope you will excuse my being frank—why our overall attack was not developed as fast as some experts believe it should have been. These experts believe that the amazing success of the crossing was not exploited fast enough, and there are many questions to be asked in this connection: Did we plan only for the great prelude to the crossing? Were we unable to see

opportunities when they were offered? Were we slower than we should have been, or what did happen exactly?

A. All these questions must be asked, and I see no harm in their being asked, even for them to be answered in full we shall have to wait until we are less sensitive about security and can open our files and submit the picture of what happened for thorough study. I am sure that they will have useful lessons to teach us.

But I want to answer some of these questions at once, and I shall take the points you raised in your question one at a time.

Did we plan only for the crossing? Of course not. We had a much more extensive plan—we had to, since war is a dialogue between plan and plan, firing power and firing power, ability to move and ability to move.

It is unreasonable to suppose that we planned to take one step only and then come to a stop, without knowing how to continue the dialogue of plan, firing power and movement.

Of course the crossing operation engaged a large part of our attention, because it was the first step, because it was a step we had studied in all its details, because we knew we were going to start with it and this was the advantage of taking the initiative.

After that, what? There were many possibilities, all of which we had studied. We had made every possible calculation regarding them, but in the end everything depended on what the enemy was going to do. Thus the crossing was in itself a complete step, and what came after it had been covered by the plan. But the choice of possibilities depended on the enemy's reaction.

Were we unable to see opportunities when they were offered?

As far as I was concerned, it was not a question of opportunities, but of calculations, and whatever opportunities seemed to be offered to us it was essential that I should take no risks. We started the operation under the protection of the famous missile network, and if I was to advance after that, whether or not others, or I myself, saw opportunities, I had to wait until I was sure that my forces were sufficiently protected in the rear, and I had to give the tanks and the mobile anti-aircraft missiles the chance to come in.

Our air force has made heroic efforts. But if I had made my forces take the opportunity that people are talking about, without my defences

¹²⁹ Interview conducted by *al-Ahram's* editor, Muhammad Hasanayn Haikal; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), November 18, 1973.

against enemy air superiority being ready, this would have meant that I had thrown the whole of the burden on the air force and given it a task it was incapable of performing at a time when I knew that difficult hours still lay ahead of us.

Were we slower than we should have been? I do not know. What I do know is that I stuck to the plan—the basic plan, I mean—which provided for a pause for retrenchment after crossing and after the bridgeheads had been secured—a pause in which I could reappraise the situation in the light of the enemy's reaction and get ready for the next step, take the necessary precautionary measures as regards the next step, and advance.

The pause for retrenchment was not a period of rest. It was a period of receiving and repelling enemy counter-attacks; and let us not forget that during that period of receiving, repelling and destroying enemy counter-attacks we destroyed 500 tanks, which was no mean feat.

In spite of that—and I do not think that I am disclosing a secret that is unknown to the enemy—we were obliged to make an extensive attack before the right time came. Our object in this was to relieve the pressure on Syria. There were huge tank battles outside the cover of the missiles, and when I saw that we had forced the enemy to withdraw some of his forces that were operating on the Syrian front, in addition to diverting his air effort from there and in addition to his speeding up the deployment of his reserves on our front, I preferred to return to the bridgeheads and continue to support them so as to make them a rock on which the enemy's counter-attacks would be smashed.

Q. I want to ask you again—I hope you will excuse my insistence—were we more traditional than we should have been?

A. You have yourself seen and heard appraisals of the crossing operation by world experts. I want to ask you if this crossing was a traditional operation. Those who heard me talking to the troops know that the thing I most warned against was being traditional.

I did not want us to be traditional, but at the same time I did not want us to be adventurous. War is something much bigger than adventurism.

Q. Then let me ask you about the gap. How did it happen? Why did we let it happen? Why were the

official statements about it contradictory? Why did we play it down as we did? At the start we said that seven tanks had infiltrated at night. Then we said that we had burned most of them. Then we said that we had called on the rest of them to surrender or be destroyed. Then suddenly our statements started talking about the fighting on both banks of the Suez Canal.

There was a military problem, but there was also a psychological and information problem. From the military point of view the operation was clearly a shock to our hopes of victory, and from the psychological point of view it was clearly a shock to our confidence in what we were told.

A. I will start with the second point. I am with you all along the line that the way our statements dealt with the gap left much to be desired and was not in accordance with the method I followed from the first moment of the war—that we should say nothing but the truth.

I want you to realize right away that never for a moment has it been my intention to say anything about the gap, or to allow anyone else to say anything about it, other than the truth.

This means that what we said in the great majority of cases reflected the picture as we saw it. I admit that our view of the picture was confused for many reasons, but we tried to say what we saw.

I knew from the start that a great part of success in the war depended to a great extent on people having confidence in what we said we were doing, and I therefore demanded strict adherence to this principle in the framing of communiqués.

There were many complaints about the paucity of official communiqués and the scantiness of the information published about the fighting, but I had laid down two principles:

1. That we should say all we could without disclosing our plans and our situation to the enemy. Perhaps we were somewhat pedantic about this, but it is my view that it is better to be pedantic than voluble, especially in matters related to war.

2. That what we said must be true or—let me be frank with you—it must be near the truth.

So much for the psychological aspect of dealing with the gap. I now return to the military aspect, and here too I say frankly that our picture of what really happened was confused for a number of reasons.

The first information I received of the operation, which I found awaiting me when I returned from

the session of the National Assembly on October 16, mentioned small numbers of amphibious tanks having infiltrated and stated that, in the view of our local command at the place where the infiltration had taken place, they could rapidly be destroyed. In fact the local commander did give orders to a strike battalion to confront them.

This was one reason. Another was that information was interrupted as a result of considerations related to a shuffle of responsibilities we carried out in certain commands because of unforeseen circumstances.

A third reason was that the enemy managed to conceal his infiltrating tanks in the area of the gap, which is an area of fruit orchards which made concealment easier in the critical stages at the start of his operation.

A fourth reason was that the enemy was desperately anxious to open this gap, so that he threw his whole weight into it and was prepared to sustain any losses to achieve his objective. He probably wanted to force us to withdraw some of our forces on the east bank to confront his operation on the west bank, and this I did not want to do. I have perhaps said that I had evidence which assured me that the enemy had failed in his first attempt to open the gap and was about to drop it. This is when we broadcasted that we had destroyed the enemy's infiltrating forces. But he later made a last effort because he knew that if it succeeded its success would have a psychological effect on himself, on us and on the world, greater than the military value of this action.

There was a fifth reason which was confirmed by later events. This was that the enemy knew that the ceasefire resolution was going to be adopted and saw that this resolution and its implementation would provide him with safeguards in the dangerous adventure which he had embarked upon and which, because his forces were spread out on the west bank and deliberately dispersed for the psychological effect of a guerrilla war with tanks, he could not maintain for long.

Related to this fifth reason is the fact that the enemy not only made the anticipated ceasefire resolution a safeguard for his operation, but also, as we have seen, when it was adopted, exploited it to enable him to maintain his position in the gap, which he could only have done at the cost of terrible sacrifices had the fighting continued.

We accepted the ceasefire resolution because

of more far-reaching reasons and greater considerations than the operation in the gap.

The enemy exploited the ceasefire resolution and we knew what he was doing. You may recall that I warned against the enemy's perfidy in the light of the experiences of 1948, 1956 and 1967—but we should not be human if we did not realize that the word "ceasefire" has an effect on warring forces.

All the same, the forces were alerted; we succeeded in encircling the gap area and we tried to exert pressure on it by all available means.

Let me briefly and frankly say this on the subject of the gap.

I do not want and I shall not try to give people a picture different from the true one as we see it.

I admit that this gap was an abnormal period for the local forces, for many reasons, all of which we shall examine carefully with a view to learning their causes.

All the same, can this gap affect the value of what we achieved?

Q. What is your estimate of the enemy's losses?

A. Let me quote the American estimates. These estimates enumerate Israeli losses as follows:

3,000 killed—in my view, judging by what I saw with my own eyes, this is less than half the real figure.

20,000 wounded—this figure is about right.

970 tanks—this is more than half of the armoured forces with which Israel started the war.

150 planes—the evidence and the documents at our disposal show that the enemy's losses in planes were much greater than this. Perhaps the American sources were reckoning losses in American planes only.

Q. What is your estimate of our losses?

A. I know exactly what our losses were, there is no question of an estimate, but I do not want to talk about them now. Suffice it to say that our losses were not commensurate with what we achieved. All the world estimates of our possible losses in the crossing operation alone were between 25,000 and 30,000. But this was not the case, thank God. Overall, I can say that our total losses, taken together with all that we achieved in the war, were less than our losses in 1967 when unfortunately we achieved nothing.

Perhaps I should here add something on our prisoners-of-war. On October 16, with all that we had achieved by our war against the enemy,

there were not more than sixty or seventy prisoners in his hands, most of them strike forces brought down behind the enemy lines. These fought with the greatest ferocity, continued firing until their ammunition gave out and resisted until they were completely surrounded. But according to the enemy's figures, there are large numbers of other prisoners-of-war in his hands. Where did they come from? The simple answer is that they were captured after the gap operation, when the enemy encircled certain logistic units and rounded up numbers of the peasant inhabitants of the area, taking them as hostages, not prisoners.

Q. What is the Egyptian theory of security? Or let me put the question in another way: Do you think that there is an Egyptian theory of security apart from an Arab one?

A. The Egyptian theory of security must be an Arab one—can you not see that?

Q. I have always subscribed to the view that there can be no life and no future for Egypt outside an Arab framework. I therefore believe in the existence of an Arab theory of security and an Arab theory of prosperity—an Arab theory of security along the line, longitudinally, from Aleppo to Aden and an Arab theory of prosperity, latitudinally, from Basra to Casablanca.

A. Arab security is indivisible and there can only be one theory of that security.

Q. How do you define the Arab theory of security?

A. That the Arab nation should constantly be strong enough to decide things for itself in the present and the future in accordance with its own will without fear of any threat advancing on it from without or being sown in its heart from within.

But to attain this we must ensure that there is a single strategy that precisely determines for us who is our present enemy and who are our possible future enemies that lies within the framework of what we are planning for.

This will enable us to build up the unified military strength we require. By unified military strength I do not mean that we should have one army; that depends on political circumstances which are not my province.

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Article by the PLO's London representative Hammami suggesting principles for Palestinian participation in a Middle East peace conference¹³⁰

London, November 16, 1973

Ever since the infamous Balfour Declaration was issued in 1917, the rights of the Palestinian people have been ignored and betrayed. The Declaration was issued without any consultation with the inhabitants of Palestine and without their consent. It promised that nothing should be done which might "prejudice the civil and religious rights" of the Palestinians. That promise was broken. Not only were their rights prejudiced, but their whole national identity was destroyed in the process.

On November 29, 1947, the General Assembly of the United Nations decided to partition Palestine without the consent and against the wishes of the Palestinians. This decision was a denial of the basic right of the Palestinians to self-determination—a right which is inherent in the Charter of the United Nations.

The decision was wrong in principle. It was also manifestly unjust in its practical aspects. The proposed Arab state under the partition resolution comprised only 42.88 per cent of the territory—and that the least fertile parts—although the Palestinians had a majority of two-to-one in the population and owned more than 94 per cent of the land. Even in the proposed Jewish state, there was a majority of Arabs over Jews. The Palestinians were entirely within their rights in opposing this unlawful decision by the United Nations.

The United Nations made no provision for the implementation of its decision. That was left to the Hagana and the Irgun who, with the support of the United States and other powers, attacked the defenceless Palestinian population from December, 1947, onwards. They turned nearly one million Palestinians into homeless refugees, seized four-fifths of their land and destroyed their national identity.

In 1948 the United Nations General Assembly promised the Palestinian refugees that they would be given the choice of returning to their homes or

¹³⁰ *The Times* (London), November 16, 1973, p. 20.

of receiving compensation for their property and help in resettling elsewhere. That resolution has been reaffirmed year after year at every regular session of the United Nations, but has never been fulfilled. Israel has refused to allow the Palestinians to return, and has seized their property without compensation and used it to accommodate Jewish immigrants supplanting the Palestinians in their own land.

In November, 1967, after the June war, the Security Council outlined in its Resolution 242 the elements of a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The resolution made no mention of the Palestinian people as such. Their rights received no acknowledgement beyond a reference to the need to achieve "a just settlement of the refugee problem". This was a flagrant disregard of the human and national rights of a whole people.

Since 1967, there has been a reassertion by the Palestinians themselves of their rights through armed struggle. Israeli leaders have responded by denying in insulting fashion the rights and even the existence of the Palestinians. The Israel Prime Minister says: "There was no such thing as Palestinians. They did not exist." The Israel Foreign Minister says: "They have no role to play."

The response of the world community has been different. There has been a growing recognition throughout the world of the need to take account of the rights of the Palestinians. In November, 1970, the General Assembly in its Resolution 2628 (XXV) reaffirmed the Security Council's Resolution of November, 1967, but significantly added to it that the Assembly "recognizes that respect for the rights of the Palestinians is an indispensable element in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East".

Addressing the General Assembly in December last year, the United Kingdom Permanent Representative at the United Nations said: "Our thoughts about the shape of a final settlement must also be focused on the fate of the (Palestinian) refugees. The fate of these helpless and homeless people who have suffered so much lies at the heart of the Middle East problem, or the Palestinian problem as it could still perhaps more meaningfully be called. We must show the hundreds of thousands of (Palestinian) refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and elsewhere that the world has not forgotten them. We must take note of, and action on,

their legitimate aspirations which must not be overlooked in any final settlement."

All Palestinians read or heard with high appreciation the way Britain put their question in front of the world. The Executive Committee of the Palestinian Liberation Organization saw this as an important achievement of the sacrifices and resistance of the Palestinians.

The United States and Russia made a joint move towards a hopeful gesture and showed a new understanding of the Palestinian question when President Nixon and Mr. Brezhnev singled out the restoration of the "legitimate interests of the Palestinian people" as a necessity for a lasting peace in the Middle East.¹³¹

This new world-wide understanding of the Palestine question was further demonstrated when the heads of state of 74 non-aligned countries met in Algeria last September and gave Mr. Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the PLO, an enthusiastic reception when he addressed the conference as the representative of the Palestinian people. There was strong support for the idea of accepting Palestine as a fully fledged member.

President Sadat, in his speech to the Egyptian Parliament on October 16,¹³² made a courageous and realistic attempt to break the vicious circle of violence by proposing a framework for a comprehensive Middle East settlement through an international peace conference. As a contribution to his peace efforts, I would like to put forward the following principles:

1. That the right of the Palestinians to participate in any forthcoming peace conference on the Middle East on an equal basis with the other parties must be acknowledged by the international community.

2. That to this end, duly authorized representatives of the Palestinian people, both those living in exile and those still living under Israeli occupation in their own land, should be invited to participate in any peace conference.

3. That the recognition of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, in particular their right of self-determination in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, constitutes an indispensable element in any lasting settlement in the Middle East and that this must be acknowl-

¹³¹ Doc. 102 above.

¹³² Doc. 291 above.

edged and recognized by the international community.

Everyone has agreed "that in the establishment of a just and lasting peace account must be taken of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians"—as was declared by the EEC governments recently. The only discordant note has been struck by Mrs Meir, who keeps on rejecting the Palestinians' right of self-determination even on a part of their homeland—as she did at her press conference in London last Monday. The principles outlined above might be regarded as a framework according to which the Palestinians' legitimate rights could be acceptably interpreted.

Many Palestinians believe that a Palestinian state on the Gaza Strip and the West Bank including Al-Hammah region, is a necessary part of any peace package. Such a Palestinian state would lead to the emptying and closing down of the refugee camps, thereby drawing out the poison at the heart of Arab-Israeli enmity.

It is no small thing for a people who have been wronged as we have to take the first step towards reconciliation for the sake of a just peace that should satisfy all parties.

I therefore hope that these principles will be accepted by the world community and the great powers, that this step towards peace will be reciprocated by Israel. Israel must stop playing the game of preconditions which so far has proved so destructive to all peace efforts.

Even at this late hour, everything possible should be done to restore to the Palestinians their rights as a nation. Peace in the Middle East, and perhaps world peace, depends on that.

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Communiqué issued by a meeting of Arab Oil Ministers exempting EEC countries except the Netherlands from progressive cuts in oil supplies¹³³

Vienna, November 18, 1973

The Arab Oil Ministers met in Vienna on 18 November 1973 in the series of meetings that they have decided to hold periodically in order to review the measures to be undertaken in order to implement their decision of 17 October 1973.

In appreciation of the political stand taken by the European Common Market countries in their communiqué regarding the Middle East crisis,¹³⁴ it has been decided not to implement the five percent reduction (in oil production) scheduled for the month of December as it applies to Europe only. However, the assigned cut in production for the said month will apply to non-European countries as originally decided. Subsequently the five percent reduction will apply to all nations other than those which are exempted at the rate of five percent of December production applicable to the January production.

Also the embargo as was previously decided will continue to apply to the US and Holland.

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Statement issued by the government of Iraq announcing its decision not to attend the Arab summit conference in Algiers¹³⁵

Baghdad, November 19, 1973

Since the inception of the 17th July revolution, Iraq has been handling Arab issues within the context of the national responsibilities of the Arab states. The events of the past few years have shown the practical interpretation of Iraq's policy in this respect, which our Arab masses have come to understand.

While adhering to the policy of unified Arab action and realizing the significance of Arab solidarity in the service of the objectives of the Arab nation and the aspirations of the Arab masses, Iraq does not think that the Arab summit meeting to be held in Algiers will achieve the aspirations of the Arab masses, the objectives of liberation and the continuation of the struggle with all resources and capabilities against the enemies of the Arab nation.

Moreover, the positions of certain Arab states during and since the war have shown that they have acted unilaterally and pursued an obvious method of making decisions directly affecting the interests and future of the Arab nation without regard to the opinions of the other Arab states and the masses of our nation, who have devoted all

¹³⁴ Doc. 184 above.

¹³⁵ Broadcast by Baghdad radio in Arabic; English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4456/A/1; reprinted by permission.

¹³³ English text as published in *Middle East Economic Survey* (Beirut) XVII, 5 (November 23, 1973), p. 5.

their resources and capabilities to the battle. It seems that the intention is to impose and justify this method by means of the projected meeting.

Consequently, in the light of the above considerations, Iraq does not think that the results of this meeting would be commensurate with the responsibilities of the Arab nation to the liberation of the land and the restoration of the rights of our Palestinian Arab people to their land and homeland. This has prompted the Iraqi political leadership, after a full study of the current Arab situation and the results expected from this conference, to decide that Iraq should not take part in the meeting.

As in the past and at present, Iraq will continue to bear its national responsibilities and to support any serious Arab effort serving the issues of our nation, the foremost of which is our great cause—the question of Palestine.

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Speech by Foreign Minister Bouteflika of Algeria made at the opening of the Arab Foreign Ministers' Conference (excerpt)¹³⁶

Algiers, November 24, 1973

Brothers,

We are entering on a critical state in the conflict against Zionism and colonialism. We do not believe that we are approaching a true and permanent solution of the problem. In our view the battle must continue as long as the goals for which so many thousands of our nation have laid down their lives have not been achieved. On the contrary, we believe that the enemy will do his best to take advantage of the present situation so as to reorganize his ranks, recover his strength and obtain further aid. In this way he may once more destroy Arab strength and impose solutions that are in conformity with his expansionist interests and his plans aimed at stripping the Palestinian people of their established national rights. Therefore the present situation requires that we shoulder our responsibilities so as to ensure that the battle continues.

In order that the magnificent gains achieved by the October War may not be rendered meaning-

less by the manoeuvres and pressures of the enemy, it is essential that all Arab territories be liberated and that the rights of the Palestinian people be fully recovered. For if the real meaning of our common struggle and of the solidarity between our countries is to be realized it must take the form of continued struggle in all fields, military, political and economic, in fulfillment of the legitimate national aspirations for which the Palestine resistance is fighting.

Events have proved that the essential and decisive factor in winning victory lies in the intrinsic strength of our nation, and in the organization, mobilization and unification of our energies. This is the way to vanquish the aggressor, to achieve solidarity with the peoples of the third world and to influence the attitudes of other countries. Without this we shall stumble in our march, our resources will dissipate and our relations with our friends will be upset. Therefore we must not allow our ranks to be infiltrated by indecision which can only result in our loss of the immense resources which are today at the service of our just battle.

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Press interview statements by PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat on USSR-Palestinian relations, the October War and its aftermath and negotiation possibilities¹³⁷

Algiers, late November, 1973

Q. Do you think that the Palestine revolution has become sufficiently mature to take part in the peace conference? Have you become convinced that the revolution can negotiate and bear arms at the same time?

A. I will answer by asking another question: Why have we waited until now to announce our decision? It is not a question of hesitation. For there is a decision about which we shall not be hesitant—it is not because there is no way ahead of us that we have not announced which way we intend to go, but because the interests of our cause require that we should be the last to speak.

What is ahead of the Palestine revolution so far

¹³⁶ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Shaab* (Algiers), November 26, 1973.

¹³⁷ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Ahram*, (Cairo), November 28, 1973.

is something fluid and ill-defined; this being so it is in our people's interests that we should remain silent. In the Executive Committee we decided not to express any view, saying only that there would be further consultations or contacts.

Q. You have just returned from heading a delegation to Moscow, and we all know that the USSR has its views on the Palestine problem. Are you more convinced since this visit that you should announce the establishment of a provisional government for Palestine?

A. I can describe my talks with the Soviet leaders as having been frank and responsible, and at the same time they were very advantageous to the Palestine revolution. As for announcing the formation of a provisional government, we believe that the time has not yet come.

Q. Has a decision been taken on the representation of Palestine at the peace conference?

A. The question is not that of the representation of Palestine at the conference; what is very important is that we should not show our cards. They are talking about a peace conference and the rights of the people of Palestine, but I want something definite to reply to.

Q. Being a principal party to the problem, have you any idea of what your minimum and maximum demands should be?

A. I do not define a minimum because I believe that the democratic Palestinian state must be established. And can any civilized man or civilized state say that this is wrong, or is there any objection to it as a principle? If anyone says that such a goal is difficult to achieve, he has a pre-October War mentality—I mean the Ramadan War, as I call it.

Q. So far you have not stated your view of the October War.

A. Regardless of certain negative aspects at the military and political levels, the war was a positive turning point for our Arab nation. For the first time the decision to confront aggression was Arab and the myth of Israeli superiority was smashed forever, and we proved that the Arab fighter is capable of confronting the challenges of imperialism and Zionism.

Q. Did the October War benefit the Palestine revolution?

A. I cannot say that it was a gain for Palestine

alone, for the Arab nation is all linked together, with its different parts all complementing each other; we cannot talk of individual positions, whether Egyptian, Syrian or Palestinian. It is a single integrated problem. And there is something more important than that. The October War proved that the process of Israeli expansion is not an Israeli decision. It also proved that the survival of Israel in itself depends on the Arab will.

The war certainly had a very great effect on Israeli society.

It is difficult to estimate exactly what human and material losses Israel sustained, because in spite of her claim that her losses did not exceed 1854 killed and 1800 wounded Israel has herself disclosed that she was lying by a major information error that she herself did not notice at first: her Hebrew broadcasts announced that a ceremony had been held in Upper Galilee for the burial of 850 men killed from the village of Naharia and the nearby settlement of Mair. If these were her losses in one place, what must her losses have been in the whole war? In any case, since this mistake was discovered, Israel has not given any figures.

Q. Do you think that the Palestine revolution has now achieved sufficient political maturity for it to represent the people of Palestine?

A. Certainly, the Palestine revolution attained the ability and the political maturity long ago, and proved it at the Non-Aligned Conference where the Palestine revolution spoke on behalf of the liberation movements of the world; also at the World Youth Rally in Berlin, where it was invited to take over the banner of world struggle from the Vietnamese revolution.

Q. What were Palestinian losses in the October War? They have not been announced.

A. Our losses come third, after those of Egypt and Syria. The Palestine revolution's losses were about 870 killed and missing.

Q. It is said that the Palestine revolution did not accept the ceasefire resolution?

A. I... It is not a matter of objecting. We have been fighting since 1965 to achieve the goals of the Palestine revolution. In 1967 the fighting stopped but the revolution went on; then there was the war of attrition which stopped in 1970, but the revolution went on. Then there was the October War and it stopped, but the revolution is still going on.

Q. Can the Palestine revolution continue its military struggle while it is sitting at the negotiations table?

A. I am fighting as the Vietnamese do, but I cannot do exactly what the Vietnamese do, for every revolution has its own character and special features. When we talk of the negotiations table it is an ambiguous expression, and circumstances since the October War are favourable for our taking advantage of the gains it achieved.

Q. Did you feel in Moscow that pressure was being exerted to induce the Palestinians to form a provisional government to sit at the negotiations table? And did you feel that there is a Soviet-American agreement to induce the revolution to adopt specific attitudes as regards the peace conference?

A. I felt that there was a strong desire to support the Palestinian people and to ensure that they achieve their national rights. The Soviets told me that they support the rights of the Palestinian people; this was expressed in the official statement issued on the Brezhnev and Tito talks.

Q. Did the delegation represent all the Palestinian organizations with all their various trends?

A. I can say that the delegation was a high level one and that all sections of the resistance that fight under the banner of the Palestine Liberation Organization took part in it.

Q. Will the Palestine National Council be convened to discuss...?

A. Possibly. In any case the Central Council has been called to meet after the summit conference to discuss the situation. It is an intermediate authority between the Executive Committee of the Liberation Organization (which is the political command) and the National Council.

Q. Will the resistance ask the summit conference to issue a resolution stating that the Palestine Liberation Organization is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people?

A. What I want to say at the start is that the occupied West Bank has expressed its view on three occasions. The first was in its memorandum to Waldheim last July, the second in its memorandum to the Non-Aligned Conference in August, and the third in the memorandum which I have with me now, which states that the Palestine Liberation Organization has the right to represent the Palestine revolution and the Palestinian people.

Q. Are you thinking of announcing the formation of a provisional government at the summit conference?

A. The time has not yet come for that. It is sufficient that there are 120 states that recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization as the representative of the Palestinian people who are fighting to recover their rights.

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Speech by Fatah Central Committee member Khalaf [Abu Ayyad] calling for unity among all Arab quarters in support of the non-negotiable rights of the Palestinians (excerpts)¹³⁸

Beirut, November 27, 1973

The Fifth Fact

The time has now come for the Palestine problem to be on the negotiation table so that we may not be in the situation we were in when Security Council Resolution 242 was adopted—so that we may be able to say that the Arab countries have the right to reject what they want and accept what they want, and that it is our right to reject what we want.

All must understand that we are passing through a grave and critical stage; we must not allow ourselves to be influenced by events—we must influence them.

No leader of the Arab countries has the right to call a peace conference, but have we been invited to a peace conference?

No one has invited the Palestine Liberation Organization to the peace conference. All that has happened is mere talk. We must bide our time and consult with all quarters, because this time we do not want to be immolated by pressure from any quarter; what we want is to make our decision ourselves and confront our destiny ourselves.

The decisions taken by the Central Committee at its last meeting were:

1. To insist on the historical right of the Palestinian people to liberate the whole of Palestinian territory.

¹³⁸ Abu Ayyad's speech was given at the Arab University of Beirut; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *Filastin al-Thawra*, (Beirut), December 12, 1973, p. 14.

2. To insist that the West Bank and the Gaza Strip should not be returned to King Hussein.

3. To insist on the Palestinian people's right to self-determination.

The peace conference can only mean the implementation of the Security Council resolution, which means directly negotiating with the enemy, ending the state of war and opening the sea-ways to the enemy. We wager that our enemy does not desire or want peace, so that it is a delusion to believe that he will withdraw from the occupied territory.

The statements of the enemy leaders, and events at Kilometre 101, where negotiations are being held up for two centimetres on the map, show that the enemy will never withdraw from the occupied territory. How can anyone believe that the enemy will withdraw from Sinai, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip? Let no one think that we take orders from this quarter or that, or that if we are told to attend the peace conference we shall obey the order.

We have told all the Arab authorities that peace is not in Israel's interests, so that she will not withdraw from Arab territory. Israel is based on expansion and her withdrawal would upset the theory of security. The aim of expansion is to absorb 15 million Jews, and if she withdraws she will be unable to absorb anyone.

The enemy claims that he wants peace and is carrying out a manoeuvre in accordance with a clear-cut plan. Therefore we are entitled to act in accordance with a clear-cut plan.

An American peace would be the same as a Zionist peace. The visits of American officials are mere manoeuvres because America will never agree to Israel being weak and incapable in the face of Arab strength.

America is trying to win time so as to recover from the oil crisis.

For the enemy to accept peace would mean that the Zionist entity was condemning itself to death.

What directs our moves is the fact that we have a historical right to Palestine, and even if this generation is unable to liberate it, it has no right to relinquish this historical right.

We are taking action and fighting for the revolution's right to represent the people because King Hussein is lying in wait for our revolution and our people.

This is the acid test of our present political activity; it does not mean that our principles or our aims have changed. Our enemies are betting on our becoming divided. Sisco said in Beirut that America is betting on the Palestinians never agreeing on anything, and King Hussein is betting on this too; America and Israel, too, are betting on our quarrelling.

Regrettably there are some who have a passion for standing in front of the microphone and repeating all the laws and principles of our nation. They have said a great deal about us, but we are always against purely verbal stands.

But this "No" that we have said throughout our history has never been accompanied with sufficient strength to protect it, and today we do not want to be political refugees in this country or that; we want the revolution to go on in circumstances best suited to our people. We must constantly abide by the attitude of the masses so that they may be convinced that the movement that leads them is an aware and responsible movement concerned for their future. It is not a question of speeches and "No's"; it is a question of adopting the right national attitudes that will ensure that the struggle continues.

From the start of the revolution they have cast doubts on us, but these are the facts and they have been confirmed by the blood of our revolutionaries.

We cannot agree that our rejection should be mere words. Rejection means practical application; rejection means preparing a document and hard political work, and it must be able to rely on sufficient strength to protect and reinforce it.

It is not a question of our overbidding each other; our view must be broader than the organizational horizon, for today the question for us is one of to be or not to be.

An absolute "No" is not always the hallmark of the absolute revolutionary. The Palestinian vanguards have resolutely defended Palestinian rights. Today we are not going to say "No" and sit at home; we are going to work for this people and their goals. We are against resounding slogans that urge the revolution to commit suicide. We shall not hesitate to do anything that can promote the interests of our people; we shall shoulder our guns with the same strength and resolution for the achievement of the aims of our people.

We have made contacts with the Arab countries and with our friends.

The USSR says that every revolution must have an interim programme. We agree with you about the Palestinian democratic state, but how to get it?

In People's China we are waiting for them to prepare things for a delegation from us to visit Peking. The other socialist countries have the same attitude as the USSR, while the positions of the Arab countries are as follows: Iraq wants us to reject [a peace conference], in appreciation of our position, and we are determined that our relations with Iraq should remain as close as possible. I can say that our relations with Iraq are exceptional; Iraq has given us aid and played an effective part in the October War.

As for Libya, we respect Colonel Qadhafi's attitude to our national struggle.

As for Algeria, our brothers are aware of the difficulty of our situation and have said to us: We are with you in whatever decision you take in accordance with the interests of your people.

The other Arab countries have said: Define the attitude that best suits you and we shall be with you.

I say that it is a good thing that we should advance so that we may be able to take our own decisions, but our brother Arabs must stand by us in the consequences of our decision.

In the Palestinian arena we are anxious that we should remain united, because in the long run we are all in the same trench and in the same position. As far as our people are concerned we are anxious that they should be in contact with our people in the occupied territory and that there should be constant consultations with them.

Let me tell you that nothing will induce these young men who sparked off the revolution to waive their historical rights. It is impossible that men who have borne arms for eighteen years should not be with their people and their nation.

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Resolution to continue use of the oil weapon, adopted at the Sixth Arab Summit Conference¹³⁹

Algiers, late November, 1973

With regard to oil, the conference resolves to continue the use of oil as an economic weapon in the battle until withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories is achieved and the national rights of the Palestinian people are ensured, in the following manner:

1. Continuation of the embargo in relation to countries supporting Israel.

2. Continuation of percentage reductions to the point at which the reduction in a state's revenues is no more than one quarter of its revenues in 1972.

3. A committee of the Foreign and Oil Ministers of the Arab oil states shall be formed whose task shall be:

Firstly: To draw up a list classifying countries according to the following categories:

- (a) Friendly states.
- (b) Neutral states.
- (c) States supporting the enemy.

Secondly: To follow up the implementation of the resolution on the use of oil and to review the classification of countries as follows:

(a) To transfer the classification of states from one category to another in accordance with their commitment to implementing the political course of action decided on by the summit conference or with their adoption of positions, whether political, economic or military, which warrant a review of their classification.

(b) To give to neutral states which become friendly the quantities which they imported in 1972, provided they undertake not to reexport them as crude or products.

(c) The reexport of oil from any importing country to another hostile country is not permitted.

Thirdly: The committee referred to above shall meet to draw up the classifications and shall inform the Arab oil producing states or those through whose ports oil is exported for implementation.

¹³⁹ Adopted at the meeting held November 26-28; *al-Shaab* (Algiers), November 29, 1973; English translation, *Middle East Economic Survey* (Beirut), XVII, 7 (December 7, 1973) pp. 15-16.

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Decisions of the Sixth Arab Summit Conference¹⁴⁰**Algiers, November 28, 1973**

The Sixth Arab Summit Conference held in Algiers discussed recent developments in the Arab and international situations and the circumstances of confrontation with the enemy.

Having heard the statements made by the Arab Kings and Presidents, the Conference took the following decisions.

I. THE INTERIM GOAL OF THE ARAB NATION

The Conference decides that the goals of the Arab nation at the present stage of common Arab struggle are:

1. The total liberation of all the Arab territories occupied during the aggression of June 1967 and refusal to relinquish or renounce any part of these territories or to allow national sovereignty over them to be prejudiced.

2. The liberation of the Arab city of Jerusalem and refusal to accept any situation liable to prejudice total Arab sovereignty over the Holy City.

3. The commitment to the recovery of the national rights of the Palestinian people in conformity with the decisions of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole representative of the Palestinian people. (The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has reservations about this paragraph.)

4. The cause of Palestine as the cause of all Arabs. No Arab party is entitled to relinquish this commitment; this is in conformity with the decisions of the previous Arab Summit Conference.

II. IN THE MILITARY FIELD

In view of the continuation of the battle against the enemy until the aims of our nation are realized by the liberation of the occupied territories and the restoration of the national rights of the Palestinian people, the Conference decides the following:

1. Solidarity on the part of all the Arab countries with Egypt, Syria and the Palestinian people in the common struggle to realize the just goals of the Arabs.

2. The provision of military and financial aid

of all kinds to the Egyptian and Syrian front so as to reinforce their military capacity to fight the battle of liberation and to combat the immense aid and unlimited support received by the enemy.

3. To support the Palestine resistance by all available means so as to ensure its ability to play an effective role in the battle.

III. IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD

In view of the importance of the economy in the battle against the enemy and of the necessity to make use of all the weapons in the Arabs' possession and to mobilize all resources capable of reinforcing combat capacity, the Conference decides the following:

1. To strengthen economic relations between the Arab countries and to call on the Arab Economic Council to draw up a programme of implementation to ensure this.

2. To continue to use oil as a weapon in the battle in the light of the decisions of the Oil Ministers and to link the lifting of the embargo on oil exports to any country with that country's undertaking to support the just cause of the Arabs, and to call on the Oil Ministers' Follow-up Committee to follow up the implementation of these decisions and the decisions of the Oil Ministers on rates of reducing production, this committee to work in coordination with the Committee of the Foreign Ministers of the Oil Countries on all matters regarding the development of the attitudes of foreign countries to the Arab cause.

3. The necessity to support resistance and ensure endurance in the occupied Arab territories.

4. To rebuild what was destroyed by the war because of the effect this will have on the war effort and on raising the fighting spirit and combat potential of the confrontation countries.

IV. IN THE POLITICAL FIELD

Political action complements and is a continuation of the military battle in our struggle against the enemy.

In light of the attitudes of foreign countries to the just struggle of the Arabs, the Conference decides the following:

A. In the African Field:

1. To reinforce Arab-African cooperation in the political field and to strengthen Arab diplomatic representation in Africa.

¹⁴⁰ Translated from the confidential Arabic text as obtained by and published in *al-Nahar* (Beirut), December 4, 1973.

2. That all relations, diplomatic, consular, economic, cultural, etc., with South Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia should be severed by all Arab countries that have not already done so.

3. That a total embargo be imposed on exports of Arab oil to these three countries.

4. That special measures be taken to ensure that normal supplies of oil to the friendly African countries continue.

5. To strengthen and expand economic, financial and cultural cooperation with the friendly African countries bilaterally and at the level of Arab and African regional institutions.

6. To set up an Arab-African financial establishment to participate in economic and social development projects and to provide the African countries with technical aid. The Arab Economy Ministers shall draw up the regulations for this establishment and determine its capital.

7. To provide immediate aid to the African peoples who are the victims of natural disasters and famine.

8. To increase support for the struggle of the African liberation organizations at the diplomatic and financial levels.

9. With a view to speeding up the implementation of these decisions and ensuring constant cooperation between the Arab and African countries, the Secretariat General of the Arab League is called upon to take the measures necessary for their implementation and to get in touch with the General Secretariat of the Organization for African Unity and its Committee of Seven States, to arrange periodical consultations at all levels, including the highest, between the Arab and African countries.

B. *The Non-Aligned Countries:*

1. To act to secure the implementation of the resolutions of the Algiers Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, especially those resolutions concerning the boycott of Israel, particularly in the political, economic and military fields, and to request Algeria, as Chairman of the Conference, to call its members to a special high-level meeting of the Bureau to ensure the implementation of these resolutions.

2. To act to ensure that these countries continue to provide support by all available means to the Arab struggle against Zionism.

C. *The Islamic Countries:*

1. To make every effort to persuade the Islamic countries that have relations with Israel to sever these relations—political, economic and cultural.

2. To make every effort to ensure that these countries provide greater support to the Arab struggle in all fields.

D. *Western Europe:*

1. To call on the Common Market countries to develop the political attitude initiated in their statement of November 6, 1973.

2. To call on the Western European countries to stop their military and economic aid to Israel.

3. To make every effort to ensure that these countries lift their embargo on exports of arms to the Arab countries.

4. To make every effort to ensure that the Western European countries exert pressure on the United States of America to stop aiding the enemy.

E. *Asian Countries:*

1. To continue efforts to persuade the Asian countries that have political, economic and cultural relations with Israel to sever them, and to adopt an attitude of greater support for the Arab battle of liberation and greater solidarity with the Asian Arab countries which have territories that have been occupied.

F. *The USSR and the Eastern European Countries:*

Continued contacts with these countries to ensure that they:

1. Continue to support the Arab cause in all fields.

2. Provide the Arab countries and the fighting fronts with arms in sufficient quantities and of the right quality to enable the Arabs to confront the enemy.

3. Make every effort to persuade Romania to sever her political and economic relations with Israel.

G. *People's China:*

Continued Arab contacts with People's China to ensure that she continues to support the Arab cause and to provide it with all possible support.

H. *The United States of America:*

1. Efforts to make the American government change its attitude of alignment with Israel, and to call its attention to the dangers of its interests in the

Arab area if it continues to pursue its present policy.

2. Redoubled efforts at the level of the American people and their various information media to explain the justice of the Arab cause and the dangers involved in the United States' alignment with Israel to the interests of the American people and to international peace and security.

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Communiqué issued following the Sixth Arab Summit Conference¹⁴¹

Algiers, November 28, 1973

Policy Statement

The Kings and Presidents of the States of the League of Arab States, at their meeting in the Palais des Nations in Algiers at the invitation of President Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat of the Arab Republic of Egypt and President Hafiz al-Asad of the Syrian Arab Republic, studied the Arab and international situation in the light of statements submitted by the Kings and Presidents, of the report of the Secretary General, and of the recommendations of the Foreign Ministers, and took the political, defense, and economic decisions which the situation requires.

The Arab world is passing through a decisive period in its history, and the battle against Zionist aggression is a long-term historic responsibility which demands further efforts and sacrifice. If the war of October 1973 demonstrated the determination of the Arab nation to liberate its occupied territories whatever the cost, then the cease-fire on the ground in no way means that the struggle is over or that a solution can be imposed on the Arab states which does not realize their just aims.

So long as the causes of the aggressive and expansionist wars which have brought the world to the brink of global conflict are not eliminated, no lasting peace or true security can be established in the Middle East. It is impossible to reconcile aggression, occupation, expansionism and hegemony with the principles of national independence, development, progress and a just peace.

The war of October 1973 is, like its predecessors,

the inevitable result of the policy of aggression and fait accompli practiced by Israel in violation of international principles and resolutions and the rights of peoples. Since usurping the rights of the Palestinian people and expelling them from their country, Israel has not ceased its efforts to expand, relying on the collusion of the imperialist states and their economic, technological and military support, particularly from the United States of America. This collusion has recently come to light in the form of mobilizing unprecedented financial and material support, supplying specialist mercenaries, and organizing a political offensive which groups together all the enemies of the liberation of the Third World.

In addition to its policy of war and expansion, Israel also seeks as part of its imperialist strategy to rule out the possibility of development for the peoples of the area. Zionism thus appears, in an era which is witnessing the upsurge of national liberation movements and the eradication of imperialism, as a dangerous resurgence of the imperialist and racist system and of its methods of domination and economic exploitation.

Despite Israel's ties with world imperialism, which places various means and capabilities in the service of its aggressive aims, the Arab nation has never abandoned its national goals nor shrunk from the demands of the struggle. Setbacks and hardship have been unable to weaken its national will, but have rather strengthened its resolution and determination.

In October 1973 the armed forces of Egypt, Syria and the Palestinian resistance, accompanied by other Arab forces, were able to inflict very heavy losses on the Israeli aggressors, and during this battle there developed a growing awareness on the part of the Arab nation and governments of their responsibilities and their human and material potential. This awareness is manifested in a practical solidarity whose effectiveness has been proved and which has given a new impetus to the Arab liberation movement.

The Conference salutes our brave soldiers on the battlefronts, who have written the most glorious and bravest pages of our national history and whose determination to fight until victory is ever growing. The Conference also calls blessings upon our valiant and upright martyrs who have immortalized their memories and raised the stature of their nation.

¹⁴¹ Issued in Arabic after the meeting held November 26–28; English translation *Middle East Economic Survey* (Beirut), XVII, 6 (November 30, 1973), pp. 4–8.

Israel now appears in its true light and the expansionist nature of its policy is clear for all to see. Its bogus friendship towards the African peoples stands exposed and it no longer receives the slightest support in Africa except from the imperialist and racist regimes in South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal.

Moreover, Israel is facing a general rejection of its policy in the Islamic countries, the non-aligned countries, the liberation organizations of the Third World, the socialist countries and in enlightened and unbiased world public opinion. As a result, Israel's diplomatic isolation has today become a palpable reality. A particular indication is that some European governments traditionally known for their support of Israeli positions have begun to question the validity of Israel's adventurist policy, which involves great danger to international peace and cooperation.

These factors, which represent important gains for the Arab cause, must be developed and reinforced in order to arrive at a solution which will guarantee Arab national rights.

The cease-fire of over one month ago continues to meet with maneuvering and sabotage from the Israeli side. Israel's official attitudes and its actions on the international level also confirm that Israel has in no way abandoned its old policy or renounced its imperialist and expansionist ambitions.

The cease-fire is not peace. Peace requires the fulfillment of a number of conditions, foremost among them two firm and fundamental ones:

(1) Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories, with particular regard to Jerusalem.

(2) The recovery by the Palestinian people of their established national rights.

Unless these two conditions are met, it is useless to expect anything in the Middle East other than the aggravation of the explosive situation and the outbreak of new confrontations.

The Arab Kings and Presidents, aware of their historic responsibilities, confirm their readiness to participate in reaching a just peace on the basis of these two principles. It is up to those who talk of peace to give concrete proof of their desire to end a situation which grows daily more dangerous and explosive.

The Arab countries will not under any circumstances accept to mortgage their future against

illusory promises and empty bargaining. Not the slightest doubt must be left in world public opinion, which has for so long been deceived by Zionist propaganda, about the Arab nation's intention and determination to recover its usurped rights and to liberate its occupied territories.

Peace can only be achieved through complete frankness and by avoiding maneuverings and deception, and on the basis of the principles set out in this statement. Therefore the Arab Kings and Presidents announce that any new and constructive consultations must take place within this framework. If the conditions for a just peace are not forthcoming and if Arab efforts for peace meet rejection from Israel and its allies, the Arab countries will find themselves compelled to draw the natural conclusions and to continue their battle for liberation, however long it may take, by all means possible and in all fields.

The Arab nation is determined to do its duty and is prepared for further struggle, expenditure and sacrifice. It is up to the whole world to bear the responsibility for resisting aggression and to support the Arabs' just struggle.

Statement to Western Europe

The world, which is following with interest developments in the Middle East problem, has a right to know the definition of what we are seeking and to share our hopes and views as to the future in our region and in the world as a whole.

We affirm to the world that we are endeavoring within the framework of international law to achieve a just and lasting peace on the basis of the restoration of our occupied territories and the recovery of the national rights of the Palestinian people. Within this framework we are endeavoring to establish a zone of peace in the Middle East which will ensure our interests and the interests of all the countries of the world, and we desire to remove international tension from the area, believing as we do in the UN Charter and the principles of non-alignment.

While expressing our deep appreciation of the positive and constructive participation undertaken by our brothers and comrades-in-arms in Africa, Asia, the non-aligned countries and the socialist countries, we are also watching with greater attention and interest the signs of an understanding of our position which have begun to appear in the states of Western Europe. We also announce our

sincere readiness to cooperate in the efforts being undertaken within the framework of the United Nations to establish a just peace in the area.

Western Europe is linked across the Mediterranean to the Arab peoples by strong ties of civilization and vital interdependent interests which can only flourish in a framework of cooperation characterized by mutual interests and trust. It is therefore appropriate for it to adopt a clear and impartial stand in respect of our just cause, thereby proving the independence of its will and playing its full role in international affairs. It should accomplish this by committing itself to work by all possible means to bring about Israel's withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories, with particular regard to Jerusalem, and the recovery by the Palestinian people of their national rights.

The Arabs desire the friendship of all peoples and wish for an exchange of benefits with them without discrimination on the basis of guaranteeing their legitimate rights and safeguarding their vital interests. They similarly desire to share in providing for the well-being of the world, as long as the world participates with them in providing security and justice in their region.

Statement to the Socialist Countries

At their meeting in Algiers from 26 November to 28 November 1973, the Arab Kings and Presidents studied the Arab and international situation. They express their appreciation of the socialist countries which cut their diplomatic relations with Israel following the Israeli aggression against the Arab countries in 1967. They note with pride the full political support of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, their military support and economic cooperation with the Arab countries, and their standing at the side of the just Arab struggle to liberate the occupied Arab territories and recover the rights of the Palestinian people. They also note with appreciation the continued support of the People's Republic of China for the struggle of the Arab nation.

They look forward to a reinforcement of this cooperation and a development of these ties by all possible means, in the service of mutual interests, of the fulfillment of common objectives and of the strengthening of Arab friendship with the socialist countries. They are confident that the socialist countries' solidarity with the just struggle will

render ever increasing service to freedom and justice and ever increasing support for world peace.

Statement to Africa

The Arab Kings and Presidents who met in Algiers from 26 November to 28 November 1973 discussed the new situation in the Middle East resulting from Israeli aggression and its effects on international security. They took into consideration the growing movement towards solidarity which the fraternal African states have expressed in favor of the just Arab cause and the struggle to liberate the occupied Arab territories and to recover the national rights of the Palestinian people. This struggle is part of the battle which the forces of liberation are waging against the forces of imperialism, racism and Zionism.

Since they consider that Arab-African solidarity must manifest itself in a tangible form in all spheres, including the sphere of economic and political cooperation, with the aim of strengthening the bases of national independence and achieving development, they resolve:

1. To send messages of appreciation to fraternal African states for the decisions they have taken to break their relations with Israel, thereby increasing its isolation from the world.
2. To express their appreciation for the confirmation of this solidarity with the struggling Arab countries at the extraordinary meeting of the Ministerial Council of the Organization of African Unity.
3. To extend full support to the African countries in their struggle for national liberation and economic progress and in their struggle against imperialism and racial discrimination.
4. To welcome the decision of the Ministerial Council of the OAU at its recent emergency meeting to form a committee composed of seven countries to organize African-Arab cooperation. They resolve to take the following measures to strengthen Arab-African solidarity and embody it in practical form:

a) Support for Arab-African cooperation in the political sphere and strengthening Arab diplomatic representation in Africa.

b) Breaking off all diplomatic, consular, economic, cultural and other relations with South Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia by those Arab states which have not yet done so.

c) The application of a total embargo on Arab oil exports to these three countries.

d) The adoption of special measures to continue normal supplies of Arab oil to the fraternal countries of Africa.

e) Strengthening and expansion of economic, financial and cultural cooperation with fraternal African states, at a bilateral level and at the level of Arab and African regional organizations.

f) Doubling their political and material support for the struggle of African liberation organizations.¹⁴²

g) In order to speed up the application of these decisions and the establishment of continuous cooperation between the Arab and African countries, they charge the Secretariat General of the Arab League with taking steps to implement them and with contacting the Secretariat of the OAU and the committee of seven countries attached to it to organize regular consultations between the Arab and African countries at all levels, including the highest.

Statement to the Non-Aligned Countries

The Arab Kings and Presidents who met in Algiers from 26 November to 28 November 1973 consider that Israeli aggression has proved the soundness of the analysis made by the heads of state and governments of the non-aligned countries during their fourth conference in Algiers. This analysis establishes with precision that the prevailing situation in the Middle East is the result of Israeli obduracy and Israel's persistence in the policy of occupying the territories of three non-aligned countries, and that this aggression represents a threat to world peace and security.

The Kings and Presidents note the imperialist character of Israel as a factor causing tension and confrontation in a vital region of the Third World. They note with satisfaction the full solidarity the non-aligned countries have shown towards Egypt, Syria, Jordan and the Palestinian people in the struggle for the liberation of their territories, the integrity of their soil, and their national rights.

This solidarity has manifested itself particularly in the political and diplomatic activity which has played its part in the disapproval of the international community and its condemnation of Israel's aggressive, expansionist and annexationist plans.

Since the Kings and Presidents are sending messages of appreciation to the non-aligned countries in Africa for the effective solidarity they have shown towards the struggle of the Arab peoples, they urge all the non-aligned countries to redouble their individual and collective efforts to find a solution in the Middle East which accords with the principles and resolutions of the non-aligned countries and seeks to establish peace and security in the world.

Since the Kings and Presidents condemn the close collusion existing between Israel, imperialist and racist regimes, and American imperialism, they call upon the community of non-aligned nations, which represent the peoples of the Third World and a majority of the world's population, to shoulder their international responsibility to support right and justice not only in the Middle East but throughout the world. They will thus participate more fully, in accordance with the resolutions of the fourth summit conference, in the establishment of an international system based on democracy and in conformity with the peoples' aspirations towards progress, security and peace.

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Speech by King Hussein of Jordan on Jordan's position toward the ceasefire resolution, the Geneva conference and Palestinian self-determination (excerpts)¹⁴³

Amman, December 1, 1973

Although the date when the war would break out was unknown to us and therefore we could not plan for it, when it did break out we had to take action in such a way that we could perform our natural duties.

Since we did not have the element of surprise and the enemy was prepared for us all along our front, from the Yarmuk Heights to the coast of Aqaba, and as we realized that our first duty was to protect the advance of the fearless Syrian forces against any attempt by the Israeli forces to penetrate through our northern areas, we deployed an important part of our armed forces to close these

¹⁴² This paragraph is missing from the BBC translation; translated from the Arabic text, *al-Shaab* (Algiers), November 29, 1973.

¹⁴³ King Hussein spoke at the opening of the seventh session of the ninth Jordanian National Assembly; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Dustur* (Amman), December 2, 1973.

gaps and to protect the Syrian advance. In this way we were also able to continue confronting considerable Israeli forces that might have supported their combat forces on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts, had we not been as close as possible on our advanced lines.

As the military situation on both fronts developed and Israel threw as many as possible of her air, sea and land forces into the battle, we decided to adapt ourselves to the changed circumstances of the battle. Our armed forces were transferred to the field of battle in Syrian territory in brigade strength, supported by the best of our armoured forces and our main reserves. This was followed by another brigade, and then by a division command.

Then came the ceasefire resolution on October 22, which was accepted by the three confrontation countries and by Israel.

While accepting the ceasefire resolution we left our combatant forces on the Syrian front, under the orders of the Syrian command, until the fighting stopped. They stayed on after the fighting had stopped and, indeed, they are still there now, and they will stay there until there is no longer any need for them in Syrian territory, when they will return to perform their important duties and fulfill their destiny of confronting the perils and challenges.

Senators and Deputies,

The ceasefire resolution to which we are referring, which was adopted by the Security Council as resolution 338, not only calls on all parties concerned to make an immediate start on implementing all clauses of Security Council Resolution 242. At the same time it stipulates that talks shall start immediately between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices, with the object of establishing a just and permanent peace in the Middle East.

Gentlemen,

Ever since resolution 242 was adopted on November 22, 1967, the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan has always maintained that it should be implemented and, as a result of the recent fighting, there have been some moves towards unfreezing this resolution.

In this connection, Senators and Deputies, I want to reaffirm to you, unhesitatingly and unambiguously, that my government understands

that the basic theme of Security Council Resolution 242 is that Israel must withdraw completely from all the Arab territories occupied since June 5, 1967, and that the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arab people must be ensured.

Gentlemen, we maintain our position that Israel must withdraw from all the Arab areas she has occupied since June 5, 1967; we believe that there can be no peace in this area without full withdrawal. There is no need to say that in no circumstances and for no considerations shall we abandon our insistence that Arab Jerusalem, that precious jewel at the crossroads of this homeland, be restored to full Arab sovereignty, so that it may return to its people, to the Muslim Arabs, to become the object of worship for believers.

No less strong than our insistence on complete Israeli withdrawal is our insistence that there should be mutual agreement between ourselves and Egypt and Syria to this withdrawal as a single operation so that it may not be weakened by being partial.

Inasmuch as the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan, the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Syrian Arab Republic are the three countries concerned in Security Council Resolution 242, it is natural that these countries should act as a single party as regards its implementation.

This principle, of course, is not inconsistent with the possibility of any aspects of this resolution being discussed with any of these three countries that has a special interest in such discussion or the possibility of an agreement on the matter being concluded with it. But there must be only one general and final agreement with the three Arab countries and it must cover all aspects of implementation so that there may be only one settlement.

We also insist that the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people must be ensured in view of the fact that the overwhelming majority live in the East and West Banks of Jordan.

The ensuring of these rights is another basic condition for a final settlement and for peace, because these rights of a people who have been evicted through no fault of their own are bestowed by God, confirmed by man, attested by international resolutions and required by justice. It is neither reasonable nor acceptable that every other people should enjoy its security, freedom and the power to build itself while those to whom these rights belong are prevented from doing so.

If God permits and guides us to our goal of liberation, the first thing we shall propose to all the people of Palestine as regards the land of Palestine is that they be allowed to choose whether they stay with us, unite with us or separate from us through a referendum held under neutral international auspices. People must realize, at last, in spite of the incessant misrepresentation that has clouded the issue, that we intend neither to take them against their will nor to abandon them by default, but that we are going to let them choose for themselves the form of government they want and the future that will satisfy them.

You know, gentlemen, that the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan attended the last Arab summit conference along with the other Arab countries, and at the conference we defined our policy as follows:

1. We demand Israel's complete and comprehensive withdrawal from all the Arab territory she has occupied since June 5, 1967. We cannot accept withdrawal from any part at the expense of any other part. In the light of this attitude we insist that the withdrawal must be a single operation.

2. We cannot accept any partial or individual settlement; the final general settlement must be with the Arab party as a single unit. This requires that the Arab parties concerned should be united in their commitments, their acceptance and their rejection.

3. As regards the Palestine problem we recognize the Palestinian people's right to self-determination. When we have performed our duty of liberating the West Bank and Jerusalem within the framework of our national duty to liberate all the occupied Arab territories, we shall allow our people of the West Bank to choose for themselves the future they want and the form of government that satisfies them and to decide in complete freedom, by a referendum held under neutral international auspices, whether they want to stay with us, to unite with us or to separate from us. They shall have what they want and in any case we shall always be their brothers and kinsmen.

This is our attitude, which derives from our principles and our convictions; we have adopted it for altruistic reasons, for the sake of the nation and of our duty.

We have received an invitation to take part in

the peace conference at Geneva. We shall not hesitate to meet our responsibilities or to make every effort to recover the territory and our rights at any international gathering held for the purpose. However, in our view, to let others represent our people in this respect would be to deprive us of our role of ensuring the rights of our people in the West Bank and of endeavouring to recover their territory. This is something we shall have to discuss with the other Arab parties concerned so that we clearly understand where our responsibilities lie and what would be involved if we did or did not go to this conference. In both cases what we do will be a matter of give and take, it will be based on frank and earnest discussion with our brothers and our people. It will be based on clear and solid mutual understanding of what steps we should take on the road to the conference and what action we should take at the conference, and of our united attitudes and our joint demands and obligations. In addition to this and in the face of any attempt to prevent us from speaking on behalf of the people in our occupied territory and defending their rights until they are liberated, we have no intention of competing with anyone or of quarreling with our brothers. Successive generations of my family have sacrificed all that was most dear to them for the cause and their one concern has been, as it is ours, to follow the right course with a clear conscience until God grants us victory and a relief. Come what may, we are firmly resolved that all the sons of Palestine shall exercise their right to self-determination in full and absolute freedom. This is why we are still waiting until the picture becomes clear before giving our final reply to this invitation.

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Statement issued by the Islamic Council of Jerusalem supporting the decisions of the Arab Summit Conference¹⁴⁴

Jerusalem, December 3, 1973

The Islamic Council, having met after the Ramadan War, and reviewed the events which resulted, the attitudes adopted and the statements

¹⁴⁴ Translated from the text, *al-Ittihad* (Haifa), December 7, 1973, pp. 1, 6.

issued after it, wishes to affirm the following:

1. The Islamic Council of Jerusalem, from its zeal and faith, and its consciousness of the responsibility that has befallen it since its formation immediately after the occupation, affirms its support for Arab unanimity and for the honourable spirit of solidarity that has made itself felt in the actions and attitudes of the Arab peoples, and their Kings and Presidents, which aimed at preserving the Arab character of the soil of Palestine and the rights of the Palestinian people. It also affirms its support for the resolutions of the Arab summit conference in Algiers, which was an embodiment of the unity of the Arab nation, and its concern for the heritage and the people of that nation and its holy places, and first and foremost Jerusalem.

2. The Islamic Council of Jerusalem declares that the Arab character of Jerusalem is a historic fact whose character cannot be changed or invalidated by all the statements and actions attempting to impair it.

3. The Islamic Council affirms that aggressions against the Islamic holy places are continuing and affirms its anxiety as regards their fate as long as the occupation does not come to an end, with the restoration of their legitimate rights to their owner. In this connection the Council declares its condemnation of the recent aggressions against the Ya'qubi Mosque in the Ibrahimi Haram, which are a continuation of previous aggressions against the Islamic mosque. It demands that this aggression be prevented and that all the consequences of the fact that it infringes upon the most elementary legal rights and the most fundamental tenets of Islam be eliminated. In publishing this statement the Islamic Council hopes that all will adhere to and act in accordance with the united stand of the Arabs in support of what has been achieved by this Arab nation.

It is God who grants success.

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Communiqué issued after a meeting of Arab Oil Ministers affirming that the lifting of the oil embargo against the US depends on total Israeli withdrawal¹⁴⁵

Kuwait, December 8, 1973

The Arab Ministers of Oil and their representatives signatory to this resolution met in Kuwait on 8 December 1973, after reviewing their resolution issued on 18 November 1973 relating to the suspension of the five percent reduction for the European Common Market countries with the exception of Holland decided upon for December,¹⁴⁶ subject to the proviso that the reduction of five percent of December production levels will continue thereafter for all non-exempted countries in January, have adopted the following resolution:

Firstly: If agreement is reached on withdrawal from all the territories occupied since 1967, foremost amongst them Jerusalem, in accordance with a timetable which Israel agrees to and whose implementation is guaranteed by the United States, the embargo on exports to the United States will be lifted as soon as the withdrawal program begins, and at that point the general reduction applicable to it will be determined on the basis that it should not exceed or be less than the prevailing percentage applicable to the oil consuming countries at the time the embargo is lifted. The percentage reduction will then be applied to the United States in the same way as to Europe and the rest of the world.

Secondly: When agreement on a timetable for a withdrawal is reached the Arab Oil Ministers implementing this resolution will meet to draw up a timetable for the gradual restoration of production to the level of September 1973 in a manner corresponding to the stages of the withdrawal.

Thirdly: The friendly African and Islamic countries will be given the full quantities contracted for in concluded contracts, even if this necessitates an increase in production by a percentage which will guarantee that their domestic requirements

¹⁴⁵ English text as published in *Middle East Economic Survey* (Beirut), XVII, 8 (December 14, 1973), p. 4. Signed by Abu Dhabi, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Syria.

¹⁴⁶ Doc. 325 above.

are met, provided it is ascertained that there is no possibility to re-export to countries to which oil exports are embargoed.

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Speech by Information Minister Hatim of Egypt to the National Assembly outlining his government's post-war policy (excerpts)¹⁴⁷

Cairo, December 8, 1973

Mr. President, Honourable Members,

It is also our duty to record and to salute with the highest appreciation the brave stand of the whole Arab nation. We send our salutations and our appreciation to every member of this mighty nation. When the battle was at its height we knew that every heart was beating in sympathy with us and that every arm was raising the standards of Egypt in support of our heroic fighters. For the first time in modern history the whole of the Arab nation mobilized all its resources, material and moral, for the battle. Our salutations to the Arab kings, presidents, governments and people, who proved to be, in accordance with God's will, "the best of nations." Salutations to our brothers in the covenant and our comrades in arms, salutations to the heroic Syrian army which advanced, along with the Egyptian army, in the vanguard of the struggle of the whole Arab nation and fought the fiercest battles with peerless courage and unparalleled gallantry, inflicting terrible losses on the enemy and bringing low his arrogance and pride.

Salutations to the friendly countries which supported us in our just struggle and, first and foremost the USSR, the socialist countries, the African countries and the non-aligned countries, which encouraged our determination and strengthened our resolution in the struggle.

The political and economic aid supplied us by the USSR, and the Soviet arms with which we confronted the aggression will ever be one of the mainstays of the friendship that link our great peoples.

Mr. President, Honourable Members,

The government whose statement I have the

honour to present to you realizes that the feelings of pride that we have all felt must be transformed in the heart of every individual into a constructive action.

On this basis it is clearly the first duty of our people and our government to draft a national policy for the stage following October 1973, so that all national action may be on a scientific and objective basis and so that we may rebuild on firm foundations capable of confronting present circumstances.

Egypt is starting on years of action during which she must exploit all her energies for development, construction, and the elimination of the traces of aggression at the economic, political and psychological levels. To achieve this we have no alternative but to implement a comprehensive and scientific programme which aims at providing radical solutions for our problems and takes a total and comprehensive view of them.

In the drafting of this national strategy we are ruled by a number of basic principles which can be summed up as follows:

1. The war has not yet ended, despite the ceasefire. We still have a long way to go before we completely attain our national and Arab objectives.

2. The military, political and Arab victories that have been won were the result of intense and continuous efforts and full and comprehensive planning; the winning of further victories for the achievement of our goals requires of us further efforts and proficiency in comprehensive and scientific planning.

3. The achievement of victory requires that we continue with the total mobilization of all the resources and energies of the state and that we prepare ourselves for and anticipate all efforts the enemy may make to change the situation in his favour.

4. The positive results of the war of liberation at all levels must be exploited and made the point of departure on the stage of development and building.

5. The vast masses of the Egyptian people, by their efforts, their awareness and their sacrifices played their part in winning the victory, and they must continue to make efforts and sacrifices until our national and Arab goals are fully achieved.

6. A start has been made toward development and reconstruction, which will continue in con-

¹⁴⁷ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), December 9, 1973.

formity with carefully drafted scientific plans at the economic, social and human levels.

7. The state is responsible for compensating all who suffered injury as a result of aggression. This compensation will be paid without delay in the light of objective studies and on an equitable basis.

Within the framework of these principles I submit to you the government's programme for all fields of national action.

In the field of foreign policy: as you know, when Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal and entered Sinai, international policy, with all its interests, came to the end of a stage when Zionism had tried to misrepresent the facts to create a situation it could impose on the Arab nation and thereby confront the world with a *fait accompli*. At that moment a new stage started, a stage in which the world revised its view of the nature of the aggression to which our peoples are being subjected contrary to the basic principles of justice, in violation of international pacts and in unequivocal infringement of the Charter of the United Nations and its resolutions.

The following are the two most important of the facts to which we have long been drawing the world's attention:

1. The acquisition of territory by force is absolutely unacceptable as it is a flagrant violation of the principles of the United Nations and a direct threat to world peace.

2. The struggle of the Palestinian people against colonialism, Zionism and racism to recover their national rights is a legitimate struggle and an integral part of the world liberation movement.

With a view to demonstrating these facts and obtaining unanimous support for them on the part of the peoples and governments of the world, we have left no avenue unexplored and no legitimate course untrodden in the field of political contacts, according to our belief that the diplomatic and political battle against colonialism and Zionism is a fundamental part of the whole conflict in which we are engaged. This activity has borne fruit in several fields:

1. In the Arab world: October 6 was a prominent landmark on the road towards Arab concord, showing the strength of the links that hold the Arab nation together. It also called the attention of the whole Arab nation to its historical responsibilities which require that further

efforts and sacrifice be made until such time as Arab territories are liberated, whatever the cost.

At Algiers the Arabs unanimously agreed that the ceasefire is not peace and that peace requires that a number of conditions be met, the most important of which are:

a) Israel's withdrawal from all the occupied territories, first and foremost Jerusalem.

b) The Palestinian people's recovery of their established national rights.

As long as these two conditions are not met it is a delusion to expect anything in the Middle East but an aggravation of the explosive situations and new confrontations.

Aware of their historical responsibilities, the Arab kings and presidents affirmed their readiness to play their part in achieving a just peace based on these two principles.

2. In the African field: Africa was with us in our struggle, was responsive to what happened in it and adopted a well-defined attitude in defence of our rights. This was expressed by the Council of Ministers of the Organization for African Unity when it adopted practical resolutions, which formed the basis for the African continent's support for the heroic struggle of the people of Egypt, the Arab countries and the Palestinian people.

The African countries which severed their diplomatic relations with Israel made great sacrifices on behalf of principle and conviction. Neither Egypt nor the Arab world can ever forget these sacrifices.

The spark of Arab-African cooperation which was lit on October 6 opened new horizons in the field of economic and political cooperation with the peoples of the African continent, which the Egyptian government will make constant efforts to maintain and consolidate.

3. Similarly the non-aligned countries adopted an unambiguous attitude, calling for Israel's immediate and unconditional withdrawal from all the territories occupied since 1967. These countries also of their own accord displayed a clear-cut policy of support for the Palestinian people in their struggle against Zionist racist colonialism in order to recover their full national rights. All of the non-aligned countries demand that immigration to Palestine and the occupied Arab territories be prevented. They condemn all countries that give military, political and economic

aid and moral support to Israel, in particular the United States of America, whom they urge to stop giving this aid.

4. At the level of the Islamic world the battle aroused international Islamic sympathy for the Arabs accompanied by a trend towards the adoption of a unified attitude to Israel's violations of the Islamic holy places.

Israel is today confronted with a general rejection of her policies in the Arab countries, the non-aligned countries, the liberation organizations of the Third World, and also in the socialist countries and Western Europe. An important indication of this is the fact that certain Western European governments, traditionally known for their support of Israel's adventurist policy, are starting to question the advantages of this policy, which has so gravely endangered peace and international cooperation.

The whole world must realize that the Arab nation does not want to threaten the peace of anyone. More than any other nation it wants to direct all its energies to ensuring security and peace for its sons and for all around it. The whole world must also realize that the Arab nation does not want to threaten anyone's prosperity, but it does ask the world not to support those who are seeking to destroy its own prosperity and who, by their aggression and occupation of Arab territories, are sowing seeds that threaten the peace and prosperity of all.

Mr. President, Honourable Members,

The diplomatic activity we have undertaken in directing our historical struggle against colonialism and Zionism has demonstrated our real concern for peace. The whole world should recall that it was President Anwar Sadat who, at the peak of our military victory, took the initiative by putting forward a comprehensive proposal for the achievement of a just peace in the Middle East.

Let us all remember, brothers, that our acceptance of the ceasefire was, in its turn, an expression of our concern for peace, although we never for a moment forgot that it would not mean the end of the battle and would not lead to peace solutions.

The real threat to peace at the present stage lies in the enemy's procrastination in the implementation of his agreements and this, as you know, has led to the breakdown of the talks at Kilometre 101.

We, for our part, shall continue to cooperate at this stage and to work through the United

Nations, adhering to the pledges of the two great powers to take action to secure the implementation of the United Nations resolutions in this connection, making every effort to ensure that international detente between the two great powers continues to be an instrument in the service of peace and justice on which our struggle is based, and joining with the whole of the international community in bearing the responsibility for it.

But we shall continue to do all this with our arms at the ready and our eyes on the perfidious enemy whose aggression and full responsibility for threatening the world's security, stability, and prosperity are now known to the whole world.

We are preparing to take part in the peace conference that is to be held in Geneva, but when we go there we shall hold fast to the following principles:

1. We shall never agree that this conference should be used to postpone the implementation of United Nations resolutions or to restore the stagnation that prevailed before October 6.

2. We reject every attempt at the further discussion of the two just principles on which our foreign policy has been based—the principle of Israeli withdrawal from Arab territories and the principle of the recovery of the rights of the Palestinian people.

3. We regard Palestinian participation in this conference as an affirmation by the international community of the legality of their existence and a clear recognition of their rights.

We remind ourselves, as we remind our friends, that our real strength at these talks derives from our intrinsic strength, at the political, economic and military levels, and also from continued Arab cohesion and the solidarity of all the friendly forces that have stood beside us throughout our struggle.

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Press interview statements by King Hussein of Jordan discussing the decision of the Algiers summit conference to recognize the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people¹⁴⁸

Amman, December 9, 1973

Q. What do you think of a "two-headed State" which would recall the Hashimite Federation of 1959 between Iraq and Jordan, or resume the formula advocated at the Algiers summit by President Bourguiba with this essential difference that the Palestinian state would be federated to Jordan and not to Israel?

A. Ask the Palestinians that question. It's their business to decide on their future and on the political institutions which should govern the liberated territories. But allow me in the meantime to assume all my responsibilities to ensure first of all the liberation of these territories. No one can deny what the Hashimites have done for Palestine since the beginning of this century. We have given it everything, our lives and our possessions, and on this particular point we have no lessons to learn from anyone. But for the moment let us keep to the most urgent thing, which is the evacuation of the territories. Before going to Geneva we should coordinate our policy and all our initiatives with Egypt and Syria. We should know why we accept negotiation and agree on the attitude to adopt in order to confront our choice and take all the consequences of it. [Discussing the Algiers Summit resolution which recognized the PLO as sole representative of the Palestinian people and its right to speak in their name:] That's what explains our delay in deciding to participate in Geneva. There is an ambiguity we must dispel and positions we must clarify—

Q. So you might as well wait for the Syrians and Egyptians to change their minds about their decision concerning Mr. Arafat's organization?

A. And why should the latter reserve for itself the exclusive representation of the Palestinian people, while we are forbidden to make such claims, and this, in consideration of the wish of this people which has not yet been expressed?

[Le Monde: *When asked if this right doesn't primarily belong to those who fight and die to liberate their country, rather than to those who, by their passivity, become almost accomplices of the enemy, the King replied:*]

A. ...with regard to occupied Palestine, no one can avail himself more than another of the honour and merit of struggle and sacrifice: those who remained have done as much for the cause as those who fight outside and far from the homeland.

Q. But then why not have all those who are responsible for Palestine's destiny participate at Geneva?

A. We are not counting out any possibility and are ready to envisage any formula proposed to us. Why not integrate among the members of the Jordanian delegation who would go to Geneva, representatives of all the political viewpoints who lay claim to call on the Palestine revolution? We totally reject all vetoes and exclusive rights provided others do the same.

Q. Do you really think that, in spite of the September 1970 civil war, there is still a possibility of cooperation and coexistence between the Palestine resistance and the monarchy?

A. I advocate an association for better and for worse. Why not disregard the past? The responsibilities for the events of September 1970 are, for me, shared. In fact, this armed conflict never opposed the Palestinian and Jordanian people; it brought into conflict a regime threatened with destruction and anarchist groups who didn't agree amongst themselves and who didn't know what they wanted.

Q. But, beyond the Geneva conference, how do you view the Palestinian state? President Sadat has declared to the resistance organizations that the Gaza Strip will never return to Egyptian sovereignty. What about the West Bank?

A. That will depend, as I've already told you, on the choice made by the Palestinian people.

Q. But during the period between evacuation and the referendum, who will control the liberated Palestinian territory?

A. We shall see that the referendum is organized in the shortest possible time under aegis of the UN authorities. In any case, the Palestinian people will have the last word.

How do you explain that the Arab nation, which aspires to unity, should be so lamentably split up into miniscule states which are not economi-

¹⁴⁸ Excerpted and translated from the French text of the interview conducted by Edouard Saab, *Le Monde* (Paris), December 11, 1973, pp. 1, 4.

cally viable? All that was necessary was for those who declare or wish themselves to be the makers of this union decide at Algiers to separate what history and geography have united; the two banks of the Jordan.

Q. Some people think that placing Jordan in quarantine was due to the Kingdom's refusal to open a third front against Israel during the October war—

A. We went beyond what was expected of us. Our complications with the Palestinians since the 1967 war and treasury problems prevented us from rebuilding our war arsenal, and consequently we were unable to pass to an offensive from the Jordanian front. We had only to see that our territory didn't act as an air and ground corridor for enemy troops, and to prevent those from taking up positions to the rear of the Syrians. When the latter's situation became critical, we sent one of our crack brigades there to fight where our fathers and grandfathers had formerly distinguished themselves by their heroic deeds of valour, to defend the land of this indivisible nation whose guardians they were. What more could we do, taking account of the circumstances and of our modest means?

Q. In Cairo, last September 11 and 12, what did you discuss with Presidents Sadat and Assad?

A. Everything, except the war: Israeli expansionism, Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union, markets where one could buy arms, the necessity of one day having to resume hostilities, the conditions of forming an Arab front under unified command. But not a word was said about the zero hour of the battle.

Q. During the war, the Palestine resistance asked your permission to enter Jordan and organize commando raids against Israel. Why did you reject that request?

A. I refused because I think that the resistance only has a place on the battlefield, at home in Palestine. For our part, we are doing our duty. Besides, salvation can only come from the Arab states and armies. The latter had to go into action to alert public opinion, the great powers and the international authorities. Fedayeen action had no effect on this plan.

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Television interview statements by Oil Minister Yamani of Saudi Arabia outlining revised conditions for the lifting of the oil embargo against the US¹⁴⁹

New York, December 9, 1973

Q. Mr. Minister, you are quoted in a prominent newspaper this morning as having said "I think we can change the Arab oil embargo sometime in 1974." This morning we have also received a story from Kuwait saying that the Arab oil states insist that the embargo will be continued until Israel has agreed to withdraw from all Arab territories occupied since 1967, including first and foremost the city of Jerusalem. If I may put these two things together, do you think these objectives will be achieved in 1974?

A. If you are talking about the oil embargo against the US then the Arab Oil Ministers met yesterday in Kuwait. Last night they took their decision and they decided to remove the embargo against the United States of America immediately when Israel accepts to withdraw from the occupied Arab territory and that acceptance is guaranteed by the United States of America. Now this is a decision, a new one, from the Arab oil producing countries.

Q. Does it represent some departure from the statements you made yesterday, when you said "I think we can change some time in 1974"?

A. Well I think this is a departure from the previous decision which was taken by the Arab producers which linked the cut down in production and subsequently the oil embargo with the complete withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the Arab territories. Now it is possible to move back again our oil to this country immediately when Israel accepts to withdraw from the Arab territories and that acceptance is guaranteed by the US.

Q. Does this mean you no longer think this may happen in 1974?

A. It means that this could be done very soon. It could be done in January if Israel accepts to withdraw.

¹⁴⁹ Interview conducted by Lawrence Spivak, Richard Hunt (NBC), Hobart Rowen (*Washington Post*), Peter Grosse (*New York Times*) and Rowland Evans (*Chicago Sun Times*) for NBC's "Meet the Press"; excerpted and transcribed from videotape at the US Information Service office in Beirut.

Q. Would the lifting of the embargo mean that the production of oil and the shipments of oil would be resumed at their former levels?

A. If you are talking about the level of September 1973, the lifting of the embargo alone does not take it back to that level; but the cut down of production, if it is now removed—and this is also linked to the acceptance of the Israelis to withdraw—then we immediately start increasing production. Upon the complete withdrawal then the normal production of 1973, September 1973, would again come into existence.

Q. Mr. Minister, I would like to ask you a couple of political questions. Did King Faisal ever warn this country, either President Nixon or President Johnson, that Saudi Arabia and the other Arab oil states might feel compelled to stop oil shipments on the basis of the Middle East political controversy with Israel?

A. Very much so.

Q. When was the last warning before the actual war which started on October 6?

A. I was here in April, and I delivered the message to the US government officials and I explained that our policy is based on full cooperation with the United States of America, that we would like to produce as much as you need. All what we want you to do is to have an even handed policy, is to implement the 242 resolution of the Security Council. I told the US officials this and we kept saying this. So what happened is not a surprise at all.

Q. Mr. Minister, does the goal of the restoration of the rights of the Palestinian people which is being insisted upon by the Arab states and particularly Yasser Arafat, who is the leader of the Palestinian nationalists, does that imply the end of the state of Israel as a state and if not, why not?

A. I see that there is a contradiction between saying that we want to implement the 242 resolution and saying that there should be an end to the state of Israel, because 242 talks about a recognized boundary for the state of Israel and I think they do not contradict.

Q. But, sir, you support the Arafat position do you not?

A. I think Arafat when he goes to Geneva will take with him the framework of the 242.

Q. So you think the restoration of the rights of the Palestinian people per se does not mean that Israel would have to go back to 1947–48 borders or Israel would be made extinct as a state, because that is the way Arafat talks?

A. I do not think he is saying this. I think all the Arab leaders surrounding Israel are talking about recognizing this state, living in peace with Israel. So this is not an issue at all.

Q. When you speak of this political obstacle, right now you clearly mean the problem of Israel and more specifically Jerusalem, but at the Algiers summit meeting the various Arab leaders said that their oil exporting policy would be governed by the attitudes of oil consuming nations toward the Arab cause. Now that is a rather vague statement. Perhaps the Arab cause could at some future date include other political problems?

A. To me it is not vague and I think what the Arabs are trying now to get is to get back the occupied territory and to have peace in the area. I can tell you that with regard to Saudi Arabia, if there is anything that we hate, then it is to use this oil as a weapon. We were so reluctant to use it. We came to this country begging you to change this policy, asking you to implement the 242 and bring peace to the area. All that we want is peace and nothing else. So we hate to use oil as a weapon and I do not think we will ever use it again if the problem, which is the only problem, is solved. There is nothing between the US and Saudi Arabia as a bilateral dispute or difficulty. The only thing is this problem of the, what you call it, the Arab cause, peace and removal of occupation.

Q. Well, looking at the problem specifically let us take Jerusalem. The Prime Minister of Israel, Mrs. Meir, has proposed that all the holy places of Jerusalem be under the exclusive control of their respective religious communities, now would such an arrangement, exclusive Muslim control for the mosque of Umar and all the places, meet your government's interest in Jerusalem?

A. Our government's interest is to have all occupied territories back, including East of Jerusalem.

Q. East Jerusalem must go back to King Hussein of Jordan in your policy?

A. The Israelis must withdraw from East Jerusalem.

Q. In favour of what government? In favour of the government of Jordan?

A. Well if there is a new state for Palestine, I don't know. If there is nothing I think it is Jordan.

Q. Mr. Minister, may I ask you a question. You and the other Arab countries have indicated quite clearly what you want Israel to do. Can you give us some idea of what you think Israel is entitled to get in return?

A. Well if they give up their policy of expansion I think then peace is what they should look at. I think they can enjoy a recognized, secure boundary as such, secured by the treaty of peace and probably by the guarantee of the super powers, if this is what they want.

Q. Your country for example has not yet recognized Israel, has not said it would. Would your country if you had all of that, would your country for example be ready to recognize Israel and have diplomatic relations with them and do you think the other Arab countries would?

A. I think what matters are those Arab countries surrounding Israel. They have to recognize Israel and sign a peace treaty with Israel but I don't think that those who are far away are an immediate party to the problem and therefore I don't think it is important or significant for the problem to have all the Arab countries recognize Israel or live in peace with them because there is no immediate contact with them and the state of Israel.

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Communiqué issued by the government of Syria announcing Syria's refusal to attend the Geneva conference¹⁵⁰

Damascus, December 18, 1973

In light of recent contacts, including those with Egypt and the United States of America during the US Secretary of State's visit to Damascus; and in light of all the circumstances of the present situation, which indicate a series of conspiracies aimed at serving the interests of Israel and at diverting the conference to the discussion of partial issues that would involve us in interminable fruitless discussions with the aim of diluting the main problem and preventing it from being dealt with by

the drafting of a programme for total withdrawal from the territory occupied in 1967 and drawing a precise picture to ensure the rights of the Palestinian people;

In light of the above it has been decided that the Syrian Arab Republic will not take part in the Geneva Conference which is to meet on December 21, 1973.

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Statement by Vice Chairman Hussein of Iraq's Revolutionary Command Council outlining Iraq's attitude to the oil weapon (excerpts)¹⁵¹

Baghdad, December 19, 1973

Reactionary ruling circles well known for their links with America and American monopolistic interests have in the past continually rejected the principle of using oil as a weapon in the national battle against the Zionist-imperialist enemy. They rejected all the serious proposals and projects submitted by Iraq at both the official and popular Arab levels, projects built on a firm scientific and nationalist basis in order to realize the desired aims in the most satisfactory way.

When the war of 6 October 1973 broke out, these circles made no move and took no steps in the field of oil. But after Iraq proceeded to nationalize the American share of the Basrah Petroleum Company on 7 October,¹⁵² and with the escalation of the battle against the enemy and the escalation of the sweeping and pressing popular demand for a blow against American interests in the area, and after more than ten days of the war, these circles began to make a series of moves on the oil front, of which the most important were the embargo on oil to America and Holland and a general reduction in output.

The embargo on oil to Holland and America is a sound move, although we thought it weak and not enough to pressure America and deter it from supporting the enemy. But the policy of reducing production generally harmed other countries more than America, which is a totally different matter,

¹⁵¹ *Al-Thawra* (Baghdad), December 20, 1973; excerpted from the English translation in *Middle East Economic Survey* (Beirut), XVII, 10 (December 28, 1973), pp. 14, 16.

¹⁵² Doc. 278 above.

¹⁵⁰ Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Thawra* (Damascus), December 19, 1973.

and led to results which run counter to its stated purpose. The production cutback in the form arranged by reactionary circles—in which they succeeded in involving other Arab circles—means effectively depriving the countries of Western Europe and Japan of their oil requirements and causing them an extremely serious economic crisis.

If we compare the effect of the decision to cut off oil to America with the effect of a cutback in production in Europe and Japan it becomes very clear that more damage is being done to Europe and Japan than to America. This is a serious political mistake, since the aim of this policy was to create suitable conditions for the Arabs in their just struggle with the Zionist enemy. Despite the fact that Western Europe carries important weight in putting pressure on the enemy, and admitting the great need for it to adopt a clear and just position on the legitimate Arab cause, Western Europe is not the most powerful party supporting the Zionist enemy and permitting it to continue in its occupation of Arab territory and to defy human values and feelings. The party doing this is well known. It is America which is giving total support to the enemy with arms, money and political backing, and it is natural to direct the oil weapon against America and those on its side rather than at other countries and parties.

The true and successful way to use oil as a weapon against America and the Zionist enemy is to nationalize American oil interests and the interests of any country standing by the enemy. This is the weapon which will really force America to stop supporting the enemy. At the same time nationalization will achieve total economic independence for us and enable us to control our resources fully and to cooperate freely with the countries of the world on the basis of reciprocity and mutual advantage, thus achieving prosperity both for our people and the peoples of the world. This is the path we have chosen in Iraq, whose soundness and full effectiveness for our interests and our national and patriotic aspirations have been proved by experience.

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Speech by Foreign Minister Fahmy of Egypt made at the opening session of the Middle East Peace Conference¹⁵³

Geneva, December 21, 1973

Mr. Secretary General, we are meeting today under the auspices of the United Nations and we are indeed pleased to meet under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Your presence symbolizes the interest of the organization in the question of the Middle East, which has been the concern of the United Nations since its inception.

We would wish to thank you and all your colleagues, and we are sure that the United Nations will follow with keen interest our celebrations, and I welcome, if and when our work departs, God forbid, from the principles enshrined in the charters, your and the UN duty to put us back on the path prescribed by the charter [sentence as heard]

Gentlemen, throughout history countries and nations have shown a stubborn resistance when faced with wrongs perpetrated against them. Legitimate grievances never failed to generate increasing revolt to do away with injustice. We in Egypt have had to face along the centuries many kinds of wrongs inflicted upon us. Each time we have resisted and suppressed them and have emerged in the end triumphant. No sacrifices were too great and no sufferings unbearable when nations pursuing such a noble cause worked with determination for justice and genuine peace. Such are the teachings of history.

This we must remember when all of us look ahead and (? delve) into the future. When applying the lessons to the Middle East, one hardly needs to find out the tragic events that took place since the Palestinians were denied their national rights over their country and driven by force from their own land—a land to which they and to which we eternally belong. This area has since then continuously suffered from the militaristic and expansionist policy of Israel and from its unrelenting efforts to conquer and annex ever more territory, thus seriously endangering the independence and

¹⁵³ English transcript, archives of the Institute for Palestine Studies. For the speeches of other delegates see docs. 16, 216–218 and 343 elsewhere in this volume.

infringing upon the territorial integrity of the countries in the area.

The conflict in the Middle East is not and never has been a struggle that arose because its people held different beliefs. For centuries these peoples, irrespective of their creeds or religion, lived peacefully side by side. They could have continued living in peace enjoying the immense opportunities which God and nature has bestowed on this good earth had it not been for the wedge that was driven by force and in the alleged name of religion into their midst for the sake of domination, exploitation and racist practices.

I do not wish, however, to dwell on this known matter, but merely want to say that the moment warlike acts and aggressions cease to be the maxim of Israel, trying to convince the world that its very existence can be built on military rashness and supremacy, at such a moment only can a just peace at last be envisaged for the region.

For as a result of the events which took place on the 6th of October, the Israelis must, we hope, have decided to relinquish this maxim and to change their course toward the road to real peace, durable peace and just peace. So far as Egypt is concerned, my presence here symbolizes our deep desire to restore to our ravaged and embattled region a durable and just peace.

This conference is a historical event on which all the hopes of the world are focused. It would be a real tragedy if the wisdom of those most directly concerned, or even of those only partly linked with the future of the Middle East, should fail to seize this unique opportunity to face the basic issues involved in the conflict and find real solutions that would constitute the mainstays in a permanent peace that leads us to an era of enlightened achievements instead of tragic disappointments.

This conference, as I have said, is historic and unique in its nature because it represents the culmination of efforts and many attempts by all the peoples and the undertakings of world statesmen for the purpose of putting an end to this conflict which has extended over a long period of time. As for the Arab countries, they have accepted the invitation to the conference while ready and determined to lay down the cornerstone of the edifice of peace in the Middle East.

This conference is unique in its nature because if Israel does not appreciate the far-reaching significance of our work here, the chances that this

historic meeting will be repeated will indeed become extremely remote. The obvious result then, without any doubt, would be to resort to other means to liberate our lands and regain our rights after a quarter of a century.

Moreover, this conference is unique in its character too. I can even say that there is nothing like it. This is the first time in history that a conference dealing with the affairs of peace in the Middle East has included among its participants the Soviet Union and the United States, the two superpowers which shoulder responsibilities unprecedented in history for preserving the world security and peace. I consider their participation a good omen. I also consider their representation here by their foreign ministers a fact that gives further evidence of their desire to insure that a peaceful and just settlement is reached in the Middle East.

For Egypt, and I am sure for the world as well, this conference is a historic event of important political significance. Also, I hope that we all agree that no lasting and just peace can emerge in our area if such a peace is not compatible with certain basic rules and principles which I would like to call the prerequisites for peace in this area.

I am confident in this regard that we all, including the major powers, fully realize that the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the area cannot be based on the following:

- a) The expansion by force of one state at the expense of another.
- b) The seizure of foreign territory by force.
- c) Threatening recognized international borders under any pretext or claim.
- d) Jeopardizing the sovereignty of states and violating their territorial integrity.
- e) Denial of the right of Palestinians to determine their future and live in peace.

As for us, Mr. Chairman, we hopefully and sincerely look forward to the achievement of a lasting and just peace. This, in our opinion, is the least that this historic meeting should accomplish. Otherwise, we would produce an extremely strange document that public opinion in our country and in the whole world would absolutely not digest and would even oppose and reject. Such a peace would be as flimsy and frail as the present cease-fire and would be similar in its risks and dangers to the conditions that have existed in the Middle East for the past 25 years as a result of the failure to

implement the many resolutions concerning this subject adopted by the various UN organs.

Mr. Chairman, my presence here is a continuation and a real and faithful application of the policy and strategy whose basis President Anwar Sadat has founded. Out of fairness to justice and right, His Excellency, as you might recall, on 4 February 1971¹⁵⁴ proposed a program for the realization of peace based on the full implementation of Security Council Resolution No. 242 and on 16 October of the same year, he once again proposed holding a peace conference at the United Nations. The said conference was supposed to chart the situation and to provide safeguards for the establishment of peace based on respect for the legitimate rights of the people of the area.

Egypt's determination to work for peace is matched by its determination to see its lands and the lands of the other Arab countries liberated one way or another and to see that the Palestinian people enjoy their legitimate right to live in security and dignity.

This, in fact, represents what Egypt has been striving to achieve since 5 June 1967 and until October 1973. Indeed, Egypt has worked for peace without slackening. Its efforts have been recognized and welcomed by all the countries of the world, whether in Africa, Asia, Europe, the Soviet Union and even in the United States. Documents bear witness that the president and the Egyptian people have done all they can in order to achieve a durable and just peace. Alas, all these efforts were met by a persistent cry and determination to retain Arab territory unlawfully and by the use of force.

Then the hour of 6 October 1967 [as heard] struck, as a result of which we hope that the Israeli Government has now realized that Israeli security does not lie in retaining geographical profits or in achieving military supremacy, but that it would be best to safeguard it if it accepts to live in peace with its neighbors. We hope, furthermore, that Israel now understands as well that Egypt—and for that matter, all the Arab countries—cannot be conquered by force or allow its land to remain occupied, nor would the Arab world accept that the Palestinians continue to be treated inhumanely and Jerusalem, the city of peace, remain under the banner of the conqueror.

Territories are the heritage most jealously guarded and defended by a people. They are handed from generation to generation. They are part of its history, convey a profound sense of pride and [words indistinct] loss of territory deeply affects them and provokes a strong resolve to regain by all means what is by right theirs.

People do not bargain or barter over their territories, and the Arab nation is no exception. To expect the Arabs to give up part of their land is to misread tragically their determination as to the contrary. To insist that this be done would wreck all hopes for this conference of peace to achieve what it has set out to do.

To all of us, coming to this conference is a major step on the road to peace. We realize that this conference would never have materialized if it were not for the multiple efforts of all countries of the world and the resolve to see to it that peace is at last restored to the region.

Egypt attends this conference with full determination to do its best in a businesslike manner to achieve a just and lasting peace. In doing so, however, we will never overlook the following basic essentials for peace in our area:

1. Total withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Arab territories occupied since 5 June 1967.

2. Liberation of the Arab city of Jerusalem and nonacceptance of any situation which may be injurious to complete Arab sovereignty over the holy city.

3. The exercise by the Palestinians of their right to self-determination and to live in peace and dignity.

4. The right of every state in the area to enjoy territorial inviolability and political independence.

5. That there be international guarantees of the major powers or the United Nations or both as an added safeguard to international peace and security in the area.

These essentials for peace are in conformity with and fully reflect the decisions taken at the recent Arab summit in Algiers. Egypt, for its part, is fully prepared to honour all its other obligations emanating from Security Council Resolution 242 both in letter and in spirit.

Mr. Secretary-General, I hope I have made clear the basic philosophy of my government and that I have conveyed to you and the members around this table to what extent we have [words indistinct]. We in Egypt are prepared to cooperate

¹⁵⁴ Doc. 274 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

to establish a just and durable peace. We realize that this cannot be achieved through Egypt's will and determination alone. Peace needs an equally profound desire and determination by all those concerned with this conflict, and in particular the United States and the Soviet Union, who took upon themselves a unique responsibility unprecedented in history.

Durable and just peace in the Middle East must be maintained without ambiguity, in conformity with international law and basic principles enshrined in the charter of the United Nations and reflected in the resolutions and decisions of the world organizations, which are in fact the true expression of the opinion and the hopes of the peoples of the world.

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Speech by Foreign Minister Rifai of Jordan made at the opening session of the Middle East Peace Conference¹⁵⁵

Geneva, December 21, 1973

Mr. Secretary-General, as we come to this peace conference, it might be in order to recall the words of Rabindranath Tagore, and I quote: "Give me the supreme faith of love. This is my prayer: The faith of the life in death, of the victory in defeat, of the power hidden in frailness of beauty." Indeed, Mr. Chairman, it is this victory of rights over wrongs, of justice over injustice, and of peace over war which the delegation of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan is coming to seek at this conference.

It has been a long time—too long—since we started our search for peace in the Palestine area. The Middle East crisis of today, which earlier was known as the question of Palestine, is a tragedy the likes of which humanity has never witnessed with such a wide magnitude. From the days of the First World War, when the Jews in Palestine were no more than 56,000 people who owned no more than 2 percent of the total area of Palestine, to the days when they increased immensely and vastly through immigration from various other lands and expanded in Arab Palestine through invasion and

occupation, the struggle between the Israeli invaders and the indigenous Arabs weighed heavily on human conscience.

The tide, however, never stopped at any limits. The resolution of the partition of Palestine adopted by the United Nations in 1947 was overshadowed by the delineation of the armistice lines in 1949 as a result of Israel's military gains. Thus, while the Jewish state in the partition of 1947 was given only 56 percent of the total area of Palestine, she was able to occupy 77.4 percent of this total area, and, in its ambitious expansionist policy, Israel followed its own timetable for the acquisition of Arab territory.

In 1967 and after 20 years since its establishment, Israel swept over all of Palestine plus large areas of three neighboring Arab states. Today, its armed forces stand on the banks of the Jordan River, on the plains of Damascus and west of the Suez. By force of arms, Israel reached that extent. Is it the sword that shall win? Is it the force of arms, as Israel's leaders put it, that shall determine the issue? Can Israel establish its future in the Arab ocean through continued adventure?

Throughout the 25 years of its life, Israel failed to win the slightest degree of love or acceptance by its Arab neighbors. It has been always looked upon as an authority of terror and aggression the conduct of which [pause of about one-half minute] Arab population, of the [word indistinct] of their roots, of the suppression of those who were left behind, of the repressive measures taken against them, of the wide-scale deportation of Arab inhabitants, of the confiscation and expropriation of land and property, of the desecration of holy places and venerated shrines, and of the change of historical and cultural heritage.

It is not the time to speak of the damage, destruction and murder that was done against the Arab people and homeland at the hands of Israel.

But it is time, no doubt, to ask at the outset of this conference: How long will this Israeli armed aggression be allowed to continue and to remain? Should the Arabs always have to wage war in order to live in peace? Those files of resolutions which were adopted at the United Nations by its various organs stand witness to the failure of the international community to heed the call of justice. The fact, the naked fact, remains that Israel's armed occupation of Arab territory constitutes an act of continued and escalating aggression which

¹⁵⁵ English transcript, archives of the Institute for Palestine Studies. For the speeches of other delegates see docs. 16, 216–218 and 342 elsewhere in this volume.

the world has watched in silence.

It is from this position, the position of recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny, that the Arabs had to take up arms. The fighting which broke out in our area at the Egyptian and Syrian fronts on last October 6 was a gallant effort by the Arab forces dedicated to bring peace into reality. The economic measures taken by other Arab countries were another resolute expression demanding the compliance of Israel with the conditions of peace. The sacred heritage which descended to our people from the rise of history and the well-established civilization which we safeguard motivate us continuously to avoid exposing this legacy to danger and destruction.

Israel does not seem to share with us this concern. Could it be because it does not belong to our environment? Could it be because it is a stranger in our homeland? The measures Israel took despite the universal will of mankind to alter the status of the holy city of Jerusalem and to change life and tradition in it is a grave violation which neither history nor the future will forgive or tolerate. How can Israel be introduced into the Arab region and live in permanent peace with the Arab surroundings as long as it insists on being foreign and hostile?

The peace, Mr. Chairman, which we would conclude with Israel is that which would restore to the Arab people their occupied land, that which would return to the legitimate inhabitants their inalienable rights, and that which would insure Arab neighbors with security against Israeli attacks.

Mr. Chairman, we meet today as directly concerned parties under appropriate auspices with the aim of establishing a just and durable peace through the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 in all its parts. In fact, the Government of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan never failed on any single occasion to call for the implementation of Resolution 242 as the way to achieve peace. This has been our steady position since the adoption of this resolution. Whether at the General Assembly of the United Nations or the Security Council, or whether with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Jordan maintained this stand.

Neither in international law, nor in sound logic can a state of occupation by armed attacks be acceptable or permissible. Nor can such a state be allowed to continue simply because the oc-

cupying authority insists on imposing its own will.

Six and one half years have passed at the expense of peace and tranquillity in the Middle East. There was no reason for failure to achieve peace during that period except for the refusal of Israel to comply with the pronouncement of the United Nations, with the rule of law, and with the prerequisites of peace. We ought to declare unequivocally that time will continue to lapse mainly unless Israel commits itself to complete withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied since June 5, 1967, and this includes occupied Syrian territory since the absence of Syria from this conference should not in any way prejudice her right to full withdrawal of Israeli forces from all its occupied territory and since the position of my government is that the principle of withdrawal is indivisible.

This, Mr. Chairman, is the only way to proceed if we at this conference are to reach a peaceful settlement. My government believes that there are main issues in the construction of peace which should be decided upon in this conference. These issues are outlined as follows:

1. Israel's complete withdrawal from all Arab territories which it occupied since June 5, 1967. A program of implementation and a timetable for this withdrawal should be drawn up and agreed upon.

2. International boundaries of the states of the area must be recognized and respected, as well as the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of these states.

3. Wherever there are no international boundaries between an Arab state and Israel, such boundaries are to be established by agreement and on the basis of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force.

4. The right of every state in the area to live in peace within secure and recognized [words indistinct].

5. The legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine must be fulfilled in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations, and the Palestinian refugees must exercise their right of repatriation and/or compensation in accordance with law and justice.

6. Arab Jerusalem is an inseparable part of the Arab occupied territory. Therefore, Israel is to relinquish its authority over it. Arab sovereignty must be restored in the Arab sector of the city.

The holy places of all the three divine religions must be preserved, protected and respected, and free access for all the followers of these three religions must be secured and maintained.

Mr. Chairman, when Israel was established by the United Nations in 1947 and was admitted to the membership of the United Nations in 1948, it made a declaration that it, and I quote: "Unreservedly accepts the obligations of the United Nations charter and undertakes to honour them from the day it becomes a member of the United Nations."

And of course, with such an undertaking, Mr. Chairman, Israel failed to honour its first obligation of membership in the UN charter, which stipulates that, and I quote: "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threats or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state." And of course, Israel for the last 6½ years has been violating the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of three Arab states, namely Egypt, Jordan and Syria, and has for the last 25 years been violating the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine. Today, we come as directly involved parties and most concerned with the problems to try to arrive at a settlement through peace.

My government's attitude toward the deliberations and conclusions of this conference is that an overall settlement to the problem before us, and the major issues related to it, is a collective responsibility of all the parties directly concerned. Questions of withdrawal, boundaries, Palestinian rights, refugees, obligations of peace and the status of Jerusalem are all of common concern and collective responsibility. My delegation, therefore, is not prepared to conclude any partial settlements on matters that we feel are of a joint interest with our Arab brothers at this conference.

Sir, faithful to our obligations toward the United Nations, and noting that the only recognized documents before us today are Security Council Resolutions 242 of November 22, 1967, and 338 of October 22, 1973, my government is pleased to have the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dr. Waldheim, preside over the opening meeting of this conference. Also, may I be allowed, Mr. Chairman, to acknowledge at this occasion with sincere appreciation and high admiration the effective and noble role which both

the United States of America and the Soviet Union have played to bring this conference into being.

Needless to say, we are also grateful to have had the chance to convene our conference of peace in Switzerland, the land of peace, beauty and human dignity. And as we meet today, we know that the eyes of the world are turning toward us. Here in the European continent the voice of right is echoing stronger and stronger. On the free soil of Africa, our African brothers are boldly knocking at the gates of peace. Great Asia is backing our efforts with all its weight and dignity. Every patriot, every refugee and every freeman is wishing us success in our work. Let us, therefore, give in the present test of the lofty principles of mankind what they deserve of seriousness, sincerity and devotion. Let us give to the Middle East, the torch of civilization and the cradle of prophets, the peace which it has missed for many decades. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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Statement issued by Saiqa rejecting the idea of Palestinian participation in the Middle East Peace Conference (excerpt)¹⁵⁶

December 22, 1973

Now that the dialogue has assumed its full dimensions in the institutions of the Liberation Organization and in the ranks of our people, and that the Geneva Conference has actually started, our Organization wishes to place on record the following observations, as expressing the salient points in the current situation:

1. The Geneva Conference is not meeting in the context of a clear understanding between the two great powers as regards at least the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people, which could ensure that people a minimum of justice.

2. Most countries in the world are vying with each other to declare that it is essential to ensure the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people in addition to withdrawal from the territories occupied in the June 1967 War, as the basic condition for the establishment of a just and permanent

¹⁵⁶ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Tala'i* (Damascus), December 25, 1973, supplement, p. 1.

peace in the Arab area, but it is rare for anyone to announce the adoption of a clear basis for the definition of these rights. On the contrary, they leave this to the Palestinians themselves and to the peace conference.

3. The peace conference, by virtue of the nature of its establishment and its terms of reference and the principles in accordance with which representatives were invited to attend it, is called basically to discuss the practical measures necessary for the implementation of resolutions and documents sanctioned in advance by the parties concerned. These are resolutions 242, 338, and 339. Consequently the conference will not be able to go beyond this framework, solve the fundamental problem, and adopt resolutions defining the rights of the Palestinian people that go further than anything adopted by the United Nations.

4. The balance of forces under whose auspices the conference is meeting gives no grounds for the most optimistic to hope for anything that goes beyond Security Council Resolution 242. The forces that convened the conference have declared that they have adopted the above-mentioned Security Council resolutions, but they have avoided declaring any other commitment vis-à-vis the Palestinian people, even to the United Nations resolutions on Palestine and the Palestinian people.

In light of the above, Saiqa is of the opinion that:

1. There must no longer be any doubt or obscurity about the rights of the Palestinian Arab people. The first and foremost of these rights is the right to return to their homeland so as to build their own society and to achieve their unified political existence through the exercise of sovereignty and of the right to self-determination in the whole of their homeland.

This is a natural right that cannot be waived and must not be confused with any transient demand or interim gain that could be achieved by the national struggle of the Palestinian people and the Arab nation today or tomorrow.

2. The Conference on the Middle East which met in Geneva on December 21, 1973, is not qualified to achieve a solution that will ensure that even partial justice is done to the problem of the Palestinian people or that they recover the minimum of their national rights.

3. Participation in the conference by any Palestinian quarter would turn the anticipated settle-

ment of the consequences of the June 1967 aggression into a general liquidation of the Palestine problem. This is the price that the Zionist enemy and his ally, American imperialism, insist on extorting in return for withdrawal from all or part of the territories occupied in 1967.

4. The political and constitutional future of the Palestinian territories affected by the withdrawal, should the peace conference be successful, must be discussed and decided when the withdrawal has taken place, within an exclusively Arab framework and without any Zionist-American participation or any commitments or concessions prejudicing the real essence of the problem. This must not be left to the Hashimite regime alone.

5. Similarly, the future of the Palestine Liberation Organization and its relations with the territory from which the occupation withdraws must be subsequently discussed in light of the demands of the Palestinian masses, of respect for their right to continue their struggle and of the necessity to maintain the national identity of the Palestinian Arab people.

Struggling masses of our people,

The continued Zionist presence in the territory of Palestine conflicts fundamentally with the existence of the Palestinian people and of the Arab nation. Therefore the liquidation of this artificial Zionist-colonialist pocket must remain the first strategic target of Arab struggle and the pivot of the struggle and the activity of the Arab national liberation movement in general.

This requires that all efforts be directed towards the achievement of the total and effective mobilization of national energies—military, economic and political—so that the conflict may be decided in favour of the Arab nation by the Zionist invaders being repelled and the territory liberated, and the Palestinian Arab people returning to their homeland and exercising their legitimate right to sovereignty over their land.

With this end in view, so that the conflict may remain alive and active and from concern for our national cause and the national rights of our people, we call on the Palestinians to refuse to participate in the peace conference and to take care lest the Conference be turned into an instrument with which to threaten our national unity and distract the revolution and the masses from their basic tasks and duties, that is, continuing and escalating armed struggle and all kinds of national struggle

which the National Charter, the political programme of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the resolutions of the Palestine National Council have prescribed for the rescue of our people from occupation and for the liberation of the land.

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Communiqué issued after the meeting of Arab Oil Ministers welcoming the changes in attitude of Japan and Belgium and announcing a raise in oil production¹⁵⁷

Kuwait, December 25, 1973

At their meeting in Kuwait, the Arab Oil Ministers heard a report by Shaikh Ahmad Zaki Yamani, the Saudi Arabian Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, and Mr. Abdesselam Belaid, the Algerian Minister of Industry and Energy, on their tour of certain Western capitals, the impressions they formed during this tour, the outcome and effects arising from it, and the proposals they have put forward as a result of all of this.

The assembled Ministers studied the real aim of the oil measures adopted in their previous decisions, which is to convey to the world the real injustice inflicted on the Arab nation through the occupation of its territories and the uprooting of an entire people—the Palestinian people—without allowing this to cause the economic collapse of any nation or nations of the world. They reaffirmed once again their previously announced decision of 17 October¹⁵⁸ that these measures should not affect friendly countries and that there should be a clear differentiation between those who side with the Arabs, those who side with the enemy, and those whose position is in between.

The assembled Ministers took note on the one hand of the change in Japan's policy towards the Arab cause, which has been demonstrated by various means including the visit of the Japanese Deputy Prime Minister to the Arab countries,¹⁵⁹ and on the other hand of the deteriorating economic situation in Japan, and they decided to accord

Japan special treatment which would not subject it to the full extent of the across-the-board cutback measures, out of a desire to protect the Japanese economy and in the hope that the Japanese Government, in appreciation of this stand, will continue to adopt just and fair positions vis-à-vis the Arab cause.

The assembled Ministers, in recognition of the political stand of Belgium, also decided to lift the cutback on oil supplies to that country and to permit oil supplies to reach its territory via Holland, after receiving sufficient guarantees that such supplies will reach Belgium in full. They also decided to supply certain friendly countries with their actual oil requirements, even in excess of the level of their imports for September 1973, on condition that Arab oil does not find its way beyond their borders or replace non-Arab oil which they would have imported.

In implementation of all this, the Ministers decided to raise production in their countries by 10 percent of September production so that the percentage reduction becomes 15 percent instead of 25 percent, and not to apply the further reduction for January.

The Ministers noted with satisfaction the gradual change which has begun to become evident in American public opinion, since a significant segment of it has begun to recognize the reality of the Arab problem and Israel's expansionist policy. This has been particularly evident in the adoption by a number of American senators and congressmen of objective and unbiased attitudes towards the Arab-Israeli question.

The assembled Ministers hope that the desire of the US Government to participate in the search for a just peaceful settlement of the problem will be fruitful and will lead to results beneficial to the peoples of the world and in particular to bilateral relations between the Arab and American peoples. However, the embargo on both America and Holland will continue.

The Ministers will meet again in Tripoli in the Libyan Arab Republic after the end of the second part of the tour of the two Ministers representing them, unless the situation calls for an earlier meeting.

¹⁵⁷ English text as published in *Middle East Economic Survey* (Beirut), XVII, 10 (December 28, 1973), p. 11.

¹⁵⁸ Doc. 292 above.

¹⁵⁹ Doc. 200 and 214 above.

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**Open letter to the American people by
Foreign Minister Saqqaf of Saudi Arabia¹⁶⁰**

December 31, 1973

We, the Arabs, wish you a Happy New Year. Your holiday season may have been marred by the hardships of the energy crisis. Ours is haunted by the threat of death and continued aggression.

But it is not in bitterness that we address this message to you and it is our hope that there will be no bitterness in you as you read it.

We have been under continuous attack from the American Press—with notable exceptions—for two decades, and we must confess we are unable to understand the reasoning behind this overwhelming hostility. We lived in Palestine for two thousand years, and when we resisted displacement by a foreign state, the Americans branded us aggressors.

But let that pass.

In the past year, we have made considerable concessions, given up much of what is rightfully ours, for the sole purpose of promoting peace in the Middle East and the world in general. These concessions appear to have had no effect whatsoever on the American attitude. Indeed, wild accusations against the Arabs are increasing in volume and intensity, and all of them are so baseless that we have begun to wonder whether the American people really know what the Arabs want.

Do the American people know what we are asking for?

The United Nations Resolution 242, of November 22, 1967, which has been officially approved by the United States, calls for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East based on "withdrawal of Israel Armed Forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict" and "termination of all claims or states of belligerency."

This is what we are asking for.

President Lyndon Johnson stated in September, 1968 that "boundaries cannot and should not reflect the weight of conquest."

This is what we are asking for, and we want nothing more.

Israel says it wants peace. So do we. Israel says it wants security. So do we. And we are prepared to discuss any variety of means to guarantee both peace and security.

But along with peace and security, Israel wants the Arab lands it occupied by force in 1967. Israel has said that, regardless of Arab concessions, it will not give back the Golan Heights, the Jordan River, Sharm Esh-Sheik of Sinai and—most significantly—Arab Jerusalem. Israel wants peace and *lebensraum*, security and Arab land, and Israel cannot have both.

In October of this year, we imposed an oil boycott on the United States, and this was no pioneering action. The United States itself has on more than one occasion resorted to economic boycott when it was provoked into it and when its national interests demanded it.

We have been provoked into it, and our national interests demanded it.

We cut oil supplies to the United States after the United States, which had repeatedly assured us of our rights to our lands, made massive arms deliveries to the Israelis to help them remain in our lands. We did so not to impose a change in U.S. policy in the Middle East but to demand the *implementation* of U.S. policy in the Middle East, as it has been repeatedly defined. We did so not to "blackmail" the American people, but to put our case to them as effectively as we knew how.

This is our case:

We are offering Israel peace and security, but we cannot and will not offer Israel our lands, nor would any just people anywhere in the world expect us to do so.

We are asking the American people, especially the American friends of Israel, to understand this and to help us attain the peace we are after.

Omar Saqqaf
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
Government of Saudi Arabia

¹⁶⁰ Advertisement, *New York Times*, December 31, 1973, p. 5.

Appendices

A. Egypt's Cabinet in 1973

<i>Head of State</i>	Muhammad Anwar Sadat
<i>Prime Minister</i>	Aziz Sidky
<i>Deputy Prime Minister</i>	Muhammad Abd al-Salam Zayyat
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Information</i>	Muhammad Abd al-Qadir Hatim
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Economy and Foreign Trade</i>	Muhammad Marzuban
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Interior</i>	Mamduh Salim
<i>War</i>	Ahmad Ismail Ali
<i>Foreign Affairs</i>	Muhammad Hasan Zayyat
<i>Treasury</i>	Abd al-Aziz Higazi
<i>Planning</i>	Sayyid Sayyid
<i>Education</i>	Ali Abd al-Raziq
<i>Waqfs and Azhar Affairs</i>	Abd al-Halim Mahmud
<i>Cabinet Affairs</i>	Yunis Imara
<i>Health</i>	Mahmud Mahfuz
<i>Social Affairs</i>	Aishah Ratib
<i>Manpower</i>	Salah al-Din Gharib
<i>Civil Aviation</i>	Ahmad Nuh
<i>Higher Education</i>	Shams al-Din Wakil
<i>Power</i>	Ahmad Sultan
<i>Housing</i>	Abd al-Aziz Muhammad
<i>Transport</i>	Hasan Humayda
<i>Communications</i>	Mahmud Riyad
<i>Irrigation</i>	Aziz Saad
<i>Industry, Oil and Mineral Resources</i>	Yahya Mulla
<i>Tourism</i>	Zaki Hashim
<i>Justice</i>	Muhammad Salama
<i>Production</i>	Muhammad Salim
<i>Marine Transport</i>	Ahmad Iffat
<i>Agriculture</i>	Mustafa Gaabali
<i>Land Reclamation</i>	Uthman Badran
<i>Supply and Internal Trade</i>	Fuad Mursi
<i>State for Planning</i>	Ismail Abdallah

NEW CABINET: MARCH 27

<i>Prime Minister</i>	Muhammad Anwar Sadat
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Information</i>	Muhammad Hatim
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Interior</i>	Mamduh Salim
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Finance</i>	Abd al-Aziz Higazi
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Waqfs</i>	Abd al-Aziz Kamil
<i>War</i>	Ahmad Ismail Ali
<i>Foreign Affairs</i>	Muhammad Hasan Zayyat
<i>Planning</i>	Sayyid Sayyid
<i>Education</i>	Ali Abd al-Raziq
<i>Azhar Affairs</i>	Abd al-Aziz Isa
<i>Cabinet Affairs</i>	Abd al-Fattah Abdallah
<i>Communications</i>	Mahmud Riyad
<i>Civil Aviation</i>	Ahmad Nuh
<i>Power</i>	Ahmad Sultan
<i>Information</i>	Muhammad Ghalib
<i>Social Affairs</i>	Aishah Ratib
<i>Irrigation</i>	Aziz Saad
<i>Land Reclamation</i>	Uthman Badran
<i>Health</i>	Mahmud Mahfuz
<i>Manpower</i>	Salah al-Din Gharib
<i>War Production</i>	Ahmad Badri
<i>Culture</i>	Yusuf Sibai
<i>Justice</i>	Fakhri Abd al-Nabi
<i>Agriculture</i>	Muhammad Zaki
<i>Government and Popular Organization</i>	Ahmad Muhy al-Din
<i>Housing</i>	Mahmud Abd al-Hafiz
<i>Oil and Mineral Resources</i>	Ahmad Hilal
<i>Industry</i>	Ibrahim Muhammadin
<i>Insurance</i>	Hasan Sharif
<i>Supply and Internal Trade</i>	Ahmad Thabit
<i>Higher Education</i>	Muhammad Layla
<i>Marine Transport</i>	Abd al-Muti Ismail Arabi
<i>Transport</i>	Al-Husayni Abd al-Latif
<i>National Assembly Affairs</i>	Albert Salama
<i>Tourism</i>	Ismail Fahmy
<i>State for Planning</i>	Ismail Sabri
<i>State for Youth</i>	Ahmad Magd

CHANGES: OCTOBER 28

<i>Reconstruction</i>	Uthman Uthman
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OCTOBER 31

<i>Foreign Affairs</i>	Ismail Fahmy
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B. Israel's Cabinet in 1973

<i>Head of State</i>	Zalman Shazar Ephraim Katzir (elected April 10, sworn in May 24)
<i>Prime Minister</i>	Golda Meir (Labour-Mapai)
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Education and Culture</i>	Yigal Allon (Labour-Ahdot Ha'vodah)
<i>Foreign Affairs</i>	Abba Eban (Labour-Mapai)
<i>Defence</i>	Moshe Dayan (Labour-Rafi)
<i>Labour</i>	Joseph Almogi (Labour-Mapai)
<i>Commerce and Industry</i>	Haim Bar-Lev (Labour-Mapai)
<i>Interior</i>	Yosef Burg (National Religious Party)
<i>Social Welfare</i>	Michael Chasani (National Religious Party)
<i>Police</i>	Shlomo Hillel (Labour-Mapai)
<i>Tourism</i>	Moshe Kol (Independent Liberal)
<i>Immigrant Absorption</i>	Natan Peled (Mapam)
<i>Communications and Transport</i>	Shimon Peres (Labour-Rafi)
<i>Finance</i>	Pinhas Sapir (Labour-Mapai)
<i>Justice</i>	Ya'acov Shapiro (Labour-Mapai)
<i>Housing</i>	Ze'ev Sharef (Labour-Mapai)
<i>Health</i>	Victor Shemtov (Mapam)
<i>Religious Affairs</i>	Zerah Warhaftig (National Religious Party)
<i>Without Portfolio</i>	Israel Galili (Labour-Ahdot Ha'vodah)
<i>Agriculture</i>	Haim Gvati (Labour-Mapai)

CHANGES: NOVEMBER 1

Ya'acov Shapiro resigned; Golda Meir became Acting Minister of Justice.

C. Jordan's Cabinet in 1973

<i>Head of State</i>	King Hussein Ibn Talal
<i>Prime Minister</i>	Ahmad Lawzi
<i>Defence</i>	Ahmad Lawzi
<i>Foreign Affairs</i>	Salah Abu Zaid
<i>Development and Reconstruction</i>	Subhi Amin Amr
<i>Justice</i>	Salim Mas'ada
<i>Interior</i>	Ahmad Tarawna
<i>Economy</i>	Said Nabulsi
<i>Communications</i>	Muhammad Bashir
<i>Tourism and Antiquities</i>	Ghalib Barakat
<i>Information and Culture</i>	Maan Abu Nuwwar
<i>Finance</i>	Farid Saad
<i>Transport</i>	Nadim Zaru
<i>Social Affairs and Labour</i>	Ali Inad Khurays
<i>Public Works</i>	Ahmad Shawbaki
<i>Agriculture</i>	Khalid al-Hajj Hasan
<i>Health</i>	Farid Akshah
<i>Education and Religious Affairs</i>	Ishaq Farhan
<i>Municipal and Rural Affairs</i>	Yaqub Abu Ghawsh
<i>Prime Ministerial Affairs</i>	Rashad Khatib

CHANGES: MARCH 26

<i>Information and Culture</i>	Adnan Abu Awda
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NEW CABINET: MAY 26

<i>Prime Minister</i>	Zaid Rifai
<i>Defence</i>	Zaid Rifai
<i>Foreign Affairs</i>	Zaid Rifai
<i>Development and Reconstruction</i>	Subhi Amin Amr
<i>Justice</i>	Salim Mas'ada
<i>Interior</i>	Abd al-Karim Tarawna
<i>Economy</i>	Kamil Abu Jabr
<i>Communications</i>	Muhy al-Din Husayni
<i>Tourism and Antiquities</i>	Ghalib Barakat
<i>Information and Culture</i>	Adnan Abu Awda
<i>Finance</i>	Muhammad Shafiq
<i>Transport</i>	Nadim Zaru
<i>Social Affairs and Labour</i>	Yusuf Dhihni
<i>Public Works</i>	Ahmad Shawbaki
<i>Agriculture</i>	Umar Nabulsi
<i>Health</i>	Fuad Khaylani
<i>Education</i>	Mudar Badran
<i>Religious Affairs</i>	Ishaq Farhan
<i>Municipal and Rural Affairs</i>	Marwan Hammud
<i>State for Foreign Affairs</i>	Zuhayr Mufti
<i>State for Occupied Territories</i>	Tahir Masri

CHANGES: AUGUST 21

<i>Prime Ministerial Affairs</i>	Dhuqan Hindawi
<i>Information and Culture</i>	Marwan Dudin

NOVEMBER 11

<i>Economy</i>	Umar Nabulsi
<i>Information and Culture</i>	Adnan Abu Awda
<i>Finance</i>	Dhuqan Hindawi
<i>Agriculture</i>	Marwan Hammud
<i>Religious Affairs</i>	Abd al-Aziz Khayyat
<i>Municipal and Rural Affairs</i>	Fuad Qaqish
<i>Prime Ministerial Affairs</i>	Marwan Dudin

D. Syria's Cabinet in 1973*Head of State*

Hafiz Assad

Prime Minister

Mahmud Ayyubi (Baath)

Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs

Abd al-Halim Khaddam (Baath)

Deputy Prime Minister, Agriculture

Muhammad Haydar (Baath)

Defence

Mustafa Tlas (Baath)

Interior

Ali Zaza (Baath)

Supply and Internal Trade

Ahmad Qablan (Baath)

Public Works and Water

Abd al-Ghani Qannut (AS)

Planning

Mustafa Hallaj (SU)

Education

Hafiz Jamali (Baath)

Higher Education

Shakir Fahham (Baath)

Oil, Power and Mineral Resources

Fayiz Nasir (Baath)

Finance

Nurallah Nurallah (Independent)

Culture and National Guidance

Fawzi Kayyali (ASU)

Tourism

Abdallah Khani (Independent)

Industry

Hasan Khatib (Baath)

Municipal and Village Affairs

Abd al-Razzaq Abd al-Baqi (SU)

Economy and Foreign Trade

Muhammad Imadi (Independent)

Justice

Adib Nahawi (ASU)

Communications

Umar Sibai (Communist)

Euphrates Dam

Munir Wannus (Baath)

Waqfs

Abd al-Sattar Sayyid (Independent)

Health

Madani Khiyami (Independent)

Information

Ahmad Hasan Asaad (Baath)

Social Affairs and Labour

Husayn Kuwaydir (Baath)

Local Administration

Adib Milhim (Baath)

Frontline Village Affairs

Muayyad Jazzan (Baath)

Cabinet Affairs

Marwan Sabbagh (Baath)

State

Abd al-Majid Manjuna (ASU)

State

Fayiz Ismail (SU)

State

Ali Hashim (SU)

State

Zuhayr Abd al-Samad (Communist)

CHANGES: JANUARY 11

Minister of State Fayiz Ismail resigned.

MAY 7

Minister of State Abd al-Majid Manjuna resigned

SEPTEMBER 25

Deputy Prime Minister, Economic Affairs
Education
Higher Education
Oil, Power and Resources
Industry
Information
Cabinet Affairs
State

Muhammad Haydar (Baath)
 Shakir Fahham (Baath)
 Muhammad Hashim (Baath)
 Jabr Kafri (Baath)
 Shutaywi Sayfawi (Baath)
 George Saddiqni (Baath)
 Fayiz Nasir (Baath)
 Anwar Hammada (ASU)

Minister of State Ali Hashim left the government.

Abbreviations: ASU: Arab Socialist Union
 AS: Arab Socialist
 SU: Socialist Unionist

**E. Palestine Liberation Organization,
Executive Committee in 1973**

Yasser Arafat (Fatah)—Chairman
Khalid Hasan (Fatah)
Faruq Qaddumi (Fatah)
Muhammad Yusuf Najjar (Fatah)
Taysir Qubaa (PFLP)
Zuhayr Muhsin (Saiqa)
Sami Attari (Saiqa)
Salih Ra'fat (PDFLP)
Ahmad Maraashli (Arab Liberation Front)
Kamal Nasir (Independent)
Salah Salah (Independent)
Yousef Sayegh (Independent)

New committee: elected January 12

Yasser Arafat (Fatah)—Chairman
Muhammad Yusuf Najjar (Fatah)¹
Zuhayr Muhsin (Saiqa)
Adib Abd Rabbou (PDFLP)
Ahmad Yamani (PFLP)
Abd al-Wahhab Kayyali (Arab Liberation Front)
Yousef Sayegh (Independent)
Kamal Nasir (Independent)¹
Hamid Abu Sitta (Independent)
Muhammad Nashahibi (Independent)
Salih Ra'fat (PDFLP)—honorary member

CHANGE: JUNE 22

Faruq Qaddumi (Fatah) elected.

¹ Killed in the Israeli raid in Beirut on April 10.

F. Voting on UN General Assembly resolutions, 28th session

Y = Yes N = No A = Abstention NP = Not Present

RESOLUTION	3089					3090	3092		3101	3175
	A	B	C	D	E		A	B		
Afghanistan	: Voting not recorded	: Voting not recorded	Y	Y	: Voting not recorded	: Adopted unanimously	Y	Y	Y	Y
Albania			Y	Y			Y	Y	N	Y
Algeria			Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y
Argentina			Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y
Australia			Y	A			Y	A	Y	A
Austria			Y	A			Y	A	Y	A
Bahamas			A	A			Y	A	Y	NP
Bahrain			Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y
Barbados			N	N			Y	N	Y	A
Belgium			Y	A			Y	A	Y	A
Bhutan	: : NP	: : NP	NP	NP	: : NP	: : NP	NP	NP	Y	Y
Bolivia			A	N			A	N	NP	N
Botswana			Y	A			Y	Y	NP	Y
Brazil			A	A			Y	A	Y	Y
Bulgaria			Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y
Burma			Y	A			Y	Y	Y	Y
Burundi			Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y
Byelorussian SSR			Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y
Cameroon			Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y
Canada			A	A			Y	A	Y	A
Central African Rep.	: : Y	: : Y	Y	Y	: : Y	: : Y	Y	Y	Y	NP
Chad			Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y
Chile			Y	Y			Y	NP	Y	Y
China			Y	Y			Y	Y	NP	Y
Colombia			Y	Y			Y	A	Y	NP ¹
Congo			Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y
Costa Rica			N	N			A	N	Y	A
Cuba			Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y
Cyprus			Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y
Czechoslovakia			Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y
Dahomey	: : Y	: : Y	Y	Y	: : Y	: : Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Democratic Yemen			Y	Y			Y	Y	NP	Y
Denmark			Y	A			Y	A	Y	A
Dominican Republic			A	A			Y	N	NP	N
Ecuador			Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y
Egypt			Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y
El Salvador			A	A			Y	A	Y	A
Equatorial Guinea			Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y
Ethiopia			Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y
Fiji			Y	A			Y	Y	NP	Y
Finland	: : Y	: : Y	Y	A	: : Y	: : Y	Y	Y	Y	A
France			Y	A			Y	A	Y	A
Gabon			Y	Y			Y	Y	NP	Y

¹ This country later informed the Secretary-General that it intended to vote "Yes."

² This country later informed the Secretary-General that it intended to abstain.

RESOLUTION	3089					3090	3092		3101	3175
	A	B	C	D	E		A	B		
Nicaragua	: Voting not recorded	: Voting not recorded	N	N	: Voting not recorded	: Adopted unanimously	A	N	Y	N
Niger			Y	Y			Y	Y	NP	Y
Nigeria			Y	Y			Y	Y	NP	Y
Norway			Y	A			Y	A	Y	A
Oman			Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y
Pakistan			Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y
Panama			NP	NP			NP	NP	Y	NP
Paraguay			NP	A			NP	NP	NP	Y
Peru			Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y
Philippines			Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y
Poland			Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y
Portugal			A	A			Y	A	A	A
Qatar			Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y
Rumania			Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y
Rwanda			Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y
Saudi Arabia			Y	Y			Y	Y	NP	Y
Senegal			Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y
Sierra Leone			Y	Y			Y	Y	NP	Y
Singapore			Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y
Somalia			Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y
South Africa			NP	NP			NP	NP	Y	NP
Spain			Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y
Sri Lanka			Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y
Sudan			Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y
Swaziland			NP	NP			NP	NP	Y	NP
Sweden			Y	A			Y	A	Y	A
Syria			Y	Y			Y	Y	N	Y
Thailand			Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y
Togo			Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y
Trinidad & Tobago			Y	Y			Y	Y	NP	Y
Tunisia			Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y
Turkey			Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y
Uganda			Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y
Ukrainian SSR			Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y
USSR			Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y
United Arab Emirates			Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y
United Kingdom			Y	A			Y	A	Y	A
United Rep. of Tanzania			Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y
United States			A	N			Y	N	Y	N
Upper Volta			Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	NP
Uruguay			Y	A			Y	A	Y	A
Venezuela			A	A			Y	A	Y	Y
Yemen (North)			Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y
Yugoslavia			Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y
Zaire			Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y
Zambia			Y	Y			Y	Y	NP	Y

G. Chronology

January

- 6–12 The 155-member Palestine National Council meets in Cairo (*see docs. 223, 224*).
- 12 The Palestine National Council's Executive Committee reelects Yasir Arafat as Chairman of the new Executive Committee (*see Appendix E*).
- 28 The Arab Joint Defence Council appoints Egypt's War Minister as joint commander of Syrian/Jordanian/Egyptian forces (*see doc. 227*).

February

- 3 In a speech to the nation King Hussein announces that Jordan has rejoined the Arab front against Israel (*see doc. 228*).
- 6 The 20th ministerial conference of the OAU meets in Addis Ababa (*see doc. 58*).
- 21 Israel raids two camps in North Lebanon.
- 21 Israel shoots down a Libyan civilian airliner over Sinai leaving 106 dead (*see docs. 45, 47, 61–63*).

March

- 1–2 Five diplomats are seized as hostages in a raid on a Saudi embassy reception in Khartoum by Black September commandos. When the commandos' demands for the release of Palestinians jailed abroad are refused, US Ambassador Cleo Noel, US Chargé d'Affaires George Moore and Belgian Chargé d'Affaires Guy Eid are killed.
- 13 Syria's new constitution is promulgated by President Assad.
- 24–27 An extraordinary meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Islamic countries meets in Benghazi (*see doc. 74*).
- 24 Egypt's Prime Minister Aziz Sidky resigns.
- 26 President Sadat takes over the office of Prime Minister to prepare for a "total confrontation" with Israel (*see doc. 238*).
- 27 A new Egyptian cabinet is announced (*see Appendix A*).

April

- 10 Israeli commandos kill three Palestinian leaders, Muhammad Yusuf Najjar, Kamal Udwan and Kamal Nasir, in a raid in Beirut (*see docs. 32, 79, 241–243*).
Lebanon's Prime Minister Saib Salam resigns in protest against army inaction during the Israeli raid in Beirut.
- 12–21 The UN Security Council debates, at Lebanon's request, the Israeli raid in Beirut.

May

- 2 Heavy fighting between the Palestinian commandos and the Lebanese army erupts in Beirut.
- 7 A state of emergency is called in Lebanon and martial law is imposed.
- 7 A large military parade is held in Jerusalem to celebrate Israel's 25th anniversary (*see doc. 23*).
- 8 A new ceasefire is announced in Lebanon but fighting continues. Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut are hit in air attacks by the Lebanese air force.
- 15 An agreement is announced between the Lebanese government and the Palestinian commandos, ending recent fighting in Beirut.
- 24 Ephraim Katzir is sworn in as Israel's fourth president (*see Appendix B*).
- 26 A new Jordanian cabinet is announced (*see Appendix C*).
- 27–29 The OAU summit conference in Addis Ababa resolves to support the Arab confrontation countries actively in their war of liberation (*see doc. 91*).

June

- 6–14 UN Security Council debate on the Middle East situation resumes.
- 24 Nixon and Brezhnev meet in California (*see doc. 102*).

July

- 8 Lebanon announces a new cabinet of national coalition headed by Takieddine Solh.
- 20, 25–26 UN Security Council debate on the Middle East situation resumes.
- 26 The US vetoes a UN Security Council draft resolution supporting the legitimate rights of the Palestinians (*see doc. 109*).

August

- 5 In Athens airport, three are killed and 55 wounded when a US-bound TWA plane is attacked by two men claiming to be members of Black September. The plane was thought to be mistaken for an airliner carrying Israeli tourists.
- 10 An Iraqi-leased MEA plane enroute from Beirut to Baghdad is hijacked by Israeli jets over Lebanese air space and forced to land at an Israeli military airfield (*see docs. 33, 46, 48*).
- 22 President Nixon announces his nomination of Henry Kissinger as Secretary of State (*see doc. 115*).
- 27 UN Secretary General Waldheim begins his Middle East tour to Syria, Lebanon, Israel and Egypt.
- 29 Egypt and Libya issue a joint declaration specifying a common constitution in a first step toward a united Arab state.

September

- 5–9 The Fourth Conference of the Non-Aligned countries meets in Algiers (*see docs. 118–120, 266, 267*).
- 12 An announcement is made that Egypt and Syria have restored diplomatic relations with Jordan.
- 25 A new Syrian Cabinet is announced (*see Appendix D*).
- 28–29 Two Arabs seize three Soviet Jews and an Austrian official from a train transporting Soviet-Jewish emigrants in Austria. The hostages are released after Austrian Prime Minister Kreisky agrees to their demands for the closure of transit facilities at Schönau castle (*see docs. 123–127, 271*).

October

- 6 War breaks out in the Middle East at 13:50 local time (*see docs. 9, 10, 272, 273*).
- 8–27 UN Security Council debates the Middle East conflict (*see docs. 17–22*).
- 10 The USSR begins an arms airlift to Syria and Egypt.
- 13 Jordan's King Hussein announces sending troops to Syria (*see doc. 289*).
- 13 US President Nixon decides to begin a massive arms airlift to Israel (*see doc. 168*).
- 15–16 An Israeli task force crosses the Suez Canal to the West bank.
- 16–19 USSR Premier Kosygin visits Cairo.
- 17 OAEPC announces a gradual reduction in oil production until Israel withdraws from all occupied territory (*see docs. 293, 294*).
- 17 Four Arab Foreign Ministers meet with President Nixon in Washington (*see doc. 155*).
- 18 Abu Dhabi announces a total oil embargo against the US; Saudi Arabia and Kuwait follow suit two days later (*see docs. 296–299, 306, 307*).
- 19 President Nixon requests Congressional authorization for \$2.2 billion in emergency security assistance to Israel (*see doc. 158*).
- 20–22 Secretary of State Kissinger holds talks in Moscow and Tel Aviv on the Middle East war.
- 22 UN Security Council Resolution 338 calls for a ceasefire and immediate peace negotiations (*see doc. 34*).
- 22 After the ceasefire Israeli forces cut the main Cairo-Suez road and Egypt's 3rd army is encircled.
- 25 Nixon orders a world-wide alert for US military forces (*see doc. 158*).
- 25 UN Security Council Resolution 340 calls for a return to the ceasefire lines of October 22 (*see doc. 36*).

November

- 5 OAPEC announces a 25 percent reduction in oil production (*see doc. 316*).
- 6 The Foreign Ministers of the EEC issue a joint statement on the Middle East in Brussels (*see doc. 184*).
- 7 The US and Egypt resume diplomatic relations (*see doc. 186*).
- 11 Egypt and Israel sign a ceasefire agreement at Kilometre 101 (*see doc. 188*).
- 18 OAPEC cancels the 5 percent December cutback in oil exports to Europe excluding the Netherlands (*see doc. 326*).
- 21 The Council of Ministers of the OAU meets in Addis Ababa and calls for a total embargo against Israel (*see doc. 197*).

December

- 9 OAPEC announces a 5 percent cutback in oil production for January 1974.
- 11 NATO's Council of Ministers meets in Brussels and issues a communiqué on the Middle East (*see doc. 210*).
- 18 Syria announces its refusal to attend the Geneva peace conference (*see doc. 340*).
- 20 The US Senate passes emergency security assistance of \$2.2 billion to Israel.
- 21–29 The Middle East Peace Conference convenes in Geneva (*see docs. 16, 216–218, 342, 343*).
- 25 OAPEC announces a raise in oil production (*see doc. 345*).

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(comm.) = official communiqué
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